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THE CHANGING NATURE OF PEACE

by

Sandra F. Wilson

Major, USAF

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College, the Department of the Navy, or the Department of the Air Force.

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ABSTRACT of

THE CHANGING NATURE OF PEACE

As the nature of war changes, the conditions for the nature of peace may also change. Inherent in the changing nature of war and peace are implications for war termination, end state, and peace which present perplexing questions for national leaders and operational commanders alike. More specifically, as commanders plan for war, they must also take into consideration the conditions and plans for the peace anticipated. This aspect of operational planning historically, has been neglected as attention has been focused on preparing for and executing the battle.

This paper will consider the changing nature of peace through examination of Napoleon's 1812 invasion of and retreat from Moscow and the 1991 US-led campaign in the Gulf War. Lessons and recommendations will be drawn from analysis of war termination, end state, and peace aspects of these two cases. In addition, since it is becoming more apparent that operational commanders will have a key role in making recommendations for war termination, end state, and the peace of a campaign, it will be essential to build this aspect into future plans. These lessons and recommendations will further show the applicability for operational missions and planning considerations in the future. When it comes to war termination, the end state, and the peace envisioned, understanding this perspective will be as essential in planning and execution as the campaign itself.

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CHAPTER ONE

"You do not get peace by shouting 'Peace!'...
Peace is a meaningless word; what we need is
a glorious peace"1.
- Napoleon I

INTRODUCTION

All too often, from a historic perspective, forces have engaged in war for reasons that have been written about through the ages. However, often times, the outcomes of those engagements have not always resulted in the anticipated peace--"a glorious peace"2 as Napoleon intimated. In many regards, leaders attempted to link strategic objectives to a desired outcome by using military means. However, when those strategic objectives were unclear or vaguely stated for the military commander, the results were frequently disastrous. Unfortunately, the outcome, though often victorious at the tactical and operational levels, still failed to achieve the strategic result. It is at the operational level where planning for war termination, end state, and peace should also be concentrated for the future. Lessons and recommendations from two historic cases will illustrate why.

The Problem with Peace

Historians and policymakers through time have explored the issue of war termination, end state, and peace from different perspectives. Much of this exploration, however, has been studied at the strategic level, whereby a strategic objective or goal may or may not have been established, but the expectation was the military arm of government would be capable of achieving it. Yet, the commander gave little attention to the study of the end state beyond attainment of the military goal as he was satisfied that his role had been accomplished. Even when that goal was nebulous or unattainable through military means, the operational commander may not have given much attention to the end state his military condition was creating.

However, as will be examined, the military commander will have a more proactive, definitive role in planning, advising, and recommending actions on whether or not objectives achieved at his level have also produced the strategic result. Too, he will be faced with the question that even if the stated or tasked objective has been reached, is this the end state envisioned by national leaders? If not, what are other considerations or alternatives that would produce a more realistic or acceptable end state or peace beyond war termination?

For the purposes of this paper and analysis examined, the following definitions will be used in describing war termination, end state, and peace. All are very similar, yet, very different in their connotation. War termination is defined as cessation of fighting. The end state is the condition envisioned, achieved, and sustained once war termination begins. Peace is simply defined as the end state after war termination is declared.

Overview

This paper then, will consider the changing nature of peace as it relates to the changing nature of war. It will be considered in the context of two historical cases, one tragic in the end; the other, an overwhelming success; one occurring almost two hundred years ago; the other, only two years ago. Yet, both render valuable lessons for war termination, end state, and peace considerations. Lessons that are applicable today and for future missions as they evolve.

Chapter two will examine the implications for war termination, end state and peace through analysis of Napoleon's infamous march to and retreat from Moscow in 1812. It will consider the facts and ascertain lessons in relation to war termination, peace, and end state issues only. The lessons are gleaned from the problems Napoleon experienced as he attempted to achieve a certain end state. In turn, chapter three will review similar issues as

considered in chapter two but in terms of the more recent conflict--the Gulf War.

