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**Wings For Peace:
Air Power In Peacemaking Operations**

**A Monograph
by
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United States Air Force**



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
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
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


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ABSTRACT

WINGS FOR PEACE: AIR POWER IN PEACEMAKING OPERATIONS by MAJ W. Bruce Rember, USAF. 57 pages.

This monograph examines the possible roles of air power in peacemaking operations. While the end of the Cold War has brought increased hope for peace and stability in the world, a rise in ethnic tensions and nationalist uprisings prevents attainment of this goal. The crisis in Yugoslavia has provoked calls for armed intervention, yet in the U.S. opinions diverge over what type and amount of force would be necessary to compel an end to the fighting. While the Pentagon envisions the requirement for joint air and ground forces, other officials advocate a limited approach using air strikes to coerce the belligerent factions to lay down their arms.

This study seeks to define the appropriate role for air power in peacemaking. The first section explains the purpose of peacemaking operations, contrasting them to peacekeeping operations to emphasize the different requirements for force in each. The next section expands on this distinction by developing guidelines for employing force to compel peace. The third section compares the inherent capabilities and limitations of air power with the unique requirements for force in peacemaking. This combination provides reasonable expectations for what air power can achieve in peacemaking situations. Historical examples demonstrate that air power has the potential to compel changes in belligerent behavior, but only under limited circumstances. The monograph concludes that since these favorable circumstances are not present in Yugoslavia, successful peacemaking there will likely require more than just limited air strikes.

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Blessed are the peacemakers, for they will be
called sons of God.

Matthew 5:9 (NIV)

Section I: Introduction

The words of Christ from the Gospel of Matthew provide noble justification for the use of armed intervention to stop wars and alleviate human suffering. However, in practice the use of U.S. military forces in peacemaking operations causes controversy. The debate over the use of armed force to stop the fighting in Yugoslavia is no exception. In August 1992, the deputy chief of the Yugoslav desk at the U.S. State Department, George Kenney, resigned over the failure of the U.S. to intervene against Serbian aggression in Bosnia.¹ Other vocal proponents of U.S. intervention in the Balkans include President-elect Bill Clinton and Representative Les Aspin, Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee.² In President-elect Clinton's words,

We cannot afford to ignore what appears to be a deliberate and systematic extermination of human beings based on their ethnic origin...I would begin with air power, against the Serbs, to try to restore the basic conditions of humanity.³

Certainly the human suffering in Yugoslavia provides a moral basis for action; however, the realities of the situation make it a complex issue. Major General Lewis MacKenzie, Commander of the United Nations (UN) peacekeeping effort in Sarajevo through the end of July 1992, emphasizes the difficulty of identifying combatants, warning that armed intervention would "put the UN peacekeeping force in great jeopardy because they're built-in hostages."⁴ Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney has similar objections, noting, "there are some

problems that don't lend themselves to a military solution, and this may be one of them."⁵ Perhaps the most forceful objections, though, come from Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell:

As soon as they tell me it is limited, it means they do not care whether you achieve a result or not. As soon as they tell me "surgical," I head for the bunkers.⁶

This controversy over armed intervention in Bosnia is only part of a larger U.S. foreign policy dilemma. During the Cold War, U.S. armed forces existed primarily to oppose communism throughout the world. Thus, "policymakers...[defined] national interests in the bilateral US-USSR mode" and military leaders prepared to fight a major war in central Europe while supporting participation in so-called low intensity conflicts "lest the Soviet Union profit from the lack of American resolve."⁷ The disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 removed a primary *raison d'etre* for the U.S. military. Accordingly, a smaller military force is a reality, and political and military leaders struggle to define what circumstances justify the employment of U.S. military power.

In order to prevent the short-sighted commitment of U.S. forces, leaders such as Secretary Cheney and Chairman Powell continue to use former Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger's November 1984 list of six major tests for the commitment of U.S. combat forces:⁸

1. The United States should not commit forces to combat overseas unless the particular engagement or occasion is deemed vital to our national interest or that of our allies.
2. If we decide it is necessary to put combat troops into a given situation, we should do so wholeheartedly and with the clear intention of winning. If we are unwilling to commit the forces or

resources necessary to achieve our objectives, we should not commit them at all.

3. If we do decide to commit forces to combat overseas, we should have clearly defined political and military objectives. We should know precisely how our forces can accomplish those clearly defined objectives.

4. The relationship between our objectives and the forces we have committed--their size, composition, and disposition--must be continually reassessed and adjusted if necessary.

5. Before the United States commits combat forces abroad there must be some reasonable assurance that we will have the support of the American people and their elected representatives in Congress.

6. The commitment of U.S. forces to combat should be a last resort.

The lightning military victory of coalition forces over Iraq during Operation Desert Storm in 1991 seems to validate these tests. Notwithstanding the decisive military victory, the situation in Iraq was far from stable, requiring Operation Provide Comfort to protect the Kurdish refugees in northern Iraq. In that instance, the U.S. assumed the responsibility to help the Kurdish refugees. Yet many other nations continue to suffer under civil strife: as of September 1992 over 45,000 UN peacekeeping forces were spread over 11 trouble spots throughout the world.⁹ Of these, the conflict in Yugoslavia commands the most attention in the U.S., bringing into sharp focus the debate over when and where to commit U.S. forces.

During the Cold War, U.S. policy sometimes subordinated purely humanitarian concerns to the national security threat posed by the Soviet Union. Since Secretary Weinberger's six tests were a product of Cold War conditions, several

scholars and prominent politicians now question their relevance. John Mearsheimer, chairman of the political science department at the University of Chicago argues for the use of "military force for human rights reasons, not just strategic reasons." Mearsheimer's views represent "a powerful liberal internationalist strain" in the U.S., posing a direct challenge to the realpolitik of the Cold War era.¹⁰ Representative Aspin also believes that a strict interpretation of Weinberger's tests is no longer valid, arguing that "reserving the military for conflicts where the objectives are clear and overwhelming force can be used means 'the U.S. military is likely to be used only very, very rarely.'" Thus, he concludes the military "will become irrelevant to the problems that the United States faces on a day-to-day basis in the post-Cold War world."¹¹

Certainly, the military exists to serve national goals which are primarily political in nature. Once the nation's political leadership decides on a course of action, the military responds by pursuing military objectives which support the overall political objectives. At issue in the debate concerning armed intervention in Yugoslavia is not the military's willingness to participate, but a basic disagreement over how much and what type of force is required to compel the warring factions to lay down their arms. The Pentagon estimates it needs up to 400,000 troops¹² to accomplish this objective, too large a number to be politically supportable. In response, Representative Aspin has called for a "limited objectives" approach, which he claims "can be used successfully--without inevitable escalation--for such things as enforcement of U.N. resolutions through the use of airpower."¹³ Underlying this argument is the view that the costs of inaction

exceed those of limited action.¹⁴ This assumes that gradualism can now work in the post-Cold War world.

The focus of the debate over U.S. intervention in Yugoslavia concerns the amount of force required to compel the belligerent parties to stop fighting. Since air power is the central theme in the "limited objectives" approach, the critical issue is the ability of air power alone to compel this change in belligerent behavior. Certainly, Operation Desert Storm bore witness to the destructive potential of advanced aviation technology such as stealth fighters and precision munitions. However, this destructive potential does not necessarily mean that air power alone can successfully compel belligerent parties to accept and observe a truce. In fact, peacemaking operations like those proposed for Yugoslavia impose limitations on the effectiveness of air power. To determine if airpower alone would be effective in Yugoslavia, one must address a basic question: *what is the role of airpower in peacemaking operations?*

This monograph seeks to answer the question by defining the unique requirements for force in peacemaking operations, comparing these requirements with the current capabilities of airpower, and then offering guidelines for employing airpower in peacemaking operations such as those proposed for Yugoslavia. The first section of the monograph explains the purpose of peacemaking operations, contrasting these operations with peacekeeping operations to emphasize the different roles for force in each. The next section expands on this distinction by developing guidelines for using force during peacemaking operations. The third section compares the inherent capabilities and limitations of airpower with the

unique requirements for force in peacemaking operations. This combination provides reasonable expectations for what airpower can achieve in peacemaking, and produces basic guidelines for employing airpower in those situations. The final section of the monograph applies these general guidelines to the situation in Yugoslavia. While this section does not propose specific courses of action, it illustrates the applicability of the force employment concepts developed in this monograph.

There is apparent a tendency to seek for a higher standard of ideals in international relations. The barbarism which once looked to conquest and the waging of successful war as the main object of statesmanship seems as though it were passing away.

