


AD-A263 594



2

STUDY PROJECT

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

THE POST COLD WAR SECURITY LANDSCAPE AND FUTURE SECURITY STRUCTURES ON THE NORTHERN FLANK OF NATO

BY

COLONEL NILS G. FOSLAND
Norwegian Army

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:
Approved for public release.
Distribution is unlimited.

DTIC
ELECTE
MAY 05 1993
S E D

USAWC CLASS OF 1993



U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050

93-09582



93 5 04 123

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188

1a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED			1b. RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS		
2a. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY			3. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF REPORT Distribution is unlimited. Approved for public release.		
2b. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE					
4. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)			5. MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)		
6a. NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE		6b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable)		7a. NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION	
6c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) ROOT HALL, BUILDING 122 CARLISLE, PA 17013-5050			7b. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)		
8a. NAME OF FUNDING/SPONSORING ORGANIZATION		8b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable)		9. PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER	
8c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)			10. SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERS		
			PROGRAM ELEMENT NO.	PROJECT NO.	TASK NO.
			WORK UNIT ACCESSION NO.		
11. TITLE (Include Security Classification) THE POST COLD WAR SECURITY LANDSCAPE AND FUTURE SECURITY STRUCTURES ON THE NORTHERN FLANK OF NATO					
12. PERSONAL AUTHOR(S) COLONEL NILS G. FOSLAND, NORWEGIAN ARMY					
13a. TYPE OF REPORT STUDY PROJECT		13b. TIME COVERED FROM _____ TO _____		14. DATE OF REPORT (Year, Month, Day) 93/04/15	
15. PAGE COUNT 29					
16. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION					
17. COSATI CODES			18. SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)		
FIELD	GROUP	SUB-GROUP			
19. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number) ON REVERSE SIDE					
20. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT ☒ UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED ☐ SAME AS RPT. ☐ OTIC USERS			21. ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED		
22a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL LTC William Johnsen			22b. TELEPHONE (Include Area Code) 717/245-3911		22c. OFFICE SYMBOL AWCI

ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Nils G. Fosland, Col. Norwegian Army
TITLE : The Post Cold War Security Landscape and Future
Security Structures on the Northern Flank of NATO
FORMAT: Individual Study Project
DATE : 15 April 1993 PAGES: 29 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

This paper examines the fundamental changes that have taken place in Europe since 1989, and the effects they have had on the security of the northern area of NATO. The major problem facing Norway in the future is marginalization and isolation, if it does not become a member of the European Community (EC).

The paper concludes that the northern area of NATO still is exposed, and until Russia emerges from its current problems in some form of democracy, Norway should keep up a strong national defence with priority to Northern Norway.

The paper further concludes that if Norway does not become a full member of the European Community and the Western European Union, it must find some other security arrangement for the future. A bilateral security agreement with the United States could be a solution.

USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

**THE POST COLD WAR SECURITY LANDSCAPE AND FUTURE SECURITY
STRUCTURES ON THE NORTHERN FLANK OF NATO**

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

**Colonel Nils G. Fosland
Norwegian Army**

**Lieutenant Colonel William T. Johnsen
Project Adviser**

**DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public
release; distribution is unlimited.**

**US Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013**

ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: Nils G. Fosland, Col, Norwegian Army
TITLE : The Post Cold War Security Landscape and Future
Security Structures on the Northern Flank of NATO
FORMAT: Individual Study Project
DATE : 15 April 1993 PAGES: 29 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

This paper examines the fundamental changes that have taken place in Europe since 1989, and the effects they have had on the security of the northern area of NATO. The major problem facing Norway in the future is marginalization and isolation, if it does not become a member of the European Community (EC).

The paper concludes that the northern area of NATO still is exposed, and until Russia emerges from its current problems in some form of democracy, Norway should keep up a strong national defence with priority to Northern Norway.

The paper further concludes that if Norway does not become a full member of the European Community and the Western European Union, it must find some other security arrangement for the future. A bilateral security agreement with the United States could be a solution.

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 5

Accession For	
NTIS	CRA&I ☒
DTIC	TAB ☐
Unannounced ☐	
Justification _____	
By _____	
Distribution /	
Availability Codes	
Dist	Avail and/or Special
A-1	

THE POST COLD WAR SECURITY LANDSCAPE AND FUTURE SECURITY STRUCTURES ON THE NORTHERN FLANK OF NATO

INTRODUCTION

The strategic importance of Norway, or the northern area of NATO, to Western Europe during the Cold War was its geographic position. Bordering on the Norwegian Sea and the Barents Sea, North Norway dominated the sea lanes between Soviet naval bases on the Kola Peninsula and the Atlantic Ocean. As long as the defence of Western Europe depended upon reinforcements and supplies coming across the Atlantic, whoever controlled Norwegian territory had an advantage in the battle for the Atlantic. And, whoever emerged a victor of the battle for the Atlantic had the upper hand in the fight for Europe. Indeed, some observers, such as Norwegian Minister of Defence, Johan Jorgen Holst has concluded that although NATO could not win a war in Europe by holding Norway, NATO could loose a war by not holding it.