Further analysis will be provided in chapter four as lessons are drawn for war termination, end state, and peace issues from both the 1812 Moscow campaign and the 1991 Gulf War. Although both conflicts are very different in many respects, both offer significant considerations for today's operational commander as he plans for tomorrow's uncertain mission and its conclusion. This chapter will go on to explore the lessons from those historic cases and draw applicability to new and future missions challenging the operational commander. In turn, several recommendations will be suggested as planning and designing the anticipated peace will be as crucial as planning for battles and conflicts. Chapter five will look at potential counters to the analysis prescribed.

The concluding chapter will summarize the lessons and proposals examined in the two campaigns to demonstrate the increasing need for continued study, analysis, and planning at the operational level for the anticipated peace, the changing peace, the glorious peace3. For it will be critical to prepare the envisioned end state and peace long before forces are engaged.

CHAPTER TWO

Peace lies at Moscow!1

- Napoleon I

Napoleon Bonaparte, a name associated with the masters of the great art of war; though, in the same breath, synonymous with tragic defeat in his art. His craft--that of understanding and winning wars-- generated much success, changed a nation, a people, and a continent. He influenced the way war would forever be fought. Nevertheless, the craft he so earnestly pursued, created his ultimate downfall. Historians and curious observers since Napoleon's time have theorized and studied his life and craft to postulate answers to questions in order to learn from his genius as well as his mistakes.

Again, Napoleon and his craft will be used to draw lessons of value for today. In this case, the lessons for war termination, end state, and peace will be explored through Napoleon's 1812 march to and retreat from Moscow. This campaign and the resulting lessons will be examined in the context of the following questions. First, to consider what happened at the campaign's end, the question must be posed in terms of why Napoleon decided to go to Moscow to begin with, and what his objective was? Did he envision a certain end state or peace? Secondly, what were his plans once he decided to go,

and did he adjust those plans to the unfavorable conditions of the end state or objective? The third consideration is once Napoleon determined he had met disaster, did he have plans or alternatives to minimize the defeat? Fourth and foremost, what are the lessons gleaned from this case for planning the end of a conflict?

Napoleon's Changing Peace

When Napoleon decided at the end, Moscow was the object, it was because of an earlier resolve to "crush the tsar"2. This was, in part, retaliation for Tsar Alexander's withdrawal from the Continental System3. It has been suggested that "the object of Napoleon's invasion of Russia was not to conquer Russia, but to win Russia's friendship back and make it once more a satellite"4 Further, "Napoleon never meant to go to Moscow. He thought that once he said, 'I'm going to Moscow', the Russians would take fright and at once give way to what ever he wanted"5

Since he did go to Moscow, and with this objective in mind, how did he envision his end state, indeed, even if he did envision it at all? This question will be addressed shortly. Essentially, the plan for the object, Moscow, and the imminent disaster can be summarized as follows:

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"He intended a short, sharp war, such as most of his
wars had been in the past and carried with him
only three week's supplies...It was Napoleon's
principle to force decisive battle, but the
Russian Army simply melted away. It was his
principle to live on the country...but the
Russians destroyed as they retreated...it was his
principle always to outnumber the enemy at the
decisive spot; but the Grand Army had left so many
detachments along its line of march that at
Borodino the Russians outnumbered it...It was
Napoleon's principle to concentrate his artillery,
but here he scattered it instead, to throw in his
last reserves at the critical moment, but at
Borodino...he refused the risk of ordering the
Old Guard into action"6.

Although accustomed to winning and ultimate success,

Napoleon began to see signs of impending defeat. After the

Battle at Borodino, in private, he reflected, "I have beaten

them. I have beaten them. It means nothing?"7. Yet, he

marched on to Moscow failing to carefully reassess

alternatives to such a move, for the "Peace lies in Moscow!"8.

Borodino, however, would be an indicator of events to come in

Moscow, an enemy unwilling to fight at least in the framework

of his past battles and victories.

Napoleon did enter Moscow and once again discovered an

enemy still not abiding by the principles of war as he

envisioned.   The Russians deserted the city, burned all
potential resources for the French and refused to give
battle or even acknowledge Napoleon's call for victory.
Napoleon found himself having to mount a retreat in the
worst of conditions for winter helped to create a
ruinous withdrawal.   This returns to the question of
Napoleon's vision of his end state.

