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NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, R.I.

Putting the Commander in Control --

the Light Cavalry Regiment's Utility to the Joint Commander

by

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Major, United States Army

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: Michael N. Smith

18 June 1993

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A
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Paper directed by Captain H.Ward Clarke
Chairman, Department of Military Operations

93-10374

93 5 11 140

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

1a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASS	1b RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS
2a. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY	3 DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF REPORT DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A; APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION IS UNLIMITED.
2b. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE	
4. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)	5 MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)
6a. NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT 6b OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable) C	7a NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION
6c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) NAVAL WAR COLLEGE NEWPORT, R.I. 02841	7b. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)
8a. NAME OF FUNDING/SPONSORING ORGANIZATION 8b OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable)	9. PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER
8c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)	10 SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERS PROGRAM ELEMENT NO / PROJECT NO / TASK NO / WORK UNIT ACCESSION NO.

11. TITLE (Include Security Classification) PUTTING THE COMMANDER IN CONTROL --
THE LIGHT CAVALRY REGIMENT'S UTILITY TO THE JOINT COMMANDER (U)

12. PERSONAL AUTHOR(S)
SMITH, MICHAEL N., UNITED STATES ARMY, (MAJ)

13a. TYPE OF REPORT	13b. TIME COVERED	14. DATE OF REPORT (Year, Month, Day)	15 PAGE COUNT
FINAL	FROM _____ TO _____	1993 JUNE 18	31

16. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION A paper submitted to the faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Operations. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

17. COSATI CODES			18. SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)
FIELD	GROUP	SUB-GROUP	CAVALRY LIGHT CAVALRY CONTINGENCY JOINT OPERATIONS COMMAND AND CONTROL

19. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)

With the demise of the Soviet Union, the world is entering a new phase and the United States has responded with an entirely new National Security Strategy. As a consequence, our military focus will be on more numerous and likely regional operations, carried out at the operational level. The United States Army's Light Armored Cavalry Regiment is the single best asset for ensuring the Joint Task Force Commander gains and maintains positive command and control in these contingency operations. This paper will address the Light Armored Cavalry Regiment's organization and equipment, and doctrinal employment to show how it is ideal for enhancing the Joint Task Force's ability to plan, prepare and execute at the operational level of war. The Joint Task Force Commander will be a three star commander, working under the Unified Commander, who may or may not be dealing with other operations simultaneously. Four specific mission areas will be discussed to show how the Light Armored Cavalry

20. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT	21. ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
☒ UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED ☐ SAME AS RPT. ☐ DTIC USERS	UNCLASSIFIED
22a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL CHAIRMAN, OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT	22b TELEPHONE (Include Area Code) 841-3414 / 22c. OFFICE SYMBOL C

DD FORM 1473, 84 MAR 83 APR edition may be used until exhausted. All other editions are obsolete

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE

★U.S. Government Printing Office 1988—439-013

BLOCK 19(CONT) Regiment is the best single unit to accomplish the multiple missions needed by the Joint Commander in executing future contingencies at the operational level.

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

PREFACE

Much of the material for this paper is from unpublished papers from the various service colleges, as well as from my personal observations, notes and work as the Light Cavalry doctrinal expert at the United States Army Armor Center and School, previous to this assignment. The disproportionate number of unpublished sources, as well as their varied points of origination highlight the fact that we as a military have not truly mastered the future of our own operational art and the operational level of war, as well as revealing the incompleteness of the Army's response with doctrine to the revised world situation and the new National Security and Military Strategies. Most of the works tended to focus on specific aspects of joint operations, and confirmed what those of us who have been working on the issue of the Light Armored Cavalry Regiment knew for the most part to be the case.

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PUTTING THE COMMANDER IN CONTROL --THE LIGHT CAVALRY REGIMENT'S UTILITY TO THE JOINT COMMANDER

" A cavalry general should be a master of practical science, know the value of seconds, despise life and not trust to chance."

Napoleon[1]

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The future for the United States in the "New World Order", regardless of who plays, will be one of dynamism and change; a multipolar world, with regional threats no longer constrained by the interaction of two global superpowers. The military has had to rethink virtually its entire war fighting concept at the operational and strategic levels; with a much greater emphasis on power projection from CONUS against ambiguous threats. The United States Army's responses included the development of a Light Armored Cavalry Regiment (LACR) which allows rapid force projection of significant combat power and intelligence collection capabilities. These new requirements, and the new capabilities of the LACR, make it the optimum asset for the operational commander to execute campaigns in the near future by allowing him/her to set the conditions under which the Joint Task Force will conduct successful, decisive operations in a contingency.