To the United States, the strategic importance of Norway was its position on the shortest route between the vital parts of the United States and the former Soviet Union. Norway, therefore, occupied the very middle of the maritime, air and strategic nuclear common areas of interest of the two superpowers.

For Norway, a place on the periphery of NATO and Europe, the strategic importance of its territory has, until recently, made it easy for Norwegian security concerns to be taken seriously. The "old" security conditions and system in Europe have thereby served the northern area of NATO well.

The fundamental changes in the political, economic and military situation in Europe have made it fashionable to talk about a "new" security system on this continent. Since the security of Norway is closely connected to the security of the European continent, this paper will examine the changes that have taken place in Europe and how the European security system might adapt to them. The paper will then examine potential effects this new situation has on the northern area of Nato and what possible changes, if any, that may have to be made to secure the peace in this area.

THE NORTHERN AREA OF NATO

To understand the many aspects of the Norwegian strategic situation it is important to point out some basic information on history, geography, and population. Historically, the sea has always been vital to the survival of the Norwegian people. From the sea came wealth, culture and enemies. And, historically, whenever an enemy was the dominant sea power, Norway suffered. Therefore, keeping the country on friendly terms with the ruler of the seas has been a vital ingredient in the nation's security politics. World War II gave Norway one more historic lesson. The German invasion, followed by five years of occupation, led Norwegians to conclude, that even being on the side of the dominant sea power was not sufficient. The dominant land power in Europe also had to be reckoned with if the country should have a lasting peace.¹ These factors brought Norway into NATO, and NATO

has for more than forty years maintained peace in Western Europe. The dominant sea power during these forty years has been the United States. The dominant land power during the same period of time has been the Soviet Union. Political and military changes in these two countries will therefore also influence the future security system of the northern area of NATO.

Norway lies in the northwestern corner of Europe and constitutes the western part of the Scandinavian peninsula. Norway is a long (1752 km), narrow (greatest width 430 km, narrowest width 6.3 km) and mountainous country with an extensive (21925 km)³ and rugged coastline. One third of the country lies north of the Arctic Circle. Importantly from a security standpoint, Norway is now the only member of NATO that has a common land border (167 km) with Russia. On the eastern side of the border lies one of Russia's most vital strategic areas, the Kola Peninsula, the home base of the largest concentration of naval power in the world.⁴ The proximity to Russia and Russian capabilities and intentions must be taken into consideration when Norway evaluates its security situation.

The Svalbard Islands in the Barents Sea, situated along the route the Russian Northern Fleet have to follow if its ships are to enter the Atlantic, pose another consideration. According to the Paris Treaty of 1920, the Svalbard Islands are under Norwegian sovereignty, but all signatory powers of the treaty were granted equal economic rights on the islands. At present, only Norwegian and Russian settlements have been established in

the Svalbards. The treaty prohibits permanent military installations on the islands. But, since these islands offer excellent basing and warning possibilities to any side in a battle for the Atlantic, the islands must be defended in a possible future conflict.

According to population, Norway is a midget in Europe. Although it is the fifth largest country on this continent, it has a population of only 4.2 million, with the second lowest population density in Europe: only 12 persons per sq km. Nearly 90% of this population lives in southern Norway, the rest of Norway being, by European standards, almost uninhabited. In case of an attack, these 4.2 million people would have to defend an area equal to the combined size of Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium and Germany, which have a population of approximately 110 million. Although Norway presently plans on mobilizing 7.6%⁵ of its population for employment in her armed forces in the event of war, the defence of the country is heavily dependent upon allied reinforcements.

THE "NEW" EUROPE

The changes in Europe caused by the end of the Cold War have not yet run their full course and the future seems rather unclear. Although the imminent danger of an armed conflict between European nations seems further away than ever,⁶ this must not lead us to believe that there will be peace and harmony on this continent forever more.

Five obvious and important changes in Europe since the collapse of the "Iron Curtain" will shape security arrangements of northern Europe and of NATO in the foreseeable future. First, the Soviet Union has disappeared as a superpower and its major successor, Russia, is struggling to develop a form of democracy and to find its future position in the world. Second, Eastern Europe, to include the southern Baltic coastline, is no longer under Soviet control. The evolution of the situation in the Baltic States will particularly effect the security of Norway. Third, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, specifically the on-going implementation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), will drastically reduce military equipment and personnel. Fourth, Germany is reunited, greatly altering the political, economic, and military conditions of the Baltic. Finally, Finland and Russia have renegotiated their treaty of "Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance", giving the Finns more political maneuver room. As Finland exercises its greater political freedom, it will effect the situation in the other Nordic countries.

RUSSIA

Russia has largely accommodated itself to the new situation in Europe. As a result, Russia will likely not attempt to dominate the new independent states in Eastern Europe unless Russia views them as competitors or potential adversaries. And, since the new states most likely will defend their territory

against any enemy, whoever it may be, they create a buffer between Russia and the NATO-forces in Central Europe, increasing both the security for Russia and for Central Europe.