Lord Haldane,
Lord Chancellor of England,
September 1913¹⁵

Section II: Peacekeeping or Peacemaking

Lord Haldane's statement came from the general optimism for world peace just 15 months prior to the outbreak of World War I. Despite nearly 80 subsequent years marred by several major wars and numerous smaller conflicts, the dream of a "new world order" continues. In a speech to the United Nations, President George Bush spoke of the need to prevent, contain, and resolve conflict around the world.¹⁶ These tasks all fall under the broad category of peacekeeping, according to the International Peace Academy:¹⁷

Peacekeeping is the prevention, containment, moderation and termination of hostilities between or within states, through the medium of a peaceful third party, intervention organized and directed internationally, using multinational forces of soldiers, police and civilians to restore and maintain peace.

However, the United Nations definition differs by specifically excluding the "enforcement powers"¹⁸ of military personnel during peacekeeping operations.

Current U.S. joint doctrine resembles the UN view:

Efforts taken with the consent of the civil or military authorities of the belligerent parties in a conflict to maintain a negotiated truce in support of diplomatic efforts to achieve and maintain peace.¹⁹

Critical to this definition are the requirements for consent of all the belligerent parties, a pre-existing negotiated truce, and on-going diplomatic efforts to achieve

a long-term solution. Unfortunately, as Joint Pub 3-07.3 notes:

There is no universally accepted definition of the term "peacekeeping." The absence of one specific definition has resulted in the term being used to describe almost any type of behavior intended to obtain what a particular nation regards as peace.²⁰

Ambiguity in the concept of peacekeeping has caused difficulties for soldiers and diplomats alike. For soldiers who have endured the rigors of combat, the idea of peacekeeping can be anathema. Not only does it appear to dilute the warrior ethic, but the American experience of peacekeeping in Lebanon during 1982-84 still evokes painful memories.

On 23 October 1983 a terrorist drove an explosive laden truck under a Marine headquarters building in Beirut killing 241 Americans and wounding another 70.²¹ Repercussions from this event included a unilateral U.S. withdrawal of forces from the area and the Pentagon's appointment of the Long Commission to determine what went wrong. These findings shaped the current U.S. doctrine which details procedures for peacekeeping and clearly distinguishes peacekeeping as different from peacemaking. A review of events in Lebanon highlights the importance of this distinction.

The initial deployment of the 32d Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU) came on 25 August 1982 at the request of the Lebanese government. The 800 Marines joined a multinational force (MNF) of around 800 French and 400 Italian soldiers, with a mission to

assist the LAF [Lebanese Armed Forces] in a safe and orderly evacuation of PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization] and Syrian armed forces who were encircled by the IDF [Israeli Defense Force] in Beirut.²²

Despite the lack of UN sponsorship,²³ this peacekeeping force was successful in meeting its clearly stated objectives within the specified time limit of 30 days; the contingent of Marines began redeployment on 9 September 1982.

Two subsequent events quickly overshadowed this success. On 14 September a car bomb assassinated Lebanon's newly elected President Bashir Gemayel. In retaliation, Christian militias from the Phalange Party, tacitly supported by the Israeli Defense Force (IDF), massacred over 700 men, women, and children in Palestinian refugee camps.²⁴

These events led to civil disorder throughout Beirut, prompting a return of the Israeli Army and a request from the Lebanese government for a return of the MNF. Thus the 32d MAU returned to Beirut less than a month after it departed, this time with an ambiguous mission. According to then Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger, its mission was initially simply to "establish a presence."²⁵ After a year of this mission, following the suicidal terrorist bombing, Newsweek magazine recorded the complaint of an unidentified Marine general: "we are potted palms creating the illusion of an oasis."²⁶ In the intervening year, the MNF forces had abandoned their neutrality and openly supported the Lebanese government. Not only did the U.S. forces choose sides, but they escalated the conflict by using naval gunfire against Druze militia positions in the hills surrounding Beirut. In December 1983, U.S. Navy aircraft flew strikes against Syrian surface-to-air missile positions around Beirut, resulting in the loss of two aircraft, the death of one pilot and the capture of another. Yet, despite these escalations, the Marines remained manned and equipped for peacekeeping, not combat.²⁷

In contrast to the original, highly successful deployment of the 32d MAU to Beirut in August 1982, its return deployment at the end of September 1982 provides a near classic example of what not to do in peacekeeping operations. A paper from the National Defense University highlights two of the main lessons of this experience. First, "peacekeeping operations can be successful only if they include the maintenance of impartiality and noncoercion." The decision to support the Lebanese Army clearly violated this principle. Second, militant factions in Beirut perceived the Marine's use of naval gunfire and air as coercion rather than self-defense.²⁸ This incremental escalation in force backfired, with the peacekeeping force bearing the brunt of the retaliation. U. S. News and World Report claimed the air attacks against Syrian air defense positions actually "aroused widespread sympathy and support for Syria."²⁹ While some of the air strikes accomplished limited tactical objectives by knocking out surface-to-air missiles, a report in Newsweek makes their operational and strategic effects appear counterproductive:

The New Jersey's broadsides, meantime, raised the level of U.S. involvement in Lebanon another important notch, even though Pentagon officials couldn't say whether the shells had hit their targets. The big guns also failed to impress the Syrians. "If the New Jersey shelling was meant to scare us," said Syria's Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Farouk al Sharaa, "Then they have the wrong message. We are not scared."...[administration officials] also sounded increasingly doubtful that a policy of military retaliation could deter Syria from shooting at U.S. planes or blocking efforts for a peace-ful settlement in Lebanon. "You can't argue that anything anyone has done so far has discouraged the Syrians," said one U.S. diplomat in Washington. "in fact, it may have convinced them they're on the right track."³⁰

In its final report, the Long Commission not only faulted the military for tactical mistakes in Beirut, but also pointed out the "'fundamental conflict' in the

administration's effort to maintain a peaceful military presence in an environment that has become increasingly hostile."³¹ A Newsweek editorial highlighted the controversy over the use of force to enforce peacekeeping arrangements, criticizing the Washington establishment for second-guessing tactical decisions made by military commanders in the field, while failing to understand the larger context of the conflict:

We are no more prepared for the suicidal "human bomb" terrorist in the Middle East than we were for the saffron-robed monk in Saigon who put the torch to himself...we persist in refusing to acknowledge what we don't know or understand about them--or heaven forbid--to concede that many of them are not likely to respond to either our threats or our blandishments.³²

In short, Beirut demonstrates that gradual escalation of force is incompatible with peacekeeping operations. Nevertheless, the military appears to offer a quick solution when no diplomatic or any other solution is working. In his analysis of the Beirut disaster, Professor P. F. Diehl writes, "peacekeeping has become a means of avoiding or postponing action in important areas of the world. Peacekeeping cannot suffice as a quick fix to the threat of war..."³³ Unfortunately, if peacekeeping is merely a stopgap until something better comes along, the objectives remain vague, the level of force tends to escalate, and frustration builds.

Such a piecemeal and shortsighted use of the military prompted Secretary of Defense Weinberger to offer his six tests for the employment of U.S. military forces. Current U.S. doctrine applies even more stringent tests by setting the following preconditions for deployment of U.S. military forces in a peacekeeping role:³⁴

1. Consent of the authorities of the belligerent *parties*. [emphasis added]
2. Political recognition of the peacekeeping operation by most if not all of the international community.
3. A clear, restricted, and realistic mandate or mission.
4. Sufficient freedom of movement for the force and observers to carry out their responsibilities.
5. An effective command, control, and communications (C3) system.
6. Well trained, balanced, impartial, and non-coercive forces.
7. An effective and responsive all-source information gathering capability.

To ensure the forces remain impartial and non-coercive, Joint Pub 3-07.3 allows the use of "active force...only as a last resort in self-defense," clearly defining specific situations that "constitute grounds for self-defense."³⁵

The essential purpose of peacekeeping operations, as reflected in the doctrinal emphasis on preconditions and force restrictions, is to enhance stability in a region by interposing military forces to monitor a truce between belligerents while diplomats work out a more permanent peace. By design, peacekeeping should be a temporary operation. If the truce is broken and fighting resumes, peacekeepers can quickly become involved in the conflict; yet, they lack both the mandate and the weapons to compel a stop to serious fighting. To avoid the mistakes of the past and prevent confusion, Joint Pub 3-07 makes a clear distinction between peacekeeping and peacemaking. While it recognizes peacekeeping as one of the four main categories of low intensity conflicts, it places peacemak-

ing as a sub-category under peacetime contingency operations.³⁶ This is more than a semantic distinction; peacemaking is a combat operation, while peacekeeping operations require the existence of a truce.

