


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**INDONESIAN FOREIGN POLICY:
REGIONAL AND GLOBAL DIMENSIONS**

BY

**COLONEL SJAHRIAL
Indonesian Army**

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Indonesia proclaimed itself as a free and independent country on 17 August 1945, shortly after Japan surrendered to Allied Forces during World War II. With Pancasila as a basic fundamental principles and 1945 Constitution, the major goals of National purposes are to protect the Indonesian people and the entire motherland; to advance the public warfare; to develop the intellectual life of the nation; and to contribute to the establishment of the world order based on freedom, peace, and social justice. Efforts to achieve its goals through regional and international action have been dependent on more general political and economic development.

The changing of strategic environment also affected Indonesia to face many political, economic and security problems on its way to achieve its national objectives. After the establishment of the New Order Government, efforts to improve the fate of the people and economic development had been vigorously launched based on the same principles.

With the help of the ASEAN regional cooperation the economic development has achieved satisfactory progress and the South East Asian region has been relatively stable. Therefore, in the future Indonesia can be expected to apply its active and independent foreign policy in a more dynamic and active way through regional and international fora to achieve its national objectives.

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INDONESIAN FOREIGN POLICY: REGIONAL AND GLOBAL DIMENSIONS

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

Colonel Sjahrial
Indonesian Army

Dr. Thomas L. Wilborn
Project Adviser

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INDONESIAN FOREIGN POLICY: REGIONAL AND GLOBAL DIMENSIONS

INTRODUCTION

The Republic of Indonesia is a large archipelagic nation straddling across the equator from the southern tip of the Malay Peninsula to the northeast coast of Australia. After being ruled by the Dutch for more than three centuries and by the Japanese during World War II, Indonesia proclaimed itself a free and independent country on August 17, 1945, shortly after Japan surrendered to Allied forces. The former colonial power did not recognize the Proclamation of Independence, however, and an armed struggle was required until 1950 to establish the government's control over most of the former Dutch East Indies. The Dutch retained a foothold in their former colony until 1962, when the province now called Irian Jaya, the western part of the island of New Guinea (the eastern part is Papua New Guinea) was incorporated into the Republic of Indonesia.

Faced with many of the problems common to new emerging states as well as those resulting from Indonesia's unique historic, geographic, and demographic conditions, Indonesia has worked to mobilize all of its capabilities to achieve higher levels of economic development. This paper will examine the role of Indonesian foreign policy in contributing to the achievement of national goals. It will examine the present and projected security environment, the evolution of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as a central focus of Indonesian foreign policy, and Indonesia's leadership role in the region.

INDONESIA'S NATIONAL GOALS AND OBJECTIVES

The national purposes of the Republic of Indonesia are clearly stated in the Constitution of the state. This Constitution, usually referred to as the 1945 Constitution, was drafted and promulgated in 1945, simultaneously with the Proclamation of Independence. It should be distinguished from two other constitutions¹ under which Indonesia was briefly governed in the 1950s.

Part of the Constitution is Pancasila, five fundamental principles which together form Indonesia's official ideology. They are belief in one God, humanitarianism, national unity, democracy guided by the wisdom derived from the deliberations of representatives of the people, and social justice for all. The broader purposes of the Republic flow from this ideology, which is viewed as a guide to all government activities and is accepted by all participants of the political process. The major goals of the national purpose are to protect the Indonesian people and the entire Motherland; to advance the public welfare; to develop the intellectual life of the nation; and to contribute to the establishment of a world order based on freedom, peace, and social justice.

Indonesia's efforts to achieve its major goals through regional and international actions necessarily have been dependent on more general political and economic developments. In the political field, Indonesia first experimented (primarily under the now discarded constitutions) with a system of parliamentary government based on the Western democratic model

which encouraged many political parties and degenerated into "hyper pluralism." As "too many cooks spoil the broth," so also did too many competing groups cripple the governments' ability to govern. The resulting gridlock was not fully overcome until the return to the Constitution of 1945 (in 1959); the merger of many political parties into relatively few, all of which accepted Pancasila; and the aftermath of the unsuccessful coup of the Communist Party of Indonesia (Partai Komunis Indonesia, (PKI)) in 1965. Moreover, the evolution of Indonesia's political system was distorted by foreign intervention during the PKI rebellion in 1948 (Soviet Union), the separatist movement of the Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia in 1957/58 (United States), and the PKI attempted coup in 1965 (People's Republic of China).² Since 1965, with the introduction of the "new order" under President Suharto, Indonesia has experienced a strong unitary government with stable leadership--Suharto is still President³--without damaging foreign intervention.