But what will the operational level look like in this new world? We must avoid the temptation, so often visited upon us, to project a future identical to the past. We must not envision all future operations on the Desert Shield/Storm (DS2) model. Most nations do not possess armies nearly the size of Iraq's; in fact over 60 nations have militaries with less than 30,000 personnel, and over 100 have less than 100,000 personnel.[2] Given the hard facts of an unstable world with numerous regional conflicts, and the sizes of potential opponents -- our likely employments will be of a much smaller scale than DS2. Our own force reductions, wherever they may eventually take us, also mitigate against having any excess forces. Everything we keep must be maximized to operate within the anticipated environment and support the needs of a primarily Continental United States (CONUS) based force that must deploy into a theater of operations.

Additionally, as some authors have noted, the increasing tempo, improved Command, Control, Communications, Computers and Intelligence (C4I) systems and technology have begun to expand the scope of the "operational" level of war into activities which were once considered as either strategic or tactical.[3] The aim of the operational level of war is to design and execute campaigns to achieve strategic objectives.[4] It may therefore be executed by any level of command capable of achieving the stated strategic objective.

Increasing world instability means lower level commanders, and not the CINC, will be executors. The current operations in Somalia are indicative of this future scenario; where the CINC is still concerned with operations around the Gulf itself, and an operational commander is in charge within a particular theater of operations. With the potential for multiple regional conflicts within

a Unified Command's Area of Operations (AOR), the CINC and his staff could conceivably support multiple JTFs,each executing completely distinct operational level missions. With that in mind, the focus here will be on the implementation of operational art at the Army Corps or comparable Joint Task Force level -- a three star command -- through the conduct of the operational level of war.

The LACR, though designed originally to support a United States Army Corps, can be seen as a tool of any operational level commander. The LACR's design was buil on the requirement for rapid air deployability on USAF C141/C17 aircraft.[5] This fact, combined with the organization and training of the soldiers of the LACR, makes the LACR the first and only choice for this mission. But this requirement means more of a change in operational focus by the leaders and staff officers than a change in organization or equipment.

When we push the operational level of war down to the three star level, we also push down the need for that level to plan campaigns, not just execute tactical combat, which has been the focus for much of our history. Part of the reason for this has been, I believe, because of our pre-occupation with certain organizations being "operational" and certain forces being "tactical," a concept the United States Army formalized to some extent in the various post-Vietnam editions of Field Manual 100-5 (Operations). However, such a dogmatic view has not always been the case; while United States Army Cavalry doctrine has, over the past focused primarily on tactical support, it is easily translated to the operational level. During World War 2, Cavalry Groups (equivalent to the LACR) were assigned to Armies, and many were then further placed under Corps control, and some down to divisions.[6] Current Army doctrine places the ACR

under Corps control, though as shown in the historical precedent, the ACR is prepared to work for whomever, at whatever command level is required.

This operational reconnaissance capability was lacking in the otherwise excellent German forces of the Second World War. The result was that their tactical superiority rarely achieved decisive results due to the lack of operational intelligence on the enemy throughout the depth of the battlefield.[7] The Germans, particularly on the Eastern Front, usually were reacting to the enemy's actions in the close fight, and not building the battlefield through collecting information or providing protection to their maneuver formations with an operational level reconnaissance and security force. We, in the future must avoid the mistake the Germans made, and ensure we provide the operational level commander an adequate reconnaissance and security force.

This Joint Task Force will be primarily ground oriented, executing a "Continental Strategy." The majority of the areas where strategically decisive operations must take place are away from littoral areas, and historically purely naval forces have rarely obtained decisive results. In future operations, the pattern will likely remain the same; some of the areas with the greatest potential for conflict are in the former Central Asian (and largely Muslim) Republics between Iran/Afghanistan and Russia, quite a way from any major sea or ocean. Additional troublespots such as the former Yugoslavia are near the ocean, but will require large, predominantly ground forces, for decisive operations. While maritime forces may be the primary element in getting the JTF in-country, only though extensive ground campaigns can decisive results be achieved.