> "He thought he had foreseen everything: the bloody
> battle, a long stay in Moscow, a hard winter, perhaps
> a few reverses; but never had his fertile brain even
> dreamt of this happening--the old capital of Russia
> destroyed by the Russians themselves.   The operational base
> on which his plans and schemes depended had just been taken
> from him.   This other Eden that he had been promising his
> army for two months had gone up in smoke. How could they
> stay there?   How could they live like conquerors among the
> ashes?   The memory of other conquered capitals, where it had
> been so pleasant to linger, was too fresh for the army to
> accept a stay in Moscow"9.

Once Napoleon realized that tragedy was unfolding before
his army, did he have plans or alternatives to minimize the
defeat?   "For a whole month, or very near it, the vast
French army...was scattered in and around Moscow, with
conditions getting worse--Moscow burning..."10

Napoleon finally, acknowledged the victory, the end state,
the peace envisioned was not coming to fruition.   "He [then]
withdrew from Moscow.   And the retreat from Moscow, unlike
the advance, was a catastrophe"11. Then what is to be
ascertained from all of this?

The key aspects of this historical assessment are the

lessons that can be learned for war termination, end state, and peace issues. Several lessons come to the forefront. Indications are that Napoleon did envision an end state or peace. Yet, his visions of the "Peace [that] lies at Moscow"[12] was not what the Russians had in mind. The Russians had designed a different end state. Napoleon did not envision the enemy waging a different strategy for conducting war which resulted in a different peace. As the Russians believed "that the enemy's entry into Moscow [did] not mean the conquest of Russia"[13] and planned accordingly against Napoleon's vision of peace. The enemy, the Russians, had learned the principles of Napoleon's success and used them against him. They created an unforeseen end state and although war termination occurred when Napoleon reached Moscow, the end state, the peace he envisioned was not to be found or created. Therefore, one lesson of this event is that the end state envisioned must be planned in the context of how the enemy could also envision and counter the nature of the peace sought.

Another key consideration and lesson in determining the end state contemplated after war termination and peace, is the need to constantly reassess the desired end state. In particular, constant evaluation must be done in terms of how the campaign is being waged and the success and failure along the way. Napoleon had numerous indicators that this campaign was not

necessarily going as planned but did very little to adjust his desired objective, in the end, Moscow.

An even more significant lesson drawn from this case is that of reaching a desired end, yet, still not achieving the strategic result. Napoleon did reach and take Moscow, but it still did not result in the envisioned end state or peace. When he reached Moscow, his desired objective and end state, he expected the Tsar to capitulate and "He thought: Now I'm in Moscow, Alexander will send a message of surrender. No emissary came"14. Instead Napoleon was left with few alternatives, to wait for surrender or to leave. Surrender never came, so he left since he had not considered any other alternatives to his envisioned end state. The success of the past had clouded his view from the beginning. Therefore, success in his craft was intoxicating enough to drive him to Moscow, abandon all other considerations, and thus too far.

CHAPTER THREE

The Paradoxical War

From catastrophic defeat to overwhelming victory, almost two hundred years later, finally, a war perfected, by the books. It was almost as if someone wrote the script and everyone including the enemy, played the role down to the last page, the final scene. Desert Shield/Desert Storm was such a war--"a remarkable war"2. Many lessons from previous wars had been learned and put to the test at all levels and phases in this campaign. The American-led coalition against Iraqi aggression during the 1990-91 crisis was a phenomenal success. Yet, and still, there are lessons to be learned especially in the realm of this conflict's conclusion. A conclusion that was almost paradoxical in that several controversial issues followed the victorious finale or war termination phase of war.

An Uncommon Peace

This chapter will explore the paradox surrounding the Gulf Crisis conclusion. It will examine similar issues and questions raised in Napoleon's fatal campaign conclusion almost two hundred years earlier. What were the objectives, the plans, that, instead of disaster, created success, and yet, controversy?

