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**THE ARMY RESERVE COMMAND:
FACTORS SHAPING ITS DEVELOPMENT;
CURRENT STRUCTURE AND ANTICIPATED VALUE**

BY

**LIEUTENANT COLONEL JOHN R. O'SHEA
United States Army Reserve**

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93-11188



REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No 0704-0188

1a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED			1b. RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS NONE		
2a. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY			3. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY OF REPORT DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.		
2b. DECLASSIFICATION / DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE					
4. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)			5. MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)		
6a. NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE		6b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable)		7a. NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION	
6c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) ROOT HALL, BUILDING 122 CARLISLE, PA 17013-5050				7b. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)	
8a. NAME OF FUNDING / SPONSORING ORGANIZATION		8b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable)		9. PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER	
8c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)				10. SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERS	
				PROGRAM ELEMENT NO	PROJECT NO
				TASK NO.	WORK UNIT ACCESSION NO
11. TITLE (Include Security Classification) The Army Reserve Command: Factors Shaping its Development; current structure and Anticipated Value					
12. PERSONAL AUTHOR(S) LTC John R. O'Shea, USAR					
13a. TYPE OF REPORT STUDY PROJECT		13b. TIME COVERED FROM _____ TO _____		14. DATE OF REPORT (Year, Month, Day) 15 April 1993	
15. PAGE COUNT 31					
16. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION					
17. COSATI CODES			18. SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number) ARMY RESERVE; ARMY RESERVE COMMAND; COMMAND AND CONTROL; CONGRESSIONAL INTEREST IN ARMY RESERVE COMMAND; ARMY RESERVE READINESS		
FIELD	GROUP	SUB-GROUP			
19. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number) You may type out in its entirety the full abstract of your document, or you may xerox copy over onto the reverse side of this document.					
20. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT ☒ UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED ☐ SAME AS RPT. ☐ DTIC USERS				21. ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION Unclassified	
22a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL THOMAS W. SWEENEY, COLONEL, TC				22b. TELEPHONE (Include Area Code) 717-245-4134	
				22c. OFFICE SYMBOL USAMHI	

ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: John R. O'Shea, LTC, USAR

TITLE: The Army Reserve Command: Factors Shaping its Development; Current Structure and Anticipated Value

FORMAT: Individual Study Project

DATE: 15 April 1993 PAGES: 28 CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

The establishment of the US Army Reserve Command has been lauded by some as the most significant reorganization of the Army Reserve in recent times. While this action represents the culmination of Public Law 90-168, the Reserve Forces Bill of Rights and Revitalization Act, it was not taken without controversy and delay. Congressional interest in the readiness of the Reserve Components has been consistent with concern for the status of Reserve and Guard units expressed as long as 25 years ago. It was not until the Total Force Policy of 1975 that the Army carefully focused on the readiness of the Reserve Components when the revised force structure inextricably integrated reserve and active force elements. From that point on, no future contingency could be met without the Reserve Components. But an examination of resource allocation shows an historic shortfall to the Army Reserve. This shortfall stems, in part, from the large number of combat service and combat service support missions assigned to the Army Reserve. These missions represent core competencies for the Army Reserve but result in low funding priority with the emphasis on a "first to fight; first to equip" procedure. The data confirm the theory of an under-resourced Army Reserve with readiness deficiencies further exacerbated by the layering of headquarters between the funding source and the funding recipients. It was this reality which was the genesis of the concept of an Army Reserve Command; a command that would eliminate layering and improve efficiency of resource allocation. Establishment of the Army Reserve Command also represents one of the final actions to meet the intent of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 by a command and control process which ensures effective responsiveness from reserve forces to the CINCs they support. Force integration is also improved through the USARC's office of Deputy Chief of Staff, Force Development (DCSFOR). Serving as the commander's sole integrator, the DCSFOR provides efficient and effective focus by synchronizing diverse requirements to units subordinate to the command and monitoring the force integration process. The value of the USARC was confirmed when an Independent Commission, established by the Secretary of the Army, unanimously recommended that the Command continue and be organized as a separate command no longer subordinate to US Forces Command. Congressional interest remained high throughout the Command's development as shown during Hearings and as written in directive language of the law. The USARC not only improves efficiency and effectiveness but allows the Total Force, as envisioned by General Creighton Abrams, to become a reality.

USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

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**THE ARMY RESERVE COMMAND:
FACTORS SHAPING ITS DEVELOPMENT;
CURRENT STRUCTURE AND ANTICIPATED VALUE**

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

BY

**Lieutenant Colonel John R. O'Shea, IN
United States Army Reserve**

**Colonel Thomas W. Sweeney
Project Advisor**

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Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania 17013**

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HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

The most significant reorganization of the Army Reserve, in recent times, was the establishment of the US Army Reserve Command (USARC). As often happens with major decisions, there was delay and controversy, with much of this controversy surrounding the command's authority and structure. Indeed, MG William Ward, past Chief, Army Reserve, considered the Command's establishment to have been the most difficult, yet the greatest achievement of his tenure. The satisfaction he had was with the ability to sell "the concept of the Army Reserve Command based upon logic, not based upon twisting any arms."¹ The logic was there to prove the Command's value.

For many the Army Reserve Command represents the culmination of the intent of Public Law 90-168, the Reserve Forces Bill of Rights and Vitalization Act. "The basic purpose of the Act was to provide statutory changes in the organizational and administrative structure of the Reserve Components of the Armed Forces so as to enable each of the reserve components to more fully and effectively meet the mobilization readiness requirements as dictated by our contingency plans"² through guaranteeing the integrity of the Reserve Components and mandating management of the RC by reservists during peacetime. A provision of the statute was establishment of the position of Chief, Army Reserve.

Although the intent of Congress was for the legislation (PL 90-168) to apply to all of the Reserve Components, the Services

varied in how they met these requirements. The Congress, in a report prepared by the House Appropriations Committee, cited the Air Force as having a command structure for its reserve credited with achieving a high state of readiness.³ Indeed, the Air Force model was used as an example of efficiency and effectiveness in command and control of reserve units. At the same time, the Appropriations Committee expressed concern for what it viewed as a lack of compliance by the Army with the law's requirement.⁴ "It has been the varied implementation of PL 90-168 among the services that has kept the Army Reserve command and control issue a Congressional concern since 1967."⁵

The reserve is not useful unless it is ready and readiness of the Reserve Components has been of long-standing concern. During Congressional testimony more than twenty-five years ago, Secretary of the Army Brucker reported that since passage of the Reserve Forces Act of 1955, the Army conducted "a continuous, objective and searching examination of both Reserve Components to determine their combat readiness."⁶ Secretary Brucker's conclusion was that both the Army Reserve and National Guard had need for additional personnel, equipment and training funds to meet mobilization requirements. Ten years later, Senator Stennis commented on the lack of equipment, saying "I have always thought that the Reserves and the National Guard got slight treatment when it comes to dividing the money. They never did have enough means put at their disposal for them to develop anything like their full potential..."⁷

While Senator Stennis' comments reveal his advocacy for the Reserve Components, his statement was given credibility by Army Secretary Ailes. Arguing in favor of a merger of the Reserve Components, Secretary Ailes said: "...our structure, in reserve, contains some 21 low-priority divisions which "are not a significant military asset to the United States unless backed up by the necessary supporting units and unless the divisions and those supporting units are equipped."⁸ Secretary Ailes' observation identified force structure inefficiencies as well as funding shortfalls. But it was Defense Secretary McNamara's comments which highlighted the enormity of the shortfall: "... the 21 low priority divisions, 15 Guard and 6 Reserve, are not combat ready and cannot be made combat ready in any reasonable period of time. For those divisions, we lack a total of some 640,000 men that would be required to maintain them at a combat level, and we lack approximately \$10 billion worth of equipment."⁹

THE TOTAL FORCE POLICY

This inequality in resource allocation was to be reversed following development of the Total Force Policy, a development that Colonel Heller¹⁰ traces as far back as the period following the Civil War when Emory Upton observed a cost savings by integrating an Army of both regulars and reservists. Reform measures began in 1903 with initiatives by Elihu Root, subsequent

passage of the Dick Act in 1908, followed by the National Defense Act of 1916.¹¹ It was General Creighton Abrams, however, who forged the concept of the Total Force largely from his frustration during our build up in Viet Nam when the reserve components were not mobilized even though they were badly needed.

