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NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
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SEVEN LOGISTICS IMPERATIVES OF

'...FROM THE SEA'

by


Joseph D. Cassel, Jr.

United States Marine Corps


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ABSTRACT

"...From the Sea", the Navy and Marine Corps vision statement published in 1992, is examined from an operational logistics perspective. The four conditions that will shape the context of logistics challenges are increased demand for use of naval expeditionary forces, defense cutbacks, fewer forward logistics bases and the need to support multiple geographic CINCs or JTFs.

To evaluate the goals of operational logistics two effectiveness measures are developed. RESPONSIVENESS measures whether logistics can support a wide range and scope of operations. REACH measures the where, when and duration of sustainment.

Seven logistics imperatives are proposed to focus attention on vital command and staff planning matters. The fusion of intelligence, CINC staff and liaison team logistic data must form the planning basis. The precise tailoring of embarked assets will ensure the relevance of self-contained forces. Two additional imperatives stress the need for new forward bases and power projection infrastructure. Realistic training must occur to guarantee confidence between combat and logistic forces and to isolate shortfalls. The professional development of operational logistics leaders and planners must continue and, finally, seamless staff integration between naval expeditionary and CINC joint staffs is vital to best exploit the joint use of scarce logistics resources.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

A Military, Naval, Littoral War, when wisely prepared and discreetly conducted, is a terrible Sort of War. Happy for that People who are Sovereigns enough of the Sea to put it in Execution! For it comes like Thunder and lightning to fume unprepared Part of the World.

-Thomas More Molyneux, Conjunct Expeditions, 1759¹

'...From The Sea' sets forth a combined vision for the Navy and Marine Corps in an uncertain future amid defense spending cutbacks and the prospects for new security challenges and military roles. The shift from blue water warfighting on the sea to brown water operations in or near foreign littoral areas constitutes a central paradigm change for the Naval Services.² There is therefore a need to explore the logistics ramifications of this sea change.

This paper will examine naval expeditionary forces in forward presence and crisis response roles supporting a geographic commander-in-chief (CINC) or joint task force (JTF) commander from an operational logistics perspective. Beyond the scope of this paper are the logistics aspects of strategic deterrence, reconstitution and acquisition.

Recent operations such as Desert Shield/Storm/Sortie (ODS), Provide Comfort, Fiery Vigil (Mt. Pinatubo evacuation of the Philippines) and Restore Hope demonstrate that joint and combined operations have become the rule, not the exception. To be relevant, therefore, the Naval Services must stipulate and

clarify the specific contributions they can make in joint operations to achieve national objectives. Operational logistics will play an important role. Thus the thesis:

Littoral warfare poses critical logistics challenges to naval expeditionary forces serving in either an independent, unilateral role or in an enabling role for the introduction of joint follow-on forces.

To analyze and prove this thesis three main chapters are offered. The naval strategic and operational context is first examined to highlight the circumstances and conditions that will shape the operational logistics effort.

Then, two effectiveness measures are proposed as conceptual prisms to evaluate operational logistics in support of naval forces and national aims. Most often logistics literature is either too vague for functional logistic utility, or of such technical minutiae that it's hard to connect logistics with operational reality. This chapter tries to fill the conceptual void that lies between strategic thinkers and bean counters.

Finally, as promised in the title, seven logistic imperatives will be asserted. Each provides an aiming point for command attention and the staff planning effort to ensure that naval expeditionary forces indeed provide maximum effectiveness from the sea.

CHAPTER II

STRATEGIC CONTEXT

The Navy is always at war, because it is always fighting winds and waves and fog. The Navy is ready for an instant blow...The ocean is limitless and unobstructed; and the fleet, each ship manned, gunned, and provisioned and fuelled, ready to fight within five minutes.

-Sir John Fisher: Memories, 1919³

The National Military Strategy mandates that the Services will provide forces with a regional focus to meet adaptive planning contingencies.⁴ Four critical conditions will shape the strategic and operational context of the near future and thus have significant logistical ramifications.

Strategic Ends and Logistics Missions May Increase

U.S. overseas interests, alliance commitments, and collective security arrangements show little prospect to diminish in the near future. Despite the decreased threat of Soviet aggression, the requirement for U.S. naval action is on the rise, as demonstrated since 1990:

* Combat power projection in a hot war with Iraq in 1991; as of February 1993 naval forces still loiter in an economic blockade against Iraq, and naval air power projects metered surveillance or strike responses to enforce United Nations (U.N.) sanctions.

