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**The British Experience in Northern Ireland:
A Model for Modern Peacemaking Operations?**

**A Monograph
by**

Major William J. A. Miller

Armor

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**School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas**

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MONOGRAPH

THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE IN NORTHERN IRELAND: A
MODEL FOR MODERN PEACEMAKING OPERATIONS?

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ABSTRACT

THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE IN NORTHERN IRELAND: A MODEL FOR MODERN PEACEMAKING OPERATIONS? by MAJ William J.A. Miller, USA, 53 pages.

This monograph examines the evolution of the British Army's tactics and doctrine during its employment in support of the civil powers in Northern Ireland and compares these evolutions to its conventional warfighting doctrine. The ultimate objective is to determine whether there is a set of unique and/or common tactical imperatives, read here as tactics, techniques and procedures, for peacemaking operations which might allow U.S. forces to be properly manned, trained and equipped before their commitment to such operations.

The British Army's operations in Northern Ireland have evolved over the last twenty-three years not only to meet the threat but also to conform to shifts in governmental policy toward the resolution of the troubles. As a result of this long-term commitment, the British Army has adapted itself to man, train, and equip a significant portion of its force structure, between 20% and 33% infantry battalions at any one time, for operations in Northern Ireland while retaining its other unilateral and coalition commitments. The bottom line is that the battalion that deploys to Northern Ireland is significantly different in structure, capability and method of operations than one configured for conventional operations.

In this monograph it was determined that British operations in Northern Ireland are remarkably similar to what the United States classifies as peacemaking operations. As a result, the British experience in Northern Ireland may serve as a model for the United States Army's preparation for and conduct of peacemaking operations.

This monograph concludes that peacemaking operations are fundamentally different from conventional combat operations. Peacemaking is not simply a conventional combat operation with restrictive rules of engagement; it is not prudent to expect conventionally trained units to simply pick up and execute such a complex undertaking. Peacemaking operations require different training, different equipment and a different ethos. Without extensive forethought and preparation, the employment of conventionally trained forces to execute peacemaking operations could lead to a forcing of the proverbial square peg in the round hole. British experience in Northern Ireland suggests it just won't fit.

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
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
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The United States conducts peacemaking operations with its military forces when it is in the national interest to stop a violent conflict and force a return to political or diplomatic methods. ... While the ultimate objective may be to maintain peace, the initial phase in peacemaking is to attain it ... peacemaking is often unilateral, possibly with some consent from the beneficiary, and the peacemaking force imposes it [peace].¹

I. INTRODUCTION

The specter of violent civil and interstate war, based primarily on ethnic and religious factors, threatens to destroy the peace and stability necessary to transition the former communist bloc states and other developing nations into productive members of the global community. A state of peace may have to be imposed on the warring factions to ensure continuity of the transition and the stability of emerging governments. Given the United States Army may be called upon to engage in such "peacemaking" operations, there is a requirement to determine what actions are necessary to ensure the Army is capable of performing them.

This monograph examines the evolution of the British Army's tactics and doctrine during its employment in support of the civil powers in Northern Ireland and compares these evolutions to its conventional warfighting doctrine. The ultimate objective is to determine whether there is a set of unique and/or common tactical imperatives, read here as tactics, techniques and procedures, for peacemaking operations which might allow U.S. forces to be properly manned, trained and equipped before their commitment to such operations.

This monograph contains five sections. Following this brief *Introduction*, Section II, *Background*, contains a discussion of the historical background for the British involvement in Northern Ireland and a comparison of their operations to the U.S. concept of peacemaking. Section III, *Analysis*, consists of two parts. The first part

is a comparison of the British and American preparations for the conduct of conventional warfare. The purpose of this portion of the analysis is to determine whether the two armies' approaches to manning, training and equipping soldiers for combat can be objectively compared. The second part is conducted within the framework of the U. S. Army's tactical battlefield operating systems² and compares the methods used by the British Army to prepare for conventional combat and the methods it uses to prepare units for operations in Northern Ireland. The fourth section, *Findings*, is a distillation from the preceding analysis of the specific trends and considerations that could be taken from the British experience and applied to the development and evaluation of doctrine, training, leader development, organizations and materiel for United States Army peacemaking operations. The conclusions are presented in the final section.

II. BACKGROUND

A Brief History of the Conflict.

British involvement in Northern Ireland dates back to 1169 A.D. when a Norman earl landed in Ireland with approximately 400 soldiers.³ Soon thereafter, in 1171 A.D., Pope Adrian IV issued an edict proclaiming King Henry II of England as King of Ireland.⁴ While the English ruled over Ireland in name, in fact Ireland and her people maintained a certain autonomy for several hundred years after this declaration.

The year 1534 was a turning point in Irish history. It was during this year that England set about extending and maintaining her control over the whole of Ireland.⁵ By 1540 the struggle was temporarily over and the only region left completely untamed by the British was the north of Ireland, Ulster.⁶

By 1591 the embers of revolt and resistance had rekindled a fire and a passion for independence in most of Ireland. Again the feelings ran deepest in Ulster, "the last great stronghold of Gaelic tradition."⁷ In 1595 Hugh O'Neill, originally a protege of the

English government, took to the field against the Crown because he "saw the Gaelic tradition being gradually eaten away with the rest of Ireland and ... looked forward with dismay to the prospect of English law and the reformed church."⁸ The war raged for six years with the Irish holding their own. Then, in 1601 the Spanish intervened on behalf of the Irish by landing a fleet with several thousand soldiers near Kinsale. The combined force of Spanish and Irish were soundly defeated -- for all intents and purposes ending the six year revolt. Eventually O'Neill surrendered and the rebellion against the Crown collapsed.

With the collapse of O'Neill, the House of Tudor completed its conquest and domination of Ireland. Ireland had been transformed; Gaelic Ireland was gone. The traditionally dominant power of the chiefs and authority granted them under the ancient laws was shunted aside in favor of the duly constituted power of the Crown's government in Dublin and the rule of English law.⁹

In the early 1600's the British government, under the guidance of King James I, began a thorough and determined program of "implantation" in Ireland. Under this system of colonization, Catholic landowners and tenants were evicted from their properties. In their stead, the British government emplaced "undertakers." These were Protestants, loyal to the crown, who had immigrated to Ireland in search of land and opportunity.¹⁰ In Ulster, because of its considerable population of immigrants and British public servants, this effort was especially successful, at least in the eyes of the Crown, although less so in the eyes of the indigenous Irish.¹¹

In 1641, as a result of the continued discrimination against the Catholics, which included more stringent land reforms and the mandated expulsion of Catholic priests from Ireland, revolt was born anew. Rebellious Irish Catholics quickly overran and seized control of Ulster. While the English reacted swiftly, the revolt was not snuffed out and, with the coming of the English civil war, the Crown's attention turned inward. With the end of the civil war came Cromwell's effort to put down the rebellious Irish. In

1649 Cromwell struck out for Ireland with 12,000 men and within a matter of months decimated the Irish forces and firmly reestablished British control of Ireland.¹²

In the late 1690's and early 1700's the Protestant-controlled Irish Parliament continued to tighten the policy of separation and disenfranchisement of the native Irish Catholics. The vehicle for this constriction was a body of law collectively known as the Penal Code.¹³ Harsh, unjust and morally indefensible, the Penal Code served to perpetuate a "policy of exclusiveness"¹⁴ and further separate those who were colonists and loyalist, and those who were native and republican.

By 1800, many of England's politicians, William Pitt foremost among them, realized the scope of the problem in Ireland and passed the Act of Union. This act joined Ireland to England and the Commonwealth under the auspices of the British constitution. Its intent was to alleviate many of the problems in Ireland by allowing a more direct role for the government of England in solving the economic, social and political problems of Ireland.¹⁵ However, it failed in its application to Ireland and the situation there continued to erode.

Throughout the 1800's and into the early 1900's, tension mounted as Ireland's problems went unaddressed. The potato famine of 1841, the rise of extremist organizations such as the Catholic Irish Republican Brotherhood and the much older Protestant Orange societies, and the inability of the British government to address the nationalist desires of the majority of the Irish people made the situation all the more volatile. Finally, in 1916 on Easter Sunday, Dublin exploded.

The Easter Rebellion was organized by the Irish Republican Brotherhood. On the whole it was a failure because of the rapid and brutal British response but it captured the attention of the Irish nation and galvanized nationalist sentiment across the country.

As a result of the rebellion, political pressure began to rise as Sinn Fein, an ultra-nationalist political party, began to acquire a significant voice in Irish politics and

formed a secessionist legislature in Dublin. As Sinn Fein was making its presence felt, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) was born. Members of the IRA considered Ireland a free republic and were prepared to fight to make it a reality. The IRA launched its first campaign in 1919 and with extensive support from the people was extremely successful. It soon became apparent that while the IRA could probably never defeat the British, they would probably never lose either.¹⁶

In 1920, as the unrest and pressure continued, the British government decided to act and passed the Government of Ireland Act.¹⁷ The act partitioned Ireland. In the north, the six counties of Ulster were to remain a part of the United Kingdom. In the south, the remainder of Ireland would become an independent state. Unfortunately, this act did not solve the problem. Instead, it simply changed its scope. The problem of Republican versus Unionist was localized to Ulster. For the Republicans the solution was not good enough. The Catholic population in the north would be further isolated and placed in the minority, not only politically but numerically. They saw no hope of having their grievances addressed under this arrangement; in their eyes, all of Ireland should have been granted independence. For the Unionists, the solution was acceptable. Ulster remained part of the United Kingdom and the Unionists' positions in power were secured.