President Johnson's decision not to call up the reserve affected every aspect of the Army. The escalation of our involvement in Viet Nam, without a change in force structure, meant that resources for the effort were to come from existing structure. The practical result was the repetitive tours that many career soldiers experienced. Although a pool of qualified leaders existed in the reserves, the President's policy made that pool inaccessible. Young officers and sergeants were promoted prematurely to meet requirements in South East Asia thus exacerbating the leadership challenge that already existed. Furthermore, badly needed equipment was diverted from delivery to stateside units to Viet Nam. In essence, management of the conflict was described by Army Secretary Stanley Resor as the "allocation of shortages."¹²

The events which preceded General Abrams' development of the total force policy represent a grim period in our nation's recent history. Even though the Reserve Components have always been considered a mobilization asset for the Active Component, their value was substantially diminished when, contrary to the recommendation of Defense Secretary Robert McNamara, President Lyndon Johnson refused to call up these forces to support the

Viet Nam conflict. The result of the president's decision was profound. Not only were the dedicated career reservists disappointed but later their "disappointment turned to dismay when their units became refuge for the disaffected, the dissident and the draft dodger."¹³ The quality of the reserve force plummeted not only because of the poor motivation of assigned personnel but also because of a lack of upgraded equipment-equipment that was diverted to support the conflict.

Lack of mobilization also affected the quality of the active force. General Bruce Palmer described the most serious problems in Viet Nam as manpower and personnel. "Without at least a partial mobilization, the Army was denied the use of the trained, experienced units and personnel present in the National Guard and organized reserves."¹⁴ President Johnson's reason for not calling up the Reserve Components was a reluctance to spread the sacrifice required for the effort among the general population. "Certainly many more families and virtually every town and city would be affected by a call-up of any proportion."¹⁵

The validation of General Abrams' concept on use of Reserve Forces was achieved during Operations Desert Shield and Storm. Ironically, the argument against call up during the Johnson Administration became the source of overwhelming support during the Bush Administration. Mobilizing units from virtually every town and city gave all Americans a sense of ownership in the fight against Saddam. As General Ward said, the public's support of the President's policy in the Gulf was 50% at the start of

Operation Desert Shield. As soon as the President exercised his call-up authority, "it jumped to 90% as the mobilization process progressed. Why the almost doubling of support? The country is serious about its vital national interests"¹⁶ and with a reserve call-up, the importance of the action becomes known by every citizen.

General Abrams was keenly aware of the devastation caused by our failure to employ the reserve components in the 1960s. Consequently, he devoted his tenure as Chief of Staff to correcting this egregious failure to use a valuable asset. Working in harmony with Secretary of Defense Schlesinger, General Abrams won political support for a policy which would ensure that the Army could not be engaged in a future conflict without the use of its reserve components. "The vehicle for doing this was a revised force structure that integrated reserve and active forces elements so closely as to make the reserves virtually inextricable from the whole."¹⁷ From this vision came the Total Force Policy defined by the Army's Reserve Forces Policy Board, in 1975, as:

...the integration of planning, programming and budgeting for the manning, equipping, maintaining and training of a mix of active and reserve forces essential for meeting initial contingency demands for forces. The Total Force Policy implies an increased interdependence of active and reserve forces. It absolutely requires that the availability and readiness of reserve forces must be as certain as the availability of active forces.¹⁸

Although General Abrams' policy for a total force developed within a Cold War environment, war planners have continually updated allocations to meet developing threats. These plans include the Reserve Components as integral elements for contingencies as well as a source of reconstitution should a major threat evolve to oppose the U.S. Furthermore, the need for greater reliance on lower cost Reserve Component units emerges as overall budget resources decline. "The role of the RC clearly has been expanded from one of wartime augmentation only to now being an integral part of the base force. Today's Army can meet no major contingency without the Reserve Components."¹⁹ If this policy is to be effective, it must go beyond contingency missions to the allocation of much needed equipment and training.

INEQUALITY IN RESOURCE ALLOCATION

But the reality of resource allocation falls short of the promise of a Total Force Policy. The allocation shortfall stems, in part, from the large number of combat service and combat service support missions assigned to the Army Reserve. Of the force structure available, 42% of tactical support is in the USAR, 31% in the National Guard and 27% in the active component. The corollary is that the preponderance of combat units are found in the Active Component and National Guard. Indeed, 56% of the combat divisions are active, 42% Guard and 2% Reserve.²⁰ From this structure emerges core competencies for the Army Reserve not

only in combat support and combat service support but in the command and control of above the line forces, i.e., those forces found at echelons above division and echelons above corps.

