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"Marine Integration On Naval Aircraft Carriers--
What is the CINC Getting?"

by

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

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: Guy L. Varland

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Abstract of
"Marine Integration on Naval Carriers- What is the CINC Getting?"

The traditional composition of Naval aircraft carriers is made up almost entirely of Navy assets. A recent change in the composition of the USS *Theodore Roosevelt* (CVN-71), however, has resulted in a dramatic increase in Marine Corps tactical aircraft, personnel and helicopters assigned. Since this composition is unprecedented, regional Commander in Chiefs (CINCs) have not had exposure to this unique force composition. This paper will contrast the capabilities and limitations of the new composition of *Roosevelt*, with the composition of *Roosevelt* prior to Marine integration.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

A current force structure proposal within the United States Navy (USN) is being implemented which will deploy a Naval aircraft carrier, USS *Theodore Roosevelt* (CVN-71), with a dramatic increase in the number of Marine Corps tactical aircraft, rotary wing aircraft and personnel assigned.¹ The new composition of *Roosevelt* will be significantly different than the traditional CV currently deployed to regional Commander in Chiefs (CINCs), composed entirely of USN assets.

Combatant CINCs, (especially in the Pacific, European, and Central commands), are very familiar with the structure and employment of the "all-USN" CV. This paper will examine the capabilities and limitations that *Roosevelt's* new composition with increased Marine presence will provide CINCs, given likely missions in their region, as compared to the traditional all-USN CV composition.

The comparison will focus on the utilization of the two compositions by CINCs in missions at the Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) level, since any inherent limitations in a CV's composition can be alleviated in a Major Regional Conflict (MRC) by the many additional forces which would be allocated to the CINC. Therefore, to enable the most meaningful comparison of the two compositions, this paper will further concentrate on their utilization in LIC scenarios where the CINC has only one carrier battlegroup (CVBG) available in

theater. Commander in Chief Central Command (CINCCENT) will be used as a regional example to contrast the capabilities and limitations of the two compositions, as utilized in current operations in CINCCENT's Area of Responsibility (AOR).

CHAPTER II

BACKGROUND

The force structure and tactical aircraft (TACAIR) mix on CVs has been an evolutionary process that has changed and adapted as a function of many variables. The phasing out of older TACAIR platforms and subsequent replacement with a new platform, the status of required CV modifications to accommodate the new platform, the size and available deck space of the CV, and the tactical lessons learned from prior force compositions are but a few of the myriad inputs that have determined the historical force composition of the CV. Therefore, it has traditionally been difficult to categorize the "standard" CV TACAIR force mix, especially during periods of major changes in Navy TACAIR procurement (i.e. the phasing out in the mid-to-late 1980s of the A-7 by the F/A-18) and a shortage in available Navy squadrons of a particular platform (i.e. the EA-6 and A-6 in the mid 1980s) to meet operational requirements.

It is precisely during these periods in the past that Marine Corps TACAIR have been utilized.² Historically, Marine Corps TACAIR have been sporadically utilized on CVs throughout the history of Marine Aviation as a "stop-gap" measure to assist the Navy in meeting CV TACAIR requirements. Those platforms in the Marine Aviation inventory which have been utilized to "fill the need" have included the F-4, EA-6B, A-6 and F/A-18. Once the Navy was able to again meet its own

TACAIR requirements, those Marine TACAIR squadrons which had been temporarily utilized, returned to meet their own completely separate commitment as a member of the Air Combat Element (ACE) assigned to a particular Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF).