In a sense, economic development paralleled political development, with significant strides occurring after the establishment of the new order. Not only did the country not have stable leadership--Sukarno was President for 20 years, but he presided over a shaky coalition which included the Communists, Moslems, and Armed Forces--but it was engaged in its historic battle of independence for much of the time. It was also confronted with the heritage of Dutch colonial policy, arguably the least progressive of any colonial power in Southeast Asia before World War II, and a huge population of mostly illiterate

and unskilled people. No other nation in the ASEAN was burdened with all of these obstacles at independence.

After 1965, however, especially through the 1980s, Indonesia has experienced rapid economic growth, and is now poised to become one of the new "dragons"⁴ of East Asia. Its foreign and security initiatives are not only supported by this growing economy, but also an expanding network of trading partners which includes the Economic Community (EC), Japan, and the United States.

STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT OF SOUTHEAST ASIA

The end of the Cold War, although Indonesia was never a direct party, has had a major effect on the strategic environment of Southeast Asia. First of all, it has lowered the potential for tension and conflict in the region. Neither Russia, the successor to the Soviet Union, nor the United States any longer has the incentive of East-West confrontation to intervene militarily into regional affairs. And by eliminating the external support for Vietnam, the withdrawal of Russia from Southeast Asian affairs has facilitated the search for a solution to conflict in Cambodia.

As a matter of fact, Russia has too many internal concerns and its economy is in too much disarray to be a major player in the economic or political affairs of Southeast Asia. While it still retains access to Cam Rahn Bay in Vietnam, there is no possibility that it will reintroduce a regional military presence for the foreseeable future.

United States

The United States, while the only remaining superpower, faces serious internal economic problems--budget and trade deficits and a persistent recession--and having closed its bases in the Philippines, no longer stations forces within the region. Access and repair agreements with Indonesia, Singapore, and Malaysia, entered into within the last few years, mean that it will not be denied the capability to maintain a limited military presence at sea in Southeast Asia. However, it has yet to develop a strategy for assuring stability, its major security objective for Southeast Asia, within the new, evolving strategic environment.

The United States is still a large trade and investment partner for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), especially Indonesia, so that it will have an impact on economic development and economic security. While the value of U.S. economic activity in Southeast Asia is smaller than that of Japan, the United States has the most liberal market, and is therefore valued by the ASEAN countries. Compared to Japan, the United States also has a more favorable record for the transfer of technology and management skills.

Japan

Japan's economic involvement with Indonesia and the region generally continues to be very large, and, at the urging of the United States, it is beginning to be more assertive politically in the region. Whether this will contribute to the tranquility of the area is yet to be seen. Every plan to increase Japan's defense expenditures and improve its military capability, or

expand Japan's military role (e.g., the dispatch of members of the Japan Self-Defense Force to Cambodia), is challenged by Asian nations, such as China and Korea, where the memories of Japan's brutal behavior during World War II is still vivid. Increases in Japan's defense capability do not automatically have to be viewed negatively by Southeast Asians, however, if the capability is used to enhance East Asian security. With other members of the ASEAN, Indonesia will monitor Japanese security policy to insure that Japan does not get militarily involved in Southeast Asia, especially Indonesian territory.

Japan is the largest investor, trader, and donor of aid to Southeast Asia, and its activities have a profound impact on the economic development of the region and each nation in it, including Indonesia. But Japan also views trade, aid, and investment as important to its strategy for international politics. Within Japan's concept of "comprehensive security," security is not only a factor of political and military issues, but also socio-economic conditions. In this context, Japan's economic actions (e.g., beside normal commercial activities, support for the ASEAN industrial projects, creation of the ASEAN Development Fund for assistance to the private sector, and official development assistance) also may contribute to regional security. On balance, Japan's contribution to stability in Southeast Asia is positive.

