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THE 1ST BATTALION 7TH INFANTRY IN THE GULF WAR

BY

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United States Army

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

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The Persian Gulf War provided the United States Army with numerous challenges. To meet the force ratio requirements desired by CENTCOM, the United States would have to employ forward deployed forces from Europe. Because not all of the units in Europe were completely modernized, some realignment of the deploying units was required. This study project presents the story of one of those units. The 1st Battalion, 7th Infantry deployed to the Gulf War with its parent brigade, the 3d Brigade, 3d Infantry Division, as a part of the 1st Armored Division. Once attached to the 1st Armored Div, it would be called the 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division. While outlining the sequence of events, this study examines the issues encountered and solutions used by the battalion as it joined a new division, deployed from Europe, fought as the division's lead task force, conducted post-conflict humanitarian relief and assistance for over 100,000 refugees along the military demarcation line, and redeployed to Europe. Finally, this study provides some recommendations based on the after-action reviews and experiences of the author who served as the battalion commander.

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THE 1ST BATTALION 7TH INFANTRY IN THE GULF WAR

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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List of Illustrations

FIG	TITLE	PAGE
1	Task Force 1-7 Movement Formation	17
2	Ammo Expenditure and BDA	32
3	Graphic Summary of Movement	33
4	Humanitarian Relief Summary	43

LIST OF APPENDICES

A. Operations Order 20S-91, 191100 Feb 91, HQ, 1st Bn 7th Infantry

B. 1st Brigade Graphic Summary of Gulf War Activities

C. 1st Brigade After Action Review

D. Valorous Unit Award Citation and Order

INTRODUCTION

The 1st Battalion, 7th Infantry has a long and distinguished history of service to the nation. Beginning with its service in the War of 1812, where it earned the nickname 'Cottonbalers' by fighting from behind cottonbales for Andy Jackson at New Orleans, through its service as part of the U.S. forward deployed forces in Europe, the battalion has proudly contributed to the rich heritage of the army. The Persian Gulf War provided yet another opportunity for the Cottonbalers to step forward in battle. This paper is intended to provide a record of the accomplishments of the officers and men of this battalion during the preparation, conduct, and post conflict periods of this war.

This paper will not be able to codify the contributions of each individual soldier, non-commissioned officer (NCO), and officer. That is beyond its scope and the author's ability. It is rather to highlight the extraordinary accomplishments of the entire organization which are due solely to the contributions of soldiers who worked together courageously and unselfishly for the good of the unit. Where individuals have been identified, it is to help clarify the events being described and is not intended to overlook the equally important efforts by all who were present.

This paper is also intended to draw some conclusions on the training, equipment, and preparations for war that may benefit others. The author served as the Commander, 1st Battalion, 7th Infantry, throughout this period and is solely responsible for any errors this study may contain.

ALERT/NOTIFICATION

VII Corps was alerted on 8 November 1989, that it would deploy to the Persian Gulf. The 1st Armored Division and the 3rd Armored Division were initially identified to deploy. As the initial planning got under way, it became clear that the 1st Armored Division could not field three modernized brigades. Downsizing and an as yet incomplete modernization process were the culprits. On 18 Nov 1989, the 3d Brigade, 3d Infantry Division (Phantom Brigade), located in Aschaffenburg, was notified that it would be attached to and deploy with the 1st Armored Div in the place of its 1st Brigade. The Phantom Brigade was comprised of the 1st Bn, 7th Infantry, the 4th Bn, 7th Infantry, and the 4th Bn, 66th Armor. To avoid confusion with the existing 3d Brigade, it would be called the 1st Brigade of the 1st Armored Div (and will be refered to as such for the remainder of this paper). Also deploying to support the brigade would be the 26th Forward Support Battalion, the brigade's habitual support unit, and the 2-41 Field Artillery Bn, our habitual direct support unit.

Notification was received on a Friday afternoon and the information was quickly passed to each company to tell their soldiers before they were released for the weekend. Commanders and staff were brought in and over the course of the weekend a tentative work schedule for initial planning was outlined.

The next weeks became a blur as staffs and commanders worked

to identify equipment, training, and personnel shortfalls and to brainstorm requirements for the upcoming deployment. If anything, the battalion staff got too far ahead of the planning cycle during this period. At all levels, both within and above the battalion, there were good and capable staff officers working the multitude of issues that were being identified. However, as the battalion staff identified problems, they began to call and push for answers, and in more than one instance this caused some bruised feelings and didn't facilitate resolving problems.

Training, taking care of families, and deployment were set as the clear priorities for this period. Not identified as a priority but something that took some effort was integration into the 1st Armored Div. Learning their SOP's for reporting, etc., would take time.

DEPLOYMENT PREPARATION

Initial assessments by the battalion staff and company commanders included personnel shortages, equipment needs (both authorized shortages and additional desired equipment for the mission), and laundry lists of unanswered questions.

Personnel requirements were forwarded and eventually filled by personnel from units that were inactivating. The 1st Bn, 15th Infantry from Kitingen provided most of our personnel fillers. Most were quickly integrated into their new companies. Billeting quickly became a problem as the companies were unaccustomed to

operating at the increased strength levels and most of the replacements were single. For those who were married, there was an immediate morale problem. The married soldiers who lived in Aschaffenburg could return to their homes even if it was late at night. Not so for the soldiers from Kitzingen. Special efforts were made to try to block time for them to return occasionally to see their families with varying degrees of success. These soldiers performed quite well throughout the deployment.

Non-deployable lists were scrubbed daily with guidance changing frequently over how much flexibility the chain of command could exercise on who to take. The final guidance was to take everyone who was physically capable. A rear detachment was authorized, one NCO per company with an officer in charge, and where possible it would be composed of those not physically capable of deploying. Company commanders and the legal system were also under a great deal of pressure to expedite a number of discharges for those soldiers with disciplinary problems that the units didn't want to take with them. This process highlighted a longstanding complaint of the companies about receiving new soldiers from CONUS as routine replacements who were in fact non-deployable. A number of medical review packets were begun for soldiers with long standing ailments for potential medical discharge.

To prepare the soldiers for overseas movement to a new region, administration specialists from the community and 3d Inf Div set up a processing station in a local gym. By unit,

soldiers went through to get shots, update wills and survivor benefits, ID cards and tags, privately owned vehicle data, and obtain powers of attorney. Soldiers were 'strongly encouraged' to bring their wives with them to ensure that the wives were involved in the decisions. This way they were present when the question was asked about local checking accounts, banking privileges, and pay options. They understood that powers of attorney would be required to file income taxes, sell cars etc. It also allowed the community staff to make sure that all dependents were properly enrolled in the medical system to preclude problems in the future. The battalion's rear detachment NCOs participated in this as well. Noncombatant evacuation packets were updated with phone numbers and addresses for future use in telephone trees, casualty notification, etc. This was particularly valuable.

The logisticians in the battalion were easily the most overworked of all. The identification of shortages, requisitioning of replacement items, conduct of lateral transfers, calling units searching for needed equipment, local purchase of desired/needed materials, accountability of equipment, and transfer of hand receipts were just some of the major areas of concern for them. The battalion level S-4 staff is inadequately staffed to accomplish all the tasks asked of it in this type of situation. It was only through the extraordinary efforts of 1Lt Dan Oh and his staff that these were eventually accomplished.

New equipment, with which we were unfamiliar, was received by the battalion during the deployment. Of greatest significance was the heavy expanded mobility tactical truck, or HEMTT. This vehicle was to prove to be absolutely critical to our successful operations in the desert. However, during this phase it created problems for property transfer, training for drivers and mechanics, and the turn-in of the now excess 2 1/2 ton trucks. Turn-ins were still required to be done in accordance with peace time rules and it was difficult to reconcile our war/deployment focus with units and some individuals who were staying behind, working normal duty days, and not sharing our focus on mission accomplishment. This was not widespread, but was prevalent enough to cause frustrations.

Requisitions were submitted without regard for shipping time because it was the only means of giving visibility to shortages or perceived needs to higher. To their credit, 3d Infantry Division never constrained our requests although not all were filled. Local purchase funds were also provided to procure wood for packing vehicles with equipment, and for use in Southwest Asia (SWA), as well as the purchase of other items for troop use.

A particular headache was property accountability throughout the deployment. Company commanders wanted to take both TO&E property and installation property to SWA. Accounting for equipment as it was placed into MILVANS, picking up newly arrived property, identifying, segregating, and securing equipment to stay behind, and having rear detachment personnel sign for it,

took an extraordinary amount of the company commander's time. This was complicated by frequent changes in instructions for the shipment of equipment to SWA. What could/would be placed inside tracked vehicles, MILVANS, open trucks, etc, all changed with monotonous regularity. Simultaneously, the individual soldiers had to pack up their personal belongings, have them inventoried, boxed, and placed in secure storage areas.

Maintenance was also a focus for the preparation of the equipment to deploy. Dollar shortages had often prevented commanders from ordering parts for sets, kits, and outfits which suddenly became a priority. The priority load list for parts was reviewed and new/additional parts were ordered in anticipation of the problems to be encountered in the desert. Older trucks were swapped out with inactivating units to upgrade our fleet, but a concerted effort over the previous 6-8 months by our maintenance personnel to upgrade our wheel maintenance proved to have been very valuable.

Packing and preparing trucks and wheels for shipment by sea was an area in which we had no previous experience. The identification of hazardous cargo, use of required forms, methods for banding vehicles and equipment were all new to our personnel. Some training was provided by a team of reservists from Movement and Traffic Management Command, but the eventual solution was to run centralized teams for the inspection of the vehicles (both mechanical and for materials packed aboard), the blocking, packing, and banding of the vehicles, marking with LOGMARS

(automated bar codes), and the preparation of the required forms. These teams greatly aided our efficiency and accuracy.

The battalion's tracked vehicles moved by rail to the port and the only difficulties encountered were getting adequate tiedown material. Personnel accompanied the trains as security and to unlock the vehicles at the port. These personnel would also be the supercargos on the ships. In the end, too many personnel were sent because of conflicting information. An officer was sent as the senior representative of the team to report back on the status of the battalion's equipment and this was very valuable. His reports provided valuable feedback on which ships were carrying our equipment and when they sailed. He was also able to coordinate for some maintenance support for several of the wheeled vehicles.

Wheeled vehicles traveled by road convoys. The weather was generally quite bad with snow and ice on the roadways most days. The convoy support centers that had been established to provide maintenance, fuel, and Class I (food) support were especially valuable in the safe conduct of this operation.

The main body began departing for Saudi Arabia on 23 Dec 89, and the last flight closed on or about 10 Jan 90. Notification and pickup was smoothly conducted with trucks and buses arriving to carry baggage and soldiers to various airealports of debarkation (APOD) being used.

PRE-DEPLOYMENT TRAINING

To prepare for the range of combat missions expected to be encountered in the desert, the company commanders assessed their training status against a modified Mission Essential Task List (METL) that we had developed. The training priorities focused on individual and crew level training in field sanitation, first aid, chemical defense, and cultural training on desert warfare and the Muslim religion.

The Brigade Commander was in frequent contact with MG Griffith, the Commanding General, 1st Armored Div, and had been told that we would be the division's advance guard in the event of combat operations. Because of the likelihood of encountering Iraqi obstacles and minefields in this role, we spent a great deal of effort to reexamine and codify our brigade and battalion SOPs for breaching obstacles. Our previous experience in putting on breach demonstrations in the 3rd In Div, at the direction of MG Shoffner, was key to our confidence that we could successfully accomplish this mission. Subsequently, a presentation was made by the brigade during a warfighting seminar to the rest of the 1st Armored Div's senior leaders on our plans for breaching obstacles.

Gunnery was considered to be the major training deficiency identified by the company commanders. The battalion had not had a live fire gunnery since the previous summer. They had done well, but we had undergone a lot of personnel turbulence and our crews

had never fired dual ammunition types from their Bradley fighting vehicles. Up to that time, training ammunition in Europe had only provided a training HE (high explosive) round but no sabot round (armor piercing). A new training sabot round was now in Germany but we had not trained with it. Having to deal with a real mix of ammunition rather than simulated in a UCOFT was considered to be very important. Also, many new soldiers had arrived in the unit who had not qualified with their weapons because of a lack of facilities at our home station. 3rd Infantry Div solved this problem for us by supporting a remarkable gunnery period at Grafenwoehr. Our soldiers were bussed to Graf where they fell in on the Bradley's of a sister battalion already there for training. They ran all the ranges for us and provided all vehicle support while our crews conducted gunnery training with the dual ammunition. Our soldiers also requalified on their basic weapon, anti-tank weapons, and our infantry squads went down the Squad Assault Course. Though it was very compressed, and some complained about losing a weekend from their families, I consider it to have been very important.

FAMILY SUPPORT

Care for the families left behind was of great concern to us all. We were authorized to leave an officer and some non-commissioned officers behind for the purpose of supporting the families. Their responsibilities would be to take care of the

installation, sign for and care for property left behind, assist the families with any problems they might have, and take care of mail.

The officer selected to remain behind was not one of the more experienced in the battalion, but as he was just changing jobs, he could be given the job without destabilizing a staff section. His inexperience and youth worked against him during this trying period as he had a difficult time working with the wives. In retrospect, it would have been better to have selected a more senior or experienced officer for the task.

Prior to our departure, great efforts had been made to meet the anticipated needs of the families. Accurate phone trees were made to pass information, all dependents were provided with phone lists of emergency numbers for assistance, office space was set aside for the wives council members in the battalion headquarters, and procedures for the rear detachment were established. Despite our best efforts, a great deal of the problems encountered by the families were unanticipated and just had to be dealt with by the senior wives with common sense at the time.

A significant problem encountered was rumor. Once soldiers began deploying, they would call their families whenever possible. Whether the rumors were started by the soldiers exagerating their situation or by the wives misunderstanding is unknown (probably a combination). However, rummors of inadequate treatment or danger would flash through the community. To combat

these rumors was difficult. My wife found three techniques to be the most effective. First, she would write a short summary of our situation after each phone call made by me or a member of the staff. These were reproduced and put into every mail box that day for each family to have the latest known information. Secondly, because our community was very small, she tried to be very visible in the community. Whenever she was at the commissary or other facility, she would talk freely and positively with all the other wives she encountered about what she knew. She found herself frequently approached by wives, both from within the battalion and from other units. Finally, she attended all the family support group meetings and passed out the latest information there for dissemination as well.

Access to the phones in Saudi Arabia made this a rather unique experience for families during war and led to certain expectations on their part. It did prove to be useful on the day that the air war began. I had the Battalion XO call back to Germany and pass to my wife that we were safe and not in any danger. She said later that that information flew through the entire community and was one of the most valuable things I had done for the families.

The overriding issue regarding family support is one of training. The Army expects our families to band together and the wives of the senior officers and NCOs to be responsible. Yet, no formal training is available, and, in many cases, direct support from the community is often lacking. The Army should develop a

voluntary training program for our spouses and it should begin as early as the advance course. Furthermore, during a crisis, community staffs should be sensitive to the precarious role we are asking our spouses to play, often at great emotional cost. Under these circumstances it is imperative that the opinions of the unit spouses be respected. There were isolated incidents where both my wife and other members of the battalion's family support council were treated by members of the community staff with little regard.

ARRIVAL IN COUNTRY

As elements of the battalion arrived in country, a smooth system was already in effect for their reception and transport to an Initial Staging Area (ISA), affectionately called the Desert Inn. The ISA was a tent city established north of Al Jubayl near the highway leading north with adequate space for tentage, vehicle parking, and convoy preparation.

The ISA was intended to be a temporary holding area until vehicles arrived and were painted. Unfortunately, the soldiers arrived a couple of weeks ahead of the vehicles (the air flow being driven to fill all seats). This led to some ill feelings on the part of many soldiers for having been taken away from their families earlier than necessary; the hurry up and wait syndrome.

Priorities in the ISA were discipline, personal hygiene, and

training at the individual/crew/squad/platoon level. Training priorities were chemical defense, land navigation, movement techniques, fire discipline and control, and Common Task Training (CTT). Units also made every effort to begin the acclimatization process through vigorous physical training activities. Daily meetings were conducted to outline responsibilities in the camp for security, police, and other details. Information on the arrival of our equipment and intelligence updates on the Iraqis was also disseminated.

Brainstorming sessions were held with the brigade commander and the other battalion commanders to discuss possible missions, formations, vehicle marking, etc. Similar sessions were also conducted within the battalion for the company commanders and battalion staff. These proved to be very useful.