The objects of this war were carefully planned and specified, not only to the military leaders, but to the American people and the world. Then President Bush explicitly stated that the coalition goals were as follows:

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> "Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait, restoration of
> the legitimate government of Kuwait,
> protection of US and foreign citizens,
> and stability of the Gulf region"2.

Plans were made accordingly in order to achieve those
goals. As the world witnessed, the US-led coalition
overwhelmingly forced the Iraqis from Kuwait, then restored the
legitimate government of Kuwait to power, and provided for the
protection of US and foreign citizens. However, "stability of
the region"3 is a somewhat vague objective which implies
something beyond war termination. Before exploring the
implication of this less focused objective, let's examine the war
termination phase of this war and the end state and peace
envisioned.

In the initial stages of Desert Shield, plans of all
sorts were generated and executed as commanders at all
levels prepared for battle. Was this same consideration
being given at that time to war termination, the end state,
and the peace anticipated? According to Lieutenant General
Thomas W. Kelly, the Director of Joint Operations at
the Pentagon during the war, "the only person I'm aware at
that time, planning for the Iraqi end state was General
Powell (Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff)"4.

Near the war's end, the commander in the field--General
H. Norman Schwarzhopf--even acknowledged that "Powell told
me that the President would ask for a meeting of generals
from both sides within forty-eight hours to work out the
military particulars of the cessation of hostilities. That

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caught me by surprise--it had never crossed my mind that I'd

have to sit down opposite Iraqi generals--"5. Although

this aspect of the Gulf War was not carefully considered

earlier on, it was, nonetheless, successful. As the terms of

war termination or cease-fire were generated and dictated based

on the state of events at war's end.

In addition, a controversial issue evolving from the

termination of war relates to whether or not the war should

have ended when it did based on the triumphant success already

accrued. Responding to this allegation, General Schwarzhopf said,

> "There's a lot of people who are still saying
> that the object of the United States of America
> was to capture Iraq and cause a downfall of the
> entire country of Iraq. Ladies and gentlemen,
> when we were here, we were 150 miles from Baghdad
> and there was nobody between us and Baghdad. If it
> had been our intention to take Iraq, if it had been
> intention to destroy the country, if it had been
> our intention to overrun the country, we could have
> done it unopposed, for all intents and purposes,
> from this position at that time. But that was not
> our intention. Our intention was purely to eject
> the Iraqis our of Kuwait and to destroy the military
> power that had come in here" 6.

That goal was envisioned and achieved. However, going beyond the

goal established could have created a completely new end state

and peace the coalition may not have been able to manage as

successfully.

In addition, the issue of the civil unrest in Iraq that

occurred after the cease-fire and the brutal Iraqi

suppression of that unrest was not envisioned. That

suppression led to a major flood of refugees out of Iraq

both in the north and south. The military was faced with

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managing such an effort, as "Bush advisors admit that the
administration, understandably preoccupied with winning the
war, never gave much thought to managing the peace"7.

Returning to one of the original objectives of providing
"providing stability in the region"8, one can see that such a
goal implies a long term commitment to the region. In restoring
the legitimate government of Kuwait that long term
commitment was also reinforced. Military forces still
remain, two years later, in the region, to help rebuild a nation
and keep the peace. It must be a consideration that forces will
remain after reaching the desired end. Therefore, implied
missions must be planned for in the long term. In addition,
planning several end states may be required. In this situation,
an end state could have been considered for Iraq, Kuwait and
other parts of the region.

Then what are the lessons learned from this campaign.
First, the commander on the ground could be responsible for
making recommendations on how to terminate war and the military
terms of agreement. These terms need to be considered in
conjunction with the ebb and flow of the campaign being waged.
War termination plans should be framed and adjusted for
evaluation as early as possible. Planning for the war
termination phase of hostilities after reaching the objective
should consider the requirements or military terms of agreement
in the conclusion. Just as the plans for intelligence, logistics,
communications and other supporting elements for a campaign must

be brought into planning stages initially, so too, must war termination plans. They must also be fine-tuned throughout the campaign for clarity and realism.