Other influences on the strategic environment of Southeast Asia from Northeast Asia are benign. Because of improving relations of North and South Korea, a war between them is less likely than before. Such a conflict would result in a chain

reaction effecting at least Japan and the United States, and no doubt would be disturbing to Southeast Asia also.

China's highest priority appears to be economic development, and, on the whole, probably will not disturb its relations with Indonesia or the stability of Southeast Asia. Much will depend upon political developments within the country. If China continues to be ruled by individuals who stress economic development and responsible membership in the world community, it will be favorable. But if economic development fails or causes serious social tensions and radicals gain control of the Communist Party and the government, China could become a dangerous force in Asia.

The highest potential for problems in the region concerns border disputes in the South China Sea, which do involve China as well as several states of Southeast Asia. These disputes relate to sovereignty over the Spratly Islands (China [both Beijing and Taipei]⁵, Malaysia, Philippines, and Vietnam) and Paracel Islands (China and Vietnam), and the mineral wealth which may be below their territorial waters; and the borders of the Economic Exclusive Zones and continental shelf in the South China Sea. Indonesia has a long border on the South China Sea, and is concerned with these disputes. As previously indicated, it has tried to help the parties involved achieve a peaceful solution.

Progress toward regional cooperation in South Asia is a favorable development for all of East Asia, including Southeast Asia. However, the continuing conflict between India and Pakistan is still a disturbing factor. Indian naval expansion

could not threaten or intimidate Indonesia or other countries of the ASEAN, since it is only political move to balance the strategy with Pakistan and China. She has no capabilities to replace any power vacuum in South East Asia region and does not have global interest in the region and the ASEAN concept of national and regional resilience has taken deep roots.

Australia and the South Pacific

Australia, together with Papua New Guinea and, to a lesser extend, other nations of the South Pacific, are important to Indonesia, and will be more important in the future. Successful development in these countries will reduce the need to concentrate on the southern and eastern part of Indonesia as far as defense and security are concerned. Developments in Papua New Guinea clearly influence what happens across the border in Irian Jaya, as well as other part of East Indonesia.

While at times relations between Indonesia and Australia have been difficult, Australia's recent initiatives have been beneficial. The "Cairns Group" of raw material producers, an Australian idea, was very valuable in the negotiations leading up to the Uruguay round of GATT talks.

The most serious problem in Southeast Asia in the recent past, the war in Indochina, has a prospect for settlement, which Indonesia was instrumental in developing. Moreover, relations between Thailand and Vietnam, which had involved limited conflict for a time, have greatly improved. If the UN sponsored settlement for Cambodia is successful, then this dangerous war zone in the region will be transformed into a developing zone.

Then, conciliation between the ASEAN and the Indochina states will be possible. Whether or not Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia become members of the ASEAN, greater cooperation will promote peace and regional resilience.

International Economic System

The international economic system, which effects virtually all aspects of the economies and Indonesia and the other members of the ASEAN, is also part of the strategic environment of Southeast Asia. Except in the most narrow sense, it impacts on the region's security.

With the rapid economic growth enjoyed by most of the ASEAN members and the sluggish economies of the developed countries in the last several years, the gap between the developing nations and the ASEAN has not been increasing, as it did for decades after the end of colonialism. But it is still very large, and the economies of the developed nations continue to influence economic development in the ASEAN.

The failure of the larger developing countries (United States, Japan, Germany) to stimulate economic growth has limited exports for the ASEAN, and slowed the increase of interdependence. Moreover, protectionism, decreases in the flow of development aid, and falling prices of commodities from developing countries has increased the burden of foreign debt for some of the ASEAN states, including Indonesia. Technology must be one of the major drivers for global economic growth, but in the short-run it tends to improve productivity and lower prices for production in the developed world, and make it more difficult for developing countries to sell on the world market.

