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"CONSIDERATIONS IN JAPAN'S MILITARY PLANNING FOR THE FUTURE"

This paper represents the view of the author and does not necessarily reflect the official policy of the U.S. Navy or the Department of Defense.

ROBERT L. RAU

POLITICAL SCIENCE DEPARTMENT

U.S. NAVAL ACADEMY


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The end of the cold war, the war in the Persian Gulf, the withdrawal of U.S. forces from the Philippines among other disrupting events have forced Japan to reevaluate its military and foreign policies. Before 1990 Japan had been isolated and protected from having to assume political and security roles commensurate with its economic power. The highly effective strategy of Yoshida Shigeru who served as prime minister in the early post-war period established the principle of Japan's post-war non-involvement in the political and military disputes of other nations as well as the concept of minimal self-defense.¹ This strategy when combined with U.S. willingness to provide for Japanese defense, enabled Japan to rebuild its industrial base and establish international trade and industrial relations.

Japan's economic success as well as the reduction of security tension produced by the cold war has encouraged the reconsideration of old policies and relations with a view to the future. In security terms the partnership with the U.S. remains the most important as well as the most delicate. In 1992 the two most prominent security related issues have been whether to demand a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council and whether to create a peacekeeping force which can be deployed under U.N. auspices in trouble spots.²

¹ See Kenneth B. Pyle, *The Japanese Question-Power and Purpose in a New Era*, The AEI Press, 1992, pp. 20-41.

² See Draft Report-Japan's Role in the International Community-Special Study Group Report, LDP; reprinted in *Japan Echo*, Summer 1992, pp.49-63.

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The paper will focus upon the following aspects:

- ...Current limitations and review of Self Defense Forces Structure

- ...Discussion of U.S.-Japan Security Treaty in light of current circumstances

- ...Military-political implications of the Gulf War for the security process in Japan

- ...External Concerns

- ...Conditions under which Japan may be compelled to adapt a more aggressive security posture

U.S.-JAPAN SECURITY RELATIONS -- Over less than ten years Japan has selectively rebuilt its defense forces to a formidable level in the areas of anti-submarine warfare, aerial patrol of sea lines of communications, defensive uses of submarine warfare and a limited ability to defend Hokkaido, Japan's north island.³ Japan does not possess a balanced military force although it has organized the personnel structure of the Japanese Self Defense Forces(JSDF) so that it may be expanded rapidly if necessary.

Despite surface appearances, U.S.-Japanese security relations have always been marked by contrasting views of security issues. Although the alliance partners have generally been in agreement as to the nature of the military threat. The intrusion, in recent years, of economic considerations and competition in the


³ See "Defense of Japan-1991," *The Japan Times*, 1992, p. 215.

military arena(FSX and other cooperative military technology exchange projects), the dispute over the nature of Japan's contributions to the Gulf War and the relative decline of U.S. economic power are making relations more difficult as well as more important to both parties.

From the alliance perspective, the intent in recent years has been to identify areas in which Japan can supplement/complement U.S. forces in areas in which the U.S. does not possess adequate numbers of naval vessels, air craft and other military assets. 1992 represents a way-point in this relationship.⁴ Greater levels of cooperation have increased expectations on the part of the U.S. and raised questions in Japan as to the level of cooperation necessary. Concepts such as burdensharing, interoperability and military technology issues define the relationship. Japan must soon decide whether to allocate the necessary funds to continue its expansion of more sophisticated military equipment(aircraft carriers, amphibious ships, aerial refueling aircraft, etc.) Continuance on this course will eventually result in a force structure capable of deployment overseas, patrol of the SLOCS east to Hawaii and south to the Indian Ocean, and west to the Persian Gulf. (See Map 1.) In that the U.S. is faced with the removal and or retrenchment of

⁴ Prime Minister Miyazawa, in early October 1992, announced a review of current defense spending and intimated that funding would be reduced and postponed for the purchase main battle tanks,F-15's and escort ships. See reporting in *Foreign Broadcast Translation Service-FBIS-EAS-92* in August, September and October 1992.

its bases in the Philippines and other countries in Asia, maintaining balanced security relations with Japan becomes increasingly important.



Map 1: Trade Routes (Source: U.S. Department of State)

The joint statement issued by Prime Minister Suzuki and President Reagan on May 8, 1981 marked the beginning of the contemporary U.S.-Japan security relationship. This document reflected months of negotiations and emphasized their joint concern as to the Soviet military buildup in the Northern Pacific area. The parties agreed on an appropriate division of roles in the defense of Japan.⁵

Japan committed to

- (1) Defending Japanese territories and its surrounding sea and air spaces in Japan.
- (2) Alleviating the financial burden of stationing U.S. forces in Japan.
- (3) Extending financial assistance to strategically important regions (Overseas Development Assistance-ODA).

Japan discussed:

Prime Minister Suzuki discussed sea lane defense to a 1000 miles east and south of Japan. He also made tentative remarks regarding the future ability to interdict the strategic straits of Soya, Tsugaru and Tsushima which control access to the Sea of Japan and the Pacific Ocean. (See map 2.)

⁵ Sakana Tomohisa, "Perception Gap Between Japan and the U.S. on Defense Cooperation," Aoyama Gakuin University, Tokyo, September 1985, pp. 11-12.



Map 2: Japan's 1,000 Nautical Mile Defense Perimeter (Source: GAO/NSIAD-89-188 "U.S.-Japan Burden Sharing")

The U.S. committed to:

- (1) Providing a nuclear umbrella for the defense of Japan.
- (2) Sending offensive forces in case of an attack on Japan.

(3) Maintaining its military forces in South Korea.

(4) Defending sea lines of communication to the Indian Ocean and the Southwest Pacific.⁶

It is significant to note that as part of this process Japan sought to gain the U.S. guarantee that the U.S. would defend her as a main priority; whereas the U.S. emphasized Japan's defense as part of its global strategy.

Comparison of Japanese and U.S. Defense Build-up Plan
(Major equipments)

	U.S. Proposal (A)	Current Capability (B)	Future Plan (C)	Difference (A - C)
Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF)	Modernization & Sustainability	180,000 (Troops)	180,000	
Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF)				
Destroyers	70 vessels	54 vessels	60 vessels	10 vessels
Submarines	25 "	14 "	16 "	9 "
Anti-submarine Aircraft	125 aircraft (P3Cs)	110 aircraft (P2J & P2Vs)	100 aircraft (P3C & P2Js)	25 aircraft
Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF)				
Intercept Fighters	14 Squadrons	10 Squadrons (229 aircraft)	10 Squadrons (250 aircraft)	4 (about 100 aircraft)
Fighting Support Aircraft	6 "	3 (57)	3 (100)	3 (about 100)
Transportation Aircraft	6 "	3 (37)	3 (40)	3 (about 40)
Early Warning Aircraft (E2C)	2 "	(4)	1 (8)	1 (about 8)

Notes: (1) Current Capability means the capability consisting of equipments ordered in 1979 Budget.