Also, the United States will not seek to fight unilateral operations in this "New World Order" but maximize coalition operations. This is what we did in DS2, are now doing in Somalia, and is a recurring precondition for any type of ground operations in the former Yugoslavia. The LACR organization and equipment provide the operational commander with an immediate interface capability without detracting from any other, particularly combat, assets.

First, this paper will look at the Light Armored Cavalry Regiment (LACR) itself, the types of equipment it contains and how it is organized. Then follows a discussion of four major operations the LACR would execute in support of a Joint Task Force in a contingency scenario, focusing on how the missions support the higher headquarters. Each of the four operations (security, intelligence, managing fires, and structuring the battle space) will be discussed in detail.

CHAPTER II.

ORGANIZATION and MISSIONS.

The LACR will be organized around three Light Armored Cavalry Squadrons, an Aviation Squadron, a Support Squadron, a Headquarters and Headquarters Troop, an Engineer Troop, a Chemical Company, an Air Defense Artillery Battery, and a Military Intelligence Company. Appendix I is a series of detailed line charts with equipment densities to provide the numbers, while below is a breakout by unit of the capabilities.[1]

The Light Armored Cavalry Squadrons (LACS) provide the majority of the Regiment's capability. They are organized around Troops of M113A3 Armored Personnel Carriers (interim is HMMWV) and Armored Gun Systems(interim is TOW/HMMWV). *Their mission is to provide both a robust close-in* reconnaissance capability and sufficient combat power to defend against most, if not all, enemy threats. Each LACS includes a Light Armor Company and Field Artillery Battery for direct and indirect fire support respectively.

The Aviation Squadron is equipped with OH-58Ds, which act as both aerial reconnaissance and surveillance platforms and as attack aviation assets. Additionally, the Squadron contains three EH-60 electronic warfare aircraft, and UH-60s for internal movement support.

The Support Squadron provides all the assets normally provided by an Army Division or Corps to its subordinates, making the LACR fully self-contained for limited periods. It provides maintenance, medical, supply and transportation assets required to keep the LACR operating.

The Headquarters and Headquarters Troop provides command and control facilities for the LACR, and is designed to provide command and control of additional augmentation and facilitate interface with other units. A critical capability of the HHT is its ability to link with higher headquarters both via communications systems and through the use of organic Liaison Officers (LNOs) from the Regiment's S-3 (Operations) section. Its Fire Support Element (FSE) provides an access for interface (both physical and electronic) with inorganic fire support systems. Each Squadron also has a Fire Support Element, giving the LACR a robust ability to plan, integrate and execute supporting fires at all levels, throughout the depth of the battle space.

The Engineer Company provides traditional support through mobility, countermobility and survivability operations. However, it like the HHT has additional liaison elements and is capable of providing a point of contact for external engineer assets.

The Air Defense Artillery Battery provides short range Air Defense (SHORAD) support to the LACR, and links into the JTF/Corps/JFACC Air Defense Network. Its position far forward provides the JTF a much enhanced early warning and defensive capability against enemy aviation threats. Finally, the Chemical Company provides both chemical reconnaissance and limited decontamination support to the LACR.

But given the assets above, how does the LACR employ them? By doctrine, the LACR conducts three major missions: Reconnaissance, Security and "Other". Rather than describe each mission, and the 20-plus sub-missions/tasks, the ones that apply will be defined at the beginning of each of the four operational areas.

CHAPTER III.

SECURITY

How does the LACR accomplish the security mission? And what is the security mission? By doctrine, security is a mission conducted "to provide information about the enemy and terrain and preserve the combat power of friendly forces."[1] Within security there are three levels, screen, guard and cover, each of which delineates an increasing level of protection to the main body, in this case the JTF.

Screen operations seek only to protect the main body from observation by enemy elements, guard operations mean that enemy elements are destroyed within the guarding unit's capability and provide more time and space to the main body, and cover operations mean that the covering unit operates virtually independently of the main body and engages all enemy with all available systems to prevent any enemy forces from reaching the main body. What these mean to us is that the LACR conducts these missions to protect the JTF. While cover is a security mission, its nature (direct combat) does not provide the operational commander any operational level support since it tends to be focused on the here and now, and will not be covered.

