Urban Counterinsurgency in a Democracy: Great britain Versus the Irish Republican Army
Abstract
With the end of the Cold War and the growth of democracy, the United States faces increased responsibilities and potential for urban counterinsurgency operations in democratic countries. This paper identifies the operational focus that must be possessed by a democratic government and the military operational commander in countering and dealing with urban insurgency. This required operational focus for successful counterinsurgency is illustrated through examination and analysis of the current conflict between Great Britain and the Irish Republican Army (IRA). A theory is provided for Great Britain's lack of success in countering the insurgent IRA, and frameworks are recommended for analysis of insurgencies and counterinsurgencies. General lessons, concepts and theories in the form of principles that can be applied to urban counterinsurgency at the operational level are also provided. After twenty-three years of active counterinsurgency against the IRA, the British can produce little evidence of progress towards resolution of the Northern Ireland Conflict. There are three primary reasons for Great Britain's failure to eliminate the insurgent IRA; the complexity of the Irish Conflict's origins, the exceptional political and military capabilities of the IRA, and last, Great Britain's inadequate system and methods for countering the IRA insurgency. This analysis of the Irish Conflict shows there is no purely military or paramilitary solution to counterinsurgency. and military, as well as the efforts of civilians, police and military....Counterinsurgency, Irish Republican Army, IRA, Low Intensity Conflict, Democracy, Great Britain, URBAN Counterinsurgency, Ireland.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 01, 1993
- Accession Number
- ADA264286
Entities
People
- Russell C. Thackston
Organizations
- Naval War College