While these core competencies represent the strength of the reserve, the result is that the Army Reserve is lowest on funding priority as emphasis is placed on a "first to fight; first to equip" philosophy. Furthermore, tactical support units have low density equipment requirements which exacerbate their historic under-resourcing particularly when the equipment is not available in an economic buy as is high density equipment. The data confirm the theory of an under-resourced Army Reserve. A study prepared by COL Ritterpusch²¹ found striking differences in appropriations between the two reserve components. The comparison of Reserve and Guard allocations, adjusted for the difference in size between the two, showed disproportionate funding in Operations and Maintenance (O&M), full time support and equipment received even though the Army Reserve is a federal force. As an example, the Army National Guard received almost \$8 billion in equipment during FY88 while the Army Reserve received just \$3.5 billion. This represents a 128% difference, which is considerably greater than the 49% difference in the two components' respective unit personnel strengths.²²

A systemic problem in resource allocation has been the layering of headquarters between the funding source and the funding recipients. For the Army Reserve, funding would pass from the source through U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM),

through the Continental Army Commands (CONUSAs) through the major subordinate commands (MACOMs) to the recipient as shown in Figure 1. Often, funds would be misallocated or delayed in the process. It was this reality which was the genesis of the concept of an Army Reserve Command; a command that would eliminate layering and improve efficiency of resource allocation as shown in Figure 2. Recognizing that up to 30% of allocated funds were withheld at intervening headquarters only to be released at the end of the fiscal year, General Ward and his staff proposed a remedy through direct allocation. "We said, why can't we channel money from the CAR's account directly to the people who spend it against their budget which is their plan for the year. Not only can we do that but we can save a lot of spaces" by consolidating duplicative positions at the CONUSAs into the Army Reserve Command.²³

THE GOLDWATER NICHOLS ACT

Establishment of the Army Reserve Command represents one of the final actions to meet the intent of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. This watershed legislation resulted in the most significant reorganization of the DoD since the Key West Conferences. The Act is named for two of its foremost authors: the late William Nichols, a wounded World War II veteran and ten term Democrat Member of the House of Representatives and Barry Goldwater, a World War II veteran who rose to the rank of Major General, Air Force Reserve and served




Figure 1




Figure 2

five terms as a Republican in the U.S. Senate.²⁴ While there were differences in the initial House and Senate versions of the bill, the Conference Committee prepared a compromise that, when passed, was lauded by, then, House Armed Services Committee Chairman Les Aspin as "one of the landmark laws of American history."²⁵

The history of the Goldwater Nichols Act is unique and demonstrates the resolve of the Congress to reorganize the DoD. This legislation was enacted only after years of research, Congressional testimony and Presidential commission studies.²⁶ Those efforts were worthwhile as the House version, passed in lieu of the Senate bill, received an overwhelming, bipartisan majority of 383 to 27 votes. In the September 17, 1983 edition of the Congressional Record, Congressman Nichols (D-AL) quoted Senator Goldwater (R-AZ) as saying that the conference to resolve differences between the House and Senate versions "...was the most cordial and cooperative conference in his memory. That is because each side had similar objectives. Those objectives were to strengthen the organizational structure of the Department of Defense and thus to improve the defense posture of this nation".²⁷

Clearly, with such a strong mandate from the Congress, due diligence must be followed to ensure that the full intent of Goldwater-Nichols is followed. While much attention has been given to the legislation's requirement for joint versus service command structure, another issue involves responsiveness of

forces to supported CINCs. That responsiveness is dependant on ready units properly resourced and organized along an effective peacetime chain of command.²⁸ All of these reforms are germane to the Army Reserve Command's mission.

THE ARMY RESERVE: FUNCTIONS, RESOURCE ALLOCATION AND FORCE DEVELOPMENT

Title 10 of the United States Code, as amended through April 6, 1991, calls for appointment of a Chief, Army Reserve who is to be advisor to the Chief of Staff on Army Reserve matters and given command and control authority over all reserve units with the exception of Special Operations Force units and OCONUS units. Additionally, he is to ensure that those units under his command are available for their federal missions.