I had read that there were no atheists in foxholes and for several of our soldiers that proved to be true. A soldier asked the battalion Chaplain to be baptized while at the ISA. The Chaplain, Cpt. Don McConnaughhay, was a Baptist who believed in full-immersion Baptism and there were concerns that it would insult our Muslim hosts. Not to be thwarted, a pit was dug and lined with plastic and at dark a water truck was brought and filled the pit. That night, the Chaplain baptized the young soldier in a very moving and solemn service under the bright Saudi starlight. Three of the witnesses were so moved that they asked to be baptized as well and it was accomplished.

Advanced parties moved into the desert under the control of

a team from 1st Armored Div and began the process of laying out the base camp locations for the Tactical Assembly Area known as TAA Thompson while the reception, maintenance, and desert camouflage painting was accomplished at the ISA. As soon as units could put together enough vehicles for a convoy and the heavy equipment transporters (HET) for the tracks could be procured, they departed for the TAA. Inadequate HETs were available when the first contingent of combat vehicles from our battalion were ready to role. I asked for and received permission to road march our tracked combat vehicles to the TAA (370 km). Wheeled convoys departed in advance of the tracks with tentage and as many soldiers as they could carry to begin set up of the base camps. The tracks made the trip in two days, with only two maintenance problems, both of which were relatively minor. The road march was a great confidence builder for our drivers and crews both in their ability to operate in the desert and in the quality of their maintenance.

Two days were allocated to setting up tents and security. Wartime rules of engagement went into effect on 20 Jan 91.

TAA THOMPSON

Upon arrival in the TAA, the battalion task organized with 4-66 Armor Bn. Our A company, under the command of Cpt Joe Manchego, went to 4-66 Ar Bn and we received A/4-66 Ar, under Cpt Charles Arp in return. The arrival of the tanks was a welcome

increase in our firepower and was the traditional task organization for which we had trained on a regular basis in Germany. A, C, and D companies were formed as teams with one tank platoon and two Bradley infantry platoons each. B Co was left pure infantry. D Co 16th Eng Bn was also attached.

The weather was a shock for most of the task force. It was very cold and very rainy. Temperatures would fall below freezing at night, freezing the water in the water trailers. Vehicles moving across the rain soaked sand turned the previously smooth surface into rutted quagmires. When the first vehicles arrived in the TAA, the surface of the desert was in pristine condition. Wheeled vehicles could drive at high speeds safely over its smooth surface. Movement during the rains caused deep trenches and ruts to appear. Coupled with the digging of trash pits and blackout conditions at night, traveling from one unit to the other for meetings became a slow and somewhat hazardous undertaking. More than one person spent the night with his HMMWV nosed down in a trash pit.

Training now began in earnest with the priority given to platoon and higher level training. Unit tactical movement, navigation with the Loran and GPS navigation aids, battle drills, limited visibility movement, ammunition reload drills, and casualty evacuation all were stressed at the company level.

Mission analysis was being conducted at battalion and brigade level on the anticipated missions in a ground campaign. The decision was made that TF 1-7 In would lead the brigade which

would move in a wedge formation as the advance guard for the 1st Armd Div (see appendix C). To best provide protection to the brigade, my decision was to move as a task force wedge (see Fig 1). This was not a movement technique that had been possible in the terrain of Europe, so rehearsals were conducted of task force movement by walk-throughs and then the task force began full movement training.



TASK FORCE 1-7 MOVEMENT FORMATION

FIGURE 1

Movement training included refuel operations to determine the time necessary to conduct full and partial refuels, battle drills were tested and rehearsed, formation changes and various movement speeds were practiced, and the conduct of obstacle breaching operations was rehearsed. These were practiced both day and night. One task force rehearsal was conducted in a blinding sand storm with visibility reduced to 50 meters. The task force moved over 30 km in that sand storm successfully and gained a great deal of confidence.

Live fire was eventually conducted to zero main guns and coax weapons at a berm constructed by the division engineers. This was the first opportunity for the crews to shoot live HE and sabot ammo. Shortages prevented us from shooting as much as we would have liked, but it was valuable none the less.

Training was elevated to the brigade level through a series of rehearsals for brigade movement and actions on contact. A walk through down to platoon leader level was conducted of the anticipated axis of movement into Iraq on a 1 to 100 scale. This was followed by a similar exercise in HMMWV's on a 1 to 10 scale. Finally, a full scale brigade rehearsal was conducted covering 50 miles in the daylight and then, after turning the brigade, 50 miles back at night. TF 1-7 In was the base element for the movement of the entire brigade. Our C Co, under the command of Cpt Tracy Cleaver, had the responsibility for guiding our movement using the navigation devices. The rest of the battalion

would guide on them and the rest of the brigade guided on the battalion. Valuable lessons were learned about optimum travel speeds, how to turn the formation, the ability of our support vehicles to follow, actions on contact, and reporting. Lateral communications between commanders, both in the battalion and the brigade, was critical to controlling the force.

Our logistics and support elements were training equally hard during this time. All support was being provided by LOGPAC (meals, parts, fuel, water, etc) to give the company teams practice in ordering and reporting and our HHC practice in preparing and delivering. Field maintenance was stressed and innovative ways of storing equipment and ammo were shared among the units.

When we first arrived in theater, insufficient desert uniforms were available to issue to the 1st Armored Division. The soldiers had been a little upset initially, but rumors were passed to the battalion that the Iraqis had been told to watch out for the Americans in green uniforms because they had just come from from killing Russians in Europe. The source of the rumor was not known but it had a useful effect. After that the soldiers took some pride in staying in the green battle dress uniforms. In any event, there was little to be gained as the chemical protective overgarmets that we all wore were green anyway.

Marking of friendly vehicles for the prevention of fratricide was of great concern. After trying several ideas,

wooded panels were mounted on the back of the Bradley fighting vehicles with the task force numbers stenciled upon them (like the marking panels used by the tanks). Most importantly, headlights were taken off the front of the vehicles, mounted on the top of the panel facing to the rear, covered with heavy tape, and wired into the turret dome lights. These lights created enough heat to create a distinctive marking visible from the rear through thermal sights. This was a great aid to the commanders trying to control their vehicles during movement that was invisible to the naked eye. Unfortunately, tests later showed that it was not picked up in the sights of the Apache helicopters.

Our medics trained constantly with our surgeon and physician's assistant. They prepared sets and kits to deal with the expected casualties. Our surgeon, Cpt Luis Rodriquez-Betancourt, who had been Gen Saint's flight surgeon, had a great deal of training in dealing with trauma. His experience and training was critical to the high state of readiness and confidence achieved by our medics prior to the start of the ground war. I would strongly oppose efforts in the future to pull the surgeons out of the battalion aid stations. Battalion level exercises were conducted to test and practice procedures for evacuating the wounded, to include extraction from the combat vehicles, collection of casualties at a collection point, and treatment and evacuation to the support battalion for both clean and contaminated casualties. These exercises were great

training and were taken very seriously by the soldiers.

Locating and retrieving equipment and supplies shipped from Europe was a continuing problem. Our MILVANS had all been painted with distinctive markings, but several were not retrieved. Some had been opened and the contents pilfered. More often than not, the culprits were US soldiers. As the time to depart grew closer, personal gear and extra unit equipment were stored in empty MILVANS for eventual movement to a Logbase. Some of these MILVANS were welded shut to try to prevent losses.

Soldiers began to grow impatient as the days passed, and the chain of command spent a lot of time talking with the soldiers. The consistent message was that every day of delay was an investment in their welfare and longevity because of the continuing punishment being dealt to the Iraqis by our air force. To relieve tensions, a training holiday was declared in the division. Various sporting events were conducted, time for personal business was allocated, and the day concluded with a steak dinner. Though we had not received a full ration of the accoutrements (potatoes and vegetables), the cooks did an admirable job and there was enough food to go around.

FAA GARCIA

The movement from the tactical assembly area to the west to the forward assembly area, FAA Garcia, began on 14 Feb 91, and

was, as has been widely reported, a masterful exercise in logistics by all concerned. It was also a remarkable opportunity to conduct additional rehearsals at all levels, from platoon through corps. Initial movement entailed the 1st Armd Div moving to the west side of the north-south KKMC road that leads south from Wadi-al-Batin to King Kahlid Military City. Once established there in an assembly area, the 3rd Armored Div moved across the KKMC road to an assembly area to our north (right flank). The entire VII Corps then conducted a movement rehearsal to the west that approximated the anticipated movement into Iraq including a corps turning movement to the north. With the entire corps finally oriented north toward Iraq, we had to cross the Tapline road into our FAA positions even as traffic continued to support the XVIII Corps movement further to the west along Tapline Road and the movement of the logistics bases. It was a tremendous accomplishment for everyone involved and very valuable in working out liaison and contact procedures with the 3rd Armd Division.

Arriving in the FAA on 16 Feb, efforts were directed at last minute maintenance, the issuance of orders, and last minute examination of plans and SOP's. Col Riley, the Brigade Commander, talked to the officers of the battalion on 18 Feb, giving them one of the most moving and inspiring speeches I have ever heard. Its essence was that our men were ready and that it was time for quiet competence to come to the fore. Aggressive, "killer" units survived with the fewest casualties. He expressed

his confidence that TF 1-7 was a killer unit and that it was prepared to lead the 1st Armored Division to war.

A final walk through was conducted by division down to battalion commander/S-3 level on a giant sand table on 21 Feb. G-day, the beginning of the ground war, was set for the 24th at 0600.

LTG Franks, VII Corps Commander, visited the brigade and TF 1-7 Inf before dark the night of the 23rd. He walked along the front line of soldiers talking to platoons, shaking hands, and having his picture taken. At one point, he was serenaded by one platoon with their vulgar platoon song that seemed to take him aback for a moment, but then he just grinned and waded into the sea of hands that reached out to him. He seemed genuinely moved as he departed after signing some of their tracks and taking pictures. He could sense their confidence, but knew the dangers that lay ahead.

THE WAR

Although scheduled to attack on D+1 (25 Feb), the brigade was prepared to begin movement early if so ordered. When asked at about 1300 hrs on the 24th if the battalion could begin early, my response was that we could attack within 20 minutes. Eventually, the order was given to begin the attack at about 1600 hrs. The brigade advanced in a wedge with TF 1-7 at the point, TF 4-66 on the left flank, and TF 4-7 on the right. 1-1 Cav, the

division cavalry squadron was attached, and was clearing to the front of the brigade. 2-41 Artillery followed TF 1-7 and 26th Forward Support Battalion followed them with the brigade support area or trains. These trains contained over 600 vehicles.

TF 1-7 was centered in zone and moved as the base element for the brigade and division. By the time that the attack began, a strong sand storm blew up and visibility was greatly reduced. At times, visibility was as little as 100 meters. However, having trained in a storm that was at least as bad as that one, the battalion was confident of accomplishing its mission and had no difficulty with navigation.

Once across the border into Iraq, the terrain became rough and unexploded ammunition was being encountered by some units. No casualties were suffered by the task force and movement continued steadily until after dark. The brigade was held at Phase Line (PL) APPLE and conducted LOGPAC operations and prepared to continue the attack at 0630 the following morning.

By 250700 Feb, TF 1-7 had crossed PL APPLE and moving steadily through the zone toward Objective BEAR. Intelligence had placed a reinforced enemy company at the objective. The Division Commander made the decision to commit the 3d Bde in the east against Obj BULL and Obj DOG and the 1st Bde against Obj BEAR (see appendix B, 1st Brigade Graphic Summary of Operations). The task force shifted west in zone to make room for the 3d Bde on the right and to head directly for the objective. The 2d Brigade was following the 1st Brigade by this time. As the

formation approached the objective, the 1-1 Cav moved to the right to get out of the way of TF 1-7, and we moved forward for our first engagement. Reports had indicated that the enemy had been surrendering when given the chance, so in an effort to reduce casualties, both friendly and enemy, a loudspeaker team from the Psyops Group was brought forward to induce the enemy to surrender. No movement to surrender was noted, so artillery and mortar fire was called on the trench lines to the front and direct fire put on the enemy vehicles observed. Some confusion and a dangerous situation occurred when a number of US helicopters, Apaches and OH-58's, flew directly over the battalion during some of the artillery firing. No coordination had been made by the aviation unit at all and they seemed oblivious to our activities. The task force advanced through the objective and encountered some apparent minefields. Although they appeared to be fake, tanks with mineplows cut hasty breaches and the attack continued. No appreciable enemy fire was received during the attack. The task force destroyed 2 BTR-50's, 1 MTLB, and 5 wheeled vehicles. The brigade continued to move forward and sweep the objective as we moved toward PL NORTH CAROLINA. It soon became dark and we moved slowly as we continued to capture enemy soldiers in zone. 70 EPW's were taken and turned over to the military police.

The brigade was then ordered to conduct a coordinated attack with the 2d Brigade in the west across ATK Position PYTHON (Al Busayya). An enemy commando battalion and an infantry battalion

reinforced with 20 tanks was reported in the objective. The task force led a complicated move in the dark to position the brigade properly on the east side of the sector. By 2030 hrs, the brigade was halted and conducted a LOGPAC to prepare for the attack at dawn.

MLRS and the 2-41 Arty fired an artillery prep on the targets at Al Busayya and the division attacked. The 2d Brigade in the west was making the main attack against a built-up area in Al Busayya. The 1st Brigade attacked in the wedge with TF 4-66 Armor on the left designated as the main effort. We suppressed some bunkers and destroyed some abandoned equipment and supplies but otherwise encountered no organized opposition. After refueling at PL NEW MEXICO, the task force was ordered to move and occupy Attack Position COBRA. We were in position by 1130 hrs.

The original plan had been to hold for up to two days at COBRA while the logistics and replacements caught up and the plans for hitting the Republican Guards were finalized. However, it was already apparent that we were far ahead of the original plan. Also, the Republican Guards were apparently trying to escape to the north. We were ordered to continue the attack to destroy the Republican Guards.

Shortly after arriving in COBRA, aircraft from 1-1 Cav identified elements of the TAWAKALNA Division to our south. Indications were that they were moving toward us. TF 1-7 was given the mission to move forward and pick some ground to

establish a hasty defense to engage the enemy armor as they approached. After selecting the best terrain available, TF 4-7 and TF 4-66 came up on our flanks and we used our engineer equipment hurriedly to improve fighting positions. However, 2 A-10's and 8 F-16's were available to attack under control of the 1-1 Cav TACP. Using Mark 84 bombs and Maverick missiles, they destroyed 27 enemy tanks. We were ordered to then continue our movement to PL LIBYA.

Movement through this area was hampered by bad weather but other than isolated enemy vehicles there was little contact. As we approached PL LIBYA, fuel became critical. Distribution of fuel had been a problem all along and my support personnel were frustrated because every time they returned with full tankers, much of it was diverted to other units. To complicate the refuel on this evening, several of the pumps were not working on the tankers that did arrive and we found ourselves working in the dark surrounded by unexploded ammunition. We were later told that the area had been an Iraqi training area. Movement was quite hazardous as tracked vehicles would set off explosions and fragments would careen wildly off the sides of adjacent vehicles. Miraculously, no casualties were suffered during this stop but it took much longer than planned because of the shortage of tankers. Only the tanks and critically low combat vehicles could be fueled.

Movement became more deliberate as we moved slowly forward during the night while making only sporadic contact with single

enemy vehicles and surrendering enemy soldiers. Our training had not prepared us for the difficulties associated with trying to protect the force during night movement while trying to safely take prisoners, link them up with military police and continue movement. We were concerned that we were bypassing many Iraqis hiding in bunkers who could effect follow on units but there didn't seem to be a satisfactory solution.

The corps artillery battalion following our task force had been firing MLRS missions over our heads at some deep targets at several points during our movement. It was a very impressive sight. During one lull in the movement and firing I was looking up into the night sky and saw an explosion overhead. It was similar to that associated with the MLRS rockets at the end of their flight as they release the submunitions but there had been no rockets fired. Suddenly, 1-1 Cav reported that they were being hit with artillery. The commander came on the command radio net screaming to have the artillery shut off in the apparent assumption that it was friendly fire. I am certain that it was not a round fired by our artillery because I had been watching the fire and saw the round go off in the air. It was reported to have been Iraqi artillery but I think it more likely to have been an air force cluster bomb. They suffered over 20 wounded and had several vehicles severely damaged.

TF 1-7 was ordered to bypass the 1-1 Cav and continue the move to the east. The intent was to conduct a division attack on the Republican Guards in the vicinity of OBJ BONN.