The situation is quite different in the northern area of NATO; particularly in Northern Norway and on the coast of the Barents Sea. Here, as indicated earlier, Russia borders directly on Norway, and there is no buffer to protect its vital military installations on the Kola Peninsula. For the United States this would be just as discomfoting as having a Cuba, if it was a member of the Warsaw Pact, lying off the coast of Virginia, overlooking the military installations in Norfolk. Additionally, the Barents Sea is in the middle of the maritime, air, and strategic nuclear common area of interest between Russia and the United States. Therefore, in a crisis, the Russians are more likely to look upon this area as more exposed than its borders in Central Europe.

Further, there is an unsolved border dispute between the former Soviet Union and Norway, in the Barents Sea, the "Gray Zone".⁷ The negotiations on the "Gray Zone" between Russia and Norway were resumed in April of 1992, but so far they remain deadlocked.⁸ The reasons for this are twofold. First, the Russians continue to fixate on the security of their Northern Fleet. Second, the possible existence of oil in the disputed area. Natural gas has already been found there, and seismic surveys have revealed the presence of all the basic geologic requirements for oil deposits.⁹ These factors make the Barents

Sea very important in the competition for strategic resources.

On the southern flank of the northern area of NATO lie the Baltic States. For the sake of the Baltic States, one hopes that they achieve complete freedom, but the planned Russian withdrawal from the Baltic states has a good news-bad news effect on the situation in the northern area of NATO. As Russian forces leave, Russian access to the Baltic Sea diminishes, and the tension in the Baltic Sea and the surrounding areas will be reduced; particularly the possible threat towards Sweden and Southern Norway. This is the good news.

The bad news is that withdrawal from the Baltic States puts additional pressure on Northern Norway. The equipment of the large Russian military land and air forces¹⁰ in the Baltic States, that are not reduced under the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty), will have to be based somewhere else.

The purpose of the CFE Treaty is to reduce the ability for a surprise attack on any European country and to increase stability in Europe. For the northern area of Nato this should be interpreted to reduce the threat potential of local forces which could be employed against Norwegian territory from the Leningrad Military District.¹¹ The result of the treaty however, so far has been more beneficial to the Central Region than to the two flanks of NATO, due to the particular arrangements of zones and categories of forces and equipment.¹² The main thrust of the negotiations concentrated on reducing the level of forces

confronting each other in Central Europe, hoping the result also would benefit the flanks. Whether the result will benefit the northern area of NATO remains to be seen.

Further, since naval forces are not addressed in the CFE Treaty, the Baltic Fleet due to reduced basing facilities,¹³ must at least partly be stationed somewhere else. My estimate is, as Russian access to base facilities in the Baltic States diminishes, Russia will have to rely increasingly on its base facilities on the Kola Peninsula to compensate for the loss. Increased basing also leads to the need for additional security, and the need for "legitimate" security, could lead to increased tension in this area.

Nor is Russia the only party concerned with security issues on the Kola Peninsula. Norway has often been accused by its NATO allies of being fixated on the Kola Peninsula and the forces there.¹⁴ To a certain degree, this criticism, is probably accurate, but overwhelming military forces between 10-100 km from your borders tends to get your undivided attention. The question for NATO, in general, and Norway in particular, therefore, is whether Russia, with its close geographic proximity to the northern area of NATO, presents a threat to the security of this region?

In addition to geostrategic factors, the combination of a country's military capabilities and intention to use them must also be considered. To assess whether Russia poses security risks to Norway today requires, therefore, a brief study of Russian

military capabilities, particularly in the Leningrad Military District, and the present political situation in Russia itself.

The modernization of the Russian Northern Fleet has continued and increased the capabilities of the fleet. Although a number of older ships have been decommissioned, the new ships are bigger, better armed, and equipped with more advanced technology than the old ones.¹⁵ With the introduction of an aircraft carrier, the "Admiral Kuznetsov", Russia has for the first time, the capacity to launch a task force with sea based air support for power projection anywhere in the world.¹⁶ The Air Force of the Northern Fleet is also being modernized, increased in size and given more offensive capacity. With this new capacity the Northern Fleet Air Force has increased its ability to strike against the transatlantic lines of communication,¹⁷ and to support naval operations in the Norwegian Sea. Further, there has been no reduction in the Russian Air Forces in the close vicinity of the Norwegian/Russian border.¹⁸

Additionally, Russia plans to increase defence spending by 10% in 1993. The alleged reason is that Russian armed forces still need additional and more modern equipment.¹⁹ Finally, Russia remains a nuclear superpower matched only by the United States.

In my opinion, few, if any, signs point to any decrease in Russian military capabilities on the Kola Peninsula. The military capabilities present there are overwhelming and would pose a considerable threat against Norwegian territory, if used. The

trends and changes in the northern area of NATO are, therefore, different from those in the Central Region of NATO. One could say that in the post-Cold War era the roles of these two area have been reversed, leaving the northern area the more exposed.

