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**The Defense Acquisition
Workforce Improvement Act
and Its Impact on the Navy's
Aerospace Engineering Duty
Officer (AEDO) Community**

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THE DEFENSE ACQUISITION WORKFORCE IMPROVEMENT ACT AND ITS IMPACT ON THE NAVY'S AEROSPACE ENGINEERING DUTY OFFICER COMMUNITY

BY

CAPTAIN DAVID C. OFFERDAHL

ABSTRACT

Due to the nature of its business as well as its size, the Department of Defense (DOD) Acquisition Community has probably been one of the most studied and written about organizations in the world. My perception is that until recently most of the studies have been involved with the acquisition process; looking for ways improve the process to prevent future debacles like the \$600.00 toilet seat, \$400.00 hammer, etc. But if we look at the last few studies, including the Packard Commission Report in '86 and the Defense Management Review in 1989, we can see a growing concern regarding the quality of the acquisition workforce. It shouldn't have come as any surprise therefore, when, after two recent major snafus in the DOD acquisition arena (Ill Winds and the A-12 debacle), strong new legislation was introduced to improve the quality of the acquisition workforce!

This new legislation, the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) of 1989, was designed to address the workforce ills perceived by the Packard Commission and described in their final report as... "Compared to its industry counterparts, this workforce is undertrained, underpaid and inexperienced. It is vitally important to enhance the quality of the defense acquisition workforce... both by attracting qualified new personnel and by improving training and motivation of current personnel."

This paper addresses the events leading up to DAWIA, the details of the legislation itself and, finally, the impacts of the DAWIA on the Navy's Aerospace Engineering Duty Officer Community. I had hoped to be able to be much more definitive regarding the impacts of the law, but as the paper points out, remarkable changes in the world situation have had tremendous impacts on the DOD Acquisition Community. Consequently, the law is far from being fully implemented and it is difficult to fully appreciate what the true impacts of DAWIA will be. Considering how costly this legislation would be, however, and considering the current deep defense budget cuts, it is difficult to believe that this legislation will ever be implemented as envisioned by Congress.

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The Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act and Its Impact on the Navy's Aerospace Engineering Duty Officer (AEDO) Community

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INTRODUCTION

In June of 1990, as a result of his concern regarding the perceived impact of the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) on the uniformed Naval Aviation Community, the Commander, Naval Air Systems Command (COMNAVAIR), issued a memo directing the formation of the DAWIA Executive Study Team (DEST). The function of the DEST was to assist COMNAVAIR in assessing and controlling the overall impact of DAWIA on the uniformed Naval Aviation Community.¹

RADM W. L. Vincent, RADM(s) L. G. Elberfeld and RADM(s) W. J. Tinston were tasked to co-chair the team and I was tasked to act as Executive Recorder. I devoted the next five weeks almost full time to the effort before being transferred to the Industrial College of The Armed Forces in August of 1990. Capt Bill Belden was nominated as my relief to complete the study.

Although the task was not complete when I left, much had been accomplished. The team was in place and had held numerous meetings, all of the major issues had been identified and inputs on all of those major issues had been provided to me. It was frustrating to leave the study before it was completed and I was delighted to have this research opportunity to see it through. As an "off the scale" ISTJ reaching closure on this issue has been very fulfilling! Although much of what I incorporated into the NAVAIR DAWIA study is also reflected in this paper, i.e., background, specifics of the law and perceived impacts, this research goes beyond that study. More in-depth research has been accomplished on DAWIA background and, most importantly, the extra 3-4 months has allowed me to address this process with somewhat more currency.

I hasten to add, however, that this whole process is just beginning to evolve. When one considers the many concurrent events taking place in this rapidly changing world that are also having a tremendous impact on the way we do business, it may be years before we are able to segregate and assess the true impacts of the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act!

Documenting credits for this paper has been very difficult for two reasons. First, much of the background information came from a collection of numerous DAWIA briefs that had been presented within DOD over the last two years. Many of the "hard copies" of those briefs were undocumented as to who, where, and when the briefs were given. Secondly, as previously mentioned, I have incorporated some of what I had originally written for the DEST study into this paper, plus I've included portions completed by my successor on the team. I have made every effort to ensure that proper credit was given where appropriate.

My thanks to Captain Bill Belden as well as the ASN(RDA) DAWIA staff for keeping me in the loop as DAWIA continued to evolve.

BACKGROUND

The United States Department of Defense(DOD), which provides full or partial employment to almost 10 million people and has a budget of approximately \$300 billion, is far and away the largest and most complex business organization in the world.² Like most large organizations it has been in a continuous state of refinement and reorganization; evolving from a small, independent and somewhat self-sufficient organization into a huge monopsonistic organization that provides employment opportunities to over 10% of America's working force.³ It's no wonder then that DOD suffers the same, and in most cases worse, ills as so many large corporations and is generally perceived as bureaucratic, cumbersome and unresponsive to the needs of its customers.