The task force led the division movement across PL SPAIN at approximately 0630 hrs, having been constantly on the move now for over 24 hrs. Contact was made with a brigade of the ADNAN Division in the vicinity of PL LIME. The brigade attacked on line with TF 1-7 in the middle. The 2d brigade was on the far left flank, and 3d Brigade on our far right. The fight took about two hours as we moved steadily through their positions. We tried to maximize our firepower and superior range to reduce the risk to our soldiers. The fighting was intense at times with the concussions from exploding enemy vehicles and ammunition rattling the battlefield. The weather was very heavily overcast, windy, and rainy. The fires and explosions cast a red glow as they reflected off the clouds. I recall thinking that I was looking into the gates of Hell as the violence and destruction took place.

The brigade held up for about three hours as enemy prisoners were evacuated and the flank brigades cleaned up their portion of the battlefield. At 1130 we continued the attack into Obj BONN where contact was made with the MEDINA Division. Once again the fighting was intense with lots of enemy targets that appeared to be attempting to flee north while some appeared to be defending to our front. While the fighting raged, we began to receive some artillery fire. Two separate heavy concentrations landed just behind the task force and then one landed directly to our front. I was convinced that the enemy was trying to adjust fire onto the task force. I ordered the task force to back up 100 meters. No

sooner had this been done than heavy artillery landed on our previous positions. I felt that I was playing cat and mouse with the enemy observers as we moved several times while pouring fire into the enemy bunkers to our front and counterbattery fires were conducted by the artillery. Eventually the enemy fire came to a halt. Three soldiers in my combat trains had been wounded and five vehicles damaged or destroyed by the enemy artillery. Artillery channels reported that between 4 and 6 enemy artillery battalions had been involved in the engagement. Enemy fire and dismounted troops had destroyed two Bradleys in TF 4-66 Armor on our left, killing one soldier and wounding several. During the two battles, the battalion destroyed a total of 17 tanks, 18 BMP's, and 21 other vehicles. 46 prisoners were taken.

To prepare for the subsequent operations, the Corps Commander was trying to position the 1st Cav Div on the left flank of the 1st Armored Div as dusk began. To make room, the 2d Brigade on the left was ordered to pull back behind our brigade and the 1st Brigade was ordered to close up its frontage. TF 1-7 In was ordered to pull straight backwards and TF 4-66 Armor slid right in front of us. That much was accomplished before dark, but concerns over the potential for fratricide with the other brigades moving around in the dark caused the rest of the movement to be held. The battalion rested for a few hours while awaiting orders.

At about 290100 hrs Feb 91, the word was passed to the battalion of a possible cease fire to go into effect by morning.

This was greeted with smiles all around, but within a few hours, the story changed. The brigade was ordered to continue the attack at 0615 to destroy the remainder of the MEDINA Division after a planned 45 minute artillery preparation. TF 1-7 In would swing left out from behind the other two battalions and attack on the left flank of the brigade. This move was accomplished with great skill on the part of the company commanders and platoon leaders as they moved through trains elements from the 2d Brigade that inadvertently passed into our sector.

The task force hit the line of departure right on time and was almost immediately in contact. We continued to move forward as a part of the brigade, engaging the enemy at long range and driving through the exploding ammunition and burning vehicles as we went. At 280750 Feb 91, the word was passed that a cease fire would go into effect at 0800 hrs. The task force destroyed 6 T-72 tanks, 6 BMP, 11 other vehicles, and took 62 prisoners during this last engagement.

Our supply trains, under the command of Cpt. David Sutherland, had done a superb job of keeping up with the course of the battle and trying to anticipate our requirements. Fuel was a problem once or twice during the movement, and I took my frustrations out unfairly on the S-4, Lt Dan Oh. He had been doing every thing possible to get fuel for us. However, unknown to me, when our tankers would return with fuel, they were being diverted to sister units that apparently had a greater need by the support battalion commander. Though inconvenient, we were

delayed for only an hour and I greatly regretted having chewed out this fine soldier.

SUMMARY OF ENEMY EQUIPMENT DESTROYED

BEFORE THE CEASE FIRE		AFTER THE CEASE FIRE	
15 - T55	1 - MTLB	2 - T72	122 - BUNKERS
1 - T62	1 - D30	1 - T55	6 - GENERATORS
8 - T72	1 - 2S1	6 - AA GUNS	3 - MOB KITCHENS
1 - T59	18 - TRUCKS	4 - BMP	1 - BUILDING
25 - BMP	8 - OTHER	67 - TRUCKS	
13 - BTR		13 - JEEPS	
		4 - ARMD ENGR VEH	

FIGURE 2
(Source: 1st Bde, 1st Armored Div After Action Review)

POST CEASE FIRE

Immediately following the cessation of hostilities the task force conducted a LOGPAC, cleaned up our lines, cleared out the remaining bunkers in the area, and took some more prisoners that had fled the earlier fighting. We found ourselves sitting essentially on top of a bunker complex that had been hit several times by air and ground launched weapons and unexploded bomblets were a great concern. One young medic, PFC Mike Burgess, lost a leg and very nearly his life after stepping on one near what had been an Iraqi aid station. Our medics justified our confidence in them as they worked feverishly to save his life. The area had been cleared by the engineers, but we discovered that some of the bomblets had settled under the sand because of the heavy rains.



SUMMARY OF UNIT MOVEMENT
(SOURCE- Phantom Brigade Desert Shield and Storm After Action Review)

Movement was greatly restricted and combat engineer vehicles withrakes mounted cleared roads from position to position for movement. We were all relieved several days later when we were able to move approximately 20 km deeper into Kuwait and out of this hazardous area.

The soldiers remained alert during the next week or two but were able to get cleaned up, fed, and rested. Of great interest was getting information on what else had happened during the war outside of what we had seen. The day after the cease fire, MG Griffith came to the Brigade TOC to congratulate and thank the leaders of the Brigade for their efforts. He gave us a synopsis of the campaign as he knew it. I subsequently visited every company and separate platoon to pass on this information and to pass on my own appreciation and congratulations.

Though all combat systems were still combat capable at the cease fire, a great deal of maintenance was needed and this was pursued as aggressively as parts permitted. A requirement to recover all damaged, destroyed, or abandoned US military equipment required an expedition by the battalion XO and a recovery team back through the sector to recover the damaged equipment lost to the enemy artillery and the melted remains of a HMMWV that had burned to the ground in an accident. Fortunately, the support personnel in our trains had a good fix on where everything was. Under the command of the battalion Executive Officer, Maj Garrison, they recovered the equipment back into KKMC. They then acted as our advance party for the set up of the

base camp for our use in redeployment.

Telephones were finally emplaced in the desert about 15 km away on 17 March, and the soldiers had the chance to call their families in Germany. This was much appreciated by all concerned.

CHECKPOINTS ALPHA AND BRAVO

Our focus was on preparing for movement back into Saudi Arabia and getting out of Kuwait because of the black clouds from the oil fires that covered us daily. On 19 Mar, the brigade was alerted to relieve elements of the 3d Armored Div at security positions along the military demarcation line (MDL) in Iraq. The task force was given the mission to occupy the two principal checkpoints in the sector, Checkpoint Bravo along Highway 8 from Basra to Baghdad and Checkpoint Alpha, two miles south of Bravo along a parallel secondary road.

The task force moved at 210600 hrs and occupied the sector at 1100 hrs. Team A was given checkpoint Bravo and B Company was given the mission for checkpoint Alpha. After a short transition, the units from 3d Armored Div departed by 1500 hrs. The other companies of the task force were assigned sectors along the highway where they were to patrol, provide a visible US presence, and protect the force.

The situation in southern Iraq at this time was very unsettled. Uprisings among the populace were being violently put down by elements of the Iraqi army that had escaped. Enormous

numbers of civilians and deserters were trying to escape the fighting that continued to our north. Our guidance initially was very confusing and changed frequently. Initially we were told to prevent movement of all personnel along the highway. Then it changed to permitting people and humanitarian items to pass freely. After several days of confusing guidance, we were instructed to allow refugees to pass freely after searching the men for weapons, allow the passage of food and other humanitarian items, seize all Iraqi military equipment, and take all Iraqi soldiers prisoner. Under no circumstances were we to create a refugee camp there in the middle of the desert. Refugees could be given emergency medical treatment, food, and water, but then they must be required to move on. We were approximately 75 km west of Basra, and the Rumaylia oilfield refinery was visible from some of our positions.

Anticipating a high volume of traffic, engineer equipment was used to build barriers on the roadway that would slow down traffic and protect both the soldiers manning the sites and the dismounted passengers while the vehicles and men were being searched. Tanks and military police vehicles were placed on the roadway in visible yet protected positions to provide protection and to intimidate the local populace. We had also anticipated a need for medical support and established our aid station with augmentation from the support battalion at the checkpoint in a protected location for emergencies.

The primary instructions given to our soldiers were to

maintain discipline and military courtesy at all times. It was our intention to show the Iraqi people who came through our checkpoints what a professional army looked like, that a soldier didn't have to be feared. Our soldiers lived up to all expectations. They showed great respect for the women, children, and elderly. Their compassion for these people was genuine and appreciated by most of the refugees that passed through the checkpoints.

As the volume of traffic increased and the needs of the refugees became more desperate, we were augmented by a civil affairs task force from the 354th Civil Affairs Brigade. Although the command relationship was never exactly clear, for all intents and purposes they were attached to the task force. They extended the humanitarian efforts by pushing medical teams out to the small villages and towns in the area and controlled the issuance of food and water to the needy at the checkpoints.

Working with the Iraqi refugees was generally very rewarding. Many were in desperate need of medical care and our aid station and surgeons were busy treating the sick and wounded. These included women and children suffering from gunshot wounds and burns reportedly inflicted by the remnants of the Iraqi army as they tried to put down the unrest in the region. The flow of refugees would give an indication of the severity of the fighting and the location. If the fighting was in the Basra area, the flow would be to the west. If the fighting was near Najaf or Nasria, the flow would be toward the east. Buses, trucks, and

cars of all descriptions would arrive at the checkpoint overloaded with desperate people seeking safety and food. Only a few weapons were found and most of the Iraqis took the searches of their belongings stoically. Frequently, cars with coffins roped to the top would arrive as a family would transport a loved one for burial. The coffins were searched as well.

A refugee camp was rapidly filling up in the area around Safwan (near Basra where the cease fire talks were conducted). We were asked to tell the refugees that no help was going to be available for them there and that they should return to their homes. Many just stared and said they had no homes left, or that if they returned they would be killed so they continued on in hopes of finding some help. In accordance with our instructions, we refused to let them stay at the checkpoints any longer than necessary.

The word soon got around to the Iraqi populace that the Americans were providing some help and we began to receive more casualties. Also, it appeared that many Iraqi soldiers were coming to the checkpoints for the purpose of being taken prisoner, carrying their few personal belongings. I am convinced that this was done specifically to get out of the country. Many were professionals who had been drafted into service, and some spoke English.

It soon became apparent that many of the prisoners had current information on Iraqi operations and capabilities and many were anxious to tell of continuing atrocities being committed

against the Iraqi people. After repeated requests, a small military intelligence team was assigned to the checkpoint to interview those refugees and prisoners who claimed to have first hand information of this nature. It took a disturbing incident to break loose this support however. One day, a group of 40 men (including a young boy) arrived as a group at the checkpoint. They claimed to be a paramilitary resistance group that had been fighting the Iraqi army near Najaf. They were clearly under the control of an old man with lines in his face that spoke of years of sun and hardship. The old man began to talk of the killings being committed by the Iraqi soldiers and of thousands of bodies lining the streets of the town. The young boy that was with them had seen his family murdered in the street. Tears streamed down the old man's weathered face as he recounted the horrors. Up to that time, I had little success in getting any appreciable interest by Division or higher in documenting these stories. Fortuitously, MG Griffith, the CG of 1st Armored Div, arrived by helicopter with a news team from ABC to inspect the site while the men were still there. I brought him to the old man and had the man retell his story through a translator. The news team recorded the incident on camera. The man made a great impression on MG Griffith and I think this was instrumental in our getting the needed support. The men feared for their lives if forced to return. Many of the men in the group were deserted Iraqi soldiers so I made the decision to treat them all as POWs and to evacuate them as a group. I also decided to evacuate the young boy with

the prisoners. He was being cared for by the men and there was no place else for him to go.

Word apparently was spread among the various news media that interesting events were occurring at the checkpoints. We were soon inundated with news teams and reporters who began to tell the stories of these displaced people.

We responded to all kinds of problems in the area. One day a bus tried to pass a dump truck on the road approaching Checkpoint Alpha. Both were loaded with people and the bus was traveling too fast. The bus struck the rear of the truck and the bed of the truck sheared into the passenger compartment. The accident had been seen from the air by BG Hendricks, the Assistant Division Commander, who notified our checkpoint. One passenger was dead, nearly decapitated, and several were critically injured. Our medics stabilized the more seriously injured and two or three were medivacd. The body was placed in a body bag, the family placed it in the back of a truck heading their way and continued their journey. The remainder climbed aboard other vehicles passing by and departed. It seemed that these Iraqi people had seen too much already to be concerned over another death or misfortune.

Several times women and children would arrive with tales of their husbands missing or dead with no place to go and no possessions. We would give them food and water and put them on vehicles travelling toward Safwan and the refugee camp there. Once or twice we forced drivers to take them on as passengers. (I

hope they weren't cast off the vehicles down the road).

Our patrols in the region were intended to provide security for our forces and to keep Iraqi forces from infiltrating across the MDL. They quickly took on the added role of securing the refugees as well. Bandits were beginning to prey on the refugees, stealing what few possessions they had. We also got reports from some that Iraqi secret police were among the refugees looking to identify those who were cooperating with the Americans. One refugee was murdered near the oil fields, his throat was cut. The family said the bandits escaped back north across the MDL. One company did capture a group of bandits with their weapons shortly after they had robbed some refugees. They had large sums of Iraqi currency on them and had been hiding in an overturned tanker along a road in the town near the oilfields. They were turned over to the military police who were unsure of what jurisdiction, if any, they had. I don't know what happened to the men or the money.

Interpreters were of paramount importance in dealing with the civilians at the checkpoint for crowd control, interrogation of enemy prisoners of war and other persons who had information to pass to us, and for helping the medical personnel as they dealt with the various medical emergencies that occurred. Unfortunately, we only had two interpreters initially, but these were eventually augmented by several others as the support for the checkpoints grew. We overworked these dedicated persons over the course of the several weeks we were there.

Throughout this period, abandoned Iraqi equipment was destroyed as it was found. Engineers worked in and around the task force positions to blow up ammunition and vehicles. We used some Iraqi vehicles as targets to shoot our TOW anti-tank missiles that had been uncanned and had been in our exposed launchers. It was great training and provided our soldiers with an opportunity to break up the monotony of patrolling the MDL.

While the task force had been busy in Iraq, an advance party of the battalion had been working on the task force assembly area near KKMC. They had been setting up tents, showers, and latrine facilities as well as identifying redeployment requirements. The task force began its move from Iraq on 11 April 90. We withdrew from the highway to an assembly area and then moved for two days south to Saudi Arabia as a part of the brigade task force. Our attachments went back to their parent units as well. We were sorry to say good by to Cpt Arp and A Co, 4-66 Armor. They had been outstanding in every manner and left with the respect and good wishes of every member of the task force. We were glad to be able to welcome our own A Co back however. They had done a terrific job for TF 4-66.

After crossing into Saudi Arabia, the entire brigade stopped to download ammunition and inspect vehicles for contraband weapons and souvenirs. The support platoon brought up some empty HMMETS and picked up the ammo for transportation directly to storage facilities near KKMC. After receiving an all clear from the company commanders, we were given permission from the Brigade

Commander to move on to KKMC.

SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES
CHECKPOINTS ALPHA AND BRAVO

Vehicles searched	19,111
EPW's taken	3,867
Civilians searched	114,980
Weapons seized	45
Medical Treatment:	
Critical Care	701
MEDCAP	928
HELO MEDEVAC	90
Rations and Bulk Food:	
MORE (case)	4,401
MRE (case)	354
Protein Drink (case)	671
Milk (case)	624
Juice (case)	702
Rice (lbs)	15,610
Lentle (lbs)	3,570
Flour (lbs)	3,686
Water (bulk, gals)	9,373
Water (bottled, case)	775
Baby Food (case)	28
Misc Food items (lbs)	7,900

FIGURE 4

REDEPLOYMENT

Considerable effort had been put into the division base camp at KKMC. Each task force had its own area separated from the others by 2-5 kms. Our advance party had set up tents and installed wooden floors in most of them. Showers and latrines were also in place. Efforts had been made to set up a recreation area for the men. Tents were set aside for watching VCR movies

on television and sports were encouraged. Of great interest was the PX complex that soon opened. It offered food items and other luxuries, a tent with telephones, a post office, a tent with games and music, and a trailer that gave out "wolf burgers" and fries. These were a real hit with the soldiers. The soldiers finally received desert uniforms after we had been in the base camp for several days. The soldiers were glad to see them, but it was somewhat anticlimactic.