Having established that Russia has sufficient military capability to pose a threat to the northern area of NATO, the question remains whether Russia intends to use those capabilities against Northern Norway. This is a very difficult question to answer. Most likely, Russian leaders do not even know where the country is heading. Political crises are as frequent and unpredictable as winter snow flurries.²⁰ All these crises stem from the inability to create a viable political system rapidly enough to cope with changing conditions. The lack of a viable political system has created a very unstable situation, and what looks like a confrontation between government and parliament is really a fight between the remnants of the old system.²¹ The combatants on the political scene in Russia range from the old hard line Communists to the so-called democratic reformers. Whatever faction emerges, the winner will decide Russia's future and the Russian will to use, or not use, its military forces. As daily headlines indicate, the battle for political supremacy rages continuously.²²

On December 14, 1992, Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev stunned the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) when he delivered a Cold War style speech announcing that Russia is preparing to defend its interests in

the former USSR territory by all available means, including military and economic ones.²³ He later retracted his remarks, saying such policies could result if President Yeltsin lost power. Thus, the speech reflects the hard political struggle in Russia. Moreover, President Yeltsin recent forced withdrawal of his nomination of new prime minister, the reform architect Yegor Gaidar, and the selection of a more conservative official, is but another example.²⁴ This is a victory for the hard core of communists and might indicate what to expect in the future.

Russia, in whatever shape it eventually takes, will continue to be the largest military power on the European continent in years to come. It is vital for Europe, therefore, that Russia succeeds in its "Second Revolution" and the quest for democracy. But a bumpy road lies ahead. The Russian economy is in a shambles, and these economic problems could lead to further discontent and a "Third Revolution" paving the way for an authoritarian takeover and increasing tensions in Europe, particularly, in the northern area of NATO.

The best assessment of the situation in Russia is to declare the Russian future uncertain. Although Russia presently intends to avoid war, it is too early to exclude this possibility in the future. Russian leadership could change overnight, and since vital interests are products of human judgment,²⁵ its intentions might also change. Europe cannot escape its Russian dilemma, and must always take the Russian situation into consideration as the future European security is discussed. Until Russia has settled

down. her neighbors should not start harvesting the peace dividend, but rather be prepared for any option.

THE CONFERENCE ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE

The CSCE is a young organization on the international scene. It emerged in 1973 and so far has made an important contribution to European security and stability as a forum for political discussion and arms reductions talks. The strength of the organization is that it brought all European and North American states together, bridging the gap of distrust between the two former competing systems in Europe. The most important feat of the institution was the signing of the CFE Treaty and Vienna Document (VD 90) on CSBMs at the CSCE summit in Paris in November of 1990.

The weakness of the CSCE is that it seems to be more a process than an institution and more dialogue than substance. Since issues like validation of borders and conflict prevention arguably are within the agenda of the CSCE, it could have played a vital role in handling the civil war in Yugoslavia, and the break up of the Soviet Union. But, due to lack of interest and disagreement among its member states, the CSCE remained idle, and thereby lost its golden moment to established itself as an important player in the European peace process.¹⁶

The last, if not final blow against the CSCE was, in my opinion, the creation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) at the NATO summit in November 1991. This council is

designed to be a forum for political discussion and confidence building measures between the governments of NATO and former Warsaw Pact countries, including Russia. The NACC is thereby capable of taking over much of the agenda of the CSCE, and could, at worst, make CSCE obsolete, or, at best, make the CSCE's role and influence in the future Europe marginal²⁷. NATO has by creating the NACC, put a damper on the vision of making the CSCE the cornerstone of European security.

A CHANGING NATO

NATO has been accused, in particular by Americans,²⁸ of not adapting fast enough to the radical transformations that have taken place in Europe over the last three years. In my opinion, this misconception reflects a lack of understanding of what it takes to make sixteen different sovereign nations walk in concert. Changes in NATO have been approved, and adjustments are under way in four different areas: roles and missions, military strategy, military structure and revised command structure.²⁹

All these adjustments, of course, have had an impact on the northern area of NATO. The unilateral draw down of forces in NATO, beyond CFE requirements, as long as it is done in concert with a Russian draw down in adherence with the CFE Treaty, should reduce tension. But, since Russia's future intentions are uncertain, Norwegian concerns remain over the future availability of reinforcements in the event of a crisis in Europe. Moreover, as the reduction of forces continues, and the forward defence

strategy is replaced with the forward presence strategy, the number of reinforcements will also decrease. And, since Europe would still need reinforcements to counter a possible Russian attack, the competition for ever diminishing reinforcements to the different areas of NATO will likely increase, and the most vital areas of NATO, will have to be prioritized³⁰. Norway must therefore continue to uphold a credible national defence capability, at least until the situation in Russia is stabilized.