INDONESIA'S INDEPENDENT AND ACTIVE FOREIGN POLICY

Having won independence in a long and bloody struggle, Indonesia has always been determined to avoid any foreign ties which could restrict its hard-won freedom. Therefore, it has consciously pursued an "independent and active" stance. Indonesia was the host of the famous Afro-Asian Conference at Bandung in 1955 and a founder of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Still involved, Indonesia is the elected leader of the NAM in 1992. As a result, Indonesia did not join either bloc during the Cold War, although it sometimes supported either superpower on issues which advanced Indonesian national values and interests, and did not adopt the passive position of neutrality. Especially with respect to the United Nations and regional affairs, Jakarta's policy has been dynamic and vigorous. Besides the ASEAN, the NAM, and the United Nations, Indonesia is active in the APEC, the Islamic Conference, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and the North-South dialogue. In recent years, it has provided a forum for China and other claimants to parts of the Spratly Islands⁶ to work out a peaceful solution to dispute. Indonesia has also been a major force, working with the permanent members of the Security Council, behind developing the arrangements for achieving a political solution among the four competing factions in Cambodia, including the deployment of the United Nations Temporary Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC).

The primary objectives of Indonesian foreign policy are as follows:

- o To support national development, with priority to economic development as set out in the Five Year Development Plan;
- o To preserve internal and regional stability conducive to national development; and
- o To protect the territorial integrity of Indonesia and safeguard the people's place of abode.⁷

ASEAN

The well-being of Indonesia, especially its opportunities for economic development, is obviously tied to the stability of the entire region of Southeast Asia. It has sought to promote regional stability and development primarily through the regional organization which it helped to found, the ASEAN.

Formed by Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand, the Association of Southeast Asians was established in 1967 to foster economic, cultural, and political cooperation. All former colonies except Thailand, their established channels of international communications were directed more towards their respective former metropolitan countries (in the case of Thailand, with Britain and France) than with each other, giving special need for an organization to encourage regional interchange. Following the fall of Sukarno's government after the attempted coup of 1965 and the end of confrontasi between Indonesia and Malaysia a short time later,⁸ Indonesia was able to

assume a leadership role in the creation and development of the new regional organization. The ASEAN Secretariat is located in Jakarta. When the British protectorate over Brunei ended in 1984, Brunei Darussalam became the sixth ASEAN member.

Political Cooperation

Although political considerations were for a long time downplayed within the ASEAN, they were always important. In the words of former Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik:

Although from the outside the ASEAN was conceived as an organization for economic, social and cultural cooperation and although considerations in this field were no doubt central, it was the fact that there was convergence in the political outlook of the five prospective member nations.

There was early recognition that meaningful progress could only be achieved by giving first priority to the task of overall and rapid economic development. It also realized that, to this end, policies should be consciously geared toward safeguarding this priority objective not only purely in economic terms, but simultaneously also to secure the essential condition of peace and stability, both domestically and internationally in the surrounding region.⁹

The political achievements of the ASEAN are in fact better known outside of the area than those in the economic, social, and cultural fields, which were suppose to have been the major foci of the organization. Some of the more notable ones are adoption of the Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN); the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia; the campaign to mobilize international opinion to reverse the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia and bring peace to that country; the evolution of effective political, economic, and social ties at

all levels of society among the member states; and the evolution of the Post-Ministerial Conference into a permanent institution of East Asian regional politics.

Indonesia was active in formulating the ZOPFAN in 1971 to provide the basis for the end of outside interference in the affairs of Southeast Asia. With the Cold War still influencing international politics and both U.S. and Soviet forces stationed within Southeast Asia, all great power intervention could not be abolished, but the ZOPFAN provided a strong basis for the members of the ASEAN to assert their determination to control events within their region, in cooperation with the states of Indochina and Burma, on their own.¹⁰

In 1976, the members of the ASEAN drafted and signed the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, in which each party pledges to settle all disputes by peaceful means. It is open to accession by other states, and in fact has been joined by Laos and Vietnam. Together with the ZOPFAN, the Treaty is an extension of two fundamental Indonesian concepts, independent and active foreign policy and regional resilience, which the ASEAN has adopted as its own.

The victory of Communist forces in Vietnam, and Vietnam's subsequent dependence on the Soviet Union, caused concern among the ASEAN nations. In 1978, Vietnam began to pose a real threat to the ASEAN interests--particularly those of the frontline state, Thailand--when it invaded Cambodia and threatened to destabilize the entire region. Moreover, Vietnam's policies toward its ethnic Chinese citizens led to a surge of refugee

"boat people" (as well as hundreds of thousands who fled to China) seeking asylum wherever their rickety boats would take them, which most often were the ASEAN nations, including Indonesia.