* Noncombatant evacuations missions in Liberia, Somalia and the Philippines.

* Assistance projection in the form of humanitarian or disaster relief missions in Bangladesh, Florida, Hawaii, Guam, and Somalia.

It must be emphasized that each mission required a substantial logistic effort and each depended in part upon naval expeditionary forces or strategic sealift in joint operations. As '...From The Sea' asserts, naval expeditionary forces can respond swiftly to far away crises, rapidly build power ashore, and sustain operations without approval of transit or overflight rights.

The need for these types of missions may increase in the near future. President Clinton has clearly and publicly stated that U.S. interests are enduring.⁵ In fact his key advisors, such as Defense Secretary Les Aspin, have suggested increased use of military forces in peacetime contingency operations in Bosnia, as well as peacekeeping operations to support U.N. efforts.⁶

The projection of presence, power, or assistance with naval expeditionary forces may expand for two reasons. First, the self-containment comparative advantage that maritime forces have over continental or aerospace forces are conducive to operations far from the U.S. Operations can be conducted without entangling alliances or base agreements and, furthermore, responses can be precisely tailored and metered based on the political will to send diplomatic, economic or military signals.

Next, looking at the bigger picture, the U.S. may be called upon to provide logistic and support forces for U.N. sponsored interventions while combat forces are provided by other na-

tions.⁷ Many nations have combat units and advanced weapons systems, but only the U.S. has the mobility and logistics wherewithal to project operations around the world, a substantial advantage compared to other nations.

Less Military Means, Greater Expected Flexibility

Despite the aforementioned potential for increased demand in the use of naval forces, U.S. domestic and budgetary pressures dictate that the naval forces will get much smaller. For example, the Navy's ship strength could be cut to 320,⁸ and the Marine Corps will cut back by nearly 30,000 personnel.⁹ Despite the sincere desire to do more with less, U.S. naval forces will do less with less, but with the same high public expectation of positive results accrued with recent military successes.

As a signal of things to come, the character and shape of forward deployed naval forces has changed. In the Mediterranean Sea amphibious assault ships with embarked AV-8B Harriers have been used in sea control missions.¹⁰ Last year, Fifteenth Special Purpose Marine Air Ground Task Force (SPMAGTF) sailed with less than 60% of the customary amphibious lift, but was detailed a Maritime Prepositioned Ship (MPS) to fulfill CINCCENT's need for a MEU(SOC) capability. It was then used as the lead force in Operation Restore Hope.¹¹ In March 1993, another unique SPMAGTF, consisting of a command element, an aviation component and a reinforced rifle company, will deploy aboard the aircraft carrier U.S.S. Theodore Roosevelt to fulfill raid and evacuation

missions for CINCEUR.^{12, 13} Budgetary necessity appears to be the mother of naval operational invention.

Even though a full range of naval force requirements remain, the confusion wrought by change coupled with a concomitant decrease in personnel, ships and resources will make logistics even more challenging and difficult.

Fewer Forward Bases to Project Combat or Logistics Power

As part of the expected defense drawdown and changing world security environment the U.S. will have fewer bases to stage or move forces and logistics overseas for military commitments.

Some overseas bases have already been closed and several more will disappear in the next few years. For example, the loss of Republic of Philippines naval and air bases means the U.S. forgoes 1.1 million square feet of storage space, a port handling capacity of 25 containers per hour, 2.3 million barrels of fuel storage, an 840 foot deep draft pier, 12 thousand acres of ammunition storage and the loss of a 9000 foot runway airfield that supported 18,000 takeoffs and landings annually.¹⁴ Losses of bases in the SOUTHCOM and EUCOM theater are expected as well.

Although naval forces have significant ability to loiter and sustain themselves they cannot do so forever, and thus need forward logistic bases for global projection.¹⁵ Therefore, the loss of these bases, or 'power projection or sustainment platforms' if you will, will have manifold logistic consequences.

The first and most obvious is the ability to cost effectively support Navy ships themselves. The loss of the Philippines bases not only extends support distances in the CINCPAC area of responsibility (AOR), but severely threatens logistics overstretch in the CINCCENT AOR as well. And the loss of other forward U.S. Air Force bases may reduce a critical source of lift and throughput to fill critical spares and logistics requirements for forward deployed naval forces.