The purpose of each reserve component is to provide trained units and qualified persons available for active duty in the armed forces, in time of war or national emergency and at such other times as the national security requires, to fill the needs of the armed forces whenever, during, and after the period needed to procure and train additional units and qualified persons to achieve the planned mobilization, more units are needed than are in the regular components.²⁹

The availability of these units is a function of individual and collective readiness. When General Vuono became Chief of Staff, he directed his principal staff officers to focus on improving the unit readiness of the Total Force through monthly reviews. These reviews were prepared to identify systemic

problems and initiate corrective action. But for the Army Reserve, correction was difficult to achieve as there was no one office to integrate the myriad actions required³⁰ nor were there offices with either the potential or authority to develop this capability; a condition that was known by the Congress as well. Recognizing the need for effective resource allocation in the Army Reserve, the Defense Authorization Bill for fiscal year 1991 established command and control authority for the Chief, Army Reserve over certain units within the Army Reserve.

Corrective action for systemic readiness problems involves appropriate allocation of funds for equipment, training and manning as well as effective integration of force structure changes. While changes in force structure were rapid during the 1980s, they continue, but at a moderated pace, today. Although these changes in structure were to improve the capabilities of the Force, they often resulted in excessive turbulence, MOS mismatch and unit unreadiness within the reserve component.

The Army Reserve is similar to the Active Component in its federal mission but unlike the Active Component, reservists cannot easily be assigned from one unit to another. Therefore, a decision to change the mission of a reserve unit must consider the available pool of personnel who are qualified, or who can attend training to become qualified, to perform the unit's new mission. Decisions to change the geographical location of a unit to take advantage of more favorable demographics are constrained by Congressional interest. In many communities, the local

reserve unit may be the largest employer in town and the transfer of that unit to another Congressional District will be closely monitored. Indeed, all stationing actions involving the transfer of 100 or more spaces require formal notification of the affected Members of Congress prior to the effective date of the action.

The rapid and sometimes turbulent changes in planning and execution of the Army's manpower program was questioned by both the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Congress in 1988. A Rand study cited a Memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments from Secretary Carlucci indicating serious variances in the Army's ability to track manpower decisions accurately through the planning, programming and budgeting process to actual execution.³¹ This issue prompted an examination of the entire force development process by the Rand Corporation supplemented by an assessment of missions, functions and organization of the general support forces and development of a blueprint for transition to the smaller CONUS-based Army of the 1990s under Project Vanguard. As Project Vanguard developed, new initiatives emerged including that of realigning the HQDA Staff. Both Project Vanguard and the Rand Study found a lack of integration in building, managing and executing Army programs at the Headquarters, Department of the Army level. Furthermore, the lack of a single-point, HQDA, program integrator for development of the force was seen as a major operational dysfunction.³² Both studies recommended establishing the position of program integrator responsible for development and execution of the

Army's programming and force integration functions. This program integrator is to be responsible for the systematic management of change including the introduction, incorporation and sustainment of doctrine, new organization and equipment into the Army.³³

Project Vanguard recommended that the position be at the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff level consistent with the need for a centralized position with authority to arbitrate competing Army Staff requirements.

THE ARMY RESERVE COMMAND

As important as proper force development is to the Active Component, it is critical to the Army Reserve which, until recently, had diffuse and inefficient allocation of resources through layering of commands. While budget constraints limit the size of the Active Component, national military strategy requires a robust Reserve Component to meet contingency requirements. Although the Army Reserve has been given an increasingly important contingency role, there has been a proportionally troubling deficiency in resource allocation and management structure. Resource difficulties have been caused, in part, by the CSS-intensive nature of the USAR structure and an "unsympathetic external support system."³⁴ The establishment of the Reserve Command, and particularly its focal point office for force integration developed in accordance with Project Vanguard's recommendation, will contribute to correcting this situation.

Provisionally organized on 1 October 1990 as a major subordinate command of FORSCOM, the USARC gave the Chief, Army Reserve not only command and control but also resource allocation authority over certain Army Reserve units.

As significant as the command's establishment was, it also provided an opportunity to change the manner in which force integration had been managed in the past. That change was made through development of the position of Deputy Chief of Staff, Force Development (DCSFOR) whose principal duty is to ensure that a properly resourced, integrated and capable-of-implementation, troop action program for the USAR is developed and executed.³⁵ Within the DCSFOR are four divisions responsible for force integration, structure/stationing, documentation and manpower (see Figure 3). Serving as the commander's sole integrator, the DCSFOR provides efficient and effective focus through synchronizing diverse requirements to units subordinate to the command and monitoring the force integration process as shown in Figure 4.