By the end of the 1920's the partitioning of Ireland had magnified the already powerfully held Catholic perception of disenfranchisement and the equally strong Protestant perception of isolation:

On the one side [Catholic] we have a minority which sees itself as cheated by force out of its birthright, isolated from the rest of the Irish people, and always drawn by the most natural instincts to correct that injustice. On the other [Protestant], there is a community that constitutes a majority of the area it actually controls politically, but always unsure of that control because it depends to such a great extent on the support of Britain ...¹⁸

Until this basic dichotomy was solved, there would always be conflict over the irreconcilable differences between Catholics wanting a free, whole and independent Ireland and Protestants wishing to maintain the status quo in the north. The battle lines were thus drawn for the next seventy years of conflict.

The enmity simmered through the interwar years with the IRA mounting campaigns of violence in Northern Ireland during 1940 and 1956. Both campaigns were suppressed by the British. In the 1960's the Catholic minority allied itself with the burgeoning civil rights movement in England. Beginning in the summer of 1968, several Catholic-led marches, organized under the civil-rights banner, created tension between the extremist Protestant and Unionist factions. Finally, in August of 1969, Ulster exploded once again. However, this time the violence was far too much for Northern Ireland's police force, the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), and their auxiliaries to handle. The British Army was called in to restore order and has been there in force ever since.¹⁹

The British Army's Mission in 1969.

The British Army's commitment to Northern Ireland in 1969 was precipitated by the civil authority's inability to control the sectarian violence which had erupted during that summer between the Catholic and Protestant communities. As a result, the Army's mission seemed clear and simple: "act in aid of the civil power to restore order."²⁰ In order to prosecute its mission successfully, the British Army had to accomplish two major tasks. The first was short term and immediate in nature; the Army had to separate the two communities.²¹ The second was long term in nature and more comprehensive in scope; the Army had to assist in creating the conditions which would allow a return to peaceful coexistence between the competing factions.

The British government established a framework around which all operations would be built. The framework consisted of three tenets. The first was the minimum

use of force.²² It was critical that force be applied in a judicious, measured and selective manner. In the eyes of the British Army, the operations in Northern Ireland did not constitute war. These operations were regarded as Internal Security (IS) operations, where the Army was to act in support of the established civil government, not to destroy an enemy force. As a result, the Army issued "orders to shoot only as a last resort."²³ The second tenet was the primacy of law.²⁴ The perceived legitimacy of the government's action was essential and, as a result, the rule of law had to be maintained and enforced regardless of the circumstances. As one senior officer said during the early days of the Army's commitment, "The one firm guideline we had was the law..."²⁵ The final tenet the British Army embraced was the necessity of taking an even-handed approach to any disturbance²⁶. Again the concept of the legitimacy of government actions was the driving factor. The Army did not want to be perceived as favoring one faction over another. Rather, it wanted to be seen as a neutral peacemaker whose job it was "to restore the [writ of the] Queen's Government."²⁷

Evolution of British Operations in Northern Ireland.

Upon its initial deployment in 1969 the British Army, according to COL (Ret) Norman Dodd, executed its mission "reasonably well"²⁸ considering the difficulties it faced. Yet in spite of its initial success in controlling crowds and separating the belligerents, the Army found itself ill-prepared for the evolving conditions under which it was required to operate. Soldiers and their commanders were confused; just what did aid to civil authorities entail? Was the Army to control crowds, replace the police, or fight a guerilla war?²⁹ No one knew the answer, so the Army did what it knew best: it called upon its colonial experience.

The Army's only experience in similar situations was based on operations throughout the Empire and Commonwealth over the previous 200 years where "the rules were simple, the chain of command direct and the objective clear."³⁰ This time,

however, the Army had to control violence by British citizens and as such found itself very much in the public eye. Restraint and control were paramount; no longer could the Army resort to the use of deadly force to accomplish its basic mission to support the civil power in the restoration of order.

The basic tactic to control crowds, developed and tested in the colonies, was the box formation. Soldiers formed into a tightly knit box formation, deployed barbed wire to separate it from the hostiles, and unfurled banners stating that the crowd should disperse. In the words of one historian, the British soldier was:

Trained in the 'shoot one round at that big ... bugger in the red turban' style ... they had all practised ... All the old drill. Dannert wire ... unfold the banners ... bring out the camera ... get the magistrate to read the Riot Act and say 'move now.'³¹

The Army had assumed the responsibility for law and order and had, for all intents and purposes, replaced the police as the symbol of authority. The Army's actions in Northern Ireland were initially successful because in the early days of the emergency, the threat was simply crowds of hooligans bent on having a go at one another. Its tactics were adequate for separating two rival groups of people and arresting troublemakers. However, because of the government of Northern Ireland's intransigence in dealing with the causes of the problems, the threat changed; the Army became the target and it discovered that the colonial techniques were no longer appropriate.

In late 1969 and into 1970 the threat began to evolve radically. The Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) separated from the older and somewhat more conservative IRA.³² The PIRA was clearly a more violent and dangerous organization that vowed to use any means necessary to accomplish its goals. The Provisionals changed the rationale behind the disturbance -- independence, not civil rights, became the issue. The PIRA:

had now embarked upon a full-scale guerilla war, striking indiscriminately at civilian and military targets in an endeavour to make the Province ungovernable and so bring about the collapse of the State and the withdrawal of the British who, the terrorist believed, would not be willing to pay the price in soldiers' and civilians' lives, in wrecked infrastructure and perhaps most important, international odium.³³

As a result the British Army "found itself involved in a counterinsurgency campaign in Northern Ireland."³⁴ The Army delineated two new objectives, defeat of the terrorist and the creation of a stable political situation which would allow a return to normalcy in the Province.³⁵ Emphasis was placed on keeping the general level of violence down while shifting assets and focus towards the attrition of terrorists.³⁶

In late 1970 the British Army acknowledged the scope and complexity of operations in Northern Ireland by appointing the first Commander, Land Forces (CLF) to deal with day to day operations.³⁷ Up to this time the General Officer Commanding in Northern Ireland had been responsible for policy rather than operations. The CLF was a true operational commander. This period also saw the appointment of Brigadier Frank Kitson as Commander, 39 Brigade. Kitson brought an intellectual rigor and a wealth of experience in counter-revolutionary warfare operations to the Province which had heretofore been absent.

The key to Kitson's approach was a coordinated effort of the civil and military operations, to include greater integration of police and Army operations, against the insurgent. Kitson called for an extremely selective use of force in the street against the average rioter but a stepped up program of attrition against the terrorist. Both actions had to be clearly and effectively integrated with supporting civil programs.³⁸ While his ideas were not fully accepted at the time, many of them were adopted in the years to follow.

In 1971 the Army began a concerted effort to build an intelligence system within Northern Ireland. The RUC's ability to gather intelligence had suffered greatly during the troubles and the process of exchanging information between the Army and the RUC was difficult at best. The Army realized from its colonial experiences that reliable

intelligence was critical in battling an entrenched terrorist organization, so they determined that if they could not get intelligence from the police infrastructure they would have to create their own system³⁹ in order to ensure the supply of the necessary "contact" intelligence.

In the summer of 1971, as a result of escalating violence and calls to get tough, the British government resorted to a new tactic, internment without trial. The Army was the vehicle for its execution. Under the provisions of the Special Powers Act of 1922, the security forces, under the direction of the Home Secretary, were allowed to intern certain suspects and "take all such steps and issue all such orders as may be necessary for preserving peace and order."⁴⁰ It was a political disaster and, for the most part, militarily ineffective.⁴¹ The Army was alienated from a large part of the community because internment focused on one faction, the Catholics. Protestant extremists were virtually ignored. In the words of one officer involved in the operation:

The British Army, as the instrument of internment, [had] become the object of Catholic animosity. ... It has, in fact, increased terrorist activity, perhaps boosted IRA recruitment, polarised further the Catholic and protestant communities and reduced the ranks of the much needed Catholic moderates.⁴²

The fundamental mistake of internment was the inability of the political leadership to realize that since they were involved in an insurgency campaign, the real battle was for the hearts and minds of the people.⁴³

By the end of 1971, the Army had established a system for manning the increasing requirements for troops in Northern Ireland. The system had three components. The first was a body of battalions which formed a permanent garrison, a portion of which had been stationed there for many years. Additional units were moved lock, stock, and barrel into Northern Ireland, including heavy equipment, vehicles and their families. The tour of duty for these units was two years. The second and largest component of the system was a group of battalions which rotated on four

month roulement tours from posts in England and West Germany. These units left their heavy equipment at home station and drew the necessary transport and support equipment from depots in Northern Ireland upon arrival. The third component consisted of battalions on "Spearhead" duty. These battalions were on standby for emergency deployment from home station. Their deployments usually lasted a matter of weeks.⁴⁴ The challenges posed by this constant rotation of a large portion of the British Army generated significant impacts on the readiness of units in relation to their primary missions in NATO or in support of other out of area operations.