Table 1 (Source: Sakanaka, Tomohisa, *Perception Gap Between Japan and on Defense.*)

This difference in emphasis remains to the present, although it has become less important as a result of the lessons of the Gulf War. The other important issue in the 1981 negotiations

⁶ *Ibid*, p. 14.

involved the pace and ultimate goals of Japan's defense buildup. A review of table 1 illustrates the U.S. estimate of the necessary numbers of ships, air craft and other weapons systems necessary to interdict the straits and maintain a minimal patrol capability in part of Japan's SLOCs.⁷ By 1992 Japan had exceeded the spirit of the agreement with the design of new missiles(land to sea missile-SSM-1)and by 1988 equipped and trained well- prepared naval and air units.⁸

Major Forums for Japan-U.S. Consultations on Security

(As of July 1, 1989)

Japanese side	Legal basis	Consultative forum	Purpose	U.S. side
Minister of Defense Affairs, Director General of the Defense Agency, and others	Established on the basis of letters exchanged between the Prime Minister of Japan and the U.S. Secretary of State Jan. 19, 1960, in connection with Article IV of Security Treaty	Security Consultative Committee (12 members)	Security matters which could be of significance to Japan and U.S. government and contribute to the strengthening of cooperation and understanding in the area of security and defense, the level of security and are related to security	U.S. Ambassador to Japan, Ambassador in Charge of the U.S. Pacific Command, and others
Participatory and coordinated	Article IV of Security Treaty	Security Consultative Committee (12 members)	Exchange of views on security issues of common concern to Japan and the U.S.	Participatory and coordinated
Director General of Foreign Affairs, Director General of Defense Agency, Director General of Defense Agency, Director General of Defense Agency, Director General of Defense Agency, and others	Established on the basis of the agreement reached between the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the U.S. Ambassador to Japan, Jan. 19, 1961, in accordance with Article IV, Security Treaty	Security Consultative Committee (12 members)	Consultation and coordination on security issues of common concern to Japan and the U.S.	Minister and Ambassador of the U.S. Embassy, Commander in Chief of U.S. Forces Japan, and others
Director General of Foreign Affairs, Director General of Defense Agency, Director General of Defense Agency, and others	Article XXV of Status of Forces Agreement	Japan-U.S. Joint Committee (three members each side)	Consultation concerning implementation of Status of Forces Agreement	Chief of Staff of U.S. Forces Japan, Ambassador at the U.S. Embassy, and others

* Meetings are held from time to time between working level officials of the two governments, such as officials corresponding in rank to secretaries or undersecretaries.

Table 2 (Source: *Defense of Japan*, 1989, p. 323)

⁷ Ibid, p. 16.

⁸ "Defense of Japan-1989," *The Japan Times*, 1990, pp. 87-126.

A brief discussion of the building blocks of the alliance is revealing in tracing the evolution and future direction of the partnership. The structure and process include formal meetings at every level including heads of state as well as senior officers of the U.S. forces and their Japanese counterparts. (See table 2.) In addition to the consultations the following categories of cooperative interaction take place:

...Joint Studies based on Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation.

Topics for study:⁹

- Joint Defense Planning
- Joint Operations Planning
- Definition of a coordination center
- Electronic communications in C3
- Intelligence exchange
- Logistic support
- Interoperability
- Sea lane defense

Review of table 3 outlines the scope of combined U.S.-Japanese military training covering many aspects of naval, air and ground warfighting. Other aspects of the alliance include: joint studies on future military technology exchange issues, assistance with housing, and training space tension points with local governments and citizens.

⁹ "Defense of Japan-1989," pp. 176-194.

Performance of Japan-U.S. Combined Training in FY1990

Joint Staff Council

Exercise Designation	Date	Place	Participating Forces		Outline
			Japan	U.S.	
Joint Command Post Exercise	January 22-February 1, 1991	Hiroshima, Japan Headquarters, etc.	About 3,400 from the Joint Staff Office, Ground Staff Office, Maritime Staff Office, Air Staff Office, GSDF Northern Army, Self-Defense Fleet, and Air Defense Command, etc.	About 1,300 from the U.S. Forces, Japan, Headquarters, U.S. Military Forces Headquarters, 9th Corps, the 7th Fleet Headquarters, 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force and the U.S. 5th Air Force	Training on coordination

GSDF

Exercise Designation	Date	Place	Participating Forces		Outline
			Japan	U.S.	
Army Command Post Exercise	May 15-24, 1990	U.S. Army maneuver area, Hawaii, U.S.	About 100 from the Ground Staff Office, etc.	About 250 from the 9th Corps, etc.	Training on coordination
Field Training	February 4-18, 1991	Iwate-san maneuver area, etc.	About 200 from the Northeastern Army	About 200 from the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Forces	Training on cooperation and interoperability (training in snowy, cold conditions)
Field Training	February 18-March 7, 1991	Kamukura maneuver area, etc.	About 500 from the Northern Army	About 400 from the 9th Corps	Training on cooperation and interoperability (training in snowy, cold conditions)

MSDF

Exercise Designation	Date	Place	Participating Forces		Outline
			Japan	U.S.	
Special Mine-sweeping Training	July 15-25, 1990	Mutsu Bay	26 vessels 19 aircraft (combined total)	2 aircraft (combined total)	Minesweeping training
Special Anti-submarine Training	Sept. 18-22, 1990	Sea area extending south of Hokkaido to south of Boso	10 vessels 3 aircraft (combined total)	4 vessels 2 aircraft (combined total)	Antisubmarine training Air defense training Electronic warfare training, etc.
Japan-U.S. Combined Training in MSDF Exercise	Oct. 2-9, 1990	Sea areas south and east of Honshu	15 vessels 65 aircraft (combined total)	13 vessels (including the aircraft carrier Midway) 130 aircraft (combined total)	Antisubmarine training Air defense training, etc.
Special Anti-submarine Training	Jan. 19-25, 1991	Sea area extending south of Boso to east of Ogasawara Islands	7 vessels 15 aircraft (combined total)	3 vessels 16 aircraft (combined total)	Antisubmarine training Air defense training, Electronic warfare training, etc.
Special Mine-sweeping Training	February 15-27, 1991	Suonada Sea	30 vessels 24 aircraft (combined total)	6 aircraft (combined total)	Minesweeping training
Command Post Exercise	March 18-28, 1991	U.S. Naval War College	About 20 from the MSDF Staff Office, etc.	About 50 from the 7th Fleet, U.S. Naval Forces, Japan, Headquarters, etc.	Training on coordination