The end-state objectives of peacemaking, then, are the pre-conditions for peacekeeping. The U.S. military's current definition of peacemaking is "a type of peacetime contingency operation intended to establish or restore peace and order through the use of force."³⁷ Thus, peacemaking operations require neither a pre-existing truce nor the consent of all belligerents. Peacemaking should not be a long-term operation--its purpose is to "stop a violent conflict and to force a return to political and diplomatic methods." Consequently, peacemaking operations are "best terminated by prompt withdrawal after a settlement is reached, or by a rapid transition to a peacekeeping operation."³⁸

The above definition does not necessarily exclude the use of economic and political measures to secure an end in the fighting; national and international leaders should employ all applicable elements of power in concert with military operations to force a stop in fighting. The cessation of hostilities, in turn, provides an opportunity for diplomats to address the underlying issues of the conflict and thus lay the foundation for a long-term peace.

A study of British peacemaking efforts in Northern Ireland from 1969-1972 emphasized the requirement for diplomats to aggressively exploit such an opportunity. When Britain first interposed its army between warring religious factions in Northern Ireland, they were successful in stopping the fighting and were "welcomed by both sides." However, the study notes that instead of

"making a rapid transition to a peacekeeping operations, the British Army itself became a target." In short, the "window of opportunity" closed before the diplomats seriously addressed the root issues of the conflict. For this failure, the study blames the British government for its lack of a comprehensive strategy, as it "made what it thought to be the minimum effort required initially, and slipped gradually into the conflict."³⁹ The conclusion of the study reveals the fallacy of using military power by itself to tackle difficult political problems:

Britain used the military element of power almost exclusively, using only minimal political and economic power, and concentrated its efforts against the internal security threat...Thus, Britain only treated the most troublesome symptoms, rather than attempting to cure the disease.⁴⁰

The American experience in Lebanon reinforces this same lesson. In Lebanon, no clear distinction existed between peace-keeping and peacemaking, with the result that MNF peacekeepers became targets themselves. The British example shows that a successful peacemaking operation achieves only a temporary solution; long-term success requires a complementary political plan to address the underlying causes of the conflict. In practice, this is difficult to achieve, largely due to the nature of politics. If politics is indeed the art of compromise, diplomats will likely favor vague statements and goals which allow both sides to claim a victory. When considering the use of force, political leaders must resist this bias toward ambiguity and understand that "precise political goals assist, not hinder, operational success."⁴¹

Maximum show of force ensures best minimum use of weapons.

UN Force Commander Gustav Hagglund⁴²

Section III: The Use of Force to Compel Peace

Gustav Hagglund's observation reinforces the idea that gradual escalation of force is not appropriate for either peacekeeping or peacemaking. Yet, national leaders may experiment with limited force options out of desperation when other options have failed. Unfortunately, such experiments typically occur in the absence of clearly defined political goals, thus blurring the critical distinction between peacekeeping and peacemaking. Ultimate success in peacemaking requires not only tactical successes but an acute awareness of the relationship between the use of force and the political or strategic goal. Tactical success flows predominately from purely military considerations such as the mission, threat, geography, forces available, and time allotted. Force considerations for achieving tactical success generally have a short-term perspective. In contrast, the linkage between tactical success and the political objective introduces a long-term view. By definition, this linkage requires that the type and size of force selected is relevant to the strategic goal and has a reasonable chance of achieving success. In peacemaking this means the force successfully compelled the belligerents to stop fighting, at least for an interim period. Political factors, such as public opinion and legal considerations, also influence the linkage by providing constraints on the use of force.

The use of military force in peacemaking is a combat operation--this

means purely military considerations for peacemaking are basically the same as in any other combat operation. Since these tactical considerations are situationally dependent, they warrant further discussion only in the context of a specific crisis. Moving beyond purely military considerations, one finds force requirements and constraints unique to peacemaking in the linkage between military missions and strategic goals. While this linkage is also situationally dependent, several generalizations concerning the use of force are possible using Clausewitz's trinitarian view of war as a tool for analysis:

[War is] a paradoxical trinity--composed of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; of the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and of its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone. The first of these three aspects mainly concerns the people; the second the commander and his army; the third the government... These three tendencies are like three different codes of law, deep-rooted in their subject and yet variable in their relationship to one another. A theory that ignores any one of them or seeks to fix an arbitrary relationship between them would conflict with reality to such an extent that for this reason alone it would be totally useless.⁴³

The effective use of force to compel belligerents to stop fighting is a complex issue, as noted in the Washington Post: "It is often easier to use armed force to defend or deter than to compel."⁴⁴ However, Clausewitz's trinitarian view of war provides a framework for analyzing specific uses of force to accomplish this objective. This framework leads to three different approaches for applying force which can function separately or in combination. Very simply, force can target the armed forces physical ability to fight; the government's ability to maintain order among the people and command and control of its armed forces;

and the people's willingness to support the government and the armed forces. For force to be effective, it must exploit a vulnerability in the area or combination of areas which most affect the belligerents' ability and desire to continue fighting. Considerations for applying force against each of these areas appear below.

First, the most straightforward case involves applying force directly against the belligerents' armed forces. This can take the form of actual destruction of these forces, or indirectly target these forces by cutting off supplies and reinforcements. In conventional conflicts, readily identifiable forces and demand for logistical support present vulnerabilities to attack. However, if the belligerents are guerrilla-based, direct attack will be difficult; quick and decisive results will be elusive.⁴⁵ In these cases, indirect vulnerabilities such as external support may be the appropriate target for attack. This would be especially true in situations where national, ethnic, or religious survival is at stake. In these situations, the line between combatants and civilians quickly disappears as the populace takes up arms.

Returning to the Clausewitzian trinity, the government itself could be a target for attack. This would be especially appropriate in cases where national will to fight is weak, and the government maintains tight, centralized control. Attacking a government's ability to maintain control of its people and command its armed forces may provide a relatively low-cost option to compel the belligerents to cease fighting. However, if the government is weak, or if power is dispersed through several factions of military forces, fighting may not cease even if the government wants it to.

Finally, peacemakers could focus force against the people's will to continue fighting by directly attacking their infrastructure. While this may appear to be desirable because it avoids direct contact with enemy troops, it would be appropriate only if the government and military were responsive to the desires of the people. Of the three areas, this presents the biggest challenge for determining cause and effect. Much controversy exists over the legality, appropriateness, and even effectiveness of using force in this manner. Furthermore, as one study notes, "if great damage to infrastructure, loss of civilian property, or if loss of life occurs, the transition to peacekeeping...may be undermined."⁴⁶ Despite this shortcoming, planners should at least consider the specifics of each situation to determine if this area provides an exploitable vulnerability.

The most effective use of force will consider these areas in combination, analyzing both the areas themselves and the linkages between them. During this analysis, planners must also consider friendly vulnerabilities, especially as related to proposed uses of force. In peacemaking operations, these vulnerabilities may be complex and even contradictory.

When considering the vulnerabilities of friendly armed forces, responsibility for tactical security and preparedness rests with the local commander. However, as the case with the Marines in Lebanon, the politically defined mission can place a military force in a position which is "tactically untenable."⁴⁷ Generally, risk for the military tends to increase with the amount of political restrictions placed on the use of force.

Political decisions concerning force deployment and redeployment will also

affect the military's ability to accomplish its mission.⁴⁸

The time dimension is important. Recent research indicates that the "success rate" in applying military force erodes sharply over time, and, as the experience of Korea and Vietnam suggest, piecemeal commitment ("Salami tactics") does not achieve optimum results. In the locality of low-intensity conflict, high-intensity resolution may be in order.

Thus, time itself is a major criterion for determining how to use force. Despite the Weinberger doctrine's commitment to use force only as a last resort, early military intervention may successfully stop fighting before organizations solidify and while the participants still have more to gain by not fighting than by fighting. In some cases early intervention may even have a better chance of succeeding.⁴⁹ Furthermore, quick and decisive military operations leave the belligerents less time to adapt, thus offering better chances for long-term success.

