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
**INTERVENTION IN THE BALKANS:
THE UNIFIED COMMANDER'S PERSPECTIVE**


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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Operations.


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19. The crisis in the Balkans is examined from the perspective of the unified commander. Specifically, it analyzes three forms of intervention the unified commander could recommend to the National Command Authority, and the likelihood of each in achieving the national strategic objectives. This crisis represents the most likely form of conflict in the future. As the first serious test of US foreign policy in a truly multipolar world, it has the potential to define the boundaries and character of US foreign policy and with it, the role of the military in future regional conflicts of this kind. The forms of intervention analyzed include: nonmilitary intervention (military in supporting role only), limited military intervention and overwhelming force. The results of the analysis indicate that the national strategic objectives outlined for the crisis in the former Yugoslavia cannot be achieved by the use of military force. Furthermore, the most effective form of intervention is nonmilitary in nature, however this would demand compromises in the national strategic objectives in order to be a suitable recommendation of the unified commander. The conclusion is that the unified commander should recommend a nonmilitary form of intervention (with military in supporting role only) recognizing its shortfalls, as the only option with enduring qualities and not in and of itself destabilizing to the region.

INTERVENTION IN THE BALKANS: THE UNIFIED COMMANDER'S PERSPECTIVE

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PREFACE

The crisis in the Balkans is an evolving situation. It is far from resolved at the time of this writing. As a result of this constantly changing situation, the facts, comments and opinions expressed in this paper are relevant as of the time of submittal. Furthermore, the courses of action presented in this research paper do not necessarily reflect any planning conducted at the U.S. European Command, nor is it intended to convey that this command has received tasking to initiate deliberate planning. Lastly, the position of unified commander is treated generically and not intended to reference any officer that has held or currently holds that position. Throughout this research paper the titles of unified commander, operational commander, combatant commander, and regional CINC are used interchangeably. Additionally, all references to national powers indicate the four pillars of national power identified as economic, diplomatic, psychological and military.

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INTERVENTION IN THE BALKANS: THE UNIFIED COMMANDER'S PERSPECTIVE

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The Problem. The explosion of violence and atrocities that accompanied the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia has keenly focused the attention of the western world on the Balkans. It has become a serious test of the free world's commitment to a nation's right to self-determination and to the preservation of human rights. Furthermore, such tests of resolve are likely to become commonplace in view of the recent global reemergence of ethnicity and nationalism as significant driving forces in conflict. The importance of properly managing this crisis cannot be overstated. It is perhaps the prototypical regional conflict with which the world will be confronted as the 21st century approaches. In fact, analysts have suggested that "the Balkan conflict may be a truer test of whether military force can be used to preserve a 'new world order' than the Persian Gulf war."¹ The outcome of this crisis will dictate the frequency and level of violence of future conflicts, as well as the effectiveness of collective security in the new world order.

The manner in which this crisis is resolved is of special importance to the United States. As the one true "superpower" to emerge from the Cold War, the new role the United States will play in controlling world conflict is still evolving. Therefore, this crisis has the potential to define the character and the limits of American foreign policy at a critical time in world history. This is a particularly apt conclusion in light of the fact that this crisis is the first serious test of the Clinton Administration's foreign policy.

More significantly, this crisis has the potential to define the role of the military in future regional conflicts of this kind. As this crisis comes on the heels of the end of the Cold War, the military is somewhat "vulnerable" to a redefining of its purpose in a multipolar world. The combination of considerable pressure on the United States to intervene militarily in the Balkans and the search for a new role for the military could contribute to a less-than-optimum employment of the military in the Balkans. In that eventuality, it would be a severe test of the operational commander's ability to effectively employ military force in the pursuit of national objectives.

This paper will examine the crisis in the Balkans from the perspective of the operational commander. Specifically, it will explore three forms of intervention the unified commander could recommend to the National Command Authority (NCA) and the likelihood of each in achieving the national strategic objectives. This study will be divided into four parts: the origins of the crisis; the development of national strategic objectives; the operational commander's strategic considerations; and an analysis of the three forms of intervention available to the unified commander to recommend to the NCA. The result of this analysis, and therefore the thesis of this paper, is that the national strategic objectives outlined for the crisis in the former Yugoslavia cannot be achieved by the use of military force. Furthermore, the most effective form of intervention is nonmilitary in nature, however this too, would demand compromises in the national strategic objectives in order to be a suitable recommendation of the unified commander.

CHAPTER II

UNDERSTANDING THE CRISIS

The crisis in the Balkans is the focal point of a wealth of international efforts. The United Nations is actively pursuing a solution in conjunction with the European Community. As well, under the Clinton Administration the United States has for the first time actively joined the process, albeit with some ambiguity. It is to state the obvious, but it is imperative that any resolution of the conflict in the Balkans demands that it first be understood.

The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was a relatively young country in 1991 when it ceased to exist. However, the history of the six republics of which it was comprised is long and representative of the contemporary crisis. The ancient hatreds, political repression, human rights violations and economic chaos that have characterized the past, were suppressed during Tito's reign but have resurfaced to fuel the war in the Balkans.

Ancient Hatreds. The conflict in Yugoslavia is an "eruption of ancient religious, ethnic and territorial hatreds."¹ As a land of conquest, the territorial boundaries within the Balkan region have routinely been defined and redefined at the discretion of the latest conqueror. This historical pattern of conquest has developed a combatant demand for territorial inviolability among all current and former states in the Balkans. The dominance of the Serbian state has served to exacerbate these territorial disputes. The first Serbian state emerged in A.D. 850 and thus predated all other states. Consequently, Serbian nationalism has long sought a Greater Serbia to the neglect of a greater Yugoslavia. Contemporary Serbian nationalism is centered on a belief "that all Serbs outside Serbia belong in a Greater Serbia

and that the precondition for its creation lies in the . . . 'ethnic cleansing' . . . of wide areas of Bosnia of all but like-minded Serbs."²

As problematic as the territorial disputes of this region may be, the religious and ethnic divisions are equally difficult to mediate. These divisions date to the Ottoman wars of conquest (approx. 1385-1830), in which whole populations were decimated or fled, and in their place the Turks transplanted immigrants to support the treasury. The end result was ethnic and religious dispersion at cross purposes with largely ethnically defined republics.