Strong Congressional interest has been present throughout the planning and stand up of the Army Reserve Command. Among findings in the FY 90 Conference Report accompanying the Department of Defense Authorization Act was the sense of the Congress for greater use of the Reserve Components. Acknowledging these forces to be an essential element of national security while facing an overall reduction in the threat with the likelihood of continued fiscal constraint, the Congress concluded

USARC

ORGANIZING FOR "SUCCESS "





Figure 3

USARC

THE FORCE INTEGRATION PROCESS



THE DCSFOR REPRESENTS THE COMMANDER AND INFLUENCES THE FORCE INTEGRATION PROCESS

DCSFOR

Figure 4

that the United States must increase use of its Reserve Components. The Congress further stated that the Department of Defense has not adequately implemented the Total Force Policy since its inception in 1973 and, accordingly, should shift a greater share of force structure and budgetary resources to the Reserve Components. In the same report, the Congress directed the Secretary of the Army to established an Army Reserve Command as a major subordinate command of Forces Command for a two year test period when its progress and effectiveness would be examined by an Independent Commission.

THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION

The Independent Commission submitted its report in October, 1992. The Commission's examination was broad and included: evaluating key changes and their effect within the USAR since 1990, assessing the impact of long range trends, comparing the USAR to the other Reserve Components, recommending changes needed to improve the USAR, and reviewing resource implications of command structures.³⁶ Some of their conclusions can be found in the following paragraphs.

When the USARC was established, the Chief, Army Reserve (CAR) assumed triple responsibility as he became, in addition to CAR, Commanding General of the USARC and Deputy Commanding General (Reserve Affairs), FORSCOM. In the latter position, the CAR reports to and is rated by the CG, FORSCOM. In the position

of CAR, he reports to the Chief of Staff, Army, representing USAR interests on the Army Staff. Concurrence by the Secretary of the Army with the Commission's recommendation for separate command status would eliminate the position of DCG(RA), FORSCOM.

Resource allocation has been a critical element in the readiness of units. With the establishment of the USARC, FORSCOM and the CONUSAs were eliminated from the Army Reserve funding stream. As a result, significant layering was removed and efficiencies introduced by direct funding flow from OCAR to the USARC. Furthermore, Reserve Personnel Army (RPA) and Operations and Maintenance, Army Reserve (OMAR) funds are now under the control of the Army Reserve. Inefficiencies resulting from withholding of funds under CONUSA control has been eliminated by providing Major US Army Reserve Commands (MUSARCs) with programming and budgeting cycle funds up front. Capability for operational efficiency is handicapped, however, by a lack of automation due to Congressionally imposed restrictions, a condition that should soon be corrected.

The most important objective of command and control efficiency is combat readiness. The historic data show lowest unit status within the Army Reserve. Similarly, an analysis of army reserve administrative and command functions show areas for improvement. Indeed, it was these analyses which prompted the Congress to call for establishment of the USARC. The Independent Commission's study specified areas which require additional improvement/resourcing. The Commission considered a need for

adequate full time support and required unit equipment as major impediments to unit readiness. Excessive layering between the CONUSAs and the MUSARCs, particularly in training assistance, was also identified as needing correction.

All these considerations directed the Commission to a unanimous recommendation that the USARC become a major command (MACOM), similar to the AF Reserve model, with full command and control responsibility of all USAR units, less Special Operations Forces, not later than 1995 as shown in Figure 5. Efficiencies will be achieved through elimination of layering and stipulation that the USARC have responsibility for training and operations while FORSCOM has responsibility for mobilization and deployment. As mentioned earlier, the Army Reserve Command represents a change that meets the intention of both Public Law 90-168 and the Goldwater-Nichols Act. Acceptance of these changes will be difficult. To paraphrase General Ward: the issue is not one of an objective change but one of a visceral change in culture where command and control of the Army Reserve rests with Army Reservists. As difficult as the change will be for some, adherence to these recommendations will allow the Total Force, as envisioned by General Abrams, to become a reality.

USARC C2 - 1995

(COMMANDS ALL USAR UNITS LESS SOF)




Figure 5

ENDNOTES

¹William F. Ward, MG, USA (Ret), Interview conducted, by author, as part of the MHI Oral History Program, 15 December 1992, Suffern, New York. Tape recording.