ASDF

Exercise Designation	Date	Place	Participating Forces		Outline
			Japan	U.S.	
Air Defense Combat Training and Fighter Combat Training	April 17-25, 1990	Air area off Kure (C) Air area off Hyakuri (E)	252 aircraft (combined total)	194 aircraft (combined total)	Training in adjustment of interoperability between Japanese and U.S. units, and aerial combat
Fighter Combat Training	May 11, 1990	Air area west of Aki-ta (C)	18 aircraft (combined total)	31 aircraft (combined total)	Aerial combat
Fighter Combat Training	July 24, 1990	Air area east of Misawa (B)	78 aircraft (combined total)	24 aircraft (combined total)	Aerial combat
Air Defense Combat Training and Fighter Combat Training	July 31-Aug. 10, 1990	Air area around Okinawa (W)	132 aircraft (combined total)	299 aircraft (combined total)	Training in adjustment of interoperability between Japanese and U.S. units, and aerial combat
Fighter Combat Training	Sept. 14, 1990	Air area east of Misawa (B) Air area west of Aki-ta (C)	12 aircraft (combined total)	32 aircraft (combined total)	Aerial combat
Air Defense Combat Training and Fighter Combat Training (conducted at the time of training by ASDF)	Oct. 9-16, 1990	Air area east of Misawa (B) Air area west of Aki-ta (C) Air area around Okinawa (W)	192 aircraft (combined total)	244 aircraft (combined total)	Training in adjustment of interoperability between Japanese and U.S. units, and aerial combat

Table 3 (Source: Defense of Japan, 1991)

Interoperability -- Interoperability may be described as the process through which a systematic approach to arms, communications, logistics, command and control and war fighting tactics of two or more allied partners are integrated so as to be able to function efficiently in combat. In the case of the U.S. and Japan, this concept was not very important until the Japanese forces were ready to train and plan for war with their U.S. counterparts. This occurred by the middle 1980's in selected cases, and by 1989 selected Japanese ships, air craft types and fighter squadrons were competing with like U.S. units with little effort, and, in some cases, surpassing them.¹⁰ Emphases was placed upon integrated training and acquisition of weapons and equipment which would supplement shortages in the U.S. force structure. Communications, cultural understanding and standardization of equipment, logistics and operations have also been key concerns.

Another aspect of interoperability of increasing importance is the presence in Japan of air logistics port facilities, naval bases, repair facilities, logistics and supply depots.¹¹ Ready access to these facilities enabled the U.S. forces in Japan to deploy rapidly to the Persian Gulf region and further enabled the military effort in the Gulf to be resupplied more rapidly than

¹⁰ Discussions with U.S. and JSDF Officers, 1988-1992

¹¹ U.S. Secretary of Defense, "A Strategic Framework for the Asia Pacific Rim: Looking Toward the 21st Century," Pentagon, 1990, pp. 12-13.

otherwise would have been possible.¹²

Burdensharing -- As a negotiating tactic, burdensharing has been a part of U.S. alliance relations with NATO as well as Japan for the past 40 years. It became a major issue when in 1987-88 the U.S. Congress, looking for savings in the defense budget, pointed out that the U.S. global commitment expanded tremendously, U.S. economic strength increased, but the U.S. share of world gross national product declined to less than a quarter.

"Some have said that the U.S. has incurred all the burdens of empire and few, if any, of the benefits."¹³

Some details on the burdensharing issue are useful because it serves as an indicator of the utility of the alliance relationship to both parties. If U.S. costs to base the 7th Fleet and other units in Japan appear to be too high the U.S. Congress will sooner or later dictate the restationing of these units in the U.S. Also, if the Japanese government believes that its current contribution to U.S. costs (approximately 47% in 1992) is not meeting its security objectives then it will cease such a high level of cost sharing and other support.¹⁴

¹² See Col. Shigeki Nishimura, JSDF, "U.S. and Japan as Partners," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 30 July 1992, p. 13.

¹³ See "Report of the Defense Burdensharing Panel of the Committee on Armed Services," House of Representatives, One Hundredth Congress, 2nd Session, August 1988, pp. 11-13.

¹⁴ See Admiral Charles R. Larson, USN, "Towards a More Mature Security Relationship," reproduced in *Asia-Pacific Defense Forum*, Fall 1991, pp. 7-9.

The central issue within the U.S. Congress has been the amount the Japanese have been willing to pay to contribute to the costs of stationing U.S. forces in Japan. Japan has been building up its contributions since 1981 in the following categories: land rentals, base countermeasures, labor cost-sharing, facilities improvements, relocation, foregone revenues in rents, tolls, etc. Various estimates abound as to the percentage of assistance, all agree, however, that the Japanese contributions have been rising, and by 1995 Japan will be paying 100% of all Japanese labor costs and will be providing more than half of the costs of stationing U.S. units in Japan.¹⁵ With support such as this it will be much less expensive to station U.S. fleet units in Sasebo than in Norfolk. However, forcing up the Japanese contribution through negotiated pressure will have other unpredictable consequences.

Observers in the U.S. Department of State and the Department of Defense as well as in the Japanese government believe that excessive pressure on Japan to increase not only the contribution but the level of Japanese military activity will be counterproductive.¹⁶

Some concerns:

- ... Create instability in the Asia-Pacific area
- ... Be opposed by the Japanese people
- ... Result in increased friction over U.S. military

¹⁵ Ibid, p. 8.

¹⁶ See Iwao Ishikawa, "Actual State of Japan's Share of USFJ Expenditures," *Asahi Shimbun, Daily Summary of the Japanese Press*, U.S. Embassy, Tokyo, (DSJP, 29 June 1992, p. 9).

activities in Japan

... May encourage increased nationalistic sentiments and military activity in Japan

...May lessen the effectiveness of the alliance for the U.S.¹⁷

U.S.-Japan Security Relations in 1992 --

At the end of the Gulf War in spring 1991 it is likely that decisionmakers in both governments believed that the security objectives of both nations were beginning to seriously diverge. Political dynamics in both countries during the Gulf War had induced considerable friction over the joint issues of whether Japan would/could send troops to the Gulf as well as the level and timeliness of financial support.¹⁸ Both Tokyo and Washington were struggling with the issues of reduced political and financial support for defense. Secretary Cheney had announced, in 1990, that significant reductions in U.S. forces would be occurring in Northeast Asia over the next five years.

While no consensus emerged in the wider Japanese political system, the leaders of the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the newly elected Prime Minister Miyazawa and other senior government

¹⁷ See GAO, *U.S. Japan Burden Sharing -- Japan has Increased its Contributions but Could Do More*, August 1989, p. 19.