Maintenance was a priority as we attempted to identify all vehicle deficiencies and shortcomings and repair them as best we could. For a long time it was unclear if our vehicles would return to Germany or remain in storage in Kuwait. A wash rack was constructed by the engineers near our base camp and each battalion rotated through. It was difficult to keep the vehicles clean with the dust but the big chunks were knocked off.

Once the decision to return the vehicles to Germany was announced, our tracked vehicles were shipped by heavy equipment transporter (HET) to the port of Ad Dammam and the wheels were convoyed (a two day trek) via Riyadh. About half the battalion, only enough personnel to provide drivers and assistants were sent to the port under the battalion XO, Maj Garrison. The other half of the battalion remained at KKMC.

At the port, the soldiers were billeted at Khobar Towers, a large complex of apartments that had been built by the Saudis for the Bedouins who subsequently refused to live in them. Living was plush by the standards they had grown used to as they waited

for access to the wash racks. Catered meals were served in underground parking garages converted into dining facilities, a PX was also built in one. Tents and shops were opened by enterprising Arabs selling ice cream, souvenirs, and fast food. The soldiers had hot showers and slept indoors on their cots in the otherwise empty apartments.

Each division ran its own deployment effort at Ad Dammam. This caused some painful effects as new requirements for the preparation of vehicles were disseminated almost daily. Given the size of the operation, however, it was probably remarkable that it went as smoothly as it did. Wash racks for the wheeled vehicles were being run by a support unit from outside the division, but track wash points were built using bridges from armored vehicle launched bridges (AVLB) in a nearby housing area. Once the vehicles were called to the wash racks, a well established process was begun. The vehicles were cleaned once again, then inspected for cleanliness. Once through this inspection, they were moved by convoy to the port holding area where they were inspected by customs personnel for contraband and admission into the restricted holding area where they would await shipment to Germany. This was hard work and great credit goes to the entire maintenance and logistics chain of the battalion and the individual soldiers. It took a great deal of work and patience to meet the standards. These soldiers were then free to rest at the apartment complex until called for the flight back to Germany.

The bulk of the soldiers left Dammam for Germany on 3 May 90. A few men were left behind as part of a division team to assist in the loading of the vehicles onto the ships. The stay behind party left on or about 8 May 90.

Meanwhile, half the battalion had been left at KKMC waiting in the desert for word to fly out. As the camp got smaller, they broke down tents and turned them in and packed equipment into MILVAN containers at the division container storage area using borrowed vehicles for transportation. Finally, the day came to move to a holding facility at the KKMC airfield. As we left the desert campsite nothing remained except the trash pits which were being filled in.

The soldiers were billeted in large tents and hangers near the airfield. It was a well practiced routine for the unit running the facility. As we debarked from busses, the battalion was assigned space in one of the large tents. After arranging cots and personal gear, the soldiers were free to sleep until early the next morning. After awakening and eating, customs personnel came through and did a thorough inspection of each man's baggage. After the inspection, all baggage except one carry-on per soldier was loaded on trucks and transported to the airfield. The soldiers then sat and waited outside for about six hours under camouflage nets, the tents being needed for the next units arriving.

While the soldiers waited, a convoy of vehicles pulled up and LTG Franks, the VII Corps Commander, stepped out. He said

that he felt he got to know our battalion well, having visited the night before the ground war and having made frequent visits at the checkpoints, and he wanted to say good by. We were thrilled that he had taken the time to visit and eagerly escorted him among the soldiers. Once again, he gave the soldiers a strong sense of his personal concern and was generous with his praise for their efforts.

Finally, the battalion was called forward to depart and flew on a commercial jet to Frankfurt, Germany with a fuel stop in Rome. We arrived early in the morning of 1 May 1990, at Frankfurt. After a short wait for transportation, we boarded buses for the trip to Aschaffenburg and our families. The reunions were joyous, for those with families.

We recognized, however, that for many single soldiers the arrival might be anti-climatic. Also, we knew that for the families who had remained behind many changes had occurred that the soldiers would not understand. Efforts had been made prior to our departure from the desert to counsel our soldiers, single and married, on what they might expect when we returned. Cpt McConnaughhy paid special attention to the older NCOs and their perceptions of their wives, who would undoubtably have become more independent. Also, the chain of command spent a lot of time talking to the younger soldiers. We told them that they had come of age, defending their country in a just war. They had done an outstanding job and should not return to Germany and ruin the reputation for courage and maturity they had achieved. Also we

were concerned that they might pick on soldiers in the community who had not deployed. We made sure they understood that the bulk of these soldiers wanted to deploy but were left with the unenviable job of pulling the details that hadn't gone away and with guarding the community and dependents. Our success was measured in the blotter reports that did not occur. In the 30 days after our return, we didn't receive a single alcohol related MP report on our soldiers. Four NCOs struck their wives during this period. These incidents were blamed on infidelity, money problems, and stress. They were dealt with under the UCMJ.

LESSONS LEARNED

After action reviews were conducted at all echelons and their conclusions are voluminous. The results of the battalion's internal after action review are encorporated in the 1st Bde, 1st AD After Action Review at Appendix C. Rather than review all of those issues, the following have been culled out as the most important to the author:

1. Soldier Life Support Systems. The entire range of items designed to protect the soldiers welfare in the field environment needs to be revamped. Tentage available is too heavy and bulky. Stoves for heating are antiquated and dangerous. Surely methods exist for the disposal of human waste that would preclude having to burn it with diesel fuel. Cold showers were the norm though efforts at using emersion heaters occasionally provided a luke-

warm one. Though extraordinary efforts were made to provide adequate food to the soldiers, the nourishment available from a meal of one container of microwave ravioli and a granola bar is questionable.

2. Personnel and Administration. The combat personnel and administration system is broken. Soldiers were unable to get adequate support in the field environment. Pay issues, reenlistment, promotions, all are too difficult to operate in their present form. This includes the ability of the unit to track the evacuation of casualties and the sick. It was virtually impossible for the unit to locate a soldier once he was evacuated. It has been argued that the unit has no need to be able to track a casualty. However, the modern expectation of our commanders and soldiers is to maintain a link to the soldier's care and the unit. With today's technology, a soldier shouldn't disappear into the medical system.

3. Vehicles. The Bradley Fighting Vehicle and Abrams tank were outstanding. Navigation aids, improved optics, and devices to prevent fratricide need to be added in the future. The new family of mobile and highly capable logistics vehicles, the HMMET, were indispensible and should be completely encorporated in the force structure. The older M88 tank recovery vehicle and the M113 series tracks, on the other hand, need to be discarded and replaced. A command and control vehicle is desperately needed for the commanders of mechanized forces to support mobility and survivablity with the ability to communicate and

take advantage of new C2 technology. Most commanders have to jerry-rig their tanks and Bradleys to support the radios and control functions they require.

4. Training. We proved again that we fight as we train. For the most part this was very rewarding. The system of rehearsals that we had conducted in training were used again with great effect. Rehearsals were conducted from crew to corps level and were very valuable! However, one aspect of training needs to be changed. Our experience during the first few days of the war showed that we had great difficulty in controlling the movement of the platoons and individual vehicles. Fratricide was a great concern as vehicles acquired targets and seemed to be engaging them across the front of friendly moving vehicles. Too much time was being devoted by commanders to controlling the vehicle movements of their subordinates. In retrospect the problem seems obvious, but it didn't occur to us for the first couple of days. In gunnery training in Europe, the vehicle commander drops down into the vehicle to give gunnery commands and corrections to the gunner as they move down the Table 8 record gunnery range. He doesn't stand in the turret to control the movement of his vehicle, platoon, or company. Once we told all vehicle commanders to get off the sights and to stand exposed in the turrets, the problems disappeared. Gunnery training must encorporate this change. The Combined Training Centers must be maintained with the philosophy of providing the most challenging, realistic training we can manage. It was a critical component to

the level of professional competence demonstrated by our unit in the war.

CONCLUSION

The 1st Battalion, 7th Infantry deployed, trained, fought a high intensity modern war, and redeployed at the cost of three wounded. This did not happen because of the efforts of one man or a dozen. It happened because every soldier in the unit took his portion of the mission to heart and did it selflessly and without regard to his own safety or comfort. It happened because the organization was blessed with superbly trained and professional non-commissioned officers who did what they knew was required without having to be told. It happened because the battalion was blessed with the finest, most capable, and professional officers in the army as platoon leaders, company commanders, and staff. It happened because of the innumerable acts of individual courage and discipline, whether under fire during the war or while working long hours selflessly during the training phase.

Special mention must be made of the untiring efforts of the Battalion Executive Officer, Maj W.C. Garrison, and the Battalion S-3, Maj. James Smith. Their selfless courage and professional devotion throughout this period was instrumental in the unit's success and was in the highest traditions of the service. Jim Smith died in the fall of 1991, while assigned in Washington. He will be sorely missed.

Unselfish courage was the norm, not an isolated event within the 1st Battalion 7th Infantry and the rest of the brigade. In recognition of its outstanding conduct during the course of the war, the brigade was awarded the Valorous Unit Award for its actions in battle, 24-28 Feb 1990.

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SECRET

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1st Infantry BDE, 1st
-AR GARCIA, Saudi Arabia
28 Jan 52.33 E 045.46.76
191100 Feb 91

PERATION ORDER 20S-91

EFERENCES:

a. 1st BDE, 1st AD OPORD 20S-91 dtd 180900 Feb 91.

b. Maps, Series M520, Division Special Issue, 1:25,000 sheets.

NH 38-7	NH 38-8
NH 38-11	NH 38-12
NH 38-15	NH 38-16

c. Maps, VII Corps Special Issue, 1:100,000, Sheets:

5150	5049	5047	5148
5250	5149	5048	5047

me zone used throughout the order: Charlie

sk Organization: See Annex A.

(U) SITUATION.

a. (U) Enemy Forces. Expect the enemy to respond to our closing on RCIA with blocking positions oriented up to the south and west, with mbes shifted to range our crossing points. A revetted light infantry brigade uld be positioned to block AIR PSN PYTHON, beginning vicinity N29.55 E45.42 d in depth. We expect them to be reinforced with artillery and up to a ttalion of T55's. The Tawalkana RGFC and 17th AD will adjust to new sitions from which they can either defend against a VII Corps attack, attack st against lead VII Corps divisions, or attempt to displace further north rth.

b. (S) Friendly Forces

1. (S) 1st Brigade Mission. BTL, armour, 1st Bde, 1AD arrives as e advance guard of the 1st Armored Division to destroy RGFC armored and ti-tank forces in zone and facilitate the Division attack to seize AIR N PYTHON. Rearm, refit, and set the preconditions for future operations to cate and destroy the RGFC.

2. (S) Bde Commander's Intent.

(a) (S) Purpose. Move rapidly, in tightly coordinated rmations, through the zone. Fix, suppress, and bypass enemy defenses, stroy armored formations, battalion and smaller. Destroy advance guard and main bodies of Division or larger formations to facilitate seizure of AIR PSN PYTHON.

TABA

c. Tasks to maneuver units.

1. TM A
   a. LF of BN wedge during maneuver.
   b. B/P to be the base element during movement.
   c. B/P to detach one tank platoon to form TM ENG.
   d. B/P to SBF during breach operations.

2. B CO
   a. LR of BN wedge during maneuver.
   b. B/P to follow TM D during assault through breaches.

3. TM C
   a. RF of bn wedge during maneuver.
   b. Base element of bn TF during maneuver.
   c. B/P to detach one tank plt to form TM ENG.

4. TM D
   a. RR of Bn wedge during maneuver.
   b. B/P to be the assault force during breach operations.

5. Scouts
   a. Screen fwd of TF during maneuver.
   b. Report obstacles and bypasses in zone.
   c. Maintain contact w/ 1-1 CAV during movement in zone.
   d. Report trafficability/restrictive terrain.
   e. Be prepared to provide guides to facilitate passage of previously breached obstacles.
   f. Report all enemy activity.

d. Tasks to CS units.

1. Mortars.
   a. Provide fires IAW Annex E (Fire Support).

2. D/16 EN.
   a. Priority of support to TM C, then TM A.
   b. Move IAW T.O.
   c. B/P to mark lanes/obs during movement.
   d. B/P to reduce obstacles during maneuver.
   e. B/P to form TM ENG.
   f. B/P to be the breach element during breach operations.
   g. Priority is to mobility until PYTHON.
   h. B/P to remove/destroy booby trapped enemy material, equipment, and fortifications.

3. SMK/69 CHEM.
   a. Move IAW T.O.
   b. Provide one smoke section each to TM D and B Co.

4. 2/A/6-3 AD.
   a. Move IAW T.O.

   b. Provide SHORAD throughout the TF zone.

e. Tasks to CSS units.

1. CBT Trains

a. B/P to conduct refuels at PL APPLE, NORMAN and ATP PSN PYTHON.

2. FLD Trains.

a. Move with BSA.

3. PAO moves with the TOC.

f. **COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS**

1. Upon leaving FAA GARCIA, all weapons will be loaded and on safe.

2. AD warning of imminent air attack is dynamite x 3, followed by direction air attack will come from.

3. On order, assume MOPP 2 prior to leaving FAA GARCIA. .

4. AD warn=yellow
WCS=hold

5. Avoid contact with local nationals (to include government officials and civilian personnel).

6. PAO will accompany the TF in a civilian JEEP Cherokee.

7. Bde TAC (~~1 M577~~ 2 M113, 1 M1, 1 M2) will move with TF 1-7 IN. Bn elements be prepared to provide support as required.

8. 1-1 CAV will mark waypoints with weather balloons.

9. Be prepared to provide support to CTAC and DTAC if they move with our formation.

10. Be prepared to conduct tactical refuels at PL APPLE and NORMAN and ATP PSN PYTHON.

11. All civilian males 14 or older will be treated as EPW s until released by appropriate authorities.

12. Assume all enemy weapons, equipment, bunkers and fortifications are booby-trapped. DO NOT GET KILLED LOOKING FOR SOUVENIRS!

13. PIR - Report all enemy activity.

14. Cross the LD with only those supplies and equipment essential for combat. Priority is to Class III, V, I, water, and limited maintenance necessary for vehicle recovery and BDAR.

15. Priority of work in PYTHON is security, force protection, maintenance, and life support.

16. Expected rate of march is 15 KPH.

17. Ensure all vehicles have required markings/visual signals prior to crossing LD.

18. All windshields will be covered by a section of camouflage netting.

19. The number system challenge and password is in effect for coalition forces.

20. Ensure that front B.O. marker and drive bulbs are removed.

21. Expect that captured fuel and water will be contaminated.

22. Use Super Sabot or RGFC T-72's only.

4. SERVICE SUPPORT. See Annex E (Logistics).

5. COMMAND AND SIGNAL.

A. Command: Succession of command: CO/XO/S3/CPT Riley/CPT Sutherland. S3 will continue to fight the current battle. Bn Cdr will move with TAC behind TM C.

B. Signal.

1. L Edition SOI in effect. On order, M Edition in effect.

2. Visual signals.

a. Day recognition symbols will be marked IAW the Phantom Bde TACSOP. Mark according to task organization.

b. Vehicle marking for friendly aircraft. Day - VS-17 panel on the top rear. Night - Strobe light in a tin can for platoon leader, scout section, and ALO vehicles.

c. Ensure all vehicles have the coalition identification mark - a chevron on both sides and rear.

d. The terms "Whoopee on/whoopee off" are the ALO's signals to turn on/off strobe lights to identify the battlion front line trace to friendly aircraft.

3. AJ frequencies and code words.

Frequency	Code word
Bde AJ (From Bde CMD)	Wolf
3/E/4-7 IN	Fox
Bde Cmd	Hound
Bn AJ (From Bn CMD)	Tiger
E/1-7 IN	Leopard
Bn Cmd	Horse

5. SAFETY. Risk Assessment:

- Nature of operation: 5
- First line supervision: 2
- Leader rest and time of preparation: 1
- Soldier selection: 1
- Soldier alertness: 3
- Equipment: 2
- Weather and environmental conditions: 3

Total: 29 (High)

Acknowledge.

