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**Nation Assistance Strategy--  
Latin America**  
(Using United States Military Capabilities)

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**NATION ASSISTANCE STRATEGY -- LATIN AMERICA  
(USING U.S. MILITARY CAPABILITIES)**

**This research looks at expansion of the mission of the military services to include them as an integral tool of the political goals inherent in nation assistance. Examples of lessons learned in Latin America are used. The lessons apply globally.**

**The essential point of the study is twofold. First, that the military services should expand their mission statement to include nation assistance (which is separate from humanitarian assistance). Second, that the vital interests of the nation must be served by long term goals. Goals which must be more well coordinated amongst the executive departments and agencies as they meet their charters in coordinating and accomplishing country plans.**

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Colonel, Army National Guard**

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## I. INTRODUCTION

A. Assistance to Latin American and Caribbean nations using the military services of the United States as the tool has built steadily throughout the 1980's and early 1990's. Two functions had early emerged, medical and engineer construction assistance. Later, in the late 1980's assistance for the war on drugs became a very intensive mission for the U.S. military.

Within the services (if not all of DOD) opinion has varied as to whether or not nation assistance is a valid mission for the military. Stated succinctly, are these operations valuable to the training needed for success in war; for warfighting (and readiness for it) is the primary military mission. Thus, in some quarters the tasks contained in nation assistance are viewed as not meeting training readiness for war.

In this paper, where focus on a component function is cited, just engineering and medical assistance will be used as examples. The overall focus is on what may be gained for U.S. political objectives and military readiness objectives.

B. The United States strategy for Latin America and the Caribbean is obviously derived from the interrelationships of geography, economies and security. Historically, the methods and resources applied by the United States have varied tremendously. Some would say that the variance was the result of no long term goals and hence no strategy. Generally, U.S. vital national interests have remained constant and consistent. However, the strategy, as stated earlier, derived to meet those interests in the nations under discussion was inconsistent. Interest by the United States vacillated from very intense to very uncaring. From many corners, the interpretation of U.S. policy was that its goal was to keep "those" governments

friendly and stable, namely, by keeping Communism out and some sort of stability in. The decision makers were often willing to condone dictatorships as long as they were cooperative in staying away from communist influence -- and too, European influence. The difficulty was that many of these Latin governments seldom adhered to principles and rights considered inalienable by U.S. citizens. While making this review, recall that Latin America and the Caribbean societies have long memories; too, they are traditional societies. They have viewed the United States as merely treating events (without any national tradition). Thus, resources for solutions were seen as inconsistent because outwardly there was no historical strategy nor implementing plan.

C. The United States now has produced, by President Bush, a written strategy. It is an important document in that it provides the executive branch a foundation on which to plan -- plan for the long term. In the August 1991 edition of the National Security Strategy of the United States he makes four points that U.S. planners must be cognizant of and respond to:

1. "It is our deepest belief that all nations and peoples seek political and economic freedom; that governments must rest their rightful authority on the consent of the governed, and must live in peace with their neighbors. . . . For [North] America, there can be no retreat from the world's problems." (Preface)

2. At "Our Interests and Objectives in the 1990's" (the fourth interest of) "a stable and secure world, where political and economic freedom, human rights and democratic institutions flourish" (has five objectives -- one of which is) "support aid, trade and investment policies that promote economic development and social and political progress " (3,4)

3. "Nowhere is this more true than in our own hemisphere, where our fundamental aims are to deepen the sense of partnership and common interest." (8)

4. "Managed wisely, our aid programs can play a key role in fostering world order that comports with our fundamental values. But we must ensure that our resources are adequate, that our programs pursue well defined goals, and that we retain the flexibility to respond to change and unforeseen requirements and opportunities." (17)

D. The above statements of strategy (by the administration) for foreign policy objectives were obviously in place earlier (or at least in a very similar spirit) since Secretary of State, James Baker, in Current Policy No. 1274 "Foreign Policy Priorities and U.S. Assistance" U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Washington, DC, May 1990 (1), testified to the Senate Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Foreign Operations" . . . . I indicated that our best guide to today's rapidly changing world was to be found in fundamental American principles: freedom, democracy, equal rights, respect for human dignity, and fair play."

## II. TRANSITION OF STRATEGY

A. Thus, as the executive departments expand long range plans for the Western Hemisphere to promote the vital national interests of the United States by setting objectives (and avoiding vacillation), they should keep in mind certain concepts (if not precepts).