The security mission begins during what joint doctrine describes as the "lodgement phase," when the first elements of the LACR begin moving into either the port of debarkation (POD) or the area of operations (AO), and continues until the LACR leaves.[2] The inherent organizational flexibility, rapid strategic deployability, and operational and tactical mobility of its equipment

and organizations allow the LACR to rapidly move into the AO and immediately begin expanding the AO in both time and space to provide the JTF a secure environment for debarkation operations.[3]

The LACR co-locates its command post (CP) with the JTF's CP in the debarkation area, ensuring immediate access to the operational commander and staff. With its organic communications systems, the LACR CP communicates with deployed elements out to well beyond the range of enemy tube or rocket artillery, as well as with higher and adjacent units and naval and air forces supporting the JTF. The security perimeter could be either a guard or screen, depending upon the distance to be covered, the potential threat, and how much protection the JTF commander needs.

Conducting a guard operation as an example, in which the JTF initially needed fairly strong protection, the LACR could conceivably establish a frontage of up to 120 KM with ground forces, pushing aviation assets beyond the front for short periods of time. This would provide the JTF approximately 19 Kilometers of depth if the JTF is deploying from an inland airfield, beyond the range of most light or medium indirect fire systems (under 122mm) and would allow the JTF at least one hour's warning of a major ground attack (assuming a fairly quick enemy rate of movement [ROM] of 15 KPH). If the JTF entered via a sea port, which is much more likely for a major campaign, there would only be a need to cover perhaps a 120 degree arc, which would allow the LACR to push elements over 50 Kilometers out beyond the Port of Debarkation (POD); well beyond virtually all tube and rocket artillery systems.

With a smaller or less threatening enemy, the JTF needs only a screen force, and the LACR could extend almost 40 kilometers beyond the POD in

providing 360 degree security and beyond 100 kilometers using the 120 degree arc. Thus, the JTF is immediately provided a secure area in which to conduct debarkation operations.

The mission would likely evolve from guard to screen as operational forces debarked. It might start with a guard operation when the JTF has minimal combat power on the ground and is most vulnerable, and change to a screen mission when other combat power becomes available to the operational commander, and he feels it is more important to begin extending his operational envelope and wants to start gaining operational intelligence on the enemy. However, given the sizes of forces around the globe, as noted in the introduction, the second operation, focusing more on screen, is more likely.

Should enemy forces decide to launch ground or air attacks, the LACR's "protective bubble" would extend out far enough that either the LACR could defeat the threat with organic systems or provide the early warning for the JTF to deploy assets to destroy the enemy. With its organic anti-armor and fire support systems, both ground and air, the LACR would be capable of providing substantial defensive protection itself. However, it also possesses the capacity to employ other joint systems.

Each squadron contains a Tactical Air Control Party (TACP) provided by the Air Force, which enables the Squadron to control USAF Close Air Support (CAS) assets. The TACPs may be either ground or air mounted, so that the LACR can potentially push them out beyond the physical boundaries of ground which is under the LACR's control. The TACPs function to bring additional fire support to the squadrons and enhance the LACR's ability to integrate joint fires, and will be discussed in detail later.

The POD security mission also sets the conditions for future operations by allowing debarking JTF forces to focus on preparing for combat and not on first protecting themselves. With the LACR already forward, the JTF need only arrange his main forces into their tactical dispositions. There is no need to task subordinate units to provide their own security while preparing for combat operations. Instead, the LACR operates forward of each and establishes contact with them to ensure continuous information flow both up and down and laterally. For screen operations in particular, the LACR's ability to strip away enemy reconnaissance elements provides the operational ground and air forces (including air bases and logistics sites), and possibly even naval forces operating in littoral areas, security from both harassing attacks by enemy deep reconnaissance assets and long range missile attacks targeted those units

By beginning the destruction of enemy reconnaissance units/assets and pushing security farther and farther away from our own main body, the LACR is already allowing the operational commander to start setting the conditions for decisive operations. Specifically, the JTF commander and staff are able to concentrate on bringing in forces in a sequence best suited for later decisive operations, and on building the logistics support in theater.

The LACR is linked into all available intelligence collection systems, up to the national level, and so is able to focus its actions against threats in a timely manner, rather than reacting once physical contact is made. Using this capacity, and once the JTF has significant combat power in theater, the LACR can extend its security envelope even farther; though it cannot maintain the continuous linear frontage described earlier. With its intelligence link though, it can position assets at likely locations even farther out from the main body,

and expand the JTF's area in both time and space by both physically moving out to control more terrain and by executing combat operations against enemy reconnaissance and perhaps even against selected enemy combat units.