Due to the nature of its business, as well as its size, DOD has probably also been the most studied and written about organization in the world. J. R. Fox, in his book The Defense Management Challenge - Weapons Acquisition, lists twelve high level studies done on the acquisition process between 1960 and 1987.⁴ Each study culminated in recommendations for changes or refinements to the system...changes that, over the years, have resulted in layer upon layer of regulations and laws that are beyond human comprehension. Each study group, of course, has had their own thoughts on how the DOD ought to be re-organized and about the only thing they all agreed upon was that organizational reform was required. For example, after one such study in testimony before

the Senate Committee on Armed Services, former Secretary of Defense James E. Schlesinger stated:

...in the absence of structural reform I fear that we shall obtain less than is attainable from our expenditures and from our forces. Sound structure will permit the release of energies and of imagination now unduly constrained by the existing arrangements.⁵

Up until the mid-eighties, most recommendations for change addressed the DOD acquisition organization or process. Although the aforementioned study resulted in legislation (Public Law 99-145-Nov. 8, 1985) that included a largely ignored short paragraph on the education, training, and experience requirements for program managers, it wasn't until the Presidential Blue Ribbon Panel on Defense Management in 1986, better known as the Packard Commission, that the quality of the acquisition workforce was addressed in any detail. The Commission reported:

Compared to its industry counterparts, this workforce is undertrained, underpaid, and inexperienced. It is vitally important to enhance the quality of the defense acquisition workforce..both by attracting qualified new personnel and by improving training and motivation of current personnel.⁶

The Packard Commission recommended such sweeping changes that congressional action was required to implement them. That legislation became known by several names...DOD Reorganization Act of 1986, Goldwater-Nichols Act, and technically, Public Law 99-433

of 1 October 1986.⁷ Once again, however, this law focused primarily on streamlining the DOD organization, attempting to shorten the chain of command within the acquisition arena. Unfortunately, the recommendations dealing with the quality of acquisition personnel, although given serious attention by DOD, were never fully implemented.

Over the next couple of years there was a growing perception, once again, that "While small improvements have been made...major recommendations (of the Packard Commission) have yet to be implemented."⁸ Consequently, in February of 1989, President Bush commissioned the next major study to be done on DOD, the Defense Management Review (DMR). The President directed that specific actions be identified in four broad areas, one of which was "personnel and organization". Specific guidance provided to the personnel group included:

Identify ways to improve the capabilities of military and civilian acquisition personnel, in order to ensure the development, retention, and maximum utilization of true acquisition professionals.⁹

This review had tremendous impact on the DOD acquisition organization. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition became the Defense Acquisition Executive(DAE); each service was required to establish their own acquisition czar, a Service Acquisition Executive(SAE), who would report directly to the DAE; and Program Executive Offices (PEOs) were established to streamline the chain of command between the program managers and their SAE.

There were also changes to the reporting requirements to be levied on the program managers, and finally there were recommendations made regarding the training, education, tour lengths, and experience levels of various acquisition positions. Unfortunately, although the organizational changes were implemented in earnest, most of the personnel qualification recommendations, although addressed were, once again, probably not given as much attention as Congress would have liked.

In the late eighties the DOD acquisition arena was rocked with the Ill Winds procurement scandal followed shortly by the Navy's A-12 debacle. An independent 41-member panel of defense experts, including the chairmen of the Armed Services Committees, three former Secretaries of Defense and executives from industry concluded that little progress had been made in the DOD procurement system and recommended changes which included establishing a professional acquisition corps within each branch of the military services.¹⁰ Panel testimony included statements such as:

After years on the fiscal roller coaster, we can no longer duck major reform in how the DOD manages a \$300 billion budget...If the services continue to resist the professionalization of acquisition personnel as they have in the past, then consideration may ultimately be given to the establishment of an integrated acquisition system that would oversee procurement for all the services.¹¹

Several members of Congress introduced bills to rectify the perceived problems and this time the target was the acquisition

workforce vice the acquisition process. Representative Barbara Boxer (D-Calif) went even further than the panel had threatened to do and introduced a bill that would establish an all civilian acquisition corps, outside of DOD, similar to what they have in Great Britain and France.¹² The Chairman of the House Armed Services Investigations Committee, Representative Nicholas Mavroules, also introduced a bill "...to create a professional acquisition corps in each of the services to replace what many have criticized as an amateurish approach to defense procurement. The bill would be designed to provide for professionalism, training and a career management system within each service."¹³ This was the bill that was eventually passed and became known as The Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA)...the subject of this paper.

