Befehlstaktik and the Red Army Experience: Are There Lessons for Us?
Abstract
The purpose of this monograph is to examine tactical military command and control methods as practiced by the former Soviet Army and determine what, if any, lessons one can glean from the Red Army's doctrinal experience. The monograph first examines the Prussian-German theoretical underpinnings of Auftragstaktik and the reasons for the adoption of this philosophy by the U.S. Army. It then examines the development of the Soviet tactical command and control philosophy from its origins through the post-nuclear era. The author notes that the Soviets researched and designed a command and control methodology that supported their particular environment. The most senior military and political intellectuals worked in consonance to ensure a command and control strategy that has survived technological innovations. The author concludes that, unlike the Red Army, the U.S. Army has not integrated doctrine with practice. Training and actual combat operations continue to emphasize control rather than command. There is no centralized development of the doctrine nor is there consensus among officers or the various branches on what mission-type orders are or how to implement them. The author recommends the development of a joint doctrine that would facilitate uniformity of doctrine for all services. This doctrine would be disseminated to all service academies, service schools, and institutes of higher military learning. Failing that, the Army would establish a TRADOC-level board to codify its doctrinal philosophy. Lastly, the Army should overhaul its personnel rotation system so that commanders, subordinates, and key staff spend the necessary time together to develop the cohesive teams envisioned.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Dec 01, 1992
- Accession Number
- ADA262662
Entities
People
- George W. Eisel Iv
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College