Turkish occupation was also responsible for the conversion of a high percentage of Bosnians to Islam. Ultimately, religion became another source of conflict. By way of example, the Bosnian Insurrection (1875) began with the repression of Christians by Muslims. Much later, in Croatia, during World War II, the fascist regime inaugurated the policy of "racial purification." Specifically, this policy "declared that one third of the Serbian population would be deported, one third converted to Roman Catholicism, and one third liquidated."³ And in 1992-93, the Royalist Chetniks plotted to do the same to the Croats.

Presently, the focal point of religious conflict is the ethnic cleansing of the Bosnian Muslim population. While the Muslim faith accounts for only three percent of all religions practiced in Yugoslavia (41% are Eastern Orthodox, 12% are Roman Catholic),⁴ Muslim practitioners comprise 44% of the population within Bosnia.⁵ This religious majority is the reason for Serb nationalists' rejecting the March 1992 Bosnian vote of independence. Additionally, Serbian propaganda has used this fact to accuse the Muslims of seeking to create a fundamentalist Islamic state in Bosnia. There is no indication that this is true.

Political Repression. The struggle for political identity is well founded in the Balkans. On December 4, 1918, the unified Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes emerged from the Treaty of Versailles only to be a victim of political instability a decade later. The collapse resulted from the first assembly's inability to reach agreement on a federal or a unitary state. The net effect was the dissolution of the assembly, a personal dictatorship under King Alexander and a new name for the Kingdom: Yugoslavia.

Today, instability and the Balkans are still synonymous. Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence in June of 1991 in defiance of Serbian pressure to remain within the state. On 1 March 1992, Bosnia-Hercegovina declared its independence through national referendum and broke from the former Yugoslavia. Each of these bold steps toward a more democratic nation were met by uprisings of local Serb nationalists and by reprisals from Serbia.

At the heart of this political struggle are state leaders of such notoriety that most are considered war criminals by the US Department of State.⁶ The most infamous is Slobodan Milosevic, President of Serbia, described by James Graff as the man "who has seized on generations of ethnic hatreds and resentments to turn what was Yugoslavia into a slaughterhouse."⁷ He is widely believed to be in control of the Yugoslav Army (YA) that is supplying and training Bosnian Serbs, as well as participating in the fighting in Bosnia.

Milosevic is also the power behind Radovan Karadzic, the leader of the Bosnian Serbs and the architect of the ethnic cleansing policy in Bosnia.⁸ Additionally, he has led the capture of 70% of Bosnian territory and from it has declared the new state of Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina (May 1992). He remains an unenthusiastic participant in the UN-EC

sponsored peace talks. His demands for political and economic autonomy for the Serb communities within the 10 cantonment peace plan for Bosnia portend only further bloodshed.

Franjo Tudjman of Croatia appears equally Machiavellian. Having once made a pretense of saving Bosnia, Tudjman has met secretly with Milosevic in Graz, Austria and discussed the partition of Bosnia. Furthermore, he backs the leader of the Bosnian Croats, Mate Boban. On 3 July 1992, Boban declared the independence of the Croatian Community of Herzeg-Bosnia that claimed an additional 25% of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The political reality in the Balkans is that national self-determination is not possible given such obstacles as the ambitions of Milosevic, Karadzic, Tudjman and Boban.

Human Rights Violations. Ethnic cleansing is now a part of the world's vernacular. As it is practiced in Bosnia, it is a three stage process that began with deliberate shelling of civilian populations, expanded to the forced movement of civilian populations and lastly grew to the imprisonment of civilians in detention and prison camps.⁹ On August 1, 1992, the US State Department confirmed the existence of detention centers in Bosnia. There are 94 documented detention centers in Bosnia and another 11 in Serbia and Montenegro. Within those camps, over 254,000 people have been imprisoned and over 9,000 people executed as of 22 August 1992.¹⁰ An additional "20,000 or more people have probably died in massacres and killings associated with village evacuations," but these are obviously not reported.¹¹ While executions remain the most serious of human rights violations, beatings, torture, rape, and systematic starvation are common.¹²

The United Nations Genocide Convention outlaws these and any other acts that are carried out with "a specific intent to destroy, in whole or in substantial part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group." That convention was ratified in 1988 by the US Senate and incorporated into the US Criminal Code the same year.¹³ Theoretically, the president is legally bound to enforce the law. The dilemma for the United States is obvious. In the aftermath of the Holocaust, the vow of "Never Again" was proclaimed. It is being tested in the Balkans

Economic Chaos. Yugoslavia is very much a history of the economic haves and have nots. Typically, the northern republics have prospered from rich lands, trade and more recently from tourism, while the southern republics have required subsistence. Consequently, the northern republics have resented providing a disproportionate share to the federal government in Belgrade. This has been a factor in the multiple states seeking independence.

Ironically, the financial consequences of independence are likely to cripple the Balkans long after the fighting subsides. The reality for now, however, is that the economic burden is being borne by the US and Europe. According to the UN, over 1.9 million refugees have fled Bosnia, becoming the largest forced movement of Europeans since World War II. As of June 1992, Germany alone had already absorbed 115,000 refugees at a cost of \$51 million.¹⁴ The EC countries are already deep in recession and the influx of refugees places severe demands on housing, jobs and welfare benefits that they cannot afford.

Potentially, the greatest economic burden on the horizon is the rebuilding of Yugoslavia. It is estimated that more than \$100 billion in property damage has already been incurred and the costs continue to rise. The costs will grow exponentially if the Peruca Dam

is destroyed. A personal belief is that although the United States is under no obligation, it will ultimately shoulder the lion's share of the cost to rebuild the Balkans.

Potential Spread The end product of these historical animosities is the contemporary Balkan crisis. A full understanding of the crisis forces the realization that the potential for spreading is very real. In that eventuality, it is certain to envelop the continental powers.