The background of DAWIA has already been addressed. The purpose of the remainder of this paper is to look at the requirements of the law in detail, address the perceived impacts of the law on the Aerospace Engineering Duty Officer Community (AEDO), and, to the extent possible, address the impacts and problems thus far experienced in implementing the law.

DAWIA - THE LAW

PURPOSE

As previously mentioned, the purpose of the law was "...to improve the quality and professionalism of those personnel working in acquisition positions throughout DOD by establishing the

framework for an acquisition career program."¹⁴ The supporters of the bill felt strongly that acquisition reform in the past had dealt with symptoms rather than root causes...that prior legislative reform dealing with process and organizational issues failed to take into consideration the most critical element: "...the quality and capability of the people who must work within the structure."¹⁵ The law focuses primarily, therefore, on:

- Structuring the acquisition workforce by:

- Identifying acquisition positions, and
- Designating critical acquisition positions

- Professionalizing the acquisition workforce by:

- Providing career paths
- Creating an acquisition corps, and
- Supporting education, training, and career development programs

- Managing the acquisition workforce by:

- Building a management information system, and
- Establishing a responsible management organization¹⁶

Let's look at each of these areas in more detail. Unless otherwise noted, the main source for this section of the paper was the House Congressional Record, H11984 dated October 23, 1990.¹⁷

STRUCTURING THE ACQUISITION WORKFORCE

IDENTIFYING ACQUISITION POSITIONS - All acquisition related positions in the following functional areas are required to be identified and included as acquisition positions: program

management, systems engineering, joint development, acquisition logistics, industrial property management, manufacturing and production, business and financial management, quality control and

Acquisition Career Fields/Position Categories




Figure 1

assurance, and contracting and procurement. These acquisition career fields/position categories are depicted in figure 1.¹⁸

By definition, everyone filling these positions is considered to be a part of the acquisition workforce as shown in figure 2.¹⁹ As we shall see shortly, there will be a subset within the acquisition

workforce defined as the acquisition corps (Navy has chosen to call them acquisition professionals).

CONCEPT




Figure 2

DESIGNATING CRITICAL ACQUISITION POSITIONS - The workforce is further broken down into critical and non-critical acquisition positions as shown in figure 3.²⁰ Critical acquisition positions are considered to be:

- Any acquisition position requiring a civilian GS-14/military O-5 or above
- Program Executive Officers
- Major Program Managers - ACAT 1 (budgets exceeding \$200M RDT&E or \$1B for procurement)

ACQUISITION WORKFORCE MANAGEMENT CONCEPT




Figure 3

- Program Managers of significant non-major programs (budgets exceeding \$50M RDT&E or \$250M for procurement)

- Deputy Program Managers of major acquisition programs, and
- Any other acquisition positions of significant responsibility consisting primarily of supervisory or management duties

As of 1 October, 1993, these critical acquisition positions can

Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act




Figure 4

only be filled by a member of the "Acquisition Corps" described below.

PROFESSIONALIZE THE ACQUISITION WORKFORCE

CREATING AN ACQUISITION CORPS - The law requires that the

Secretary of Defense "...shall ensure that an Acquisition Corps is established for each of the military departments..." and allows for (but does not require) the establishment of separate Acquisition Corps for the Navy and Marine Corps. Effective 1 October, 1993, in order to qualify for the Acquisition Corps a person must meet the following eligibility requirements (see figure 4)²¹:

- Currently be serving in a position of GS-13/O-4 or above.
- Possess a BS/BA from an accredited educational institution or be certified by the Career Program Board (part of the new organization required by the law) as having the potential for advancement to levels of greater authority and responsibility.
- Have completed 24 semester hours in business and management or 24 semester hours in their own field plus twelve semester hours in business and management.
- have a minimum of four years experience in an acquisition position.

Also, in the case of military personnel, selectees must be officers that are expected to be as promotable as all line officers of the same service, and civilian employees may be required to sign mobility statements.

As with any law or regulation, there are exceptions and waivers to the rules. In this case, the aforementioned requirements do not apply if, as of 1 October, 1991, an employee has had at least ten years of experience in acquisition positions. Also, the requirements do not apply to employees who were serving

in an acquisition position on 1 October 1991, and have less than ten years of experience, if they pass an examination that demonstrates an appropriate skill level. And lastly, the Acquisition Career Program Board, which will be elaborated on shortly, has the authority to waive all requirements except for the requirement to certify an employee without a BS/BA degree.