Recent events, however, have resulted in a dramatic increase and a fundamental change in the utilization of Marine TACAIR on CV's. In the spring of 1992, the Navy and Marine Corps announced plans to integrate, as a permanent step, three Marine F/A-18 squadrons and one Marine EA-6B squadron into Navy CVs with implementation beginning in September 1992.³ The concept involves decommissioning four Navy TACAIR squadrons and replacing them with the previously mentioned Marine squadrons. A catalyst mentioned by Naval Aviation's leadership for this fundamental change and increase in utilization was the shift in Naval strategy from "a focus on a global threat to a focus on regional challenges and opportunities."⁴ Increased Marine Corps TACAIR integration on CVs was viewed as supporting some of the tenets of this strategy.⁵

Budgetary constraints have also served as a major catalyst for Marine TACAIR integration. Rear Admiral Riley Mixson, director of air warfare for the Navy, has stated "because of budgetary pressures and our new focus on regional warfare, it makes sense" to merge Navy and Marine air task units.⁶ The plan is expected to save up to \$300 million in operating costs by the year 2000.⁷

Another more controversial and political reason for the increased Marine integration is the intense scrutiny in Congress and the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning the future of a separate Marine aviation force, as part of the Pentagon's overall review of the military services' different roles and missions.⁸ The increased integration displays politically favorable utilization and optimization of forces to Congress. However, the plan's controversy centers around Navy perceptions of increased decommissionings of their own TACAIR squadrons, while the Marine Corps is concerned with potentially degrading the effectiveness of its own force structure by having Marine TACAIR units removed from their parent MAGTFs and permanently assigned to the Navy.⁹

Meanwhile, outside of the TACAIR arena, another force structure modification further increased Marine Corps presence on CVs, in the unlikely form of ground troops and rotary wing aircraft. In an unprecedented move, a Special Marine Air Group Task Force (SPMAGTF) deployed concurrently with the Naval air element, Carrier Air Wing Eight (CVW-8), aboard *Roosevelt* for operational testing designed to validate interoperability and test the capabilities of the concept.¹⁰ The SPMAGTF force consists of approximately 600 Marine troops and an air element of 6 CH-53D and 4 UH-1N helicopters. A reduced command element, platoon-sized combat service support element, shore fire control party, forward air controller and a reconnaissance detachment rounds out the structure.¹¹

The concept of the SPMAGTF evolved in an attempt to tailor and optimize force packages to meet the broad range of requirements that confront CINCs amidst the current downsizing of available assets. The current societal emphasis on the use of the military in missions at the LIC end of the conflict continuum, like disaster relief and humanitarian assistance, also contributed to the "birth" of the SPMAGTF. Admiral Paul David Miller, Commander in Chief Atlantic (CINCLANT), envisioned the use of the SPMAGTF as an integral part of an "adaptive force package" utilized in the following manner:

"This initiative combines the carrier's speed and firepower with the flexibility and responsiveness of small Marine task organizations. Such forces could support a variety of operations: e.g., noncombatant evacuation, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, hostage rescue, and embassy reinforcement. The goal is to spread out our ability to respond quickly to the kinds of crises we will confront in the coming decade." ¹²

Embarking the SPMAGTF aboard Roosevelt results in a compromise of the composition of CVW-8 because of limited deck space on CVs. It reduces current aviation assets by two squadrons. The composition of CVW-8 (as of February 1993) has resulted in the removal of one F-14 squadron and Roosevelt's only S-3 squadron to allow sufficient CV deck space for the SPMAGTF.¹³

Since it is difficult as previously stated to categorize the "standard" CV force composition, the aforementioned composition of CVW-8 and Roosevelt with full Marine integration, contrasted with its prior all-USN composition, will provide the boundary for discussion in this paper.

A graphic depiction of the two compositions will assist in identifying the differences in Roosevelt's two compositions and enable further analytic comparisons of their capabilities and limitations *:14

ALL USN COMPOSITION

20 F-14
20 F/A-18C (LOT 13)
24 A-6
5 S-3

WITH MARINE INTEGRATION

10 F-14
20 F/A-18C (LOT 13)**
10 F/A-18C (LOT 9)
14 A-6
6 CH-53D
4 UH-1N
SPMAGTF

* The CV has more aircraft types aboard including E-2, EA-6 and SH-60. However, since the numbers of these aircraft do not change between the two compositions, they have been omitted purely for graphical ease in comparison and follow on analysis.

