The Light Infantry Division: A Case for Greater Robustness in a Downsized Army

Abstract

In 1984 a decision was made to create the Light Infantry Division (LID). This decision sparked controversy throughout the Army and raised issues that remain unresolved today. The primary concerns that were raised centered on the LID's shortcomings in lethality and sustainability. This study project is a review of current LID limitations as seen by past and present Light Infantry Division commanders. Their perspectives were taken from Division Command Lessons Learned Program pamphlets, Combat Training Centers (CTC) Lessons Learned, and a detailed interview on this subject with a serving Light Infantry Division Commanding General, MG Steven L. Arnold. The recommendations and conclusions do not represent a consensus from the light infantry community, but are the summarized views of LID commanders. The general view is that the shortcomings of the LID must be corrected -- the LID must become more robust in the 1990's in order to meet the Army requirement for 'versatility, deployability, lethality, and expansibility.' If it cannot meet this criteria, the LID risks being viewed as irrelevant and expendable in a budget constrained, downsized Army.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
Feb 08, 1993
Accession Number
ADA264491

Entities

People

  • Franklin L. Hagenbeck

Organizations

  • United States Army War College

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Biomedical
  • C4I
  • Human Systems
  • Weapons Technologies

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Active Duty
  • Aircrafts
  • Combat Forces
  • Combat Operations
  • Combat Readiness
  • Combat Support
  • Command And Control
  • Fire Support
  • Force Structure
  • Lessons Learned
  • Military History
  • Military Operations
  • Security
  • United States
  • Unmanned Aerial Vehicles
  • War Colleges
  • Warfare

Readers

  • Joint Military Operations and Doctrine.
  • Military Science
  • Systems Analysis and Design