The second consequence of having fewer forward bases is an increased reliance upon naval expeditionary forces to establish lodgements in littorals to enable and facilitate the deployment and buildup of joint follow-on forces, a central tenet of "...From The Sea". Logistically, this means more dependence on planning data for littoral environmental conditions, power projection infrastructure and local support agreements. Planning considerations differ greatly from the near ideal ports, airfields and transfer facilities of Saudi Arabia to the austere, desolate conditions in Somalia. All of these factors impose logistics complications.

Finally, fewer forward bases implies an increased dependence on merchant marine lift for a sizeable surge build-up of power or sustainment. In ODS, under the aegis of U.N. sanctions and a cooperative worldwide coalition, over ninety five percent of the military and sustainment tonnage that was moved to the CINCCENT theater was moved by sea.¹⁶ In recognition of this dependence, "...From the Sea" embraces sealift as an enduring mission of the

Navy as the key to force sustainment for joint operations.¹⁷ Despite this fact, the U.S. flagged merchant marine is likely to evaporate soon unless the U.S. government provides major subsidies or regulation reform, which is unlikely.¹⁸ Should the U.S. desire to act unilaterally in the future, then its lack of a flagged merchant ships may indeed demonstrate an attempt to traverse a maritime bridge too far. The uncertainty of sealift will continue to be a problematic wildcard for logistics planners.

Cutbacks of U.S. forward deployed land forces combined with the loss of bases will mean increased reliance on forward deployed naval forces, but again, with a concomitant decrease in the capacity to support forces at sea. The uncertainty of planning assumptions and sealift capacity will also complicate logistics support.

Same Naval Forces Must Support Multiple CINCs

Another important logistics implication of defense cutbacks is that naval expeditionary forces may be assigned or put on a tether to support more than one CINCs. For example, permanent amphibious forces have been on station in the EUCOM and PACOM AORs for decades, but there is now an additional requirement for these forces in the CINCCENT AOR. This requirement has been met by the sharing or tethering of forces to support the different CINCs. Forward deployed forces now must have the inherent flexi-

bility to support any CINC. The logistic ramifications of doing so are subtle, but are significant nonetheless.

Environmental operating conditions differ drastically between CINC AORs, which of course alters demand for different logistic support items. On a recent six month deployment, for example, one naval expeditionary force was assigned training missions ranging from a late summer field exercise in 135 degree heat in CINCCENT AOR to an early winter field exercise in the chills of South Korea in the CINCPAC AOR. Ships may be self-contained for basic needs, but space and storage limitations usually preclude the embarkation of supplies and equipment for all environments.

The proliferation of detailed logistics choices to be made in the provision of individual clothing and equipment (mosquito nets or snow-shoes?), lubricants, spares, and medical supplies (more MAALOX for logisticians?) make such endeavors interesting if not enjoyable.

The tethering of naval expeditionary forces makes sense operationally by finding innovative ways to support multiple CINCs, but these robust changes wreck havoc upon the means and methods of logistics support. While naval force commitments may increase in an even wider domain of CINC operating theaters and environmental conditions, the reduction of naval means and forward logistics bases will make the accomplishment of those missions more risky. New logistics concepts and methods must be found to meet these challenges.

CHAPTER III

LOGISTICS MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS

If a man does not know to what port he is steering, no wind is favorable.

-Seneca, 4 B.C. - 65 A.D.¹⁹

If you don't know where you're going you may end up somewhere else.

-Casey Stengel, Manager, New York Yankees, 1961

The first reason to discuss effectiveness measures is, of course, to heed the warnings of prophets such as Seneca and Stengel, but the need to do so goes deeper. Just as war planners search for an enemy's center of gravity, so too must logisticians have targets to ensure that plans support the accomplishment of goals. The two metrics proposed here are RESPONSIVENESS and REACH, but some background information is needed because of the paucity of literature on the theory of operational logistics.

Logistics pervades each of the three levels of war: strategic, operational and tactical. At the strategic level, logistics encompasses national mobilization, acquisition and force structure development. Combat service support and technical functions dominate logistics at the tactical level and include the busy areas of maintenance, supply, food service, medical, transportation, and so on where effectiveness measures abound and most logisticians spend their careers. Operational logistics lies

somewhere in between, but its meaning is less clear. The basic military definition of logistics is:

The science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces. In its most comprehensive sense, those aspects of military operations which deal with: a. design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation, and disposition of materiel; b. movement, evacuation, and hospitalization of personnel; c. acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities; and, d. acquisition or furnishing of services.²⁰

Despite its comprehensiveness, this definition still lacks the necessary operational focus to clearly spell out the logistics aspects it will take to implement "...From The Sea".