In March of 1972 Direct Rule was initiated in Northern Ireland. The Northern Ireland Parliament was suspended and Direct Rule from London was established. With Direct Rule came a change in policy for Army operations. The Army assumed a low profile and basically withdrew from the problem areas and, as a result, intelligence began to dry up. The reestablishment of "No-Go" areas, where for all intents and purposes the extremists were the law, and the strengthening of safe areas by the IRA became a major problem and tensions began to build. In response, the British government initiated Operation Motorman to retake the "No-Go" areas. The aim of the operation was clear. "It was to establish a continuing presence in all hard areas and dominate both IRA and Protestant extremists."⁴⁵ The operation was an immediate success and the Army quickly began to build upon it by establishing comprehensive intelligence and training programs to ensure its dominance and preclude the establishment of such areas in the future.

The evolution of the IRA's competence and methods reinforced the British Army's traditional belief in solid, reliable intelligence programs. "The Army had learned ... that it was no use mounting an operation ... unless it had very good intelligence."⁴⁶

The British emphasis on intelligence was manifest in two trends which accelerated during 1972 and 1973. The first trend was General Kitson's requirement

that a greater responsibility for intelligence be devolved to the company commander. Kitson realized that the nature of the threat and the area of operation dictated this arrangement and as such intelligence efforts would have to conform to the operational necessities. "Kitson's policy of making every company commander identify and pursue the terrorist structure in his own area pushed each company into becoming a low level intelligence unit."⁴⁷ The consequences of this policy eventually changed the way the British organized and executed intelligence operations across the Province.

By 1973 the Army had significantly expanded its intelligence operations in the Province. Computers, new intelligence gathering systems and the institution of long-term, covert surveillance operations changed the character of the intelligence effort.⁴⁸ Computers were eventually pushed down to the company level and so allowed the establishment of data bases for analysis and reference. Covert, manned observation posts and new technologies such as night vision devices, signals intelligence devices and electronic surveillance apparatus greatly expanded the Army's ability to conduct surveillance over longer periods of time to isolate specific persons or operational cells. In accordance with General Kitson's policies, the intelligence gathering and processing capabilities of the battalions and companies deployed in Northern Ireland were increased significantly.

The second trend was the recognition by the Army that its units had to gain a better understanding of the environment in which they now operated. The Ministry of Defense began to conduct studies which focused on the soldier, his enemy, the people caught in the middle, and the conflict as a whole. The studies had two major objectives. First, they sought "to present complete, coherent pictures of the enemy on which Army training, tactics and strategy could be based."⁴⁹ The second goal was to develop a program of education for the soldier, which could counteract the soldiers' preconceptions about the conflict and the people in Ulster, and allow him to function more effectively in Northern Ireland. The reports tried to "paint a comprehensive

picture of the people and their lifestyle -- as they would affect the soldiers, and as the soldiers would affect them."⁵⁰ They were aimed at helping the soldier understand the conflict and his role in it.

Both of the trends mentioned above, the devolution of intelligence operations to the lowest tactical levels and the quest to understand the conflict, had a direct impact on the training of units for duty in Northern Ireland. One of the major results was the institution of the Northern Ireland Training Assistance Teams (NITAT) in 1972.

These teams were formed to assist commanders in their preparation for deployment and operations in the Province. Units attending NITAT courses were rigorously trained. The instruction included information about the different organizations they might face, their tactics and goals, familiarization with their area of operations, rural and urban patrolling techniques, intelligence operations, the handling of various incidents, ambushes, bombings, and the rules of engagement. Extensive hands-on training and practical exercises at training areas on the mainland followed this initial instruction.⁵¹ NITAT was the first and most decisive institutional step toward dealing with the long-term nature of the British Army's commitment to Northern Ireland.

The year 1977 saw another major change in governmental policy and consequently the Army's role in Northern Ireland. The new policy was "to reestablish the primacy of the RUC."⁵² In order to support this new policy, a quasi "joint" command structure was established. The Security Co-ordinating Committee was formed to report to the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, who was made responsible for the direction of security policy in the province. The Committee was chaired by the Chief Constable of the RUC who was to report to the Secretary of State in consultation with the General Officer Commanding Northern Ireland. This type of parallel structure was extended to the divisional level where RUC divisional commanders and Army battalion commanders were encouraged to coordinate their

efforts in a more systematic way.⁵³ The premise of this arrangement was not unity of command, rather unity of effort. The requirement was to maintain separate and distinct chains of command while focusing both organizations on a common goal: defeat of the terrorist threat in order to return the province to normalcy.

From this point forward, the Army focused on two overriding military tasks: the elimination of terrorism, and the protection of the policeman on the beat in order to return the duty of routine policing to the RUC.⁵⁴ To accomplish these tasks the Army reorganized its military operations into five categories which remain the basis for operations today: framework operations, reactive operations, specialist operations, covert operations and static tasks.⁵⁵

Framework operations are the daily, planned, overt around the clock operations which are designed to provide a commander "detailed knowledge and a feel"⁵⁶ for his assigned area. These operations include patrolling on foot, in vehicles and in the air, in order to deter terrorist activity, random vehicle check points and searches, the maintenance of a physical presence among the populace for purposes of reassurance, and the overt surveillance and questioning of suspicious persons.⁵⁷

Reactive operations include two subcategories of operations. First, reactive operations encompass "the immediate reaction of the Army to ... terrorist incidents."⁵⁸ The second subcategory includes preplanned operations by Army units in reaction to specific intelligence or information. They may be well-planned and rehearsed or executed quickly as targets of opportunity.⁵⁹

Specialist operations are those which require the Army to provide certain skills or equipment support to the police. These operation include bomb disposal, air reconnaissance, specially trained search teams, air support, and special photography.⁶⁰

Covert operations include two major subcategories. The first are those operations designed to specifically destroy the terrorist organizations. Conventional

units attempt to "kill or capture" if an opportunity presents itself but are not the units of choice in covert attrition operations. These operations are almost solely the province of special operating forces such as the Special Air Service (SAS). The second category includes operations designed to gather intelligence on the terrorist. These operations are conducted largely by conventional forces in two modes: specially trained soldiers in plain clothes operating among the population and the operations of specially trained close observation platoons (COP), an evolution of the conventional infantry battalion's reconnaissance platoon.⁶¹

The final category is static tasks. These operations revolve around the protection of key facilities, maintenance of fixed observation posts and the guarding of security forces and their facilities.⁶²

Today the British Army's mission in Northern Ireland is:

"TO DEFEAT TERRORISM IN SUPPORT OF THE RUC - through:

- a. Reassurance of the local population as a whole;
- b. Deterrence of terrorist activity;
- c. Attrition against the terrorist."⁶³

In the view of the British, reassurance, deterrence and attrition form an interdependent whole. Reassurance of the population is the key element in the relationship, for without it there is no possibility of political progress. Reassurance, however, is dependent upon attrition and deterrence. Attrition must be maintained at such a level that the thought of it becomes the dominant factor in the terrorist's decision cycle. Deterrence must be effective enough to prevent the terrorist from influencing and threatening the average citizen into support or silence.⁶⁴ Operating within the structure of operations described above and consistent with the concepts of reassurance, deterrence and attrition, the Army continues to execute and reinforce these concepts in order to allow the political system to mete out a solution for the eventual return to a normal existence for the people of Ulster.

III. ANALYSIS

Peacemaking and the British Army in Northern Ireland.

Notwithstanding the British view that their operations in Northern Ireland are within the realm of what they consider to be matters of Internal Security, the similarities between their operations and what the United States might classify as peacemaking operations are considerable.

British Army operations in Northern Ireland fall under the rubric of what the United States Army now defines as operations other than war.⁶⁵ According to Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations, (DRAFT, Revised September 1992), the successful planning and conduct of such operations require that the six principles for operations other than war, objective, unity of effort, legitimacy, patience, restraint, and security, be considered before and during the execution of an operation.⁶⁶ Based on their colonial experience and extensive study of what the United States now classifies as operations other than war, the British have demonstrated a clear understanding of these principles during their operations in Northern Ireland.

The notion of objective is at the heart of the British concept of operations in Northern Ireland. The ultimate objective of British Army operations is to work in concert with the civil powers in order to return the Province to a state of normalcy. The British Army acts as an enabling force which is focused on creating the conditions that allow the political and diplomatic apparatus to solve the problem. Unity of effort is clearly demonstrated by the extensive, while not always historically cordial, coordination between Northern Ireland police units, the Army and the representatives of the Home Office.⁶⁷ The focus of the initial operating tenets discussed earlier has been to maintain the legitimacy of the British role in Northern Ireland. While some may argue the effectiveness of the policies towards that end, there is little doubt that the British government, and by extension its army, seeks to perpetuate a sense of legitimacy for their actions, both internal and external to Northern Ireland. The British

patience, perseverance and determination to stay the course are clearly demonstrable. After twenty-three years, thousands of deaths, and untold misery experienced by soldier and civilian alike, the British remain committed to seeing an end to the conflict and reestablishing a condition of peaceful coexistence in Ulster. Restraint has been a key ingredient in the British formula for operations since its inception. Two of the initial operating tenets, the minimum use of force and the requirement to operate within the law, demonstrate the British application of the concept of restraint. Finally, the British believe strongly in the principle of protection. As the following analysis will show, protection of the force is critical to the British concept for operations.

Not only do British operations in Northern Ireland seem to fall within the United States' concept of operations other than war, they further bear a strong resemblance to what the United States specifically defines as a peacemaking operation.