Second, the need to envision the end state at the outset, not only at the strategic but operational levels to ensure that they work in concert with each other. Too, not allowing the success of a campaign override original objectives and carry forces beyond these objectives, thereby, creating a condition not anticipated. This anticipation must also consider conditions for several end states, not just the main objective, but those also implied. Thirdly, the end state must be planned for and managed as well. Conceptualize having to organize, plan and manage the end state conditions beyond war termination phases. The plans should allow for forces that will be there long after war termination has been concluded. Planners should also look to the implied strategic goals and what they could mean in the long term.

CHAPTER FOUR

"You know what the trouble with peace is?
No organization"1.
                                        - Bertolt Brecht

Through evaluation of Napoleon's failure at

Moscow in 1812 and the success of the Gulf War in 1991,

several lessons and recommendations can be formulated for

war termination, end state, and peace considerations. As has been

shown, neither campaign adequately prepared for the end of the

conflict. And although one war was a defeat, and the other a

victory, lack of organizing for the peace created problems and

controversy for both ends.

From Napoleon's failure in his retreat from Moscow, the

following can be ascertained: one) the end state envisioned must

be considered in the context of how the enemy may plan against a

strategy which could change the desired end state; two) the need

to constantly reassess the intended end state in terms of how a

campaign is progressing; and three) reaching the envisioned end

objective, yet and still, not achieving the strategic result.

When the enemy has learned the principles of your success and

attacks your strategy, as Sun Tzu said,2 he has begun to change

your desired peace and end state before forces are even engaged.

Because of the recent success of Desert Shield/Desert

Storm, the tendency may be to underestimate or overlook the

lessons that can be developed from that success, especially

in terms of war termination and an eventual peace.

Political and military leaders alike can indeed learn

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lessons from the fog of success. Lessons generated from the
Gulf War include the need to envision the end state at the
outset--at both the strategic and operational levels.
Secondly, commanders in the future will be responsible for
providing recommendations on how to terminate war and the
military terms of agreement. In addition, war termination
plans must be an integral part of overall planning just as
intelligence, logistics, and communications support plans.
Finally, even when an end state is successfully achieved, if
prior attention has not been given to planning for it, the
operational commander still may not be fully prepared for it.
The end state must be planned for and managed as well especially
after all the warriors have departed.

Building a Foundation

From this analysis, significant recommendations are
generated that can result in important contributions to
commanders and planners today and in the future. Major
considerations for developing war termination, end
state, and peace plans evolved. In both cases it was key to
envision an end objective. However, it became more apparent in
the need to reassess and evaluate peace in the context of how the
war progessed. Both campaigns emphasized the need to plan for the
terms of agreement in war termination with the enemy. Gulf War
commanders, although they did not actually plan until the end,
were successful. Napoleon, on the other hand, planned for it but
the enemy did not accept the terms. Another key aspect is

planning for war termination and making it an integral part of the planning process. Also, a key lesson is reaching the desired end or objective, yet, not having it turn out as envisioned. Whether the enemy created a different state of peace or the success of your condition pushed beyond the objective to create a different peace, the end was not prepared for or expected. Once war termination is achieved; planning, organizing, and managing the end state is key long after the fighting is over.

Today's operational commander faces significant new and nontraditional missions and conflicts. These missions include those such as already experienced in humanitarian assistance (Bangladesh), nationbuilding (Kuwait), drug wars (Latin America), and peacekeeping (Somalia).

The same questions and recommendations posed in planning for conventional type missions are applicable to non classic missions. They, too, should be built into the operational plans and annexes of joint staff planning organizations. The following are the types of questions the war terminators on staff should be addressing as the end state and peace are being planned in conjunction with war plans include:

- What is the objective to be achieved through military means?
- What is the end state envisioned after the objective is achieved?
- What are plans for attaining and sustaining the end state?
- Will there be several end states to consider?
- Are there alternatives to the anticipated end state and peace?

- What are the war termination considerations once the war is concluded?