SUPPORTING AND PROVIDING FOR CAREER DEVELOPMENT - The law requires that "The Secretary of Defense...shall ensure that appropriate career paths...are identified in terms of the education, training, experience, and assignments necessary for career progression of civilians and members of the armed forces to the most senior acquisition positions."²² In doing so, the law requires that:

- No preference or requirement will be made for military personnel in an acquisition billet unless strong justification can be shown for doing so. A policy which clearly states the critical criteria for military only billets must be established and by 15 December of each year the list of all billets falling into that category must be forwarded to the SECDEF. Furthermore, civilians must be given equal opportunity to qualify and positions must be filled using a "best qualified" criteria.
- Through fiscal year 1996 a substantial increase must be made in the proportion of civilians serving in critical positions in general, program manager positions, and division head

positions.

- Special education, training, and experience qualifications be established for each acquisition position based on the complexity of the position. Mandatory requirements include (see figure 4):

- Program managers and deputy program managers must: complete the Program Management Course (PMC) at the Defense Systems Management College (or a comparable program); execute a written agreement to remain in service; and have eight years of acquisition experience (two in a program office) for major programs or six years for non-major programs.
- Program Executive Officers must also complete PMC; have ten years of acquisition experience (four in a critical position); and must have previously served as a program manager or deputy program manager.
- Flags and SESs must have ten years of acquisition experience, four of which must be in critical acquisition positions.
- Special requirements for contracting officials including four years of contracting experience for senior contracting personnel.

In order to address the highly publicized issue of lack of tenure on the part of many critical acquisition officials, the law requires a minimum tour length of three years for all critical positions with a mandatory assessment for rotation at the five year

point. It also requires that major program managers and deputies stay on the job for a minimum of four years or until completion of the next major milestone.

SPECIFY AND SUPPORT EDUCATION AND TRAINING - SECDEF is responsible for seeking an educational and training budget which will ensure that, as a minimum, the following programs are established as uniformly as practicable within all military departments:

- **INTERN PROGRAM** - "...to provide highly qualified and talented individuals an opportunity for accelerated promotions, career broadening assignments, and specified training to prepare them for entry into the Acquisition Corps."²³
- **COOPERATIVE EDUCATIONAL PROGRAM** - Designed to provide undergraduate credit to employees in acquisition positions.
- **SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAMS** - Designed to provide undergraduate or or graduate degrees to eligible candidates. Requires a one-to-one payback, i.e., one year of government service for each year of school provided.
- **STUDENT LOAN REPAYMENT** - DOD employees appointed to an acquisition position may be eligible to have all or part of their student loans repaid.
- **TUITION REIMBURSEMENT** - DOD acquisition employees may be eligible for tuition reimbursement under the guidelines of section 4107(d) of title 5.

- **DEFENSE ACQUISITION UNIVERSITY** - A Defense Acquisition University shall be established to provide for "...the professional educational development of the acquisition workforce," and "...research and analysis of defense acquisition policy issues from an academic perspective."²⁴

Obviously, the law is very specific in the guidelines it presents to professionalize the workforce. How the guidelines will be implemented will be addressed later in this paper. Let's now address the requirements for managing the workforce.

MANAGING THE WORKFORCE

MANAGEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEMS - This law was conceived primarily as a result of Congress' perception that the services were not paying heed to previous direction. It stands to reason, therefore, that there would be copious reporting requirements. Reports, of course, require data and data requires information systems. Specifically, DAWIA requires a system that will gather data on: personnel qualifications, assignments, and tenure; exceptions and waivers; military promotion rates; and the annual report to SECDEF and to Congress. That report, at a minimum, must include:²⁵

- Positions reserved for military only
- Acquisition Corps size by grade, function, and whether or not it is filled by military or civilian personnel
- Critical acquisition positions by grade, function, and how filled (Civilian/Military fill ratio and acquisition corps

fill rate)

- Promotion rates for acquisition corps officers
- Equivalency exams
- Exceptions to education requirements
- Board certifications (boards will be described in more detail in the next section)
- Major program manager and deputy program manager reassignments...a major sore spot with Congress
- Critical acquisition position reassignments
- Waivers
- Rotations
- Educational program participation, and
- Bonuses

This is no trivial requirement and currently no system exists that will accommodate the myriad of outputs required. It's going to be interesting to see how this requirement is funded and implemented!

A change in requirements of this magnitude will obviously require some changes in the current acquisition organization. Let's take a look at the new organizational structure responsible for managing this complex new organization.

ESTABLISHING A MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATION - The law is very specific in the wording used to assign general authorities and responsibilities. Basically, the Secretary of Defense (working through the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition) is

ultimately responsible for "...establishing policies and procedures" which will "...ensure uniform implementation throughout the Department of Defense."²⁶ There is a requirement to establish the following organizational entities:

- Director of Acquisition Education, Training, and Career Development to assist the Under Secretary in the performance of his responsibilities.