The change that is less welcomed than all the others, is the revised command structure for Central and Northern Europe that was approved on May 27, 1992, in Brussels,³¹ and will be effective from July 1994. The headquarters of Allied Forces Northern Europe (AFNORTH) at Kolsas in Norway and Allied Command Channel (ACCHAN) at Northwood in the United Kingdom will be dissolved. A new command, Allied Forces Northwestern Europe (AFNORTHWEST) will be established at High Wycombe in Great Britain with responsibility for defending the United Kingdom, Norway, the English Channel, the North Sea and, remarkably the Baltic Sea. To accomplish the maritime defence of the region, the command will have operational control of naval forces from Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Germany and Norway. The headquarters of Allied Forces Central Europe (AFCENT) will take over the responsibilities for the land and air defence of Denmark and Schleswig-Holstein.³²

Norway will be left with one Principle Subordinate Command (PSC) level command instead of the earlier two. The new PSC

NORTH, will be located in Stavanger in Southern Norway and will have representatives from the reinforcing allied nations permanently assigned to the staff.

The changes in the NATO command structure are mainly the result of German insistence on having all of its territory under one command. This demand is understandable from a military standpoint. Reunification has increased German territory by one third, and the large scheduled cutbacks in German force structure will result in fewer defensive forces. With a centralized control of all its forces, Germany can more easily mass its forces in a crisis. Denmark, being a part of the European continent, found it natural to follow suit and maintain her old command relations in the Jutland Corps. Moreover, since the threat of a Russian forced break out from the Baltic Sea has diminished, it may not longer be necessary to have a coordinated defence of the Baltic approaches.

But, from a military perspective, it must be rather inconvenient for AFCENT to have to coordinate its control of the land and air battle with AFNORTHWEST's sea battle in the Baltic Sea. In addition, it must be just as inconvenient for AFNORTHWEST to fight a sea battle far from its own resources. Political trade offs sometimes create strange military results³³. In my opinion, the only correct military solution is to give responsibility for the Baltic Sea and the Baltic approaches to the adjacent land and air command, AFCENT. Such an option eases command and control problems for both commands.

For Norway, there are good and bad sides of the decided command structure. The bad part is that it leaves Norway with less contacts to the Continent and a feeling that its allies in Central Europe are not sufficiently concerned with the security of the northern area of NATO. Norwegians also are concerned that the result could eventually lead to isolation and marginalization of the northern flank, particularly since Norway is not a member of the EC and only an associated member of the WEU³⁴.

The good sides are that as Norway has moved further away from the Continent, it has moved closer to the United Kingdom, a country with whom Norway traditionally has had very close relations, particularly in defense matters³⁵. And since the defence of AFNORTHWEST heavily depends on control of the North Sea, the Atlantic and the Barents Sea, the cooperation and coordination between AFNORTHWEST and Allied Command Atlantic (ACLANT) will be important. Furthermore, since the heaviest reinforcements to Norway are coming across the Atlantic, close ties with ACLANT and the United States are vital for the defense of Norway as well³⁶. AFNORTHWEST will have at its disposal a large number of naval forces from NATO countries around the British Channel and the Baltic Sea, all vital forces for the defence of Norway, and this is not a bad trade off.

Although the changes in the command structure of NATO have created an increased distance between Norway and its allies on the Continent, they still provide sufficient security for the region. Norway can live with the military results of the new

command structure, but the political results are uncomfortable. From a Norwegian perspective, Norway is becoming a marginal ally on the political outskirts of Europe³⁷. The new command structure has created a political distance between Norway and its allies in continental Europe³⁸, increasing the Norwegian fear of marginalization.

THE US ROLE IN A CHANGING NATO

As the changes in NATO are taking place, the United States is increasingly focusing on its domestic problems. The American people underlined this message by electing a president who ran his campaign on domestic issues only, and who has no international political experience. Therefore, as President Clinton takes office, NATO will likely see a further draw down of American forces in Europe beyond those already planned.³⁹ And, as the United States continues to turn inward, American influence in Europe may diminish and the influence of the European Community, would logically increase.

Furthermore, a larger American withdrawal would likely lead to less contact between Norway and her largest reinforcement contributor, the major naval power of the world. Less contact could lead possibly to less understanding and less willingness to contribute reinforcements to support the defense of Norway. For the northern area of NATO this has a negative effect. The defense of the area depends heavily on allied, particular American support.

THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

The European Community is presently the major economic and political organization in Europe. With a reunited Germany as the motive power, the EC may move even further. At Maastricht, in December 1991, the community decided to try establish a common foreign and defence policy.⁴⁰

To take care of the military aspects of the defense policy, the EC has revitalized the Western European Union (WEU). As a result the WEU has moved from being a small, slumbering footnote to the EC, to the military and security arm of the organization.⁴¹ To help achieve this end, the WEU will be given a mission, a command structure and military forces.⁴² And, unlike NATO, the WEU will have no restriction on "out of area operations."⁴³

The revitalization of the WEU as the "European Pillar of NATO", may change substantially the European side of NATO. European NATO matters will more and more be discussed and agreed upon inside the EC/WEU. At NATO meetings, the EC/WEU countries could meet with coordinated views, making it difficult for none EC/WEU members to influence decisions. This situation could more and more lead to a bipolar NATO, with the EC/WEU and the United States as the two main players. Since these two players represent the majority in NATO by far, the major decisions could then be made between the two of them, leaving outsiders to fend for themselves as best they can. Norway, afraid that its influence in NATO in the future could be substantially reduced, applied for,

and eventually became an associated member of the WEU in November 20, 1992⁴⁴. The associated membership gives Norway full access to meetings and conferences in the WEU, and, thereby, some influence; but Norway is not allowed to vote on any issue.