Any analysis of friendly vulnerabilities must also consider the government or other policy making body. The friendly government may be a single nation, a coalition of nations, or the whole United Nations. While legitimacy increases with more nations involved, so do political restrictions. The mandate for action will list specific restrictions, considering international law and the degree of consensus within the UN.⁵⁰ While Chapter VII of the UN Charter provides specific authority to use force in "enforcement" actions, it is subject to veto within the Security Council. Even without a veto, this process takes time and will certainly add restrictions on the use of force. Traditionally, the UN has not invoked Chapter VII during peacekeeping operations, since peacekeepers could use force only in self-defense.⁵¹ Lessons from the peacekeeping in the Arab-Israeli conflict highlight the difficulties inherent in the UN process:

The vaguer the legal mandate and proposed function of a UN force, the more difficult its operations; however, the more explicit the mandate, the less likely are the Great Powers and the concerned government(s) to agree to support the effort.⁵²

Planners must not only consider legal restrictions on the level of violence, but also the public's perception of force proportionality. Balancing this consideration with the military's desire for overwhelming force at the decisive point will be a key factor in achieving the strategic goal. During Operation Peace for Galilee in 1982, the Israeli use of cluster munitions against PLO forces in towns was clearly disproportionate, and cost them support from the United States.⁵³

One final factor to consider is the possibility of unintended consequences. This could occur in any or all of the areas affected by force:

[The] entry of an outside military force changes the situation. The new force does not simply add to the military balance of forces. Rather, in large part because it is an "outsider," its influence on the situation is not entirely calculable. In fact, the nature of the problem may fundamentally change when the foreign force is introduced.⁵⁴

Thus, the planning process must continually assess military objectives in light of the strategic goal, analyzing branches and sequels to the current operation. Political and military leaders should also agree on a rough time limit for achieving their defined end-state, forcing a reassessment of the overall policy if the peace-making operation has failed. Regardless of the political decisions, "military planners probably are going to have to plan disengagement under both favorable and unfavorable conditions from the very first moments of the planning process."⁵⁵

(NOTE: Appendix A contains an outline of these general planning considerations for using force to compel peace. While not all inclusive, this provides a starting point for analyzing force options in a potential peacemaking operation.)

I will say this. I've said it before, and I'll say it again. Air power was decisive in that war. It made the rest of what we had to do much easier. Air power won the game ball in that contest.

General Colin Powell, 14 September 1992
Remarks to the Air Force Association
concerning Operation Desert Storm.⁵⁶

Section IV: Role of Air Power in Peacemaking

The deserts of Iraq provided an ideal location to display state of the art aerospace technology, ranging from the F-117 Stealth Fighter to sea-launched Tomahawk cruise missiles that destroyed targets in downtown Baghdad. Television coverage in the U.S. broadcast video highlights of the "air war" from start to finish, leaving no doubt just how far air power had come in the almost 20 years since the war in Vietnam. The television coverage actually made the pinpoint destruction of difficult targets appear easy. Unfortunately, memories of the destruction recorded in cockpit displays tend to eclipse an understanding of the unique circumstances that contributed to success: the desert environment provided minimal cover for hiding men and equipment, and the Iraqi Air Force did not seriously contest air superiority.

Despite the success of U.S. air power against Iraq, military and civilian planners should not assume air power can repeat the performance of Operation Desert Storm in every potentially hostile situation, especially when those situations entail the unique requirements for peacemaking set forth in the previous section. Dr. David Mets, an air force historian, outlines four roles for air power in achieving political objectives: send a message or warning, support or reinforce current behavior of allies, neutrals or enemies, deter an undesirable action, and

compel a change in behavior.⁵⁷ It is this last role that applies to peacemaking. A comparison of the current missions and capabilities of air power with the unique force requirements of peacemaking answers the primary monograph question concerning the role of air power in peacemaking.

Secretary of the Air Force Donald Rice lists five primary strengths of air power in general: speed, range, flexibility, precision, lethality.⁵⁸ The first two provide a significant advantage to the Air Force in being able to respond quickly to contingencies. Flexibility refers to the ability to adapt to a changing situation, either by using the inherent speed and range of airpower or by using the same aircraft to do a variety of missions. Precision and lethality refer to the ability of aircraft to achieve a high probability of kill, despite adverse weather or darkness.

Based on these capabilities, current Air Force doctrine defines four basic aerospace roles.⁵⁹

<u>Role</u>	<u>Associated Missions</u>
Aerospace control	Counterair Counterspace
Force application	Strategic attack Interdiction Close air support
Force enhancement	Airlift Aerial refueling Spacelift Electronic combat Surveillance/Reconnaissance Special operations
Force support	Base operability and defense Logistics Combat support On-orbit support

All of these mission areas could potentially support peacemaking operations in the future. However, three particular missions would most likely be directly linked with the application of armed force in peacemaking: counterair, interdiction, and close air support. Other missions, such as surveillance and airlift, will certainly operate in support of peacemaking. Since these missions do not involve the direct application of force, their role in peacemaking is similar to that in peacekeeping. In contrast, the missions of counterair, interdiction, and close air support all potentially involve the direct use of force against belligerents or their property. It is this offensive force orientation that distinguishes peacemaking from peacekeeping.

US Air Force doctrine currently lists seven tenets of aerospace power; these tenets provide a general guide for employing airpower.⁶⁰

1. Centralized control/decentralized execution
2. Flexibility/versatility
3. Priority
4. Synergy
5. Balance
6. Concentration
7. Persistence

Two of these tenets deserve additional explanation due to their applicability to peacemaking. The combination of flexibility and versatility is "the ability to concentrate force anywhere and attack any facet of the enemy's power."⁶¹ Second, balance refers to the trade-offs between

combat opportunity, necessity, effectiveness and efficiency against the associated risk to friendly aerospace resources. Technologically sophisticated aerospace assets are not available in vast numbers and cannot be produced quickly.⁶²

The risk referred to above primarily concerns the tactical arena, although

the loss of aircraft will have a direct bearing on the government's policy and the level of popular support. The peacemaking force employment guidelines provide a useful framework for assessing the level of acceptable risk for air power. The following analysis will match the unique capabilities of air power with peacemaking force requirements; the results highlight both the strengths and weaknesses of air power in peacemaking situations.

The tactical limitations of air power in accomplishing its component mission tasks will depend on the specifics of the proposed peacemaking operation:

The characteristics of a war should shape campaign decisions. The specific characteristics of a war determine what missions should comprise the campaign, how they must be executed, and how much freedom of action is available for military operations.⁶³

The battle for air superiority, while always the first priority of air power, may require minimal effort against a poorly equipped belligerent, or a high-intensity offensive counter air battle against a well-equipped belligerent air force.⁶⁴ Once air superiority is guaranteed, air power can focus on interdiction and close air support missions to compel the belligerent(s) to stop fighting.

The key mechanism for compellence by air power is firepower. Thus, the focus when analyzing tactical mission feasibility must be the ability to place bombs on target at exactly the right time, then return to base in order to reload and do it again. This requires suitable targets, a means to detect and acquire those targets, and weapons systems to destroy those targets. A primary consideration is whether the belligerent force is primarily a conventional or guerrilla force. Generally, in a guerrilla situation "the distinction between offense and defense is blurred and...there exists no perceptible front line on which to concentrate force

and firepower."⁶⁵ Not only do light, guerrilla forces present few lucrative targets for attack, a study on the use of air power in Vietnam found that target acquisition in this environment is extremely difficult: "Fast moving aircraft are unable to acquire a slow moving target on the ground. They are totally ineffective against small, mobile groups of guerrillas in a jungle or heavily wooded area."⁶⁶

Closely linked to tactical target acquisition is intelligence collection and analysis. As AFM 1-1 notes, "precision weaponry requires precision intelligence and effective command and control."⁶⁷ In a quick-reaction situation, this could present a major challenge if the crisis region has not been a priority for intelligence collection. Satellite orbits can be adjusted given time, but information not obtainable from overhead imagery may require human or other creative sources.

AFM 1-1 identifies effective command and control as the other requirement for precision weaponry. Even a limited air operation requires an extensive command and control network. A simple interdiction mission would probably require participation by tankers, AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control System), ABCCC (Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center), counterair fighters, and a variety of electronic warfare aircraft in addition to the aircraft actually carrying the bombs. Add to this an overlapping array of ground radar and communications sites, an air defense network, and an air component commander and staff to oversee the entire operation. While this complexity in command and control increases in a multinational environment, the US Air Force's restructuring in 1991, to include a transition to a composite wing structure, should simplify command and control for smaller scale contingency operations.⁶⁸

Geography likewise has a major impact on tactical mission feasibility. Jungles and forests detract from the tactical effectiveness of air power, especially when fighting small, mobile groups of soldiers. Urban areas, such as Beirut, Ulster, and Sarajevo, present even more complex challenges for targeting small bands of guerrillas while avoiding collateral damage. Furthermore, certain types of terrain may increase the risks to friendly aircraft. In rugged or mountainous terrain small groups of belligerents with shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles and automatic weapons can threaten low flying aircraft while remaining under good cover. Such was the case in Afghanistan, when the Mujaheddin used American supplied Stinger missiles to inflict heavy losses on Soviet tactical aircraft.⁶⁹ Other potential geographic limitations include basing rights, lines of communications, and overflight privileges through neighboring airspace.