Process




Figure 5

- Service Acquisition Executives (SAE) for each service will

be accountable to SECDEF for implementation of DAWIA within the military department concerned.

- Directors of Acquisition Career Management (DACM) for each service to assist the Service Acquisition Executive.
- Acquisition Career Program Boards to advise each SAE regarding execution in managing the accession, training, education, and career development of the acquisition workforce.

A graphic representation of the Navy's new acquisition organization is shown in figure 5.²⁷ How these positions are being filled and by whom will be addressed in detail later in this paper.

Now that we understand what the law is all about, we can take a closer look at the impact that it will have on the Navy's Aerospace Engineering Duty Officer (AEDO) community, as well as how well the implementation is progressing.

THE AEROSPACE ENGINEERING

DUTY OFFICER COMMUNITY

Before addressing the impacts of the law it is important to provide some insight into the purpose and the history of the AEDO community in order to facilitate understanding its relationship to the overall Naval acquisition process. As we shall see, this is an existing group that, for the most part, already "fits to a tee" the requirements of the DAWIA.

HISTORY OF THE AEDO COMMUNITY²⁸

The genesis of the AEDO community dates all the way back to

1842, when Congress authorized the formation of the Corps of Naval Engineers to meet the growing technical complexities being experienced by the Navy in its transition from sail to steam propulsion. Over the next 100 years the community rode the tide of the whims of Naval leadership ...changing names on numerous occasions, and vacillating between the restricted line and unrestricted line (restricted line is not eligible for command at sea).

By the end of WWII they were a restricted line community consisting of over 300 officers and had a congressional charter which officially established the AEDO's size and promotion criteria relative to the unrestricted line.

Today, in spite of the establishment of the restricted line Aviation Maintenance Duty Officer Program (AMD) in 1968 and the unrestricted line Material Professional Program (MP) in 1985, they remain a community of approximately 400 men and women with a distinct and well defined mission. That mission is to provide leadership, expert management and professional technical direction in RDT&E, acquisition, production, maintenance and logistics support of Naval Aerospace; including air and space vehicles, their associated weapons systems and support equipment.

AEDOs are able to accomplish their mission by developing highly qualified acquisition and logistics professionals who have the formal technical and managerial education (97% have masters degrees) as well as considerable operational fleet experience to provide leadership and management in all phases of aerospace life

cycle management. They are unique in that their officer corps develops years of consecutive acquisition experience (over ten years of experience on the average by the 22 years of service point) which rivals that found in the executive levels of private industry.

Additionally, AEDs are a community of Fleet aviators (28% are Test Pilot School graduates) who have had at least two tours of operational experience and are qualified warfare specialists. This provides the community with the insight required to truly understand the Fleet customer's requirements and then have the technical knowledge and hard core acquisition experience to convert those requirements into hardware. The AEDO community has been able to maintain its exceptionally high caliber of officer by accessing only 20% of the applicants who seek to enter the community.

Out of the seven functional areas emphasized in DAWIA the typical AEDO has experience in all except auditing and the billet structure includes specific billets in all the areas except cost estimating and financial management.

The bottom line is a that AEDOs are the Navy's only full time, Fleet experienced, aviation warfare qualified, technically educated engineering experts with years of experience in leading the development, procurement, and logistics support of Fleet aerospace weapon systems.

As previously mentioned, it appears that the existing AEDO community should have very few problems in meeting the requirements of the new law. Let's take a closer look at what the DAWIA

Executive Study Team (DEST) found in their investigation.

DEST METHODOLOGY

The team's intent was "....to analyze the specific requirements that DAWIA is imposing on the DOD, determine how these requirements affect the Aviation MP community and the way we currently do business and how the community can best respond to those areas which are affected."²⁹ One of the first things the team did was to attempt to categorize possible impacts of the law into specific DAWIA related issues. The issues developed were: billet structure, career patterns, billet assignments, training requirements, and command opportunity.³⁰ Let's take a look at each of these in more detail and see what the results of the team study were.