The ASEAN's response to these problems was unprecedented in the history of international relations. From 1978 until today, the members of the organization have maintained their unity, in spite of efforts by Vietnam and the Soviet Union to divide them, and year after year successfully prevented Vietnam from obtaining international legitimacy for its conquest of Cambodia by mobilizing overwhelming majorities in the UN General Assembly. Moreover, they succeeded in forming a single, if sometimes instable, coalition of Cambodian resistant groups to oppose the occupation. Then, in the new strategic environment following the end of the Cold War, the ASEAN elicited the cooperation of Vietnam in working towards a settlement in Cambodia. As noted above, Indonesia has played a major role in that effort.

In the long run, the most significant accomplishment of the ASEAN may be that it has evolved into a permanent institution in East Asian international politics. Initially created with very little formal structure, it has evolved into a meaningful agency for cooperation among the members, and for interacting with nations outside of the region. Indeed, the ASEAN is seen by many observers of international politics as a model for regional organizations throughout Asia and the rest of the world. It has reached the status of a "security community"--a group of nations which do not consider the use of force in their relations with each other and which consider each other's interests in their

respective decision making processes.¹¹ Moreover, this cooperative behavior is not confined to the relatively infrequent formal ASEAN ministerial meetings, but takes place through daily telephone contacts among the political leaderships and bureaucracies of the ASEAN nations and through the cooperation of the ASEAN ambassadors in the capitals of the world to which they are assigned.

One of the unique institutions which has evolved around the Annual Ministerial Meetings (AMM) of the ASEAN is the Post-Ministerial Conference (PMC). The foreign ministers of major trading partners of the members--Australia, Canada, Economic Community (EC), Japan, New Zealand, South Korea, and the United States--are invited to meet with the ASEAN foreign ministers after the AMM has concluded to discuss matters of common concern. Over the years, these meetings have become major diplomatic events, involving as they do most of the major powers involved in East Asian international politics. In 1991 and 1992, China and Soviet Union/Russia were invited to observe the AMM, and thus their foreign ministers were present in the city where the meetings took place, and could meet informally with PMC ministers. This is now all-the-more significant because, beginning in 1992, the AMM and the PMC formally include items, previously taboo for the ASEAN, on their agendas. The PMC is the only regular forum for security dialogue in East Asia.¹²

Economic Cooperation

The ASEAN programs in the economic field have been less dramatic than those in the political field. There is an on-going

effort to avoid competition in emerging industries by developing cooperative concerns in particular countries which were to benefit all. Indonesia and Malaysia were designated for fertilizers, Philippines for phosphate and sulfur, Singapore for diesel engines, and Thailand for caustic soda. Five committees were established to supervise these ASEAN mutual programs. The success of these programs has been uneven. In 1993, an ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), a very ambitious undertaking, was inaugurated. It is too early to evaluate this program, but if it is successful, it will have a major impact on economic development of the region.

Despite the absence (except for AFTA) of dramatic programs, the economies of all the ASEAN members, including Indonesia, have prospered, and the amount of inter-ASEAN trade (which was virtually nonexistent before the ASEAN was formed) has increased significantly.

Defense Cooperation

Until recently, defense and security matters were never formally a part of the ASEAN's agenda. The ASEAN has never been, and probably never will become a collective defense or collective security organization. While foreign ministers and various kinds of economic ministers meet regularly, there has never been an ASEAN defense ministers meeting or a meeting of the ASEAN military leaders. On the other hand, the ASEAN leaders, especially Indonesian ones, have been careful to prevent the ASEAN from becoming, or appearing to become, a threat to any nation. This character of the ASEAN has made it easier for the

organization to act as a peacemaker with respect to Vietnam and the rest of Indochina.