¹⁸ See Eugene Brown, *The Debate Over Japan's International Role: Contending Views of Opinion Leader During the Persian Gulf Crisis*, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, July 1991.

officials reaffirmed the importance of the alliance.¹⁹

The alliance would continue to be supported for the following reasons:

...Japan would need to develop a nuclear arsenal in the absence of the alliance.²⁰

...Japan would have to increase its defense expenditures.²¹

...Japan would possibly emerge a major militarist state.²²

...Japan needs a mechanism of deterrence.²³

...Treaty provides both Japan and the U.S. the opportunity to effectively execute their policies in the Asia-Pacific region both individually and in partnership.²⁴

In 1992 the costs of replacing U.S. military services and overall benefits to Japan would be prohibitive. On balance, it is more prudent and cost effective to continue in the alliance and continue to negotiate the increased costs of the U.S. presence than to begin to assume those burdens unilaterally.

¹⁹ Defense Agency Director General Sohei Miyashita, "Continuing the Alliance," Kyodo, 31 July 1992, in *FBIS-EAS-92*, 3 August 1992, p. 1.

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ *Ibid.*

²² *Ibid.*

²³ See Vice Foreign Minister Takakazu Kuriyama, "Security Treaty Importance," Kyodo, In *FBIS-EAS-90*, 20 June 1990, p. 1.

²⁴ *Ibid.*

Two documents of importance in understanding U.S. security policy and Japan are "A Strategic Framework for the Pacific Rim" (DOD, 1990), and the recently published work by the Secretary of the Navy, "From The Sea," September 1992. The "Strategic Framework" paper published in April 1990 clearly outlines strategic and military-political objectives in the alliance relationship. Little of this information has changed since the summer of 1990, other than the fact that the consultative process has been upgraded as a result of the level of activity related to the Gulf War and the deployment of JMSDF minesweepers in the Gulf in 1991. The significance of the paper, "From The Sea," is its description of the new naval strategy and its focus on forward deployment, coastal emphasis and the closer cooperation of the U.S.-U.S.M.C. and amphibious warfare. All of which makes the U.S.-Japan alliance all the more important. As the U.S. Navy and Air Forces leave the Philippines, with possible continued access to military bases, in November 1992, Japan remains the only major host for air, naval, marine, logistics and repair facilities in the Asia-Pacific area.²⁵

The U.S. and Japan have been very successful in negotiating feasible, flexible and politically acceptable solutions to the various political and economic problems which have arisen over the life of the alliance. Both sides have managed to keep separate the friction which exists in the U.S.-Japan trade talks.

²⁵ See "Senator: Manila to Continue U.S. Base Access," HK, AFP, 5 October 1992, in FBIS-EAS-92, 5 October 1992, p. 29.

Many of Washington's policy objectives have been ambivalent and difficult to keep on track. Some examples:

..."Continue to encourage Japan to increase its territorial defense capabilities and enhance its ability to defend its sea lines out to a distance of 1000 miles, while at the same time discourage any destabilizing development of a power projection capability" (See Map 2)

..."Reduce as possible our force level in Japan while maintaining essential bases which enable us to provide regional stability and deterrence in Northeast Asia."²⁶

In the spirit of doing more with less the U.S. has been trying to accomplish political goals and guarantee militarily important objectives at the same time. The emphasis shifted in 1990-91 from concern with the Soviet military threat, to the need to address Japan's concern with stability in Northeast Asia and its interest in contributing to a greater extent, to regional stability under the auspices of the United Nations. The alliance began to focus on discussions as to how the JSDF might provide logistics and maintenance support to U.S. forces which could be deployed to conflicts in a combat role.²⁷

As U.S. military strategy shifts to reflect changing strategic missions, a reduced force structure, and budgetary restrictions, increased emphasis will be placed on "Expeditionary

²⁶ See "A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim," p. 18.

²⁷ See Nishimura, p. 13.

Force Packages" consisting of units from all services depending on the mission and the location of the conflict. The success of this venture depends on the ability of the U.S. to sustain military operations around the globe. To accomplish this task effectively the U.S. armed forces will need to stockpile supplies and be guaranteed access to fuel, water, repair and recreational facilities. The joint facilities of the U.S.-Japan alliance will play a large role in the transition to a new mode of warfighting.²⁸

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE GULF WAR TO JAPANESE DEFENSE PLANNING --

The onset of the Gulf war in the summer of 1990 exposed the U.S.-Japan alliance to considerable stress. In Japan's view, the security relationship had been based on a subordinate's role in the defense of Japan. Nothing else. The U.S. strategy of rapidly erecting a military, political, economic, and diplomatic coalition of countries with interests in the Gulf left Japan unsure of what, if any, contribution to make.²⁹ Keeping in mind Japan's modern history of pacificism; its restrictive constitution; the defensive orientation of its military forces; current friction with the U.S. over trade relations and a host of other considerations -- it is not difficult understand Japan's disinclination to rapid response to Washington's requests for a

²⁸ See Sean O'Keefe, Secretary of the Navy, "From the Sea," September 1992.

²⁹ See Larry A. Niksch and Robert G. Sutter, *Japan's Response to the Persian Gulf Crisis: Implications for U.S.-Japan Relations*, CRS Report for Congress, Congressional Research Service, May 23, 1991, pp. 1-2.

"physical presence" and a strong financial contribution. Larry Niksch and Robert Sutter of the Congressional Research Service indicate that there are conflicting accounts as to whether the U.S. requested troops of Japan but describe in some detail how President Bush negotiated upward from, 1 to 4 billion, Tokyo's financial contribution.³⁰ Japan's efforts to comply with the "physical presence" demands met with a disruptive debate in the Japanese Diet over a "peace cooperation" law which would have permitted the deployment of a JSDF support force in the Gulf.

Tokyo's response to Washington's demands for financial and other assistance, in the fall of 1990, were difficult to understand in the U.S. and were heatedly debated in Japan. Japan was involved elsewhere with foreign policy initiatives with other Northeast Asian nations. The fact that Japan is dependent on the Gulf for 65% of its oil supplies and relies on the U.S. to assure continuing access to these resources highlighted an important point of contention. The Japanese failed to see the crisis in the same light as the U.S. Since Japan had a reserve of 142 days of oil it believed that they could outlast any scarcity and, if necessary, pay a higher price.³¹

In early 1991, when the fighting began on the Iraq border, Prime Minister Kaifu managed to negotiate with the opposition parties in the Diet a \$9 billion contribution. He also tried to arrange a relief mission, to be flown by JSDF pilots, to fly

³⁰ Page 5

³¹ *Ibid*, p. 6.

refugees from Jordan. In the face of public and political pressure, he finally decided to forgo this gesture. The chronicle of Japanese response to U.S. expectations is an example of Japan's difficulty in assuming a more active and responsible role in international affairs. This difficult period is also illustrative of the complexities and divisions in the Japanese political system.