Time constraints on the mission will come from either political restrictions as defined by the strategic goal or military capabilities. Transportation and logistics will limit early commitment of ground forces; air forces, in contrast, are well-suited for early intervention. Regardless, analysis of the military mission should include a definition of the military end-state desired and a timetable for achieving it. In the case of peacemaking, the basic end-state is a truce between belligerents which allows the peacemaking forces to withdraw in favor of more impartial peacekeeping forces. In support, air forces could transition to a peacekeeping role, with counterair fighters maintaining air superiority over the peacekeeping forces and attack aircraft remaining close enough to be recalled if serious fighting began anew.

The analysis of tactical feasibility provides a general idea of the strengths and weaknesses of airpower in a proposed situation. As long as the general concept for the military mission is feasible, the next step is to fine tune the concept by deciding exactly how air power will contribute to the attainment of the strategic goal. For air power these are essentially decisions concerning targeting. Specifically, planners must figure out what specific sequence or array of targets will best exploit belligerent vulnerabilities.

In conventional situations, military forces may be vulnerable to air attack, either through direct destruction of combat vehicles or interdiction of supplies.

Robert Pape writes that

Air strikes on military targets can have significant coercive impact, but only if they dramatically reduce the opponent's hopes for success on the battlefield. Simply destroying some enemy forces is not enough, as the Vietnam War illustrated...the success or failure of coercive bombing depends not only on the bombing strategy, but also on the strategy employed by the opponent.⁷⁰

Thus, even if air attacks against guerrilla forces are tactically feasible, they are inappropriate if they have no coercive value. However, guerrillas may have a vulnerable support base or sanctuary suitable for attack, political restrictions permitting.

This does not imply that air power cannot be effective against bands of guerrillas or other light fighters. In 1950 United Nations forces had pushed the North Korean Army close to the Chinese border. Although General MacArthur may have overstated the ability of the Air Force to isolate the battlefield by keeping the Chinese from seriously intervening⁷¹, air power did have a major role in facilitating MacArthur's retreat when faced with a Chinese advance that

outnumbered his by as much as 10 to 1 in places: "in December alone air attacks killed and wounded more than 30,000 Chinese soldiers--the equivalent of four to five full divisions."⁷² Because of these losses the Chinese pursuit slowed, as they resumed their previous practice of moving at night and hiding during the day. In this case, the coercive impact of air power was limited to forcing a change in enemy tactics; however, this was enough to permit a successful allied retreat with losses of "less than 13,000 killed and wounded."⁷³

In cases where popular support is low and the belligerent government has a centralized power structure, direct air attack against command headquarters and communications facilities offer a tactically feasible alternative to direct attack against belligerent forces. If the belligerent appears vulnerable in this area, attacking these types of targets first will as a minimum facilitate subsequent attacks against belligerent forces.

Finally, air could feasibly target the civilian infrastructure in order to undermine popular support for the belligerent. This is only a vulnerability if something less than national survival is at stake for the populace, and the belligerent armed forces respond either directly or through the government to pressure from the population. The effectiveness of this targeting strategy may be controversial from the start and remain so through the end of hostilities. Citing the example of World War II bombing of civilian population centers, Robert Pape writes "conventional air attacks on civilians do not cause states to abandon important national interests."⁷⁴ Adding in considerations of international law and public support, non-lethal means of influence such as PSYOPS

may prove far more effective in undermining the will of the belligerent population to continue fighting. As one defense analyst put it, "you must avoid destroying a village to save it."⁷⁵

The preceding analysis focused on targeting, seeking to exploit enemy vulnerabilities by bombing the appropriate targets which will compel the belligerent(s) to stop fighting. However, an accurate analysis of belligerent vulnerabilities will not ensure a link up between the tactical mission and the strategic goal if the proposed action does not also minimize friendly vulnerabilities.

The first vulnerability to protect is friendly military forces. In the case of air this means military and civilian leaders must select the right type and size of force to do the mission without undue risk. Certainly, some circumstances may allow air power to independently conduct limited raids to compel changes in belligerent behavior, such as the 1986 air attack against terrorist targets in Libya. However, most of the time peacemaking operations will require a joint task force to ensure attainment of the strategic goal.

The friendly government or alliance is the next vulnerability to protect. Specific rules of engagement will necessarily restrict the employment of air power to maintain the legitimacy of the overall policy. Since the primary method of using air for compellence is bombing, the primary restriction on air will be proportionality; restrictions to avoid collateral damage and fratricide will also be critical, even if making tactical mission accomplishment more

difficult. On the other hand, certain political restrictions may prevent completion of the assigned mission. For example, political restrictions may prevent offensive counter air taskings from attacking belligerent aircraft on the ground. This could indefinitely delay the attainment of air superiority, and accept a high degree of risk by relying solely on defensive counter air, thus ceding the initiative to the enemy. Finally, in the case of multilateral cooperation, the centralized control and decentralized execution tenet of air power allows air forces from several nations to integrate quickly by using the centralized air tasking order (ATO) process to coordinate and deconflict taskings

The last friendly vulnerability to overcome is public support. Generally, since the visible presence of air forces is far less than ground forces, this is less of a problem for air power. However, the risks are potentially greater for air power, as a tactical mistake can have immediate strategic consequences. Consider the case of an inexperienced pilot who inadvertently hit the wrong switch and sends a bomb into an off-limits target. One such act could jeopardize the entire peacemaking operation by undermining public support.

Certainly the chances of one tactical error touching off a chain of events leading to strategic failure are remote. Nevertheless, such unintended consequences are a distinct possibility with which planners must consider. In tactical terms, this is really an analysis of branches and sequels, done with a strategic perspective. Prior to the end of the Cold War, the primary unintended consequence to avoid was a superpower confrontation. In peacemaking operations,

the primary unintended consequence to avoid is probably the building of sympathy for the belligerent cause. This will inhibit peace by encouraging external support for the belligerent(s) or undermining the consensus for and hence legitimacy of friendly forces. Within this area of unintended consequences, planners must consider the possibility of failure. In this regard, air power offers more flexibility by operating from distances which allow for disengagement. Thus, air power provides the flexibility to execute an air only option, and in the event of an initial failure, then proceed with a build-up of ground forces or disengage as appropriate.

The preceding comparison of the force requirements in peacemaking with the capabilities of air power has shown air power definitely has a role in peacemaking operations. The use of air to support ground forces engaged in combat should not be a controversial issue for peacemaking. The Army's Field Manual 100-5 states "the Army will not operate alone. Operations involving Army forces will always be joint."⁷⁶ At the other end of the spectrum, though, actual air strikes are incompatible with a peacekeeping effort--air attacks in this environment violate the impartiality of the peacekeepers and expose them to retribution without the necessary combat means to fight back.

The difficulty in defining the role of air concerns the area in the middle--air only options or air operations supported by minimal ground combat power. Both of these options essentially rely on bombing alone to compel the belligerents to stop fighting. Applying the preceding analysis of the

use of air power in peacemaking to a specific situation should determine whether this is a realistic expectation. The following historical examples illustrate cases in which air power alone was successful in compelling a change in belligerent behavior.

Immediately following World War I, Britain successfully used its Royal Air Force (RAF) in a primary role of "policing the empire."⁷⁷ The British government found the air force particularly suited to enforcing the peace throughout sparsely populated areas of the Middle East:

The aeroplane can be regarded as a primary weapon in wild unadministered country, and as a secondary weapon in co-operation with the Army wherever a strong and settled administration exists. It is fairly obvious why this should be so, for when trouble breaks out in a settled country...the guilty and innocent parts of the population are living close together, anti-Government forces rarely come out into the open, and the chief requirement is to separate the combatants or to give physical protection to property and to the many important and vulnerable points which exist in any organized community: the whole thing is on too small a scale to give scope for the characteristics of the aeroplane...⁷⁸

The minimum political objectives for these air control operations were to ensure British officials could "travel unmolested" anywhere they wanted to go, to preserve the "sanctity of the trade-routes," and to ensure that any fighting between tribes did not interfere "with the rights of third parties."⁷⁹ The first such example of British air control occurred in 1919, when the RAF's "Z" Unit deployed with its DH-9s to Somaliland to compel Mohammed bin Abdullah Hassan, the "mad" mullah, to stop raiding friendly tribes. The first raid of six aircraft nearly scored a direct hit on the mullah himself. Subsequent raids forced the mullah and his dervishes to evacuate their villages. Less than a month later, after a combined

pursuit by ground forces and "Z" Unit, the operations concluded with the mullah fleeing the country due to his loss of face after having most of his personal following killed or captured.⁸⁰