In 1917, Colonel Thorpe, a Marine in search of the meaning of logistics, described logistics as "all that part of war which is not included in Strategy and Tactics".²¹ Over thirty years later, in his seminal work Command Logistics, Admiral Eccles argued that "logistics provides the means for the conduct of military operations".²² Both of these ideas mark a good starting point for the ensuing discussion.

Operational logistics makes the operational art possible by providing the means for military operations. Logistics dictates what operations will be possible, where and for how long. Further, the concept of agility that now permeates service doctrines on how to fight wars can be applied to logistics as well: the ability to shift the weight and momentum of logistics resources to meet the operational need. Logistics agility will be especially daunting and challenging in the sea and land areas of

littorals, thus a concept of operational logistics emerges that related directly to '...From The Sea'.

So in the area between strategy and tactics, the realm incidentally of CINCs and JTFs, lies the area of operational logistics that is concerned with:

- * procuring assets not provided by strategic logistics through host nation support, inter-service support agreements, the local economy or captured from the enemy;

- * managing limited resources to sustain the campaign, to include apportioning and rationing assets; and,

- * delivering assets for the length of campaign, throughout the breadth of theater using power projection infrastructure such as ports, airfields, lines of communications, transfer facilities, road and rail networks, barges, and so on.²³

Effectiveness measures should emphasize these areas.

Responsiveness measures operational flexibility, that is, whether or not logistics can support the wide range and scope of missions required of naval expeditionary forces. Responsiveness must account for the momentum, tempo and duration of operations as well. Operational logistics is responsive if the right forces with the right ranges of operational capability will be available in the right amount to be used simultaneously or in sequences by the CINC or JTF commander.

The responsiveness of naval expeditionary forces will be measured by the ability to operationally respond to all three kinds of projection (presence, power, and assistance) and to meet the mission needs of low intensity conflict, diplomatic signaling, sea control, amphibious raids, noncombatant evacuation,

humanitarian or disaster relief, peacemaking or peacekeeping, amphibious assault, rescue and so on.

Just as important as the initial responsiveness capability of naval expeditionary forces is the staying power and ability to build up forces. Thus, there is also a need for a measure to highlight the duration and sustainment of naval expeditionary operations.

Reach, an inherent strength of naval forces, determines the where, the when and the duration of operational sustainment. Pertaining to operational logistics, reach measures the ability to get to, loiter in and build up in littoral areas as well as the ability to reinforce and sustain naval forces in depth for the duration of a campaign or operation.

The initial projection of power, presence or assistance may gain a lodgement to create a maritime bridge to move assets into to the theater of operations or war, but it is the throughput across that maritime bridge that will determine the size and shape of joint follow-on forces and logistics. The notion of reach is therefore strategic because resources may come from U.S. or from other out of theater sources, but it is also operational because of the enabling of follow-on forces such as Air Force Tactical Fighter Wings, Army mechanized forces, and Marine Corps expeditionary forces to project power from land bases. Providing logistic agility for the CINC or JTF commander is essential. Force projection and sustainment in littoral areas will be a

function of the reach of naval expeditionary forces to enable and facilitate that effort.

So the fundamental question that must be answered to form logistics imperatives for "...From The Sea" is : what must be done to ensure that naval expeditionary forces have the requisite RESPONSIVENESS and REACH to accomplish the likely missions encompassed in forward presence and crisis response?

CHAPTER IV

SEVEN LOGISTICS IMPERATIVES

"The seas are no longer a self contained battlefield. Today they are a medium from which warfare is conducted. The oceans of the world are the base of operations from which navies project power onto land areas and targets...The mission of protecting sea-lanes continues in being, but the Navy's central missions have become to maximize its ability to project power from the sea over the land and to prevent the enemy from doing the same."

-Timothy Shea, Project Poseidon, February 1961²⁴

Seven logistics areas must be mastered to accomplish the responsiveness and reach to successfully implement "...From The Sea":

1. Logistic planning information must foster the precise selection, sequencing and application of resources to flexibly support operations.