DAWIA ISSUES AND IMPACTS ON THE AEDO COMMUNITY

Billet Structure

The first issue addressed was: "DAWIA requires all acquisition billets be identified to include categories of 'critical acquisition' and 'military only'. Additionally, DAWIA mandates the substantial increase in the number of civilian billets in the workforce. How will this impact each community?"³¹

From an AEDO perspective, there should be very little impact as long as the majority of their current billets are coded as

acquisition billets. From a cursory first look, that should not be a problem. Almost all of their billets deal with some phase of the acquisition life cycle. Also, unlike some of the other communities, their billet structure provides them ample opportunities to meet the DAWIA qualification requirements as well as Navy flight gate requirements.³²

Regarding the requirement to substantially increase the number of civilian billets in the workforce, it is uncertain as to how that will be accomplished. Certainly, if that increase is at the expense of AEDO billets then there is reason to be concerned. This issue should be better defined within the next few months as the list defining critical acquisition billets is completed.

Recommendations submitted to COMNAVAIR on this issue were:

(1) NAVAIR propose legislative relief to redefine "critical" acquisition billets as O-6/GM-15 or senior. This would allow O-5/GM-14 billets to be identified as "experience gaining" positions to assign non-acquisition identified personnel to without having to request waivers from the DACM.

(2) NAVAIR community managers and AIR-71 scrub the aviation MP billet structure, military and civilian, to create (by priority) an aviation acquisition workforce in anticipation of reduced initial community size and future DOD personnel cuts.

(3) Aviation community managers perform an acquisition corps billet scrub and apply the appropriate AQDs to the appropriate billets. Following NAVAIR's approval, submit this listing to BUPERS for input to the manpower documents.

(4) NAVAIR advance the establishment of aviation MP billets on Warfare Sponsors, ASN and OSD staffs.³³

CAREER PATTERNS

The second issue was: "How will the requirements of DAWIA, especially the minimum training and acquisition experience requirements, change the 'typical' career patterns of each community?"...."What will be the effect of meeting DAWIA experience requirements on the promotability of community officers?"....and, "In what arenas should the communities compete?"³⁴

The AEDOs are not really impacted by this issue. As previously mentioned, acquisition training and experience do not present a problem. Most AEDOs meet or exceed the requirements of the new law. Also, they have and will continue to compete in all of the acquisition arenas previously mentioned and, by law, their promotability percentages are competitive with other communities.

BILLET ASSIGNMENTS

The third issue was: "In light of decreasing force structure and budgets, and increasing acquisition workforce requirements, it is imperative that we accurately define which billet assignments will give each community the experience necessary to successfully compete for key acquisition positions. Are any changes required in current billet assignments...are DC tours necessary? How will DAWIA impact the detailer as well as the individual Material Professional?"³⁵

Although the policy regarding military/civilian billets under the DAWIA is not yet clear, if the result is competition for all "neutral" acquisition jobs, detailers will lose any control they had over building community career patterns. Career planning, from both an individual's perspective as well as the detailer's, will become much more difficult to achieve. Currently detailers consider the needs of the Navy, career needs of the individual, and the individual's personal desires while slating billets to build a community of experienced professionals. If you add to this equation competition for current O-4/O-5 developmental acquisition billets it will become very difficult for long range career planning. The competition for billets will tend to reward specialization as opposed to potential too early in the career process.

Direct competition between uniformed Navy and the civilian community for many acquisition billets will give rise to several new and unique situations Specifically:

- a. How can we preserve billets that have been encumbered by a civilian?
- b. When a civilian is principal, how can we ensure a military deputy? (Program continuity also becomes an issue here)

These critical issues need to be studied and resolved by the Navy hierarchy responsible for establishing DAWIA implementing policy. The solutions require more flexibility within the current structure of laws and regulations governing military

and civilian personnel management. Program managers and PEOs will have to manage personnel issues more closely and have a manning plan in place to ensure the proper mix of civilian and military is maintained.³⁶

Recommendations to COMNAVAIR on this is were:

(1) NAVAIR establish, through the NAVAIR Career Management Board, a joint military/civilian manning plan - to include a balance of military and civilians.

(2) NAVAIR establish a total force personnel management office.

(3) NAVAIR request that all AWOC decision packages contain both military and civilian nominees.³⁷

TRAINING REQUIREMENTS

The fourth issue was: "DAWIA mandates specific training and experience requirements which must be met for filling critical acquisition billets. How well does each community meet these requirements?"³⁸

The DAWIA establishes stringent training requirements for qualification in the Acquisition Corps. As previously mentioned, a baccalaureate degree is required along with completion of 24 hours (or equivalent) of study in business disciplines. As an alternative, this requirement is considered met with 24 hours (or equivalent) in their career field plus 12 hours in the business disciplines. After four years of undergraduate education plus a master's degree (97%

have masters degrees, 70% have technical masters), most AEDOs will have already fulfilled this requirement. Also, many officers have recognized the value of a sound formal business education and have pursued additional courses on their own. In the unusual circumstance that this requirement has not been met, appropriate training should be made available at Navy expense. Extending on an as required basis while attending other training courses, such as NPS Monterey and DSMC, would be one means of fulfilling this requirement.

