Is Current US Army Rear Operations Doctrine Prepared to Counter a Guerrilla Threat in Rear Areas
Abstract
This monograph examines whether or not current US Army doctrine is prepared to counter a guerrilla threat in rear areas. Guerrilla groups may comprise the most likely rear area threats in many regions around the world. Consequently, the US Army must be ready to identify and defeat such guerrilla threats in potential force projection missions. In examining the research question, this study begins by exploring the characteristics of rear area guerrilla threats. Next, two historical examples--the Germans in the Soviet Union during World War II and the Soviets in Afghanistan--demonstrate the difficulties in countering guerrilla threats with inappropriate forces and doctrine. Finally, a hypothetical situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina assists in analyzing the ability of US Army rear operations doctrine to effectively respond to a guerrilla threat. Overall, this monograph concludes that US Army rear operations is not presently prepared to counter guerrilla threats. Four recommendations result from the study. First, doctrinal manuals must move away from their overwhelming emphasis on the previous Soviet Union's conventional rear area threats. Second, rear operations doctrine must emphasize the importance of gathering intelligence and demonstrating initiative. Third, the US Army should modify the roles of reaction forces, response forces, and tactical combat forces to more effectively counter guerrilla threats in rear areas. Lastly, these US Army rear operations forces must be properly trained and equipped to successfully perform their anti-guerrilla missions....Rear operations, Rear area threats, Guerrilla warfare, Response force, Reaction force, Tactical combat force, Doctrine.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Dec 19, 1992
- Accession Number
- ADA262628
Entities
People
- Edward M. Sekerak
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College