1. Understand the intent of the executive and legislative offices

2. Remember Clausewitz's caution to "beware the vividness of transient events."

3. Understand, as Dmitry Mikheyev does in "the Soviet Mentality," Political Psychology, Vol. 8, No. 4, December 1987: "Different societies operate on different perceptions of human nature, depending on the culture, mores, traditions, and requirements of time. One society, can, for instance, consider people to be basically obedient and constructive, another may believe them unruly and destructive. Accordingly, the first society might emphasize the importance of organization and control over its members; the other might focus on stimulating their creativity, as a means of enhancing its inner resources. Societies can to a different degree be willing to accept transformation."

4. In all the analysis of possibles, probables and likelihoods by the policy makers and their planners, they should keep in mind rules (linked to the above ideas) posited by Hans J. Morgenthau in Chapter 32 of his book, *Politics Among Nations*. He discusses nine rules (584-491) that the strategy and objective planners should refer to from time-to-time. Four he states are fundamental:

- a. Diplomacy Must Be Divested of the Crusading Spirit.
- b. The Objectives of Foreign Policy Must Be Defined in Terms of the National Interests and Must Be Supported With Adequate Power.
- c. Diplomacy Must Look at the Political Scene From the Point of View of Other Nations.
- d. Nations Must Be Willing to Compromise on All Issues that Are Not Vital to Them.

Five Rules are Prerequisites of Compromise

- e. Give Up the Shadow of Worthless Rights for the Substance of Real Advantage.
- f. Never Put Yourself in a Position from Which You Cannot Advance Without Grave Risks.
- g. Never Allow a Weak Ally to Make Decisions for You.
- h. The Armed Forces are Instruments of Foreign Policy, Not Its Master.
- i. The Government is the Leader of Public Opinion, Not Its Slave.

B. Continuing, the DOD and its military leadership support the regional and global view and intentions. Consider that the National Military Strategy of the United States, January 1992, addresses as the Strategic Landscape such "...Other significant forces impacting the security environment include:

- The continuing struggle to improve the human condition throughout the world, particularly in lesser developed countries.
- Drug trafficking and associated problems.
- The march toward democracy in Eastern Europe, Latin America, and many other parts of the world.
- A momentum toward increased political, economic, and military cooperation in Europe, the Pacific, and other regions."

Further, the National Military Strategy in the Realities section states, "the United States must maintain the strength necessary to influence world events, deter would-

be aggressors, guarantee free access to global markets, and encourage continued democratic and economic progress in an atmosphere of enhanced stability." For the Western Hemisphere the Military Strategy addresses the "advance of democracy. . . . hard-won" but points out that "the problems of drug trafficking, illegal immigration, the environment, lingering insurgency, and slow economic development are of concern to all. The United States must remain engaged in support of the developing democracies and in economic and social progress throughout the region."

### III. OPINION

Nation assistance is a necessary mission and the United States' military services truly have the capability and wherewithal to perform this mission. On many occasions the political and military leadership have indicated a concurrence for the military to accomplish such tasks. The 1992 National Military Strategy at Forward Presence states: "In addition to forces stationed overseas and afloat, forward presence includes periodic and rotational deployments, access and storage agreements, combined exercises, security and humanitarian assistance, port visits, and military-to-military contacts."

United States leadership comments complement the Forward Presence concept and intent. For example,

a. "In that world, the U.S. military, skilled in moving men and equipment, may find itself 'providing as much humanitarian assistance as combatant assistance,' Jeremiah said." (Admiral David E. Jeremiah, Vice Chairman, JCS from an article in the New Hampshire Sunday News (Manchester, N.H.) October 27, 1991 pg 16.)

b. LTG Henry J. Hatch, Chief, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers has succinctly stated in articles and speeches that nation assistance is extremely important to the interests of the United States. And that, the Army, in the performance of these missions does provide good readiness training for its soldiers. In his paper "Security, Stability, Sustainability: Conditions For Peace," December 9, 1991, LTG Hatch explains his concept of how "We must promote and manage these 'conditions for peace'. . ." (14) His conclusion ends by stating, "The U.S. will achieve its National Security goals only through a better integration of its multi-agency capabilities and the application of a systems approach. It must blend economic, political, military, and sustainment (resource) components and use a long-range perspective. The emphasis has to be on transfer of skills, self reliance and market forces.