The end result of constant debate, intra party negotiation and apparent indecision on the part of the leadership of the Japanese government finally produced a limited consensus the spring of 1991. The rapid allied victory, in February 1991, signaled the gradual shift in support of the Prime Minister's attempt to achieve a larger role for Japan in the Gulf coalition.

DISPATCH OF MINESWEEPERS TO GULF --

The decision to deploy minesweepers to the Persian Gulf was the result of increased pressure from the leadership of the LDP and also the wishes of the U.S.³² The question of the commitment of minesweepers was of symbolic as well as utilitarian importance to the U.S. In 1987 the question of deploying Japanese minesweepers had been raised during the period when the U.S. and other NATO naval forces had protected tankers of all nations during the Iran-Iraq war. At that time, the minesweepers were badly needed and the failure of Japan to contribute was noticed in light of the heavy usage of Gulf waters by Japanese tankers.

³² See "Gulf Mission as Point of Honor," *Asahi Evening News*, April 16, 1991, p. 5 (DSJP), American Embassy, Tokyo, April 25, 1991.

From the viewpoint of military planning the deployment of the four minesweepers and two support ships was hastily done and completed under great political pressure and oversight. This mission was the first naval unit committed to a war zone for semi-combat duty since WW II.³³ Detailed planning was impossible since only eight days were allowed before departure. Diplomatic problems were rapidly resolved and permission was granted for the flotilla to make port calls in the Philippines, Singapore and Pakistan on the way to the Gulf. Military needs were subordinated to political concern when the flotilla was committed without helicopters (highly useful in logistics and clearing minesweeping lanes) and vague "rules of engagement" as to the limits of the use of force for self defense.³⁴

The four minesweepers disposed of a total number of 34 mines of various descriptions, and cleared the most difficult area adjacent to Iran and Iraq of 17 mines. Japanese minesweeping equipment, methods and personnel were proven to be combat ready and capable of handling all the professional challenges presented. The commitment in the Gulf revealed areas in which improvements were needed but also demonstrated that the JMSDF was capable of overcoming various difficulties and successfully integrating its units into a larger coalition naval force.

³³ See the comprehensive account of this mission by Ushiba Akihiko, "The Minesweeping Mission: A Job Well Done," *Japan Echo*, Spring 1992, p. 43.

³⁴ *Ibid*, p. 49.

United Nations Peacekeeping Bill(PKO)-On June 15,1992, after two years of intense debate, theatrics and threats of mass resignations the Japanese Diet voted to permit the overseas deployment of 2000 members of the JSDF as part of U.N. peacekeeping forces.³⁵ The passage of the bill represents a radical change in policy and reopens old feelings in Japan and in China, South Korea, Singapore and in other countries in Asia regarding Japan's terrible human rights record in WW II. Most Asian countries occupied by Japan in WW II believe that no sincere apologies have been offered and that no national atonement has occurred within Japan.³⁶ The remilitarization of Japan continues to be an important issue in many Southeast Asian countries with higher concern with JSDF ground than naval deployment.

The Peacekeeping cooperation Bill(PKO) reflected the opposition of the socialists and others concerned with the remilitarization issue. The legislation is somewhat restrictive and makes deployment of forces a limited option for the Japanese government. The following presents the bill in outline.

...The prime minister must seek a cabinet decision to plan and carry out Japan's peacekeeping activities.

³⁵ See David E. Sanger, "Japan's Parliament Votes to End Ban on Sending Troops Abroad," *New York Times*, June 16, 1992, p. 1.

³⁶ See Gerard Henderson, "Japanese Sorrow is No Apology," *Sydney Morning Herald*, February 25, 1992, p. 9; "Japanese Peacekeeping Bill Opposed," *The Straits Times*, 12 June 1992, p. 34; Spokesman, "No South Asia War Apology Planned," *Kyodo*, 5 December 1991 in *FBIS-EAS*, 5 December 1991.

...Prior Diet approval is necessary to send JSDF members abroad as members of U.N. peacekeeping units.

...When the Diet is adjourned the prime minister must seek approval without delay for sending troops overseas immediately after the Diet is convened. If the Diet refuses to approve the dispatch, the government must end the peacekeeping cooperation activities without delay.

...Diet approval is also necessary when the government plans to continue peacekeeping activities for more than two years.

...Both houses of the Diet must try to decide on dispatching troops within seven days after the prime minister submits the request.

...Creating and changing the outlines of missions will have to be done according to the U.N secretary general's instructions.

...The JSDF personnel to be dispatched will possess the status of both JSDF members and international peacekeeping operation members.

...The total number personnel to participate in the mission will not exceed 2000 people.

...The members can use small arms to protect themselves or other peacekeeping force members.

...JSDF participation in peacekeeping operations that might involve military action shall be frozen until a separate

law stipulates it.³⁷

The passage of the PKO law with its emphasis on Japanese participation in U.N. sponsored peacekeeping missions represented probably the only way the Japanese government could, with one gesture, mollify the U.S. as well as structure legislation with restrictions likely to meet the objections of those concerned with the remilitarization of Japan.

U.N operations in Cambodia have given the Japanese government an excellent opportunity to demonstrate its interest in contributing more than money to the international community. The newly appointed head of the U.N. peacekeeping activities in Cambodia, Yasushi Akashi is a Japanese diplomat. The appointment of a Japanese national to a senior peacekeeping position has been rare but may mark the beginning of a greater participation by Tokyo in U.N activities. This appointment has placed greater pressure on Tokyo to be generous in its financial contribution to the U.N effort in Cambodia.

The passage of the PKO law enabled Japan to respond to the U.N.'s request for 700 military personnel for duty in Cambodia by October 1992. The initial request included the following:³⁸

...600 engineers for road repair work.

...8 ceasefire observers

...75 civilian police officers

³⁷ "Highlights of U.N. Peacekeeping Cooperation Bill," Kyodo, 4 June 1992, *FBIS-EAS*, 5 June 1992, p. 4.

³⁸ See "700 Military Personnel for Cambodia Peacekeeping," Kyodo, 11 August 1992, in *FBIS-EAS*, 11 August 1992, p. 4.

...50 election monitors

ISSUES AFFECTING THE JSDF FUTURE --

The ability to expand into a fully functioning military force is predicated upon the availability of assets such as human resources, support within the society, a functional military organization as well as financial backing. Research reveals a number of significant areas in where problems exist which may be very difficult for the Japanese government to totally overcome.