- What are the requirements to sustain the end state once achieved?

- How to plan for stopping or getting forces out of such missions?

- What are the measures of effectiveness?

- Is the goal even attainable through military means?

The answers to such questions are difficult, the missions even more so, but questions can provide the basis for joint operational considerations for war termination, end state, and peace in planning documents and publications as well as exercises, wargames and actual conflict. However, in asking the questions, the paths for answering them is already being paved. As missions seem less focused, questions become just as important as the answers, and even more significant for planning possibilities and providing the clarity needed to bring missions and their end into clear view. In building the war termination and end state design into the operations staff plans, the idea of organizing the peace become more realistic. It moves the realm of war one step beyond to the peace anticipated.

CHAPTER FIVE

"When the horizon of strategy is bounded by the
war, grand strategy looks beyond the war to the
subsequent peace"1.
                                          -B.H. Liddel-Hart

Historically, the tendencies for planning and executing

the campaign have been so focused in that arena that very

little concern was given to the war's aftermath. Many would

argue even today the focus should be on winning wars, and

peace will be sorted out later. However, if the

objective of war is not clearly defined, envisioned, planned and

adjusted, as has been shown, the results can be

catastrophic. As Clausewitz stated "the political object is

the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can

never be considered in isolation from their purpose"2. If the

purpose is some type of peace or end state, planning to reach it

and efforts beyond are essential. Keeping this in mind, it

becomes essential to understand what the objective is in order to

achieve it. Even so, when efforts have focused on achieving the

goal, it is the effort of organizing beyond war that have been

lacking. Looking beyond strategies of war campaigns to its

aftermath takes great genius, creativity, and innovation in

thinking and planning.

Beyond War

In fact, planning beyond attaining the goal was not

considered in the purview of the military. Yet, often times

military forces were left behind or brought back to sustain

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peace. This role has traditionally not been planned as part of the military's mission. As the following assessment was the predominant thought on the subject of planning for peace while executing war:

> "Although every war is fought in the name of peace, there is a tendency to define peace as the absence of war and to confuse it with military victory. To discuss conditions of peace during wartime seems almost indecent, as if the admission that the war might end could cause a relaxation of the effort. This is no accident"3.

As the need to take on more nontraditional missions and roles increases, where seeing the end may be even more difficult, it becomes especiallly crucial to discuss the conditions of peace. The questions and answers considered throughout pre-planning, execution, and post-conflict, post-mission phases will be even more significant. This role will become more relevant for the operational commander in these more nonclassic, unconventional missions. Any argument that neglects this aspect of planning will begin to lay ground for failure or more confusion as operational commanders may be confronted with answering questions about the execution of war termination and terms of peace. It is far easier when the issue has been at least considered, than not.

Another counter is that of being caught up in designing peace, so much so, that planners could become too locked into checklist procedures for peace and leave flexibility out. Therefore, the plans for peace may be considered out of synchronization with progression of the war. This is a valid concern and

consequently, burdens planners and ultimately, the commander with working closely with those executing the war to ensure the parallels of war and peace flow in concert with one another. However, planning for the peace should not be neglected and must be carefully considered throughout the campaign.

CHAPTER SIX

"Since wars begin in the minds of men,
it is in the minds of men that defenses
of peace must be constructed"1.
                              - UNESCO Constitution 1945

CONCLUSION

As the nature of future missions and conflicts change for
the operational commander, so too, will the nature of the
peace he must plan to conclude on behalf of the
policymakers. Understanding as much as possible about the nature
of the peace anticipated is as imperative as
understanding the nature of the war one is to embark upon.
By examining what failed and succeeded in the termination of
Napoleon's 1812 campaign in Moscow and the Gulf War of 1991, and
also, analyzing the critical question, too often
neglected, of what is expected from war termination, end state
and peace, offered valuable insight and lessons for
future conflict or war's end and the operational commander who
must conclude them.