In developing this integrated strategy, the capabilities of the armed forces to contribute must not be overlooked. The military services, in both their uniformed and civilian members, have substantial support capabilities which are precisely what is called for in developing nations. The services can assist in planning, construction, and the provision of health care. Perhaps, even more importantly, the services can provide training to engineers, health care specialists, and officials from the host nation in public and private institution development, and, in the process, provide an example of the role of the military in a democratic society a role that is subordinate to civil authority.

This is a different dimension of military service. It requires the armed forces to carry out a range of tasks beyond the battlefield to prevent war, and to establish and manage the conditions for peace. These, in many respects, are tasks for the Army. It is, more than any other service, the Nation's general military servant. For the Army, this role is a return to its beginnings. For the United States, it would be a

step toward a new order and a dynamic equilibrium for a global community at peace." (14, 15)

c. The leadership of the National Guard of the United States has for many years accepted nation assistance missions for its army and air units. It firmly believes that these missions provide excellent mobilization training and excellent soldier job skill and leadership training.

Host nation national and local governments, and general populace (in areas where assistance has been performed) comments are very complimentary regarding the impact of nation assistance projects done by the U.S. military. They are particularly complimentary of engineer, medical, dental and veterinarian assistance.

These assistance projects are deemed to have had major positive impact (in some cases locally and others nationally) on commerce, communication, health, government coordination, and the image of the United States. It is a perception too that as the assistance promotes economic expansion and political stability, it will also cause some cultural change.

The degree to which the ability of the U.S. military will be employed in these assistance projects will depend on budgets. But more so, it will depend on a continued consensus that combat support and combat service support units and their personnel do receive good readiness training by performing these missions. In interpreting doctrine and applying limited dollars to train, to attain and to maintain the ability to perform war missions, some feel that nation assistance is not the place to spend the dollars. However, assuming that the money is there and that nation assistance becomes firmly embedded in doctrine, there are some lessons learned that

must be adapted for the planning process. As well, these lessons must be passed on to the units and personnel that will be involved.

#### **IV. LESSONS LEARNED**

##### **A. For U.S. Personnel:**

1. All personnel must be told (they must remember and conduct themselves accordingly) that the host nation is a sovereignty.

2. Liaison, reconnaissance and planning personnel must build rapport and sell their ideas. In particular, they must sell (not dictate) to the hosts through the country team and the ambassador.

3. Keep the "flag" low key; this statement relates to the idea of sovereignty and partnership.

4. The assistance provided must be part of a long range plan. The plan must be coordinated amongst all U.S. agencies (consider the military services as agencies). This plan for the country, if not coordinated, won't be a country plan. What will happen is that each agency will develop a short range plan, go off on its own -- and the results are inefficiencies and a less than desired image of the United States. Imagine two agencies, each doing "its own thing" on the same road. As they "come round the bend" they meet with different design specifications, because neither knew the other was there. So, to reinforce this comment, all agencies must come together to know the assets, methodology, budget, time lines, etc , of each other. The agencies must understand each other, provide input for objectives, coordinate the plan with the host and then proceed for maximum efficiency

5. U.S. personnel must coordinate with the host nation ministries and their agencies for protocols, law, rules, etc. For example, in Honduras the Health Ministry must see and verify the certification of credentials for doctors. Presently, there is a tendency to go off (with the best of intentions) and perform tasks of which the host governments are completely unaware.

6. Keep things professional. Don't let personalities get in the way. Don't let perceptions become fact before they are proved (or disproved).

7. U.S. personnel must be trained to know and understand the culture, the mores, the history, and the "way-of-life" of the host nation. This is particularly important for the leaders and those mentioned in 2 above. However, the soldiers on the ground must be prepared too. Prepare them for the impact they will have on the populace in the area of operation. Prepare them for what they will see and hear. Above all, ensure that everyone has (and projects) a positive image.

8. The Country Team (see 4 above) needs to know the capabilities of the elements of the services being considered for taskings. Again, this influences the long range plan. Knowing capabilities, procedures and time lines drives the host nation approvals and the money requirements.

9. Get to the right person. Know with whom you are dealing. Meet all the influential people. They must all have a say in the plan and in the projects. For example, if a school (even though it will only be 30'x60' and of wood) is to be built in village "X", then National, Department (Province) and district administrators, the village mayor, and even the teacher, must be consulted. Remember, "face" is important. If time allows, brief the people of the village, and ensure (tactfully) that

the government explains to the surrounding villages why "X" got the school and their village did not

10. Understand that in many cases, just being there influences the host nation military, the politicians and the general public.