Ethnic Albanians constitute a 90% majority in Kosovo, and Vojvodina claims a large Hungarian minority, and both autonomies were absorbed by Serbia in 1989. If the ethnic cleansing begins in these regions, intervention from Albania is certain, and highly likely from Hungary. The more alarming situation would be a spread to Macedonia which is likely to involve Greece and surely Bulgaria. At that juncture, Turkey would no longer be restrained and would enter the conflict in defense of Muslim interests. Iran has already become involved in the defense of Muslim interests. In September of 1992, the Croats intercepted a planeload of Iranian arms and troops destined for Bosnia. Included in the shipment were 4,000 small arms, more than a million rounds of ammunition and 20 to 40 Iranians.¹⁵

One final possibility is Russian involvement. The release of the draft Russian military doctrine identified one mission of the Russian Armed Forces as "protecting the rights and interests of . . . persons abroad, connected with it ethnically and culturally."¹⁶ Historically, Tzarist Russia has been an ally of Serbia and shares their Slavic heritage. In an escalating situation, Russia would support Serbia. Given Germany's support for Croatia, the European continent would be at risk as Russia could potentially arm against Germany. In the event this conflict developed in this manner, United States intervention with military force under NATO or UN auspices could very well be unavoidable.

CHAPTER III

TRANSLATING NATIONAL OBJECTIVES

National Objectives. In August of 1992, former Secretary of State Lawrence S. Eagleburger stated, "Our fundamental objective is the status quo ante. . . [with Bosnia restored] as a multiethnic state, with the rights of minorities respected, with the ethnic communities of each respected."¹ A formal policy statement has not been forthcoming from the Clinton administration to date, however all indications are that the objective has not changed. Indicative of this stance, the Administration has withheld full support from the Vance-Owen peace proposal.* Specifically, as late as 3 February, President Clinton had questioned the "practicality of the plan. . . whether it can be enforced [and] also about the justice of embedding in any agreement what he called 'ill-gotten Serbian gains that stem from ethnic cleansing.'"² More recently, the Administration has backed the peace initiative, but "declined to say if the United States accepted the basic premise of the Vance-Owen plan that divides Bosnia and Hercegovina into 10 autonomous regions."³ Clearly, these are indications of a commitment to a status quo ante objective (and thus, a premise of this paper).

Given the status quo ante as the general political end state desired, a more comprehensive agenda that is implicit in the specified national objectives can be articulated.

*The Vance-Owen Peace Plan is a settlement negotiated by UN representative Cyrus R. Vance and Lord David Owen, the EC representative. The parties to the negotiations have included Izetbegovic, Milosevic, Karadzic and Boban. Talks began in Geneva in September of 1992 and in January of 1993 were moved to UN headquarters in the US after several deadlines were not met. At the heart of the proposal is the division of Bosnia-Hercegovina into 10 cantonments ethnically defined. Each cantonment would acquire semiautonomous standing, but a central government would exist in Sarajevo. At the time of this writing, all parties had loosely agreed to the terms of the treaty and to negotiate further the proposed map of the cantonments (see Appendix III).

That agenda would include the following objectives: end the hostilities prior to any spreading of the conflict, cessation of atrocities, recognition of pre-crisis borders of newly independent states, and restoration of regional stability.

The first specified objective is to end the hostilities in Bosnia-Herzegovina prior to any conflict engulfing Kosovo, Vojvodina or Macedonia. This is the logical starting point and the critical step toward the accomplishment of all other national objectives. In the absence of fighting, the negotiation process has a better chance to continue toward closure on the most favorable terms to Bosnia. Even more significantly, the containment of the conflict to the borders of Bosnia minimizes the involvement of continental powers. This in turn, minimizes the complications associated with managing the conflicting interests within a UN or NATO coalition. More basically, it reduces the amount of human suffering, which in turn removes a powerful incentive to maintain or even escalate the level of atrocities being committed.

It is evident that the extreme level of violence and tragic loss of innocent life that accompanied this crisis is responsible for generating the world's attention and condemnation of the aggressors. It is the focal point of world opinion; and as the one superpower, the United States is under pressure to fill the humanitarian leadership role in this crisis to end the killing.

Essential to achieving the status quo ante is the third objective--recognition of the independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, and Slovenia by the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). Ideally, this act of recognition would accept pre-crisis territorial boundaries in order to be meaningful and to demonstrate a commitment on the part of the FRY to the democratic process. Furthermore, to forestall further ethnic cleansing this

national objective should include the restoration of Kosovo and Vojvodina to autonomous provinces as espoused in their 1974 Constitution.

The final national strategic objective is to restore regional political and economic stability. By necessity, this also includes the reduction of Serbian military strength. Only when Serbia is on a par (or weaker) militarily with its other Balkan neighbors can stability really exist. The United States has a vested interest in achieving this objective. It is estimated that the most likely conflicts of the future will focus on ethnicity. Significantly, then, the manner in which this ethnic strife is resolved will serve as the precedence in subsequent conflicts of this nature. A clear signal needs to be sent to the independent states in the CIS and elsewhere that ethnicity is not justification for violence and more importantly, that it must be harmoniously accommodated in a regional community. This is particularly important within the CIS because of the nuclear capability that exists in a number of these statelets.

To summarize, the postulated national strategic objectives are to terminate the hostilities, end all atrocities, gain FRY recognition of newly independent states using pre-crisis borders, and to restore political and economic stability. These objectives comprise the overall strategic direction aimed at establishing the status quo ante. These national strategic objectives are the starting point for the unified commander as he begins his planning process.

The Role of the Unified Commander. The unified commander is responsible for "translating strategic direction into military objectives that, once gained, will lead to the attainment of the strategic objectives."⁴ This mission is an end product of the 1986 DOD Reorganization Act of 1986 that created an operational chain of command that runs directly

from the NCA to the unified combatant commands. The role of the unified commander as a military advisor to the NCA is potentially the foremost responsibility of the commander. In this modern era of regional focus, it takes on an even greater importance. In the January 1992 National Military Strategy of the United States, the Chairman identified the unified commander as the officer responsible to the NCA for contingency planning at all levels. He stated:

By examining and anticipating the potential for instability or crisis, the regional CINCs develop plans for the employment of military assets (as well as examining the complementary economic, diplomatic, and political options). These options, used singly or in various combinations can be carried out with the intent of deterring or averting crisis.⁵

The operational commander represents the expert knowledge of his region and is best able to assess the situation, recognize possibilities and to make recommendations for the employment of all national powers.