In this "Joint Battle Area" the LACR uses not only its assets, but those of other operational components, particularly the Air Force, to enlarge the operational force's battle space.[4] If the enemy does not have the intelligence, or is unable to move his combat assets, the battle space has been effectively enlarged in time. Slowing the enemy's tempo allows the JTF additional time for its planning and preparation. Providing a relatively benign environment for JTF forces to operate in allows them to build momentum and focus their energies on identified enemy and objectives.

CHAPTER IV.

COLLECTING INTELLIGENCE

As noted above an adjunct to the security mission is intelligence collection and the LACR provides the JTF with a robust human intelligence (HUMINT), electronic intelligence (ELINT) and signals intelligence (SIGINT) capability. All the Squadrons, ground and air provide numerous platforms which can collect "eyes on" HUMINT for the JTF. A primary mission of the LACR is to collect intelligence and it is manned and equipped to do so.

While most everyone agrees that developing good intelligence is key, and that an operational commander must have certain levels of information to develop plans, everyone seems to wish away the problem of how to get the intelligence. Either the issue is ignored, or the G2 simply "has it" without any description, other than perhaps a mention of "national asset support", on how it is actually collected.

Specifically, Joint Publication 5-00.1 "Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Campaign Planning" addresses the need for the commander to identify key information about the enemy in order to conduct planning, but ignores how the commander is supposed to get the information.[1] Further, Joint Publication 3-03.1 specifically identifies the need for real time intelligence from Reconnaissance, Security, Target Acquisition (RSTA) elements, but never identifies what those assets/units would be.[2] The LACR is the single on-hand units capable of meeting the needs articulated in these, and other, manuals.

The LACR's ground scouts are capable of self-inserting to operational depth (over 200 KM), in virtually all environmental conditions and operating with little or no resupply, depending on the length of the operation and the enemy threat. It is critical here to remember that in this case the operational level is not an Army Group in Central Europe, with a 1000-plus kilometer depth and a 12 month focus; but more on the level of a Desert Storm or Falklands operation, with a 300-500 kilometer, 3-6 month focus. The ground assets could conceivably operate up to two weeks without resupply, and aviation assets could provide repetitive short-duration observation of critical locations almost without end. Also, the LACR's Regimental Support Squadron (RSS) allows the LACR to position logistics well forward and provide immediate response using only organic assets. This means those elements out front get the support they need, but the LACR does not impose on the JTF's assets flowing into theater to provide the support.

By providing assets with the capability to move and look deep, the LACR provides reliable, redundant assets to both assist development of and verify the JTF's campaign plan. But organic ground HUMINT systems are not the LACR's only contribution to the operational commander. The LACR can provide the continuous thread between SOF assets which have perhaps been inserted earlier to establish local resistance or conduct special reconnaissance, and the JTF. In a particularly deep theater, such as Iraq, or one of the former Central Asian Republics, the capability to establish a continuous reconnaissance and surveillance net would be essential to ensure mission accomplishment. Also, by pushing out deep, the LACR may allow the JTF to re-deploy SOF, which are usually in critically short supply, to even deeper or more critical areas.

At operational depth, the LACR would provide continuous observation of enemy forces which might have been picked up by either national technical or HUMINT assets. The LACR provides a continuous intelligence net, linking and verifying national intelligence and then either passing intelligence or enemy units off for destruction, or destroying them itself. With the integration of components of the Army Tactical Command and Control System (ATCCS) into the LACR, it will possess a unique ability to not only rapidly and accurately monitor internal situations and statuses, but will be able to pass information and intelligence between the JTF and forward deployed elements much faster, and with less potential for loss or distortion of data. By pushing out HUMINT systems that not only collect intelligence but provide a measure of security with their organic fires, the LACR allows the JTF to push out valuable, and vulnerable, ground based intelligence collectors to allow them to maximize their range.

The LACR's electronic warfare systems provide the JTF the capacity to get real time electronic emitter data to refine or verify national data, and provides redundancy to the data collected from other JTF assets. Also, by having airborne (EH-60/QUICKFIX) assets within the LACR, the regiment allows more exacting detection of enemy forces in areas where the friendly and enemy reconnaissance forces might be intermingled. Since all the friendlies would be from the regiment their locations would be provided to the EH-60 crews on a routine basis. By putting all reconnaissance assets that are forward under one commander, the JTF maximizes the potential for survival of the individual assets (soldiers) and increases the chances of successfully detecting the enemy at the earliest opportunity.