11. Public Affairs Offices and the media must be kept informed. This requires a very meticulous plan, with constant commander involvement, to ensure that nothing gets "bruised."

12. Keep the U.S. military and political leadership informed. In the case of the National Guard, keep the state governor, legislature and media informed.

13. At the project sites, keep the local civil populace involved in performing the work (and the military if they are present). It is their project. The United States is supporting them.

14. In the area of operation (AO) for specific projects, the commander of the forces involved (through coordination with the next higher headquarters) should personally go to each village or town in the AO and brief the populace about what is going on. The people need to know who is doing what, when, where, how, and why.

B. For the Host Nation:

1. It must involve all of its ministries (military, in this sense, is considered a ministry) in the development of the country plan. Even though a ministry may not

have a direct input for a particular project (because it does not perceive a direct impact or benefit for its function) it must still be made aware.

2. The lead contact ministry must arrange for the United States' service that will actually do a particular project to brief the various government levels involved and the general populace residing in the area of a project. These briefings must detail the who, what, when, where, how and why of the project. Reasons for conducting these briefings are myriad. Examples are:

a. If United States National Guard Forces (army or air) are doing the project, the U.S. leadership must ensure that all who are in contact with the NG forces understand the difference between the United States National Guard and Latin American "National Guard." Even if the host country does not have a Guardia de Nacional, its people have heard the name and have a concept or perception of it that is often negative.

b. Rumors will abound as to what the North Americans do in their camps and how they will live. The host government must work with the project unit(s) to show exactly what is being done. Aside from national leaders and media, local government leaders and persons whose positions imply leadership (their word is respected and sought out) must be shown about, so that the true information gets out to the populace. Examples of these positions are the nurse, the teacher, the priest, the midwife, etc.

c. It is key that the host nation ministries be briefed about time lines and money. They must be told about the "training" the U.S. forces will receive, about what U.S. training doctrine sets as goals and how those goals will be met. In other

words, though there may be (from the host's point of view) massive amounts of equipment, the host must be brought about to understand how much of that equipment is actually "rubber on the project" and how much of it is not. Explain and show the support Services such as:

- (1) Maintenance (shop vans, contact trucks, parts vans, etc.).
- (2) Water purification and storage equipment.
- (3) Fire fighting equipment.
- (4) Communications equipment.
- (5) Supply and transport equipment.
- (6) Medical equipment.
- (7) Administration facilities.
- (8) Facilities maintenance equipment.
- (9) Supply activities.
- (10) Rations (dining facilities).
- (11) Hygiene, morale and welfare equipment and facilities.
- (12) Staff activities facilities and equipment.

3. When it comes to the money (budget), everybody needs to know whose money is paying for what; everybody includes the national government and the local populace. For example, who pays for veterinary supplies; for culverts; for fuel; etc. An adjunct to this is that the U.S. soldier needs to be told too!

#### **V. FORCE DEVELOPMENT**

Regardless of the mission, the headquarters involved in analyzing the mission, developing the plan, coordinating the plan, tasking the units and conducting the operation must consider doctrine first and then adjust as needed. Experience tells

that there is a tendency in nation assistance missions to forget, at times, doctrine. In particular when it comes to planning for engineer and medical missions. Desire to do a great humanitarian job becomes infected by hyperbole. It is essential that no promises be made that cannot be kept.

Beware that, in time, initial estimates of money, scope of work, etc., become fixed all by themselves through lack of coordination. There is a tendency by one element to set the budget in "a vacuum" and to set the tasks in "a vacuum" by another element. At about two months before the start of the exercise mission, the fight starts on which element gets its way. Increase the budget? Cut the scope of work? Compromise? Adding pressure to this is the fact that waiting behind this decision are the logistics needed, which must be exact. From the force commander's point of view, the initial higher headquarters planning needs to involve the tasked units early on to avoid "strings and mirrors, and smoked glass" accounting late in the cycle of event planning.

Recalling doctrine, those that make the agreements and the plan must not forget that nation assistance missions have political purposes. Joint Pub 0-1 (Proposed Final Pub), Basic National Defense Doctrine, 7 May 1991 provides the starting block. "The use of military power. . .military action. . .should be viewed in the context of ends (national objectives), ways (methods or patterns of action), and means (available resources)." (I-4) In the case of nation assistance, when the military is the agency selected (from the government resources) as being best able to provide the wherewithal to gain the political goals by completing, through exercises, certain tasks or series of tasks over time contained in the country plans, then all other agencies not selected must support the decision. However, the other agencies must

continue to remain aware of tasks completed and thus aware of necessary adjustments to the country plan.