²US Congress, House of Representatives, House Report No. 13, 13 February 67, pg 2.

³US Congress, House of Representatives, DoD Appropriation Bill, 1990. Report of the Committee on Appropriations, House Report No. 208, 101st Congress, 1st Session, 1989.

⁴Evan Hultman, MG, USA, (Ret), "Command and Control are Key Issues." Officer Magazine, March 1989, pg 25.

⁵Ibid., 26

⁶Wilbur M. Brucker, Statement by the Secretary of the Army before Subcommittee No. 1, U.S. House Armed Services Committee. Washington, DC, 4 February 1957.

⁷US Congress, Senate, Hearings Before the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services. Proposal to Realign the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve Forces, Washington, DC. 1 March 1965, pg 3.

⁸Ibid., 11.

⁹Ibid., 39.

¹⁰Charles E. Heller, COL, USA, Total Force Policy a paper delivered at a workshop on "US Domestic and National Security Agendas: Into the 21st Century" 17-19 September 92, pg 1.

¹¹Ibid., 2.

¹²Lewis D. Sorley. Thunderbolt (New York. 1992: Simon and Schuster, 1992) pg 186.

¹³Lewis D. Sorley, "Creighton Abrams and Active-Reserve Integration in Wartime, Parameters 21 (Summer 1991): 38.

¹⁴Bruce Palmer. The 25-Year War America's Military Role in Viet Nam (Lexington, Kentucky: University Press, 1984): 169.

¹⁵Sorley, Creighton Abrams and Active-Reserve Integration in Wartime, 37.

¹⁶Ward, Interview.

¹⁷Sorley, Thunderbolt, 362.

¹⁸Department of Defense, Reserve Forces Policy Board, Annual Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board, FY 1975, Washington, DC: GPO, 1975, pg 2.

¹⁹US Army War College, Department of Command, Leadership and Management, Army Command, Leadership and Management: Theory and Practice, 1992-1993, Reference Text. Carlisle Barracks: 1992 pg 13-2.

²⁰Department of Defense, Reserve Forces Policy Board, Annual Report of the Reserve Forces Policy Board, FY 1991, Washington, DC: GPO, 1992, pg 11.

²¹David S. Ritterpusch, COL, USA, The Army Reserve and U.S. National Defense Strategy. U.S. Army War College Study Project. 18 April 88, Carlisle Barracks, PA.

²²David S. Ritterpusch, COL, USA, (Ret), "Unique Capabilities of Army Reserve Value to Nation." Officer Magazine, December 1989, pg 14.

²³Ward, Interview.

²⁴US Government Printing Office, Biographical Directory of the U.S. Congress 1774-1989, 1989. Washington DC, p. 1071 & 1569.

²⁵US Congress, House Armed Services Committee, "The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986: Summary of Provisions," news release, 11 September 1986. (Course 4 Selected Readings, Vol I pp 63 to 76). USAWC p 73.

²⁶Association of the U.S. Army, Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 - A Primer. 1987, Washington, DC p 4.

²⁷US Congress, Congressional Record. Proceedings and Debate of the 99th Congress, Second Session. September 17, 1986 p H7005.

²⁸Robert F. Norton, COL, USA, Impact of the Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act on the U.S. Army Reserve. USAWC Military Studies Program Paper. 1988. pg 18.

²⁹United States Code, Vol 3, Title 10-Armed Forces. 1989. pg 86.

³⁰William A. Whittle, COL, USA (Ret), Interview conducted by author during Course 1, USAWC, 24 October 1992, Fairfax, Virginia. Tape recording.

³¹The Rand Corporation, Organizational Analysis and Resource Management Planning: A Final Report. Santa Monica, CA: 1989 p 34.

³²US Army, Vanguard Final Report. Washington, DC: 1990 p EX 10-11.

³³US Army War College, Department of Command, Leadership and Management, Army Command, Leadership and Management: Theory and Practice, 1992-1993, Reference Text. Carlisle Barracks: 1992 pg 3-12

³⁴David S. Ritterpusch, COL, USA, (Ret), "Unique Capability of Army Reserve Value to Nation." Officer Magazine, December 1989, pg 14.

³⁵US Army Reserve Command, Regulation 10-5 dtd December 1990.

³⁶US Army Reserve Command Independent Commission, Final Report. Washington, DC 15 October 1992 pg 1.

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