In the intelligence area, the LACR would be able to provide physical as well as electronic contact with SOF and conventional platforms. The LACR's various communications systems would also provide redundant links with SOF elements, reducing their need to carry numerous high technology long range communications systems. With the LACR within encrypted Very High Frequency (VHF) communications range, needing only an ordinary receiver-transmitter rather than a highly sensitive second tactical satellite (TACSAT) system, SOF elements could use more of their limited carrying space for mission support equipment. These communications links would also provide a valuable backup system to request support for extraction or emergency resupply on short notice.

With its ATCCS architecture, the LACR is one of the few units which will be capable of rapidly integrating digital information throughout its organization, up, down and laterally. This, combined with the inherent capability to provide liaison teams, with communications packages, to various coalition partners, means that the LACR assists the JTF by increasing the information flow to and from those partners. The LACR could thus provide intelligence not only on what the enemy is doing but on what the friendlies are doing as well, giving the operational commander better situational awareness as to what is going on around him on both sides of the line. This translates into better understanding and anticipation of events, and better command and control at the operational level.

CHAPTER V.

MANAGING FIRES

As noted above, the LACR possess remarkable operational agility, intelligence collection capacity and communications capability. These are linked to an impressive organic fire support system which is also capable of integrating joint assets. Each LACS has eight organic M-109A6/PALADIN 155mm artillery pieces, each of which is capable of independent operation. The Regimental Aviation Squadron (RAS) can provide aerial artillery via 2.75" rockets or through laser designation for Precision Guided Munitions (PGMs), giving the LACR a potent punch.

Additionally though, through the organization of FSE at both the Squadron and Regimental levels, a structure exists for integrating all manner of joint fire support. The FSEs provide digital fire control and management (the TACFIRE system), allowing timely and accurate transmission of fire support information up, down and across the fire control channels.

The RAS's, terminal guidance capability allows designation for a variety of precision guided munitions from artillery, rotary or fixed wing assets, in both daylight and at night. The aircraft are linked into TACFIRE, and can provide terminal guidance against deep, perishable targets on very short notice. Additionally, the aircraft are capable of carrying their own HELLFIRE missiles, and may self-designate targets, or designate for other LACR aircraft.

The LACR's aviation can coordinate fire from any supporting fire support assets, including Air Force air. They can do this due to the wide variety of

communications systems physically located in the aircraft (UHF/VHF/FM) and their capacity for providing extremely precise location for both themselves and their target. Also, by placing an Air Liaison Officer (ALO) into a helicopter, the RAS can optimize the potential for Joint Air Attack Team (JAAT) operations. Given the communications links with deep organic reconnaissance assets or SOF, these JAATs might occur at operational depth, in either time or space. The extremely good acquisition systems allow the detection, positive identification and designation of targets at extreme ranges.

This redundant organic systems capacity provides a measure of confidence to the operational commander or Fire Support Officer (FSO) should there be a need to provide precision fire support to a coalition partner with whom little or no training had been done. The LACR could provide aviation OPCON to the coalition partner for specific missions, supplying both the "designator/observer" and the "firer" without the need for long detailed coordination and deconfliction. Also, the aircraft avoid having to move among "friendly" elements on the ground who might not be familiar with them (though they might receive fire anyway) and can potentially stay forward of the coalition forces.

They would also be able to call for both conventional and precision fires from JTF elements supporting the coalition digitally -- a capacity not likely to be found in most of our potential coalition partners. The LACR's fire support system also gives the operational commander the capability to provide very selective engagements at extreme ranges, perhaps with the LACR's aircraft or artillery firing in support of SOF elements well forward. Potentially, the LACR could be providing targeting data for battles that may not occur for days, and terminal guidance for cruise missiles or other future long range artillery

systems such as the Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS). It is this unique capability which makes the LACR the "fires broker" for the JTF. The regiment's ability to acquire, communicate and bring organic and supporting fires onto targets at extreme ranges can be key to the success or failure of the JTF's campaign plan.

CHAPTER VI.

STRUCTURING THE BATTLESPACE

Brokering fires is a critical asset in the ability of the LACR to structure the battle space for the operational commander. Beginning with establishing security, and into collecting intelligence and brokering fires, the LACR built the battle space into the optimum environment for the executing the operational plan. There are two major components to this structuring: providing time and space and handing off enemy forces to the JTF main body.