Four dimensions must be considered. First, traditional naval intelligence resources must be reoriented from the high seas to the littorals. Logistic planning data can be derived from the enemy's order of battle, weather and environmental operating conditions, littoral hydrography, and medical threats. Even more important is the determination of existing power projection infrastructure such as beach, port and airfield throughput capacities, road networks, transfer facilities, power networks and so on. An ounce of good intelligence can save a ton of logistics.

The next vital dimension is to identify host nation support (HNS) agreements in place. These are tracked by the CINCs logistics staff, but have great relevance to naval staff planners. ODS provided an excellent example of how the development of a coalition coupled with a cornucopia of host nation support facilitated U.S. force projection and sustainment. Huge ports, airfields and staging areas coupled with Saudi Arabia's furnishment of food, water, fuel and line haul transport significantly diminished the strain on strategic lift. Naval expeditionary staffs must aggressively seek out this information for effective plans.

Failing host nation support availability, a search for local contracting sources or possible coalition support must occur. Liaison teams may be required to start from scratch to find and assemble this vital information. A good doctrinal example is the Marine Corps' Survey, Reconnaissance and Liaison Party which, by MPS doctrine, proceeds to a contingency littoral before the debarkation of MPS ships to determine support resources available.²⁵ This core competency, complete with doctrinal checklists, can be used and exploited by any form of naval expeditionary forces.

Fusion of the above disparate and sometimes conflicting data may be the most significant impediment to completing the logistics information puzzle. This effort will be confounded by the requirement to support multiple CINCs during the same deployment. Yet it is precisely this effective fusion of intelligence,

standing agreements with host nations and ad hoc liaison visits that will drive the decision-making for both the composition of naval expeditionary forces and logistics assets embarked to ensure operational flexibility and sustainment.

2. Naval forces must tailor the embarkation of logistics resources to accomplish the projection of presence, power and assistance.

This corollary to the first imperative focuses directly on the need for naval expeditionary forces to have the operational responsiveness to meet a wide array of missions. Since logistics makes forces expeditionary, it is vital to make the right decisions before deployment. Resources immediately available on ships will determine what littorals can and will be used, so the choice of what embark must be driven by accurate logistics planning information.

Naval expeditionary forces must have significant capability to move forces, equipment and materiel successfully from sea to land and back to sea in the littoral region, to achieve logistics agility. Assets such as amphibious ships for forcible entry; helicopters for air assaults or raids; landing craft and amphibious tractors to move forces ashore; mine clearing and naval surface support fires assets; and, operational level combat service support and throughput forces to rapidly build-up maximum combat power ashore from a base of zero. The composition of ship-to-shore assets is what provides logistics agility, and thus is vital to both the responsiveness and reach of the force.

3. New forward logistic bases and throughput points must be established at critical times and locations to facilitate and sustain power projection.

This imperative is essential to extend the reach of naval forces and is primarily an action item for CINC staffs. CINC staffs are tasked to develop political, economic, informational and military flexible deterrent options that may encompass bases and support agreements. Nevertheless, it is important that naval forces clearly identify, quantify and articulate the need for bases and throughput points in a theater.

The cutbacks in ships and forces discussed earlier may rule out that deploying forces can carry all of the resources needed for the projection of presence, power or assistance. Self-contained naval forces may deploy with less capability. So bases or staging points may be required to move assets by strategic lift, or otherwise increased risk of mission failure must be accepted.

The changing logistics dynamic in the CINCPAC AOR portends the future. The dependence upon ad hoc support arrangements in Singapore, Yokuska, and Guam instead of the Philippines may lessen the responsiveness and reach of naval forces in that AOR. Delays in order-ship times and increased transportation costs are two immediate impacts of lost bases. CINC planners will depend on naval expeditionary force planners to identify the real impact of base losses, in terms of responsiveness and reach, so new basing and staging arrangements can be tailored to meet legitimate needs.

4. Naval forces must renew emphasis on the overall logistic pipeline, especially force projection infrastructure.

No country in Sub-Saharan Africa, for example, has the inherent infrastructure provided to U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia during ODS. If forces beyond those forward deployed are needed for a regional contingency then the need for power projection infrastructure will be paramount. This includes ports or prepared beaches to facilitate the offload of prepositioned ships or logistics over the shore (LOTS), airfields and assembly areas for force reception, bulk liquid storage and transfer facilities and unique naval assets such as tenders, crane ships, floating dry docks and so on.

Naval expeditionary forces and embarked resources must be precisely chosen to connect with the littoral end of the logistics pipeline. Logistics planning must therefore center on the power projection infrastructure to rapidly introduce forces ashore, and then build operational jump-off points and vital staging and storage areas to receive, move inland and sustain forces ashore from the sea.