Formal defense program management training, such as the Program manager's Course at DSMC, is also required in the DAWIA and must be accommodated in orders. Training billets for the community must be established to recognize the requirement and allow the detailee to assign officers for training without gapping billets. Historically, the AEDOs have had difficulty in getting people to DSMC (approximately 15% are DSMC graduates). First, it is difficult to provide a five month DSMC window in orders without gapping a billet. Second, detailers do not control the quota process. Unlike PG school, where BUPERS provides quotas which must be filled, DSMC billets are controlled by the SYSCOMS with no formal quota process. The detailers have no assurance that DSMC billets will be available even if personnel become available to fill them. This system needs to be improved. There is no reason why quotas could not be dispersed to detailers for better career planning. Additionally, mandatory quotas

discipline detailers to increase DSMC training.

A formal school for AEDOs, similar to that utilized by the EDOs and AMDOs, should be established. This training would acquaint the new AEDO with the community's career planning information including specific insight into common billets such as Class Desk, APML, etc. The community indoctrination material would be presented by community leaders, ASN(RDA) staff, and OPNAV acquisition personnel. It would also include basic training in defense acquisition principles and processes, and provide an opportunity to meet the community's leaders. This training could be held at NPS Monterey or DSMC to provide the training where a formal educational environment already exists. This training could qualify as part of the business discipline training requirement if structured properly.³⁹

The following issues were submitted to COMNAVAIR on this issue:

- (1) NAVAIR request the AWOC, through the Acquisition Career Program Board (ACPB), to require attendance at the acquisition basic course at DSMC for all military prior to initial acquisition billet assignment.
- (2) NAVAIR request the AWOC, through the ACPB, establish policy for DSMC education equivalence at ICAF, NPS, and other appropriate service schools.
- (3) NAVAIR request the AWOC establish an aviation MP indoctrination course for new AED, AMD and URL MP accessions.

This course should include civilians as appropriate.⁴⁰

COMMAND OPPORTUNITIES

The fifth and last issue directly related to DAWIA was: "DAWIA requires specific training and tour length requirements for assignment to certain acquisition positions. What will be the impact of these requirements on potential for URL MP commander command and for major program manager (MPM) selection?"⁴¹

This issue was obviously directed specifically toward the URL MP community. From an AEDO perspective, however, downsizing and the resulting reorganizations will have much greater impact on command opportunities than will DAWIA. Where DAWIA will probably have an impact is in the area of program management as more of those billets go to the civilian community. Only time will tell how great that impact will be.

Now that we've looked at the background of DAWIA, the law itself, and the issues it presents to the Navy AEDO community, let's take a look at how the law is being implemented.

DAWIA IMPLEMENTATION

As is so often the case with new legislation, it has taken and continues to take time to figure out exactly what the intent of certain portions of DAWIA are, what the alternatives are, and what resources are required to meet the new requirements. The timing on this law has also been a factor. The changing world environment, with the changing threats and severe reduction in DOD resources,

has made the implementation of this particular legislation even more complex than it would have been otherwise.

IMPLEMENTING DOCUMENTATION

Most of the effort thus far has been in the area of documentation...developing the directives and instructions, primarily at a DOD level, which will accommodate the intent of the law. Along with numerous DEPSECDEF and USD(A) memorandums issued to get the ball rolling, the following DOD DAWIA Directives and Instructions have been released:

1. DOD Directive 5000.52, "Defense Acquisition Education, Training, and Career Development Program," dtd Oct. 25, 1991.

2. DOD Manual, "Career Development Program for Acquisition Personnel," dtd Nov. 1991.

3. DOD Instruction 5000.55, "Reporting Management Information on DOD Military and Civilian Acquisition Personnel and Positions," dtd Nov. 1, 1991.

4. DOD Directive 5000.57, "Defense Acquisition University," dtd Oct. 22, 1991.

5. DOD Instruction 5000.58, "Defense Acquisition Workforce," dtd Jan. 14, 1992.

Documentation at the Service level is just beginning to be issued. To my knowledge, the only Navy instruction issued thus far is: SECNAV INSTRUCTION 5300.34, "Department of the Navy Acquisition Workforce Program," dated 6 August 1991. The most important aspect of this instruction is that it requires the ASN(RDA) to ensure that the DACM, AWOC, and ACPB are chartered within 30 days of the date

of issuance of the instruction. These charters have, in fact, been completed and the positions filled. A listing of those billets and the incumbents is listed in appendix A.