The individual members of the ASEAN do have bilateral and trilateral defense relations, but not necessarily collective defense relations, with each other, however. For instance, Indonesia has agreements with Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines which involve border security, piracy, smuggling, illegal immigration, combined training, and other aspects of military-to-military relations. Indonesia also has some military cooperation which involve education exchange with Australia, Brunei, Germany, Malaysia, Papua New Guinea, Singapore, Thailand, and the United Kingdom. It is a reflection of Indonesia's independent and active foreign policy that it is the only ASEAN nation which is not a party to a collective defense agreement.¹³

CONCLUSIONS

Indonesia has faced, and will continue to face, many political, economic, and security problems on its way to achieving its national objectives, based on the fundamental principles of Pancasila. The goal of the Republic of Indonesia is not only to build a better country, but also participate with other countries to build a new world based on freedom, peace, and social justice.

Economic, social, and political development in Indonesia has progressed well, and is institutionalized within the country. However, it will always encounter difficulties, and will never be properly executed, in a world marked by conflict and the threat

of war. Acting through the ASEAN, the NAM, the United Nations, and other regional and international agencies, Indonesia will sustain its Independent and active foreign policy to reduce the obstacles to peace and stability.

Within the region, Indonesia will continue to support and lead in the ASEAN, to strengthen the organization to provide for peace and security in Southeast Asia. By implementing the concept of the ZOPFAN, Southeast Asian nations will be able to regain and retain control over events in their own region.

Indonesia will need to foster productive relations with the major powers of Asia, Australia, Japan, and China, whose actions will also influence the stability of the Southeast Asia. Indonesia will also maintain good relations with the United States.

ENDNOTES

1. A provisional Constitution of the Republik Indonesia Serikat (United States of the Republic of Indonesia) was promulgated in February 1950, to be replaced after six months by another interim Constitution, this one creating a unitary government. Indonesia was governed by the latter until July 1959, when the Constitution of 1945 was reinstated by decree of President Sukarno.

2. The facts surrounding these interventions, all covert, have been published in the media, but all three governments deny them.

3. He was reelected to another five-year term on March 11, 1993.

4. Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Thailand are often referred as the Asian Dragons because of the remarkably high rates of economic growth they experienced during the 1980s. Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand are expected to become the "new" or "little" dragons of the 1990s.

5. The governments in Beijing and Taipei both have established garrisons on some of the Spratly Islands. They agree that all of the South China Sea is Chinese territorial waters.

6. China claims that all of South China Sea, which includes the Spratly Islands chain, is Chinese territorial waters. However, Malaysia, Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam also claim some of the islets. None of them are inhabited, except for several military installations, but it is believed that they sit above a large petroleum reserve.

7. Sam A. Walean, Indonesia in the 1990's, Jakarta: Wawasan Global, Inc, 1990, p. 90.

8. President Sukarno opposed the formation of Malaysia, which initially included the Federation of Malaya, Singapore (which has since become an independent state), and Sarawak and Sabah on the Island of Kalimantan (Borneo), most of which is part of Indonesia. He considered it is a neocolonialist creation. Armed clashes took place from September 1963 until 1966, when the Suharto government withdrew opposition to Malaysia.

9. Adam Malik, "Regional Cooperation in International Politics in Regionalism in Southeast Asia," CSIS Quarterly, Volume 22, Number 5, October 1974, pp. 161-162.

10. For a thorough analysis of ZOPFAN, see Muthiah Alagappa, "Regional Arrangements and International Security in Southeast Asia: Going Beyond ZOPFAN," Contemporary Southeast Asia, Volume 12, Number 4, March 1991, pp. 269-305.

11. On the ASEAN as a security community, see Amitav Acharya, "The Association of South East Asian Nations: 'Security Community' or 'Defense Community'", Pacific Affairs, Volume 64, Number 2, Summer 1991, pp. 140-178. The concept of a security community was developed by Karl W. Deutsch, Political Community at the International Level: Problems of Definition and Measurement, Garden City, NY: Doubleday and Co., 1954, pp. 33-43.

12. Thomas L. Wilborn, Stability, Security Structures, and U.S. Policy for East Asia and the Pacific, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, forthcoming.

13. Malaysia and Singapore are members of the Five Powers Defense Agreement, which also include Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. The United Kingdom retains some responsibility for the defense of Brunei Darussalam. Philippines and Thailand have mutual defense agreements with the United States.

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