5. Training must be logistically realistic to develop confidence and identify shortfalls.

One underlying theme of this paper is that there is more to logistics than just technical or functional skills. To ensure that naval expeditionary forces are operationally responsive it is essential that logistics and combat service support readiness be tested and validated. New and innovative naval concepts may

generate or help identify logistic resource shortfalls. While this imperative may be expensive or appear unrealistic in this era of declining defense dollars, a failure in a regional contingency would cost more.

The "...From The Sea" vision of jointness will not come to fruition without the training to work out joint kinks, develop mutually supporting logistics, and gain widespread knowledge of constraints and shortfalls. Maybe naval forces can do more with less, or perhaps excessive duplication or redundancy does exist in the Services, and naval forces, with the inherent reach to get forces and materiels to key littorals, can meet the needs of other Services.

Regardless, with defense cutbacks looming, demonstrating the need for logistics support capabilities in exercises and training is the only intelligent way to develop logistic confidence in new operational concepts or pinpoint shortfalls.

6. Develop operational logistic leaders and planners who think purple and innovate.

Leadership is key to logistics, and career professionals must know the command and operational aspects of logistics as well as the functional and technical aspects. The Navy's program to develop operational logisticians and the Marine Corps' continued integration of combat service support officers into the operational mainstream is imperative.

In addition to command, joint and operational staff assignments the naval services should make it a priority to send

logisticians to intermediate and top level schools. This will develop operational logisticians with a feel for the operational art.

Leaders and staff planners are needed who understand logistics technical details and functional dilemmas, find innovative or ad hoc solutions to immediate operational problems, and clearly articulate the logistic structure needs for the future. Good results depend on well-trained, experienced and educated professionals. Investments in this area are a relatively inexpensive force multiplier to ensure logistic success.

7. Naval forces must foster close relationships to rapidly transfer knowledge and information with CINC and JTF staffs.

Naval expeditionary force staffs must anticipate, determine and communicate requirements to any supported CINC or JTF. Although the Services are responsible for the logistic support of the forces they provide, CINCs have directive authority of logistics in their geographic AORs.²⁶ Thus the blue-green Navy and Marine Corps team must think purple to be effective, because the joint use of logistics assets may be key to effective crisis responses.

CINCs have the authority to direct the Services to share logistics resources, so teamwork and the willingness to find creative solutions are essential in a joint arena. Correspondingly, derivative staff planning by the CINC or JTF based on the clearly communicated needs of naval forces will help ensure that infrastructure and logistics assets are provided, or that the mission

scope will be curtailed. Given the enormous complexity of operational and logistics plans, naval force staffs can significantly help focus CINC or JTF staffs to understand the requirements of presence, power or assistance projection. These reciprocal relationships must be nurtured to make the full responsiveness and reach capacities of naval expeditionary forces relevant to CINCs or JTFs.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

Whatever you do, you need courage. Whatever course you decide upon, there is always someone to tell you are wrong. There are always difficulties arising which tempt you to believe that your critics are right. To map out a course of action and follow it to an end, requires some of the same courage which a soldier needs. Peace has its victories, but it takes brave men to win them.

-Ralph Waldo Emerson²⁷

Criticism, adversity and ridicule may escort "...From The Sea" into the murky waters of the future, but this charted course must be taken to keep naval forces relevant. To assist in this endeavor this paper analyzed the operational logistics perspective of "...From The Sea" by: 1) highlighting the strategic context and environment in which operational logistics decisions must be made; 2) providing two conceptual markers, responsiveness and reach, to ensure that logistics is always integrated with operations; and 3) asserting seven essential areas where it is imperative that command and staff attention be devoted.

Intellectual honesty and forthrightness, though not cited as an imperative, may also pose a great logistics challenge to implementation of "...From The Sea". With the fabulous achievements of the U.S. military forces in the past four years, the public's expectation of military success will be high. As strategic ends increase and the naval means to accomplish those ends decrease it will be crucial that operational logisticians

develop innovative and cost-effective solutions to operational problems: or have the moral courage to straightforwardly assess and articulate the risks inherent to the accomplishment of naval missions from the sea.

NOTES

1. Thomas More Molyneux, quoted in Robert Debs Heinl, Jr., Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations, (Annapolis: U.S. Naval Institute, 1966), p. 11.
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