Desert Storm -- JFACC Problems Associated With Battlefield Preparation
Abstract
This paper was based on the personal experiences of the author as Special Assistant to CENTAF Director of Campaign Plans, Brigadier General Buster Glosson. The paper examines the joint force air component commander (JFACC) objectives and problems that occurred during DESERT STORM. For example, Phase I, the Strategic Air Campaign, was never successfully completed primarily because of premature acceleration of Phase III, Battlefield Preparation. Having 50 percent of the Marine air withheld from JFACC's control only exacerbated the strategic bombing problem. Another problem was battle damage assessment (BDA). BDA rules defining a tank kill were not standardized and became more restrictive as G-Day approached. This was a problem that had to be resolved in order to insure significant numbers of Iraqi tanks, armored personnel carriers, and artillery were destroyed prior to the onset of ground operations. Finally, this paper addresses some of Army's complaints with the JFACC. Corps commanders wanted to be given a set number of daily sorties and claimed that the JFACC ignored corps inputs. This was understandable for two reasons. There was a lack of timely intelligence available to the corps and the corps commanders were not aware of many CINC constraints placed upon the JFACC.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Apr 15, 1993
- Accession Number
- ADA264043
Entities
People
- Richard B. Lewis
Organizations
- United States Army War College