It is largely because of this practical relationship with the NCA that the unified commander is the critical link in the assessment phase of a regional crisis. It is not inconceivable that a new President (without previous military experience) and a new Secretary of Defense with divergent views from their respective predecessors, would ask of the unified commander, "What form of intervention can best achieve our objectives in the Balkans?"

CHAPTER IV

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE NCA

Strategic Considerations. The adaptive planning process and the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) were designed to anticipate and adequately plan for regional contingencies in order to provide the NCA with operational-level options in a crisis. In reality, the process demands more than planning in a vacuum. For any given crisis there are strategic concerns the operational commander must consider which frequently vary with the domestic and international political winds.

Clausewitz once said, "If war is part of policy, policy will determine its character. . . . Political considerations . . . are the more influential in the planning of war, of the campaign and often even of the battle."¹ The applicability of this to the crisis in the Balkans is that the unified commander must be aware of the constraints that political considerations place on his planning. They will shape his recommendations to the NCA. President Clinton specified in his campaign that he "would begin with air power against the Serbs to try to restore the basic conditions of humanity."² Also, Secretary of State Warren Christopher has indicated the new Administration is beginning to "develop a new policy from the bottom up. . . . And there should be no assumption that anything is off limits."³ Most recently, the Administration has tenuously supported the Vance-Owen peace initiative with the possibility of US forces used in a peacekeeping role. While the signals are mixed, they do hint that domestic political considerations are more limiting than Secretary Christopher's statements might suggest.

International political considerations are even more restrictive. The CJCS has made it clear that "increasingly, we expect to strengthen world response to crises through multilateral

operations under the auspices of international security organizations."⁴ Furthermore, former President Bush has firmly stated that any actions taken in Bosnia need to be led by the European Community under UN sanctions. In light of this, there are international political sensitivities that must be considered. Most notably, the clash between Russia's support for Serbia and Germany's proven backing for Croatia. If military intervention is to be an option under a UN Security Council resolution a major obstacle will be pressing Russia (and China) not to exercise their veto power as a permanent member of the Security Council. There is general consensus that the best that can be expected is an abstention on the part of Russia.

In the event that UN action is blocked, NATO options are similarly challenging. Turkey and Greece are both members of NATO, but far from allies and they do not share common interests in this region. While Turkey supports Muslim interests in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as a prospective member of the EC they also support Macedonia's independence. Greece on the other hand, vehemently opposes Macedonia's independence and shares no interest in the Muslim cause. In light of these international political sensitivities, the unified commander must formulate theater strategy recommendations to accommodate these divergent interests, without losing focus of either the strategic or operational objectives.

In addition to political considerations there are significant strategic military considerations to be addressed prior to providing recommendations to the NCA. Clausewitz once decreed, "The first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish . . . the kind of war they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature."⁵ This is a particularly troubling concept to apply to the crisis in the former

Yugoslavia. It is not at all clear if world opinion sees this as a civil war, or as a cross-border international aggression. Regardless of the perceptions of this crisis, from a unified commander's perspective, the character of the war remains a civil war in which any ground fighting is likely to be guerrilla in nature. Furthermore, the nature of this war is punctuated by ideals--ideals about nationalism, about ethnic and religious freedoms and about territorial inviolability. Historically, guerrilla warfare is the antithesis of the American way of war. Lastly, it remains unclear to the operational commander if the nature of intervention is to be that of peacekeeping, peacemaking or power projection. This ill-defined role the unified commander is to play further hinders operational planning. In the end, the nature of the war will dictate which of the forms of intervention, if any, are viable.

An understanding of the nature of the war must lead the operational commander to consider the enemy's center of gravity; defined by Clausewitz as the "hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends."⁶ The argument has been made, by Cyrus Vance, Michael Roskin and others, that "it is Serbia's determination to bite off parts of the other republics peopled by Serbs that keeps the war going."⁷ More to the point, it is the superior military strength and industrial base that supports the war effort that is the center of gravity. With that as the center of gravity, what military condition can equalize Serbian offensive capabilities to the point that they are forced to negotiate seriously? It is entrusted to the unified commander to provide plans that create just such a military condition.

Finally, the unified commander must consider what defines the war's end. Largely, this point is specified by the national strategic objective of the status quo ante, however that is a political end state and not a military condition. The military condition is the military objective

that has to be accomplished in order to dictate war termination on most favorable terms to US interests. In the case of the Balkans, this would equate to the elimination of offensive capabilities, or the will to employ them, of the aggressors. From that point, the higher national strategic objectives can be accomplished. It is clear that it would not be an easy task to forcefully eliminate all offensive capabilities of the aggressors. However, the harder and more important task is very likely to purge the will to employ them.

A summary of the strategic considerations would indicate that there are significant obstacles to overcome. For instance, international political concerns portend that multilateral action could on one hand divide the European continental powers (e.g., Russia vs. Germany) or become so cumbersome to manage that it diminishes the effectiveness of the coalition. Strategic military considerations are equally paralyzing. The nature of the war is ill-defined and at best ill-suited to the American way of war. Furthermore, while the center of gravity is identifiable and vulnerable to attack, it does nothing to minimize the ambition of Serbian nationalism (and that may be the more significant source of conflict). Lastly, the military condition required to reach war termination is not a long term solution by any measure.

The operational commander's tasking is to consider these obstacles, as well as all other planning considerations, and make a recommendation to the NCA as to which form of intervention will best achieve the national strategic objectives.

Forms of Intervention.