** A later description will amplify the difference in capabilities between Lot 9 and Lot 13 F/A-18s.

The net differences in aircraft and other assets between the two compositions can be summarized by noting that with full Marine integration, Roosevelt would deploy with:

1. 10 fewer F-14s
2. 10 fewer A-6s
3. 0 S-3s (a net loss of 5)
4. 10 more F/A-18 (Lot 9)
5. 6 CH-53D and 4 UH-1N helicopters and the rest of the ground element assets previously mentioned in the makeup of the SPMAGTF

CHAPTER III

DISCUSSION: COMPARISON OF TACAIR DIFFERENCES

The discussion will begin with an examination of the addition of the 10 F/A-18 Lot 9 aircraft provided by embarking VMFA-312, a Marine Corps squadron, in Roosevelt. The capabilities and limitations of deploying a Marine squadron aboard the CV has been an often debated subject.¹⁵ As previously mentioned, because of the sporadic nature of the usage of Marine TACAIR on CVs, prior carrier experience of pilots within an embarked Marine squadron is almost always lacking. VMFA-312 is no exception, with only 2 of the 17 pilots having prior deployed CV experience.¹⁶ This is contrasted with an average of 10 of 17 pilots with prior CV experience among the other two F/A-18 squadrons embarked in Roosevelt.¹⁷

Quantifying the difference that this disparity in experience creates is difficult. CAPT Bill Moore, the commanding officer, or "CAG", of CVW-8 has stated "I do not draw any distinction between F/A-18 squadrons" ¹⁸, but CAPT Moore has also acknowledged that bringing in a squadron "with virtually no experience, no corporate knowledge, and no Navy airwing integration" experience brings certain challenges with it.¹⁹

To attempt to somehow quantify the effects of Marine CV inexperience in an unbiased manner, several possible avenues of research were examined. First, the possibility of analyzing

historical "debriefs" during graded training exercises of former Marine, CV deployed squadrons by outside Naval observers was examined. The vast numbers of variables involved in this type of analysis, including the fact that these graded training exercises were often done early in the CV turnaround training cycle when Marine inexperience was most apparent, quickly led to the abandonment of this particular analysis. A comparison of post deployment debriefs of CVs with Marine TACAIR was also discarded because of the similarly vast numbers of variables involved, making any conclusive analysis difficult and questionable.

Examining embarked aircraft mishap rates seemed the only unbiased data quantifiable for comparison. A request was made to the Naval Safety Center to compare the embarked Navy TACAIR Class A mishap rate (mishaps involving essentially the loss of life or aircraft) versus the Marine TACAIR rate over the last 10 years (see Table I in the Appendix for complete data). The data revealed an average Class A mishap rate nearly 3 times higher among Marine TACAIR aviators embarked on CVs than Navy TACAIR pilots. In the absence of detailed statistical analysis, it would be difficult to emphatically state that the reason for this much higher rate among Marines is directly attributed to their relative CV experience. However, it would seem logical to assume that CV inexperience is, at the very least, one of the causal factors given the constancy of almost all of the other variables.

An argument could be made of the relevance of this data at the operational level. I submit that one need only look at the "microscopic" view taken by the media and American public to build their perceptions, as to the performance appraisal and level of success of CV pilots involved in the January 13, 1993 "surgical strike" into Iraq.²⁰ This microscopic view included not only a very critical assessment of bomb damage to selected targets, but also included heavy media coverage of the strike's entire launch and recovery phases from aboard the carrier. This heavy exposure could have provided the forum for distracting and possibly even negative media coverage resulting from a CV aircraft mishap, especially given the importance placed throughout these strikes on limiting the risk to coalition aircraft.²¹ I am certainly not inferring that Marine CV inexperience is anywhere near classification as a "showstopper" for their use in contingency plans by CINCs. However, I view the lack of Marine CV experience, especially early in a deployment, as a potential limitation in certain contingency operations worthy of consideration up through the CINC level.