Another example of how the British employed air control occurred in the Aden Protectorate in 1935, when the Quteibis tribe attacked a caravan from Yemen. Due to a recently signed treaty with Yemen, the British considered the attack on this caravan politically significant, and therefore issued an ultimatum to force the Quteibis to pay a fine and turn over the men responsible for the raid:

If you do not produce the fine and the men, you must leave all your villages and fields, taking all your property and animals with you, and keep right away until the Government give you permission to come back...Until you have complied with the terms your villages and fields may be bombed or fired on at any time by day or night...⁸¹

In explaining this ultimatum, Air Commodore C.F.A. Portal, the commanding officer of the RAF unit in Aden, emphasized the importance of good intelligence in selecting targets which will compel a change in belligerent behavior:

I would like to say a word about the vital importance of intelligence. In order to put the screw on scientifically you must know a good deal about the country and the people, their resources, their methods of living, and even about their mental processes...⁸²

At the expiration of the ultimatum, the RAF "dropped a few small bombs in the principal villages" and conducted heavier bombing "against the houses of the Sheikh and his uncle, who were known to have instigated both the original offence and the subsequent defiance of the government."⁸³ When the Quteibis expressed contempt for the minimal bomb damage resulting from the original limited attacks, the RAF "flattened out a very small but conspicuous village

belonging to one of the sections of the tribe who had raided the caravan."⁸⁴

Air Commodore Portal summarized the effectiveness of the aerial blockade by tracing the reaction of the Quteibis:

The Quteibis were at first excited, defiant and boastful of the revenge they would take afterwards...The next stage was internal squabbling, blaming each other for having caused the trouble...The third stage was rather wistful boredom as they watched the approach of the rains and realized if they did not start ploughing soon they would lose their crops. Finally came the stage of making offers for peace...⁸⁵

In only two months the Quteibis accepted peace on Britain's terms. This operation achieved its objectives at very low costs: zero British casualties and only three Quteibis deaths due to tampering with an unexploded bomb.

In both of these cases of British air control, four unique factors were present. First, the British had the technological capability and a favorable environment to identify, detect, and destroy targets which had compellent value to the belligerents. Second, the British could attack with near impunity, as the belligerents had nothing but rifles to counter the air attacks. Next, the political environment supported direct attacks against the personal property of the belligerents. Finally, the belligerents fought for limited objectives. As Air Commodore Portal observed,

There are, of course, some things that the wild man of the hills is ready to die for if he is given the chance, but the question is whether he will still care so much for them after a few months of extreme boredom and inconvenience, when his neighbors are inclined to laugh at him, when skillful propaganda has turned the waverers in his own community against him, and when no chance of capturing a British rifle, or dying in the attempt, seems likely to present itself.⁸⁶

These same circumstances may permit independent air operations to have similar success in present times, as demonstrated in the joint USAF/USN air raid by the U.S. against Libya in 1986. With evidence directly linking the Libyan government to international terrorism, U.S. President Ronald Reagan ordered the raid with the military objective of destroying a significant amount of the Libyan terrorist infrastructure, and a political objective of compelling Libyan leader Mohamar Gadhafi to stop sponsoring terrorism. With the loss of one F-111, the joint air forces hit 98% of the assigned targets.⁸⁷ Clearly, the raid was militarily successful. While the longer term political impact is more difficult to judge, the low-profile of Gadhafi following the raid indicates a reasonable degree of compellence value.

Despite over 50 years separating the British air control experience and the American air raid on Libya, several common conditions were present which boosted the compellence value of air power. First, technological superiority over the belligerents allowed aircraft to fly over the belligerents, successfully acquire and destroy their targets, and egress the hostile airspace with minimum to no losses. Second, selected targets were vulnerable to air attack. Attacks conducted by the British targeted either fixed sites or belligerents out in the open. The American attack against Libya targeted fixed terrorist training sites. Third, in both cases a clear linkage existed between military action and the overall political objectives. Limitations on the use of force in both cases were an important consideration in maintaining friendly public support while being careful not to build support for the belligerents. Finally, in these cases the belligerents' objec-

tives were limited--national or ethnic survival was not at stake. In short, the belligerents had more to lose by continuing to fight than by complying with the demands placed on them.

While the British employed coordinated ground action in pursuing the "mad" mullah, the actions against the Quteibis and the American raid on Libya employed air power alone. Considering the apparent lack of significant ground action or economic and political coercion, these historical studies demonstrate the potential for air power to compel a change in belligerent behavior under certain conditions. Additionally, these favorable conditions are consistent with the doctrinally based guidelines derived in this section for employing air power in peacemaking. The key difference between these historical examples and many potential peacemaking situations lies in the nature of the belligerent's objectives. Both the "mad" mullah and the Quteibis had conducted illegal raids. All that was at stake for them was the economic loss from stopping their raiding activities and complying with British directives. For Gadhafi, compliance meant a loss of face in the Arab world and less influence through terrorism. All of these belligerents had only limited interests in continuing their offending behavior. In contrast many prospective peacemaking situations must overcome deep-seated ethnic, racial, or national rivalries which become life or death issues. In these instances, air power alone may not be sufficient to compel an end to hostilities.

There may well be reason to employ military forces in Sarajevo to restore order; among other things, such operations may help create the conditions for peacekeeping. But these are *combat* operations which entail costs and risks not normally associated with peacekeeping.

Richard J. Haney, Colonel, US Army
Professor, National War College⁸⁸

Section V: Conclusion

Colonel Haney's editorial in the Chicago Tribune emphasizes the differences between peacekeeping and peacemaking. His warning is clear: "sloppy thinking can cause embarrassment when political leaders choose inappropriate solutions to diplomatic problems; when the use of military force is considered, it can cost lives."⁸⁹ Military and civilian leaders must avoid such "sloppy thinking" by critically analyzing potential peacemaking situations to determine the most effective uses of force to compel belligerent parties to stop fighting. Clearly, the first step in the process is to define the desired end-state in as specific terms as possible. Next, planners should evaluate the tactical feasibility of proposed force employment options, then analyze which options will best achieve the desired political end-state. This analysis must attempt to exploit belligerent vulnerabilities while considering the need to protect friendly forces, operate within the given political constraints, and maintain popular support. However, for the crisis in Yugoslavia, opinions diverge over the type and amount of force required to compel a cease-fire.

At the heart of this controversy is whether limited air strikes will have sufficient coercive value to end the fighting. Representative Aspin describes the

"limited objectives school"⁹⁰ as proposing a limited role for air power to cope with crises that defy short-term resolution through economic and political means. This school of thought believes that either a show of force or limited air strikes can effectively compel belligerent parties to stop fighting and begin negotiating. Implicit in this argument is that failure will not require an increased commitment of force or result in a so-called quagmire.

Historical evidence indicates that such a use of air power can be an effective compellent in only very limited circumstances. In peacekeeping operations, air strikes are inappropriate since they violate the impartiality required of the peacekeeping force, leading to force escalation on both sides and a consequent failure of the peacekeeping mission. If hostilities are on-going with no truce to observe, peacekeeping is not possible. These situations require peacemaking operations to restore at least a temporary peace. Contrary to the argument put forth by the limited objectives school, though, previous peacekeeping and peacemaking situations show that gradual force escalation is usually not effective in compelling a determined enemy. Peacemaking is thus a combat operation, in most cases requiring joint employment of forces. Applying these conclusions to the specific conditions in Yugoslavia shows that limited air strikes alone will probably not compel a peace between the Serbs, Croats, and Bosnians. The purpose here is not to provide a detailed analysis of the situation in Yugoslavia and propose specific courses of action, but rather to show what circumstances in Yugoslavia diminish the coercive value of limited air strikes.