OFFICIAL:

SMITH
LTC

SMITH
CT

ANNEXES: A - Task Organization
B - Intelligence
C - Operations Overlay 1:100,000
D - Operations Sketches
E - Fire Support (TBP)
F - Engineer
L - Graphic readings
M - Operations Overlay 1:250,000
M - Service Support
N - Personnel Service Support

ANNEX A (TASK ORGANIZATION) TO TF 1-7 IN OPORD 20S-91

TASK ORGANIZATION

TEAM ALPHA	TEAM BRAVO	TEAM CHARLIE	TEAM DELTA
A/4-66 AR (-)	B/1-7 IN	C/1-7 IN (-)	D/1-7 IN (-)
(1 X PLOW)	3/1/D/16E	2/A/4-66 AR	3/A/4-66 AR
(1X ROLLER)	A/4/A/6-3 ADA	(1 X PLOW)	(2 X PLOW)
3/C/1-7 IN	(STINGER TEAM)	(1 X ROLLER)	1/D/16 EN(-)
2/D/1-7 IN	2/SMK PLT/69CHM	3/D/16 EN	1/SMK PLT/69CHM
2/D/16 EN		(2 X ACE)	A/4/A/6-3 ADA
(2 X ACE)		(1 X AVLM)	(STINGER TEAM)
(1 X AVLM)			Medic
(1 X CEV)			TRL

TASK FORCE CONTROL

1-7 SCOUTS
1-7 MORTARS
D/16 EN (-) (DS)
(1 x CEV) (2 ACE)
(2 X AVLM) (2 AVLB)
(2 X SEE)
2/A/6-3 ADA (VULCAN) (DS)
4/A/6-3 ADA (STINGER-) (DS)
SMK PLT/62 CHEM (DS)

(INTELLIGENCE) TO TF 1-7, 1st Bde OPORD 28S-91

ENCES: 1. 3rd Bde, 3rd AD TACSOP
2. 1st AD TACSOP

UMMARY OF THE ENEMY SITUATION: (See latest INTSUM)

PRIORITY INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS (PIR's):

1. Do the artillery positions templated in our ~~sector~~ ZONE have chemical Heads?

2. Are the fighting positions and revetments templated in our ~~sector~~ ZONE ~~type~~d?

3. What are enemy reinforcements and their probable courses of action in Area of operations?

INTELLIGENCE REQUIREMENTS (IR'S):

1. How many attack helicopters are left in our sector?

2. Are there ASTROS II or Fuel Air Explosive (FAE) capable syetems in our of operations?

3. Are there PROGs within range of Attack Position PYTHON?

INTELLIGENCE ACQUISITION TASKS:

All units report as obtained:

1. Type and number of AT weapons along route to Objective COLLINS.

2. MOPP level of enemy soldiers.

3. Sightings of enemy aircraft (fixed and rotary winged).

4. Location, route and activity of mounted/dismounted patrols.

5. Indirect fire by location and type.

6. Sabotage and infiltration activities within the unit's rear areas.

Requests to higher, adjacent and cooperating units:

1. 1st Bde report as obtained:

a. minefields
b. defensive positions

c. burned out vehicles
d. military equipment
e. clouds of dust
f. berms, obstacles and canalizing terrain
g. any movement towards our passage point
h. any movement of RGFC elements
i. plans for use of special operations

4. MEASURES FOR HANDLING PERSONNEL, DOCUMENTS AND MATERIALS:

a. TF 1-7 will have 2 MP teams for EPW handling. Each team consists of 3 MP's with 1 Humvee.

b. When time and situation permits TF elements with EPW's will search and segregate EPW's, destroy their equipment and retain custody until relieved by MP teams. Report unusual and special weapons, field grade officers and higher and any captured documents over the battalion command net.

c. When time and situation do not permit; as a minimum destroy EPW weapons and equipment and send EPW's towards follow-on units.

5. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE: terms to be published

6. REPORTS AND DISTRIBUTIONS:

a. All reports are to be submitted IAW 1st AD TACSOP

SMITH
LTC

Fortier
S-2

Appendices

1- Enemy Situation Overlay
2- R&S Plan

1 S PLAN APPENDIX 2, Annex B (Intelligence), TF 1-7 OPORD 205-91

MAP SHEETS 1:100000; 5147, 5148, 5246, 5149, 5247, 5150, 5250
250,000; NH 38-11, 38-7, 38-8

Scout Plt: Depart AA on order and conduct Recon forward of TF 7 along ZONE to Attack Pos PYTHON. REPORT on terrain along route. (as required of higher, adjacent and coordinating units in Annex B (Intelligence). Report terrain on Bde NAI's 1, 4, 5, 6 and 7. On order confirm enemy positions at NAI's 6, 9 and 11. Confirm other templated positions where required

1st Bde's NAMED AREAS OF INTEREST

(1) NT 1313
(2) NT 2722
(3) NT 3036
(4) NT 2642
(5) NT 5773
(6) NT 6693
(7) NT 7890
(8) NT 8699
(9) NU 7507
(10) NU 9128
(11) PU 0731

(C)'s INTENT: DO NOT GET ENGAGED.

ATTACHMENTS: NONE. ONE GSK TM EXPECTED AT PYTHON.

COMMO: Report initially over Bn Cdr NET On order SZ will jump to Sct internal.

(b) (s) Means. Move in zone at a fixed rate of advance (15 kph) to avoid out running combat power. Maneuver with 1-1 Cav leading 1-5 km forward followed by a Bde wedge with 1 Bradley TF leading, centered in zone, a Bradley TF in the east, and an Armored TF in the west. 1-1 Cav will provide early warning to the Bde. I do not want to be surprised. The Bde will rapidly mass all weapon systems available on moving armored formations in zone. Do all necessary to facilitate 1AD's closure in ATK PSN PYTHON.

(c) (s) Results. 1st Bde, 1AD, set in ATK PSN PYTHON retaining 80% or more combat power and postured to conduct offensive operations aimed at destruction of the RGFC.

3. (s) Unit to front. 1-1 CAV screens forward of 1st Bde, 1st AD in maneuver to ATK PSN PYTHON.

3. (s) Unit to left. 18 ABN Corps on left of Bde. H-Hour, G-1, attacks to destroy Iraqi forces in zone and link up with other 18 ABN Corps units. TF 4-66 will move at the left rear of the Bde wedge.

4. (s) Unit to right. 3d AD on right of Bde. H-Hour, G+1, attacks in zone on 1AD's eastern flank to locate and destroy forces in zone. TF 4-7 will move at the right rear of Bde wedge.

5. (s) Unit to rear. Bde TOC, 2-41 FA and 26 SB will be to the rear. 1st AD will maneuver behind 1st Bde and occupy ATK PSN PYTHON.

6. (s) 2-41 FA (155,SP) is in DS of 1st Bde.

c. (s) Attachments and Detachments. See Annex A (Task Organization).

2. (s) MISSION. TF 1-7 attacks at H-Hour, G+1, as the advance guard of the 1st Bde, 1AD to locate and destroy enemy armored and anti-tank forces in zone to secure ATK PSN PYTHON. Be prepared to continue offensive operations to locate and destroy elements of the RGFC in zone.

3. (s) EXECUTION

a. (u) Battalion Cdr's Intent.

1. (s) Purpose. Move rapidly, in tight, disciplined formation through the zone. Fix, suppress, and bypass infantry defenses. Destroy armored formations, company and smaller. Destroy advance guard and support bodies of battalion and larger formations to facilitate closure of 1st Bde in ATK PSN PYTHON.

2. (s) Means. Move in zone at a fixed rate of advance (15 kph) to avoid out running artillery and to prevent the accordion effect in follow-on units. Maneuver with scouts forward and the battalion in a modified wedge. Accept battle handover from 1-1 CAV as they move to a flank, set the task force and then engage the enemy at the maximum effective range of our weapons systems.

3. (s) Results. TF 1-7 IN set in ATK PSN PYTHON retaining 90% or more of combat power and postured to conduct offensive operations aimed at the destruction of the RGFC.

b. (u) Concept of the operation. See Annex C (operations overlay).

1. (s) Maneuver. TF 1-7 IN conducts a four phase operation in zone.

a. (s) Phase 1. (FAA GARCIA to PL APPLE). TF 1-7 IN attacks in zone as the advance guard of the 1st Bde. The TF will maneuver in a battalion wedge, with scouts screening forward. Orient maneuver on waypoints 1, 10, and 11. Be prepared to go to limited vis/restrictive terrain formation if terrain does not support an open wedge formation. Be prepared to orient on the GREEN.

b. (s) Phase 2. (PL APPLE to PL NORMAN). TF continues to attack in zone, maneuvering in a battalion wedge. Orient maneuver on waypoints 12, 13 and 14.Be prepared to stop at PL NORMAN and remain overnight. Be prepared to refuel at NORMAN. Estimated stop will be for 2 hours. Upon contact w/ dug in infantry, fix, suppress, and bypass. Upon contact w/ armored forces in company size or smaller, action to destroy.

c. (S) Phase 3. (PL NORMAN to PL MAINE). TF 1-7 continues the attack in zone. Be prepared to destroy enemy forces vicinity of OBJ DOG. Orient maneuver on waypoints 14-15-16, then orient on 37 for 7 km (4.2 mi), turn East and orient on 65 for 4 km (2.4 mi). Set on the 86 gridline (E045 83.40') and ABF OBJ DOG. On order, attack to destroy enemy forces vicinity OBJ DOG.

d. (S) Phase 4. (PL MAINE to ATK PSN PYTHON). TF 1-7 continues the attack in zone. Orient maneuver along waypoints 18, 19, 11B, 12C, and occupy ATK PSN ROCK 1 (BP 10), oriented NE. Be prepared to shift to AXIS SPIKE and orient maneuver along waypoints 1A, 81, 84, 11B, 86 and occupy ABF 10.

2. Fires. 2-41 FA is in direct support of 1st Bde. 2-41 FA moves behind TF 1-7 during movement to ATK PSN PYTHON. Priority fires in Bde to TF AV, TF 1-7, TF 4-7 and on order TF 4-66. Mortars move behind Tm A. Priority of mortars and FA fires in TF goes to TM C, TM A, TM D and on order B Co. I want to engage the enemy deep beyond direct fire weapons range. Use mortars for suppression, smoke, illumination and marking rounds if required. Priority of Copperhead is to command and control vehicles, main battle tanks, and armored fighting vehicles. FASCAM release authority is retained by Task Force Commander. All phase lines are on order Div and Bde FSCL's. On order, IPLE takes effect to facilitate 3 ACR's movement through zone. [illegible] battery priority/FPF target. Tm C has 1 mortar pit FPF.

3. Counterair. Priority of AD is command and control, then TOC. Vulcans will move with the TOC. Stinger TMs will move with B Co, Tm D, and the CBT TRAINS.

4. Intelligence. See Annex B (Intelligence).

5. EW. No change.

6. Engineering. See Annex F (Engineering).



ANNEX D (OPS SKETCHES)
TO OPORD 205-91
TF 1-7 IN

OFFICIAL



ANNEX D (OPS SKETCH)
TO OPORD 205-91
TI 1-7 IN

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ANNEX G (ENGINEER SUPPORT) TO TF 1-7 OPORD

TASK ORGANIZATION: SEE ANNEX A

1. SITUATION.

A. ENEMY FORCES. SEE ANNEX B (INTELLIGENCE)

B. FRIENDLY FORCES. SEE BASIC OPORD

C. ATTACHMENTS/DETACHMENTS. SEE ANNEX A (TASK ORGANIZATION)

2. MISSION. O/O DELTA COMPANY 16TH ENGR BN MANEUVERS WITH TF 1-7 AND CONDUCTS MOBILITY, COUNTERMOBILITY, SURVIVABILITY AND GENERAL ENGINEERING OPERATIONS TO FACILITATE THE TASK FORCE'S MOVEMENT TO CONTACT AND OCCUPATION OF ATTACK POSITION PYTHON.

3. EXECUTION.

A. COMMANDER'S INTENT. PROVIDE MOBILITY FOR THE TASK FORCE WHICH WILL ENABLE THEM TO ARRIVE IN ATTACK POSITION PYTHON WITHIN 22 HOURS OF CROSSING THE LD. EMPLOY MOBILITY AND COUNTERMOBILITY MEASURES WHICH ALLOW THE TASK FORCE TO ARRIVE ON THE OBJECTIVE WITH 90% OF OUR COMBAT POWER. OUR EFFORTS MUST FACILITATE MOVEMENT OF TF 1-7 AS WELL AS THE FOLLOW ON FORCES, PROVIDING MOBILITY LANES IF NECESSARY. ENGINEER SUPPORT MUST BE FLEXIBLE AND RESPONSIVE. UPON ARRIVAL AT ATTACK POSITION PYTHON WE MUST BE POISED TO STRIKE THE RGFC WITHIN 36 HOURS.

B. CONCEPT OF THE OPERATION. (PHASES I-IV) THIS WILL BE A FOUR PHASED OPERATION. PHASE I: (FAA GARCIA TO PL APPLE) FEATURES SOME RESTRICTIVE TERRAIN WHICH WE MUST BE PREPARED TO ASSIST 2 ACR IN DEVELOPING LANES THROUGH FURTHERMORE, BE PREPARED TO IMPROVE LANES TO FACILITATE MOVEMENT OF FIELD TRAINS. PHASE II: (PL APPLE TO PL NORMAN) TERRAIN IS MORE OPEN AND ENEMY CONTACT IS NOT EXPECTED. AT PL NORMAN, DURING REFUEL OPERATIONS, BE PREPARED TO CONSTRUCT FAARPS. DEPENDENT UPON 1-1 CAVS RECON BE PREPARED TO CONFIGURE BREACH ASSETS FOR TM ENGR. (ROLLERS AND RAKES MOUNTED, MICLICS PREPARED AND CHECKED, HAND PLACED DEMO PREPARED AND HASTY LANE MARKING MATERIAL ACCESSIBLE). PHASE III: (PL NORMAN TO PL,MAINE) LIKELY TO BE A MORE DELIBERATE ATTACK. ENGINEERS MUST BE PREPARED TO CONDUCT ASSAULT, IN STRIDE AND DELIBERATE BREACH OPERATIONS. PHASE IV: (PL MAINE TO ATTACK POSITION PYTHON) ENVISIONED TO BE A NIGHT MOVE ACROSS SOME DIFFICULT WADI TYPE TERRAIN. MOBILITY AND MARKING OF LANES WILL BE ESSENTIAL. UPON ARRIVAL AT ATTACK POSITION PYTHON, BLADE ASSETS WILL INITIATE SURVIVABILITY AND COUNTERMOBILITY OPERATIONS TO PROTECT THE FORCE. THROUGHOUT THE FOUR PHASES BLADE ASSETS MUST REMAIN FLEXIBLE TO ASSIST IN PROVIDING MOBILITY FOR THE PASSAGE OF FIELD TRAINS AND FOLLOW ON ELEMENTS INTO ATTACK POSITION PYTHON. PRIORITY OF ENGINEER SUPPORT IS TO TM A AND TM C, O/O SHIFTING TO TM D. PRIORITY OF ENGINEER EFFORT IS MOBILITY THROUGH PHASE FOUR. UPON OCCUPATION OF ATTACK POSITION PYTHON PRIORITY OF EFFORT SHIFTS TO SURVIVABILITY, THEN COUNTERMOBILITY.

C. COORDINATING INSTRUCTIONS.

(1) ENGINEER ASSETS WILL MOVE WITHIN TF AND TM FORMATIONS AS REHEARSED.

(2) REPORT WATER SOURCES IN ZONE WITHOUT GOING OUTSIDE UNIT FORMATION.

(3) EPWS WILL BE PROCESSED TO THE REAR QUICKLY [illegible]

(5) B/P TO HAND OVER LANES TO FOLLOW ON FORCE, DETAIL TO FOLLOW.

(6) PRIORITY OF SURVIVABILITY EFFORT IN ATTACK POSITION PYTHON IS CLASS I SITES, CLASS V SITES, FAARPS, ARTILLERY, ATTACK AIR AND C3 NODES.

(7) ANTICIPATE ENEMY MINEFIELDS WHEREVER BARBED WIRE FENCES ARE ICOUNTERED.

(8) MARK AND REPORT ANY UNEXPLODED ORDINANCE FOUND IN ZONE.

