Rear Battle in the Future: Is Our Doctrine up to the Task?
Abstract
This monograph analyzes the utility of the U.S. Army's doctrine for rear battle. Concepts and procedures for fighting rear battle were developed when the Army was focused on defeating the Soviet Union in a high-intensity conflict. Whether or not these procedures are relevant to an army that faces differing threats is the question the monograph seeks to answer. Rear battle doctrine is first summarized, and its procedures on self-defense, command and control, and reaction forces are analyzed for their utility against possible future threats. The most likely rear threat are guerrilla forces, and capabilities of these forces are defined. The ability of U.S. Army units to implement the doctrine successfully against this threat is examined given the constraints imposed by training, mission requirements, and equipment limitations. The doctrine is then compared with rear battle solutions developed by both the German and American armies during World War II, the Korean War, and the War in Vietnam. The monograph concludes that current rear battle doctrine needs revision, due to its concentration on the Soviet threat. Further, its procedures are flawed due to excessive demands placed on rear service and military police units to defend the rear, and for its creation of a dual chain of command in the rear. The development of new basic operational doctrine should serve as a catalyst to revise our doctrine for rear battle.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jan 25, 1993
- Accession Number
- ADA264504
Entities
People
- Thomas J. Newman
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College