The form of intervention recommended to the NCA by the unified commander must pass the tests of suitability, feasibility and acceptability. All potential courses of actions fall

into one of three basic categories: Nonmilitary Intervention (military plays supporting role only), Limited Military Intervention and Overwhelming Force.*

Nonmilitary Intervention. This reflects contemporary involvement in the Balkans. Currently, the US has accorded full diplomatic status to Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and Slovenia and has denied the same to the FRY composed of Serbia and Montenegro. It has barred Serbia and Montenegro as separate states from the UN and initiated economic sanctions and trade embargoes against each. Additionally, the US has placed monitors in neighboring states to enforce UN sanctions and to limit the risk of the conflict spreading. Relief flights into Sarajevo using American aircraft and aircrew have resumed. Additional humanitarian efforts include financial contributions to the UNHCR (\$97 million) and the regional Red Cross (\$6 million). As well, the US has made air and sea lift available to transport UN forces to Bosnia and has singularly pressured Serbia for access to all detention camps. Lastly, the US has offered to participate in no-fly zone enforcement measures that ban all non-UN flights into Bosnia (pending UN resolution).⁸

Additional measures that could be included in the operational commander's recommendations would be: a lifting of the arms embargo on Bosnia and the initiation of a war crimes tribunal to prosecute the human rights violators. The elected government in Sarajevo has expressed that a lifting of the arms embargo is the most critical form of support, short of direct military involvement that the US could offer the Bosnians.

*The option of avoiding any form of intervention was initially considered. However, in light of the substantial involvement on the part of the unified commander already, this alternative was dismissed. Samples of current involvement include US flights to Sarajevo, M.A.S.H. unit in Zagreb, CVBG and amphibious elements in the Adriatic as well as active participation in STANAVFORMED naval blockade.

As Izetbegovic has said:

We need weapons. We need them urgently, and I ask this of the United States in the name of our fundamental right to self-defense, since we are being attacked by a very well-equipped army with hundreds of tanks, thousands of artillery pieces and several tens of thousands of well-armed men.⁹

To date, the United States has been resolute in rejecting this request. Former President Bush stated, "There are enough arms there already. We've got to stop the killing some way, and I don't think it's enhanced by more and more [weapons.]"¹⁰ The international community is in general agreement on this point. The culmination of this form of intervention, though not inclusive of all options and not specifically a US measure, is the Vance-Owen peace plan.

Analysis. In analyzing this form of intervention, the first test is that of suitability. Does it fully achieve the national strategic objectives? The answer is no. It can be argued that if successful, it could achieve three of the four national strategic objectives. Specifically, it could halt the hostilities, end the atrocities and restore a substantial measure of stability to the region. It cannot, however return the independent states to their pre-crisis borders. This is not surprising given that the basis of the initiative is the partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Furthermore, the level of stability that it can bring to the region is debatable, and I would assert problematic. The reason being that the peace plan has little chance of ever achieving a consensus, since the stronger side (i.e., Serbia) has no incentive to compromise and can forcefully acquire more than the plan offers. As long as a dominant Serbian military or war fighting potential exists across any border, stability is a fleeting commodity. Additionally, the plan undercuts the Muslims by asking them to accept two cantonments, plus equal representation in a third as a substitute for once commanding a 44% majority in Bosnia.

This is likely to be acceptable to the Muslims only until the Muslims recover from the present conflict. Lastly, nonmilitary intervention tends to reward Serbian aggression and institutionalizes roughly 60% (equates to 43% of Bosnian territory) of the territory they forcefully acquired in the months of fighting.

The reality of this plan is that it portends of further bloodshed. The likelihood is that within the very near future, the Serb and Croat cantonments will use their semiautonomous status to vote to join the Greater Serbia and Croatia, respectively. At that point, the situation would be reminiscent of the original declarations of independence that precipitated the current crisis. Worse yet, this plan offers no guarantee that ethnic cleansing will not spread to Kosovo, Macedonia or Vojvodina. This would suggest that if this form of intervention were recommended to the NCA by the unified commander it would prove ineffective to achieve the national objectives. In short, this form of intervention is not suitable.

The test of feasibility is another matter. It can certainly be done, and is being done at the present time. Vance and Owen have received tentative US backing to their initiative and all parties are actively negotiating in general agreement on the map of proposed partitions. It is worth stating, however that any plan that is feasible but not suitable, is of very limited value.

To carry the analysis one step further, the acceptability of this form of intervention is debatable along ethical lines. While the costs to implement are relatively minimal in terms of dollars and lives, the principles that are compromised are much more difficult to measure. This plan compromises the principles of self-determination and collective security in the new world order to broker an unpopular peace. The acceptability test is potentially reduced to a debate over what is right and what is prudent. And that is often an individual distinction.

In the end, this form of intervention offers the unified commander a situation that is feasible, but not suitable or acceptable when measured against current national objectives.

Limited Military Intervention. Any form of intervention employing military force is more closely associated with the expertise of the unified commander. There are six limited applications of force that warrant attention and they are considered most effective when employed together. In ascending order of level of commitment, they are: psychological operations, offensive economic blockade, no-fly zone enforcement, airstrikes within Bosnia, airstrikes within Serbia and troop stationing in Bosnia as well as in bordering countries that are threatened by conflict spread.

Psychological operations could be directed on two levels at Milosevic and his support with the people of Serbia. The December elections in Serbia in which Milosevic narrowly defeated Milan Panic, an opponent of Milosevic's methods, indicate that his popular support is vulnerable to attack.¹¹ One attack could be focused on his campaign promises of 1990 in which Warren Zimmerman, former Ambassador to Yugoslavia claims "he promised the Serbian people . . . peace and economic prosperity--and what he delivered [was] two wars and economic disaster."¹² The second attack could focus on the rising discontent among the Serbian people that Milosevic is failing to more persuasively make the case to the world that Serbia is the victim.¹³ The intent would be to destabilize the aggressors in Bosnia.

The second limited military intervention could be an offensive blockade of the Adriatic, the Danube and overland routes. Presently, Serbia is conducting in excess of 50% of their pre-crisis trade which would indicate that current sanctions are ineffective. To block the

land routes, it is suggested that EC, UN or NATO forces could be stationed in the bordering countries as monitors of trade traffic. In this type of multilateral action, it is conceivable that the US would deploy security forces to participate in the enforcement of trade sanctions.