Structure of Civilian Control of the JSDF -- Within the Defense Agency the concept of civilian control of the military has its roots in the post-war period when the policy may have been to limit uniformed access to the levers of power in the higher reaches of the Defense Agency. Traditionally senior positions have been filled by civil servants seconded from the other agencies of the Japanese government. That policy may have been unharmed in the early years of the Defense Agency but is counterproductive in a period when Japan is seeking to integrate its military forces with those of other nations under U.N. auspices.³⁹ Note has been made of the fact that the civilians lack the familiarity with the equipment and methods and procedures of the military forces they are controlling and managing. There is evidence that this problem has been recognized and that the concept of civilian control will be maintained but with greater sharing of responsibilities by uniformed officers

³⁹ See "SDF Standing at Crossroads: Viewpoints on Revitalization," *Sankei Shimbun*, 24 December 1991, p. 1, (DSJP), U.S. Embassy, Tokyo, 6 January 1991, p. 4.

and civilian officials.⁴⁰

Rejection of JSDF in Schools and Teaching Materials -- A significant problem exists for those seeking to recruit additional enlisted and officer personnel for the JSDF. A distinct anti-JSDF bias can be found among many school teachers throughout Japan. Additionally the lack of descriptive and supporting materials in books available to students adds to the perception that service in the JSDF is not worth investigating. So far, little attention has been paid to upgrading the image of the JSDF in the schools context.⁴¹

Need for Upgraded Intelligence Collection, Dissemination and Funding System -- Problems appear to exist in the JSDF regarding the availability of intelligence materials for the operational levels and the larger issue of the access to intelligence -- national or tactical. The process is being revamped and by 1995 the intelligence organizations of the services will be integrated on the Defense Agency level. Future Japanese military and quasi military (shipments of plutonium from France to Japan to begin in bulk in fall 1992) activities will mandate greater intelligence collection and dissemination capabilities.⁴²

JSDF Crisis in Recruiting -- In the 1980's the Soviet threat was overused as a recruiting device among the young Japanese males. In 1991, according to *Defense of Japan*, the

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

⁴² *Ibid.*

authorized total force number for the JSDF was 273,801, the actual number on active duty was 234,174. The difference in the two figures, 39,627 service personnel, represent the unrecruited members of the JSDF. Recruiting has been a major program since the establishment of the JSDF and relative scarcities in personnel have existed throughout its history. Recruiting for the military in Japan remains a very difficult and unpredictable job. And the fact that fewer young men will be reaching enlistment age will make this task even harder. The military has to compete with industry, and resistance exists to greatly increasing the numbers of women serving in the military (2.8%). Military recruiters believe that the deployment of the minesweepers to the Gulf had a negative effect on recruiting. Hardship, lack of privacy and danger were reasons given. Poor pay, harsh living conditions, and lack of respect in Japanese society are difficult to overcome rapidly. Without forced induction, expansion of the JSDF is impossible, unless this problem is resolved. ⁴³

JSDF Intrusion into the Political Process -- On October 15, 1992 a prominent Japanese news magazine, *Shukan Bunshun*, published an article written by a Major Shinsaku Yani seeking to shatter one of Japan's most prominent postwar taboos.⁴⁴ The article openly suggested that the military depose the civilian

⁴³ See "Defense Agency Facing Recruitment Crunch," *Aera*, 26 November 1991, pp. 31-35, in *Selected Summary of Japanese Magazines*, (SSJM), U.S. Embassy, Tokyo, 12 January 1992.

⁴⁴ See David E. Sanger, "Japanese Major Suggests a Cure for Scandals," *New York Times*, October 16, 1992, p. 7.

government as the Japanese army did in the 1930's. No evidence exists that the Major's solutions to Japan's political turmoil are widely shared in the JSDF. The article written by a serving officer of the JSDF comes at a difficult time for the Japanese government as it seeks to convince other Asian countries that the JSDF remains a defensive force with limited military capabilities and no political inclinations.

EXTERNAL CONCERNS-- Although Japan's diplomatic emphasis in the post war period has been on expanding its trade and manufacturing network, a variety of military-political issues are demanding attention. Because the U.S. has provided for the nuclear and conventional defense of Japan, the JSDF has not been seriously concerned with defending mineral resources in the East China Sea or, in an extreme example, defending against a missile threat from North Korea. The perception exists that the U.S. military will be further reduced in numbers and in overseas bases in the late 1990's and that Japan may not be able to rely on the U.S. to the extent, and in the fashion, it previously enjoyed. Security related disputes of long duration will hopefully have diplomatic solutions, such as the ownership and occupation dispute with Russia over the Kurile's. One of Japan's most long term and vital international requirements remains the continuing free flow of mineral resources and food. The trade routes to India, the Persian Gulf, Australia, Southeast Asia and the west coast of Canada and the U.S. have been, with one instance of closure, open and guaranteed by the U.S. Navy and Air Force.



Map 4: *Japan, A Country Study*, (Source: Dept of the Army, 1992, p. 402.)

The following brief analysis of the most important issues/disputes is presented as a guide to those military challenges which may be faced by Japan in the future and as examples of Japanese government and JSDF, (if appropriate) response.

Dispute Over Ownership and Occupation of the Kuriles with Russia --The dispute over the ownership and occupation by the Russians of the four islands of the Kurile island chain (See Map 4.) has been simmering since the end of WW II. Japan is adamant about the return of all of the islands, as soon as possible, and has tied the grant of large scale financial aid to Mr Yeltsin's government to the resolution of this question.⁴⁵ The issue is trapped in the dynamics of Mr Yeltsin's governance of an increasing divided Russian nation. Russian opponents to the return of the four islands are invoking Russian nationalistic themes and voicing concerns as to relinquishing of minerals, fish and the loss of a military buffer.⁴⁶ The islands have acted to screen the sea of Okhotsk which continues to host Russian submarine bases and ballistic missile-firing areas. The islands also serve as bases for advanced jets and signals intelligence posts. Despite the break up of the Soviet Union it is reasonable to expect that the former Soviet military -- political policies in Northeast Asia will not change to any great extent.⁴⁷

Since political trends in the Commonwealth of Independent States remain fluid and difficult to predict, the continued presence of Russian naval, air and ground forces within sight of

⁴⁵ See Francis X. Clines, "Soviet Aid Sees Islands Return to the Japanese," *The New York Times*, p 1.

⁴⁶ See Serge Schmemmann, "Yeltsin Cancels a Visit to Japan As Dispute Over Islands Simmers," *The New York Times*, pp.1,9.

⁴⁷ See Eduard Grebenshchikov, "Place in the Sun," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 13 February 1992, p. 24.

Hokkaido continue to create uncertainty. Few observers expect overt Russian military acts against Japan. What may be expected, however, is continued friction over fishing, borders and undiscovered mineral resources.