"The United States conducts peacemaking operations with military forces when it is in the national interest to stop a violent conflict and force a return to political or diplomatic methods."⁶⁸ The British government clearly interposed the army in Northern Ireland because they felt it to be in the best interest of the nation. Without this intervention it is highly unlikely that political or diplomatic mechanisms would have been able to survive and begin work on the causes of the problems.

Current United States doctrine asserts that the United States "... typically undertakes peacemaking operations at the request of appropriate national authorities ..."⁶⁹ So it was on 14 August 1969 when the British government acceded to the request of the Government of Northern Ireland, an ostensibly independent national body, to commit British troops to stem the violence and reassert the power of government in Ulster.⁷⁰

Doctrine also holds that a peacemaking operation requires "that the available force be sufficient, but its use be applied with discretion. ROE [rules of engagement]

are apt to be restrictive because the purpose of the force is to maintain law and order."⁷¹ This was clearly the case when the British Army was committed. The force available to the government was strictly constrained by the "use of minimum force" edict issued by commanders in order to meet the political needs of the government.

Finally, doctrine states, "while the ultimate objective may be to maintain peace, the initial phase in peacemaking is to attain it."⁷² The British clearly followed this line of reasoning when they outlined the two tasks discussed earlier. First, they had to separate the factions, i.e., attain the peace. Then they had to assist in maintaining that peace by establishing the conditions which would allow the political organs of government to address the causes of the conflict.

A Comparison of British and American Conventional Doctrine.

In order to establish the efficacy of translating the British experience in Northern Ireland into a useful set of tactics, techniques and procedures for American forces involved in peacemaking operations, it must first be established that the British and American approaches to warfighting, more specifically their doctrines, are compatible.

The British and American approaches to the conduct of conventional war are quite similar in three respects: their understanding of the use and purposes of doctrine, the content of their doctrines, and the impact they have on the execution of military operations and their common alliance responsibilities and commitments.

The Armies of the United States and Great Britain share several common beliefs about the roles and effects of doctrine. Doctrine is the expression of how a nation thinks about war.⁷³ In both Armies there is an emphasis on developing the notion of how to think about war versus what to think about war. Both nations believe that doctrine "should represent an effective deterrent in peacetime."⁷⁴ Consequently, both doctrines reflect that deterrence is the primary goal of each nation's strategy, but should it become necessary, the doctrines make it clear that military forces must be

capable of attaining and maintaining national strategic goals. Doctrine should be flexible and adaptable enough to support a range of national strategic options. It does this in three ways. First, it provides the mechanism for the development of mental agility in leaders and soldiers. It prevents "rigid adherence to techniques, rules and methods because they limit the initiative that is so essential to warfighting success."⁷⁵ Doctrine is not dogma: it allows commanders and leaders to adapt to changing circumstances. Second, doctrine is closely linked to and flows from a nation's national military strategy.⁷⁶ It is the tangible expression of how to accomplish a nation's strategic goals through the application of military force based on experience, history and military theory. Third, doctrine should be flexible enough to remain relevant to a range of responses. Both the United States and Great Britain stress that a doctrine should be structured to "adapt to rapidly changing circumstances"⁷⁷ and be applicable across the many environments in which an army might be called upon to fight, if the doctrine is to remain relevant and effective over time.⁷⁸

The United States and Britain share a number of common views concerning the execution of conventional warfighting operations. While emphasis in some areas differs, the doctrines are compatible.

The United States Army is a force projection entity that must operate in the joint environment to employ its combat power. It has a balanced doctrine. It espouses both a decisive offensive capability and a defensive capability sufficient to deter any aggressor. The United States Army organizes, trains and equips maneuver-oriented, combined arms formations for employment by combatant commanders. The essence of its operations is the overwhelming application of combat power through the integration of four dynamics: maneuver, firepower, protection and leadership. Central to its operations are the operational tenets of initiative, agility, depth, synchronization and versatility.⁷⁹ The proper application of the four dynamics of combat power, within the framework of the operational tenets, leads to the generation of maximum relative

combat power at decisive times and places on the battlefield, and as such is a prerequisite for victory.

While the scope of its commitments may not be as great, the British Army, like the United States Army, is a force projection army. It is also an army that must operate in a joint environment in order to apply its combat power. Similarly, the British Army is a maneuver-based army that emphasizes combined arms operations. British Army doctrine is also balanced; it stresses the need for decisive offensive capability and the need to maintain a credible deterrent capability. For the British, balance also equates to the proper measure of aggressiveness in seeking the initiative while recognizing the need to protect the fighting power of the force.⁸⁰

The British Army espouses two overriding principles in the execution of its combat operations, the seizure and maintenance of the initiative and maintenance of balance.⁸¹ Like the United States Army, the British Army believes that "possession of the initiative is the key to success in battle."⁸² It focuses on forcing the enemy to abandon his aim and allowing the friendly commander to dictate the terms of battle. The maintenance of balance is concerned with "thwart[ing] the enemy's designs without interfering with the implementation of [friendly] plans."⁸³ Maintenance of the initiative and balance are achieved through the application of the operational functions, protection, firepower and movement.⁸⁴ Protection includes all actions, offensive or defensive, which ensure the viability of the force and the maintenance of the initiative. Striking includes all offensive actions generated through the application of firepower and maneuver to concentrate combat power in order to destroy the enemy or deny him freedom of action. Movement is the vehicle through which protection and striking are realized; it provides the ability for the force to remain balanced and protected while seizing the initiative from the enemy force. The proper orchestration of the operational functions, like the correct application of the dynamics of combat power

for the United States Army, allows the focused application of combat power at the decisive time and place on the battlefield.

The concepts of initiative, balance, maneuver, jointness, synchronized operations and agility are common to both armies. Each espouses a balanced doctrine, combined arms operations and a requirement to generate decisive combat power at the time and place of their choosing.

The final and most overt example of the compatibility of United States and British doctrines is their commitment to standard North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) tactical land force doctrine. ATP-35(A), Land Force Tactical Doctrine, delineates the common NATO tactical land force doctrine for member nations providing land forces to the alliance. ATP-35(A) was promulgated to ensure "land forces of the alliance ... possess a common understanding of the principles of land combat and apply the same doctrine in tactical operations."⁸⁵ The United States and Britain are both subscribers to and developers of this doctrine.

The commitment to a common alliance doctrine when combined with a common understanding of the purpose of military doctrine and similar doctrinal precepts, demonstrates the inherent similarities between the doctrines of the British and United States Armies.

British Operations and the Blueprint of the Battlefield.

The United States Army's Blueprint of the Battlefield is an analytical framework structured to provide a description of Army requirements, capabilities and combat activities. The Blueprint "was designed for use in combat development studies."⁸⁶ Specifically, the Blueprint is a vehicle through which existing doctrine, training, leader development, organizational structure and material issues can be analyzed and emerging issues examined. The design of the Blueprint allows its use in the analysis of battles, engagements, campaigns and major operations.⁸⁷ Because of these

characteristics, the Blueprint will serve as the analytical framework for the examination of the evolution of British tactics, techniques and procedures during their involvement in Northern Ireland. This analysis focuses on the tactical level operations conducted by the British in Northern Ireland and how they differ from tactical level operations in a conventional environment.

The Blueprint is organized by levels of war, strategic, operational and tactical. Each level of the Blueprint is organized by operating systems; operating systems are the major functions performed in war, for that specific level of war, which are deemed necessary for the successful execution of combat operations.⁸⁸

At the tactical level there are seven battlefield operating systems (BOS): intelligence, maneuver, fire support, air defense, mobility and survivability, combat service support (CSS), and command and control. These BOS are the major functions which must be integrated by Army forces to successfully execute battles and engagements.⁸⁹

Intelligence.

The intelligence BOS is the collection of functions that generate knowledge of the enemy, weather, and geographical features required by the commander in planning and conducting combat operations. It is derived from an analysis of information on the enemy's capabilities, intentions, vulnerabilities, and the environment.⁹⁰

The British have made significant efforts towards coordinating the intelligence effort across the Province while decentralizing much of its execution to the battalion level. Initial efforts to coordinate joint intelligence efforts between the RUC and the Army were sporadic at best. However, today there is a Director and Coordinator for Intelligence, who is responsible to the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland for coordinating the efforts of all intelligence agencies, both Army and police, in their work against the terrorist.⁹¹ The focus is on achieving unity of effort.

The real source of information is the people. While signals intelligence, electronic intelligence and other technologically sophisticated intelligence collection

means are important to the total effort, human intelligence is by far the most important source of information in the Province. Because of this need to collect from the populace, intelligence has become very much a bottom up operation as opposed to the traditional top down approach used in conventional operations. As such, units at the lowest tactical echelons have been augmented to execute decentralized intelligence operations.

The decentralization of the responsibility for the execution of the intelligence mission has led to several significant organizational and operational changes within the deployed units. They include an increase in the size and capability of battalion intelligence sections, the creation of close observation platoons (COP) and the use of long term, covert surveillance operations.

Battalions and companies have had their intelligence processing capabilities greatly expanded for operations in Northern Ireland. The wartime authorization for conventional operations of 5 or 6 personnel (1 officer and 4 or 5 other ranks) in a battalion intelligence section was increased to as large as 30 (2 officers and 28 other ranks) in order to provide a robust analytic capability down to the company level.⁹² This establishment provides continuity over time because each unit, down to the company level, has the capability to develop an extensive data base on its area of operations and pass the intelligence on to following units.