In addition, the present Norwegian government forwarded a new application for membership in the EC, exactly twenty years after the Norwegian people rejected the first proposal in a nation wide referendum. The political wounds from this debacle have not yet healed and still haunt the political life of the country. This time, as the last, the Labour Party government, supported by the Conservative Party, hopes to convince the Norwegian people that membership in the EC is vital to the country's future interests. At present, the chances for success seem very slim. The last polls in December 1992 gave the opposing side 49% of the votes, while the supporting side only got 34%.⁴⁵ If Norway does not join the EC this time, for the reasons above, Norway will have marginalized itself on the European continent and must suffer the self inflicted consequences of losing influence in Europe and in NATO. Although the associated membership in the WEU helps, it provides little influence when major decisions are made.

THE NORDIC AREA

The Nordic countries, for a variety of historical, political and strategic reasons, adopted different security systems after World War II. Denmark, Iceland, and Norway, because of their

World War II experiences, joined NATO. Sweden decided to remain nonaligned in peace and neutral in war. Finland, on the other hand, was coerced into neutrality by the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance with the former Soviet Union.

At present, the situation in the Nordic countries is somewhat different. Denmark and Norway are still members of NATO. Denmark is a member of the European Community (EC), bringing it closer to Central Europe. And, in November 1992, Norway, as mentioned earlier, realizing that Norwegian trade relations and security policy needed good connections to the European Community, applied for membership in the EC. But these are small changes and all within the NATO framework, so to speak. The major changes have occurred in the situation of Sweden and Finland.

Sweden has also applied for membership in the EC. If admitted, Sweden must accept the Maastricht Agreement in full and become a member of the Western European Union. Such membership would force Sweden to abandon its neutrality and to take on the same obligations as the other members of the WEU,⁴⁵ i.e., to secure mutual assistance to any member nation in the event of aggression. Furthermore, since the EC/WEU is more and more emerging as the "European Pillar of NATO", Sweden would also be closely engaged with NATO. This could, in my opinion, result in Sweden joining NATO within a short period of time.

For Finland, the changes have been even more dramatic. It has renegotiated the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance with Russia, and the Finns now have more political

freedom than they have had for decades. The ban on membership in alliances is gone and Finland is now pursuing membership in the EC. If Finland, like Sweden, becomes a member, it, too, will have to accept the Maastricht Agreement and also become a member of the WEU. This could also pave the way for a possible future membership in NATO.

With Finland, Sweden and Norway as members of NATO, the northern area of NATO would constitute a stronger flank to the NATO security system. In theory, such an option looks feasible, but reality creates certain problems. Until Russia has successfully solved its domestic problems and created some sort of stable democracy, it will probably perceive this enlargement of NATO as a threat and oppose it. Russia's attitudes toward the coming negotiations between Sweden and Finland and the EC on membership in the community and the WEU, will give an indication. If Russia accepts Finland's membership in the WEU, it probably will accept Finnish membership in NATO as well. Further, in my opinion, such acceptance would indicate that Russia would emerge from its problems a democratic nation. And, if Russia emerges as a democracy, there might be no threat to the northern area of NATO at all, obviating the need for a security system in northern Europe. This is speculative and remains to be seen. Only the future will tell.

The Nordic countries could, of course establish their own security organization. But with the extent of Russian capabilities, the Nordic area alone does not have a sufficient

military framework to provide the necessary security for this region.⁴ The area would still have to rely on reinforcement from other nations, either from NATO, the United States, or the European Community.

CONCLUSION

Although the recent changes and trends in Europe on security generally have been positive for NATO countries, improvements have varied between the Central and Northern regions of NATO. In the post-Cold War era the risks to these two regions have changed, leaving the northern area of NATO the more exposed. Moreover, the close proximity of Russian capabilities on the Kola Peninsula have left Northern Norway most exposed. Norway should, therefore, continue to keep up a strong national defence, with Northern Norway having first priority. That said, because the combination of large territory and small population, Norway will continue to depend heavily upon allied reinforcements in the event of crisis. But this may be where Norway's future headache starts. As the WEU emerges the European Pillar of NATO, and the Americans are reducing their presence in Europe, the EC/WEU could become the most important future security organization for Western Europe. For Norway it is therefore vital for her future security to join the EC.

If membership is voted down in the future referendum, Norway will be isolated on the periphery of Europe and, should NATO fade away from the European security scene, Norway must find new

security ties and needed reinforcements from somewhere else. Maybe the solution could be, as the Norwegian Foreign Minister has indicated,⁴⁹ to approach the present largest supplier of reinforcements to Norway, and the only remaining superpower on land and sea, and like Iceland, negotiate bilateral security agreements with the United States.

ENDNOTES

1. Johan Jorgen Holst, "From Arctic to Baltic - The Strategic Significance of Norway," NATO's Sixteen Nations, (May/June 1991): p. 23.