IMPLEMENTATION PROGRESS

According to the implementation schedule promulgated by the law, to date we should have completed the following actions: designation of acquisition positions; promulgation of policy for military reserved billets, longer military tours, regulations for MIS, and plan for Defense Acquisition University; PM qualifications effective; Major PM/DPM must stay until milestone closest to four years; and establishment of a central job referral system. All have been accomplished, at least at a DOD macro level, except designation of acquisition positions. The deadline for that has been changed to April 1992 due to the difficulties being experienced by all of the services in interpreting the law and establishing their lists.

For those of us working the issues at the service level, our work has just begun! Most of the questions being asked when the law was first passed have yet to be answered and continue to be very troublesome. For example...

- Will the number of critical as well as regular acquisition billets be a manageable number? (estimates are 30,000 per service)

- How will we ensure that there are sufficient military-only billets available to provide an orderly career path for military officers and at the same time ensure that adequate opportunities for civilians exist?

- Who will manage the process required to handle the military/civilian competition for billets? It isn't possible for the AWOC to address each and every billet so where do we draw the line? And, what do we do with those billets not addressed by the AWOC...arbitrarily assign them as either a military or civilian billet or flip-flop them every other time...?!

- DOD is supposed to fund DAWIA in FY91 with Acquisition Education (ACE) funds until the services can get their own line items...then what? We currently have no idea what the costs will be for formal training, i.e., ICAF, DSMC, etc. or informal training such as CO-OP, tuition assistance, scholarship or student loan repayment programs. It's hard to believe that the services will be able to come up with sufficient funding for these very expensive programs in such an austere environment. The costs go beyond training and include the new organizations as well as the new MIS system that has been dictated. These costs are by no means trivial and will further exacerbate the situation.

- Even assuming that funding is available how are we going to cycle the people through the various courses? If an acquisition professional attends a school enroute to a new position, who pays for it, the detaching command or the receiving command ...and, does the training count as part of the acquisition tour length or is it dead time?

These are but a few of the issues that are currently being discussed and that must be resolved before incorporation into the service level implementation documentation.

OBSERVATIONS

The purpose of this paper was to take a detailed look at the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act, including background, evolution, requirements, implementation, and impacts. No attempt was made to judge the adequacy or the legitimacy of the law. That could be the subject for a whole new study and is certainly subject to many diverse opinions.

I believe that this paper has highlighted several important aspects of DAWIA. First of all, it displays what a complex, in-depth piece of legislation DAWIA is. Secondly, it gives the reader some appreciation for the problems being faced by DOD and the Services in interpreting various aspects of the law. And, thirdly, it points out a few of the problems being faced in implementing and funding this new legislation.

Will DAWIA accomplish its intended purpose? There is no doubt that the law, if properly implemented, would enhance the overall professional qualifications of the acquisition workforce. The real question, in this environment however, is whether or not it will receive the attention and resources required to bring it to fruition, and...only time will tell!

ENDNOTES

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22. Congressional Record, 23 October 1990, H11983.
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27. ASN(RD&A) brief.
28. COMNAVAIR DAWIA Study Group, p. 6.
29. Ibid., p. 4.
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31. Ibid., p. 18.
32. Ibid., p. 25.
33. Ibid., p. 26.
34. Ibid., p. 18.
35. Ibid.
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37. Ibid., p. 41.
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39. Ibid., p. 43.
40. Ibid., p. 46.
41. Ibid., p. 18.

APPENDIX

ASN - RD&A
Office of the Director, Acquisition Career Management

Personnel Telephone Listing

<u>Name</u>	<u>Title</u>	<u>Phone</u>	<u>Room</u>	<u>Int</u>
Alexander, A.	Asst for Career Development	22836	568	82
Birns, C.	Computer Specialist (MIS)	22838	568	86
Guilford, J.	Civilian Acq. Workforce Mgmt (C)	22836	568	75
Halkias, G.	Asst for Info Sys & Reports (R) (MIS)	22836/8	568	87
Hauenstein, W.	Director, Acquisition Career Mgmt	22835	568	79
Hearn, C.	Secretary to the Director (S)	22836	568	80
Hedderson, T. (CAPT)	Military Acquis. Career Mgmt (M)	697-8761	Annex G809	--
Hoffman, M.	Program Assistant (P)	22836	568	84
Keightley, G.	Deputy Director Acq. Career Mgmt (A)	22836	568	81
Oatway, J.	Training Specialist (T1)	22838	568	74
Schuler, S. (CAPT/USMC)	Special Asst for Marine Corps	22805	500	44
Skulskie, C.	Training Financial Manager (T2)	22358	568	83
Speakman, G. (CAPT)	Special Asst for NAVAIR	22764	568	85
Van Belle, T. (LT)	Administrative Assistant (2)	22805	500	43