The addition of the Marine F/A-18 squadron does bring a significant increase in capability to the CV in the Close Air Support (CAS) mission, however. The specialization in CAS training by Marine TACAIR pilots for employment in their MAGTF role, has made them the "absolute masters" in air support of ground troops in combat, as noted by General Colin Powell

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.²² Since CAS arguably occurs largely at MRC level, however, this increased CAS capability is somewhat limited in utilization at the LIC level.

Next, the net effect in the increase of 10 additional F/A-18 Lot 9 aircraft in the Marine composition will be examined. To begin, a comparison in capabilities between F/A-18 Lot 9 and Lot 13 aircraft will be explained. Relevant differences which affect considerations at the operational level will provide the focus of the comparison. The Lot 13 variant is roughly 6 years newer than the Lot 9 with a dramatic expansion in night strike capability and onboard sensors for post strike bomb damage assessment (BDA). The Lot 9 has the capability to carry older versions of these BDA sensors, but the full operational status rates and quality are inferior to those on the Lot 13. As mentioned, the addition of night vision goggle technology to the Lot 13 aircraft provide a significant advantage in the "fair weather" night strike arena over the Lot 9. The Lot 9 retains, however, all of the other multiple air to air and strike capabilities of the Lot 13.

Even though they are not the newest variant, by gaining the additional 10 F/A-18s the CINC gains the true multi-role, force multiplier capability of the F/A-18. Although certainly important in a conflict that has escalated to MRC level, the multi-role capability of any asset is even more critical at

the LIC level, in situations where the CINC must perform a mission without perhaps having the luxury of the amount of forces desired in theater to accomplish the mission.

A perfect example is the recent situation in the Persian Gulf (in January 1993) where CINCCENT had only one CV in theater, the USS *Kitty Hawk*, to supplement Air Force assets ashore in providing the significant assets required for current operations. The concurrent tasking of assets required for Operation Southern Watch and to conduct "limited" air strikes against Iraq placed a premium on strike and fighter aircraft. Pete Williams, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, acknowledged that part of the reason for the limited nature of the scope of the January 1993 strikes in Iraq, was the limited assets available in theater.²³ The Roosevelt Marine composition, with the 10 additional F/A-18s, would have given CINCCENT roughly a 20 percent increase in strike aircraft capable of dropping the precision guided munitions selected for the strike. (This percentage increase is based on the fact that *Kitty Hawk* has a TACAIR mix similar to the all-USN Roosevelt composition, and also includes land based Air Force F-15Es in theater.) The additional F/A-18s would also have been capable of performing the fighter mission of patrolling the imposed No Fly Zone of Southern Watch, making it a true force multiplier for CINCCENT to fully exploit.

Unfortunately, as part of the "compromise" in force

structure, these 10 additional F/A-18s in the Marine composition come essentially at the expense of 10 F-14s. To examine the net effect of the loss of the 10 F-14s, the **operational level** differences of the F/A-18 and the F-14 will be analyzed.

Recent adaptations to the F-14 have given the aircraft a previously undeveloped capability to perform the strike mission. Comparing the F-14 and the F/A-18 in the strike role, the F/A-18 has significant advantages in the CAS mission, night strike mission and the ability to deliver precision guided munitions. The F-14 has significant advantages in the fighter mission in long range missile employment (at least until the Advanced Medium Range Air to Air Missile is operationally available in the F/A-18). The F-14 also carries more internal fuel, resulting in a greater combat radius than the F/A-18. Therefore, although the previously mentioned CINCCENT scenario would favor the additional F/A-18s, other LIC scenarios could be postulated that would favor additional F-14s. For this reason, I view this particular aspect of the Marine composition (that essentially substitutes 10 F-14s with 10 F/A-18s), as resulting in no significant operational level advantage or disadvantage as compared to the all-USN CV.