Close observation platoons were formed as a result of the requirement to conduct long-term surveillance operations in static observation posts. For the most part, these units are built around battalion reconnaissance platoons which have been augmented with additional soldiers. They are specially trained to use the most up-to-date equipment and techniques in their operations. Their operations are conducted over periods of days and weeks and are designed to target specific individuals or areas. Their main assets are stealth, cunning and technology.

Maneuver.

The maneuver BOS is the employment of forces on the battlefield through movement and direct fires in combination with fire support, or fire potential, to achieve a position of advantage with respect to enemy ground forces in order to accomplish the mission.⁹³

Maneuver seeks to dominate ground and place the enemy at a disadvantage.

In Northern Ireland the British Army seeks to dominate ground through patrolling, the emplacement of fixed observation posts and cordon operations.

The patrol is the primary vehicle which the British Army uses to achieve a position of advantage over the enemy force, the terrorist. The Army patrols on foot, in vehicles and in the air. Patrols include the establishment of vehicle check points, random searches and extensive liaison with the local inhabitants.

Patrolling has become, in every sense, a tactical art in Northern Ireland. The patrol in Northern Ireland has evolved into a completely different operation from a patrol in a conventional combat situation. Patrols in Northern Ireland are designed to reassure the populace through their presence, to deter the terrorist by dominating ground and denying freedom of movement and to attrit the terrorist by gathering information for long term operations and reacting to "kill or capture" as opportunities present themselves.⁹⁴ While patrols in conventional operations also seek information, they generally emphasize a low profile, i.e., stealth, and at times the decisive use of force to obtain information. In conventional operations patrols are conducted to support the maneuver of larger forces. In Northern Ireland today, to patrol is to maneuver.

In preparation for operations in Northern Ireland, soldiers have to be taught that the enemy spends a great deal of time trying to set up "incidents," such as bombings, shootings, ambushes and civil unrest.⁹⁵ Maneuver, i.e., patrolling, must be designed to counteract or minimize the effects of the terrorist's preparations. This is further complicated by the fact that different patrol techniques must be pursued in the urban,

rural and border areas. Within each of these areas the terrorist will operate differently because the terrain, popular support and options available to them vary. The border areas are a particular problem because they offer an opportunity for the terrorist to strike from a protected area and return before supporting patrols can react. Under these conditions, the keys to successful patrolling are a comprehensive plan, unpredictability, sound tactics and discipline. This approach avoids the terrorist's incident but accomplishes the mission.

The organization of the ground patrol has taken its own form in Northern Ireland. Beginning in the early 1970's, the size and composition of the patrol was based on the "brick," a four man team led by a corporal or lance corporal.⁹⁶ Today the patrol is based on the "multiple," three bricks or teams of four, for a total of 12 men, commanded by a senior corporal, a sergeant or a junior officer. Multiples and bricks were developed because in the narrow streets and alleys of the urban environment, many members the traditionally larger patrol became redundant. They are now employed on different routes to provide mutual support, rapid response to any incident and a minimum number of targets for ambush in a specific area. Flexibility, mutual support, depth, all around defense, deception and control are the key factors to be considered in patrolling.⁹⁷ Previously, these were considerations for operations involving larger formations than patrols because the larger formations, not the patrol, maneuvered.

The conduct and frequency of the patrol schedule is often dictated by political expediency rather than military necessity.⁹⁸ The Army, in coordination with the police, plans its patrols based not only on the need to pursue the terrorist, but also to present the appearance of normalcy within its area of responsibility (AOR). This often leads to the prohibition of patrols during certain times such as religious holidays, funerals or sectarian celebrations even though there is a significant chance for the kill or capture

of terrorists during these events.⁹⁹ Patrols are carefully planned to support the total civil-military effort in an AOR.

Observation posts (OP) also contribute to the force's ability to maneuver in Northern Ireland by providing a pivot of maneuver for friendly forces, and defining an area of constant observation around which the enemy must operate. There are several fixed OPs located along the border with the Republic of Ireland. These large facilities are constructed much like any conventional fortification to include extensive overhead cover, security zones and revetments.¹⁰⁰ The presence of these installations dominates ground and canalizes infiltration by terrorists from the safe areas in the south. Patrols can be used to cover the dead space between OPs and interdict the ingress and egress of terrorist units. The primary purpose of the OPs is to isolate the terrorist from his base area in the south by interdicting the free flow of arms, resources and personnel into the north.

Cordon operations are encirclement operations at the lowest level. These operations are designed to entrap a terrorist after he has initiated an incident or when an army unit is acting proactively to prevent an incident. They focus on maneuver to deny the terrorist escape routes and to isolate terrorist elements for the purpose of killing or capturing. Successful cordon operations are based on thorough planning and integration with patrol plans, precise intelligence about the enemy's habits, superior teamwork and exceptional proficiency in tactical battle drills.

Junior noncommissioned officers conduct the bulk of the operations from patrolling to search and cordon operations. In conventional operations within the infantry battalion, maneuver is the responsibility of the officer corps from platoon commander to battalion commander. In Northern Ireland, the propensity for maneuver has devolved to the lowest level, the junior noncommissioned officer. In Northern Ireland the conflict has become a "corporal's war."¹⁰¹

Fire Support.

The tactical Fire Support BOS is the collective and coordinated use of target acquisition data, indirect fire weapons, armed aircraft (less attack helicopters), and other lethal and nonlethal means against ground targets in support of maneuver force operations. The Fire Support BOS includes artillery, mortar, and other nonline-of-sight fires, naval gun fire, close air support, and electronic countermeasures.¹⁰²

There is virtually no use of indirect fire assets by the Army in Northern Ireland. The nature of the threat and the proximity to the population preclude its use. However, the use of nonlethal fires in the form of electronic counter measures (ECM) and electronic counter-counter measures (ECCM) is extensive.¹⁰³

Over the years the terrorist has developed an extensive capability for the employment of remotely detonated mines. In order to counter this capability the British Army has developed man-portable ECM equipment, techniques and tactical drills. These drills and techniques are based on a thorough map reconnaissance of the intended patrol route and an understanding of the bomber's tactics in order to determine likely spots for ambushes or bomb attacks. During the conduct of the patrol, soldiers must be aware of suspicious activity by the populace anywhere in the area which might point to the location of an ambush site because the locals are generally warned to avoid such areas by the terrorists. When the patrol arrives at a likely ambush/bombing site it deploys and executes a series of drills designed to protect itself and determine if any explosive device is in the vicinity. The drills include the use of small unit maneuver and electronic surveillance devices to confirm or deny the presence of explosive devices. The use of ECM capabilities and their integration into tactical maneuver is a critical factor in thwarting the effective use of the terrorist's primary weapon, the bomb.

The British make extensive use of psychological operations in the province. From the leaking of information about sources within the terrorist organizations to the enhancement of the reputation of invincibility and efficiency of the special operations

forces,¹⁰⁴ the British strive to keep the terrorists off balance and separate them from their bases of support, inside and outside of Ulster. Psychological operations are critical to deterrence and reassurance. Additionally, they allow the war to be carried to the enemy without the risks inherent in maneuver and direct combat.

Air Defense.

Tactical air defense is all measures designed to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of attack by hostile aircraft or missiles after they are airborne.¹⁰⁵

The British control the airspace over the province, but in recent years the terrorists have acquired man portable surface-to-air missiles (SAM) and heavy machine guns¹⁰⁶ which pose a threat to British air operations. SA-7 SAMs and 14.7mm machine guns have been used in the execution of sophisticated ambushes of rotary wing aircraft, particularly in the border areas. For the British in Northern Ireland, the problem is how to defend and protect their air assets, not how to defend against air attack. As a result, the British have modified their tactics for the employment of aircraft.

Tactics have evolved to encompass both passive and active measures. Passive measures include the use of missile warning indicators and infrared suppression devices. This technology is also used by helicopters on the conventional battlefield. Active measures involve two primary considerations: the actual employment and the grouping of aircraft. The first consideration is the choice of flight routes and profiles to avoid likely ambushes and firing positions. Additionally, aerial patrols are often integrated with ground patrols to provide mutual support. The key is to observe the assigned area without becoming an easy target. Again there is little difference in this area between air operations in Northern Ireland and conventional operations. The second consideration is grouping of aircraft. All operations have an *element assigned to provide an aerial overwatch similar to attack helicopter* operations executed by American forces in Viet Nam. An armed helicopter flies high cover, out of range of most man portable air defense weapons, ready to react to hostile

actions from the ground, while the reconnaissance aircraft works the lower altitudes.¹⁰⁷ It is this feature that distinguishes air operations in Northern Ireland from those in conventional operations. In conventional helicopter operations, the density and redundancy of enemy air defense systems would in all likelihood prohibit these tactics. Historically, tactical air defense has not been a great worry for the Army. However, as the terrorists gain access to more sophisticated weapons and their associated tactics, control of the airspace over Ulster is sure to become more difficult.

Mobility and Survivability.