Recommendations

By exploring the war termination, end state, and peace
aspects of Napoleon's 1812 campaign in Moscow and the 1991 US-led
coalition campaign in the Persian Gulf, several lessons and
recommendations were formulated. Furthermore, these lessons
and recommendations have implications for policymakers, and in
particular, the operational commander in future, nontraditional
missions and conflicts. These lessons have included one)
envisioning the end state from the outset; two) planning for war

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termination in conjunction with plans for waging the campaign;
three) planning for alternative end states even if the objective
is achieved; and four) planning and organizing for the end state
condition long after war termination.

Epilogue

Some thoughts beyond the lessons and recommendations
presented, however, are key to the concept of planning the war's
conclusion before it starts:

- commanders and planners need flexibility in plans for war
termination and should not become lockstep in thought to
achieving objectives.

- success does not always breed success; therefore, each
conflict and its conclusion should be considered as the situation
warrants; lessons can still be drawn from overwhelming victory as
well as tragic defeat.

- foresight and thinking several steps beyond the termination
phase of war and potential requirements that could be levied on
the operational commander as a result are key; plan for the
enemy's loss, not only victory.

It is only through further study and construct of these issues
on war termination, end state, and peace planning can operational
commanders fully understand and appreciate what will be expected
in the future. A future that is wrought with the changing nature
of war and the changing nature of peace. Perhaps, in the words
of Napoleon, we will then fully achieve "a glorious peace"2.

NOTES

Chapter I

    1.   Jay M. Shafritz, <u>Word on War</u> (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990), p. 181.

    2.   <u>Ibid</u>.

    3.   <u>Ibid</u>.

Chapter II

    1.   Daria Olivier, <u>The Burning of Moscow 1812</u> (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1966), p. 15.

    2.   R.R.Palmer and Joel Colton, <u>A History of the Modern World</u>, 6th ed. (New York: Alfred A.Knopf, Inc, 1983), pp. 414-415.

    3.   <u>Ibid</u>, p. 414.

    4.   A.J.P. Taylor, <u>How Wars End</u> (London: Hamish Hamilton Ltd, 1985), p. 5.

    5.   <u>Ibid</u>.

    6.   Palmer and Colton, <u>A History of the Modern World</u>, p. 415.

    7.   Taylor, <u>How Wars End</u>, p. 6.

    8.   Olivier, <u>The Burning of Moscow 1812</u>, p. 15.

    9.   <u>Ibid</u>, p. 72.

    10. Taylor, <u>How Wars End</u>, p. 6.

    11. <u>Ibid</u>.

    12. Olivier, <u>The Burning of Moscow 1812</u>, p. 15.

    13. <u>Ibid</u>, p. 73.

    14. Taylor, <u>How Wars End</u>, p. 6.

Chapter III

    1.   Harry G. Summers, Jr., <u>On Strategy II: A Critical Analysis of the Gulf War</u> (New York: Dell Publishers, 1992), p. 151.

2. U.S. Congress, Congressional Research Service, Persian Gulf Conflict: Post-War Issues for Congress, Issue Brief (Washington, DC: Library of Congress, 14 May 1991), p. 2.

3. Ibid.

4. Thomas W. Kelly, "Competing to Win", Lecture, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI: 6 January 1993.

5. H. Norman Schwarzkopf with Peter Petre, It Doesn't Take A Hero (New York: Bantam Books, 1992), p. 470.

6. Summers, On Strategy II: A Critical Analysis of the Gulf War, pp. 275-276.

7. "Knee-Deep in the Big Muddy" U.S. News and World Report, 29 April 1991, p. 24.

8. Congressional Research Service, Persian Gulf Conflict: Post-War Issues for Congress, p. 2.

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1. Jay M. Shafritz, Words on War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990), p. 464.

2. Samuel B. Griffth, translated, Sun Tzu The Art of War (England: Oxford University Press, 1971), p. 84.

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1. Jay M. Shafritz, Words on War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990), p. 388.

2. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), p. 87.

3. Henry A. Kissinger, A World Restored (Mass: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1973). p. 138.

Chapter VI

1. United Nations Education, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) Constitution, 1945.

2. Daria, Olivier, The Burning of Moscow 1812, p.15.

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