Next, the loss of 10 A-6s in the Roosevelt Marine composition will be addressed. This reduction will result in a 40 percent reduction of onboard A-6s available to the CINC for any all-weather night strike contingencies. Although the F/A-

18 certainly has at least a limited all-weather night strike capability, the design of the A-6 and aircrew training is maximized for this particular mission.

The January 13, 1993 strike into Iraq underscores the importance of the all-weather night strike mission. Some of the aforementioned "critical analysis" of post strike bomb damage assessment by the media (resulting in their assessment of only one of four targets being destroyed by coalition pilots) was in part due to mission aborts by some pilots due to weather.²⁴ A reduction in available all-weather capable platforms, like the A-6, has the potential to limit options available to the CINC in similar scenarios at the LIC end of the spectrum.

The loss of the 10 A-6s affects more than the all-weather night mission at the operational level. CINCs must realize that under the *Roosevelt* Marine version, external tanking requirements are certain to increase. The A-6 and S-3 provide all of the CV's organic aircraft airborne refueling assets. The *Roosevelt* Marine composition, which has 10 less A-6s and no S-3s, will present a distinct limitation in organic tanking assets to the CINC as compared to the all-USN composition. In the current Iraqi situation where CINCCENT enjoys superb host nation support and modern facilities in nearby Saudi Arabia, the limitation will not be as great because of the ease in basing external tanking assets (like Air Force KC-10s and KC-135s) near the theater of operations. However, a decreased CV

organic tanking capability becomes a much more significant issue for the CINC in situations where host nation support and nearby modern facilities are not available.

Finally, the two compositions will be contrasted in numbers of aircraft available to the CINC for tasking in basic strike and fighter missions. The all Navy composition has 40 fighter mission capable aircraft (20 F-14, 20 F/A-18), as compared to the Marine composition of 40 fighters of a different mix (30 F/A-18, 10 F-14). The Navy version has 64 strike mission capable aircraft (20 F-14, 20 F/A-18, 24 A-6), while the Marine version has 54 aircraft (30 F/A-18, 14 A-6, 10 F-14). To contrast aircraft capable of dropping precision guided munitions, the Navy version has 44 aircraft (20 F/A-18, 24 A-6) while the Marine mix has 44 aircraft (30 F/A-18, 14 A-6).

To summarize TACAIR differences in capabilities and limitations of the two compositions, the all-USN version has an operational level advantage* in the following areas:

- Better night all-weather strike capability with 10 more A-6s
- More strike capable aircraft (64 vs. 54) with a better "split" in platforms
- Better organic tanking capability (24 A-6 and 5 S-3 vs. 14 A-6)

* (With 5 additional S-3s, the Navy version has a tactical level advantage in organic ASW assets, but this limitation can be alleviated by other ASW assets available in the CV battle group, therefore minimizing the effect at the operational level.)

The Marine version has a single advantage in the CAS

mission, however, it is somewhat reduced due to the limited nature of CAS missions at the LIC level.

CHAPTER IV

CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS OF THE SPMAGTF

The addition of the SPMAGTF brings a radically new force to the CV. Since the concept is fairly recent, relatively very little operational testing of this force structure has been accomplished. The first testing on a CV with a Marine force similar in size and composition to the SPMAGTF was done late in 1991. A force of 400 Marines (about 2/3 the size of the Roosevelt SPMAGTF) participated in Operation Safe Haven aboard USS *Forrestal* (CV-59). The operation successfully tested the capability of a force, solely from the CV, to conduct the force insertion and evacuation necessary for a noncombatant evacuation operation (NEO). The NEO operation was also conducted with concurrent combat air patrol and strike sorties launched from the CV.²⁵

The SPMAGTF embarked in Roosevelt has had only two short "workup" periods at sea totalling less than a month in December 1992 and late January 1993. Lessons learned are obviously still being gleaned from the recent operations, however, interoperability problems with the CV have been less than originally envisioned, and the problems appear able to be resolved at the tactical level.²⁶

The capabilities of the SPMAGTF are to conduct some of the previously mentioned LIC missions of NEOs, embassy reinforcement, maritime interdiction, etc. A full listing of the mission areas postulated by Marine planners for

utilization of the SPMAGTF are listed in Table III of the Appendix.²⁷

Limitations in employing the SPMAGTF will now be addressed. To begin, employing the SPMAGTF results in the CV operating much closer to land than it traditionally has in the past. Operating closer to shore poses new challenges to the tactical commander in countering enemy mine, submarine and air threats. Therefore, serious threat level considerations must be made up through the CINC level, to avoid placing an invaluable asset like the CV in a threat environment above that which the CVBG is able to counter.²⁸

The next limitation for consideration is the SPMAGTF's significant lack of firepower. The basic company level firepower of the SPMAGTF, even considering CV TACAIR support, makes it extremely vulnerable in any threat level above a **very** permissive environment. In addition, the mobility and sustainment of the SPMAGTF are very limited. The SPMAGTF has only 3 utility vehicles (Marine "humvees") for mobility, and self sustainment supplies for only three days.²⁹ The command element of the SPMAGTF will be able to displace ashore, but resupply will basically be tethered to the CV.³⁰

Finally, the SPMAGTF is limited in methods of employment. On conventional amphibious ships, Marine forces may be deployed in amphibious vehicles, rubber boats and finally by helicopter. Utilized from the CV, the SPMAGTF's employment is tied entirely to the CH-53s.³¹

The LIC missions envisioned for the SPMAGTF have traditionally been accomplished by Marine Expeditionary Units (MEU)s, or by MEUs that are Special Operations Capable MEU(SOC)s. MEUs and MEU(SOC)s are much larger forces consisting of approximately 1800-2200 personnel in MEUs, and roughly 2200 personnel in MEU(SOC)s. Both forces possess a dramatic increase in armament and firepower as compared to the SPMAGTF.

An excerpt of the capabilities graph (shown in its entirety in the Appendix, Table II) is useful to analyze what Marine planners consider the **hypothetical** ability of the SPMAGTF to have been utilized in example LIC events where MEU(SOC)s were successfully utilized over the past few years.³²

<u>Event</u>	<u>SPMAGTF Capable</u>
Lebanon	
- NEO, Peacekeeping	No
- Show of Force	Yes
- Extraction of Ambassador	Yes
Grenada- Urgent Fury	No
Panama- Just Cause	No
Liberia	
- NEO	Yes
- Embassy Security	Yes
Northern Iraq- Provide Comfort	No
Natural Disaster- Bangladesh	No

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS

CINCs must realize that the Marine composition of *Roosevelt* does not possess the extent of TACAIR capabilities to which they are accustomed with an all-USN CV. Although the limitations in TACAIR capabilities are not substantial in conflicts that escalate to MRC level, they can have significant implications in LIC level scenarios where the CVBG provides the bulk of the firepower assets available in theater to the CINC. The CINC must realize the limitations of this composition: CV organic air to air refueling, all-weather night strike missions, and the number and diversity of strike capable aircraft.

In addition, although the Marine version with the SPMAGTF does bring new capabilities to the CV in LIC missions never before accomplished solely by a CV, it is definitely not a replacement for either the MEU or MEU(SOC). In fact, it is difficult to imagine a scenario where the CINC would utilize the SPMAGTF instead of a MEU(SOC) if both assets were available in theater to the CINC.

The CINC must realize that neither composition is necessarily "better", but each possesses specific strengths and weaknesses when employed in the myriad of possible LIC scenarios. He must envision and utilize the CV composition with Marine integration as a compromise in capabilities, and not as a "jack of all trades" force able to respond to any

scenario, making MEUs and MEU(SOC)s obsolete. Any false embellishments of the capabilities of this composition, resulting in utilizing the SPMAGTF in a threat level above the very permissive environment in which it is intended to operate, is an invitation for almost certain disaster.

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27. USMC Atlantic Headquarters, FMFLANT G-3 Concept Paper, 13 August 1992.

28. Richard Lawson, "Changes to Carrier Aircraft Required, Air Wing Commander Says", Inside the Navy, December 14, 1992, p.10.

29. Telephone interview January 31, 1993 with MAJ R. F. Deatherage, Operations Officer of the SPMAGTF.

30. "SPMAGTF-CV Forming", Marine Corps Gazette, December 1992, p.5.

31. Patrick Pexton and Chris Lawson, "Swapping Jets for Grunts", Navy Times, 22 February, 1993, p.15.

32. USMC Atlantic Headquarters, FMFLANT G-3 Concept Paper, 13 August 1992.

APPENDIX

**TABLE I: Class A Mishap comparison between Navy and Marine Pilots
while embarked on CVs**

CY	<u>Marine</u>			<u>Navy</u>		
	<u>Hours</u>	<u>Mishaps</u>	<u>Rate</u>	<u>Hours</u>	<u>Mishaps</u>	<u>Rate</u>
1983	4,700	0	0	185,308	16	8.63
1984	7,243	0	0	167,209	13	7.77
1985	9,302	2	21.5	161,296	7	4.34
1986	12,188	3	24.6	147,081	10	6.80
1987	6,577	2	30.4	139,708	13	9.31
1988	2,203	0	0	144,840	5	3.45
1989	7,737	0	0	148,526	2	1.35
1990	4,380	1	22.8	156,758	4	2.55
1991	5,428	3	55.3	127,393	14	10.97
<u>1992*</u>	<u>2,680</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>57,393</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>6.97</u>
	62,438	11	17.6	1,435,773	88	6.13

* Data still being accumulated

APPENDIX

TABLE II- SPMAGTF versus MEU(SOC) Capabilities

<u>Event</u>	<u>SPMAGTF</u>	<u>MEU(SOC)</u>
Lebanon		
- NEO, Peace Keeping	No	Yes
- Show of Force	Yes	Yes
- Extraction of Ambassador	Yes	Yes
Grenada- Urgent Fury	No	Yes
Panama- Just Cause	No	Yes
Liberia		
- NEO	Yes	Yes
- Embassy Security	Yes	Yes
North Iraq- Provide Comfort	No	Yes
Natural disaster		
- Bangladesh, Phillipines	No	Yes
Minor Civic Action		
- Sicily	Yes	Yes
Somalia- NEO	Yes	Yes
Haiti- NEO	Yes	Yes
Yugoslavia		
- SAR Support	Yes	Yes
- Reinforce UN HQ	Yes	Yes
- Secure Port Facility	No	Yes
Kuwait		
- Show of Force	Yes	Yes
- Tactical Deception	No	Yes

APPENDIX

TABLE III- Mission comparisons between the SPMAGTF and a MEU

<u>Mission</u>	<u>SPMAGTF</u>	<u>MEU</u>
Amphibious raids	Yes	Yes
Limited Objective Attack	No	Yes
NEO	Yes	Yes
Show of force	Limited	Yes
Reinforcement	No	Yes
Security	Yes	Yes
Maritime Interdiction	Limited	Yes
Hostage recovery	No	Yes
Humanitarian assistance	Limited	Yes
Disaster relief	Limited	Yes
Tactical deception	Limited	Yes
Fire support control	Yes	Yes
Airfield seizure	No	Yes
Recon and surveillance	No	Yes
Clandestine recovery	No	Yes
Tactical recov. of aircraft/personnel	Yes	Yes
Special Demo operations	No	Yes
Military operations in urban terrain	Yes	Yes
Initial terminal guidance	Yes	Yes
Counterintelligence	No	Yes

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