Senkaku Islands Dispute -- China, Taiwan and Japan all claim the five uninhabited rocks located approximately equidistant from Okinawa and Taiwan. The ownership claims are based on the belief that possession would grant title to some 21,645km of the continental shelf.⁴⁸ The East China Sea is also believed to contain one of the last unexplored sources of oil and natural gas in maritime Asia. In a successful claim, sovereignty extends to air space above the islands as well as to the seabed and under.

Behind the dispute is China's reassertion of its sovereignty over the Senkakus, the Paracels and the Spratly islands in February 1992. The Paracels and the Spratlys are located in the South China Sea and have been the subject of joint claims by many of the adjacent states. Fighting has occurred between Vietnam and China over selected islets and members of the ASEAN nations with maritime claims (Malaysia, Brunei and the Philippines) have been rearming to represent themselves militarily in the South China Sea.⁴⁹ China's motives are primarily economic as well as military. As seen in Tokyo, China is changing its strategic policy from a defensive orientation to one of naval activity and

⁴⁸ See Mark J. Valencia, "Insular Possessions," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 28 May, 1992, p.23.

⁴⁹ See Nayan Chanda, "Treacherous Shoals," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 13 August 1992, pp. 14-17.

policy from a defensive orientation to one of naval activity and operations in the wider Pacific area. Chinese vessels have been observed in the Sea of Japan and the previously unnavigated Tumen River (dividing Russia and North Korea). Academic research on this topic in China, and quoted in the Japanese Press, reveals discussions on the establishment of a "strategic line," necessary for security, drawn from the Aleutians to the island of Sunda in Indonesia as China's naval area of operations.⁵⁰



Map 5: (Source: *FEER*, 1 November 1990, p. 19.)

Experts such as Mark Valencia of the East-West Center believe that the recent law passed by China's National Peoples Congress is a negotiating tactic designed to pressure Tokyo into joint development of the area and co-sharing of the profits. Japan believes that the new Chinese "Territorial Waters Law" to be "a high handed and super power like declaration" which must

⁵⁰ See Soma and Yamamoto "Moves Toward Hegemony in Coastal Waters Viewed," *Sankei Shimbun*, 14 March 1992, (*DSJP*) U.S. Embassy, Tokyo, 24 March 1992.

be resisted. It also links consistent opposition to China in this matter to continuing its diplomacy to recover the Kuriles.

Although China is using the same psychological and legal tactics on Japan as it has used on Vietnam and the ASEAN countries, no military escalation is expected. The Japanese navy is a formidable surface and submarine opponent with modern weapons and a high standard of training.

Maintaining Japan's Routes and Sources of Trade -- Japan is dependent on imports for most of its raw materials needs.

"Japan imports eight tons of food, fuel, wood, and other raw materials for every ton of manufactured goods it exports"⁵¹

Japan must have continued access to the countries supplying it with its raw materials and must have secure trade routes.⁵² Japan trades predominantly with Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia, India, Canada, U.S., Persian Gulf oil-producing states and other Southeast Asian countries. Japan's diplomacy focuses on developing and maintaining good trade and ASEAN nations such as Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore are key states in maintaining open trade routes. In October, 1988 the trading nations of the world were given a shock when Indonesia closed the Sunda and Lombok Straits for military maneuvers for a few

⁵¹ See "Strategic Pacific" Map, *National Geographic*, 1989.

⁵² See the comprehensive chapter on "Imports and Dependency" in Friedman and Lebard, *The Coming War With Japan*, St Martins Press, N.Y., 1991, pp. 160-188.

days.⁵³ In Canberra and in Tokyo it was believed that the Indonesian military was asserting its rights to restrict usage of internal waters as well as test the reaction of the user nations.

The extent of Japan's nearly total dependence on imports for its minerals becomes evident when 99-100% of Japan's oil, iron ore, copper, nickel, bauxite, manganese, molybdenum and titanium are obtained overseas.⁵⁴ Japan's tentative solution to this challenge is to stockpile as much of these various minerals as possible (142 days of oil) and move toward energy conservation as rapidly as possible.

Japan's initial reaction to its situation when threatened with an oil shortage during the Gulf War was instructive. Polls, at that time, revealed that the Japanese people believed that they could pay a higher price for the oil which would continue the supply and thus avoid the hard choices as to how to share in the extended "cost" of its continuing flow. It is difficult to conceive of an extended period when the trade routes would remain interdicted. However many believe that the archipelagic states of Indonesia and the Philippines will, at some time in the future, insist on payment for passage through the north-south straits. It is possible that military force will be used once again by China and/or Vietnam in the dispute over the Spratly

⁵³ See Roy Eccleston, "Jakarta Toughs Out Diplomatic Storm," *The Australian*, October 25, 1988, p.1. Also, "Alatas on Murdani's Remarks on the Straits Closure" *Suara Pembaruan*, October 26, 1988, p.1, FBIS-EAS, Nov 2, 1988, pp. 24-25.

⁵⁴ See Friedman and Labard, pp. 8-9.

area. Other ASEAN military forces could possibly be involved.

Currently the Japanese navy does not possess significant surface, air and logistics forces to guarantee its trade routes especially to the Persian Gulf or the U.S. If the U.S. naval and air force units are significantly reduced in the future, Japan will have to find other Asian nations willing to assist in this function.

Japan and the Korean Peninsula -- The strategic importance of Korea to Japan may be explained in terms of geopolitics. The narrow Tsushima strait separates Japan and South Korea. The Sea of Japan acts as a symbolic buffer dividing Japan from North and South Korea as well as China and Russia. Since the Korean War, the U.S. military has guaranteed the defense of South Korea as well as Japan. In Tokyo that mission is seen as interconnected.

Japan occupied Korea for thirty-five years ending in 1945. Japanese colonial governance was very harsh and, in some cases during WW II, inhuman. During WW II Korean males were conscripted to fight in the Pacific, and a number of Korean young women were forced to serve as prostitutes to Japanese troops through out the Pacific.⁵⁵ A major issue in Japanese relations with South Korea, as well as other Asian nations, is the refusal of the Japanese government to make a meaningful apology for its human rights abuses during WW II. No one is quite sure what form the apology might take, but the aggrieved people of the formerly

⁵⁵ See Shim Jae Hoon, "So near, yet so far" *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 31 January 1991, p.38.

occupied nations do not believe that it has occurred as of yet. Many of the existing problems, yet to be resolved, by Japan and South Korea involve practices enduring from the colonial period, some of which are being rectified now. For example, the more than 600,000 Koreans remaining in Japan will no longer be fingerprinted. The matter of remaining claims for the loss of life or property were, according to Japan, settled in 1965 when Japan paid US\$300 million in grants and 300 million in loans to the South Korean government.⁵⁶