2. Jacob Borresen, "De nordlige havomrader i en ny dimmension," Atlanterhavskomiteens serier No. 141 (Flekkefjord: Hegland Trykkeri, 1991), pp. 1-5.

3. The Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Minifacts About Norway 1990-91 (Otta: Engers Boktrykkeri AS, 1990), p. 3, and Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook 1992 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1992), p. 258.

4. Den Norske Atlanterhavskomite, Militaerbalansen 1991-1992 (Aurskog: Printing Data Center A/S, 1991), pp. 35,48.

5. Det Kongelige Forsvarsdepartement, Fakta om Forsvaret 1993 (Oslo: Emil Mostue AS, 1993), p. 12.

6. In this respect, I look upon the war in Yugoslavia as a civil war and not a war between sovereign European nations.

7. The disputed "Gray Zone" in the Barents Sea is a 175,000 sq km large area containing fishery as well as possible oil resources. The disagreement between Norway and the former Soviet Union on the line of delineation results from different interpretations of the Geneva Convention on Continental Shelves of 1958. Norway claims the principle of the median line, while the former Soviet Union claimed the sector line principle. Jacob Borresen, "De nordlige havomrader i en ny dimmension," p. 31.

8. Det Kongelige Utenriksdepartement, "Norge Presser Oss," Telexnytt No. 220 (November 13, 1992): pp. 1-2. Interview in Aftenposten (Oslo) with officials from the Russian Foreign Ministry.

9. Paul M. Cole and Douglas M. Hart, Northern Europe: Security Issues for the 1990s (Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University, 1986), pp. 93-96.

10. Den Norske Atlanterhavskomite, Militaerbalansen 1991-1992, (Aurskog: Printing Data Center AS, 1991), pp. 18,49.

11. Holst, "From Arctic to Baltic," pp. 32,33.

12. The Norwegian Atlantic Committee, The Military Balance in Northern Europe 1990-1991, (Aurskog: Printing Data Center AS, 1991), pp. 30,31.

13. Ibid, p. 167.

14. Det Kongelige Utenriksdepartement, "Allierte Synes Norge Er for Kola-fiksert," Telexnytt No. 220, (November 13, 1992): p. 1. Interview with Johan Jorgen Holst, the Norwegian Minister of Defence.

15. The Norwegian Atlantic Committee, The Military Balance in Northern Europe 1990-1991, p. 12.

16. Jacob Borresen, "De nordlige havområder i en ny dimensjon." p. 23.

17. Forsvarsdepartementet, Stortingsproposisjon No. 1 (Orkanger: Grytting AS, September 20, 1991), p. 19.

18. Ibid.

19. Jahn Ronne, "Russland satser på Nordflaten", Forsvarets Forum No. 24 (November 18, 1992): p. 20.

20. Elisabeth Rubinfien and Daniel Sneider, "Yeltsin's Unfinished Revolution," National Review (December 14, 1992): p. 21.

21. Ibid.

22. Brian Brumley, "Staying on Top," The Patriot-News (March 27, 1993): p. A9.

23. Jack Kelley, "A Blast of Cold War Words," USA Today (December 15, 1992): p. A7.

24. Jack Kelley, "Yeltsin Selects Conservative to be Premier," USA Today (December 15, 1992): p. A7.

25. Bernard Brodie, War & Politics (New York: MacMillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1973), p. 343.

26. Douglas T. Stuart, "The Future of the European Alliance: Problems and Opportunities for Coalition Strategists," Collective Security in Europe and Asia (Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, March 2, 1992), p. 63.

27. Ibid, p. 65.

28. Major General Evan L Hultman, "NATO in Search of a NEW Identity," ROA National Security Report (July 1992): pp. 41, 43.

29. NATO Ministerial Sessions, Final Communiqué (May 27, 1992).

30. Ibid.

31. Ibid.

32. Generalmajor Torkel Hovland, "NATO's Nye Kommandostruktur og dens Betydning for Norge," Norsk Militært Tidsskrift No. 1 (1993): p. 9.

33. Ibid, p. 11.

34. Ibid, p. 13.

35. Ibid.

36. Ibid.

37. Chief of Defence Norway, Admiral Torolf Rein, "NATO Snur Ryggen til Norge," Telexnytt No. 27 (February 9, 1993): p. 1.

38. Ibid.

39. Juan J. Walte, "For Reduced Threat, a Cut in U.S. Troops," USA Today (March 30, 1993): p. A6.

40. Stuart, "The Future of the European Alliance," p. 63.

41. Maastricht Agreement, Paragraph 3, December 1992.

42. General Dieter Clauss, Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe, "Allied Command Europe: A Time of Change," RUSI Journal, (June 1992): p. 2.

43. Western European Treaty, Article VIII.

44. Det Kongelige Utenriksdepartement, "Norway Links up with WEU," News of Norway (December 1992): p. 2.

45. Det Kongelige Utenriksdepartement, "AP's JA-side Kraftig Fram," Telexnytt No. 242 (December 14, 1992): p. 2. Polls taken by Aftenposten (Oslo) during the first part of December 1992.