While bearing in mind the country plan, the plan for the force development must review all of the principles contained in Joint Pub 0-1 (use it as a checklist). Granted, some principles may not exactly fit the venture at hand. Regardless, the principles must be reviewed to assure that nothing essential to the mission is omitted.

Intermixing the principles of Pub 0-1 and lessons of previous missions, the staffs and commanders of the headquarters' involved in the process must have a firm understanding and concept of them. Then they must apply them to the country plan and its time lines. Essentials are:

1. Keep it simple. An easily stated dictum, but if the coordinating staffs do not have a clear understanding of the concept and intentions, then simplicity will crash. As the process continues planners at every level must have the command blessing to raise this issue if the perception is that it is going awry. For example, if logistics are "snowballing."

2. The country plan must be an attainable objective. As stated earlier, if the scope of the tasks contained in the plan exceeds resources for the particular moment in the time line, then everything must be adjusted at the front end. The budget, the scope of the task or both must go up or down. They must meet. There is a tendency to let this happen through uncontrolled osmosis. As a result the balanced solution never happens.

3. Concentrate sufficient resources yet maintain economy of force. Strong caution is advised in this arena. Commanders must stay directly involved. Each function necessary to the mission will have a tendency to grow. Soon, all the functions will be in direct competition. Each will "snowball." For further discussion of this matter, in particular logistics, refer to Logistics in the National Defense by Henry E. Eccles.

4. Know when and how to say yes. Know when and how to say no. Know when to say nothing. Most importantly, realize that "face" is involved in this information exchange. Use empathy. This factor will influence the esprit of all. Essentially, trust, confidence and discipline must permeate all the plans and their implementation processes.

5. Previously mentioned was an information plan that must be in consort with the country plan and the missions contained in the country plan. All the planners and the members of the units involved must be aware and be prepared for the fact that many political elements and various organizations will support all, some or none of the efforts of the plan. Suspicions of varying magnitude will abound. When security is not at risk, be open, forthright and honest. Don't lie or equivocate. An example of opinion and concern can be found in an article (July 1989) prepared for publication by the "Wyoming Catholic Register" by Len Edgerly, Member of Diocesan Social Concerns Committee, titled: Troubling Images of Honduras. Edgerly comments: "...these concerns center on the belief that use of National Guard troops contributes to the growing political turmoil in Central America. From what I saw I can't tell you whether that's true or not." Further he states, "...the trip left me with respect and warmth for the U.S. soldiers I met. They believe they are doing the right thing. I still share the doubts of the Social Concerns Committee."

## VI. FORCE TRAINING

A. Many factors influence the additional training (or specialized training) required to meet nation assistance missions. Usually, the mission is conducted in an austere environment. Thus, all functions (refer to pages 12 and 13) must be well planned, map and sandtable exercised and then adjust the plans, again and again.

The following is an example of background information considering the mission statement and factors for Task Force 164 of the Army National Guard which deployed and operated from 28 December 1988 to 15 July 1989 in Honduras (from TF-164 After Action Report, August, 1989):

### "1. Mission Statement

Task Force 164 organizes, plans for and conducts overseas deployment of personnel and equipment by air and sea to Honduras, constructs a 750 person base camp, constructs 4.9 kilometers of improved road; constructs five schools, repairs two schools; supports humanitarian and civic action construction projects and medical programs; clear and grub (NOTE: clear and grub is an engineer term for removal of trees, rocks, roots and top soil) a runway 1000 meters by 90 meters for the Honduran Air Force; and will be prepared to (on order) support other task forces, elements, and construction needs in the area of operation.