The Mobility and Survivability BOS describes the functions of the force that permit freedom of movement relative to the enemy while retaining the ability to fulfill its primary mission. The Mobility and Survivability BOS also includes those measures that the force takes to remain viable and functional by protection from the effects of enemy weapons systems and natural occurrences.¹⁰⁸

Mobility operations in the Province focus on the maintenance of friendly movement through route security and clearance operations, and the denial of enemy movement through the aggressive use of patrols and OPs, a topic discussed under the maneuver BOS.

Because of the basically static nature of the operations in Northern Ireland, survivability becomes a major concern for British commanders. While survivability is always a concern for a responsible commander, it is doubly so in Northern Ireland because of the effect casualties can have on public support both in England and the Province. A single successful attack against British forces reinforces the notion that the terrorists are successful in their operations as a whole, undermines the legitimacy of the government, and can erode public support in England.

Survivability operations fall into three broad categories in Northern Ireland: hardening of facilities, bomb disposal and search operations. The hardening of facilities in Northern Ireland is very similar to operations conducted in a conventional setting. Layered defenses, stand-off and depth provide the protection for the troops

and equipment. Bomb disposal work is an integral part of daily operations in the Province. The troops are trained to recognize combat indicators denoting possible bomb locations. Specially trained ammunition technical officers (ATO) from the Royal Army Ordnance Corps are always on call to respond to explosives finds. These operations are critical to maintenance of the credibility of the government and safety of the population. The Royal Engineers provide expert search teams in Northern Ireland.¹⁰⁹ Additionally, each unit that deploys to the Province is required to send soldiers to a "search techniques course" prior to deployment.¹¹⁰

As a result, survivability operations and the protection of the force in Northern Ireland now serve two purposes, the preservation of combat power in theater and preservation of public will at home.

Combat Service Support.

The CSS BOS is the support and assistance provided to sustain forces, primarily in the fields of logistics, personnel services, and health services.¹¹¹

Combat service support in the Province entails two challenges for commanders in Northern Ireland. The first challenge is the care and maintenance of large amounts of specialist equipment that is prepositioned in Northern Ireland for use by rotating battalions. Much of this equipment is unique to Northern Ireland and requires special training and maintenance. The second major challenge is the requirement to maintain the operational bases used by the battalions during their deployment. In many cases, commanders are responsible for the maintenance and operations of their own bases as well as the routine supply necessary to keep operations under way. Many of the operational sites are designed for company and platoon sized units and are spread across significant geographic areas. This fact, when combined with the threat's penchant for ambush, requires that commanders pay special attention to the security of their CSS needs.

Command and Control.

Tactical command and control (C2) is the exercise of authority and direction by a properly designated commander over assigned forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission.¹¹²

Command and control in Ulster is a joint effort. The joint command structure includes the police, who have the primary responsibility for the maintenance of order, and the Army, which is charged "to defeat terrorism in support of the RUC."¹¹³ The Army and the RUC maintain separate chains of command, the goal of this arrangement being to achieve a unity of effort in the absence of unity of command. Actions to focus and coordinate the operations of the Army and the RUC include the design of compatible communications systems, establishment of compatible tactical doctrine and operating procedures, education of police and soldiers on one another's roles, and the coordination of intelligence efforts.

Because operations in Northern Ireland have become a "corporal's war," the devolution of responsibility to the lowest levels has placed new requirements on commanders. Orders must be precise and clearly state the mission, the younger leaders must understand the task to be accomplished and its purpose. While this is no different from the expectations of commanders in a conventional setting, the need to design missions that support RUC operations and the overall plan for the area of operations may supersede any military necessity. At the same time, junior leaders are expected to exercise a great amount of initiative within a set of operational guidelines that are in every respect more restrictive than those likely to be encountered in a conventional setting. They must be able to deal with the press, operate effectively within a large noncombatant population and execute a complicated set of rules of engagement -- all while conducting combat operations. Senior leaders must take whatever steps are necessary to ensure that the junior leader understands his place in

the greater scheme of operations and are trained accordingly. Soldiers at all levels must understand the intent of the operations in which they are involved and their role in the execution of that intent.

Well-trained, highly disciplined troops who understand the nature of the war and the relationship of the support of the people to long term success are essential to the success in Northern Ireland. The war in Northern Ireland is for the support of the people. In the words of General (then Brigadier) Sir John Waters, "We MUST win them to our support."¹¹⁴ The key is to understand not only the terrorists, but also the noncombatants from whom they draw their support. Without such support, either in the form of overt actions to support the terrorist or through non-support of government efforts, the terrorists will be able to survive, blend in and continue their operations. Soldiers and their leaders must understand that their actions, good and bad, influence the population to support either the terrorist or the government.

The initial deployment of tactical communications systems was a disaster for the British. The capabilities of the tactical communications systems were inadequate for use in urban areas and dictated the use of airborne relays for operations. The British quickly discovered that operations within Northern Ireland require flexible, reliable, secure and redundant communications that are as effective in urban areas as they are in rural settings. Over the years this requirement has dictated the deployment of radios and communications devices capable of operating in the cities and the countryside.¹¹⁵ Much of this equipment was bought off-the-shelf from civilian sources and required new training for the soldier. The British experience verifies the need to consider the nature of the environment of operations as well as the threat when designing a tactical communications system before forces are committed.

Summary.

In Northern Ireland the relative importance of the BOS in the conduct of tactical operations and their application in the conflict when compared to conventional

operations has changed drastically based on the political restrictions and the nature of the threat.

Intelligence is the critical BOS in Northern Ireland. "Northern Ireland is a battle for information and intelligence."¹¹⁶ Intelligence operations focus not only on finding and knowing the enemy, but also on collecting and exploiting information from the population in order to build a bond of trust and reinforce the legitimacy of government commitments. Intelligence operations are critical in the battle for the support of the people.

Maneuver and fire support focus not so much on the destruction of the enemy as on the control and shaping of his movement and the negation of his plans. They do not generate overwhelming combat power for the British, rather they are intended to deny the enemy the opportunity to generate any combat power of his own.

Air defense requirements, as the United States Army views them, are virtually non-existent, but the requirement to control the air space does exist. The Army's control of the airspace centers on the protection of friendly assets rather than the attack or denial of enemy air assets.

Mobility and survivability are keyed to denying the terrorist the ability to move freely and damage the force. Critical to this BOS is the concept of force protection to deny the enemy propaganda value in the Province and in England.

Combat service support is as critical in Northern Ireland as it is in any conventional operation. The primary difference is that tactical commanders have to maintain large amounts of specialist equipment, peculiar to Northern Ireland, which they would not normally use.

Command and control serves much the same function for the British in Northern Ireland as it would in any other combat situation. However, there are two main differences between command and control functions in Northern Ireland and conventional operations. First, the Army must work in a joint relationship with a civil

authority vice another military service. This requires the integration of two systems, two cultures and two sets of expectations regarding success. Second, the requirement for the leaders and soldiers to understand the nature of the conflict is paramount. They must understand that they are an enabling force, not the decisive force, in the struggle to return the Province to a state of normalcy.

IV. FINDINGS

The purpose of this section is to review the implications of the British experience in Northern Ireland. The findings will be presented in terms of their implications for the development of doctrine, training, leader development, organizational design and material for United States Army forces employed in peacemaking operations.

Doctrine.

There are three major doctrinal implications for the conduct of peacemaking operations by United States Army units: the relative indecisiveness of military force; the necessity to focus on protection of the force; and the need for versatile units.

The use of military force in peacemaking operations will not, in all likelihood, be decisive. Military force will be employed as an enabling element of power. Just as the British have had to operate in the support of a civil power, so will United States Army forces when employed in a peacemaking role. The goal of peacemaking is to create the conditions necessary to allow other elements of power to function effectively in order to address the causes of the conflict. U.S. forces will have to operate within a broad plan of action that is focused on the restoration of normalcy as opposed to the defeat of a specific enemy force. While peacemaking operations may have to resort to the application of decisive military force, as the British did in Operation Motorman, the ultimate goal of the operation will, in all probability, be to reinforce the legitimacy of the government, protect noncombatants or to secure the freedom of action of another element of power. Military force will focus on the separation of belligerent factions with

the intent of seeking a truce and not on the ultimate destruction of one or more of the participants. From general to private, the Army must understand whether its actions are to be decisive or supporting, and the impact each concept has on the execution of military operations.

Force protection is critical to the success of any peacemaking operation. In peacemaking, as in any military operation, the commander has a legitimate and real concern for the safety and welfare of his troops. The difference in the importance of force protection in a peacemaking situation is twofold. First, casualties incurred in a peacemaking operation will have a considerable impact on the support of the American public for the operation because, in the main, the American people will be hard pressed to see such operations as essential to national security. Recall the American response to the bombing of the Marine barracks in Lebanon. Second, the successes of a small, dedicated force against a large well-trained army, for which there is significant expectation of overwhelming success, can result in a measurable propaganda advantage for the lesser force. These successes, regardless of their military value, erode confidence in the ability of the peacemakers to accomplish their mission and lend credence to belligerent claims of moral superiority and the aura of justness for their actions.

Before the United States Army is committed to a peacemaking operation, where the individual soldier may become the primary target for the opposition, it must be prepared to deal with the issues of individual and unit protection. Protection of peacemaking forces is paramount in ensuring their capabilities are maintained, public support remains adequate, and the enemy force is denied any propaganda advantage, at home and abroad.