A third possibility is the use of US air assets (among other nations) to enforce the no-fly zone over Bosnia. A resolution is currently pending before the UN Security Council to permit enforcement of the no-fly zone. The United States has already volunteered to participate in that effort if approved by the UN. The intent is to prevent unopposed YA airpower from indiscriminately bombing targets in Bosnia, as well as to show western resolve.

A fourth option is to conduct airstrikes on Serbian artillery positions that ring the besieged cities, most notably Sarajevo. Targets could also include Serbian strongholds within Bosnia, such as the airfield at Banja Luka. The intent is to provide immediate relief and lift the siege on the civilian population, as well as to cripple Serb warfighting capabilities.

One step further is to conduct airstrikes into the state of Serbia. Principal targets would be airfields and infrastructure (e.g., bridges, roads, railroads) that support the supply line to Bosnian Serbs. Additional targets could include industrial capabilities that support the war machine. The purpose for all airstrikes against Serbia is to eliminate external aid to the Bosnian Serbs as well as to provide an incentive for Serbia to increase their efforts to apply pressure on Karadzic and to issue a challenge to Serb nationalists to compromise.

The final limited military intervention is to provide military support to the nations bordering Serbia. This would include Albania, Hungary, Croatia and possibly Bulgaria. The intent is to threaten Serbia with military action from nations that historically have laid claim to Serbian territories and interest. From Albania, the defense of Kosovo can be used to posture

the advent of a "Greater Albania" which is precisely what Serbia fears from Kosovo.¹⁴ From Croatia, the threat could be to recover the 30% of territory lost to the Serbs in the past year's fighting. The intent is not to support expansionism anywhere, only to convey the message that Serbia can be vulnerable as well. The further step of stationing troops in Bosnia in this context is intended exclusively for enforcement of any negotiated peace settlement. President Clinton is presently considering this action as a measure of US commitment to the negotiated settlement of which the US is now a quasi-member.

Analysis. An analysis of this form of intervention must start by asking whether it can achieve the national strategic objectives. Is it suitable? Again, the answer is no. Psychological operations are unlikely to radically disturb support for Milosevic, when the preponderance of world opinion has already labeled him the "Butcher of the Balkans."¹⁵ Additionally, state controlled media makes the task even less likely to succeed. In the end, there is a real possibility that it may foster an "us against them" mentality that could strengthen their resolve toward promoting a Greater Serbia.

The offensive blockade would not achieve any national strategic objectives. In fact, it would not even be particularly successful in reducing trade as there is no guarantee that this effort would be joined by Greece, the Ukraine or Russia who are believed to be covertly trading with Serbia. Furthermore, the real obstacle to an effective blockade is the free trade allowed in Bosnia. Presently, there are no embargoes (except arms) in Bosnia, which means that the Serbs in Bosnia can acquire all goods just as easily as the Bosnians. And the western world would be hard pressed to further punish the Bosnian victims with economic sanctions.

Any form of limited airstrikes are unlikely to stop hostilities or end the atrocities. Quite the opposite may be true. It could very well increase the tempo of the conflict. More fundamentally however, their effectiveness against mobile artillery sites is very questionable, and the likelihood of collateral damage is high. Furthermore, strikes into Serbia now that they are cooperative participants in the peace negotiations is politically difficult. Theoretically, Serbia has already withdrawn all forces from Bosnia and is exerting considerable pressure on Karadzic to make concessions in the negotiations. How is bombing infrastructure in Serbia going to foster more stability in the Balkans? It's not.

Stationing troops in neighboring countries (e.g., Croatia, Hungary, Bulgaria and Albania) is the most effective form of limited military intervention, but it will not stop the hostilities and the atrocities, nor will it restore pre-crisis borders. It is only a threat to Serbia in the event that Serbia continues ethnic cleansing in regions outside Bosnia (e.g., Vojvodina, Kosovo, Macedonia). This gains the unified commander a measure of stability in the region, but this same measure can be achieved via the Vance-Owen peace plan without deploying forces. Taken as a group or individually, this form of intervention is too sporadic and not forceful enough to demonstrate a realistic potential to achieve national objectives.

If national objectives were to change however, and this form of intervention became suitable, a test of feasibility would highlight another significant obstacle. The forces required and the support structure to sustain them would require a multilateral effort. It is doubtful that a multilateral action would be sanctioned by the UN. Russia would likely veto such action as a member of the UN Security Council, as might France and China. As an alternative the US could act unilaterally and execute all phases of this form of intervention, but this is not

a likely occurrence. Another questionable aspect of limited intervention is the amount of time forces can remain in place. To be most effective it would require a long term presence, but this is not particularly feasible in light of US force reductions and continuing worldwide commitments.

On the other hand, this form of intervention is relatively acceptable. It can be executed relatively easily at a minimal cost in dollars and lives. The price that is paid for this intervention is a slightly reduced forward presence and a decrease in crisis response effectiveness. However, it is acceptable only until it escalates. Major General Lewis MacKenzie, former commander of the UN forces in Sarajevo issued a warning to that effect, "... you'll have Americans killed, and you'll want to do something about it. And they'll up the ante, and you'll up the ante. You can't isolate it. . ."¹⁶ This warning is appropriate to heed, for acceptability hinges on limited interventions remaining limited.

From a unified commander's perspective, this form of intervention is not suitable or feasible and only conditionally acceptable. It is not forceful enough to compel the aggressors to end hostilities nor to end the atrocities. In fact, certain options that are integral to this form of intervention are likely to escalate the situation. Moreover, any military intervention would be destabilizing to the region in the short term, and any gained stability would be enduring only as long as the forces were in place to enforce it. All told, this level of force is inadequate and ill-suited to achieve national strategic goals in the former Yugoslavia.