46. John Major, the British Prime Minister, in a speech on C-SPAN after the EC summit in Edinburgh, December 22, 1992.

47. Holst, "From Arctic to Baltic," p. 29.

48. Utenriksminister Torvald Stoltenberg, "Norsk Sikkerhet Avhengig av Medlemskap i EF," Aftenposten (November 25, 1992): p. 17.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Brodie, Bernard. War & Politics. New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc, 1973.
- Brost, Wolfgang. Endringer i Trusselbildet og NATO's Nordkommando. Den Norske Atlanterhavskomite, 1991.
- Borresen, Jacob. De Nordlige Havområder i en Ny Dimensjon. Flekkefjord, Norway: Hegland Trykkeri.1991.
- Brumley, Brian. "Staying on Top." The Patriot News, March 27 1993.
- Central Intelligence Agency. The World Fact Book. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1992.
- Clauss, Dieter. "Allied Command Europe: A Time of Change." RUSI Journal, June 1992.
- Cole, Paul M. and Hart, Douglas M. Northern Europe: Security Issues for the 1990's. Boulder CO: Westview Press, 1986.
- Den Norske Atlanterhavskomite. Militaerbalansen 1991 - 1992. Aurskog: Printing Data Center AS, 1991.
- Det Kongelige Forsvarsdepartement. Stortingsproposisjon no 1, 1991 - 1992, October 1991.
- Det Kongelige Utenriksdepartement. "Norge Presser Oss." Telexnytt, November 13 1992.
- Det Kongelige Utenriksdepartement. "Allierte Synes Norge Er for Kola-fiksert." Telexnytt, November 13 1992.
- Det Kongelige Uteriksdepartement. "Norway Links up with WEU." News of Norway, December 1992.
- Det Kongelige Utenriksdepartement. "AP's JA-side Kraftig Fram." Telexnytt, December 14 1992.
- Five, Kaci Kullmann. "Norges Plass i Europeisk Samarbeid." Norsk Militaert Tidsskrift, No. 12 (1992).
- Galo, Daniel P. "Bush and Clinton Speak Out On Europe." Europe, October 1992.
- Holst, Johan Jorgen. "From Arctic to Baltic: The Significance of Norway." NATO's Sixteen Nations, May/June 1992.
- Holst, Johan Jorgen. "EF og Var Sikkerhet." FD-Informasjon. July/August 1992.

- Holst, Johan Jorgen. "European and Atlantic Security in the Period of Ambiguity." FD-Informasjon, September 1992.
- Holst, Johan Jorgen. "Perspectives on the Interplay of NATO, the WEU and the CSCE." FD-Informasjon, October 1992.
- Holst, Johan Jorgen. "Var sikkerhetspolitiske Situasjon." FD-Informasjon, January 1993.
- Hovland, Torkel. " NATO's Nye Kommandostruktur og dens Betydning for Norge." Norsk Militaert Tidsskrift, No. 1 (1993).
- Hultman, Evan L. "Nato in Search of a New Identity." ROA National Security Report, July 1992.
- Kelley, Jack. "A Blast of Cold War Words." USA Today, December 15 1992.
- Kelley, Jack. "Yeltsin Selects Conservative to be Premier." USA Today, December 15 1992.
- Kemp, Ian. "Special Report: Nordic Appraisal." Janes Defence Weekly, March 30, 1991.
- Rubinfien, Elisabeth and Sneider, Daniel. "Yeltsin's Unfinished Revolution." National Review, December 14, 1992.
- Rein, Torolf. Norsk Forsvarspolitik frem mot ar 2000. Flekkefjord, Norway: Hegland Trykkeri, 1991.
- Rein, Torolf. "Nato Snur Ryggen til Norge." Telexnytt, February 9, 1993.
- Ronne, Jahn. "Russland satser pa Nordflaten." Forsvarets Forum, November 18, 1992.
- Snow, Donald M. National Security: Enduring Problems in a Changing Defence Environment. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991.
- Special Report. "Can Russia Escape Its Past." Time, December 7, 1992.
- Stoltenberg, Torvald. "Den Aktuelle Utenriks- og Sikkerhetspolitiske Situasjon." Norsk Militaert Tidsskrift, No. 11 (1992).
- Stoltenberg, Torvald. "Norsk Sikkerhet Avhengig av Medlemskap i EF." Aftenposten, November 25 1992.
- Stuart, Douglas T. "The Future of the European Alliance: Problems and Opportunities for Coalition Strategists." Collective Security in Europe and Asia. Carlisle Barracks: Strategic

- Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1992.
- The Norwegian Atlantic Committee. The Military Balance in Northern Europe 1990 - 1991. Aurskog, Norway: Printing Data Center AS, 1991.
- The Royal Ministry of Finance. Long Term Programme: 1990 - 1993. May 1989.
- The Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Minifacts About Norway 1990 - 1991. 15th Edition in English (1990).
- Walte, Juan J. "For Reduced Threat, a Cut in U.S. Troops."
USA Today, March 30 1993.