Vice Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher: Scapegoat or Operational Artist?

Abstract

This paper examines Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher's decision to withdraw the three aircraft carriers during the early days of the Guadalcanal campaign in August 1942. Many officers, historians, and Marines to this day criticize this decision as a bad decision that resulted in the naval defeat at Savo Island on 9 August 1942 and as another example of the Navy deserting the Marines on the beach. Research into the original documents and a careful examination of the written histories provide a different insight into the roots of the decision, particularly when evaluating the decision with some principles of operational thinking as opposed to the sometimes disjointed tactical and strategic thought of 1942. By today's standards, the decision is correct. By yesteryear's standards, it also was the correct decision given the condition of the Navy, the strategic guidance and operational level friction, and the tactical situation. Admiral Fletcher followed orders providing the requisite tactical support while not risking the operational and strategic mission by further exposing his carriers to unnecessary risk.

Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Feb 22, 1993
Accession Number
ADA263953

Entities

People

  • W. D. Hughes Iii

Organizations

  • Naval War College

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Air Platforms
  • Human Systems

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Aircraft Carriers
  • Aircrafts
  • Friction
  • Guidance
  • Military Forces (United States)
  • Military Organizations
  • Navy
  • Standards
  • Thinking
  • Vehicles

Readers

  • Military History / Militaries and War Studies
  • Military History of the United States in the 20th Century.