(9) B/P TO ESTABLISH A HASTY DEFENSE SHOULD THE TASK FORCE ENCOUNTER INTACT.

SERVICE SUPPORT. SEE BASIC ORDER.

COMMAND AND SIGNAL. SEE BASIC ORDER.

SMITH
LTC

FICIAL:

ICK
ENGR

REVISED Annex L (Graphic Readings) to 1-7 IN, 1AD FRAGO 205-91.

The list below updates the GRID and LAT/LON readings for Division Additions: Checkpoints and ABFs along AXIS SPIKE have been added due to contingency plan. CHECKPOINTS 1N, 2N, 3N, 1M, 2M, and 3M have changed along AXIS SPIKE due to new Division graphics along AXIS SPIKE. Again, this is an update and all previous editions should be ignored.

GRAPHIC	GRID	LAT/LONG	LINE #
CP3	NT100100	N29 01.10 E45 06.10	1
CP1	NT150100	N29 01.10 E45 09.20	2 *
CP2	NT200100	N29 01.10 E45 12.25	3
A026	NT244116	N29 01.75 E45 15.00	4
CP 1X	NT170234	N29 00.32 E45 10.49	5 *
CP 2X	NT220227	N29 07.93 E45 13.57	6
CP 3X	NT120243	N29 08.81 E45 07.40	7
A641	NT244217	N29 07.30 E45 15.00	8
TIR 850	NT160306	N29 12.24 E45 09.88	9
TIR 870	NT201305	N29 12.18 E45 12.41	10
TIR 890	NT249304	N29 12.12 E45 15.37	11
CON PT 15	NT284300	N29 11.88 E45 17.53	12
CON PT 235	NT140348	N29 14.49 E45 08.64	13
CP30	NT180343	N29 14.22 E45 11.11	14
CP10	NT230343	N29 14.21 E45 14.20	15 *
CP20	NT280343	N29 14.21 E45 17.29	16
CON PT 88	NT356381	N29 16.25 E45 21.99	17
TIR 880	NT338420	N29 18.39 E45 20.88	18
A026	NT299413	N29 18.00 E45 18.30	19
TIR 860	NT282420	N29 18.40 E45 17.42	20
TIR 845	NT234420	N29 18.41 E45 14.46	21
A593	NT253573	N29 26.42 E45 15.42	22
CON PT 234	NT250500	N29 22.71 E45 15.46	23
CON PT 30	NT260500	N29 22.71 E45 16.08	24
CP31	NT300500	N29 22.71 E45 18.55	25
CP11	NT350500	N29 22.70 E45 21.64	26 *
CP21	NT400500	N29 22.69 E45 24.73	27
CON PT 11	NT460500	N29 22.68 E45 28.44	28
TIR 871	NT438540	N29 24.87 E45 27.09	29
TIR 855	NT386540	N29 24.88 E45 23.87	30
TIR 866	NT330540	N29 24.89 E45 20.41	31
CP32	NT360580	N29 27.03 E45 22.27	32
CP12	NT410580	N29 27.02 E45 25.37	33 *
CP22	NT460580	N29 27.01 E45 28.46	34
TIR 864	NT404630	N29 29.75 E45 25.00	35
TIR 841	NT453630	N29 29.74 E45 28.04	36
TIR 867	NT507630	N29 29.73 E45 31.38	37
CP33	NT430670	N29 31.89 E45 26.63	38
CP13	NT480670	N29 31.88 E45 29.72	39 *
CP23	NT530670	N29 31.87 E45 32.82	40
CON PT 12	NT601687	N29 32.77 E45 37.22	41
CON PT 7	NT578704	N29 33.69 E45 35.80	42
CON PT 95	NT510748	N29 36.09 E45 31.60	43
TIR 871	NT493750	N29 36.23 E45 30.65	44
CON PT 33	NT480768	N29 37.18 E45 29.75	45
CON PT 29	NT500788	N29 38.26 E45 30.99	46
TIR 852	NT555750	N29 36.22 E45 34.39	47

TIR [illegible]37	NT604750	N29 36.20	E45 37.43	48
CON [illegible]T 96	NT587790	N29 38.35	E45 36.38	49
CON PT 27	NT666778	N29 37.[illegible]7	E45 41.28	50
CP24	NT664813	N29 39.57	E45 41.17	51
CP14	> NT630850	> N29 41.58	E45 39.07	52 *
CP34	NT599889	N29 43.71	E45 37.16	53
TIR 831	NT597870	N29 42.71	E45 35.92	54
TIR 879	NT655870	N29 42.69	E45 40.63	55
CON PT 97	NT700849	N29 41.51	E45 43.41	56
TIR 851	NT715870	N29 42.67	E45 44.35	57
CON PT 75	NT748855	N29 41.82	E45 46.39	58
TIR 892	NT754864	N29 42.18	E45 46.45	59
CON PT 40	NT588900	N29 44.30	E45 36.48	60
CP35	NT623900	N29 44.29	E45 38.65	61
CP15	NT675900	N29 44.28	E45 41.88	61 *
CP25	NT725900	N29 44.26	E45 44.98	63
CON PT 36	NT708900	N29 44.27	E45 43.93	64
CON PT 14	NT800900	N29 44.23	E45 49.64	65
TIR 882	NT764923	N29 45.29	E45 47.24	66
TIR 854	NT782938	N29 46.32	E45 48.54	67
TIR 836	NT784943	N29 46.33	E45 48.39	68
TIR 865	NT736960	N29 47.53	E45 45.69	69
TIR 889	NT693983	N29 48.79	E45 43.31	70
A003	NT705993	N29 48.80	E45 [illegible]3.5[illegible]	71
CP2A	NT800950	N29 46.94	E45 49.66	72
CP36	NT742992	N29 49.24	E45 46.07	73
CP16	NT790992	N29 [illegible]9.22	E45 [illegible]6	74
CP2A	NT842992	N29 49.20	E45 52.28	75
TIR [illegible]29	NU763004	N29 49.52	E45 47.23	76
TIR 849	NU733025	N29 51.01	E45 45.31	77
CON PT 9	NT83[illegible]	[illegible].87	E45 [illegible]	78
CON PT 83	NT89[illegible]	N2[illegible].50	E45 55.3[illegible]	79
TIR [illegible]20	NT[illegible]992	N2[illegible]	[illegible]5.6 51.0[illegible]	[illegible]
CP2E	[illegible]	N29 [illegible]58	[illegible]56.0[illegible]	[illegible]
CON PT 72	[illegible]	[illegible]29 4[illegible].02	[illegible]	[illegible]
CON PT 1[illegible]	[illegible]4038	N29 51.68	[illegible]	[illegible]
TIR 859	NU[illegible]2036	N29 51.58	[illegible].03	[illegible]
TIR 869	NU[illegible]	N29 51.37	E[illegible]	[illegible]
CP[illegible]	NU[illegible]	N2[illegible]52.35	E45 [illegible]1.[illegible]	[illegible]
TIR 835	NT[illegible]	N2[illegible]7.23	E45 [illegible].2[illegible]	[illegible]
CP4A	NU[illegible]	[illegible]29 [illegible].73	E45 [illegible].[illegible]	[illegible]8
TIR 8[illegible]	NU[illegible]25	N29 51.01	E45 45.31	[illegible]
TIR 893	NU722071	N29 53.31	E45 [illegible]4.51	[illegible]
CP37	NU851094	[illegible]29 [illegible].[illegible]2	E45 52.89	[illegible]
TIR 84[illegible]	NU855084	[illegible] [illegible].20	E45 53.14	[illegible]
TIR 84[illegible]	NT82[illegible]75	N28 59.33	E45 [illegible]	[illegible]3
CP17	NU9[illegible]94	N29 54.69	E45 [illegible]6.06	[illegible]4
TIR 858	NU9[illegible]114	[illegible]29 55.45	E4[illegible] 57.4[illegible]	[illegible]5
CP27	NU9[illegible]094	N29 54.67	E45 [illegible]0.[illegible]4	96 *
CP1A	NU9[illegible]053	N29 52.44	E4[illegible]0.07	[illegible] *
TIR 809	NU98[illegible]53	N29 52.26	E46 01.26	[illegible]8
CON PT 51	PU022[illegible]	N29 52.96	E4[illegible] 03.50	[illegible]
CON PT 81	NU064[illegible]8	N29 54.[illegible]2	E45 03.98	100
CP60	PU[illegible]2130	N29 56.54	E45 03.98	101
CON PT 77	NU[illegible]1	N29 56.89	E45 [illegible]9.1[illegible]	102
CP82	PU[illegible]61[illegible]	N3[illegible] 00.06	E46 [illegible]3.[illegible]2	[illegible]
CON PT 69	PU[illegible]320[illegible]	N3[illegible] 00.29	E46 13.59	[illegible]
CP81	PU[illegible]26193	N29 59.94	E46 [illegible]0.04	[illegible]

TIR 853	PU072172	N29 58.86	E46 06.67	107
CP28	PU073200	N30 00.35	E46 06.75	108
A004	PU050162	N29 58.20	E46 05.20	109
CP18	PU022200	N30 00.38	E46 03.58	110 *
TIR 838	PU016225	N30 01.76	E46 03.22	111
CP38	NU972200	N30 00.40	E46 00.47	112
CON PT 45	NU844200	N30 00.46	E45 52.51	113
CON PT 19	NU854229	N30 02.02	E45 53.14	114
TIR 815	NU963250	N30 03.06	E45 59.56	115
CP89	NU992250	N30 03.10	E46 01.74	116
A253	PU030252	N30 03.50	E46 04.50	117
TIR 816	PU038246	N30 02.51	E46 04.36	118
CP90	PU091259	N30 03.53	E46 07.91	119
CP29	PU130255	N30 03.30	E46 10.33	120
TIR 894	PU105211	N30 00.55	E46 08.44	121
TIR 897	PU136239	N30 02.25	E46 10.41	122
TIR 881	PU186258	N30 03.45	E46 13.82	123
CON PT 85	PU299230	N30 01.84	E46 20.83	124
TIR 872	NU959278	N30 04.37	E45 59.42	125
TIR 825	NU994287	N30 05.05	E46 01.53	126
TIR 891	PU038280	N30 04.41	E46 04.37	127
CP87	NU902300	N30 05.85	E46 56.17	128
CP88	NU967285	N30 05.00	E46 00.20	129
CP19	NU095289	N30 05.45	E46 05.92	130 *
TIR 817	PU105299	N30 05.41	E46 08.48	131
CP91	PU061304	N30 05.99	E46 06.07	132
TIR 801	PU017318	N30 06.45	E46 03.20	133
TIR 863	PU142313	N30 06.46	E46 11.12	134
CON PT 91	PU364276	N30 04.29	E46 24.91	135
TIR 887	PU273315	N30 06.49	E46 19.28	136
CP84	PU250300	N30 05.66	E46 17.83	137
CP21B	PU204301	N30 05.74	E46 14.97	138 *
CP39	PU060329	N30 07.34	E46 06.02	139 *
TIR 899	PU047358	N30 08.54	E46 05.13	140
CP86	PU111340	N30 07.91	E46 09.20	141
TIR 819	PU126342	N30 08.00	E46 10.08	142
CP11B	PU177341	N30 07.93	E46 13.31	143 *
CON PT 48	NU999394	N30 10.89	E46 02.26	144
TIR 896	PU077383	N30 10.15	E46 07.06	145
TIR 875	PU094375	N30 09.84	E46 08.17	146
TIR 873	PU236376	N30 09.81	E46 17.02	147
CON PT 44	PU092436	N30 13.12	E46 08.08	148
CP31B	PU149384	N30 10.27	E46 11.60	149
TIR 877	PU198434	N30 12.56	E46 14.41	150
CP85	PU140470	N30 14.93	E46 11.09	151
CP22C	PU308363	N30 09.04	E46 21.49	152
CP12C	PU280405	N30 11.33	E46 19.77	153 *
CP32C	PU253448	N30 13.67	E46 18.12	154
A590	PU374530	N30 18.03	E46 25.47	155
CP23D	PU440457	N30 14.03	E46 29.79	156
CP13D	PU440505	N30 16.63	E46 29.82	157 *
CP33D	PU440555	N30 19.34	E46 29.87	158
CP70	NT100405	N29 17.58	E45 06.18	159
A593	NT253573	N29 26.42	E45 15.42	160
CP71	NT300635	N29 30.02	E45 18.57	161
A014	NT432798	N29 38.50	E45 26.50	162
CP72	NT402901	N29 44.40	E45 24.94	163
CP17	NT402900	N29 44.35	E45 24.94	164

A002	NT448986	N29 49.00	E45 27.50	165
CP73	NU601000	N29 49.71	E45 37.32	166
CP74	NU726153	N29 57.96	E45 45.15	167
CP75	NU889360	N30 09.10	E45 55.39	168
CP76	NU963488	N30 16.00	E46 00.00	169
CP77	PU200600	N30 16.00	E46 00.07	170
A591	PU253633	N30 23.42	E46 18.18	171
CP60	NT485400	N30 31.93	E46 14.92	172
A594	NT522543	N29 25.00	E46 32.19	173
CP61	NT701598	N29 27.92	E45 43.38	174
TIR 806	NT817788	N29 38.09	E45 50.38	175
A598	NT808873	N29 42.48	E45 50.10	176
TIR 898	NT895865	N29 42.17	E45 55.30	177
CP62	NT969822	N29 39.94	E45 00.08	178
TIR 885	NT854932	N29 45.56	E45 52.59	179
TIR 807	NT896935	N29 46.04	E45 55.36	180
CP63	NT900315	N29 12.52	E45 55.55	181
TIR 803	NT975922	N29 45.45	E46 00.50	182
CP64	NT000915	N29 45.20	E45 00.00	183
TIR 814	NT964995	N29 49.18	E45 59.51	184
CP65	PT100000	N29 55.73	E46 07.71	185 *
CP66	PU300100	N29 54.80	E46 20.80	186
CP67	PU367200	N30 00.17	E46 25.04	187
A602	PU343246	N30 02.41	E46 23.36	188
ABF21	NT823985	N29 48.83	E45 51.10	189
ABF30	NU782059	N29 52.85	E45 48.59	190 *

AXIS SPIKE CHECKPOINTS

1M	NT694990	N29 49.14	E45 43.09	191 *
2M	NT715990	N29 49.14	E45 44.40	192
3M	NT673990	N29 49.15	E45 41.79	193
1N	NU785092	N29 54.63	E45 48.79	194 *
2N	NU809092	N29 54.62	E45 50.28	195
3N	NU759092	N29 54.64	E45 47.17	196
1P	NU936130	N29 56.63	E45 58.19	197 *
2P	NU949113	N29 55.70	E45 58.99	198
3P	NU935146	N29 57.50	E45 57.52	200
1Q	PU043135	N29 56.85	E46 04.85	201 *
2Q	PU049116	N29 55.81	E46 05.21	202
3Q	PU036152	N29 57.77	E46 04.42	203
1R	PU114164	N29 58.38	E46 09.28	204 *
2R	PU128151	N29 57.67	E46 10.14	205
3R	PU099177	N29 59.09	E46 08.35	206
1S	PU169217	N30 01.22	E46 12.73	207 *
2S	PU184201	N30 00.34	E46 13.66	208
3S	PU156231	N30 01.98	E46 11.93	209
1T	PU186301	N30 05.75	E46 13.85	210 *
2T	PU236303	N30 05.83	E46 16.96	211
3T	PU164290	N30 05.17	E46 12.47	212
W	NU913249	N30 03.80	E46 56.82	213
Y	NU992133	N29 56.76	E46 01.68	214
ABF10	PU099344	N30 08.13	E46 08.46	215 *
ABF31	PU094313	N30 06.46	E46 08.13	216

ANNEX M (LOGISTICS) TO OPERATION ORDER 20S-91

1. GENERAL

A. This annex provides CSS for task force movement to contact from FAA Garcia to Attack Position Python. CSS will be accomplished in three phases which are (1) movement to the LD, (2) conduct of refueling operations enroute, and (3) consolidation and reorganization operations vicinity Attack Position Python. The 26 FSB provides DS CSS. 123rd MSB provides DS/GS IAW 7th Support Group.