Overwhelming Force. The final form of intervention that the unified commander could recommend is that of overwhelming force. The primary distinction between this option and a

more limited form of intervention is the introduction of sustained combat troops on the ground. A plausible scenario offered by retired Army Colonel T. N. Dupuy proposes:

five relatively simple operations: 1) destruction of the offensive air capability of the Yugoslav Air Force; 2) rapid insertion of amphibious and airborne units into Split and Sarajevo; 3) the opening of ground communications between Sarajevo and Split; 4) establishment of defensive perimeters around both cities; and 5) the cutting of all communications between Serbia and Serbian militia guerrillas in Bosnia within about 125 miles of Sarajevo and Split.¹⁷

This proposal of overwhelming force would be conducted under UN and NATO auspices. Its objectives would be to establish coalition control in Bosnia; and demand from a position of strength that Serbia and Serbian nationalists accept UN resolutions without qualification.

Analysis. Once a decision for military action is made, the CJCS has specified that the strategic principle of decisive force should dictate the use of overwhelming force.¹⁸ It is how the US military chooses to fight. The foremost question to be asked and answered however, is whether this form of intervention can achieve the national strategic objectives. The answer is a qualified yes. There is little doubt that decisive force (with or without coalition forces) would be militarily capable of crushing any traditionally organized opposition, and thereby capable of compelling all aggressors to adhere to the demands of the international community.* Inserting combat forces directly into Bosnia has the greatest likelihood of stopping the hostilities before it spreads to other regions, and it can immediately end the human suffering wrought by ethnic cleansing. Furthermore, it is the only form of intervention that can restore the pre-crisis borders through direct action against Serbians and Serbian

*The counterargument to this is that the Yugoslavs once defeated 20 front-line German divisions and therefore US troops in smaller numbers would be equally unsuccessful. The conclusion is debatable, but the facts are erroneous. The German Military-Historical Research Office reported that the "actual number of German divisions was six, of which two were manned by Croats, and only one was front-line."¹⁹

nationalists. Additionally, such a demonstration of commitment to the principles of the new world order is likely to send the strongest possible message to other nations considering violent expansion along ethnic or national lines that such action will not be tolerated. In this way, overwhelming force is a stabilizing force in the Balkans and many other regions.

The suitability of this form of intervention is not unconditional. The notion that the use of decisive force will terminate this conflict quickly is suspect. A real possibility is that the US will become mired in a protracted civil war that never really ends. This points to a divergence from former President Bush's criterion for the use of military force that restricts its use to situations in which "its application can be limited in scope and time."²⁰ In the end, the suitability of this form of intervention is only valid as long as the unified commander is willing to keep the forces deployed and how long the public will support this action.

The feasibility of this form of intervention is doubtful. The forces required to overwhelm the aggressors as well as to lift the sieges in all cities are considerable. Estimates range from Dupuy's optimistic 120,000 troops to MacKenzie's estimate of 800,000 troops.²¹ The truest estimate likely falls between the two. British military experts and Lieutenant General McCaffrey, senior aide to CJCS, have estimated forces of 500,000 and 400,000, respectively.²² While these figures are speculative, they do reflect expert opinion.

Another feasibility question mark is the problem of identifying the enemy. The aggressors were once neighbors of the victims and vice versa. It will be very nearly impossible to distinguish enemy from ally within Bosnia. Additionally, as US forces occupy contested regions by way of restoring pre-crisis borders, the conflict will pit US forces against civilians. Apart from the operational concerns, the tactical aspects of this are particularly

troublesome. Specifically, where do the US forces drive the Serbs who have occupied these areas post-ethnic cleansing? What about the innocent Serbs who rightfully lived in these areas before the war? Can the forces distinguish between the two? Are all Serbs to be relocated to Serbia? What if Serbia resists this action? Are US forces prepared to expand the conflict to Serbia? That would place US forces in two countries, of which one is friendly and the other hostile to US actions. And like Vietnam, the distinction is not always easy to make.

Further analysis demonstrates that the high potential for casualties questions the acceptability of this form of intervention. This applies not only to actual combat, but also to the follow-on peacekeeping operations, which some Pentagon officials "have made clear that they see . . . as a potential Lebanon."²³ It is debatable whether objectives of less-than-vital interest to the US can justify the inherent risks and potential loss of life. Furthermore, as funding and forces are downsized (possibly below the base force), this form of intervention quite possibly is more than can be supported, particularly given its non-vital nature.

In the end, the unified commander is faced with deploying large forces at great risk that can produce a temporary solution at best, and an escalating conflict at worst. Ultimately, this form of intervention is suitable, though not unconditionally. Furthermore, whether it can be done successfully is very doubtful. The level of forces required and the difficulties in distinguishing friend from foe are serious obstacles not easily overcome. Lastly, the high expenditure of American dollars and potentially higher cost in lives in the pursuit of non-vital US interests calls into question the acceptability of this form of intervention.

In the final analysis, it is clear that the crisis does not easily lend itself to an operational solution at any level of intervention.

CHAPTER V

COMMENTS AND CONCLUSIONS

Comments. The premise of this paper was that the national strategic objectives outlined for the crisis in the former Yugoslavia could not be achieved by the use of military force; nor by any nonmilitary form of intervention without a modification to the national strategic objectives. The analysis of each form of intervention proved this thesis.

In summary, limited military intervention proved to be unsuitable largely because it would be too sporadic and at the same time not forceful enough to compel the aggressors to halt hostilities and comply fully with UN-EC demands. Furthermore, multilateral action appeared unlikely, therefore only through US unilateral action would this be feasible.

The use of overwhelming force as a form of intervention was demonstrated to be suitable only as long as the forces remained deployed to the region to enforce an imposed peace. Given that the forces must eventually leave, this intervention is guaranteed to fail. As former President Bush said, "an enduring solution cannot be imposed by force from outside on unwilling participants."¹ Additionally, even if this was the desired recommendation of the CINC, the vast forces required, the difficulties associated with fighting an adversary indistinguishable from the allies, and the huge risk in lives relegate this action to the infeasible and unacceptable.

The nonmilitary form of intervention was found to be unsuitable primarily because pre-crisis borders ceased to be an objective of the Vance-Owen peace plan. In this particular instance, the suitability of a form of intervention hinges on the prioritization of national strategic objectives. Is the inviolability of pre-crisis borders more important than stopping

hostilities and restoring a measure of stability to the region? If it is not, and that is my contention, then this form of intervention is not only suitable, but feasible and acceptable.