### 2. Planning Factors

#### a. General Planning Factors:

(1) Length of Deployment: 6 Months 2 Weeks

(2) Location. Aguan Valley, Northern Honduras

**(3) Personnel Strengths:**

**US troops: 600**

**Honduran troops: 70**

**Other: 10**

**b. Base Camp Planning Factors:**

**(1) Requirements:**

**(a) 750 person capacity**

**(b) Troop tent density: Duration - 6 / GP medium tent**

**10 / GP medium tent**

**(c) Structures designed for 6 months.**

**(d) Self sustaining (water source, organic power generation, etc.)**

**(e) All service and service support activities within a common perimeter.**

**(f) Aviation facilities to accommodate 6 organic UH-1H's and support/resupply aircraft through CH-47's including medical evacuation and "hot" refueling facilities.**

**(g) Budget of \$280K (for base camp construction).**

**(2) Planning:**

**(a) Coordinated with and designed to accommodate the needs of all major elements (Combat Service Support, Medical, Aviation, etc.)**

**(b) Perimeter approximately 650 X 1,000 meters.**

**(c) All tent structures are modified designs from the Army Facilities and Components System (AFCS) incorporating wall framing and roof support systems where needed.**

**(d) Concrete pads (11 for aviation, and 3 for maintenance) considered more economical than PSP or membrane.**

**(e) Special structures to enhance maintenance included a lube pit and "pole barn."**

(f) Design for personnel convenience (centralized services), efficient traffic flow and safety (security features, buried facilities).

(3) Total construction effort: Equipment hours 24,725  
Manhours 56,973

c. Road Construction:

(1) Length: 4,880 meters plus approximately 200 meters of improved trail to connect west end of construction to existing trail.

(2) Specifications:

(a) Width: 9.76 meters total traveled way. This includes 2 lanes at 3.66 meters each and shoulders at 1.22 meters each.

(b) Slopes: Crown 4%  
Ditch 3:1 (Includes all cut and fills)

Note: Exception to the above was in area west of the San Marcos River where large cuts were encountered. Here the ditch slopes remained at 3:1 but back slopes increased to 1.5:1 (3:2).

(c) Design Speed: 64 KPH

(d) Compaction standards: (Material)

	Cohesive	Non-Cohesive
Sub-base	90%	95%
Base	----	100%

Note: All materials found or produced in this project were non-cohesive. Percentages above are of the maximum dry density as determined in lab tests and monitored by nuclear densometer testing

(e) Curves Verticle - based on design speed.

Horizontal - 4 degree maximum."

B. Considering the stated mission and factors, all functional areas have to study their function and their coordination with the others throughout the time line.

Concurrently, each must look inwardly to the jobs it will do (occupational specialties), the equipments it will need, its stated working limits (space, budget, etc.), its Standard Operating Procedures (SOP), the effect of the commander's concept and intentions, and then proceed to develop its operating plan.

Commensurately, the training plans must be developed and accomplished.

C. The training plan must ensure that the trainers and those trained understand the mission. They must know that the environment is austere, that re-supply is not "just across the street," that communications may be interrupted, that the weather is different, that everyday is a workday, etc. Most important of all, they must understand that every skill is critical to the whole team; they must all do the "basics" well.

D. Leaders must prepare the mental attitudes of the command. For example, there may be some consternation by some personnel that working at a wash rack (from time-to-time) isn't their job. The leader must ensure that all understand the necessity of things and that some jobs require no particular skill -- just the doing.

E. Overall, for a trained and ready force able to perform these assistance missions, those that develop and train the force must apply balance (using the Army imperatives as an example) to 1) quality people, 2) training, 3) force mix, 4) doctrine, 5) modern [and well maintained] equipment, and 5) leader development.

## VII. CONCLUSION

The security strategy of the executive and military leadership of the United States is stated. We may deduce that military forces will continue to be used to perform assistance missions that further the political objectives derived from U.S. interests.

However, in this period of shrinking military budget, those that support the belief that good training and readiness can be achieved and maintained by performing these infrastructure assistance missions to Latin nations must be very stringent at assuring efficiency. Efficiency of political purpose, of infrastructure development, and efficient training.

Because of this competition for training money, some in various services and agencies will assert that if a training exercise is not putting "projectiles down range" then it is not training for war and therefore should not be funded.

Therefore, vision, efficiency and discipline will have to permeate the planning and conduct of these assistance exercises if they are to be continued in the inventory of training options.

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## INTERVIEWS

The author gratefully acknowledges and thanks those interviewed for their candid and forthright remarks.

a. Hatch, Henry J., Lieutenant General, U.S. Army (Chief, U. S. Army Engineer Corps).

b. Miller, Ward A., Colonel, U.S. Army (Commanded JTF-B, Honduras).

c. Lopez, Juan E., Colonel Honduran Army (Defense Attache, Embassy of Honduras, Washington, DC).

## NOTES

Private notes of the author from missions conducted by elements of his command in Panama 1987, Marshall Islands 1988, Ecuador 1987, Honduras 1989, Jamaica 1990