The requirement for the British Army to train and deploy conventional infantry battalions for use in Northern Ireland demonstrates the need for versatility. The United States Army, like the British, cannot afford to maintain forces specifically trained for

conventional operations or peacemaking operations. Units must have the capability to conduct peacemaking operations as well as conventional operations. This requirement has significant implications for the way the Army trains leaders and soldiers, organizes its units and equips its forces to provide this dual capability.

Training.

The British experience in Northern Ireland suggests that there are significant training challenges involved in preparing for peacemaking operations. These challenges include the amount of preparation required to attain proficiency in tactics, techniques and procedures specific to peacemaking, the dedication of assets to suitable centralized training systems, and the impact of peacemaking deployments on conventional training proficiency.

The lead time required to adequately prepare a unit for peacemaking operations will probably be significant. British units are notified up to eighteen months in advance of deployment and begin dedicated training six to nine months prior to departure.¹¹⁷ The need to learn the specific tactics, drills, special skills and methods of operation not common to conventional operations but required in Northern Ireland dictate this extensive train-up.

Because of the highly specialized nature of much of the training needed to deploy a peacemaking unit and the need to continually update tactics, techniques and procedures as the threat evolves, selected training will have to be centralized. The British have centralized the training proponentry for Northern Ireland operations with NITAT. This organization standardizes training and provides home station training advice as well as coordinating specialist training ranging from surveillance techniques to search procedures to patrol tactics. While the training of units remains the responsibility of the unit commander, the establishment of a proponent for the training of such a specialized nature ensures continuity and standardization.

If the United States Army is to become a participant in peacemaking operations, it must establish a standardized training system that defines the tasks, conditions and standards to support such operations. Additionally, the Army will have to provide dedicated resources, from doctrine developers to Combat Training Center rotations, to train and evaluate unit and individual proficiency.

The commitment of United States forces to extended peacemaking operations will have an impact on the skills required to execute conventional operations. The effects will be both negative and positive. British experience suggests that as units are oriented toward maintaining an overt presence and operating within the restrictive ROE generally required in a peacemaking operation, heavy weapons team skills, the capacity to conduct operations above the company level, and the ability to operate as a combined arms team will fade over time. On the positive side, the British have observed an enhancement in the capabilities of small unit leaders, the refinement of small unit tactics, increased proficiency in individual marksmanship skills and the increased cohesion of units as a result of the shared experience of combat.¹¹⁸

The implication of the previous discussion is that certain skills and experiences are transferrable between peacemaking operations and conventional operations. The challenge for the United States Army is to determine which skills are common and which skills are essential for either operation in order to establish a training strategy that allows units to transition from one mission to the other with minimal impact on readiness.

Leader Development.

Leadership is the critical factor in any military endeavor. However, indications from the British experience point to small unit leadership, particularly at the junior noncommissioned officer level, as the critical link in the chain of command. In peacemaking operations, which focus on separating belligerents and establishing a presence, small unit leaders will bear the most significant burden of battlefield

leadership. It is the small unit leader who will lead the patrols and maintain daily contact with the population that the force is there to protect. His decisions and actions will determine whether the Army is seen as a peacemaker or just another group of bullies with weapons.

Concurrent with the development of the junior leader, the attitude of the soldier must be addressed during the preparation for peacemaking operations. The British experience implies that soldiers must understand that their efforts in support of peacemaking operations are inherently different from conventional operations. Every individual involved in peacemaking operations must understand the linkage between the government they operate in support of, his tactical mission and the goal of returning the area of operations to normalcy. In preparation for peacemaking operations leaders must inculcate in the soldier the attitude that they will be deployed to help, not conquer.

Organizations.

The Army must be able to organize units to meet the mission requirements of peacemaking. This entails not only the task organization of units before they deploy but also an organizational flexibility within the Army to organize, train, deploy and support the force.

The British have evolved a system that essentially reorganizes the conventional infantry battalion for operations in Northern Ireland. Commanders are required to deploy with a specified number of multiples, rather than platoons or companies. As a result, each rifle company reorganizes its basic squad-platoon structure to form platoons of multiples and the heavy weapons company deploys as rifle company under the same multiple-platoon structure. Several other specialist sections or platoons are reorganized or augmented to meet the special requirements for operating in Northern Ireland. Each change to the normal organization creates turbulence among units and men that must be accommodated before deployment. All of these

modifications and reorganizations are based on a careful evaluation of the threat and the roles and missions each battalion will execute within its assigned area of operations. The bottom line is that the infantry battalion that deploys to Northern Ireland is significantly different in structure, capability and method of operations than one configured for conventional operations.

The rotation system established by the British Army to support the troop requirements in the Province is another example of their organizational flexibility. There are currently 11 infantry battalions (12 total battalions if the additional deployed battalion, armor or artillery, is counted) deployed in Northern Ireland out of 51 available, or 21% of the infantry in the Army. If one counts the number of battalions preparing to rotate into the province and as such dedicated solely to the preparation for the mission, the total commitment could be as much as 33% of the infantry in the Army. Inevitably, the effect of having up to one-third of the available infantry committed, trained and supported for a specific mission places significant stress upon the Army's ability to support other commitments.

The fact that the British organize in a specific manner for deployment to the Province is not the issue for United States Army peacemaking operations. What is important, however, is their overall ability to reorganize, and the system that has been established to execute and sustain this effort. It includes the ability to reorganize units at the lowest level, train the units in the mission specific skills needed in the Province and sustain the deployment of a significant number of troops while maintaining other commitments. In the case of the British Army, all of this has been done with little or no impact on the conventional capabilities of the force as evidenced by their performance in the Falklands in 1982 and Operation Desert Storm in 1990.

The United States Army must establish similar systems for manning, equipping, training and sustaining units on peacemaking operations. These systems must exhibit the institutional flexibility and versatility to allow individual units to reorganize rapidly

with minimum turbulence. However, there is a caveat to this type of reorientation of Army-wide systems. The cost of preparing for and executing peacemaking operations in terms of manpower, funding and time must be weighed against the potential drain on the Army's conventional capabilities. While the British have been able to deal effectively with this problem, the United States' commitments are more far-reaching. The effects on the Army's ability to conduct conventional operations by shifting resources to accommodate the special needs of peacemaking operations must be completely understood in relation to the Army's ultimate mission, the defense of the country.

Materiel.

There are two implications for the development and deployment of equipment and technologies in support of peacemaking operations. The first is the need to protect the force. Equipment and technologies will have to be developed to ensure that this is achieved. This equipment technology must be keyed to the capabilities of the enemy and the operational needs of the force. For example, the British have demonstrated an ability to adapt and deploy systems specifically designed to counter terrorist tactics and support their day-to-day operations through the development of equipment such as improved body armor, personal ECM gear and devices that can indicate the direction from which an individual rifle round was fired. The second implication is based on the British experiences with equipment designed for conventional operations and its initial performance in Northern Ireland. Before any systems are deployed, it is critical that any assessment of the area of operation for a peacemaking operation includes a consideration of the suitability of currently fielded equipment to ensure it will function effectively and be interoperable with allies and the host nations' military or civil systems as appropriate.

V. CONCLUSION

The United States Army must be able to innovate and adapt to the changing requirements for the use of military force. This "innovation is dependent on ... an assessment of the security environment that leads to ... new concepts of military operations."¹¹⁹ The security environment has changed. Peacemaking operations may well become a primary vehicle for shaping the future global security environment. They offer a method of exercising military power to control or contain conflict, while at the same time retaining international legitimacy and the moral high ground because their purpose is not conquest or defeat but accommodation and a return to peace.

In the face of continued calls for the commitment of American forces to peacemaking operations in places like Yugoslavia, Somalia and Liberia, it behooves the Army to examine how best to train for and execute such peacemaking operations. There is much that can be learned from the British experience in Northern Ireland which suggests that there is a significant difference between peacemaking operations and conventional combat operations. Peacemaking is not simply another combat operation with restrictive ROE; it is not prudent to expect conventionally trained units to simply pickup and execute such a complex undertaking. From the individual tactics, techniques and procedures employed by the force on the ground to the inculcation of different attitudes in the soldier about the purpose of the operation, peacemaking operations are fundamentally different. They require different training, different equipment and a different ethos. As the British have demonstrated, the training and equipment must evolve to minimize the effects of threat operations on friendly forces. More important, however, is the need to foster the proper ethos for peacemaking operations within the force itself. American soldiers trained to operate in the conventional environment seek a quick, decisive victory through the application of overwhelmingly violent combat power in a minimum amount of time. In peacemaking operations, the use of overwhelming force may well prove counterproductive. The

ability to stay the course over time is critical to establishing and maintaining the conditions for successful political and diplomatic operations designed to resolve the crisis. Military victory in peacemaking operations will not be measured in terms of decisiveness but in its capacity to enable other elements of power to operate freely. The ethos that must be fostered in peacemaking is not that military force must provide a quick, overwhelming, decisive victory, but that its purpose is to enable the gradual, restrained use of all elements of power toward the resolution of the problem.

The development of doctrine, leaders, training, organizations, and materiel must be sufficiently forward looking to provide United States Army peacemaking forces with the means to accomplish their mission before they are committed. The system must also provide the mechanism for them to evolve, as missions, threats and political realities change over time.