The first consideration in Yugoslavia is the nature of the belligerents and

the geography of the region. In the words of British Prime Minister John Major: "we are not dealing with an orthodox war, a single enemy, a front line, or clearly identifiable targets."⁹¹ While the regular Serbian Army is a conventional force vulnerable to attack from the air, much of the fighting in Bosnia is the result of separate Serbian militias relying on "easily concealed light mortars and irregular infantry." Thus, "air power could play only a limited role...because it would be impossible to hit defending Serb forces, which would be dug-in towns, without risking heavy civilian casualties."⁹² The Serbian "guns and mortars doing most of the killing are easily movable,"⁹³ and the mountainous terrain increases the risks by making target acquisition extremely difficult and leaving strike aircraft vulnerable to Serb gunners concealed in the mountains. Even a limited mission of flying air cover to protect relief shipments would require combat troops on the ground--the one cargo aircraft shot down was hit by an easily concealed and very mobile shoulder fired missile.⁹⁴

An even more relevant issue is the whether air power can deliver the right type and amount of force to compel peace in the region. Irregular Serbian forces are not especially vulnerable to direct air attack due to the tactical factors already discussed. The fragmented nature of the factions fighting in Serbia similarly makes attacks against Serbian government facilities of questionable value, although the missions of attacking airfields, ports, armament facilities or bridges is tactically feasible. Similarly, attacks against power stations or other high value assets within the civilian infrastructure may have little value in compelling an end to fighting. According to a Pentagon official, such "air strikes would just make

them dig in their heels, fight, and inflict greater casualties on Sarajevo... the Serbs are a hardheaded people who historically have been prepared to take heavy casualties."⁹⁵

Air power can contribute to peacemaking, and could be a vital part of a joint peacemaking effort in Yugoslavia. However, tactical air missions alone may not be sufficient to coerce the Serbs, Croats, and Bosnians to cease fighting. Not only would the missions themselves be tactically difficult, but a linkage between successful air strikes and the end to hostilities is unclear at best. Thus, if the UN or a smaller group of nations employ limited air strikes in Yugoslavia, they should set clear objectives to include a time limit for the action. If air strikes fail to bring about an end to the fighting within the prescribed time, the peacemakers must reassess the overall strategy. They should continue with the limited air strike strategy only if evidence indicates significant progress towards peace. If not, peacemakers should either disengage militarily, or commit sufficient joint air and ground forces to overwhelm the belligerents, terminate the hostilities, and transition to peacekeeping.

Appendix A: Considerations for Using Force to Compel Peace

I. Tactical feasibility of military mission.

- A. Component mission tasks/coordination required
- B. Enemy forces/risk assessment
- C. Geography
- D. Time
- E. Hostility termination

II. Exploit vulnerabilities of belligerent(s).

A. Military forces

- 1. Attack physical ability to fight.
- 2. Conventional versus guerilla forces.
- 3. Direct (physical destruction of combatants) versus indirect attack (isolate combatants).
- 4. Consider level of national will/popular support.

B. Government/civil authority

- 1. Attack ability to maintain order and effectively command and control military force.
- 2. Combination of weak national will and strong, centralized control structure should be particularly vulnerable.
- 3. Target communication/command facilities and systems.

C. People

- 1. Attack the will to continue fighting.
- 2. Difficult to determine cause and effect.
- 3. Target infrastructure within limits imposed by strategic goal.
- 4. Long-term impact could be negative.

III. Maximize friendly strengths.

A. Military

1. Appropriate force size and type.
2. Logistical support.
3. Unity of effort.
4. Early use of force may have better chance of success.
5. Overwhelming force at decisive point.

B. Government/Alliance

1. Clear mandate.
2. Level of risk versus:
 - (a) legal restrictions.
 - (b) compromises to achieve consensus.
3. Consider unilateral action if necessary.

C. People

1. Balance between overwhelming force at decisive point and perception of proportionality.
2. Military advantage of early intervention versus public acceptance of "last resort."
3. Proactive action with media.

IV. Unintended consequences.

- A. Environmental damage.
- B. Popular support (both sides).
- C. Cultural considerations.
- D. Consider impact of not taking military action.

Endnotes

1. Randolph Ryan, "Evasion on Bosnia," Boston Globe, 27 August 1992: 19. George Kenney's resignation came in response to the lack of action at a multinational peace conference held in London over the Balkan issue. Kenney's strong belief was that peace efforts would fail without "very strong pressures, including military pressures, against Serbia to stop its campaign of genocide in Bosnia."
2. William Matthews, "After the Cold War: Military 'Peace Enforcers'?" Air Force Times, (12 October 1992): 38.
3. Bill Clinton, quoted in R. W. Apple Jr., "Baker Aide Asks War Crimes Inquiry Into Bosnia Camps," New York Times, 6 August 1992: 1.
4. Lewis MacKenzie, quoted in Jane's Defence Weekly, (19 September 1992): 48. Since leaving Sarajevo, MacKenzie earned a promotion to Lieutenant General.
5. Dick Cheney, quoted in "Cheney's Strong Case on Conflict in the Balkans," Seattle Post-Intelligencer, 17 August 1992: 9.
6. Colin Powell, quoted in "The Question in Bosnia," The Kansas City Star, 5 October 1992: B-4.
7. Stephen Blank et al., Responding to Low-Intensity Conflict Challenges (Maxwell Air Force base, Alabama: Air University Press, 1990), 45.
8. Casper Weinberger, "The Uses of Military Power," in Ethics and American Power, ed. Ernest W. Lefever (Washington, D.C.: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1985), 7-8. Many quote Weinberger's second test to accuse him of taking an all-or-nothing approach to the use of military force. However, they fail to add his qualifier that "if the particular situation requires only limited force to win our objectives, then we should not hesitate to commit forces sized accordingly. When Hitler broke treaties and remilitarized the Rhineland, small combat forces could then perhaps have prevented the holocaust of World War II."
9. Lee Michael Katz, "U.N. Peacekeepers Stretched Thin," USA Today, 15 September 1992: 4A. As of September 1992, UN peacekeeping forces are in Cambodia, Yugoslavia, Lebanon, Cyprus, Israel, Somalia, Iraq, El Salvador, Angola, Western Sahara, and India/Pakistan.
10. Peter Grier, "Should US Fight War in Bosnia? Question Opens an Old Debate," The Christian Science Monitor, 14 September 1992: 9.

11. Les Aspin, quoted in William Matthews, "After the Cold War: Military 'Peace Enforcers'?" Air Force Times, 12 October 1992: 38.
12. Lt Gen Barry McCaffrey, the Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, gave this estimate to Congress. Reported by Louise Lief and Bruce B. Auster, "Defusing New Threats," US News and World Report, (21 September 1992): 53.
13. Les Aspin, quoted by Harry Summers, "Military Has a Role in a Postwar World," The Kansas City Star, 11 October 1992: K-4.
14. Matthews, 38. Retired Colonel Don Snider of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, notes the international failure to intervene will likely encourage other would-be aggressors.
15. Lord Haldane quoted in John C. Ries, "Peacekeeping and Peace Observation: The Canadian Case," (Vol IX Arms Control Special Studies Program, University of California Los Angeles, 1968), 2.
16. George Bush, White House press release of the President's address to the United Nations General Assembly, 21 September 1992.
17. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 3-07.3 JTTP for Peacekeeping Operations (Washington, DC: Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, June 1991 [Initial Draft]), A-2.
18. Ibid., A-1.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. Jeffery R. Willis, "The Employment of U.S. Marines in Lebanon 1982-1984," (Master of Military Art and Science Thesis, US Army Command and General Staff College, 1992), 74.
22. Willis, 62-63.
23. Paul F. Diehl, in "Avoiding Another Beirut Disaster," Conflict, Vol 8 (New York: Taylor and Francis, 1988), 261-270, states Soviet opposition prevented the UN from authorizing a mission on its own. He further notes Israel rejected UN action in favor of a multinational operation that included a prominent American role.
24. Casper Weinberger, Fighting For Peace (New York: Warner Books, Inc., 1990), 150-151.
25. Ibid., 152.

26. Steven Strasser et al, "Right Men, Wrong Job?" Newsweek, (19 December 1983): 39.
27. Weinberger, 166. Weinberger's account of the Beirut situation provides a unique insight on the controversy between the State Department and the Department of Defense over U.S. policy in Lebanon. Weinberger claims to have recommended against U.S. involvement, arguing that the situation was not winnable.
28. Michael D. Malone, William H. Miller, and Joseph W. Robben, "Lebanon: Lessons for Future Use of American Forces in Peacekeeping," (Strategic Study at The National War College National Defense University, 1985), 23.
29. Russel Watson et al, "Higher Risks--and No Easy Options," U.S. News and World Report, (19 December 1983): 27.
30. Mark Whitaker et al, "A Flash of Gunpowder Politics," Newsweek, (26 December 1983): 24.
31. Robert S. Dudley, "Lebanon Fallout: Strains Between Reagan, Military," U.S. News and World Report, (9 January 1984): 21.
32. Meg Greenfield, "The Druse, Alawites, and New Jewels," Newsweek, (26 December 1983): 80.
33. Diehl, 269.
34. Joint Pub 3-07.3, II-9.
35. Ibid., II-19.
36. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 3-07, Doctrine for Joint Operations in Low Intensity Conflict (Washington, DC: Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, September 1990 [Test Pub]), I-2. The word peacemaking does not actually appear in this manual; instead, the chapter on peacekeeping refers to truce-making, "an operation conducted to establish peace between two warring parties without their consent," p. IV-1. However, when referring to the chapter on contingency operations, truce-making does not appear. In its place is the phrase "operations to restore order," p. V-15. More consistent use of the word peacemaking appears in U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force, FM 100-20/AFP 3-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict (Washington, DC: Headquarters Departments of the Army and the Air Force, 5 December 1990). In this publication peacemaking is distinct from peacekeeping, as Peacemaking appears as a category of peacetime contingency operations, pp 5-1 to 5-9. The words truce-making and operations to restore order do not appear in this manual.
37. FM 100-20/AFP 3-20, Glossary-6.