In the light of the current discussions to unify North and South Korea, at some point in the future, ambivalent Japanese feelings regarding the Koreans seem to be developing. International concerns as to whether North Korea has been developing nuclear weapons when combined with the quandry of when and to what extent the U.S. will withdraw its military forces from South Korea and Japan have created a climate of doubt.⁵⁷

The debate over the reunification of the Koreas focuses on whether a unified Korea represents a heightened security threat to Japan, keeping in mind the history of animosity which has existed, and the seeming unwillingness of Japan to improve relations. Other observers believe that reunification will make it easier for Japan to ensure its own security. The reunification is not expected to occur before the late 1990's, if then. The

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷ See Shiju Sotoyama "Building a Future Oriented Relationship: Can the Thorns of History be Removed?" *Sankei Shimbun*, 19 May 1990, (DSJP) U.S. Embassy, Tokyo, 27 May 1990.

cost to South Korea for reunification is expected to be on the order of US\$200 billion, and Japan is expected to contribute tens of billions of dollars to stabilize the postreunification Korean economy. Should Japan decide not to contribute, ill feelings in both North and South Korea might rise against Japan exacerbating pre existing frictions and historical ill feeling.⁵⁸

Japan's Plutonium Shipments -- According to official and press reports, Japan plans to ship, from European ports, 30 tons of plutonium, in one ton increments, at two to three year intervals.⁵⁹ Tokyo has converted a merchant ship(Akatsuki Maru) to carry the radioactive powder and, after protests regarding security on the high seas, has built a high tech, minimally armed, gun ship(Shikishima) to accompany the plutonium vessel.⁶⁰ The Ataksuki Maru, containing the plutonium, is scheduled to leave a French port in late fall 1992 and embark on 17,000 mile voyage lasting one month. It is possible, but not probable, that the immediate voyage may be canceled because of persistent petitions by nations whose territorial waters may be transited during the voyage. Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore, states which border the straits of Malacca, have been very

⁵⁸ See Kazuyuki Hamada, "Possible Sudden Progress Toward Korean Unification is Forecast" *Ekonomisuto*, 30 June 1992, (SSJM)U.S. Embassy, Tokyo, 8 July 1992.

⁵⁹ See Walter H. Donnelly and Zachary Davis, "Japan's Sea Shipment of Plutonium," CRS Issue Brief, *Congressional Research Service*, September 22, 1992.

⁶⁰ See T.R. Reid, "Japan to Ship Plutonium Amid Rising Concerns," *Washington Post*, April 5, 1992, p.25.

concerned with possibility that accidents may occur or that the ships may be attacked by the pirate bands operating from islands close to the Singapore straits and local channels.⁶¹

Critics of the scheme believe that the security being provided for the plutonium ship is insufficient and that terrorists will be tempted to interdict the ship and use the reprocessed fuel for nuclear weapons production or sales. Environmental critics cite the possibilities for accidents in the coastal waterways, straits, the Panama Canal or the open oceans. An accidental sinking of the ship would be an environmental disaster which might not be able to be cleaned up.⁶²

The underlying issue of importance to all involved parties is that of the fact the plutonium would add to the world's supply of a key fuel for hydrogen bombs. Also, in most minds, is the question of that fuel being stockpiled for future military use.

CONCLUSIONS -- From the evidence briefly discussed it would appear that Japan, in the 1990's, has been reacting prudently to the increasing demands made upon her by international events, the U.S., and her national trade, economic and security interests.

The deployment of the minesweepers to the Gulf and the commitment of 600 troops to Cambodia under U.N. auspices do signal a radical shift from the previous uninvolved and pacifistic stance. Despite significant internal political and

⁶¹ See Michael Vatikiotis, "Stormy Passage," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 8 October 1992, pp. 12-23.

⁶² *Ibid*, p.26.

economic difficulty, Japan is adapting to each new security challenge and positioning itself for whatever the future brings. The next steps in the new relationship within the U.N. are likely to involve becoming a permanent member of the Security Council. If and when that occurs, Japan would be required to vote on the commitment of forces to international trouble spots as well as be free to commit its forces on those missions. At present it would be difficult for Japan to participate in a large scale coalition military exercise, such as Desert Storm, without changing its constitution. Much depends on the performance of the engineering battalion in Cambodia as to the level and frequency of future participation of JSDF units in future peacekeeping operations.⁶³

It is evident that the Japanese government has embarked on a path of active participation in international security activity as a means of breaking the previous nonparticipatory pattern. Limited military participation also enables Japan to prepare the JSDF for possible minor military clashes arising from resources and border disputes with its neighbors. Also, somewhat more aggressive military posture also reinforces its deterrence objectives.

Another major quandary is the alliance relationship with the U.S. The Japan -- U.S. alliance remains the most important relationship to both parties. The importance of the alliance to

⁶³ Recent information from knowledgeable observers in Japan on Japan's probable future choices of action.

Japan is not likely to change in near future. U.S fidelity to the alliance will be determined by the actions of the U.S Congress, and the state of the U.S. economy. The U.S. Department of Defense has little control over these factors. With the heightened importance of amphibious naval forces and coastal warfare, access to alliance bases and facilities becomes more important in the 1990's.

In 1992 Japan finds itself in a difficult position in terms of the continuing stability of the security of its home islands and territorial waters. Increasing challenges to Japanese sovereignty and security are becoming apparent for future resolution. The alliance with the U.S. remains vital for both parties but is not totally assured for the future. A number of issues/challenges with military overtones may occur or be heightened in the future, such as difficulties over the Kuriles, increased Chinese pressure in the East China Sea or other threats to Japanese commerce. The unlikely withdrawal or reluctance of the U.S. to act on Japan's behalf would likely trigger an aggressive Japanese response. None doubt the Japanese capability to design and manufacture additional weapons, ships and aircraft. Although, a major cultural difficulty may exist in manning a greatly expanded military force. Richard Halloran of the East-West Center in his excellent 1991 monograph, "Chrysanthemum and Sword -- Is Japanese Militarism Resurgent?" has a "What If" list of events which might trigger a Japanese response with military composition. All of these events have been covered in this paper

in one form or another. He concludes that :

In sum, it seems that Japan will remain an economic giant and a military pigmy relative to the world's other major and middle-sized powers. A resurgence of Japanese militarism is not on the horizon.⁶⁴

With the exception of the article, an aberration so far, written by the Japanese Major, suggesting that a military coup remove the civilian government, no evidence exists of a general resurgence of militarism. What does exist is evidence that incremental steps are being taken to prepare the JSDF for an increased military role, if necessary, and seek to condition the populace for somewhat greater military related activity in the defense of Japan's national interests.

One wonders what developments will transpire in 1993?

⁶⁴ See Richard Halloran, "Chrysanthemum and Sword Revisited -- Is Japanese Militarism Resurgent?", The East-West Center, 1991, p.21.