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**WILLIAM T. SHERMAN;
AN OPERATIONAL ARTIST;
"NEVER WON A BATTLE,
NEVER LOST A CAMPAIGN"**

BY

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WILLIAM T. SHERMAN; AN OPERATIONAL ARTIST;
"NEVER WON A BATTLE, NEVER LOST A CAMPAIGN"

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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ABSTRACT

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Identifying and acquiring operational art remains a difficult task in today's complex military profession. This study uncovers through primary source research material the intellectual aspects of operational art and character traits of Lieutenant General William T. Sherman before the Atlanta Campaign of May 1864. The author establishes a model to judge Sherman's intellectual capacity using existing U.S. Marine Corps and Army doctrine and Clausewitz's theoretical discussion on character traits to establish a character model. Investigating the little known Meridian Campaign of January 1864 this study highlights Sherman's developing intellect and character traits. The author concludes that Sherman possessed the basic elements of both to qualify as an operational artist; Sherman was able to weave strategic goals with a series of battles accomplishing his objectives efficiently due to his well honed leadership traits. Further the author asserts campaign studies and primary source documents provide an excellent vehicle to formally and informally instruct other military professionals in acquiring the operational art.

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Operational Art

Military theoreticians dispute when operational art came into existence. Most agree that operational art began either during the Napoleonic Wars or the American Civil War.¹ Operational Art's beginning has baffled military theoreticians for the last twenty years. Operational art is a prominent aspect of modern warfare's dynamic nature. Today's student searches to discover how previous military professionals uncovered operational art and adapted it to their particular war.

In searching for examples of how military professionals discovered the operational art, this study turns to Major General William Tecumseh Sherman, seeking to reveal what intellectual capacity he brought to war and which of his character traits best promoted the application of the operational art. After an initial review of theory to define terms, this study turns to history to reveal Sherman's development.

Sherman was selected for three reasons. First, he was a prolific writer, whose letters and primary source documents survive today. Next, although often unlucky in battle he was nonetheless successful in all his campaigns.² And lastly, for all his faults, he seemed to have possessed the correct mix of intellect and character traits required to adapt and understand warfare's evolution.

During the Atlanta campaign, May through August 1864, Sherman displayed mastery of the operational art.³ He

resorted to a campaign of maneuver off the battlefield, dislodging his enemy's forces. Confederate General Joseph E. Johnston, his opponent, selected excellent defensive positions, but Sherman maneuvered his army group to constantly out-flank his opponent and only reluctantly did he give battle. This maneuver gave Sherman the advantage of protecting his numerical superiority rather than squandering it in frontal assaults. Only when frustrated, as at Kennesaw mountain, did Sherman order a frontal assault. After this rebuff, he returned to maneuver off the battlefield. Sherman obtained his objectives while restraining Johnston's Confederate army and penetrating deep into enemy territory, destroying the enemy's ability to continue the war.⁴

This study uses the Atlanta campaign as a point of departure, seeking historical references before that campaign to reveal how Sherman acquired this mastery of operational art. This research attempts to answer how Sherman's intellect evolved and what character traits did he possess. Then the reader will understand how Sherman mastered operational art. Using Clausewitz's definition of military genius as a model, this study will peer inside Sherman's mind.

Clausewitz's Military Genius

Theoretical Temperament

Professional military students utilize theory to provide a model for military genius. Clausewitz asserts that military genius comprises both intellect and character traits (temperament).

Any complex activity, if it is to be carried on with any degree of virtuosity, calls for appropriate gifts of intellect and temperament. If they are outstanding and reveal themselves in exceptional achievements, their possessor is called a 'genius'.⁵

He further explains that the leader who possesses special intellect must be the nation's leader or the general in command of a theater of operations.⁶ This definition meets this study's needs because operational art is conducted at these levels and Sherman was a theater commander.

The character traits that Clausewitz ascribed to military genius are boldness, perseverance, and cunning. Boldness, the ability to take risk and seek a decisive result, is never detrimental as long as it is not blind passion. