


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**THE DEEDS OF VALIANT MEN:
A STUDY IN LEADERSHIP
THE MARAUDERS IN NORTH BURMA, 1944**

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL HENRY L. KINNISON IV
United States Army

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A STUDY IN LEADERSHIP
THE MARAUDERS IN NORTH BURMA, 1944

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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This paper is intended to examine key aspects of senior leadership in the execution of the North Burma Campaign of 1944 by the 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional). The paper addresses the formation and training of the unit, also known as Merrill's Marauders. It also addresses the three major missions performed by the Marauders to include the seizing of the Myitkyina airstrip. In particular, the paper considers the leadership of Generals Stilwell and Merrill during the campaign and examines new evidence concerning their performance.

THE DEEDS OF VALIANT MEN
A STUDY IN LEADERSHIP
THE MARAUDERS IN NORTH BURMA, 1944

Numerous secondary accounts of the 1944 allied campaign in north Burma have examined an organization known popularly as Merrill's Marauders and officially by the abstruse title of the 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional). Many of the accounts, in detail, alleged broken promises, ineptness, and failed leadership. Most often, those blamed are General Joseph W. Stilwell, commander of the American China-Burma-India Theater, and Brigadier General Frank D. Merrill, commander of the Marauders. The allegations, in fact, derived principally from two first-hand accounts that provided unofficial and somewhat flawed histories of the Marauders. A third first-hand account, recently published, sheds a different light on General Stilwell's and General Merrill's association with the 5307th. The account, offered as a history of the Marauders' 2d Battalion, also provides a wealth of information about both generals. Using the newly published information, this paper will examine the Marauders and their senior leaders. It will also highlight some basic themes and issues of significance to current and future military leaders.

The 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional) of the Army of the United States entered the annals of American military history for its actions in Japanese-held northern Burma during the spring of 1944. Organized and trained for long-range penetration, it bore the code name GALAHAD and popular

name "Merrill's Marauders," an appellation provided by the press. Commanded by Brigadier General Frank D. Merrill, the Marauders consisted of 2,997 officers and men organized into a headquarters and three battalions. The Marauders fought and died from the village of Ledo in northeast India to the Burmese town of Myitkyina, situated along the Irrawaddy River.

Operating in conjunction with the Chinese 22d and 38th Divisions the American Tenth Air Force, and Detachment 101 of the American Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the Marauders penetrated behind Japanese lines in some of the most difficult, disease ridden terrain in the world. In a little over three months, they marched by foot over 700 miles; in five major and 30 minor fights, they met and defeated the Japanese 18th Division (the Chrysanthemum Division), veterans of the capture of Singapore and Burma. Their operations culminated in the seizure of the strategically important, all-weather airstrip at Myitkyina. Though bought with the blood and bravery of fevered, exhausted, emaciated men--this extraordinary achievement could be realized only by the courage of equally fevered, exhausted, and emaciated leaders, who refused to quit.

Two unofficial accounts of the Marauders have proven the most popular works on the operations of the 5307th. Virtually every secondary work examining some aspect of the North Burma Campaign uses one or both of the works as a principal if not the sole source of information. The first,

The Marauders, was written by Charleton Ogburn, communications officer for the 1st Battalion. The second, Galahad, was written by Charles N. Hunter, General Merrill's deputy commander.

The official history of the unit is captured in American Forces in Action account, Merrill's Marauders. This manuscript rests primarily on the war diary of the Marauders' command historian and on the interviews he conducted. The command historian, Major John M. Jones, received relatively little other material to use in the preparation of the history. Three reasons explain this. First, because they were traveling behind Japanese lines, the Marauders minimized their record keeping to stay as light as possible. Second, a Japanese artillery round scored a direct hit on the mule carrying the unit records during the Marauders' second mission. Third, monsoon rains during the third and final mission made record keeping almost impossible. Moreover, all the papers of the Marauders' intelligence officer were lost when he was killed during the assault on Myitkyina's airstrip, and the papers washed away before his body could be recovered.

Two other official histories provide a thorough consideration of the Marauders and their operations. Stilwell's Command Problems, by Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland presents the official story of a commander, his staff, and his soldiers in a theater of war. Published in 1956, the work looks at the drama of high command and

leadership in the China-Burma-India (CBI) Theater. Because the Marauders were an important element of the drama, they receive a correspondingly large representation in the volume. The other official history is *Crisis Fleeting*, which contains original reports on military medicine in India and Burma in the World War II. Published in 1969, the history includes the reports of two of the Marauders' surgeons annotated by the editor, James H. Stone. The reports, still bearing the emotion of recently completed battle, detail the experiences and observations of two doctors who marched with the Marauders. Mr. Stone's annotations add perspective and balance. Taken as a whole, the annotated reports provide a vivid account of combat medicine in the jungle.

A third first-hand account, *The History of the 2nd Battalion, Merrill's Marauders*, appeared recently. This work provides a view sharply in contrast to Ogburn's and Hunter's, as well as certain aspects of the medical reports in *Crisis Fleeting*. George A. McGee, commander of the Marauders' 2d Battalion, details the actions of the 2d Battalion from its beginnings in Trinidad until Colonel McGee's departure from his unit in July of 1944. This account rests on his personal experience and on his battalion's combat journal and operations maps. Clearly, McGee saw or remembers events differently from Ogburn and Hunter. McGee purports not to challenge their accounts on matters addressing the first and third battalions but does

so by implication. McGee's account clearly questions Hunter's actions as deputy commander and disputes Hunter's account of his importance as the "field commander" of the Marauders.

Some indication of McGee's views on the campaign in northern Burma appeared in 1987 when McGee wrote a letter to Parameters' editor in response to an article published by the journal. "Common Man, Uncommon Leadership, Charles N. Hunter with Galahad in Burma," written by Scott McMichael, had extolled Colonel Hunter's leadership of the Marauders. Following the line taken by Colonel Hunter in his book, McMichael depicted Colonel Hunter as the real leader of the Marauders and indicted Generals Stilwell and Merrill as uncaring and inept. Colonel McGee sharply disagreed with McMichael as did the theater historian, Riley Sunderland, who separately chastised McMichael for an unbalanced criticism of Stilwell.

What is the truth? Did failings of leadership occur on a monumental scale? Were the Marauders, as McMichael asked and asserted, "unloved, misunderstood, and mercilessly abused, perhaps the most badly handled American force in the war?" These questions have defied historians for a variety of reasons but principally two. (1)

First, neither of the two earlier unofficial histories incorporated the views of all of the Marauders' senior commanders. Specifically, Ogburn and Hunter did not incorporate McGee's views when writing their works. Likely

this exclusion occurred because McGee was stationed outside of the United States during much of the time that Ogburn and Hunter were writing their books. Other principals were unavailable to support or refute the two unofficial accounts: Stilwell died in 1946; Merrill died in 1955, and Lieutenant Colonel Beach, commander of the 3d Battalion, committed suicide a few years after the war. Colonel Henry L. Kinnison, Jr., formerly Stilwell's G3 for the Northern Area Combat Command (NCAC) and commander of K Force during the Marauders' final mission, died of mite typhus contracted during the march to Myitkyina.

Second, the difficulties of combat in the hostile environment of Burma made it extraordinarily difficult for the Maruaders' command historian to collect after action interviews with key figures. In certain instances, the separation of the Marauders' forces made it impossible for Major Jones to interview battalion commanders about the actions of their battalions in important operations and battles. Of particular importance, Major Jones did not interview Colonel McGee concerning the 2d Battalion's action at Inkangahtwang and at Nhpum Ga. This and the previously noted defect in the historical process warrant consideration.

This paper will offer one more limited view on the performance of senior leaders of the Marauders in the execution of the North Burma Campaign. Even so, this view is a needed corrective: McMichael's biting indictment of

senior leadership certainly falls short in getting at the truth. It relies too much on the account provided by Colonel Hunter and on the accounts that have repeated Colonel Hunter's allegations until they have become the unquestioned truth. In relooking the North Burma Campaign of 1944, it is important to lay out Colonel McGee's evidence particularly as it contradicts significant portions of the accepted secondary source version. To do this, the text will often include many and detailed quotations to give the flavor of the people and the sources they created at the time. This is not to say that Colonel Hunter does not stand to receive great praise as a courageous leader, particularly for his heroic leadership during the three months following the seizure of the Myitkyina airstrip; but Hunter was not the only uncommon leader on the field in northern Burma. Then-Lieutenant Colonel William L. Osborne, commander of the 1st Battalion, McGee, Beach, Kinnison, Hunter, Merrill, and Stilwell all displayed uncommon leadership in the execution of the campaign. They all made mistakes. They all exhibited failings, sometimes of the body but never of the mind, while under the extreme pressures of command. They were good enough to lead the brave men of the Marauders through a string of extraordinary victories. Thus, this study is an account of senior leadership within the Marauders and of the Marauders themselves that deserves review by combat leaders today.

BACKGROUND

The Japanese conquered Burma two years before the Marauders began their operations. By the end of 1942, the enemy held the Philippines, much of Oceania, all of the Dutch East Indies, the Malay Peninsula, and most of Burma. The enemy's position within Burma threatened India itself and cut the ground lines of communications between India and China. The occupation of Burma provided protection against an allied counterattack. Its difficult terrain consisted of nearly impenetrable jungle and steep mountains, and would prove well suited to defense by a determined enemy.

The Japanese conquest of Burma in 1942 moved quickly and decisively. The enemy launched two divisions from Thailand and in succession took Moulmein and then Rangoon, seizing Burma's capital and main port on 8 March. The divisions then split into two forces and attacked north. One attacked up the Sittang River toward the Burma Road. The second pursued an Indian and Burmese force up the Irrawaddy River Valley. Then Major General Stilwell led a Chinese force in an attempt to defend the Burma Road.

A third enemy force of two divisions landed at Rangoon in April. The force attacked east into the upper Salween River Valley and then turned north to seize Lashio, the juncture of rail and highway portions of the Burma Road. This force continued its attack north into the Chinese province of Yunan. From this force, the enemy sent smaller elements along the Irrawaddy River almost to Fort Hertz, located in

northernmost Burma. Because the Japanese force had flanked the Chinese forces defending at Mandalay, the Chinese had to withdraw. As a result, the Japanese entered Mandalay unopposed on 1 May. The remnants of the British, Indian, and Burmese forces withdrew by foot up the Chindwin River Valley and across the Chin Hills into India. The fragments of the Chinese forces under General Stilwell withdrew from northern Burma into India through Shingbuiyang.

The withdrawals from Burma were not orderly affairs. At one point during the Chinese efforts to resist the Japanese, General Stilwell, under intense enemy fire, had to direct personally an infantry counterattack against the advancing Japanese. For this action he received the Distinguished Service Cross. Then as a part of the withdrawal, General Stilwell found himself and a part of his headquarters trapped behind the Japanese advance. Stilwell's diary contained the simple comment, "HELL." As a result of his entrapment, he led a small element by foot out of Burma and to Imphal, India. An Associated Press account captured General Stilwell's reaction to allied actions in Burma:

... He said he regarded Burma as a vitally important area for re-entry into China, now blocked from the Burma Road supply route.... Here, in his own salty words, is what happened to the Allies in Burma: I claim we got a hell of a beating. We got run out of Burma and it is humiliating as hell. I think we ought to find out what caused it, go back, and retake it. (2)


When the monsoons ended, the Japanese continued their attacks. By the end of 1942 they had reached the Bengal

frontier and were closing on Sumprabum in northern Burma. Allied attempts to stop the Japanese advance had proven fruitless. In the face of considerable failure, the Allies found some small satisfaction in an offensive operation conducted by then Brigadier Orde C. Wingate. The operation, a long range penetration into Japanese held Burma, was conducted by eight specially trained columns of the 77th Indian Infantry Brigade, numbering 3,200 men. This force, popularly called the "Chindits," a derivation of the mythical Burmese creature, the Chinthe, held the code name LONGCLOTH.

LONGCLOTH marched over 1,000 miles during a four-month period receiving direction by radio and supplies by plane. While the unit was able to inflict moderate damage on the Mandalay-Myitkyina railway, its losses proved significant. Of the 3,000 officers and men who had begun the penetration operation in February, nearly 1,000 men were captured or killed. (A little over 100 men of a Burma Rifle unit had been permitted to destroy their uniforms and remain in Burma.) The Chindits lost nearly all their mules and most equipment except personal arms. Strategically, the operation had no effect. However, since the Chindits were the only victorious allied unit in south Asia, they received acclaim far beyond their apparent success.

At this stage of World War II, the United Kingdom needed heroes. Called the "Clive of Burma" by Churchill, Wingate gave the allies, particularly the British public, a glimmer

of hope where none had been seen. A controversial figure in the British army, Wingate used his new-found popularity to advance his concept for a division sized special force that would penetrate deep behind Japanese lines during 1944. As a result of a decision made during the Quebec Conference in August 1943, an American force of 3,000 men was to be raised and trained by Wingate as one of seven brigades in his long range penetration campaign. Wingate's force, the 3rd Indian Division, received the code name GIDEON; the American force, GALAHAD. Additionally, Wingate received commitment of an American air contingent, called No. 1 Air Commando, to support his force during penetration operations.



FORMATION AND TRAINING

The War Department at General George C. Marshall's direction requested volunteers for GALAHAD from the South Pacific, Southwest Pacific, Caribbean Defense Command and the Army Ground Forces in the United States. In response to the request, 950 soldiers volunteered from the continental United States; 950, from Trinidad and Puerto Rico--with the great majority coming from the 33d Infantry; and 950, veterans of Guadalcanal and New Guinea.

These volunteers would subsequently form the three battalions of the Marauders. The first two battalions departed together from San Francisco with the third battalion joining the force on the way to India. The Transport Command termed the entire group Shipment 1688, with the battalions listed above referred to respectively as casual detachments: 1688 A, 1688 B, and 1688 C. As a result, the men of the battalions would often continue to refer to themselves as Battalions A, B, and C.

Then-Lieutenant Colonel Charles N. Hunter was the senior officer among the casual detachments and as such performed the duties of commander of Shipment 1688. This arrangement was typical for travel. He was to become General Merrill's second in command. Lieutenant Colonel William L. Osborne, was senior among the officers of Detachment 1688 A; he would command the Marauders' 1st Battalion. Lieutenant Colonel George A. McGee, Jr., senior officer among Detachment 1688 B, would command the 2d Battalion. Based on a conversation

with his former regimental commander, McGee understood that the volunteers he was to lead would become an infantry battalion committed to a dangerous mission yet to be specified. Because this detachment consisted almost exclusively of volunteers from one infantry regiment, McGee effectively asserted himself as a battalion commander from the beginning of the detachment's formation. Lieutenant Colonel Charles E. Beach was senior officer of Detachment 1688 C. He would command the 3d Battalion.

During the voyage to India, the detachments began such individual training as was possible. Among the written materials studied by Marauders enroute was a pamphlet prepared by Wingate. The pamphlet described the mission of a long range penetration unit.

The long range penetration group consists of a number of separate self-contained columns, each with a specific route of advance and mission. Supplied by air from a base in the rear-area, and directed from a centrally located Group Headquarters by ground and air radio and by air-ground visual signals, these columns operate by deception, evasion and infiltration for a considerable period (up to three months) in the heart of enemy occupied territory. (3)

A three month (or 90 day) limitation on long range penetration operations was to become the subject of much controversy at the end of the Marauders' second mission. Based on the experience of 77th Brigade's four-month operation during the spring of 1943, Wingate came to believe that a deep penetration unit could reasonably expect to remain effective for 90 days. Ogburn and Hunter would

assert their belief that the Marauders as whole considered 90 days as a hard limit on combat operations. In contrast, McGee states he always considered the 90 day figure a planning factor with the actual time to be spent in operations to be determined by many factors but "with military necessity being the paramount one." (4)

After Detachment 1688 disembarked at Bombay on the west coast of India, the three groups traveled a short distance to a British transit camp at Deolali where they remained for three weeks. McGee recalls the situation as one of inconvenience with its primary effect as the loss of effective training time. Since the original tables of organization had not provided for cooks, the messing situation in particular proved unsatisfactory for the enlisted men. As a result, native cooks and the detachment volunteers had to fulfill duty as mess personnel. In contrast, the officers were separated from their men in accommodations and fed at the transit camp officers mess.

In a formal letter to General Stilwell listing several complaints against his command, Hunter later would charge bad treatment of the Marauders when they arrived in India. However, McGee's description of the Deolali transit camp seems to depict a rather typical British camp organized within traditional British conceptions of the appropriate stations in life of officers and enlisted men. In McGee's assessment, Deolali was simply "a rude but necessary awakening to the fact that we must get back to the job of

taking care of ourselves and depending on no one else to do so." (5)

The three battalions departed separately by train from Deolali on 17, 19, and 20 November--each at 2110 hours. Concern for operational security reflected in the listing by train authorities of each battalion as a shipment of medical fillers. Upon arrival at Jakhlaun station, located in central India, the battalions collected their men and followed a compass heading to the training camp near Deogarh. The British had set up the camp along the Betwa river. The layout of the camp provided for battalion areas for each of the battalions and plenty of open ground for training to include firing of weapons and practice with explosives. The Marauders again ate British rations--exactly that provided their British soldiers; the rations were clearly limited in quality and quantity. No PX existed, and there was no recreational facility. McGee noted in his account that the British standard of living "at this stage in the war was by necessity much more austere than ours" and that the Marauders were "accorded the same treatment as their troops." Austere conditions in the United Kingdom and the relative well-being of U.S. troops were reflected in the British lament about the Americans being "over-sexed, over-fed, and over here." India proved no exception to the strained friendship between the Americans and English.

From the Marauders' arrival in India, Colonel Francis G. Brink, a general staff officer from China-Burma-India (CBI) Theater Headquarters, overwatched the unit's preparation for combat. General Stilwell had charged Brink with responsibility for all facets of the Marauders' activities. Hunter would recall Brink as an intelligent, aggressive officer, though technically not qualified to command because of his general staff assignment. Although Hunter saw himself as the commander of the Marauders for matters of administration and discipline, both Hunter and McGee then clearly saw Brink as the officer in charge. McGee recalled Brink as the de facto commander; Hunter was the camp commandant with responsibility for administration and with duty as the camp meeter and greeter. McGee noted that Hunter did not involve himself in the day to day activities and training of the battalions.

Brink would direct a reorganization of each of the battalions into two jungle columns or combat teams permitting some latitude to each of the battalion commanders. A typical column or team as exemplified by B Battalion consisted of a beefed up rifle company, a heavy weapons platoon, an intelligence and reconnaissance (I & R) platoon, a pioneer and demolitions (P & D) detachment, a communications element and a complement of animals. A medical officer and several aidmen would accompany each column. The battalion executive officer and the battalion

operations officer each assumed command of a column. Each rifle company had its own commander.

By McGee's account, training was decentralized in execution with Brink ever present to provide guidance and suggestions. Training guidance came from three sources: Brink's notes, U.S. Army training documents, and comprehensive training notes from Wingate's headquarters. McGee recalled Colonel Brink and his contribution to the training of the Marauders:

Colonel Brink delegated the responsibility for training to the battalion commanders, permitting them wide latitude in carrying out this task. There was no question but that training was the first priority mission, and that the battalion commanders were not interfered with in getting the job done. Colonel Brink rarely if ever convened the battalion commanders, instead he visited them individually and observed training frequently, and in a soft-spoken but firm manner made suggestions and otherwise provided guidance.

He had observed warfare against the Japs since the beginnings of the war, and he had maintained in small leather notebooks his comments thereon, together with precise sketches of Jap tactical dispositions and movements under various conditions and circumstances, and these he made available to the battalions. (6)

In addition to the contribution by Brink, Wingate's training notes outlined tactics and techniques and prescribed standing operating procedures based on the experiences of the Chindit long range penetration during the spring of 1943. McGee observed there was no counterpart in U.S. training literature. Battalion training programs focused on platoon patrolling, establishment of outposts and

trail blocks, ambush techniques, and security actions. Exercise involved columns in the attack and defense, and the battalion on the march and in perimeter defense. Subjects new to the soldiers of the battalions were animal management and packing, airdrop and air support procedures, and river crossings.

McGee, in particular, notes that the troops were neither green troops nor misfits. Instead they were representative of experienced soldiers then assigned throughout the army. Ogburn and others' recall of the unsavory appearance of the Marauders and depiction of them as misfits seems more a function of the observer's inexperience than the condition and quality of the soldiers. This difference of observation between McGee and others would be one of many addressing either the leaders or the led.

The battalions participated as independent opposing forces in a week long exercise before Christmas against all the brigades under Wingate's control. At the time, no regimental headquarters existed so Brink provided mission orders for each of the battalion to begin the exercise. McGee notes the training value of serving as an opposing force was marginal in preparing to become a long range penetrating force. Still, each of the Marauder battalions performed credibly.

By the time the Marauders departed for combat at the end of January 1944, they were well trained for the missions they were to undertake, with one exception. The battalions

would not receive their several hundred pack animals until just before departing to Burma. As a result, the battalion lacked desirable experience in handling and loading animals. Two companies of quartermaster specialists somewhat relieved the deficit in knowledge until experience on the road from Ledo into Burma acquainted soldiers with their animals. Of more serious concern was the lack of time to train and condition the animals. Consequently, the mules and horses suffered excessive sores at the beginning of the campaign.

Another matter of concern about the animals was they had not been devocalized as had all of the Chindit animals. This would be omission of great concern during the Marauders' first mission. Hunter in his work says that he personally had prevented devocalization. Information provided by McGee suggests no such decision was made. In his view, the failure to devocalize the animals resulted from a combination of a shortage of available time on the receiving end and an unintended omission by the stateside senders. If, in fact, Hunter made the decision, it would prove to be a bad decision as subsequent events would show.

It would be a mistake to think that disagreement was common at the time of the actual events. Merrill, Hunter, and McGee collectively viewed the foot march from Ledo into Burma as necessary training and a good shake out march, particularly for the animals. In this matter, they ignored the advice of Colonel William R. Peers, commander of OSS Detachment 101, to fly or truck the Marauders from Ledo to

Shingbuiyang in Burma to conserve their strength. Peers's advice derived from Detachment 101's experience in the jungle, which caused him to share Wingate's concern about the practical limits of human endurance in the jungle. Peers's view was that the Marauders' three-month clock started unnecessarily early by the long march from Ledo. Hunter asserted he caused the march and Merrill would have done whatever Hunter thought right. However, Merrill was a cavalryman with a broader experience than Hunter in matters of horses and mules. More likely the Marauders' commanders collectively thought it the right thing to do.

To some extent, disagreement expressed later in personal accounts probably represented the unilateral perceptions at the time that became exaggerated over the years. McGee stated that until he received Colonel Hunter's letter at Myitkyina, he was unaware of any strain or disagreement between General Merrill and Hunter. McGee seemed to see the strain as a matter of Colonel Hunter's perception, not General Merrill's. It seems possible these perceptions partly derived from an implicit rivalry. Both Merrill and Hunter were classmates from the Class of 1929 at the United States Military Academy. Clearly Merrill's star had risen faster than Hunter's.

MOVING FORWARD

In early January 1944, the Marauders received notification they were to move at the end of the month from Deogarh to Ledo and then into Burma. While the unit had experienced some personnel losses resulting from sickness incurred in training, the Marauders received no replacements. The War Department plans for the 5307th envisioned the Marauders would be employed for approximately 90 days, then dissolved. To this end, planners required no replacements to join the unit.

Toward the end of January, the battalions departed Jakhlaun station in central India and journeyed by train to Ledo. The trip lasted ten days with various stops, transfers, and river crossings. The battalions ate C rations and some 10-in-1 rations. General Merrill and the unit staff made the trip by plane and had been in the Ledo area for about ten days when the battalions began to arrive. The battalions arrived at Margherita on 5 through 7 February and began preparations for movement into Burma. The animals were unloaded from the trains, and combat teams began building their loads. Still traveling with all of their personal effects, the battalions stacked all their belongings in several locations at the bivouac site. Orders required the Marauders to travel into Burma with their combat loads. Assurances were offered as to the safety of the unguarded baggage. Personal items left by the units included barracks bags, duffel bags, suit cases with khakis

and other clothing, shoes, wallets, pictures, and items purchased as gifts. McGee recalled being brought his battalion's national and battalion colors to be stored in his personal gear. He hoped it might not be lost: "When we departed that night our baggage remained there in the jungle, uncovered in a light rain. It would be thoroughly looted by rear area troops." (7)

Despite Colonel Peers' cautioning, General Merrill chose to make the long administrative foot march into Burma for what he believed good reasons. Several tasks confronted leaders and men. The animals required conditioning and their handlers required experience. The march provided the chance to break in new saddles. It also let the men adjust their marching loads. McGee recalled General Wingate's training note on "Christmas treeing"--the tendency of soldiers to carry too large a load encumbered by nonessential items. The long daily marches still without the weight of three to five days of combat rations corrected this inclination. Units shed nonessential gear at Shingbuiyang and later at Ningbyen. The battalions typically marched 10 to 12 miles per day along an improved dirt road. Marches varied between as many as 17 or 18 miles and as few as three miles, depending on march objectives. Unit kitchen detachments traveled by truck ahead of the battalions so units could eat hot rations at their bivouac sites. Despite an accident with 2d Battalion's ration truck that killed ten men, the march entailed no particular

difficulty. Various accounts later called into question a general absence of coordination between OSS Detachment 101 and the Marauders. However during the march, Colonel Peers drove from Shingbuiyang to visit with his old friend McGee, and there were many close contacts between Detachment 101 and the 5307th.

Entering its assembly area at Ningbyen during the latter part of February, the 5307th came together for the first time as a tactical unit. This was the first experience for the Marauders' unit headquarters. The battalions used their time in their assembly areas to rest and conduct final preparations for combat. McGee assessed the the impact of his battalion's movement from Deogarh as a positive experience, reflective of good leadership:

During the long journey covering 25 days we had been most fortunate in avoiding any significant health problems. Constantly on the move, across a disease-ridden country, we had eaten a variety of rations prepared under varying conditions and drunk from water from many sources, though treated with chlorine, Halazone and/or boiled. We had lived and slept in dirty train cars, stayed at filthy and overcrowded transient camps and had been for two days on a river boat with normal accommodations for 160 persons. The conditions down the Ledo Road were also conducive to trouble since we were staying at and moving through old campsites and bivouac areas which had been recently occupied. The battalion had run this gauntlet without damage. This result was much less a matter of luck than it was of the awareness and understanding by the troops as to the potential health hazards and of vigilance on the part of the company officers and noncommissioned officers. (8)

As a result of their experience on the Ledo Road, units reduced their marching loads to the essentials. Typically

soldiers would carry toilet articles, a change in socks and underwear, a blanket, a shelter half, and mess gear. Soldiers carried all of their personal gear with the battalions' animals being committed to carrying unit equipment. Loads typically consisted of five categories of equipment: ammunition, communications equipment, medical supplies, and engineering equipment and supplies. The battalions also took their first parachute drops of supplies into paddy drop zones located near their encampments. This was to be the first of many such resupply drops that the Marauders would take. As operations unfolded, the units would gain great proficiency at taking resupply drops. They would also gain expertise in running medical evacuations by light planes flying in and out airstrips often hacked out of the jungle. To facilitate air-ground operations, each of the battalions received army air corps liaison officers. The officers would handle radio contact with airdrop aircraft. They would also provide forward control for fighter aircraft supporting the battalions.

It was in their assembly areas that the Marauders met General Stilwell. McGee recalled the visit by Generals Stilwell and Merrill to his area and reflected on its importance. McGee was clearly impressed by Stilwell's demeanor. An extended excerpt from McGee's account reveals his feelings and the values in leadership McGee saw expressed in Stilwell, Merrill, and the relationships involved:

The remainder of that morning was spent in drying out clothing and equipment and caring for weapons. While this work was going on, General Stilwell accompanied General Merrill moved through the battalion area observing with evident interest the troop activity, making a quiet comment here and there but causing no flurry on the part of the men nor making any demands on their time. However, the interest was mutual, and they saw a wiry individual, a Lieutenant General, dressed for the field in baggy khakis and leggings, an open-collared shirt, a well worn field jacket and wearing a peaked Chinese troop cap, and whose reputation as a tough and dogged soldier was well known to them.

As General Merrill and I followed him through the battalion area, General Merrill told me with amusement that he had mentioned to General Stilwell that one soldier on seeing him seated in a jeep along the trail and wearing his peaked cap, not recognizing him, had said, " Well I'll be damned, imagine seeing a duck hunter way out here." He said that General Stilwell's reply was, "I don't care what they call me as long as they will fight."

The visit was carried out in an appropriate and effective manner; and it accomplished all that needed to be done, that is, he saw the troops and sized them up and they saw him and appreciated his interest, and both were well satisfied. Although clearly not General Stilwell's style, this was no time for oratory and there was no need for exhortations and flattery. These were well-motivated soldiers, and any questions which may have been in their minds at this time, on the eve of being committed to combat, were not ones that General Stilwell could answer.

This would be the only time that the 2nd Battalion would see General Stilwell during the campaign, although I would meet him again at Maingkwan and Myitkyina. As a matter of fact, there would be no reason for us to be concerned with General Stilwell and his staff: General Merrill was our commander and the person responsible for our employment and welfare, and I never looked beyond him.

Of particular interest was the easy and comfortable relationship that clearly existed between General Stilwell and General Merrill. It

was one that could only exist between two individuals who knew and understood one another, shared a mutual respect and confidence and were in agreement as to the course of action to be undertaken. Having been General Stilwell's G-3 during the planning for the Northern Burma Campaign, General Merrill, would require only a brief statement of mission for our commitment. Throughout the campaign, General Merrill was to operate with the lightest touch of reins. (9)

THE STRATEGIC SITUATION

In late February 1944, six Japanese ground divisions and an air division occupied Burma; two more were arriving. The 33d and 55th Divisions had led the initial Japanese attack from Siam into Burma in 1942. The 18th and 56th Divisions had come from Malaya to Rangoon in March 1942 after the fall of the port city. The 31st and the 54th Divisions arrived during the summer of 1942. The 2d and 15th Divisions were closing into Burma at the beginning of the Marauders' first mission.

During this time, two Japanese armies controlled combat operations in Burma. The Japanese Fifteenth Army, which had conducted the attack into Burma, controlled all of the divisions listed above except the 55th Division and the 5th Air Division. The Burma Area Army controlled the Fifteenth Army, the latter two divisions, and other smaller units to include marines. At the time of the Marauders' initial mission, the Burma Area Army had tasked the Japanese Fifteenth Army to begin planning and preparing for an offensive into India in 1944. Under the command of the Japanese Expeditionary Forces in the Southern Regions, the

Burma Area Army held complete authority for planning and executing local strategy. Neither the Expeditionary Forces nor the Area Army had any control over naval forces. Instead, Japanese army and army air forces worked in cooperation with Japanese naval forces.

Opposing Japanese forces along the Indo-Burmese border were elements of the Allied South-East Asia Command (SEAC). British forces consisted of six divisions under the control of the IV and XV Corps. Chinese forces consisted of two American trained divisions, the 22d and 38th Divisions organized as the Chinese Army of India. Chinese forces along the Salween River consisted of many divisions but largely untrained and poorly organized. The British had conducted two offensive operations during 1943. An attack into the Arakan peninsula failed and British forces had to withdraw to the Indo-Burmese border. The second operation had been that of Wingate's long range penetration element, the 77th Brigade (the Chindits). This operation directed at the Japanese line of communication achieved limited success, and some argued that it had resulted in little benefit. Still it caused the Japanese concern for the security of their activities in northern and central Burma. Certainly the operation provided a needed lift in morale for allied forces in theater at a time when little else good had happened. In October 1943, Japanese forces conducted their only offensive operation of 1943 by launching a spoiling attack against Chinese forces along the Salween River. The

Chinese 30th Division took a thorough beating by the Japanese 56th Division and an element of the 18th Division.

SEAC plans for 1944 called for the main effort to go into central Burma and the Arakan Peninsula with the British IV and XV Corps attacking to destroy Japanese forces. Supporting attacks would come from a long range penetration by Wingate's 3d Indian Division (the Chindits) to cut north-south lines of communication in the area encompassed by Katha, Indaw, and Mawlu; from the Chinese Yoke Force attacking from the east to divert Japanese attention from the Allied main effort; and from Chinese 22d and 38th Divisions in conjunction with the 5307th and a brigade of the 3d Indian Division attacking south toward Myitkyina to open a ground line of communication between India and China.

THE OPERATIONAL AND TACTICAL SITUATION

Japanese forces in northern Burma consisted of the 18th Division. Arrayed in strong defensive positions near and north of Maingkwan, the 18th Division conducted operations to control the Hukawng Valley and protect the Kamaing Road, the main line of communication for the division. Peers describes the Japanese defense:

The 18th was solidly dug in. They had shown uncommon aptitude in utilizing the natural terrain as their front of resistance--and what it was like can best be described as a wall of steel, though in fact, it was bamboo. Since to most of us bamboo suggests something light and fragile, dedicated to the easy way of fishing, it should be explained that this was a variety of bamboo known as bullaca; it is from four to eight inches in

diameter, and is capable of withstanding light artillery fire. The Japanese had perfected this bamboo into a concrete-strong barricade. Clumps of the bamboo grew ten to fifteen feet in diameter; the enemy had burrowed underground, as if building a tunnel, until they reached the center of the clump. Then, coming up to the center, they had chopped away enough so that they were absolutely surrounded by the natural obstacle, protected against light and heavy rifle fire. (10)

Against this bamboo reinforced defense, which protected the Kamaing Road, the Chinese 22d and 38th Divisions had struggled. Nearly five months of slow advance against a most determined enemy brought the Chinese 60 miles into the Hukawng Valley. Each of the principal Japanese positions held 40 to 100 Japanese and required the bravest of efforts to dislodge the defenders. By 24 February 1944, the Chinese 38th Division and the 1st Provisional Tank Group, NCAC's main effort, were attacking south along the Kamaing Road toward Maingkwan. They had cleared the area north of the Tawang and Tanai Hka Rivers. (The tank group was a Chinese-American unit that consisted of 90 light and medium tanks. An American, Colonel Rothwell Brown, commanded it. An American tank platoon served as its spearhead.) The 22d Division operated in a supporting effort, 20 miles to the west across a range of 4,000 foot hills. The 22d Division covered the 38th Division's left flank by continuing to move to the southeast.

Operating in support of NCAC, OSS Detachment 101 had already proven itself enormously effective in disrupting the operations of the Japanese Army in northern Burma. It had

extended its operations as far south as Mandalay and proven itself in direct action and strategic reconnaissance. The detachment, in spite of various setbacks, had developed an effective resistance movement among the Kachins, a tribe of northern Burma. Thirty-five agents--American, English, Anglo-Burmese, and others--were operating in north Burma by the end of October 1943 and controlling less than a thousand guerrillas. In less than a year and one-half, the number of agents would nearly quadruple and would control over 10,000 guerrillas. OSS Detachment 101 accounted for up to 85 per cent of targets attacked by the Tenth Air Force, which killed approximately 11,000 Japanese by the end of the campaign. The G2 of NCAC later estimated that between 85 and 95 percent of all usable intelligence derived from the detachment. While the Tenth Air Force would continue to improve its aerial photographic capabilities, the skill of the Japanese was such that on-the-ground reconnaissance continued to provide the most effective way of finding the enemy. (11)

At the beginning of the Marauders' first mission, Detachment 101 was under General Stilwell's orders to expand its guerrilla force to 3,000, center its operations around Myitkyina, and provide intelligence and espionage throughout north Burma. As a result, the detachment organized itself to operate in direct support of the advancing forces as well as to go deep into Japanese held north Burma. In addition to the OSS Detachment 101, NCAC also controlled Kachin

Levies under the command of a British brigadier. The Kachin Levies originated from Fort Hertz and were conducting operations on the east flank of the NCAC's main effort.

WALAWBUM

The Plan

On 22 February, General Stilwell gave oral orders to General Merrill for the 5307th "to cut the Japanese supply line, the Kamaing Road, south of Walawbum, and to seek out and attack the 18th Division's command post, which was thought to be near Walawbum." General Merrill met with his battalion commanders later on the same day and outlined his plan for the upcoming operation. McGee recalls this first orders meeting as typical of those conducted by General Merrill:

This meeting with the battalion commanders was typical of those which General Merrill would conduct as necessary. He always dealt directly with the battalion commanders, as a group or singly, and rarely through a member of his staff. It will be realized that his unit consisted of only three infantry battalions which had been trained to operate independently. There was no other units, organic, attached or supporting. There was no administrative encumbrance or workload. ...The 5307th was as lean and combat-tailored as a unit could be. Directing the battalions was a one-man task, and General Merrill would do the job exclusively. (12)

With Chinese forces driving for Maingkwan, the Marauders would attack in an encircling movement to the east then south to establish road blocks behind the Japanese front lines. The Marauders' Intelligence and Reconnaissance (I&R)

platoons, one from each of the battalions, would move in advance of the main body. The platoons would reconnoiter three trails leading to the Tawang Hka River. On the basis of the reconnaissance, General Merrill would chose a route for the main body to move along. General Merrill did not specify an objective for his commanders. The I&R platoons were to depart on 23 February, a day in advance of the main body. The platoons maintained radio contact with their battalions. The main body would move out on 24 February with the order of march as 1st Battalion, Regimental Headquarters, 2d Battalion, and 3d Battalion. The regimental net would be in operation on 24 February. Contact with the Japanese was expected. Exact locations would be developed on contact.

Terrain and Movement

The envelopment march crossed generally flat terrain heavily jungled with undergrowth. Stream beds were dry; rivers were shallow but broad. Clearly the onset of monsoons would bring significant problems. The broad rivers provided defenders great fields of fire. Trails seldom directly crossed riverbeds. Instead, they tended to follow the river with the trails crossing and recrossing several times. Because of the heavy undergrowth, movement through the area was restricted to the trails. As a result, point elements throughout the campaign experienced extraordinary danger because Japanese defenders could concentrate their

defenses along the few usable trails. Movement of the main body presented challenges to marchers. The 5307th moved in a column of battalions; each battalion moved in a column of combat teams; combat teams moved in single file. With nearly 3,000 men and 700 mules and horses following one another, trail units often had to march in the dark to close on bivouac sites. An occasion, units would bivouac on the trail when movement at night became too difficult to be useful.

Action Summary

On 23 February the I&R platoons departed as ordered; the Marauder main body departed on the following day. On 25 February, the I&R platoon of 2d Battalion's Blue Combat Team made contact with a Japanese squad-sized element. After a firefight, the Japanese withdrew. During the fight, Private Robert W. Landis became the first United States Infantryman to be killed in Southeast Asia. McGee describes this first Japanese position, a first indication of the skill the Marauders repeatedly found in the Japanese 18th Division:

I found the Japs had been set up in a thoroughly professional manner. A light machine gun had been emplaced, well dug in and concealed, on a small rise on the edge of the jungle where the trail south to Nhkang Kayang left the village. From this position, with the entire village clearing as field of fire, the machine gun covered the other two trails entering the village, from Nding Ga to the north and from Tanja Ga to the east. In a draw to the rear of this position a bamboo lean-to had been constructed for unit sleeping quarters, and in front of it was a single communal fireplace. It appeared that the unit had been of

squad-size, eight men. From the lean-to paths led up to the machine gun position and to the riflemen foxholes on both sides of it. These paths had been cleared of jungle growth, and bamboo had been strung railing-like about three feet above the ground along them. It was evident that day and night these soldiers could get to their positions.

(13)

Also on 25 February, the I&R platoon of 3d Battalion's Orange Combat Team made contact with a Japanese patrol near Nzang Ga. The platoon killed one Japanese soldier; one Marauder was wounded. The Marauders arrived near Tanja Ga and Lanem Ga on 28 February where they took an airdrop of two days food and grain and received orders from General Stilwell. On 2 March after three days of movement but still 15 miles from Walawbum, General Merrill issued combat orders to his battalion commanders:

....the 3d Battalion was to pass through Sabaw Ga and Lagang Ga and secure hold of the Kamaing Road at Walawbum by seizing the high ground along the Numpyek River east of the road. The 2d Battalion was to proceed via Wesu Ga, cut a trail through the jungle westerly to strike the Kamaing Road just east of the Nambyu River at a point 2 1/2 miles west of Walawbum, and there construct a road block. The 1st Battalion was to block the trails at Sana Ga and Nchet Ga, with a minimum of one platoon at each point. One combat team of the battalion was to establish combat patrols along the Nambyu River between Shimak Ga and Uga Ga. The rest of the battalion was to constitute a reserve at Wesu Ga. The Marauders were to hold their positions blocking the Kamaing Road until the Chinese, following up an enemy withdrawal, could occupy and relieve them. (14)

On 3 March the battalions started for their objectives. The Marauders made numerous contacts with the small elements of combat support and service support units one would expect to find 20 miles behind division front lines. The 3d

Battalion bivouacked within a half mile of Walawbum. Orange Combat Team led the battalion column followed by Khaki Combat Team. Major Lew of Orange Combat Team relieved his I&R platoon from its duties at the point of the column and sent it across the Numpyek River to protect his right flank. Khaki Combat Team began construction of a small airstrip to permit the landing of L-4 and L-5 liaison airplanes. The 1st and 2d Battalions bivouacked within two miles of Wesu Ga. All three battalions put out trail blocks and listening posts, and made contact with many small Japanese elements throughout the night.

On 4 March the Japanese began actions to find the Marauders' positions. The 3d Battalion's Khaki Combat Team was securing the airstrip they had built when at 0630 they received an attack by a 30 man Japanese unit. Fog and heavy undergrowth had permitted the Japanese to get close. Ten Japanese were killed during the fight. Khaki Combat Team suffered six wounded. The combat team evacuated four of the wounded by plane. Within an hour, the Orange I&R platoon led by Lieutenant Logan Weston received the first of five attacks by a 90 man force--each attack from a different direction. Weston was able to shift his forces to meet each new attack because of the efforts of his Niesi interpreter who quickly translated shouted enemy orders. During the third attack, the enemy attacked from three sides and used mortar fire against the platoon. Khaki Combat Team responded with its 81mm mortars and the I&R platoon broke

contact across the river supported by direct fire from the combat team. The action by the I&R platoon permitted the combat team to move into position on the high ground overlooking Walawbum. In this position, the combat team could provide effective direct and indirect fires onto the Kamaing Road.

The 2d Battalion continued its movement toward the Kamaing Road by cutting its way through the jungle. The battalion neared the road after dark and went into a bivouac without exterior patrols and listening posts. A Nisei interpreter with the battalion tapped a Japanese telephone line and learned of the enemy's confusion and the location of an ammunition dump. Although 2d Battalion had sent back nonessential animals, a number still accompanied the unit. During the night, some of the mules began braying. The failure to provide the Marauders with devocalized animals seemed a large failing to the men of 2d Battalion hoping to escape notice in their clandestine position. Somehow, the Japanese did not hear the mules.

Throughout 4 March, the 1st Battalion continued to guard the Marauders' rear and serve as the regimental reserve. It made many small contacts with its several patrols and caused heavy Japanese casualties among rear echelon elements.

Early on 5 March, 2d Battalion moved to the Kamaing Road and dug in a perimeter roadblock with a combat team facing each way along the road. Each combat team dispatched its I&R platoon down the road on its side to establish an ambush

to provide early warning. General Merrill and Colonel McGee agreed the 2d Battalion would wait for the 3d Battalion and the 1st Provisional Tank Unit to link up at the roadblock. As the 2d Battalion dug in, the battalion's communications section tapped a Japanese telephone line and found it in use by the Japanese. Technician 4th Grade Roy H. Maysumoto, who had lived in Tokyo, translated the conversations and passed the information to General Merrill. Later in the day, information on the telephone line indicated the Japanese were using a route other than the Kamaing Road to move around the 2d Battalion's block. Still the Japanese made a strong effort to clear 2d Battalion's block by shelling the perimeter and launching six successive infantry attacks. The battalion had one man killed and five wounded. As the day progressed, water for the animals and ammunition became a factor in the continued occupation of the perimeter.

The 3d Battalion, south of Walawbum, received heavy mortar and light artillery fire. Strong Japanese patrols attempted to find and attack Orange Combat Team's flanks, but found no success in doing so. Ambushes set by Orange Combat Team killed at least 75 Japanese. Orange suffered one man killed and seven wounded. By evening Japanese attacks had eased in intensity and frequency, but the enemy was moving significant reinforcements up the Kamaing Road from Kamaing. A 2d Battalion intercept on the Japanese telephone line indicated the Japanese intention to attack the 2d Battalion in strength while the remainder of the 18th

Division's elements would withdraw through the bypassing route. Throughout the day, fighter aircraft attacked Japanese forces as they moved up the road.

General Merrill and Colonel McGee reviewed the situation in the late afternoon. The 1st Provisional Tank Unit was delayed. The 3d Battalion's considerable contact with the enemy prevented its moving to 2d Battalion's location. The 2d Battalion needed rations. Water for the animals had become critical. While soldiers were able to survive with water taken from bamboo, the animals in the perimeter had not watered since 2 March. The surgeons had stabilized the wounded and conducted immediate surgery, but evacuation of the men was required. Finally ammunition, particularly mortar ammunition, was low. As a result of their review, General Merrill directed the McGee to withdraw 2d Battalion to Wesu Ga, about two miles north of Walawbum. Colonel McGee dispatched an element to reconnoiter a route back to Wesu Ga that could support the battalion's movement at night. A modified return route plus good light from the moon permitted the battalion to move "steadily." While an easier move than the one into the blocking position, the move back required much hard work. No move in any jungle is ever easy. McGee recalled the march as "a hard and jarring ordeal for the litter patients and a tiring experience for the relays of bearers." (15)

On 6 March 3d Battalion's Orange Combat Team remained in position to command the Kamaing Road by direct and indirect

fire. Khaki Combat Team broke was relieved from its security mission and proceeded to reinforce Khaki's position. Against the Orange Combat Team, the Japanese directed considerable mortar and artillery fire but without effect. Orange had dug in with strong overhead cover. Throughout the day, 3d Battalion employed its mortars effectively to break up assaults before they could be launched. At 1715, two Japanese companies with support by heavy machine guns, mortars, and artillery fire attempted to cross the river against Orange Combat Team. Orange held its fire until the assaulting force reached within 25 yards of the defenders. At that point, all within view to include two heavy machine guns opened fire. Four hundred Japanese died. The attack failed. This was the last attack of significance by the Japanese against the Marauders in the Walawbum area.

One final incident occurred as the Chinese 38th Division closed on Walawbum after the Chinese Divisions and the 1st Provisional Tank Unit had forced the Japanese to withdraw from Maingkwan. Before the final fight by Orange Combat Team, a Chinese battalion commander met with General Merrill to arrange for the 113th Regiment's relief of the Marauders at Walawbum. The Chinese regiment arrived on 7 March, but its initial contact with the Red Combat Team resulted in a firefight initiated by the Chinese, who did not recognize the Americans. Red Team responded with direct and indirect fires. The fight stopped when a Chinese interpreter

identified the Chinese force as friends. The Chinese lost four badly wounded men, to include a major. Red team surgeons treated the wounded, who were quickly air evacuated.

That evening, General Merrill, meeting with his three battalion commanders, offered his commendation and General Stilwell's congratulations on a job well done. In five days from the beginning of the Walawbum action on 3 March, the Marauders had killed 800 Japanese. Moreover, they cooperated with the Army Air Corps, the Chinese, and OSS Detachment 101 to force a major withdrawal by the Japanese 18th Division. The Marauders had lost 8 men killed and 37 wounded. Seventy patients had been evacuated for malaria, other fevers, psychoneurosis, and various injuries.

Reflections on Leadership

Having reviewed the basic facts and chronology of events up to the capture of Walawbum in March 1944, it is worth stepping back to analyze various facets as they pertain to larger, more enduring issues. These issues are the presence of the commander in battle, styles of senior leadership, use of the deputy commander, and the provision by commanders of the purpose, direction, and intent of their operations.

Commander's Presence

A central issue concerns the relationships between the methods of senior leadership, the physical environment, and

the tactical and operational situation. Jungle warfare does not lend itself to the traditional applications of face-to-face leadership by senior leaders. The close terrain of the jungle inhibits a general's use of his personal presence to inspire his subordinate leaders and his men. Opportunities for men to see their generals and for generals to see their men rarely come. A senior leader cannot easily move to the decisive point of battle to rally his men. Jungle movement, often measured in hundreds of yards per hour, denies the senior leader the ability to move easily and quickly anywhere on the battlefield. As a consequence of these limitations, senior leaders in jungle warfare must carefully weigh the opportunities to see and be seen by their soldiers. The realization of these opportunities should always result from careful consideration rather than impulse.

Understanding these difficulties, General Stilwell got it right in joining the Marauders as they entered the assembly area at Ningbyen near his headquarters at Shingbwiyang. On the trail near the unit's assembly area, he watched the Marauders move. Then in the assembly area, he spent time walking through battalion bivouacs talking with soldiers. His time in observation on the trail seems appropriate for two reasons. First, the unit was finishing a 140-mile march; watching the unit at the finish would give him a good idea of the soundness of its leadership. Second, the upcoming campaign was going to require daily, long marches;

observing the Marauders at the end of a series of lengthy marches would provide a good notion of their fitness to complete their missions. Given his style of leadership, he was seeking neither to inspire nor rally the 5307th. He came to assess its qualities.

Colonel Hunter criticized Stilwell for not visiting the Marauders in Deogarh (located in central India) and noted visits by Admiral Mountbatten, supreme commander for Southeast Asia, and General Wingate. In the case of the latter, it must be remembered that General Wingate, in spite of publicity, was only commander of a division not yet committed to combat. He had the time to devote to such visits. Since the Marauders were to have been one of his brigades before it was decided otherwise, visits to the 5307th seem obligatory. As to Admiral Mountbatten, he like Stilwell spent a proper moment as a senior commander in seeing and being seen. Visiting the Marauders in Deogarh made sense geographically. His presence unquestionably gave the Marauders a sense of importance and purpose. As to General Stilwell not coming to Deogarh, it did not make sense geographically. General Stilwell was actively prosecuting a campaign against the Japanese with the Chinese Army of India. Deogarh stood a long ways from combat operations, and men Stilwell trusted were overseeing the training of the Maruaders. Occupant of multiple positions of responsibility ranging from the strategic to the tactical, Stilwell had no time to waste and little time to spend. In

using his presence at the beginning of the campaign as he did, he got it right.

General Merrill got his part right, too. He spent a lot of time with his men. He could do this because the 5307th was a relatively uncomplicated organization at this time. Other than Colonel Hunter's criticisms, the Marauders appeared to have uniformly liked and respected Merrill. In executing the Walawbum campaign, General Merrill's decision to employ the Marauders as a single unit permitted him to move his command post with the battalions. As a result, Merrill was to share with his men the rigors and dangers of the operation, and they knew it. The movement of the Marauders as a regiment during the first mission also permitted him almost daily contact with his battalion commanders. His presence reassured them, and a mutual trust developed between General Merrill and his battalion commanders. Composed under fire, too, he cast a calming presence that seemed to permeate the command environment of the Marauders.

Styles of Senior Leadership

Some of the discussion on presence has already addressed the styles used by General Stilwell and by General Merrill in dealing with the Marauders. Capturing a thorough understanding of General Stilwell's style of leadership as he applied it to all of his responsibilities certainly

exceeds the scope of this paper. Renowned or infamous for bluntness and irascibility, he showed none of this in dealing with the Marauders. Throughout the campaign, he only once visited the battalions of the Marauders. Given the type of combat, which widely dispersed Marauder columns, this was not remarkable. However, he was to visit with Marauder commanders on several occasions until their withdrawal from Myitkyina. In all cases, he is described as calm, direct, and even polite. He did not seek to attract attention to himself. Even Colonel Hunter's account does not discount this description. Except for Colonel Hunter, who barely knew General Stilwell, no one within the Marauders who did know the General from firsthand experience has written to criticize him. In fact, Colonel Peers, commander of Detachment 101, who did know him well, wrote with great admiration about "Uncle Joe." Years later as a senior general officer, Peers was appointed to head an inquiry because of his own reputation for honesty and directness--Stilwell characteristics. (16)

General Merrill clearly enjoyed working around soldiers. Calm, confident, and outgoing, his style won him wide admiration. He did not waste words when time was short, but he could also tell a story with ease. His confidence derived in part from considerable personal intelligence and from the experience gained from having worked in the theater of operation for over two years. He had walked out of Burma with Stilwell and survived a heart attack enroute. As

Stilwell's G3 earlier in the war, Merrill implicitly understood the strategic, operational, and tactical situation faced by the Marauders. His warm relationship with General Stilwell bought him considerable freedom of action in leading the Marauders. Merrill was no puppet. In dealing with his commanders, he dealt with them directly and in a low key manner. Quiet strength was his mark. Except for Hunter's comments, one cannot find criticisms by his subordinate commanders.

The Deputy Commander

Colonel Hunter's account of his actions as deputy commander suggests an importance throughout the campaign transcending the actions of General Merrill. This is nonsense. He contributed to the actions of the Marauders dutifully--at times outstandingly and at times poorly. Neither he nor Merrill had served before as commanders at the regimental level, and both made mistakes. Hunter had not participated in battalion training in Deogarh, nor had he played any part in the employment of the Marauders during the exercise with the 3d Indian Division in December 1943. Certainly through the beginning of the campaign, both Hunter and Merrill were learning how to best employ a deputy commander. Since Merrill and Hunter had been classmates at West Point, one would expect Merrill to give Hunter as wide authority as possible. However, because General Merrill chose to employ the Marauders as a single element in its

first mission, no command requirement existed for Colonel Hunter beyond ensuring the provision of logistical support. He seems to have done this adequately.

Hunter's commentary on tactical operations during Walawbum certainly was not based on personal observation but on speculation. His suggestion that General Merrill withdrew the 2d Battalion's block prematurely does not match up with the tactical facts. McGee's account of his battalion's occupation and subsequent withdrawal from the block at Walawbum confirms General Merrill did the sensible thing in agreeing to the withdrawal. Hunter and others have suggested Merrill as a tactical novice, but Hunter had never seen combat before. Merrill had served as Stilwell's G3 during combat operations and had enjoyed considerable experience as an operations officer. In combat he appeared quick to comprehend developing tactical situations and unafraid to take appropriate action, even if it did not fully match his commander's desires.

Purpose, Direction and Intent

To Colonel Hunter's frustration, General Stilwell chose to deal directly and almost exclusively with General Merrill in the planning and directing of combat operations. Because of General Merrill's previous experience as a member of Stilwell's staff, he undoubtedly understood the purpose and

intent of the campaign in north Burma. Jungle operations tend to be slow. What General Merrill could not know, nor could General Stilwell, was the timing of operations. General Merrill assuredly knew of or could reason Myitkyina as the campaign's objective, but he probably did not think of the Marauders as the instrument of final action against Myitkyina. Neither he nor General Stilwell could foresee how successfully the Marauders would conduct operations. General Merrill chose to keep his thoughts to himself on such matters when dealing with his commanders. In fact, he tended to begin operations with a march order and a general area of operation, and, as the situation developed, would issue fragmentary orders adjusting the tasks given the battalions. As McGee's account shows, General Merrill did not provide his or General Stilwell's intent, and instead he chose to provide tight instructions for each battalion as it neared possible action. Several reasons argue for this approach. First, because of the very long enveloping marches the Marauders would make, he could make no hard assessments of enemy dispositions until the battalions had reached their general objective areas. Second, in the spirit of Stonewall Jackson, keeping intent and purpose general until time of action may have helped preserve operations security. Last, experience with the Chinese had shown them slow and somewhat unpredictable in action. Merrill may not have wanted to build an elaborate plan contingent on Chinese action thinking it easier instead to

issue subsequent orders than to build an overall plan and have to readjust it significantly by radio. Neither Stilwell nor Merrill apparently ever revealed a broader operational or strategic view until immediately necessary when executing combat operations. In the short term, this would have no impact. In the long terms, this approach would yield grave consequences.

SHADUZUP AND INKANGAHTAWNG

The Operational and Tactical Situation

With the occupation of Walawbum, NCAC controlled the Hukawng Valley. The Japanese had withdrawn 15 to 20 miles south to defend the the northern end of the Mogaung Valley. Japanese losses in defending Walawbum had proven high. Accustomed to the slow forward movement of the Chinese, General Tanaka felt he could concentrate at will to defeat his attackers in detail. In attempting to concentrate against the enveloping attack by the Marauders, he found his forces outfought and forced into a withdrawal.

The Strategic Situation

During the Marauders' first mission and the two months preceding it, serious differences had risen between the British and Americans as to the strategic direction to be taken in Southeast Asia. The British desired to fight a holding action in Burma and pursue an offensive through Malaya. They would then retake Singapore and possibly seize

a Chinese port to facilitate prosecution of operations in the Pacific. Clearly the British wanted to reacquire their colonial holdings. In contrast, the Americans wanted to support the Chinese. To do this, they sought a decisive action in Burma to reestablish a land bridge between India and China. Across this land bridge, the Allies would move supplies and equipment that would permit the Chinese Army to attack east in support of operations in the Pacific. In the disagreements, Admiral Mountbatten thought at one point that General Stilwell, his deputy in SEAC, had acted disloyally. Specifically, Mountbatten felt actions by Stilwell had proven decisive in convincing President Roosevelt to block British intentions. Both Mountbatten and Stilwell were to learn subsequently that independent action by the American Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), not by Stilwell, had led to the President's actions. In conversation with Prime Minister Churchill, the President said he was expecting the seizure of the Myitkyina by the end of the dry season (May-June) in Burma. On 2 March, Mountbatten and Stilwell met at Stilwell's invitation and reestablished a cordial relationship. Stilwell wrote General Marshall that he "ate crow" for not keeping Mountbatten fully informed. The meeting did not decide the strategic questions of the theater, but it did establish Mountbatten's willingness to cooperate with the effort in north Burma.

On 8 March, the Japanese Fifteenth Army launched its major offensive into India. In support of the operation,

General Tanaka withdrew his forward defense to the area around Jambu Bum and limited his actions against NCAC to counterattacks.

The Plan

The next operation by NCAC aimed the Mogaung Valley. A set of low hills holding the village of Jambu Bum marked the northern end of the valley and separated the Hukawng Valley from the Mogaung. The Chinese 22d Division would advance south along the Kamaing Road toward Jambu Bum. The Chinese 65th Regiment, located 25 miles to the west, would cover the right flank of the advance. The Marauders would conduct enveloping attacks on the left flank of the operation. Detachment 101 would operate in direct support of the attack as well as continuing actions near and beyond Myitkyina.

Colonel McGee recalled receiving his initial orders for the Marauders' second mission. His recollection speaks to a clear admiration for General Merrill's style of command and leadership:

On 11 March General Merrill met with Beach and me and informed us that the 5307th less the 1st Battalion would move out the next morning. With the 2d Battalion leading, the route of march would be Shikau Ga-Galun Ga-Kaidau Ga and thence along and up the Tanai Hka. I understood that this rather sudden departure was due in part to his concern over the number of cases of diarrhea being experienced, particularly in the 1st Battalion which was bivouacked much closer to Chinese units than the other two battalions.

At this meeting, as had been the case at Ningbyen prior to the Walawbum operation, General Merrill confirmed himself to matters pertaining to the

march movement. While we knew that the general plan envisioned an attack on the Road north of Kamaing, it would not be until we were well down trail, at Janpan, that he would inform us concerning the operational plan. His reticence concerning these operational details was understandable; first, we had a long march ahead of us and the situation could change quickly and drastically, and secondly, Beach and I had no requirement for such detail at this time.

He had given Osborne his instructions separately, and I knew generally that his mission involved a shallow envelopment of the Japanese position in the Jambu Bum, and that the 1st Battalion would be followed at a day's march by a regiment of the 38th Chinese Division with an attached artillery battery.

At this time General Merrill had General Stilwell's approval of the operation and the one matter left unsettled was the degree of participation by the 38th Chinese Division. It was General Merrill's plan, in which General Sun had expressed agreement, that the other two regiments would follow the 5307th(-) up the Tanai Hka. It should be noted that in each instance the Chinese units were not to be attached to the 5307th but rather would remain under Chinese control. This matter of the extent of Chinese participation was currently under consideration by NCAC staff, and General Merrill had sent Hunter to Miangkwan to get the decision. The outcome would be that the NCAC staff would recommend against the participation of the two regiments in the Tanai Hka operation, and General Stilwell would so decide. This was to prove a crucial decision.

At the conclusion of this meeting, I told General Merrill that Sergeant Freer was now in command of the Green C(ombat)T(eam) I&R Platoon, and I would like to have him commissioned as soon as possible and preferably before we moved out on this new mission. His unhesitating reply was that I should pin second lieutenant bars on him, and we would leave the administrative details to be sorted out later. (17)

Action Summary

Movement to Shaduzup

On 12 March, the 1st Battalion started in an enveloping march for Shaduzup. The Chinese 113th Regiment and 6th Pack Artillery Battery trailed the battalion. Two days march covered about 20 miles and brought the battalion into rugged terrain with hills as high as 2,000 feet. On 14 March, the point platoon of the battalion surprised elements of a Japanese company killing five men. The Japanese withdrew but now knew where the 1st Battalion was. The next day, the battalion experienced eight separate fights along the trail. Unknown to the battalion, an element of Detachment 101's Kachin guerrillas led by Lieutenant James L. Tilly was harrassing the Japanese in support of the 1st Battalion's movement south. To avoid the continued resistance by the Japanese, Colonel Osborne left one combat team in contact with the Japanese and moved the second team to cut a path around the Japanese position. White Combat Team took two days of exhausting effort to hack four miles through the jungle to Kumshan Ga reaching it on 17 March. The Red Team and the Chinese regiment followed. On 19 March, the battalion received an airdrop of supplies and another one on 21 March.

From 19 March the battalion continued its movement steadily opposed by Japanese ambushes. Each contact would lead to a sharp fight followed by a Marauder element cutting a path around the enemy's trail block. On 23 March Colonel

Osborne again decided to take 1st Battalion off the trail. Two days of hacking through the jungle covered only five miles but without opposition from the Japanese. Frequently the battalion would encounter hills too steep for its animals to climb loaded. Again and again, soldiers would unload the animals, hand carry the heavy loads to the top of the hill, and reload the animals. This would become a familiar experience on the trail.

From Detachment 101, Colonel Osborne learned that an estimated 300 Japanese held Shaduzup and another 500 to 600 were defending near Jambu Bum. Based on the information, Colonel Osborne decided to feint to the north of Shaduzup with a platoon and move the 1st Battalion into a road block four miles south of the village. He selected a block position close to the Mogaung River where the road ran parallel to the river.

As the feinting rifle platoon made contact with the Japanese, the 1st Battalion continued its move south of Shaduzup. Arriving in the area of the intended block, White Combat Team's I&R platoon reported it had seen an estimated company sized force encamped near the river. The platoon also reported that another larger element was just south of the first element.

Colonel Osborne planned a night attack on the first position with one combat team attacking, one in support, and the Chinese 113th Regiment in reserve. White Combat Team crossed the Mogaung River at 0300 on 28 March and caught the

Japanese by surprise. The attacking team killed many of the enemy with bayonets, grenades, and tommy guns. White Team quickly pushed to the road and began digging in its perimeter. The Japanese responded almost immediately with snipers, assaulting infantry, and artillery. By midday, 1st Battalion was receiving 77mm and 150mm fire. Throughout the afternoon, the Japanese repeatedly attacked in force from different directions. All attacks were repelled. By evening infantry assaults ceased, but Japanese artillery attacks continued to hammer the battalion.

On 29 March, the 113th Regiment relieved the 1st Battalion from the roadblock. The battalion withdrew to a position near a Seagrave Hospital supporting the Chinese. Caught between the Chinese moving south through Jambu Bum and the roadblock, the Japanese withdrew south toward Kamaing along the Kamaing Road. The 1st Battalion had killed more than 300 Japanese soldiers but had lost eight men killed and 35 wounded. By 1500 lead elements of the 22d Chinese Division linked up with the 113th Regiment. The Kamaing Road now stood open to Laban.

The 1st Battalion's original orders called for it to rejoin the main body of the Marauders somewhere near Hsamshingyang. A confirming order directed it to move to Janpan, about 17 miles straight line distance. Movement took the battalion across a part of the Kumon Range with a rugged climb nearing 4,000 feet. A day's march at times yielded little more than a mile of movement. The battalion

lost all radio contact when a sack of grain delivered from a supply plane fell on the unit's long range radio. On 3 March, impatient with his inability to talk with General Merrill, Colonel Osborne retraced the unit's movement from Shaduzup to find a radio. When communications were reestablished, the 1st Battalion received instructions to move as fast as possible to join the rest of the 5307th at Hsamshingyang. The 2d and 3d Battalions were engaged in a major battle with the Japanese.

Movement to Inkangahtawng

While the 1st Battalion conducted its shorter enveloping attack to Shaduzup, the rest of the Marauders moved on a longer enveloping attack to block the Kamaing Road near Inkangatawng, about 12 miles south of Shaduzup. The block near Inkangatawng would sever the line of communications of the 18th Division about halfway between the division's forward line of troops and its supply base at Kamaing. Conducted in concert with the block at Shaduzup, the Inkangahtawng block would cause great problems for the integrity of the Japanese division's defense.

From 12 through 16 March, the 5307th(-) covered nearly 40 miles. The Chinese regiment that was to accompany the Marauders was not available at the time of the Marauders' departure. Enroute to the Village of Naubum, the Marauders picked up an element of Detachment 101, led by Captain Vincent L. Curl, that consisted of 300 Kachin guerrillas.

Also joining the Marauders at Naubum was Father James Stuart, a missionary Roman Catholic priest, who became the Marauders' unofficial chaplain. On the 18 March, General Merrill stopped the 2d and 3d Battalions in the Weilangyang-Janpan area to receive supplies and wait for final orders from NCAC.

Merrill's Marauders, of the Armed Forces in Action Series, records that General Merrill received new orders from General Stilwell on 20 March. The orders directed the 2d and 3d Battalions to complete their original missions of blocking the Kamaing Road plus blocking Japanese movement along the Tanai River. General Stilwell's order included an estimate of Japanese strength south and west of Kamaing at about 2,000 men. McGee recollects receiving his battalion's order on 19 March. McGee received the order in an one-on-one meeting with General Merrill. Again, McGee's account of the meeting illustrates General Merrill's style of command and leadership:

General Merrill said that the job was for us to move to the Kamaing Road. A task force composed of the 2d Battalion and one combat team of the 3d Battalion would move down the ridgeline toward Kamaing, cut down into the Hkuma Hka at Auché and thence proceed downstream through the Nampama Chaung to Manpin on the edge of the Mogaung plain, some seven miles north of Kamaing. From there we would move through Sharaw, countermarching some 20 odd miles to Warazup.

At Warazup our mission was to block the Kamaing Road and "to remain there for 24 hours or as long as consistent with not getting cut off."

He said that Hunter would command this task force, adding at once, "I know that you can do the job,

but one-half the outfit is involved, and after all that is what Hunter is here for and he might as well get started."

He stated further that the 3d Battalion less the Khaki Combat Team would remain under his control. He did not mention a specific mission or location for the 3d Battalion (-), but he did say that his command post would remain at Janpan for the time being.

I mentioned the matter of being kept informed of the progress of the 1st Battalion, and we agreed that it was desirable that the two forces hit the Road at approximately the same time in order to get the maximum effect of surprise effect of surprise and shock. He said that he would keep us so informed.

There was no mention of any linking-up of the two battalions nor of any other joint efforts.

He said that the Kachins had made the trail from Auche down into the Hkuma Hka passable for animals, but there was no other mention of Kachin participation in the operation. However, he did say that an OSS operative, "Skittles," would be in the vicinity of Manpin but he did not elaborate on this statement.

A food drop would be required, and in any case desirable, before leaving the ridgeline, and General Merrill said that he would provide information as to the place and time of this drop which would probably be at Auche.

He said that he would provide me further information pertaining to the move down the ridgeline to Auche. It was clear to me that he wished to personally control our movement as long as possible. Undoubtedly in view of the unsettled conditions in the Theater and in the Jambu Bum, and he was not yet ready to turn us loose.

As far as the Chinese forces were concerned, they were all involved in one way or another with the attack at Jambu Bum. No Chinese troops had followed us up the Tanai Hka Valley.

As to the Japanese forces south of the Jambu Bum and in the Mogaung valley, there was no information at this time as to where or in what strength they might be. Kamaing, along with Myitkyina and Mogaung, was known to us as a

Japanese stronghold, and it might be expected that the Mogaung valley and the Japanese main supply route from Kamaing to the Jambu Bum would be an area of increasing Japanese activity, both logistical and tactical. However, we did not dwell on this matter to the extent of the above, and the current information was that Captain Curl's sources indicated that the trail from Janpan to Auche was free of Japs at the time of his report. However, this could change quickly.

Some later accounts of the coming operations would indicate that our movement into and in the Mogaung valley was secured or otherwise covered by Kachin guerrillas but this was not the case at all.

The foregoing account of my meeting with General Merrill at Janpan incorporates the atmosphere, the substance and the manner in which the mission order for the Inkangahtawng operation was given to me. I have seen accounts which would indicated that General Merrill issued a formal written order, but I never saw nor heard of such an order. (18)

McGee's comments, shown below, on his command relationship in the Inkangahtawng operation with the Marauders' deputy commander, Colonel Hunter, are cool. In Hunter's account of the Marauders and his role in the unit, Hunter would describe himself and his actions as key and essential to the command and leadership of the 5307th. McGee would disagree strongly with Hunter's assertions, arguing that he always considered General Merrill as the commander of the Marauders in every way.

As to Hunter, I did not know where he was at this time. I had last observed him on the drop field at Tategahtawng engaged in trying to incorporate three elephants which Captain Curl had produced into the bundle-retrieving operation, an exercise of no current or future significance. In point of fact, Hunter would not come into the picture until after the arrival at Auche, as General Merrill would deal directly with me concerning the movement.

With reference to the command arrangements for the operation, I was personally not happy at all with the set-up. Hunter had never participated in any training with the battalion, and up to this point in the campaign he had no command responsibilities nor even demanding duties. His principal function had been in regard to routine airdrops, and in that capacity I had little contact with him as these matters and related duties were normally and competently handled within the battalion by Major Hestad, the battalion executive officer, and Captain Scott, the battalion S-4. Thus, on the basis of my observations and contacts at Deogarh and in the campaign to date, I did not have confidence in him, and I was most reluctant (to) see my battalion come under his control at this critical time. However, General Merrill had put the situation in perspective, and in so doing had shown regard for my feelings. My personal views notwithstanding, it was indeed time for Hunter to get his feet wet operationally. I accepted the arrangement without comment. (19)

Merrill's Marauders, similar to Colonel McGee's recollection, recorded General Merrill's order as follows:

The 2d Battalion and the Khaki Combat Team of the 3d Battalion under command of Col. Charles N. Hunter will move south on the (trail to) Warong..., reconnoiter the trails south toward Kamaing, and move rapidly to seize and hold...a block on the main road between Warazup and Malakawng in the general vicinity of Inkangahtawng.

Orange Combat Team will remain in the vicinity of Janpan, prepared to move on short notice. Two reinforced platoons will be kept ready to polish off any Japs filtering into this area. Extensive patrolling of the trails to the north, south, and west will be maintained.

Capt. Curl's guerrillas will also aid in the patrolling of this area and will furnish guides to go with Col. Hunter's force.

Communications will be maintained by radio, runner, and liaison plane with command post which will be at Janpan temporarily. (20)

McGee's account of the Inkangahtawng operation and that of Hunter's differ considerably particularly in the matter of Hunter's involvement. Merrill's Marauders seems to follow Hunter's line. However, McGee notes that Major Jones, the 5307th's combat historian, was unable to secure a post operational interview with Colonel McGee on both the Inkangahtawng and Nhpum Ga operations and that Major Jones was never able to the 2d Battalion's input. It does not seem unreasonable that Jones would accept Colonel Hunter's account. However, this manuscript will follow the account provided by McGee.

McGee's account provides a wealth of detail. It recounts orders sent and received by the 2d Battalion. It also provides entries made in the battalion's combat log. McGee's account clearly discounts Hunter's involvement in all but the most peripheral aspects of the operation. Perhaps this discounting arose from some criticisms made by Hunter in his book about the 2d Battalion, as one subsequent writer has argued. The argument cannot be immediately dismissed.

The style of the two writers differs, too. A reading of Hunter's account reveals a folksy, colorful, somewhat self-glorifying story. On the other hand, McGee's rendition reflects much detail, straight-forward language, with no hint of self service. McGee does go to great length to debunk some of Hunter's story; but, in spite of the possibility of bias, the debunking should also not be

dismissed. Many subsequent accounts of the Marauders rely heavily on Hunter's account of the second and third missions of the Marauders without confirmation by other principals in the North Burma Campaign. McGee's offering, perhaps discomfoting to old soldiers who hold favorable memories of Hunter's compassion, deserves equal hearing in future histories.

As a final note on this matter, all accounts would seem to indicate that Hunter acted with courage throughout the entire campaign, particularly so in the difficult summer months during the seige of Myitkyina. Hunter appeared a forthright individual, apparently fond of offering his opinion, and not unskilled as a soldier. His concern for the survivors of Myitkyina earned him much respect among the Marauders, respect he rightly deserved. He was a tough, capable soldier and leader, but he stood in the company of strong men who also knew their business. That Hunter and McGee would see the same campaign so differently is not surprising in personal accounts of war. Their difference of views, in fact, represents but one of a number of sharp contrasts in opinion regarding operations in north Burma. War in this theater was fought by diseased, exhausted, and brave men who killed and died in great numbers under the toughest of combat conditions. At times, they made mistakes and misjudgments with heavy consequences. An absence of any disagreement about the campaign would not have been possible.

A summary of McGee's account follows. Blue Combat Team led the Marauder force out of the Janpan area at 0700 on 20 March. The remainder of the task force followed. The 2d Battalion arrived at Auche on 21 March where it received orders from General Merrill to wait for a supply drop on 22 March. Late in the afternoon, Hunter joined the 2d Battalion with striker and mule. It is at this point in McGee's account that he addresses some of the differences between what Hunter wrote had happened and what McGee saw:

While I have no intention of taking on the endless task of putting straight the many inaccuracies and misstatements which would later appear in Hunter's account of the Inkangahtawng operation, I think it appropriate at this point, the beginning of the mission, to quote his version of "our" arrival at Auche and the "airdrop" there. I think that this portion of his tale, in the light of my account, is indicative of the factual quality and general tenor of his total account. I have transposed his first two paragraphs for the purpose of chronology, and I have omitted nonrelevant superfluities. His story begins, as far as I can determine, at Janpan on the night of 20 March, at which time the 2nd Battalion was already at Nhpum Ga and Hsamshingyang. I quote:

'After organizing my task force that night and issuing a march order, I went to be too tired to think further. My force was to proceed to Auche, take an air drop...'

"Villages along the trail occupied the few open areas we traversed. They were neat, well kept and carpeted with a luxurious green grass that appeared not to grow beyond three inches in height and made sleeping on it a pleasure to our weary bones. Each village had its bed of poppies..."

"We reached Auche without incident. Finding the village occupying the only open area in the vicinity, I was faced with a problem in selecting a drop zone. After a conference with the headman of the village, he agreed to let us drop on the village itself. In return, we were to leave all

parachutes in the drop in the villagers' possession. This was a bargain for sure. We seldom recovered the chutes any way except to hide them from air observation by hiding them in the bush."

"When the drop came, surprisingly little damage was done to some of the bashas, and our relations with the Kachins of Auche were fortunately not impaired."

The facts are that there were no occupied villages along the route down to Auche, no villagers and no poppy beds. He had not accompanied us. Auche was unoccupied; there was no headman, and the only basha on the site was a bamboo leanto erected by the Kachins as a rain shelter or whatever during their improvement of the trail we would take down into the Hkuma Hka. Finally, we were never to take an air drop at Auche. (21)

During the afternoon and evening of 21 March, two orders came to Hunter through the 2d Battalion:

To Hunter: Push on like hell after our Auche drop and hold on to the road as long as possible. Boss (General Stilwell) says blow off at hand and everyone must get along fast if they want to get in on the party. C.G. 5307 3/21/1347 (22)

To Hunter: Boss directs disregard security and move with maximum speed to road. Inkangahtawng is satisfactory instead of Warazup. Orange Team arrives south of Warong night of 24th and will block all trails leading north from Kamaing. Chinese have broken through Jambu Bum and Nips are running, so move fast, get on the road. C.G. 5307 3/21/1402 (23)

Urgency clearly dictated canceling the supply drop and pressing with all speed. Blue Combat Team's I&R platoon departed at 0630 and the battalion main body depart at 0700 on 22 March bound for Manpin. During the initial part of the battlion's movement, the battalion followed a riverbed "rock-strewn" and requiring "many wadings from side to side

of the river." McGee's operations sergeant noted in the unit journal, "Crossed river 51 times today." (24)

The battalion plus Khaki Combat Team received a much needed supply drop in the late afternoon with each man receiving three days of K rations and a doughnut. In spite of losing march time to take the drop, the task force continued moving at night until its lead elements reached Sharaw, located on the edge of the Moguang Valley about six miles from Inkangahtawng. The majority of the task force bivouacked along the trail.

The next morning, McGee moved the force in and around Sharaw and planned for an officers' call to give orders. He then sought Hunter, who indicated he was not going to accompany the force but to remain instead at Sharaw. Hunter requested the provision of an SCR 284 radio with operators and a platoon. McGee's account of the meeting concluded with the following recollection.

"Do you have anything to tell me before I leave?" and he replied, "No, you know as much about it as I do." I returned to the battalion. This meeting concluded Hunter's active participation in the Inkangahtawng operation. (25)

Based on his conversation, McGee issued his plan to his officers. He also contacted Major Briggs of Khaki Combat Team and advised him of the plan. Essentially the plan was to move closer, assess the situation, and choose the road block site. Hunter's decision to remain at Sharaw effectively removed him from control of the task force of which he had been given temporary command. Out of position

to influence the key decisions of the operation because of a subsequent lack communications, Hunter would not move forward to regain contact with the task force. (Through some malfunction, Colonel Hunter's radio apparently could transmit but not receive messages.) Later, Hunter would conjecture that McGee should have remained in the roadblock or raided further south against Kamaing. The developing enemy situation and actions by the Chinese moving south along the Kamaing Road would show both courses of action as unwise and tactically unsound.

On 23 March, the task force moved all the way to Ngagahtawng without contact from the Japanese. Green I&R platoon made first contact with the Mogaung River. At this point, the river was 250 feet wide from bank to bank. Steep banks of 8 to 10 feet bordered both sides of the riverbed. The river itself was 150 feet wide and fordable. Observation by a possible Japanese soldier or Burmese caused McGee to push the 2d Battalion immediately across the river with Khaki Combat Team overwatching the crossing and remaining on the east side of the bank to secure the crossing point. Based on the experience at Walawbum, 2d Battalion left its animals in a village on the east side of the river. The 2d Battalion also left its mortars with those of Khaki Combat Team also located on the east side of the River. As the men of the battalion dug in the perimeter roadblock that night, they could hear the sounds of trucks

discharging passengers and the Japanese digging in their positions.

At first light on 24 March, 2d Battalion expanded its bridgehead, anchored its flanks on the river, and continued to dig. The Japanese quickly began its assaults on the roadblock. The Japanese "banzai" assaults would come again and again, always from a different direction, and supported by mortar fire. Several times during the morning, McGee sent radio messages to Hunter reporting the force's situation and making various requests, but without response. Unable to communicate with Hunter, McGee turned by noon to sending his radio traffic to General Merrill and the regimental headquarters. Artillery fire continued through the day but with minor physical effect. The Marauders were dug in, but the psychological impact of getting shelled remained considerable. Concerned about ammunition resupply and in the absence of communication with Hunter, McGee had sent Captain Hickman, his S4, back to Sharaw to seek supply assistance. Upon Hickman's arrival at Sharaw, Hunter sent two messages to McGee. The first provided a code word to 2d Battalion for an ammo drop; however, McGee had already gained a code word by his direct contact with regiment. The second message gave a vague situation report on the 1st Battalion. In conjunction with a situation report intercepted from 1st Battalion to regiment, McGee knew that 1st Battalion was four miles from Shaduzup and making slow

progress from the east. This he passed to combat team commanders.

While 1st Battalion was clearly winning its current battle, McGee developed concerns about getting cut off in his present position. The Chinese did not appear close to linking up at the roadblock although precise information on their situation was not forthcoming. Ammunition and food were becoming an issue. A supply drop under fighter cover could effectively deliver what the battalion needed but on the east not west side of the river. Lastly, General Merrill's guidance requiring the battalion to remain in position "at least 24 hours or as long as possible consistent with not getting cut off" loomed large in McGee's considerations.

Based on these considerations, McGee decided to withdraw to the east side of the Mogaung and move to Ngagahtawng that night. McGee issued his plan to the two 2d Battalion combat team commanders. The 2d Battalion would withdraw as soon as it gained fighter support to help in breaking contact. To Major Briggs, commander of Khaki Combat Team (KCT), McGee sent the following message:

To CO KCT: I plan to withdraw from this side to east bank when I get fighter support. Be prepared to support me with all you have. Cover the river banks on my sides so they do not catch us from the flanks. Grissom with I&R platoon is going to village to cover trail junction. Osborne is 4 miles NE Shaduzup with enemy opposition. C.O. 2nd Bn 3/24/1303 (26)

P-51 fighters came at 1545 hours and began their attacks under the control of Lieutenant Dallison, Army Air Force Liaison Officer attached to the 2d Battalion. Upon their departure and at 1700, Khaki Combat Team opened up with the task force's mortars; Green Combat Team, followed by Blue Team, recrossed the river. The Japanese did not interfere with the crossing and did not follow. McGee reported:

To Regt: Have withdrawn to Ngagahtawng. Position west of Mogaung Hka under artillery fire for five hours. Two killed 12 wounded 2nd Bn. One killed KCT. Plan to move to Tigraymyang tomorrow. Many Nips piled up. C.O. 2nd Bn 3/24/1907 (27)

The force had performed extraordinarily well and was ready for resupply. A second message from General Merrill would foreshadow a developing situation that soon would place 2nd Battalion in a tough fight:

To C.O. 2nd Bn: 300 Japs moving north on route as follows SC3366 to stream junction at SC 3694. Other route Zigyun SC 3963 by trail to Paokum, SC 4275. at least 7 LMG with this force. Info considered reliable. Orange in position to intercept. Orange to withdraw via Taronyang-Sharaw if unable to hold. First batch seen at 1600 two miles north of road. C.G. 3/24 (28)

McGee understood the message in two parts. First, two Japanese forces were just north of Kamaing probably heading for either Manpin or Warong or both. Second, Orange Combat Team under General Merrill's control was in position to block the trails leading north from Kamaing.

Two other entries appearing in McGee's history warrant noting. First, on 24 March, General Wingate was killed in a plane crash. All aboard the B-25 bomber in which he was

traveling were killed. The loss of this visionary, charismatic, and most controversial leader weighed heavily on the officers and men of the 3d Indian Division. Brigadier (General) Lentaigne, commander of the 3d Division's 111th Brigade, assumed command of the 3d Division, but could not replace Wingate. Second, the Chinese forces moving down the Kamaing Road did not arrive at Inkangahtawng until 4 May. McGee had made a sound tactical decision in withdrawing from the roadblock.

Movement to Nhpum Ga

The flanking attacks of the Marauders had severely threatened the Japanese 18th Division's line of communications and required an immediate response. As the supporting effort to the Japanese Fifteenth Army's main effort to the south, the 18th Division had to maintain the integrity of its defense. A failure by the division to withhold the attack of Chinese-American force would threaten the success of the ongoing Japanese offensive and as a result the Japanese position within Burma.

The 18th Division had experienced difficulties brought on by heavy losses and defeat at Shaduzup and heavy losses at Inkangahtawng. As a result, General Tanaka withdrew his battle lines to about three and one-half miles north of Inkangahtawng. Against the Marauders, the 18th Division would move several forces, first in an attempt to maintain, then in an effort reestablish an effective defense. Before

the Marauders hit Shaduzup and Inkangahtawng, the division sent the 1st Battalion 55th Regiment to be joined with two companies of the 114th Regiment to block the enveloping movements. After the Marauders had hit their targets, the 18th Division also sent two battalions of the 114th Regiment less the two companies already committed. The mission of the Japanese task force was to push the American force as far north as possible to permit the capture and defense of Nhpum Ga. Located on a defensible hill astride the north-south ridgeline of the Kumon Range, Nhpum Ga constituted decisive terrain. The 18th Division committed a 1600-man force to take it. By 24 March, the Japanese were racing to Nhpum Ga. Reading Tanaka's intent, the Marauders, too, soon entered the race.

On 25 March during the march away from Inkangahtawng, the 2d Battalion received two messages from General Merrill that began to clarify the situation:

To C.O. 2nd Battalion: Situation at Shaduzup uncertain. Beach holds all trails north of Kamaing against increasing Jap pressure. Best bet is for you to pull back to Warong as I can see no rpt no help in sight for several days. C.G. 3/25 (29)

To C.O. 2nd Battalion: At least two battalions moving on your flanks and rear. Withdraw rpt withdraw along route of march towards Carolina and Oregon who will withdraw toward CP rpt CP when you rendezvous. C.G. 3/25 (30)

At Sharaw, McGee released Khaki Combat Team to rejoin 3d Battalion. He also regained the security platoon and radio

detachment he had left with Hunter. As to Hunter, McGee recalled the following:

I found Hunter to be completely out of touch with General Merrill and accordingly with the developing situation; and he resisted being informed, saying General Merrill did not mean what his messages stated. He said something to the effect that we were going to Kamaing, a notion I considered idiotic. I told him bluntly that my orders were coming from General Merrill and that after my wounded were evacuated the next morning the 2d Battalion was moving with delay, in accordance with my current orders, to Manpin and on to the Auche-Warong ridgeline. (31)

In his account of 2d Battalion's withdrawal to Auche, Hunter disparaged McGee's decision to keep his animals to the rear without rear guard. McGee's decision was derived from the message traffic he received from regimental headquarters and from reports made by his own unit. Clearly the information indicated the threat would be in front not behind 2d Battalion. McGee would explain in the 2d Battalion's history that he wanted to keep his columns free of animals so they could move or maneuver forward more quickly. In a recent comment in a professional journal, a writer would suggest that McGee resented Hunter's criticism that McGee lost control of his battalion during movement, that he had improperly placed his animals at the rear of his column, etc. Perhaps McGee's resentment was justified. It should be noted that Hunter would again apply the "animals at the end of the column" criticism to another Marauder battalion. This time it would be the 3d Battalion as a part of K Force that would be its object.

At Manpin, Colonels McGee and Beach met. Beach confirmed Orange Combat Team was blocking the trail from Kamaing and that he had a small element on the ridgeline. Both agreed General Merrill's command post, located Nhpum Ga was at risk until the two battalions could move back onto the ridgeline. McGee commended Khaki Combat Team's performance. Beach advised of an incoming supply drop at Manpin for both battalions. Finally, both commanders agreed Auche was a critical point that had to be reached before the Japanese reached it.

Again, two more incoming messages began to shape 2nd and 3d Battalions' situation:

To C.O.s 2nd and 3rd Bns: (Garble interpreted as "Move") Auche area as rapidly as possible. Fairly large force Japs moving up trail from Sugar Cast 5680 toward Auche. On arrival 2nd Bn block all trails both towns. 3rd Bn no rpt no change at present time and supplies will be dropped to your outfit at Warong. C.G. 3/26 (32)

To C.O. 2nd Bn: Japs moving in strength on Auche from SE. (garble) to hold Auche during the night with special care and attention to trail (garble) N of Auche going SE. In the morning move one combat team to Hnhum Ga rpt Nhum Ga and leave one combat team to cover Beach withdrawal at Auche. C.G. 3/26/1730 (33)

The daily journal entry from 2nd Battalion captured the flavor of the day:

3/26/44 At Sharaw--L-5s came over 0655. Four all told. Evacuation of patients ended 0940. Evacuated 10 patients. Moved from Sharaw 1000, marched on Manpin. Made Manpin at 1200. Learned here two L-5 cracked up pilots with us. At 1245 moved out and headed up the river. Marched toward Auche until 1500. Made 14 river crossings so far. Received two days of K and 1 pack of fags. Also 1 box of matches. Moved out at 1700. Crossed river

14 more times, made total of 28 crossings.
Bivouacked at 2000. Tonite makes total of 70
miles we have covered in last four days. (34)

On 27 March, with 3d Battalion covering their movement with Orange Combat Team, 2d Battalion moved onto Auche. Based on his orders from General Merrill, McGee selected Blue Combat Team, which had seen less action Inkangahtawng, to remain in a blocking position at Auche. Green Combat Team would move to Nhpum Ga the next day. At 1630, Orange Combat Team passed through Auche marching as long as daylight permitted toward Nhpum Ga. Lieutenant Weston's I&R platoon, which had performed heroically in delaying Japanese pursuit, rejoined Orange Team as it passed. The remainder of 3d Battalion passed through at 1730. Shortly thereafter, 2d Battalion received from its patrols reports of Japanese reconnaissance patrols south of Auche. In response to a query by McGee, regimental headquarters responded with instructions to move the entire battalion to Nhpum Ga the next morning. From the 2d Battlions's journal, the day was summarized:

3/27/44: Moved from bivouac 0530, crossed river 22 more times (total 51). Left riverbed to climb Auche hill at 0730. Reached Auche at 1000. Dug in here. Waiting for 3rd Bn to pull thru, they finished passing at 1730. Booby trapped area.
(35)

The 2nd Battalion's movement to Nhpum Ga on the morning of 28 March brought an unpleasant surprise. As the battalion stretched out in column, it received two incoming artillery rounds with two more following in rapid succession. The Japanese were close and in force.

Organized with a strong rear guard to cover the withdrawal, the 2d Battalion could not avoid stretching itself out along a narrow trail along a ridgeline. Thick growth and steep terrain to either side of the trail gave 2d Battalion no choice but to pick up the pace. More rounds came in. The 2d Battalion struggled along the muddy trail breaking into the awkward run of tired, pack-carrying soldiers. Animals fell often. Because of their heavy loads, the animal required unloading to permit them to rise to their feet and then reloading. Exhaustion was at hand when the battalion arrived at Nhpum Ga an hour and a half after it started. An excerpt from the 2d Battalion journal encapsulated the ordeal:

3/28/44: Moved from Auche at 0600. Artillery opened up at 0700. Men wounded, one bit the dust. First time I ever saw the boys shaken up like this. Made Nhpum Ga after double-timing most of the way, 0830. (36)

Siege at Nhpum Ga

At Nhpum Ga McGee reported to General Merrill for orders. 3d Battalion had already cleared Nhpum Ga proceeding to the Hsamshingyang area, about five miles north. McGee recalled his conversation with General Merrill:

General Merrill said that he was glad to see me as he had heard that I had been killed. He asked how things were going, and I recounted what had happened. He asked if I had left a combat team at Auche, and I told him that I had not as my orders were to move the battalion. I then informed him of the rear guard arrangements.

I do not know how General Merrill viewed the situation at this time; but, for my part, I was only too aware that the Japs were now on the ridgeline in sufficient strength to warrant accompanying infantry guns. This was clearly no patrol or small unit that we were concerned with.

He then mentioned the possibility of "holding at Auche" with a combat team. This was the first indication that I had that he was considering a static defense on the ridgeline rather than a delaying action. I said a combat team could not hold Auche. He asked the reason, and I told him that the requirements for an effective defense there exceeded the capability of a combat team. He acknowledged this.

He asked, "Can Nhpum Ga be held?" , and I replied, "Yes, we can hold Nhpum Ga. "His response was, "Good. Hold Nhpum Ga. I am going down the trail to Hsamshingyang and get out of your way. I will send you further instructions from there."

Throughout the meeting he had been composed as always, and as I turned to leave him, he said, "The Kachins made this basha for me. You may want to move in." (37)

After General Merrill's departure, McGee emplaced Blue Combat Team on the south side of a battalion perimeter and Green Team on the north side. The 2d Battalion's P&D section placed booby traps in the village of Kauri halfway between Auche and Nhpum Ga. By noon the perimeter was set. From the remainder of the daily entry for 2nd Battalion journal:

3/28/44: Regt and C Bn pulled stakes, leaving us here to guard rear. Japs opened up with knee mortar or artillery piece. One hit got eight mules. They hit flanks most of the afternoon in small groups. Planes over at 1200. Ordered to bomb and strafe Warong-Auche trail. This quieted down field piece, but all hell was still going on with small weapons. Planes came back at 1600 and given same mission. Expected action after dark but all was quiet. (38)

Protection of the animals became a growing problem. Artillery and mortar fire had killed at least ten the first day. Should the 2d Battalion receive orders to move, the immediate presence of the animals was imperative. Additionally, evacuation of the sick and wounded as well as resupply would require the animals. Three days later, however, the surrounding of the 2d Battalion would sentence the animals to remain in the perimeter generally unprotected. By 30 March, 75 of the 200 mules and horses belonging to the 2d Battalion would die. Others were wounded. The animals would suffer. The soldiers would suffer watching.

The next day, 29 March, would prove relatively quiet. The battalion evacuated its wounded to Hsamshingyang. Improvement of the perimeter and patrolling occupied its attention. The Japanese conducted probing attacks and continued to shell the perimeter, and Hunter visited the perimeter at General Merrill's request and toured the perimeter. On this day, General Merrill suffered a heart attack, his second since he had been in Southeast Asia, and was evacuated. His apparent loss shocked the Marauders and in particular the 2d Battalion. The daily journal entry for 2d Battalion summarized the day:

3/28/44: Now 0720, nothing has happened as yet. Just finished eating breakfast. Good old K ration. Marine stove really came in handy. Heated my coffee on it. P-51s over 0935. Bombing Aucher. C-47s for our drop over 1040. Drop finished 1400. Were shelled while getting drop. Drop contained ammo, clothes, shoes, Ks, 10 in 1.

chicken, bread, turnovers, jam and milk. (Staff Sergeant) Sobczak said, "Christmas in March." Japs started to hit 1730. Action slowed as night came. Started as though it would be hot all night. (39)

On 30 March the Japanese attacked Nhpum Ga in force. Assaults supported by mortars and artillery fire began at first light and continued through the day and into the night. The 200-by-400 meter perimeter held despite severe attacks. The wounded had been evacuated during the morning to Hsamshingyang. McGee began requests to regiment to keep open the trail from Nhpum Ga to Hsamshingyang. The battalion's journal entry was brief:

3/30/44: Firing started this morning and continuing--still holding the fort. Under heavy mortar fire and artillery fire all afternoon. Threw everything at us. Night was sort of peaceful. We were set for anything to happen. (40)

The morning of 31 March repeated the activities of the previous morning. A 2d Battalion patrol reported a Japanese element digging in, and McGee repeated his call for strong action by regiment to keep open the trail north out of Nhpum Ga. His call was preceded and followed by numerous spot reports. Early regimental responses suggested a lack of understanding of the size of force facing the 2d Battalion. To a report of a 20-man enemy patrol digging into the north of the perimeter with a request for assistance to keep the trail open, regiment responded:

To 2nd Bn: Beach cannot furnish you men. 20 man patrol nothing to worry about. Small patrols must be sent in all directions. Regt 3/31 (41)

Concerned that regiment did not understand the size of the enemy force, McGee repeated messages explaining his concern. Additionally, messages for ammunition provided an indication of the volume of fire ongoing in the perimeter. Of grave concern, 2d Battalion lost control of its waterhole leaving only two sources of drinking water: a seepage hole and muddy ground water. Finally a series of messages caused regimental headquarters to understand the severity of the situation. A seige had begun:

To Regt: We have been hit on three sides. Platoon from Orange was cut off and are making their way back through the jungle. C.O. 2nd Bn 3/31/1242 (42)

To Regt: My rear is blocked. I cannot withdraw north. Something has to come up to take the pressure off. C.O. 2nd Bn 3/31/1610 (43)

To Regt: Casualty report today three dead nine wounded. C.O. 2nd Bn 3/31/1610 (44)

To Regt: Will need sixty and eighty one ammo tomorrow badly. C.O. 2nd Bn 3/31/1610 (45)

From the 2d Battalion's journal:

3/31/44: Hit at the break of day by patrol with knee mortars, time 0530. Tough sledding all morning. Japs reported to be in our OP. Rumored part of Orange coming up. P-51s over at 1200. Stayed until 1245. Ran low on fuel and had to return. Animals are taking a beating. Shrapnel and stray bullets are mowing them down. P-40s over at 1500, had mission of bombing and strafing. After 1730 firing heard outside the perimeter. Figure it was Orange not able to cut through. This night first night Japs started to yell. Yelled for a half hour, and then a shot and all was still. (46)

The day of 1 April proved relatively quiet with continuing probing attacks by the Japanese. Likely this day

the remainder of the Japanese 114th Regiment joined the Japanese force surrounding Nhpum Ga. Rain precluded air resupply and airstrikes but offered some relief for the extreme lack of water. Regiment reported the next day availability of an ad hoc battery of two 75mm pack howitzers, which General Merrill had planned for some earlier. Messages received from regiment (presumably from Colonel Hunter) on 31 March and 1 April suggested that relief was in sight. The journal entry for day:

4/1/44: Quiet this morning, time 0700. Started to rain about 1040. Rained all day. Hit in spurts off and on. Saddled up and prepared to move on relief. No relief--unsaddled. Night quiet. (47)

The day of 2 April repeated the activities of previous mornings with heavy assaults supported by artillery and mortar fire. The mini-battery began to support the 2d Battalion. Lacking confidence in its accuracy, the battalion used it to fire against Kauri, well away from the perimeter. Still the pack howitzers were a morale booster regardless of their effect. A somewhat confused message from Colonel Hunter provided information about the howitzer battery then directed 2d Battalion not to withdraw until further orders. The battalion had lacked this option for two days. McGee requested 500 gallons of water to relieve a critical situation growing worse each day. To this point, the Marauders had not planned or trained to drop water, but McGee looked for any option he could develop. The 3d Battalion's efforts to penetrate the Japanese ring around 2d

Battalion's position were again unsuccessful. In the journal:

2/4/44: Under heavy fire all morning. In contact with Orange by radio. Plane dropped grenades, .45 ammo, 1100. P-51s over 1115. Started to give direction to artillery fire. Really burned up ammo today. (48)

A message of 3 April captured the situation of the morning:

To Regt: Situation getting critical. Took heavy artillery attack this morning. 3 killed, 12 wounded. Japs working around to our west. Animal losses heavy. Detailed report later. General health of command only fair. Much diarrhea and stomach disorders. You must push on. C.O. 2nd Bn 3/4/1000 (49)

The battalion's aid station was well dug in and satisfactorily situated. The medical detachment performed well under extreme circumstances and provided medical care that later received praise from hospital units that supported the evacuated wounded. Still, the animals suffered. Surviving animals received what care could be given: If the animal could stand and had a reasonable chance for survival, it was permitted to live. In the other case, muleskinners moved the mule or horse away from the picket line, shot it, and covered it. Because of the health problems associated with dead animals, no animal was killed willingly.

From Colonel Hunter, a message came that caused much surprise:

To 2nd Bn: Make plans to fight your way out to the northwest tomorrow. Will give all possible assistance. Suggest 0600 as best time. Allies

not in sight. Destroy all excess equipment and shoot animals if necessary. Adjust our artillery on west flank. Hunter 3/4/44 (50)

McGee liked the notion of an all out effort, but informed Hunter of the impossibility of fighting out. The battalion had many sick and wounded. The men were close to exhaustion. The Japanese were engaging the battalion on all sides 24 hours a day, and they were particularly active to the north.

Hunter relented based on McGee's advice and on the arrival of Chinese troops in the general area. McGee then received a message from the regiment indicating they would start another push the next day.

The journal entry for the day read:

3/3/44: This morning they opened up with barrage of mortar fire or something. All it was was "whiz bang." Buried six today. Air drop ammo, food 3 days K. Also disposed of dead animals. Activity throughout afternoon varied. P-51s strafed and bombed. Artillery opened up 1600. (51)

On this day, six men died and four wounded would die the next day. More than 35 men were wounded. More animals died. Enemy assaults continued through the night.

On 4 April, the assaults of the night continued into the day. The Japanese began employing mortars from the north side of the perimeter and used them to attack heavily the CP and aid station. Two of McGee's messages captured the growing severity of the situation. McGee, concerned with the "straight up the trail" attacks by 3d Battalion that were not yielding fast progress toward a linkup, volunteered

a different approach. Clearly he was under great stress.
His unit's situation was extremely serious.

To Regt: Estimate will have only 80 live animals.
Only twenty carrying light loads. Need your help
today. C.O. 2nd Bn 4/4/0835 (52)

To Regt: I can not rpt not attack but can support
any action of yours by fire. 2nd Bn will have to
move faster and envelop and infiltrate behind road
block. Dive bombers could be used to flatten
them. They have spent three days now patrolling a
thousand yards from us and should know they cannot
keep butting down the trail. Please hurry. C.O.
2nd Bn 4/4/0920 (53)

A fighter attack occurred during the day against the
trail running north out of the perimeter; additionally, the
pack howitzers opened up at 1430. During the day one man
was killed and eight were wounded. As fighting continued
into the night, assaults on the west, north and east side
of the perimeters were successfully resisted except for the
loss of a heavy machine gun position, which was overrun.
The attackers killed the crew. Still no water resupply had
come. The journal entry reflected the events of the day:

4/4/44: Scattered activity through the night.
This morning same mortar barrage laid in--landed
plenty close. Boy, was really sweating it out.
One shell took Craig's poncho to the wind.
Another took my camouflage from behind the hole.
Bounced me about two feet. P-51s overhead, bombed
and strafed our rear. Told that at 1430 the
artillery would open up and C Battalion would
attack. Planes laid eggs, we laid mortars as fast
as we could throw them. Really had a battle
Royal. (54)

On 5 April, 2d Battalion received more of the same from
the Japanese although initially not as severe as the
previous day. No supply drop of water would occur. That

evening the Japanese launched a series of violent assaults against a position defended by a reinforced platoon. Sergeant Matsumoto who joined the platoon that day helped in the defense of the position by translating Japanese orders. As a result, forces were repositioned to meet the next assault. The Japanese, as in previous assaults, suffered large losses. Four men of the 2d Battalion died as a result of this action. Two would die later of wounds sustained during the night's fighting. The journal recorded the following:

4/5/44: Scattered attacks through the day. Too quiet for one thing. Planes over morning and afternoon. Chinese (Note: the reference here is to our own pack artillery) laid artillery to our rear. We try to match bursts with 81s. Japs opened up with artillery 1830. This started things off. Fireworks through the night. (55)

On 6 April, the usual enemy barrage did not occur. Japanese pressure on the perimeter continued apparently in an effort to collect their dead. The 2d Battalion identified one of the attacking Japanese units from the previous night as the 3d Company, 1st Battalion, 114th Regiment. Subsequent examination of enemy dead would show that the 1st Battalion had been the attacking force against the platoon position. Of great importance to morale, water came. Although insufficient to meet the needs of the battalion, its delivery proved important for the wounded. The battalion's senior surgeon noted, "Question of drinking or using water for casts." (56) Health continued to decline within the perimeter, and the smell of rotting flesh

was ever present. A brief message from General Merrill showed that he had returned to command. The 3d Battalion continued in its efforts to break through to 2d Battalion.

The journal entry for the day:

6/4/44: Morning of scattered activity. Nips dropped five shells on us this morning. P-51s bombed ridge. Black smoke seen, must have got something. Now in contact with "C." They are not far out. Time 1100. Drop continued in afternoon. One plane lost about eight chutes, all rations, guess he is feeding the Nips. C Battalion hammering out there now. Time 1640. Also plane just finished dropping water. Activity slight at night. (57)

The daily entry for 7 April summarized the day. Many messages were sent:

7/4/44: Activity last night quiet--rations split this morning--canned goods. We are now giving hand to C Bn. Laid in mortars. Time 1000. P-51s over--bombed and strafed our rear. Artillery opened up 1430, Japs just laid in a few. We really laid mucho mortars into them today. Heard C Bn but did not contact them. Time 1745 and all quiet. No food dropped today. Cigarettes also given out today. Patrolled area 200 yards to front. Boys captured some documents and turned them over to S-2. Today was Good Friday. Boy, we never realized Easter is almost here. (58)

Both 8 and 9 April were relatively quiet with little enemy activity. Khaki Combat Team had replaced Orange Team in the effort to break through, and about 1200 on 9 April 3d Battalion broke through. The seige was finished. Quickly the battalion began the process of evacuating its wounded and getting its animals to water and grazing. Following Khaki Combat team were Colonels Beach, Hunter, and Still (General Merrill's S-3) accompanied by Colonel Kinnison from NCAC headquarters. Shortly thereafter, Colonel Osborne

joined the position. The journal entry for 9 April was upbeat:

4/9/44: Today is Easter. Activity very slight. In fact we tried to stir some up. Drop started 0700. Drop continued --10 in 1s--medics the only ones issued them. "C" Battalion broke through 1200. Boy, good to see them. Sgt. Marsh wounded this morning. Patients are being readied to be evacuated. Boy, it was really good to know they are going to be taken care of. Artillery (Jap) opened up 1600. Now having artillery duel. (59)

The days of 10 and 11 April saw no enemy activity. Both Beach and Osborne accompanied McGee on a tour of the battalion's positions. Green Combat Team was relieved from its postions on 10 April and Blue Combat Team on 11 April. The battalion CP departed on 10 April with Green. McGee accompanied Blue out on the next day. The battalion entered bivouac at Hsamshingyang. No men of the 2d Battalion were missing or unaccounted for. The battle of Nhpum Ga had ended. General Merrill wrote later, "At Nhpum Ga the best part of 3 Jap Bns were engaged. It was a Jap defeat as they withdrew all the way to Myitkyina." (60)

Reflections on Leadership

Having reviewed the basic facts and chronology of events between the capture of Walawbum and the defense of Nhpum Ga, several larger issues deserve consideration. These include the role of the deputy commander, presence of the commander on the battlefield, and soldier motivation and morale.

The Deputy Commander

General Merrill's use of Colonel Hunter as commander of the Inkangahtawng task force was a proper use of a deputy commander, but Hunter performed poorly in this capacity. Several reasons contributed to this. First, one gets the feeling in reading McGee's account of the operation that Hunter would have had to assert himself strongly to have gained proper control of the 2d Battalion. In hindsight, Merrill would have done better to appoint McGee as task force commander. Second, Hunter did not move rapidly to gain control of his forces and failed to give an order of any kind to McGee. Third, having caught the 2d Battalion already on the move, Hunter chose not to accompany the task force beyond Sharaw toward Inkangahtawng. Had he maintained communication, he might have been able to exercise control over the operation. However, once he lost the ability to receive radio traffic, he effectively lost the ability to control his task force. At this point he should have moved forward but never did, leaving Merrill to control the operation himself.

By not moving forward, Colonel Hunter forfeited an important opportunity not only to control but to lead the action, too. It is doubtful the men of 2d Battalion ever knew about the forfeiture, but certainly McGee did. Possibly his combat team commanders to include the Orange Team Commander knew, too. Hunter advances in his account of the action the notion that the task force should have

continued south to raid against Kamaing. While the notion does not stand up to the perceived or actual enemy situation, Hunter was in no position to advance his concept. His failure cost him credibility with the commander of the 2d Battalion that he did not recover.

Presence of the Commander

General Merrill correctly chose to position his command post on the ridgeline defined by Mupaw Ga and Nhpum Ga. His positioning along the ridgeline facilitated communication with the 1st Battalion at Shaduzup, the Ikangahtawng task force, and NCAC headquarters. He correctly chose to extend his command influence by placing Hunter with the Ikangahtawng task force even though that action did not work as he might have wished. When he expeditiously withdrew McGee's force to Nhpum Ga, Merrill was there in person to give orders to McGee, which in Merrill's style were succinct and calmly stated. Given the Japanese force that was in pursuit of the battalion, General Merrill appeared at just the right point to give his subordinate commander the reassurance he needed.

When General Merrill suffered a heart attack during 2d Battalion's defense of Nhpum Ga, his absence weighed heavily on Colonel McGee. The orders from regiment--presumably from Hunter--initially reflected understandable confusion, but were followed by indecision, then inappropriate decisiveness. It is interesting that throughout this

period, General Stilwell seems unaware of the hard fight underway at Nhpum Ga. Did Hunter keep Stilwell properly informed after Merrill's departure? Probably not. However, this failing probably belonged to Stilwell and Merrill and their personal style of command. Hunter did not enjoy Merrill's rapport with Stilwell and could not easily command his attention. Because of Stilwell's multiplicity of positions and problems, he used his staff to screen with what and whom he should deal. For whatever reason, General Stilwell did not know the seriousness of the fight. He did not get the chance to choose between influencing the fight at Nhpum Ga and prodding the Chinese. When General Merrill did return to the Marauders toward the end of the siege of Nhpum Ga, one can sense relief in McGee and an improved clarity of action.

Soldier Motivation and Morale

Many accounts of the Marauders stated the morale of the Marauders reached rock bottom during the time between the end of the siege at Nhpum Ga and the start for Myitkyina. Ogburn, as the 1st Battalion communications officer, certainly held a position to make a personal observation of morale within that battalion. He and others argued that promises of no more than 90 days in combat operations coupled with the current condition of the command made any notion of a mission to Myitkyina "grotesque." The accounts of bad morale also alleged mistreatment by General Stilwell.

In contrast, Colonel McGee disagreed sharply with the viewpoint of low morale. He found this view to be the belief of a "few disgruntled individuals" who wished to grind an axe "to the detriment of General Stilwell and the Marauders." He argued that 90 days was a planning figure, never a promise. In arguing his point he provided credible evidence from a news report filed on his unit at the time in question. Subsequent investigations seemed to corroborate Colonel McGee's view that promises had not been made, but the investigations also indicated that a certain element of junior officers and enlisted men believed--albeit inappropriately--in the notion of a 90-day limit.

Another body of evidence concerning the state of morale and motivation came from the medical reports about the campaign. A junior surgeon from 2d Battalion's medical staff and the 3d Battalion's surgeon wrote these. Simply put, the reports stated the command had much illness and morale was low. A careful and balanced reading of the reports and accompanying comments causes this reader to downplay the assessments. However, little question exists that long-term exhaustion had set in and that disease, differing in each battalion, was running its course. Given its origins in the south and southwest Pacific, it appears likely that most if not all the men of the 3d Battalion were malarial. Likely most of the rest of the Marauders were not far behind only in a matter of degree. Even if they did want to continue, the Marauders were sick, they were tired.

and they did not receive enough time to recuperate from the struggle to retain Nhpum Ga. The 2d Battalion still retained a credible number of men, but many of these men were by no means at 100 percent. The 1st Battalion and 3d Battalions had spent heavily, too, in their efforts to link up with the 2d Battalion. Credibly the surgeons argued the disease that would ultimately cause evacuation of the Marauders at Myitkyina took hold at or around Nhpum Ga. This seems plausible.

Given General Stilwell's and General Merrill's penchant for restricting advertisement of their intent for subsequent operations and for the campaign--junior officers and soldiers, all dog tired and many ill, were left to conjecture on what was going to happen. Despite aggressive leadership by the battalion commanders, rumors probably spread in the 5307th. Certainly Colonel McGee handled it in the proper way, but Stilwell's and Merrill's secretive approach to combat operations did not focus the 5307th and, thus, discourage rumor. General Merrill's own illness made it difficult for him to reduce the impact of the rumors through his personal presence. Moreover, his involvement in planning the operation severely limited his available time. Finally, leveraging the situation was the decision long before in the War Department that the Marauders would receive no replacements.

To some degree these problems reflected practices of the times that have changed. Simple, up front statements of

intent by both General Stilwell and General Merrill, as is now practiced, would have dampened rumor and reduced misguided bitterness toward General Stilwell. Stilwell probably would argue that he could live with the bitterness as long as the Marauders fought, and fight they did. Still, the bitterness was counterproductive and partially avoidable.

MYITKYINA

The Operational and Tactical Situation

The victory at Nhpum Ga had blocked the Japanese counter envelopment and protected the left flank of the advancing Chinese forces. The Japanese task force from the 18th Division failed to push back the American force and seize Nhpum Ga and left a sizable threat on the 18th Division's right flank. As a result of the defeat, the 114th Regiment (-) returned to Myitkyina intact but badly battered. A small element of the 1st Battalion, 55th Regiment, remained in a blocking position south of Nhpum Ga along the ridgeline.

Late April of 1944 saw the North Burma Campaign pressure the Japanese. The Chinese column in the Moguang Valley had gained 35 miles, albeit prodded by continuing pressure from Stilwell for the Chinese to advance more quickly. Fighting just south of Inkangahtawng, the Chinese stood only 20 miles from Kamaing. In the Irrawaddy Valley to the east, a Kachin and Gurkha force had captured an enemy supply base at

Sumprabum and pressing toward Myitkyina 45 miles to the south. To the southeast of Myitkyina in the Yunnan Province of China, the divisions of the Chinese Yoke Force were massing for an offensive, although Stilwell continued to worry about Chinese intransigence toward offensive operations. To the south of Myitkyina and Kamaing, the 3d Indian Division (the Chindits), had cut the Japanese rail supply route leaving only the Irrawaddy River as a means of bulk resupply. The division had inserted four of its brigades by air and one by ground, and was operating in twenty-six columns of 400 men each.

The Strategic Situation

Stilwell's Command Problems summarized the strategic situation from the commander's view.

While the Chinese Army in India (the 22d and 38th Chinese Divisions) had been edging up to Shaduzup the thought crossed Stilwell's mind that Shaduzup might be as far as his forces could get before the rains began. Then the Japanese drive on Imphal began to acquire a disturbing aspect, and the conference between Mountbatten, Slim, and Stilwell was called at Jorhat on 3 April 1944. At the conference, Slim expressed his confidence that he would win at Imphal. Perhaps as a result of that confidence, Mountbatten confirmed the existing directives that called for Stilwell to take the Mogaung-Myitkyina area. Meanwhile, in one radio (message) after another, SEAC's staff told the Joint and Combined Chiefs that Myitkyina probably could not be taken without sending heavy added reinforcements to SEAC, if taken probably could not be held, and even if held was not worth taking.

The Japanese offensive on India, the slow progress of the North Burma Campaign, the Generalissimo's reluctance to cross the Salween, and the steady

consumption of time, all registered on Stilwell's estimate of what he could do in north Burma. His estimate of what he could do with the means several superiors had allotted him began to shrink drastically. (61)

The Plan

Stilwell's Command Problems also laid out the plan, which was:

To seize the Mogaung-Myitkyina area as directed by Mountbatten at Jorhat, Stilwell determined to drive down the Mogaung valley on Kamaing with such vigor as to persuade General Tanaka that this was the principal effort. (62)

The Marauders organized into a task force called END RUN FORCE to strike directly at Myitkyina, the principal objective of the North Burma Campaign and the 18th Division's center of gravity. Located 170 miles southeast of Ledo, Myitkyina served as the principal base of operations for the Japanese 18th Division. The town terminated the northern most point on the Burmese railroad and the head of navigation on the Irrawaddy River. It also held the only all-weather airstrip in north Burma. From the airstrip, fighters attacked allied aircraft flying supplies across the Hump to China.

After Nhpum Ga, the Marauders were exhausted but still capable as a combat force. They had marched 500 miles over difficult terrain, fought four major actions and numerous minor fights, and lived on mostly K rations for 80 days. Disease had taken a major toll on the 5307th, and losses from all sources amounted to about 700 men. Thus, the

Marauders required additional combat power to accomplish their third and last mission, so General Stilwell added two Chinese regiments and a force of Kachin Rangers that brought total combat power to about 7,000 men.

The task organization for the new mission called for three task forces. The 1st and 3d Battalions retained their internal task organization. Because of losses sustained at Nhpum Ga, 2d Battalion reorganized from two combat teams into two rifle companies and a weapons company. The 1st Battalion and the Chinese 150th Regiment formed H Force, commanded by Colonel Hunter. The 2d Battalion and about 300 Kachin Rangers formed M Force, commanded by Colonel McGee. The 3d Battalion and the Chinese 88th Regiment formed K Force, commanded by Colonel Kinnison. The H Force received a battery of 75mm pack howitzers from the 22d Chinese Division. The K Force received the battery from the 5307th. General Merrill appointed Colonel McCammon as his executive officer, but apparently did not notify his task force commanders at the outset. The commanders first met this officer on the airstrip at Myitkyina.

On 27 April, General Stilwell met with General Merrill at Naubum to confirm final arrangements. The airstrip at Myitkyina would be the first objective. The same day General Merrill issued his movement order to Colonels Hunter and Kinnison. Both H and K Forces were ordered to move north from Naubum to Taikri, then east across the Kumon Range through the northernmost pass of two available mountain

passes to Ritpong. From Ritpong the forces would move south through Seingheing to Myitkyina. On 30 April he issued the order to Colonel McGee who came that day to Naubum. The M Force was ordered to continue its current mission of screening the movements of the 1st and 3d Battalions, now H and K Forces, by patrolling in the north Tanai Hka valley. Once the other two forces had cleared the mountain range, M Force would preferably follow through the southern pass across the Kumon. General Merrill left open use of the northern pass because of reports that the southern pass was impassable to animals.

Terrain and Movement

The monsoon season was beginning. Instead of raining every two or three days, it now rained every day. With the combination of heat and daily deluges, the climate became oppressive. Climate was not the only challenge. In crossing the Kumon Range the H and K Forces would climb to a 6,100 foot pass over a trail that had not been used in 10 years. A party of 30 Kachin Rangers and 30 Chinese coolies moved in advance of K Force to make the route passable. Frequently the men had to climb on all fours and cut footholds for the animals. When the animals could not ascend, the men would unload them and hand carry the loads. Often the animals lost their footing and fell to their deaths. Khaki Combat Team in the lead for 3d Battalion lost 15 animals; Orange lost 5. The 2d Battalion, in making its

passage across a different perhaps more challenging route, lost nearly one-third of its animal train despite the care of a veterinarian and experienced handlers. Begun with near-spent men, the passage through the Kumon Range depleted the Marauders' limited reserves of strength. Many did not finish the march to Myitkyina, but most found courage of the deepest kind to persevere.

Action Summary

On 28 April, K Force departed to Taikri, turned east, and crossed the Kumon Range. On 5 May, K Force stopped at a trail junction one mile north of the village of Ritpong. In approaching Ritpong, a Chinese patrol made a minor contact with the Japanese. K Force believed the Japanese were holding Ritpong in force. Colonel Kinnison chose to envelop the Japanese force. Sending the 88th Regiment into attack down the trail, Khaki, followed by Orange Combat Teams, cut an enveloping path to the east of the village. The 3d Battalion emerged on the trail south of the village by the end of daylight on 6 May.

Moving at 0530, 7 May, Khaki Combat Team turned up the trail and established a block. Attempts to enter the village were blocked by strong Japanese resistance. Early on, a Japanese squad was killed at the trail block when it attempted to move south. Based on successful progress of the 88th Regiment in its attack, Kinnison left Khaki in its block and sent the I&R platoon south to Sana to provide

security for K Force's rear. Enroute to Sana, the I&R platoon made contact with a supply train moving to Ritpong. A firefight scattered the Japanese, who left their supplies. Twice during the night, the Japanese would attempt to fight through Khaki's trail block. The Japanese suffered heavily. On 8 May, attacks by the 88th Regiment continued with the support of 3d Battalion mortars. On 9 May, K Force seized the village. Leaving the Chinese to complete the action, 3d Battalion pressed south to Lazu where it blocked the trail and bivouacked.

During the fight at Ritpong, H Force caught up with K Force. On 10 May both forces were at Lazu. General Merrill then directed K Force to move toward Nsopzup in a feint designed to screen the Marauders' east flank. Concerned about clearing the trail for H Force to continue its move south toward Myitkyina, K Force was requested to make its move immediately. Beginning on 11 May, K Force headed toward Ngao Ga and faced exhausting climbs and extreme heat. The men, weakened by disease and exhaustion, struggled to keep up. After moving about 5 miles, K Force found itself in another fight with a determined enemy. About 400 yards from the village of Tingkrukawng, on 12 May, Orange Team made contact with an estimated platoon and attacked immediately. As the attack by 3d Battalion developed and was joined by a company from the 88th Regiment, it became apparent K Force had made contact with a battalion sized force well sited in defense.

Deciding on an enveloping attack, Colonel Kinnison sent Khaki Combat Team the next morning to cut a path north of the village. Climbing much of the way, often on all fours, Khaki emerged the other side but found the village protected by a strong Japanese trail block. A series of fights followed with both forces moving against the other, but Khaki Combat Team lacked sufficient combat strength to force the block and faced exhausted supplies of ammo and food. In support of the Khaki effort, a Chinese battalion had attacked on the west side of the village, but it too was repulsed. Unable to resupply the enveloping force, Kinnison ordered a night withdrawal. Withdrawing with its wounded over the route it had struggled to cut that morning, Khaki suffered through an exhausting night. With Japanese reinforcements beginning to arrive in the village, K Force could not easily continue the attack. Believing K Force's attack to that point had met the purpose of the screen, Colonel Kinnison decided to break contact and withdrew K Force under fire provided by the howitzer battery. The K Force then headed southwest to Marawngkawng to rejoin the trail used by H Force. Marauder casualties numbered 8 men killed and 35 wounded. The Chinese suffered more heavily.

While K Force was engaged to the east, H Force continued south. H Force took its final supply drop on 14 May at Seinneing and reached the Namkwi River at 2030 on 15 May. At this time the Kachin guide leading the force suffered a snake bite and could not immediately continue. Specially

selected because of his detailed knowledge of local trails near Myitkyina, the guide was essential to further night movement. A Marauder surgeon slashed the fang marks, and two Marauder officers spent two hours sucking out the poison. By 0230 the guide's condition improved, and, mounted on Colonel Hunter's horse, he continued leading H Force. Reaching the village of Namkwi, about four miles from Myitkyina, H Force rounded up its inhabitants to ensure operational security until they attacked the airfield the next day. A six man reconnaissance patrol was dispatched to gather information about the airstrip.

Colonel Hunter planned for H Force to attack on 17 May at 1000 to seize the Myitkyina airstrip. The 1st Battalion would lead the 150th Regiment to the southwest corner of the airstrip, where it would leave the Chinese Regiment to secure the airstrip, and attack southwest to seize Pamati, the nearest ferry site on the Irrawaddy River.

The attack to seize the airstrip unfolded as planned. At 1050, H Force sent the code words "at the ring" meaning "at the field." By 1100 1st Battalion had secured Pamati. By 1200 the 150th Regiment had secured the airstrip. After 3d Battalion had secured Pamati, Colonel Osborne and White Combat Team returned to the airstrip where Colonel Hunter directed Colonel Osborne to seize the main ferry site at Zigyun, located about two miles south Myitkyina. Departing the airstrip, White Combat Team moved south to Rampur about two miles distant where the combat team bivouacked in place

and prepared for the attack the next morning. At 1530, H Force sent the code words "Merchant of Venice" meaning "transports can land." Almost immediately two transports landed, followed by a stream of transports and gliders. One battalion of 89th Chinese Regiment came into Myitkyina late in the afternoon. The airstrip became alive with activity.

As the airstrip was being seized, K and M Forces were between 20 to 30 miles north of Myitkyina continuing their march south. Both K and M Forces had suffered greatly in crossing the Kumon Range. K Force had followed its crossing with two sharp fights with the Japanese. The marches continued to drain the strength and capability of both forces. The Marauders were wearing out, but rest was not immediately at hand. That night, M Force received the following message:

To C.O. 2nd Bn: Field taken. Expedite movement.
CG, 17/5/1309 (63)

On 17 May, while his two forces were pressing to the south, General Merrill landed at Myitkyina airstrip and established his headquarters. Colonel McCammon, Merrill's executive officer, ordered Colonel Hunter to attack the town the next morning. The plan called for the newly arrived battalion of the 89th Chinese Regiment to defend the airstrip. Two battalions of the 150th Regiment would attack the town with the remaining battalion of the 150th remaining in reserve at the airstrip. Red Combat Team was to continue

holding the Pamati ferry site while White Team would continue to seize the Zigyun ferry site. (64)

General Stilwell's diary captured the day:

MAY 17 Clear. By God a break. At 10:50 message "in the ring" came in. That meant "at the field." Old flew over (Myitkyina) at 12:00 and saw nothing. Hunter probably getting in place. We'll just have to sweat it out. Merrill in at 2:50. Had been over field which was clear (of Japs). He saw trench mortar fire to the northeast. About 3:30 we go "Merchant of Venice"--i.e., transports can land. WHOOPS! Enormous relief to get Merrill's report. At once ordered machinery and reinforcements started. About 4:00 we saw transports and gliders going over. Thereafter, a stream of planes both ways. Told them to keep going all night. We may have 89th (Regiment) in by morning--WILL THIS BURN UP THE LIMEYS. Monsoon coming in on south Burma now. Myitkyina due (for monsoon) June 1. (65)

On 18 May, White Combat Team captured several supply warehouses in Rampur, then moved to Zigyun, where it seized the ferry site at 1000. In spite of the overwhelming exhaustion felt by the Marauders at Myitkyina, all seemed to go well except when Colonel Hunter dispatched a Chinese company to relieve White Team in position. The company did not arrive for 48 hours. Enroute to the position, the company dug in nine times in five miles. Meanwhile, a worse incident occurred that would doom the attempt to quickly seize the town of Myitkyina. The two battalions of 150th Regiment launched their attack achieving success initially by seizing the railroad station in Myitkyina. Success soon turned to disaster as the two battalions became involved in a massive case of fratricide with the two units engaged in a heavy firefight between themselves. A great number of

Chinese soldiers were killed or wounded. The survivors of the two battalions struggled out of Myitkyina about half a mile west of the town where they dug in.

Both K and M Forces, moving toward Myitkyina and desperately needing rations, had arranged for an airdrop on 18 May. Neither supply drop came because an unexpected change in the supply system. Both forces, realizing a change in plans had occurred, continued their march. They had not received their rations, but they had lost time from the march. McGee recalled the occasion:

The fact was that our drop at Seingneing and those of K Force had been cancelled, and not by General Merrill or Major Hancock (the regimental S-4). I would later learn that with the taking of the airstrip the 5307th's hitherto independent supply system, including transport aircraft and light plane evacuation support, had ceased to be. We had been integrated into the overall supply operation supporting the Myitkyina Task Force, and within this new system our requirements for this day, 18 May, had been deemed less critical than those concerned with the buildup at Myitkyina.
(66)

General Stilwell began visits early on to assess the situation. His diary recorded his first reaction:

MAY 18 Not much sleep. Ants and worry. 9:30 Theissen took us into Myitkyina. About twelve correspondents. Heavy clouds. We let down and got in O.K., about 10:00. 89th (Regiment) coming in, 150th had not started attack. First Battalion (of) Galahad (Marauders) had gone to the Zigon ferry. No Jap reaction, Japs not yet located. Planes bombing the town. Shoved off at noon and came back around the Mogaung corner. Got an L-1 and flew back to Shaduzup. (67)

Greatly fatigued, K Force had closed from the north to about eight miles from Myitkyina on the night of 18-19 May.

When the guide lost his way in the dark, the task force bivouacked. Colonel Kinnison was suffering from mite typhus and would die within two weeks of the disease. His men, for the most part veterans of the south Pacific and long time sufferers of a variety of tropical diseases, were nearly dead on their feet. The next morning, 19 May, revealed that K Force was located about 50 yards off the Mogaung-Myitkyina Road. Learning K Force's location, General Merrill (or Colonel McCammon) ordered K Force to secure Charpate, which it did with little opposition. Colonel Kinnison then directed the 88th Regiment to move southwest and establish a defensive line between Charpate and the railroad. Meanwhile, the 3d Battalion dug in a block of the Mogaung Road and sent out patrols to screen the position. While in position at Charpate, the 3d Battalion received minor attacks from small elements of Japanese who were passing around Marauder blocks to reinforce the Japanese garrison in Myitkyina.

Relieved by Chinese units from the positions at the two ferry sites, 1st Battalion began the process of moving its combat teams into position on the K Force's left flank. Red Combat Team repositioned on 19 May and White Team on 20 May. In this new position, 1st Battalion defended to the northwest as did 3d Battalion on its right flank.

M Force, its men weakened by illness, hunger, and its long approach march, arrived at Myitkyina on 19 May. The 2d Battalion's journal described the events of the day.

19 May Moved 0900, marching fast to make the strip. Old man can't seem to get any info whatsoever. We are totally in dark. Just marching on strip, and hoping to hit nothing. Hit the Mogaung-Myitkyina Road at 1200 on the head. Sent I&R on to strip. Battalion closed up and we moved on toward RR (railroad). We were held up north of RR by mortar fire until contact was made with Division. (note: 2d Battalion now perceives 5307 as a division, which is appropriate considering its maneuver forces.) Mortar fire of Chinks. Trying to mortar the hell out of us. Moved then down RR to Chinese position, cut to the right, and marched to Namkwi. Nicest and cleanest town since I've been in Burma. Moved thru Namkwi and tied with RCT about 3 miles from strip. While marching we could see fight the Chinese were having at strip. Tracers going thru the air, and it looked like they were having a picnic. Bivouac at 1900. Red Combat team gave us emergency rations for supper. First meal I had in three days. (68)

On 19 May, the 150th Chinese Regiment, again committed to an attack on Myitkyina, essentially went nowhere. On 19 May, too, General Merrill suffered his third heart attack and was evacuated. General Stilwell's diary recorded:

MAY 19 Flock of visitors continues. Merrill in-- he has had another (heart) attack. Peterson gave him morphine and put him to bed. Progress terribly slow at Mitch. I am worried about the Jap reaction. 150th (Regiment) moved this a.m. and overran two Jap positions. A Jap group up by north field has not moved. Counterattack last night at Zigon ferry. (69)

The days 20 and 21 May saw the Marauders in blocking positions to the north and west. Chinese attacks against Myitkyina continued unsuccessfully. The Chinese did not appear capable of completing the attack necessary to seize Myitkyina. General Stilwell's diary captured his unhappiness:

MAY 21 Six p.m. Cannon in from Mitch. BAD NEWS. Panic in 150th (Regiment); they also ran away and had to be taken out. What goes on at Mitch. A bad day mentally. Good deal of strain and worry-- if the troops are undependable (meaning the Chinese), where are we? I'm looking forward to a full stop to this business. Wish it would pour right now. (70)

Colonel McGee recalled the circumstances.

His questioning of the dependability of the Chinese troops at Myitkyina would bring to mind that the ground troops he could count on, the Marauders, were not in the best of shape and their numbers were dwindling daily. He needed to keep an American presence at Myitkyina. (71)

On 23 May, the Maruaders received the only written order McGee had seen since he entered Burma. The field order, containing General Merrill's authority line, directed a battalion combat team of the 1st Battalion to conduct a reconnaissance in force from its current position to Charpate and back. The day also saw large numbers of Japanese infiltrating into the Myitkyina area. General Stilwell's diary entry for the day:

MAY 22 BLACK MONDAY. Bad news from Mitch. Now they saw 800 Japs go into Charpati (Charpate) last night. And 200 crossed the river from the east. McCammon says "situation is critical." Not a thing I can do. It had rained heavily all morning. We can't get troops in, also the field is in bad shape at Mitch. Radioed McCammon to take out Charpati if information was true. Later message said Japanese both in front and behind of 3d Battalion of Galahad. General air of discouragement down there, and of course corresponding worry here. We've got to sweat it out, but it's no fun. Q: Get Pick's engineers (as reinforcement)? Yes. At least alert them, and use as replacements for Galahad. Meanwhile push 42nd (Regiment) in, and follow with 41st (Regiment) if necessary. (72)

On 23 May, Colonel (nominated to be brigadier general) McCammon became commander of all units in the Myitkyina area by order of the Chinese Army in India (Chih Hui Pu) although the order was dated 22 May. The order appointed General Hu Su to command of the 30th Chinese Division, and 88th and 89th Infantry Regiments, and General Pan Yu-kun to command the the 50th Division, and the 150th Regiment and the 42d Regiment. By the same order, Colonel Hunter was appointed as commander of the 5307th Unit with all Chinese and Kachin units released to their parent organizations.

Hunter would write of himself as commander of the Marauders during this time; but, by McGee's account, Hunter's service was in name only. Hunter remained at the airstrip and never constituted a staff or communications capability to support his responsibilities. While McGee would walk on numerous occasion to the airstrip for information form Myitkyina Task Force Headquarters and Hunter, Hunter would never visit the 2d or 3d Battalions in the field. McGee recalled Hunter never called for a meeting of battalion commanders as a group or, in McGee's case, individually.

From 2d Battalion's journal:

23 May--Still at Namkwi. We were attacked early this morning. They threw in quite a few mortars but they go a bigger dose back. The I&R captured a Nip knee mortar this morning. There was a Nip patrol sighted across the Namkwi (Hka or River) at 1815. They (I&R) got one and wounded another.
(73)

From General Stilwell's diary:

MAY 23 Cleared up at 11:00. Myitkyina field closed to C-47 (troop carrier planes). Sent (Brigadier General Hayden) Boatner in (to Myitkyina) with Hu and P'an. Boatner back at 7:00, matters fairly satisfactory. Attack on 25th, tomorrow to get lined up. (74)

On 24 May, McGee learned of what he initially presumed was a Myitkyina Task Force evacuation policy. The policy called for a sick man to run a fever of 102 degrees or more for three consecutive days, then receive an evaluation by a panel of three doctors before evacuation could occur. McGee noted General Boatner, not yet on the scene at Myitkyina, received the blame from some for establishing the criteria. He also noted Colonel Hunter later wrote that he initiated the policy after discussion with available battalion surgeons. In any of the cases, McGee believed the policy unnecessary, ineffective, and shortsighted.

On 25 May, patrolling continued with adjustments to patrol areas being coordinated by Myitkyina Task Force Headquarters. On this day, McGee met with General Stilwell who had flown into the airstrip. While visiting Task Force headquarters and Hunter at the airstrip, McGee learned General Stilwell wanted to see him. McGee recalled the visit and his thoughts on the General Stilwell himself.

General Stilwell, in a raincoat and wearing his campaign hat, was sitting on an ammunition box near the edge of the runway. After I reported to him, he asked me in a calm, informal manner about the situation in the Namkwi area, that is, what had we run into, what was my estimate of the number of Japs there and other questions pertaining to the tactical situation. I told him

substantially the same information that we had been reporting to TF Headquarters, to include that we had not identified any Jap force of more than company size. Contrary to Hunter's experience, I found him interested and easy to talk with; he displayed no irritability, no impatience and no outward indication of the serious problems with which he was most surely concerned at the time. The leadership situation resulting from the unexpected loss of General Merrill, the failure of the 150th Regiment to exploit the seizure of the airstrip, the abortive attack by the 88th and 89th Regiments the preceding day and a complaint by Hunter which I did not know about at the time could have been some of the worrisome thoughts in his mind that day.

However there was nothing in the content and tenor of my remarks to add to such worries he may have had.

In passing, I had a high regard for General Stilwell as a professional soldier and as a considerate individual. From my point of view, he has been unjustly treated in many accounts as far as his relations with the Marauders were concerned. Unfortunately much of this ill will stems from the writings by a few members of the 5307th, with the most damaging being those by Ogburn and Hunter. (75)

As McGee departed, General Stilwell insured that McGee received a quart bottle of bourbon, which he later shared at his officers' call when he covered the day's activities.

On 26 May, the Japanese were active with what appeared to be probing attacks. Based on postwar interviews of General Tanaka and on his observations of the day, McGee later concluded the Japanese were conducting limited attacks to permit the passing of larger forces into the Myitkyina area. On this day, Colonel Hunter provided McGee with a copy of a letter he said he had presented to General Stilwell, McGee noted he saw it was a complaint letter but did not read it until the next day:

26 May 44. Still at Namkwi. Boy, they hit us with everything this morning. Artillery and mortar fire was very heavy today. It started at 0730 and lasted till 1715. We moved back to our old area about two miles SW of Namkwi. Healy pulled sweet withdrawal. Wounded all evacuated O.K. (Upon setting up new perimeter, men found unconscious from physical exhaustion.) (76)

On 27 May, with the addition of Company C, 209th Engineers, 2d Battalion's reported strength was 455 enlisted men, 24 officers, and 45 animals. The battalion had lost 200 men through evacuation since 27 April.

McGee recalled his reading and reaction on 27 May to Colonel Hunter's letter of complaint. Generally he categorized the contents as frivolous, incorrect, and arrogant. Simply, McGee found no validity in the allegations against General Stilwell, his staff, and by implication General Merrill. McGee noted that, while Hunter issued a number of complaints, he provided no recommendations that would correct the problems if they had been true. McGee did not share its contents with his officers.

On 28 and 29 May Japanese units continued to infiltrate into the area. Patrolling continued. The 2d Battalion journal:

29 May 44. Still in the same place. Things pretty quiet around here last night. Fighter planes were over early this morning. Boy, they sure done a good job. There was quite a bit of artillery fire last night from both sides. The company commanders were told to keep their outfits on alert for night patrols because of the moonlight night. (77)

From 30 May until 2 June, the Marauders continued the final process of wearing out completely. On 30 May, General Stilwell would place General Boatner in command of Myitkyina. Stilwell noted that "Galahad was shot" but incorrectly notes that 2d Battalion had only 12 men left. The comment should have listed 3d Battalion, which had only 12 men left on this day. In his account of this period, Hunter recalled an attack order given to the Marauder commanders, to include Colonel Kinnison, by General Boatner. McGee noted that he never attended such a meeting and pointed out that Kinnison had already been evacuated. (Kinnison's evacuation probably occurred on 26 May.) Finally, McGee stated that any attack was beyond the capability of the organization at the time. It was during this period that Colonel McGee passed out three times from exhaustion. (78)

On 2 June, Colonel McGee requested his battalion be relieved and moved to the airstrip. Colonel Hunter agreed and McGee undertook the handing over of responsibilities to the commander of Company C, 209th Engineers. The 2d Battalion, last of the standing Marauder Battalions, moved to the airstrip and went into bivouac. Air evacuation began on 3 June and finished the next day. McGee recalled one final event:

During the morning I was in the aid station, lying down and watching Major Rogoff and Captain Kolodny conduct the processing, when someone mentioned to me that General Boatner was approaching the aid station. I went out and reported to him. As of

this time, I had never met General Boatner nor even seen him before. He was a brisk, military individual, and he got right to the point, saying "McGee, I want to thank you and your battalion for the fine work done throughout the campaign." I expressed appreciation for his comment, and he then moved on. His remark was our valediction and it could not have come at a more appropriate time. (79)

Final entry in the 2d Battalion Journal for duty in

Burma:

4 June 44--Evacuation continued; whole Bn cleared by tonight. McGee, Rogoff and Healy last of our unit to come out. (80)

CONCLUSION

Thus far, this paper had examined several themes focused principally on the the style and methods of senior commanders. Leadership roles and styles within the Marauders evolved until they reached maturity at Nhpum Ga. The commonly accepted views of the North Burma Campaign, founded in the works of some members of the 5307th, have diminished the leadership of Generals Stilwell and Merrill. As we have already seen, these views often reflected the re- or uninterpreted views of subordinates that lacked an operational and strategical baseline for judgment. Often the reinterpretations have confused the causal with incidental and assigned blame where none belonged. In addition to the themes already discussed, the final mission to Myitkyina raises three additional facets deserving examination. These facets are the limits of human

endurance, commanders and surgeons, and leadership and valor under extreme stress.

The Limits of Human Endurance

In conducting its final mission, the Marauders marched and fought literally to exhaustion. Ravaged by malaria, typhus, and dysentery, emaciated and deprived of rest and nutrition--soldiers and their leaders struggled to complete the march to Myitkyina. The task demanded a kind of courage that none of them foresaw. Colonel McGee, one of the three two-time Silver Star winners during the campaign, passed out three times from exhaustion while leading his battalion during one of the last days at Myitkyina. Lieutenant Sam Wilson, 1st Battalion's I&R platoon leader, another two-time Silver Star winner, captured the essence of the challenge:

I could command one foot to move out in front of the other one. There's no great trick in that, is there? A matter of elementary muscular control! You can tell your leg what to do, certainly. What's a step? A child can take one! You advance one foot so...and the the other...and now the first again. And that is all you have to do, except wipe your hands from time to time so they won't be too slippery to hold your gun. That's all that is required of you. You just have to take the next step. (81)

Veterans of four major battles, numerous minor fights, and over 500 miles of marching in less than three months--the Marauders did not quit when confronted by the Myitkyina mission. They extended their march total to over 700 miles and fought two more significant minor fights and one more battle. The accomplishment demonstrated the difficulties of

attempting to define and measure the morale of a unit on the premise that a certain level of morale is essential to proper combat performance. One can argue that Marauder morale was low, but low morale did not stop the heroic performance that yielded the Myitkyina airstrip.

War planners in marking the parameters of the Marauders' employment had defined 85 percent casualties as what they believed the limits of endurance to be, and they were not far wrong. Final casualties for the 5307th reached 80 percent, although that figure reflected considerably greater losses for disease than planned: 66 percent actual versus 50 percent planned. The planners also had used 90 days of operations to estimate combat utility. Again they were not far wrong. Not counting the administrative march into Burma, the Marauders reached their limits in about 90 days. Yet one would suspect that none of the long range planners truly foresaw what 85 percent, or for that matter, 80 percent casualties meant in terms of human experience.

The planning decision to commit the 5307th to an exhaustion limit without replacements long before its operations began sentenced its leaders and soldiers to the fate they suffered. Ninety days was a dependent variable in the planning, not an independent variable defining a parameter of employment. From a planner's perspective, if the Marauders achieved 120 days of combat within 85 percent casualty limits, a good thing had occurred. Put another

way, war planners had planned for the Marauders to be expended exactly as they were expended.

Essentially what the planners had allowed for had occurred, but the American Army had little or no experience in developing and supporting units developed to be expended on a specific campaign without replacements. In the heat of an exhausting, bloody campaign, leaders made tough decisions with knowledge of the planner's parameters. The bottom line was to spend the unit to accomplish the mission. Leading men within such a campaign, as discussed throughout this paper, placed great demands--perhaps too great--on those leaders.

Commanders and Surgeons

History has marked the relationship between combat commanders and their surgeons as complex and typically filled with tension. The Marauders proved no exception. While a number of physicians accompanied the 5307th and its medical evacuation support was effective, the Marauders still suffered 80 percent casualties of which 65 percent resulted from illness. In spite of skill well applied and a heroic effort to save lives, the doctors failed. They could not reverse much less stop the unending loss of soldiers to a frightening collection of tropical diseases. They made every effort to keep the men of their units fit to fight. As the men neared and passed the reasonable limits of human endurance, the officers and men

of the Marauders went on and on. Daily the surgeons faced unthinkable circumstances. In the end, disease and exhaustion did what the Japanese could not.

Human reaction to extreme exhaustion varies widely. Compromised by wounds and chronic illness, the exhausted Marauders reacted to their circumstances in many ways not always positive. Perhaps most of participants understood what they had done and did not blame others for their circumstances. However, three written accounts in particular demonstrated that there were Marauders who developed bitterness about their situation and felt that certain leaders had acted unethically or perhaps immorally in continuing the mission in spite of the cost. (82) Suffering extreme exhaustion, Marauder leaders, once evacuated from Myitkyina, lost their ability effectively to control their men.

Rumors flourished as they do in every unit, but without leaders they grew unchecked. The two most common themes among the rumors were these. First, we were promised that our service was to last only 90 days. This derived from Wingate's experiences with the 77th Indian Brigade the previous year. Second, we were promised to receive good care and treatment once evacuated from the battlefield. This was a reasonable belief. However, when Stilwell, confronting a tactical emergency at Myitkyina, gave directions that returned exhausted, wounded, ill men returned to Myitkyina, it appeared as a broken promise.

The apparent conflict between the profession of arms and medicine as represented by written accounts of the campaign illustrated the root cause of the controversy that rose after the campaign alleging mistreatment of valiant men. Both professions most certainly shared much common ground. They both evidenced a sense of corporateness, a deep ethical basis, high regard for education, and strong belief in service. But, in the case of medicine, the doctor served his patient--a duty to the individual. In contrast, the professional officer served his nation as embodied in the constitution--a duty to the collective that might require sacrifice of the individual.

As the Marauder leaders--to include senior leaders outside of the 5307th--pressed to accomplish missions, they offered medical professionals no opportunity to succeed in the campaign. To this end, they knowingly, and perhaps at times unknowingly, sacrificed their soldiers. As previously discussed, the parameters of the war planners set conditions that ordained the dissolution of the unit. Duty to individual and country clashed, and the individual lost. Doctors and military officers then, as now, tended to carry big egos. In combat, leaders did not doubt what they had to do to accomplish the mission. Doctors, not used in their profession to subordination to others, had to support the mission. In that support, doctors ultimately failed--not that the parameters of the planners ever allowed for success.

When the Marauders entered hospitals and convalescent care, some bone-tired men, including doctors, lacking operational and strategic perspective, lashed out at perceived failures in leadership. The lack of experience in senior leadership in dealing with no-replacement units showed nowhere more than in the final care the Marauders got. Mistakes reoccurred. Men beyond exhaustion received less than their due. The bitterness that flowed from some Marauders skewed the telling of an extraordinary demonstration of leadership, soldiership, and military medicine. The Marauders had won. They were heroes, and they deserved better than the history that some of their company wrote for them. Despite mistakes, all, to include General Stilwell, took enormous risks. They served their country well in time of war. Many sacrificed their lives. They were our soldiers.

Valor and Leadership under Extreme Stress

One can only find the the heights of valor among the depths of combat--the higher the valor the deeper the depths. Appropriately code named GALAHAD and END RUN FORCE, the 5307th Composite Unit (Provisional) plumbed the depths. For heroism during the campaign, six Marauders earned the Distinguished Service Cross and 41 men earned the Silver Star.

Leading soldiers under extreme stress poses big costs to those who would lead, as well as those who follow. The

valiant deserve to have their campaigns studied and their sacrifices understood. But smugness in study and coolness in understanding can distort the truth, which is never neat or easy to comprehend. Sacrifice of life is a matter of the heart and full of heat. Decisions made in death-threatening situations often lack clarity when seen from the light of desk and armchair. A fleeting moment of casual analysis can demean the worth and contribution of the leader. Perhaps some historians--particularly in secondary source histories--have accepted neater truths about the Marauders because they did not choose to feel and understand the battlefield of Burma. In contrast, others may have fallen prey to Marauder authors who carried the heat of their experiences from the battlefield and could not find the perspective to interpret the meaning of their accomplishments. To some extent, bitterness and misunderstanding spawned in the heat of their memories, and distortions followed.

The Marauders deserve better. They met every challenge given them. They anchored the defeat of a veteran Japanese division over some of the toughest terrain in the world. They did not vote themselves across north Burma to achieve their extraordinary accomplishments; they were led there. Their leaders made mistakes but not many. Doomed to destruction by exhaustion, unremitting stress, and preordained expenditure of the force, the Marauders did not get the treatment they should have when they finished their final mission. Unfortunately their final treatment, brought

on by emergency circumstances and inexperience with no-replacement units, has improperly diminished their feat of arms. We should acknowledge and understand failings within operations of the Northern Combat Area Command. We also should aspire to match "the deeds of valiant men" achieved on the fields of north Burma in 1944. (83)

NOTES

- (1) Scott R. McMichael, "Common Man, Uncommon Leadership: Colonel Charles N. Hunter with Galahad in Burma," Parameters XVI (Summer 1986): 45.
- (2) Joseph W. Stilwell, The Stilwell Papers (New York: Sloane, 1948), 106.
- (3) George A McGee, Jr., The History of the 2nd Battalion, Merrill's Marauders (Privately Published, 1987), 11. The term sic will not be used in any of the quotations from this reference. Punctuation used in quotations will be as used by the author.
- (4) Ibid.
- (5) Ibid., 15.
- (6) Ibid., 18.
- (7) Ibid., 33.
- (8) Ibid., 40.
- (9) Ibid., 39.
- (10) William R. Peers, Behind the Burma Road (Boston: Little and Brown, 1963), 6.
- (11) Ibid., 219.
- (12) McGee, The History of the 2nd Battalion, Merrill's Marauders, 45.
- (13) Ibid., 49.
- (15) Ibid., 59.
- (16) Peers, Behind the Burma Road, 150-154.
- (17) McGee, The History of the 2nd Battalion, Merrill's Marauders, 71.
- (18) Ibid., 81 and 83.
- (19) Ibid., 84.
- (20) U. S. War Department, Historical Section, Merrill's Marauders (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1945), 62.
- (21) McGee, The History of the 2nd Battalion, Merrill's Marauders, 87.
- (22) Ibid., 88.
- (23) Ibid.
- (24) Ibid., 89.
- (25) Ibid., 90.
- (26) Ibid., 95.
- (27) Ibid., 96.
- (28) Ibid.
- (29) Ibid., 97.
- (30) Ibid., 98.
- (31) Ibid., 98-99.
- (32) Ibid., 100.
- (33) Ibid.
- (34) Ibid.
- (35) Ibid., 102.
- (36) Ibid., 111.
- (37) Ibid., 108.
- (38) Ibid., 111.
- (39) Ibid., 113.
- (40) Ibid., 115.
- (41) Ibid.
- (42) Ibid., 116.

- (43) Ibid.
- (44) Ibid.
- (45) Ibid.
- (46) Ibid., 117.
- (47) Ibid., 119.
- (48) Ibid., 121.
- (49) Ibid., 122.
- (50) Ibid., 122-123.
- (51) Ibid., 124.
- (52) Ibid.
- (53) Ibid., 125.
- (54) Ibid.
- (55) Ibid., 128.
- (56) Ibid., 129.
- (57) Ibid., 130.
- (58) Ibid., 131.
- (59) Ibid., 133.
- (60) Ibid., 135.
- (61) Charles F. Romanus and Riley Sunderland, Stilwell's Command Problems (Washington, D.C.: Office for the Center of Military History, 1953), 204.
- (62) Ibid.
- (63) McGee, The History of the 2nd Battalion, Merrill's Marauders, 191.
- (64) U.S. War Department, Merrill's Marauders, 108-109.
- (65) Stilwell, The Stilwell Papers, 296. In presenting entries from General Stilwell's diary, this paper follows Colonel McGee's superb methodology of interspersing applicable quotations by General Stilwell.
- (66) McGee, The History of the 2nd Battalion, Merrill's Marauders, 193.
- (67) Stilwell, The Stilwell Papers, 296.
- (68) McGee, The History of the 2nd Battalion, Merrill's Marauders, 194.
- (69) Stilwell, The Stilwell Papers, 296-297.
- (70) Ibid., 298.
- (71) McGee, The History of the 2nd Battalion, Merrill's Marauders, 119.
- (72) Stilwell, The Stilwell Papers, 298-299.
- (73) McGee, The History of the 2nd Battalion, Merrill's Marauders, 204.
- (74) Stilwell, The Stilwell Papers, 300.
- (75) McGee, The History of the 2nd Battalion, Merrill's Marauders, 206-207.
- (76) Ibid., 209.
- (77) Ibid., 214.
- (78) Ibid., 215-217.
- (79) Ibid., 223.
- (80) Ibid.
- (81) Charleton Ogburn, Jr., The Marauders (New York: Harper, 1959), 286-287.
- (82) McGee, The History of the 2nd Battalion, Merrill's Marauders, final flyleaf.

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- _____. Correspondence re "Common Man..." below.
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