B. The 1-7 Infantry CSSSOP is in effect except for changes noted below within the annex.

2. MATERIAL AND SERVICES

A. SUPPLY

(1) Class I

a. The UBL for all soldiers is 9 MREs and 9 bottles of water per soldier. The UBL will not be consumed until the LD/LC is crossed.

b. The field trains forward will carry the additional 2 days of class I UBL on resupply vehicles.

c. The ration cycle is MRE-MRE-MRE and BOI for water is three bottles of water per soldier per day.

d. Bulk water priority is to medical operations and then to decontamination operations. Local water is not authorized for consumption without prior medical verification of potability. Bulk water for use in cooking and hygiene will not be available for at least 72 hours. Until otherwise stated through the A/L net, bath and laundry after the LD/LC is prohibited.

(2) Class II - No change.

(3) Class III

a. All vehicles must be topped off ten hours prior to SP. Vehicles should have on hand a 15 DOS of packaged POL products.

b. Tactical refueling will occur vicinity PL Norman with organic assets. Bulk fuel resupply will occur from FSB M978 fuelers vicinity the combat trains. Refueling will also occur during reorganization and consolidation operations on Attack Position Python.

c. Due to possible chemical contamination of enemy class III stocks, use of enemy class III stocks is prohibited.

(4) Class IV

a. Vehicles should deploy with the basic load of class IV for possible preparation of defensive positions in Attack Position Python.

b. Additional class IV may be available through brigade sized push packages shipped directly from corps, request resupply through the ALOC.

(5) Class V

a. All elements must depart from FAA Garcia fully loaded with tier 1 ammunition levels and as much of tier 2 as possible on vehicles. Remaining tier 2 ammunition will be carried by field trains forward elements.

b. The support platoon will deliver ammo as required. Ammunition deficiencies must be identified to the ALOC on blue one reports. Emergency resupply will occur based upon METT-T and emergency blue one requests.

c. Aerial resupply will be available on an emergency basis from logbase Bravo. The packages are as follows:

	TYPE	DODIC	BOXES	ROUNDS
PACKAGE A INFANTRY	5.56 MM	A071/068	216	362,880
	7.62 MM	A131	168	134,400
	40 MM	B542	120	8,640
	CLAYMORE	K143	1	36
	.50 CAL	A540	72	14,400
	LAW	H557	24	360
	SAW 5.56	A064	72	118,080
	BOTTLED WATER		360	4,320
PACKAGE B TANK/MECH	120 MM APDS	C380		384
	120 MM HEAT	C787		96
	25 MM APDS	C974	672	67,200
	40 MM SMOKE	B509/508/ B506	120	8,640
	7.62 MM	A131	168	134,400
PACKAGE C TANK	120 MM APDS	C380		288
	120 MM HEAT	C787		72

PACKAGE D	25MM APDS	A974	384	38,400
	TOW	PB93	60	60
	40MM	B509/508/506	30	2,160
	7.62MM	A131	24	19,200
PACKAGE F	BOTTLED WATER		648	7,776
	MRE		378	4,536
SURVIVAL	5.56 MM		12/AS REQUIRED	20,160
PACKAGE H	4.2 HE	C697	360	720
	4.2 SMOKE		40	80
MORTAR				

(6) Class VI - Sundry pack deliveries will continue on an irregular basis through the S-1 and chaplain.

(7) Class VII

a. Prior to SP all commanders must have reconciled property books and hand receipts with the brigade PBO representative at the brigade ALOC.

b. Resupply through WSRO will occur based upon blue one and blue two reports if the DMMC approves the fill. All organizational equipment must be retained under unit control when soldiers are evacuated from the unit.

(8) Class VIII

a. Resupply through the medical platoon. Company medical supplies must be at 100% prior to SP. Units must have a 10 day supply of critical medical requirements.

b. Battalion resupply occurs first through C/26 FSB, second through F/123rd MSB, and third through the 428th MEDSCOM.

(9) Class IX

a. For this movement BDAR is authorized. Cannibalization is also authorized.

b. The field trains forward and combat trains will carry tailored PLL for the upcoming operation.

c. 100% turn-in of recoverable items and components will occur prior to SP. Turn-in after the LD/LC is also important to long term force sustainment.

B. TRANSPORTATION

(1) Priority goes to POL and ammunition.

(2) Request additional requirements through the ALOC.

C. SERVICES

(1) Construction - No permanent facilities will be erected.

(2) EOD - Request through the ALOC. The 512th EODCC is the responding unit.

(3) Laundry and Bath - Not authorized after the LD/LC until water becomes sufficiently available for medical, decontamination, and hydration requirements. Authorization will be given to units through the A/L net.

(4) GREGGS

a. An augmentation team from corps will be attached to 26 FSB. MSB reefer vans will be used to transport the deceased to corps

b. Remains found enroute, of allies, enemy, or civilians will be provided the same respect as the remains of U.S. service members, within the capability of the unit.

c. Conduct GREGGs operations as per SOP.

d. Contaminated remains will be temporarily interred. The internment site will be marked and reported through the A/L channels. Contaminated remains will be conspicuously marked and located.

D. CIVILIAN LABOR - Availability is controlled by 1AD.

E. MAINTENANCE

(1) Units are limited to 2 hours of repair time prior to evacuation to the UMCP. The UMCP locations are TBA.

(2) Vehicle crews will remain with down vehicles.

(3) The brigade priority of recovery/maintenance is:

a. Fuel Vehicles
b. M88A1
c. M1A1
d. M2A2/M3A2
e. Attack Helicopters
f. M109
g. 5 Ton Tractors

h. HETs
i. RTLFs
J. SMPs

(4) Controlled substitutions are authorized at all levels.

F. MEDICAL EVACUATION AND HOSPITALIZATION.

1. EVACUATION. During movement to ATK POSN PYTHON a Casualty Collcection Point (CCP) will be established forward of the TOC and between the Mortars and TAC. The CCP will be established when it is likely that the Task Force will sustain casualties. The CSM establishes and manages the CCP.

2. MASS CASUALTY. In the event of mass casualties all available means of transportation will be used to move casualties to the CCP.

3. CHEMICAL CASUALTY. In the event of chmeical casualties the unit will alert the ALOC and BAS. A 'dirty' aid station will then be established downwind of the combat trains.

4. FIELD SANITATION. During movement catholes will be used to bury defecation. Upon arrival in PYTHON units will establish slit trenches.

5. FOOD AND WATER. Units will use and consume only food and water issued through the supply system or approved for use by the 123d MSB after testing.

G. CHAPLAIN ACTIVITIES. The chaplain will move with the BAS in the combat trains. He is prepared to provide religious support to the wounded and dying. He is available to provide ministry support forward upon request through the ALOC. The chaplain is the first point of contact for combat stress related casualties.

H. PERSONNEL AND ADMINISTRATION.

1. STRENGTH REPORTING. Unit strength reports are due daily by 0800 daily. Reports will be submitted via FM (A/L) or courier.

2. CASUALTY REPORTING. Any loss forward of the LD will be reported to the ALOC in and RED 2 format via FM and a DA Form 1156 via courier. This includes all combat and noncombat losses.

3. PERSONNEL ACTIONS. Recommendations for awards will be forwarded to the S1 as soon as possible after incident. In the event of a clearly heroic act statements will be collected from witnesses and forwarded to the S1.

4. POSTAL OPERATIONS. Mail delivery will be disrupted during movement to ATK POSN PYTHON. Upon arrival in PYTHON and establishment of the

Division support base mail will be picked up and forwarded. Outgoing mail will be held in the field trains until delivery is possible. Only letter mail and packages the size of VCR tapes and smaller will be forwarded.

I. ENEMY PRISONERS OF WAR. Units will handle prisoners in accordance with the 5 Ss. All captured male Iraqis over the age of 14 will be considered prisoners of war until interrogated by Military Intelligence personnel. The capturing unit is responsible for guarding prisoners until they are transferred to Military Police control. The ALOC will be contacted immediately upon capture of prisoners. All prisoners will be tagged with the folowing information if time permits: date and location of capture, capturing unit, and circumstances of capture. Prisoners suspected of involvement in the delivery or use of chemical or biological weapons will be segregated from other prisoners and their tag will be annotated with the letters NBC. An EPW Collection Point will not be established until the Task Force reaches PYTHON.

J. CIVIL AFFAIRS. Units will report the presence of displaced civilians they encounter in sector to the ALOC. Disposition instructions will follow after coordination with the Division Civil Affairs Office.

SMITH
LTC

OH

S-4

ANNEX O (CHEMICAL SUPPORT) TO 1-7 IN OPORD 20S-91

Reference: a: Map series K520, Division Special Issue, 1:250,000 sheets.

NH 38-7 NH 38-8
NH 38-11 NH 38-12
NH 38-15 NH 38-16

b: Maps, VII Corps Special Issue, 1:100,000 Special Issue Sheets,

5150 5049 5249 5148
5250 5149 5048 5047

Time Zone used throughout the order: Charlie.

1. SITUATION.

a. Enemy Forces.

(1) Annex B (Intelligence) to OPORD 20S-91.

(2) Nuclear: Iraq to date does not possess the Nuclear Weapon capability.

(3) Biological: Iraq has pursued biological warfare research and is known to have the capability to produce the following agents:

ANTHRAX CHOLERA BOTULINUM

CLOSTRIDIUM PERFINGENS STAPHYLOCOCCUS ENTEROTOXINS

(a) Of these the "most weaponizable" are Botulinum and Anthrax. In both cases we have the capability to defeat them by inoculation or serum and to defend against them by appropriate levels of MOPP.

(4) Chemical: Iraq used chemical weapons extensively during the Iran/Iraq war. Iraqi weapons are capable of employing agents throughout the Corps area of operation. It is expected that agents will be used during and in conjunction with conventional HE strikes. Iraq has is known to produce and possess the capability to weaponize the following agents:

AGENT	NAME	TYPE	EFFECTS
HD	SULPHUR MUSTARD	PERSISTENT BLISTER (Liquid and Dusty)	Casualty producer
CX	PHOSGENE OXIME	PERSISTENT BLISTER	Casualty producer
GA	TABUN	SEMI-PER NERVE	Lethal
GB	SARIN	NON-PER NERVE	Lethal
GD	SOMAN	SEMI-PER NERVE	Lethal
GF	N/A	SEMI-PER NERVE	Lethal
VX	N/A	PERSISTENT NERVE	Lethal
BZ	N/A	PERSISTENT INCAPAC	Incapacitating Hallucinogenic
CS	TEAR GAS	NON-PER INCAPACITATING	

. (a) Of the above agents those "most likely" to be used are the iemi-persistent range of Nerve agents to cover their withdrawal from defensive iositions and HD (Sulphur Mustard) to restrict our maneuver capability.

(b) Delivery: Our potential threat is Iraqs capability to ieaponize these agents in all types of artillery delivered munitions. Based in previous use, their primary choice is 155 mm and 122 mm MRL in which both iere used extensively during the Iran/Iraq war. Two or more agents may be mployed against a target. Specifically a mixture of Nerve and Blister which iossess the ability to create immediate and delayed casualties.

(c) Chemical Warfare threat is deadly serious. Saddam Hussein as demonstrated no compunction about using chemicals against both military nd civilian targets. Iraqi forces are likely to employ agents if being ushed back from defensive positions. Once released, agents are expected to e used freely.

(5) Smoke: Threat forces possess the ability to produce smoke hrough artillery delivered munitions and on-board VESS systems.

(a) Threat smoke munitions and flares will degrade friendly orce use of:

1. Visual sights/observation devices.

2. Passive image intensifiers, such as AN/PVS-7B and N/TVS-5.

3. Laser designated munitions (COPPERHEAD and HELLFIRE).

4. Laser range finders.

5. TOW and DRAGON ATGM.

b. Friendly Forces. See Basic OPORD para 1b.

c. Attachments and Detachments. The smoke platoon, 69th Chemical Co. is ttached. See Task Organization.

. MISSION. Chemical Support units will provide smoke in support of the ffense.

. EXECUTION.

a. Commanders Intent. (See basic order).

b. Concept of the Operation. (See basic order).

(1) General. Maneuver units will provide NBC reconnaissance issively to provide early warning of NBC attack, provide data for possible ient identification, and locate suitable sites for hasty decontamination, IPP gear exchange, and operator vehicle spraydown. The smoke platoon/69th iemical Company will provide smoke in support of breaching and offensive erations.

c. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) Operational Exposure Guidance.

(a) Nuclear. Negligible to unwarned exposed personnel.

(b) Chemical. Negligible risk to warned personnel with CPE.

(2) On order go to MOPP 2.

(3) Hasty decon sites will be located as far forward as possible to prevent the spread of contamination.

(4) Bn Chemical Officer/NCO will coordinate for decon assets.

(5) **Due to the shortage of water assets in the division area, units must expect and prepare to conduct operator spraydown and individual wipedown as their primary and possibly only means of decon. This will be conducted by the use of the M11/M13 DAP's and M258 individual decon kits. Additionally be prepared to employ a mixture of STB and SAND/SOIL on grossly contaminated vehicles. Remember do not use DS2 on the internal components of vehicles, only M258 kits will be used to decon those I.e. turret systems of the M2A2.**

4. SERVICE SUPPORT. See Service Support Annex.

a. Resupply points for all classes of supply will be located upwind of hasty decon sites.

b. Medical evacuation of contaminated casualties will be IAW with medical platoon SOP's.

5. COMMAND and SIGNAL.

a. Command.

(1) Bn. Chemical Officer will travel with the TOC.

(2) All NBC reports will be sent with FLASH precedence.

b. Signal. See Basic OPORD.

Acknowledge.

Official:

SMITH

SOEBBING
CHEMO

LTC

280600 MARCH 91

IGFC DESTRUCTION



TF 1-7

051000 MAR 91

1ST BDE, 1AD AFTER ACTION REVIEW

1. Things We Did Well:

a. The Bde and internal TF's moved well together.
b. The Bde showed agility and flexibility in response to the factors of METT-T.
c. The command and control system worked well.
d. Maintenance operations allowed the Bde to sustain an outstanding operational readiness rate.
e. Discipline throughout the Bde was outstanding.
f. Rehearsals (Pre-LD training) paid big dividends.
g. Battle Drills during maneuver worked well.
h. CSS worked well on the move. (to include area support)
i. Soldiers showed initiative during combat operations.
j. Casualty reporting worked well.
k. The Bde had a clear picture of intelligence at LD.
l. Cross-talk worked well among commanders at all levels.
m. The Counterfire structure was extremely effective.
n. The Bde pulled together as a team. SLICE integration process went smoothly.
o. The Bde used Air Force assets wisely. If you don't need them don't use them!
p. Bde TOC operated well on the move. The TOC was able to maintain communications and pass timely information during movement.
q. Commo worked well throughout the formation and with flank units.
r. Soldiers were the number 1 factor in success.
s. Night operations and marking system proved effective.
t. The following equipment worked well: HEMMT, HUMMWV, BFV, M1A1, MLRS, ACE, M109, FASTV, and navigational aids.

2. Things We Did Poorly:

a. Clearing Support Fires took to much time.
b. Intelligence picture was vague after crossing the LD. 4th Bde was not used effectively to gather intelligence.
c. Flank coordination on the left flank was difficult to maintain.
d. Engineer MTOE needs more radios to support operations.
e. Engineers need a better system for marking danger areas.
f. Attack helicopter coordination was weak. Helicopter movement interfered with indirect fires.
g. Support BN MTOE is broken. Organic vehicles cannot maneuver on the terrain effectively. Support BN also needs additional radios for command and control.
h. Casualty evacuation was extremely slow and tracking wounded soldiers was difficult.
i. EPW processing was slow and hampered maneuver.
j. Control measures on the move were unorganized and confusing. (i.e. boundaries)

TAB C

k. The following equipment worked poorly:

(1) M88s must go away. They had multiple maintenance problems and could not recover vehicles effectively.

(2) M113A2 is outdated.

(3) Optics must be improved on the M2/3 and M1A1, especially at night.

(4) BFV's need an air compressor to blow out V-Packs.

(5) Need better water hauling capability.

(6) GEMMS and MICLIC must be improved.

(7) Vulcan's are obsolete.

l. DISCOM never produced a CSS overlay.

m. CORPS logistic system was weak. No 'Push', Area Support, 175 BDE.

n. FISTV is limited in offensive operations.

o. There was a shortage of NBC supplies and maintenance.

p. The ALO is not configured properly. (i.e. soft skin vehicles forward)

q. Heavy Engineer equipment arrived late in country.

r. TOCs are configured for defensive operations. TOCs must be restructured for mobile operation.

s. Exploitation of captured personnel and equipment must be expedited.

t. Maps must accurately depict terrain.

u. Individual life support must be improved. (i.e. field sanitation and tentage)

v. MTOE issues must be relooked. (i.e. 1SG and Infantry XO vehicle)

3. Battlefield Operating Systems Lessons Learned.

a. Intelligence.