38. Ibid., 5-7.

39. Daniel M. Wilson Jr., "Peacemaking: The Effectiveness of British Strategy in Northern Ireland 1969-1972," (Master of Military Art and Science Thesis, US Army Command and General Staff College, 1992), 2 and 112.

40. Ibid., 121.

41. Walter E. Kretchik, "Peacemaking and Operational Art: The Israeli Experience in Operation 'Peace for Galilee,'" (Monograph, US Army Command and General Staff College, School of Advanced Military Studies, 28 May 1992), 41.

42. Gustav Hagglund, "Peace-Keeping in a Modern War Zone," Survival 32 (May-June 1990): 233-240, quoted by John Q. Blodgett, "The Future of UN Peacekeeping," The Washington Quarterly (Winter 1991): 214.

43. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), 89.

44. Don M. Snider and William J. Taylor, "Needed-a Pentagon Prepared to Wage Peace," Washington Post, 9 August 1992: C1.

45. In 1982, Israeli military forces entered Lebanon to establish a 40 kilometer buffer around its northern border by destroying PLO elements which had been shelling and raiding settlements in northern Israel. Despite Israel's military successes against conventional military forces in Operation Peace for Galilee, Israeli forces had considerable difficulty against Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) guerrillas entrenched in Tyre and Beirut. Mark P. Hertling, "Insights Garnered and Gained: Military Theory and Operation Peace for Galilee" (Monograph, US Army Command and General Staff College, School of Advanced Military Studies, 25 April 1988) concludes from this operation that "since guerilla forces usually don't have a military center of gravity, any attack using conventional military means is doomed to failure" (p. 32). This conclusion seems a bit extreme, as Kretchik notes that the Israeli success in destroying Syrian surface-to-air missiles left the "PLO vulnerable to Israeli air power" (p. 34), implying at least an indirect linkage between that event and the subsequent cessation of PLO field operations. In any case, situations in which the belligerents are not clearly identified present a unique challenge; conventional forces will need to find a vulnerability such as external support to exploit. In short, success will most likely come through indirect means.

46. Emmett E. Perry, Jr., "Peacemaking: Implications for the US Army" (Monograph, US Army Command and General Staff College, School of Advanced Military Studies, 1991), 23-24.

47. Lieutenant General Bernard Trainor, US Marine Corps Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, Policies, and Operations. Quoted in Watson, 26.
48. George K. Osborn and William J. Taylor, Jr., "The Employment of Force: Political-Military Considerations," in U.S. Policy and Low Intensity Conflict, ed. Sam C. Sarkesian and William L. Scully (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Books, 1981), 21.
49. Ries, 25.
50. An on-going philosophical debate over humanitarian intervention seeks to answer the question "can the protection of human rights justify setting aside organizing principles of the international system [national sovereignty]?" As long as this question remains unresolved in the UN, the consensus required to draft clear mandates for peacemaking operations will likely be slow in coming. See the following articles in Ethics and International Affairs Vol 6 (Nov-Dec 1992): Jarat Chopra and Thomas G. Weiss, "Sovereignty Is No Longer Sacrosanct: Codifying Humanitarian Intervention," 95-117, Steve Brinkoetter, "The Role for Ethics In Bush's New World Order," 69-79, and Charles W. Kegley, Jr., "The New Global Order: The Power of Principle in a Pluralistic World," 21-40.
51. John Q. Blodgett, "The Future of UN Peacekeeping," The Washington Quarterly (Winter 1991): 207-220. Blodgett briefly reviews the mechanism for UN peacekeeping and enforcement actions.
52. William B. Quandt, "Peacekeeping and Demilitarization in the Arab-Israeli Conflict," (Research Paper, Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California, 1970), vii.
53. Weinberger, 144: President Reagan "was very critical of the Israelis' use of force and particularly their use of the CBU or 'cluster' bomb units, which we had given to Israel to use in their own defense; they had used them in urban areas, inflicting heavy casualties on civilians."
54. Perry, 22.
55. Osborn and Taylor, 21.
56. Colin Powell, "Building the Force for the 21st Century," Defense Issues Vol 7 No 52, 1-5. Reprint of Powell's remarks to the Air Force Association in Washington, D.C., on 14 September 1992.
57. David R. Mets, Land-Based Air Power in Third World Crises (Maxwell Air Force Base: Air University Press, 1986), 5-7.
58. Donald B. Rice, "Air Power Ascendancy Based on 3 Post-Cold War Factors," Air Force Times (12 October 1992): 37.

59. US Air Force, AFM 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force Vol I (Washington, DC: Department of the Air Force, 1992), 7.
60. Ibid., 8.
61. Ibid.
62. Ibid.
63. Ibid., 10.
64. John A. Warden III, The Air Campaign (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1988), 13, states "air superiority is a necessity...air superiority means having sufficient control of the air to make air attacks on the enemy without serious opposition and, on the other hand, to be free from the danger of serious enemy air incursions."
65. Stephen Blank et al., 317.
66. Gary N. Schneider, "Air Power In Low-Intensity Conflict" (Research paper, US Air Force Air University, Air War College, May 1987), 35.
67. AFM 1-1 Vol 1, 6.
68. Robert J. Blunden, Jr., "Tailoring the Tactical Air Control System for Smaller Scale Contingencies," CADRE Paper Special Series (Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama: Air University Press, 1992), 31.
69. Stephen Blank et al., 100: "Introduction of the Stingers [against the Soviet forces in Afghanistan]...negated a military strategy that depended on air power...The loss of aircraft to the Stingers demoralized air and airborne forces, compelling helicopters and planes to use evasive or high-flying maneuvers. These actions severely degraded bombing accuracy and helicopter interdiction, artillery, and airdrops."
70. Robert A. Pape, Jr., "Air Power Alone Is Powerless in This War," Los Angeles Times (2 September 1992): 11.
71. Clay Blair, The Forgotten War (New York: Doubleday, 1987), 377 and 394-395. Blair makes the case that MacArthur refused to believe mounting evidence of a large-scale Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) attack, and was confident of the Far East Air Force's (FEAF) ability to "slaughter" the CCF in any event. Yet, Blair notes the tactical misgivings of LtGen Stratemeyer, Commander of FEAF, in his analysis of how difficult it would be to take out bridges along the Yalu River without violating Communist Chinese airspace.

72. Robert F. Futrell, *The United States Air Force in Korea 1950-53* (Washington, DC: Office of Air Force History, 1983), 261-63, quoted in Warden, 85.
73. William Manchester, *American Caesar: Douglas MacArthur 1880-1964* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1978), 611, quoted in Warden, 85.
74. Pape, 11.
75. Lief and Auster, 48.
76. US Army, *FM 100-5, Operations* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1992 [Preliminary Draft]), 2-2.
77. C.F.A. Portal, "Air Force Cooperation in Policing the Empire," *Journal of the Royal United Service Institute*, (May 1937): 343-58.
78. Ibid., 344.
79. Ibid., 348.
80. F.A. Skoulding, "With 'Z' Unit in Somaliland," *The Royal Air Force Quarterly* (July 1930): 387-96.
81. Portal, 352.
82. Ibid.
83. Ibid., 353.
84. Ibid.
85. Ibid.
86. Ibid., 355.
87. Daniel P. Bolger, *Americans At War* (Novato: Presidio Press, 1988), 406-407, quoted by Charles H. Jacoby, Jr., "In Search Of Quick Decision: The Myth Of The Independent Air Campaign," (Monograph, US Army Command and General Staff College, School of Advanced Military Studies, 1991), 29-31.
88. Richard J. Haney, "The Perils of Peacekeeping," *Chicago Tribune*, 6 July 1992: 9.
89. Ibid.

90. Les Aspin, "With the Soviets and Cold War Gone, What is the Future for US Forces?" The Officer (November 1992): 21-26.
91. Apple, 1.
92. Pape, 11.
93. "The Arts of War and the Guiles of Peace," The Economist (21 August 1992): 37.
94. John M. Goshko, "Bosnia 'No-Fly Zone' Considered by U.S.," The Washington Post 12 September 1992: 16.
95. Eric Schmitt, "U.S. Is Shying From Bosnian Conflict," New York Times 19 July 1992: 10.

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