Given the current international situation, there is every possibility that United States Army forces will be deployed in large numbers to execute peacemaking operations within the next decade. Without extensive forethought and preparation, the employment of conventionally trained forces to execute peacemaking operations could lead to a forcing of the proverbial square peg in the round hole. British experience in Northern Ireland suggests it just won't fit.

ENDNOTES

1. Field Manual (FM) 100-20/Air Force Pamphlet (AFP) 3-20, Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict, (Washington: Headquarters Departments of the Army and Air Force, 1990) p. 5-7, 4-10.
2. TRADOC PAM 11-9 Blueprint of the Battlefield, (Ft Monroe: Headquarters, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1991), p. 7-1.
3. John A. Little, Conflict in Ulster (Wichita: Wichita State University, 1976), p. 6
4. Kenneth S. Hahn, A Case Study: The Effects of the British Army Against the Irish Republican Army (Wright-Patterson Air Force Base: Air Force Institute of Technology, 1989), p. 19.
5. J. C. Beckett, A Short History of Ireland (London: Hutchison House, 1952), p. 44
6. Little, p. 6
7. Beckett, p. 63
8. Beckett, p. 63-64.
9. Beckett, p. 67.
10. Little, p. 7.
11. Beckett, p. 70.
12. Ibid, p. 86.
13. Little, p. 9.

Some of the more significant provisions of The Penal Code:

1. Irish Catholics could not serve as members of the Irish Parliament or hold any minor government position.
2. No Catholic could attend a university, maintain a school or send his child out of Ireland to be educated. A reward of 10 English pounds was offered for reporting a Catholic school teacher.
3. No Catholic could live in the cities of Limerick or Galway or own property within their walls.
4. No Catholic could purchase land or receive it as a gift from a Protestant.
5. Orphan Catholic children must be raised as Protestants.

14. Little, p. 8.
15. Ibid, p.10.
16. Kevin Kelly, The Longest War: Northern Ireland and the IRA (London: Zed Press, 1982), p. 35-37.
17. Beckett, p. 178.
18. Gary MacEoin, Northern Ireland: Captive of History (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1974), p. 48-49.
19. Norman L. Dodd, Colonel (Ret.), "The Corporals' War: Internal Security Operations in Northern Ireland", Military Review (July 1976), p. 60.
20. Desmond Hamill, Pig in the Middle: The Army in Northern Ireland, 1969-1984 (London: Methuen Ltd, 1985), p. 21.
21. Little, p. 65.
22. Hahn, p. 31.
23. Hamill, p. 17.
24. Hahn, p. 31.
25. Hamill, p. 26.
26. Hahn, p. 31.
27. Hamill, p. 26.
28. Little, p. 66.
29. Hamill. p. 21.
30. Ibid
31. Hamill, p. 23.
32. Dewar, p. 48.
33. Ibid, p. 52.
34. Hamill, p. 32.
35. Ibid, p. 33.
36. Ibid.

37. Ibid, p. 40.
38. Ibid, p. 42.
39. Ibid, p. 52.
40. Ibid, p. 299.
41. Dewar, p. 54.
42. Hamill, p. 63.
43. Ibid, p. 62.
44. Dewar. p. 55-56.
45. Hamill, p. 115.
46. Hamill, p. 89.
47. Ibid, p. 121.
48. Ibid, p. 135.
49. Ibid, p. 122.
50. Ibid, p. 125.
51. Ibid, p. 139.
52. Dewar, p. 147.
53. Dewar. p. 148.
54. Ibid.
55. Ibid.
56. Lecture notes, Northern Ireland Presentation (CRW Course) (Northern Ireland Training Assistance Team, Dec 1991),p. 31.
57. Dewar, p. 148.
58. Lecture notes, Northern Ireland Presentation (CRW Course), p. 33.
59. Ibid.
60. Ibid, p. 33-35.

61. Ibid, p. 35-38.
62. Ibid, p. 38.
63. Planning Directive for Northern Ireland Training, (London: Headquarters, United Kingdom Land Forces (UKLF), G3, Aug 1992), p. 1.
64. Speech by General Sir John Waters, Kermit Roosevelt Lecture Series, Spring 1992.
65. Field Manual (FM) 100-5 , Operations (DRAFT, revised version), (Fort Monroe: Headquarters, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, 3 November 1992), p. 5-2.
66. Ibid, p. 5-5.
67. Interview with LTC Mike Smith 12 August 1992.
68. FM100-20, p. 5-7.
69. Ibid.
70. Little, p. 65.
71. FM 100-20, p. 5-7.
72. Ibid, p. 4-10.
73. Design for Military Operations - The British Military Doctrine, (London: The British General Staff, 1989), p. 3. and Field Manual (FM) 100-5 (DRAFT), Operations, (Fort Monroe: Headquarters, United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1992), p. 1-1.
74. Design for Military Operations, p. 5.
75. FM 100-5 (DRAFT), p. 1-2.
76. FM 100-5 (DRAFT), p. 1-2. and Design for Military Operations, p. 3.
77. FM 100-5 (DRAFT), p. 1-1. and Design for Military Operations, p. 4.
78. FM 100-5 (DRAFT), p. 1-1.
79. The tenets are summarized here, see p. 2-5 through 2-10 in FM 100-5 (DRAFT) for a further discussion:

Initiative is the central tenet. The other tenets are based on "securing or retaining the initiative." The concept of seizing the initiative revolves around the

ability to set or change the terms of battle by action. Agility is the ability of a force to act or react faster than an enemy force. It is a precondition for the maintenance of the initiative. Agility allows a commander to rapidly shift his forces to a decisive point faster than his enemy. "Depth is the extension of operations in time, space and resources." It allows the commander to attack his enemy throughout the volume of his operating space. Depth implies significant forethought, planning and an understanding of how to synchronize all available resources toward a common end. "Synchronization is the use of time, space and resources to produce maximum relative combat power at the decisive time and place." This concept implies continuity in purpose over time. Synchronization is concerned with the proper application of the effects of combat power over time toward a specified end-state. "Versatility is the ability to shift focus, tailor forces, and to move from one mission to another rapidly and efficiently." It implies that a force can conduct numerous different missions, either simultaneously or sequentially, with the same expectation of success. The proper application of the four dynamics of combat power, within the framework of the operational tenets, leads to the generation of maximum relative combat power at the decisive times and places on the battlefield and as such is a prerequisite for victory.

80. Army Field Manual, Volume 1, The Fundamentals, Part 1, The Application of Force, (London: The British General Staff, 1985), p. 47.

81. Ibid, p. 45.

82. Ibid.

83. Ibid, p. 47.

84. Ibid, p. 43.

85. Land Force Tactical Doctrine, Change 1, (NATO: Military Agency for Standardization, 1987), p. XXIII.

86. TRADOC PAM 11-9 Blueprint of the Battlefield, p. 1-2.

87. Ibid.

88. Ibid, p. 2-1.

89. Ibid, p. 7-1.

90. TRADOC PAM 11-9 Blueprint of the Battlefield, p. 7-10.

91. Lecture Notes, Northern Ireland Presentation (CRW Course), p. 30.

92. Interview with COL Peter Durrant and LTC Mike Smith, Ft Leavenworth, Ks ,4 September 1992.

93. Ibid.
94. Dewar, p. 180.
95. Hamill, p. 140.
96. Dewar, p. 222.
97. Multiple Commanders Urban Training Notes (Northern Ireland Training Assistance Team, Urban Training Team, undated), p. 3-4.
98. Interview with COL Peter Durrant and LTC Mike Smith, Ft Leavenworth, Ks, 4 September 1992.
99. Interview with LTC Mike Smith 12 August 1992.
100. Lecture Notes, Northern Ireland Presentation (CRW Course) (Northern Ireland Training Assistance Team, Dec 1991), p. 32.
101. Dodd, p. 67.
102. TRADOC PAM 11-9 Blueprint of the Battlefield, p. 7-4.
103. Interview with COL Peter Durrant 2 Nov 92.
104. Hamill, p. 189.
105. TRADOC PAM 11-9 Blueprint of the Battlefield, p. 7-4.
106. Lecture Notes, Northern Ireland Presentation (CRW Course) (Northern Ireland Training Assistance Team, Dec 1991), p. 22.
107. Interview with COL Peter Durrant 2 Nov 92.
108. TRADOC PAM 11-9 Blueprint of the Battlefield, p. 7-10.
109. Dewar, p. 187.
110. Planning Directive for Northern Ireland Training, p. 1B-1.
111. TRADOC PAM 11-9 Blueprint of the Battlefield, p. 7-14.
112. TRADOC PAM 11-9 Blueprint of the Battlefield, p. 7-7.
113. Planning Directive for Northern Ireland Training, p. 1.
114. C.J. Waters, Brigadier, Commanding Officer, 3 Brigade, Commander 3 Brigade's Operational Notes for Junior Commanders (Northern Ireland: undated), p. 1-21.

- 115. Hamill, p. 197.
- 116. Lecture Notes, Northern Ireland OPS/TAC/TNG Presentation (Northern Ireland Training Assistance Team, Urban Training Team, undated), p. 29.
- 117. Planning Directive for Northern Ireland Training, pgs. 1A-1 to 1-A3.
- 118. Interview with COL Peter Durrant and LTC Mike Smith, Ft Leavenworth, Ks, 4 September 1992.
- 119. Stephen P. Rosen, Winning the Next War: Innovation and the Modern Military, (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991), p. 96.

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