Counterargument. It could be argued that the Vance-Owen peace plan represents a sacrifice of more than just borders. It sacrifices the democratic concept of the right to self-determination, and the underpinning of the new world order. The argument continues by claiming that the western world cannot stand by idly and allow Serbian atrocities and aggression to trample these principles, and be rewarded with territorial gains through ethnic cleansing. It can be further argued that the application of military force is both appropriate and capable of achieving national strategic objectives in Bosnia. In the words of Ejup Ganic, a vice-president in the elected government in Sarajevo:

If what matters to the Americans is only oil, or territory of strategic significance, or destroying an army like Saddam's that can pose difficulties for American political power, let them say so. But if what matters is a people's right to choose democracy and civil rights, where are they going to find a better case than here?²

He is not alone in believing that American military might can and should be employed to defend Bosnia-Herzegovina. George Kenney, who resigned his State Department post coordinating US policy for this region in protest over US inaction, stated that Serbian forces "are ill-disciplined, [and] largely a ragtag group of young people without opposition."³ The implication was that US forces could easily defeat the Serbs and compel them to conform to UN and EC demands.

To those who claim that this "third party interventionist" role represents an inappropriate role for the military, the same individuals must examine the role of the unified commander in Iraq. Presently, he is managing just such a situation with Iraqi aggression

directed at the Shiites south of the 32nd parallel and the Kurds north of the 36th parallel. While the situations are not exactly the same, the military missions are the same.

Lastly, if intractability is the primary obstacle for avoiding military involvement, then US involvement in Somalia cannot be defended. Yet, more than 20,000 US forces are currently stationed in Somalia and most would agree that there is no end to the plight in Somalia in sight. Just as the goal in Somalia is to gradually relinquish the leadership role to UN forces, the same could be the goal in Bosnia. In other words, once the aggressors are subdued and the borders reestablished, the UN can assume the peacekeeping role knowing that US military power is ready, willing and able to enforce their authority.

Conclusion. Simply because the US military is already involved in difficult situations (i.e., Iraq and Somalia) it is not justification to enter another. The nonmilitary form of intervention should be the unified commander's recommendation to the NCA. It is the only form of intervention that has enduring qualities and in and of itself is not destabilizing. Furthermore, it is feasible and acceptable by most measures of effectiveness. It is acknowledged that this option sacrifices the pre-crisis borders, but it is not a perfect world. It is my opinion that to restore pre-crisis borders is to destabilize the region and guarantee a recurrence of Serbian aggression. The long view is that with all its imperfections and sacrificed principles, nonmilitary intervention is the best possible form of intervention from the perspective of the unified commander; and it is in the best interests of the western world.

APPENDIX I

PROMINENT FIGURES IN THE CRISIS

YUGOSLAV FIGURES:

Serbian Nationalists:

Slobodan Milosevic: President of Serbia

Dobrica Cosic: President of new Yugoslavia

Milan Panic: former Prime Minister of Serbia (defeated in 1992 Presidential election)

Radovan Karadzic: Leader of Bosnian Serbs in Bosnia-Hercegovina

GEN Ratko Mladic: Top Army commander of the Serbian Republic in Bosnia-Hercegovina

Biljana Plavsic: Deputy leader of the Serbian nationalist forces laying siege to Sarajevo

Nikola Koljevic: Deputy leader of the Serbian nationalist forces laying siege to Sarajevo

Croatian Nationalists:

Franjo Tudjman: President of Croatia

Mate Granic: A vice-president of Croatia

Mate Boban: Croatian leader in Bosnia-Hercegovina (claimed new Croatian republic within Bosnia-Hercegovina)

Miljenko Brkic: Leader of Croatia Democratic Community in Bosnia-Hercegovina

Bosnian Nationalists:

Alija Izetbegovic: President of Bosnia-Hercegovina (Muslim)

Ejup Ganic: A vice-president in Bosnian Government

Hakija Turajlic: Assassinated Deputy Prime Minister (8 January 1993)

Haris Silajdzic: Bosnian Foreign Minister

Rajko Bozic: Bosnian Defense Minister

Muhamed Sacirbey: Bosnian delegate to the UN

INTERNATIONAL FIGURES:

United States:


George Bush: President of the United States (until 20 January 1993)
Bill Clinton: President of the United States (post-20 January 1993)
James Baker: Secretary of State (until 23 August 1992)
Lawrence Eagleburger: Secretary of State (23 August 1992-January 1993)
Warren Christopher: Secretary of State (post-January 1993)
Richard Cheney: Secretary of Defense (until January 1993)
Les Aspin: Secretary of Defense (post-January 1993)
E.J. Perkins: US delegate to the UN (until January 1993)
Madeleine Albright: US delegate to the UN (post-January 1993)
Warren Zimmerman: Former Ambassador to Yugoslavia (recalled in May 1992)

European:

Boutros Boutros-Ghali: Secretary General of the UN
Sadako Ogata: Commissioner of the UN High Commission on Refugees
Cyrus R. Vance: Mediator for the UN (former US Secretary of State under President Carter)
Jose Cutileiro: former UN special envoy
Lord Carrington: Mediator for the EC (until September 1992)
Lord Owen: Mediator for the EC (follow on to Carrington-September 1992)
MAJGEN Lewis MacKenzie: CDR (CAN) of UN forces in Sarajevo (until July 1992)
GEN Phillip Morillon: CDR (FR) of UN forces in Sarajevo (post-July 1992)

APPENDIX II

ETHNIC GROUPS OF YUGOSLAVIA



Source: Michael G. Roskin, "The Bosnian-Serb Problem: What We Should and Should Not Do," *Parameters*, Winter 1992-93, p. 23.

APPENDIX III

PROPOSED PARTITION PLAN FOR BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA



Source: R. W. Apple, Jr., "Mediator Is Upset At U.S. Reluctance Over Bosnia Talks," The New York Times, 3 February 1993, p. A1:3.

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