Providing the time and space "bubble" for the commander began as soon as the first LACR unit was off the boat or aircraft and moving out to establish security. By getting out and protecting the force early, the operational commander can flow in forces using the sequence best designed to support his/her concept and achieve early decisive advantage.[1] Once the LACR has arrived, then he/she begins pushing assets, such as engineers, psychological operations, civil affairs, and/or electronic warfare, out to start the physical or psychological activities which support or enhance the plan. Without a unit like the LACR, these elements (which are often in short supply) would either go out unprotected, and at great risk; or the JTF would have to push in combat elements early to support them, which disrupts the combat unit's preparations for its primary mission. Greater operational impact perhaps comes with the ability of the operational commander to begin moving in the logistics support earlier in the flow, speeding up the pace of operations, and getting "inside the enemy's decision cycle" sooner. In the best case the enemy might see that he

could not get to the POD and its rapidly building logistics due to the LACR's screening operations, and seek a political settlement.

While collecting intelligence, the LACR continues constructing the battle space by providing the information needed by the operational commander to transform the concept into a plan. The information provided, whether developed with organic assets or relayed from elements like SOF, provide ever increasing detail to the JTF. As information is collected and refined, the JTF is able to better organize main body elements to maximize their capacity, because there is less and less unknown. Also, by selectively destroying (or not) enemy elements, particularly enemy reconnaissance elements, the LACR can assist the operational commander in getting the enemy commander to see the battle space the way the operational commander wants him to. The intelligence mission, when combined with the security mission, is best described as allowing the operational commander to begin reducing the friction and fog of war for his forces, while seeking to maximize it for his opponent. A key element is his ability to use a single unit, the LACR, to do both missions without the need to move in multiple units from multiple points, talking on multiple communications nets, some of whom will have additional, often higher priority, missions, and who are neither equipped or trained to execute the necessary missions.

The ability of the LACR as a single unit to accomplish the operations of security, collecting intelligence and managing fires is enhanced by the fact that it, and it alone, has the capacity (through equipment, organization and training) to conduct those operations throughout the depth of the battle space. It also can destroy, delay or disrupt enemy forces as required, and/or hand over enemy units to operational main force units for destruction. Having a single

unit manage all this greatly simplifies the operational commanders job. There are fewer "moving parts" at the Forward Edge of the Battle Area (FEBA), thus less chance that fratricide will occur, or that an enemy unit might penetrate friendly positions undetected. Given an operational level focus, where the tactical "executors" might be separated from one another in both time and space, having a single unit which transcends that separation is essential to maintaining positive command and control.

CHAPTER VII.

CONCLUSION

I believe that with the changing international environment, the operational level of war will be oriented on units and formations at a lower level than most people currently consider it to be at, and that at this new level, the Light Armored Cavalry Regiment provides the operational commander the ultimate tool for exercising command and control.

Joint, United States Army, and United States Marine Corps doctrines all center on the need for good intelligence to provide the ability for executors at all levels to exercise initiative and maximize agility. For the operational commander, having a single unit which collects the intelligence, protects his force (through both security operations and fires management) and minimizes or eliminates the impact of "friction" and "fog" gives him/her the best opportunity for implementing those doctrines and succeeding.

The LACR's rapid strategic mobility, intelligence collection and security capability, ability to manage fires over the time and space of an operational area, and to structure a battle space environment that maximizes the potential for a campaign plan to succeed makes it the best enhancement asset to keep the operational commander in control. It encapsulates within a single organization roles and missions which are usually distributed among numerous units, rather than a couple for the reconnaissance, one for the security, and a multitude of commanders all trying to manage fires. As Napoleon recognized almost 200 years ago, "Nothing is more important in war than unity in command."[1]

This flexibility becomes ever more important as our force structure reduces in size and we become ever more dependent on smaller, more capable units. In the future, we cannot plan on the luxury of a six month deployment, with a multitude of specialized forces, into a secure, benign environment while our opponent consolidates his gains and awaits our arrival on the field of battle. Our new focus on power projection from CONUS, and the potential dearth of forward bases makes it critical that our formations for the future match our vision of the future. We must have organizations designed to permit rapid strategic mobility, possessing operational mobility and survivability, and which can perform multiple simultaneous missions immediately upon arrival.

APPENDIX I

LIGHT ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT ORGANIZATIONAL DIAGRAM

THE LIGHT ARMORED CAVALRY REGIMENT



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