(1) Weather is important.

(2) Close in information is more important than the big picture.

(3) Interrogators must be forward to process information.

(4) S2 and S3 belong together in the TOC.

(5) Detailed terrain information is critical.

(6) Need better maps.

b. Command, Control, and Communications.

(1) BN level units need reproduction capability.

(2) Too many graphic control measures.

(3) The Division needs top driven consistent methodology for graphic control measures.

(4) Inter-Division flank coordination is critical.

(5) Markings and signals must be effective and consistent.

(6) Cartoons are useful in explaining concepts.

(7) Echelonment of C2 (Bde and above) worked well. RETRANS plan is critical.

(8) Brick radios are useful in Logistical Operations. (especially in the field trains)

(9) BC/TC must be up and controlling movement with Binos.

(10) Navigational aids are vital.

(11) Campaign planning and operational maneuver was extremely successful.

(12) Deception worked well.

(13) Log/Support elements must have sufficient radios.

(14) Effective use of warning orders will better prepare units for upcoming operations.

(15) Training to a tougher enemy and situation will result in greater force flexibility.

(16) Army needs C2 vehicles. (2IC, 1SG Vehicle)

(17) Every time DTAC sets signal platoons must establish long local.

(18) There was too much junk on the Division CMD Net.

(19) The Bde needs radio repair capability forward. (possibly at the TAC)

c. Maneuver.

(1) Units must be judicious in the use of thermals in order to avoid burning them out.

(2) Hand held laser range finders are useful. Vehicles need common power outlets for these items.

(3) The Bde and TF formations work. Basic drills off of these formations also work well.

(4) Rehearsals are critical to maneuver.

(5) Long range weapon advantage proved valuable. Stand off is key.

(6) Movement security is vital for force protection.

(7) Do not forget fire and maneuver! This environment facilitated more centralized maneuver. Future battlefields may require more decentralized maneuver.

(8) CAV trains positioning often hampered the movement of the lead TF.

(9) Division CAV not properly organized to accomplish the mission. Need tanks in the Division Cavalry organization.

(10) ACES facilitated maneuver in rough terrain. (BSA needs them)

(11) Navigational aids are invaluable. (Magellan or Air Force type GPS works well)

(12) EPW processing degraded maneuver.

d. Fire Support.

(1) Clearing mortar fires took a long time.

(2) Fire support systems are not engineered to support rapid movement.

(3) Deep fires facilitated successful maneuver.

(4) Equipment is not sufficient to support FSOs.

(5) Control measures for attack helicopters were lacking. (fire boxes and routes) The 4th Bde LNO package never showed.

(6) Artillery systems need more range in the offense.

(7) Attack helicopter face to face coordination never happened.

(8) Aviation LOCs were too long to facilitate cross talk.

(10) The last morning prep was real good!
(11) Integration of the Air Force in the rapid close in fight is difficult. A2C2 is broken.
(12) Avoidance of fratricide slowed the fire support system.
(13) Strobe lights wo.. well. CAS slows down the close-in fight.
(14) Close fires must be observed.
(15) Do not learn the wrong lesson from ineffectiveness of enemy artillery.
(16) Positioning of artillery in the Bde maneuver formation worked well.
(17) Counter-battery fire was effective.

e. ADA.

(1) Stinger Teams need armored vehicles.
(2) VULCAN's are obsolete.
(3) Do not take wrong lesson from Air superiority.
(4) Early warning net?

f. M/CM/S.

(1) Command/support relationships must be worked out. TFs need additional assets to support the engineer slice. (i.e. class I, III, water)
(2) MSRs must be constructed to support elements down to TF level.
(3) ACE and SEE's are good pieces of equipment.
(4) Battlefield clearance must be planned and rehearsed.
(5) Marking on the move needs work.
(6) Put SEEs in the maneuver BN structure. The SEE is a valuable piece of machinery for life support.
(7) Engineer equipment is old, unreliable and slow.
(8) Mine plows did not hamper maneuver.
(9) Carrier for rollers is inadequate.
(10) TF's need mine detection capability.
(11) Mine roller are not useable in a hasty breach due to mounting time.
(12) ERI (Engineer Realignment Initiative) is good.

g. Combat Service Support.

(1) Fuel was the long pole in the tent.
(2) Culminating point is driven by logistics.
(3) Water capacity is critical.
(4) Echelonment of the BSA would provide more effective support.
(5) HEMMTS are the way to go. Support units need reliable vehicles to handle the terrain.
(6) 'Push' supplies concept did not work. LOGPACs were too late.
(7) Key maintenance bullets:
(a) Innovation played an important role.
(b) Fix forward concept is important for quick turn around and less strain on recovery assets.

(c) Don't expect parts through the system.
(d) Crew maintenance is vital.
(e) All replaceable components must be well forward. (i.e. LRU's at the TF's)
(8) A/L nets must be green.
(9) Division A/L net did not work.
(10) Casualty evacuation is broken. Took to long to respond.
(11) Personnel and administration support problems:
(a) Awards System
(b) Finance (Finance/Savings accounts)
(c) Orders and promotions
(d) Mail and newspapers
(e) Strength reporting - pure vs. task organized
(12) Combat equipment performed magnificently.
(13) Logistics drive just before LD helped.

e. Silver Bullets.

(1) The army must have new recovery vehicles. The army must develop a new system that is durable and more reliable to replace the M88. Also replace the M113A2.
(2) Individual soldier life support must be improved.
(3) The army needs additional C2 vehicles. (i.e. 1SG and Bradley Company XO)
(4) Navigational aids are crucial. The Magellan and Air Force type GPS are great. Drivers also need a compass. (digital if possible)
(5) Proliferate mobile, reliable logistical vehicles.
(6) Family of radios must be relooked. Radios need greater distance and reliability. The distribution system must also be reviewed.
(7) Fix the combat personnel system.
(8) Continue and enhance the Combat Training Centers!
(9) The Division CAV squadron needs tanks.

E MANEUVER FORMATION
pen Terrain - Good Visibility)



Deployment and In-Theater Preparation After Action Report

The following lessons were learned during deployment to Saudi Arabia and during preparation for combat. The lessons are divided into the battlefield operating systems.

DEPLOYMENT

1. Intelligence.

a. The S2 augmentees arrived late thus taking longer to adjust to the system.

b. Our initial map issue arrived late thus slowing down the planning process.

c. There was no clear guidance on classified transport and destruction.

d. The Bde started receiving INTSUM's late. These summaries were reproductions of the 18th ASC INTSUMs. There was little analysis or focus on our area of operation.

e. OPSEC is critical during pre-deployment. The Bde needs more secure telephones and FAX capability. (especially in logistics channels)

2. Command and Control.

a. The distance between the Bde headquarters and 1 AD headquarters created communications problems initially. The Bde was forced to rely on courier, STU-III, and secure FAX for orders and messages. This often created a time lag.

b. The Bde was forced to respond to two division headquarters initially. A key issue is determining an attachment day and sticking with it. This affects training and deployment.

c. S1 and S4 were required to report the same information through different reports. This was often confusing.

d. Training ammunition became an issue. A plan needs to be developed to allocate training ammunition for go to war preparation or possibly an authorization to fire a portion of service ammo.

e. There was a conflict between computer software. All headquarters need a common word processing language.

f. The Bde was forced to consolidate and develop an SOP/TACSOP shortly before deployment. This caused some internal confusion but was necessary.

g. SIMNET is a valuable tool for preparing SM for maneuver.

h. Fixed marking systems, manufactured on to the vehicles would be helpful. This system should also give a thermal signature

3. Maneuver. The 5de move from Ready Kaserne to the airfield went smoothly. Upon arrival in Saudi Arabia the bus transportation to the ISA was not controlled properly. Certain buses became misoriented. There needs to be positive control on in theater transportation.

4. Combat Service Support.

a. The TACCS computer software and data base needs work. A key problem is attachments vs assigned.

b. Personnel Issues.

(1) Late fillers became difficult to process.

(2) Fighting two MTOEs became confusing.

(3) The 5de had a problem recalling soldiers from schools in time for deployment.

c. There was confusion in requisitioning procedures. This confusion was between what to local purchase and what to get through official channels.

d. MILVANS became an important issue. Late shipment and arrival degraded combat effectiveness. There was also a major problem in tracking them in theater.

e. Transfer of the property book to 1 AD was a problem.

f. Identifying chemical equipment shortages was an issue. Shortage counts provided by property book holders and NBC personnel never matched. Due to shortages and certain equipment being shipped in MILVANS, the NBC officer was forced to acquire large quantities of equipment.

g. There was confusing information between reference deployment regulations and guidance.

ISA TO AO

1. Intelligence.

a. While in the ISA the 5de was in an intel vacuum.

b. Maps were not available and the distribution plan was unclear.

c. Weather forecasting was not accurate and did not reflect our area of operation.

d. Initially the intel focus was to broad rather than focusing on our area.

2. Command and Control.

a. The training areas and ranges were not properly controlled. Range times often conflicted between units.

b. Training ammunition for the ranges was an issue. In the future we need to plan for in theater training ammunition or authorize the use of service ammo.

c. Task organization must be done early to allow for a smooth slice integration.

d. The availability and distribution of navigational aids is important in desert operations.

3. Maneuver. Maneuver lessons learned are covered in the combat AAR.

4. Combat Service Support

a. The postal service was unorganized.

b. PSC issues: orders, boards, information flow, red cross messages, and replacements.

c. Finance capabilities were degraded and not responsive.

d. The medical evacuation and tracking system did not work properly.

e. Mobile support activities were not adequate. There were not enough mobile PXs and MWR activities.

f. EMAIL and desert FAX did not slow down.

g. Newspaper distribution did not flow properly.

h. The telephone system was good but more phones were needed.

i. The courier system was sporadic.

j. The G1 did not issue additional guidance on personnel issues.

k. Maps were not always available and when given they were not properly documented.

l. DLA vs LOGCAP caused problems. PSB was not in the flow of the DLA.

m. Equipment tracking was difficult in theater.

n. There was a lack of NBC equipment and repair in theater.

o. The disposition of unserviceable equipment is unclear.

p. PSO Team chief was not versed on property disposition which resulted in changing guidance too often.

q. The support battalion supply company is not properly manned to handle the required distribution of supplies.

r. The guidelines for cannibalization of equipment is inadequate.

s. There was an overall lack of supplies.

5. Miscellaneous.

a. All BNs must have copy capability.

b. There was lag time between information and execution from SUPCOM and below.

c. Fuel HUMMT tanks should be compartmentalized to avoid catastrophic loss when hit by small amounts of shrapnel.

d. All trucks should have the updatic passive drivers night sight rather than an infrared sight.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT
THE

VALOROUS UNIT AWARD

HAS BEEN AWARDED TO THE

3D BRIGADE, 3D INFANTRY DIVISION

FOR
EXTRAORDINARY HEROISM IN MILITARY
OPERATIONS AGAINST AN ARMED ENEMY.

FROM 24 FEBRUARY 1991 TO 28 FEBRUARY 1991

GIVEN UNDER MY HAND IN THE CITY OF WASHINGTON
THIS 4TH DAY OF MARCH 19 91

w. j. w. Clause

SECRETARY OF THE ARMY

TAB D

By direction of the Secretary of the Army, the Valorous Unit Award is awarded to:

3D BRIGADE, 3D INFANTRY DIVISION

for extraordinary heroism in ground combat during Operation Desert Storm:

The 3d "Phantom" Brigade, 3d Infantry Division distinguished itself as the Advanced Guard Brigade of the 1st Armored Division during offensive operations against the Iraqi Republican Guard Forces Command (RGFC) during Operation Desert Storm from 24 to 28 February 1991. As an attached Brigade consisting of 1/7th Infantry, 4/7th Infantry, 4/66th Armor, 1/1st Cavalry, 2/41st Field Artillery, 16th Engineer Battalion, and 26th Forward Support Battalion, the 3d Brigade led the 1st Armored Division and VII Corps' main attack against the RGFC. On 25 February, the Brigade conducted a 113km movement to contact to destroy elements of the 26th Infantry Division resulting in the capture of 299 Enemy Prisoners of War (EPW's). On February 26, the Brigade was ordered to attack east to gain contact with and destroy the RGFC in zone. The 3d Brigade began an aggressive and continuous movement to contact which covered 74km in 12 1/2 hours, while fighting multiple engagements throughout the day and night with elements of the 52d, 17th, Adnan, and Tawakalna Divisions. During one engagement with the Tawakalna Division the Brigade destroyed 27 Soviet T-72's which had established a hasty defense to cover the Iraqi forces withdrawing from the Kuwaiti Theater of Operation. On 27 February, the 3d Brigade was ordered to transition to pursuit operations to establish contact with and destroy the RGFC forces in zone. As the Brigade attacked and fought through the Adnan Division, securing a RGFC major logistics base, it captured 465 EPW's and made contact with the Medinah Armored Division, which was augmented by elements of four other Iraqi divisions. A fierce battle ensued culminating in the destruction of 82 tanks, 31 Armored Personnel Carriers, 11 artillery pieces, 48 trucks, 3 AAA guns and captured 72 EPW's with the loss of only 2 Bradley Cavalry vehicles, 30 WIA's and 1 KIA. Through their demonstrated tenacity, Esprit de Corps, and courageous professionalism, the units of the 3d "Phantom" Brigade have brought great credit upon themselves, the 3d Infantry Division and the United States Army.



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters, United States Army Forces Central Command
Fort McPherson, Georgia 30330-7000

PERMANENT ORDERS 33-1 3 March 1992

HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS COMPANY, 3D BRIGADE, 3D INFANTRY DIVISION (WAEKAA), APO NEW YORK 09162
HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS COMPANY, 1ST BRIGADE, 1ST ARMORED DIVISION (WAHDAA)
1ST/7TH INFANTRY BATTALION (MECHANIZED) (WAMWAA)
4TH/7TH INFANTRY BATTALION (MECHANIZED) (WAMUAA)
4TH/66TH ARMORED BATTALION (TANK) (WDRKAA)
2D/41ST FIELD ARTILLERY BATTALION (WAM6AA)
26TH FORWARD SUPPORT BATTALION (WAM6AA)
16TH ENGINEER BATTALION (WAC8AA)

Announcement is made of the following award.

Award: Valorous Unit Award
Date(s) or period of service: 24 February 1991 - 28 February 1991
Authority: Paragraph 9-15, AR 672-5-1
Reason: For exceptionally meritorious service as the Advanced Guard Brigade of the 1st Armored Division during offensive operations against the Iraqi Republican Guard Forces Command (RGFC) during Operation Desert Storm from 24 to 28 February 1991. As an attached Brigade consisting of 1/7th Infantry, 4/7th Infantry, 4/66th Armor, 1/1st Cavalry, 2/41st Field Artillery, 16th Engineer Battalion, and 26th Forward Support Battalion, the 3d Brigade led the 1st Armored Division and VII Corps' main attack against the RGFC. On 25 February, the Brigade conducted a 113km movement to contact to destroy elements of the 26th Infantry Division resulting in the capture of 299 Enemy Prisoners of War (EPW's). On February 26, the Brigade was ordered to attack east to gain contact with and destroy the RGFC in zone. The 3d Brigade began an aggressive and continuous movement to contact which covered 74km in 12 1/2 hours, while fighting multiple engagements throughout the day and night with elements of the 52d, 17th, Adnan, and Tawakalna Divisions. During one engagement with the Tawakalna Division the Brigade destroyed 27 Soviet T-72's which had established a hasty defense to cover the Iraqi forces withdrawing from the Kuwaiti Theater of Operation. On 27 February, the 3d Brigade was ordered to transition to pursuit operations to establish contact with and destroy the RGFC forces in zone. As the Brigade attacked and fought through the Adnan Division, securing a RGFC major logistics base, it captured 465 EPW's and made contact with the Medinah Armored Division, which was augmented by elements of four other Iraqi divisions. A fierce battle ensued culminating in the destruction of 82 tanks, 31 Armored Personnel Carriers, 11 artillery pieces, 48 trucks, 3 AAA guns and captured 72 EPW's with the loss of only 2 Bradley Cavalry vehicles, 30 WIA's and 1 KIA. Through their demonstrated tenacity, Esprit de Corps, and courageous professionalism, the units of the 3d "Phantom" Brigade have brought great credit upon themselves, the 3d Infantry Division and the United States Army.
Format: 320

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FOR THE COMMANDER:



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1LT, AG
Chief, Awards Branch

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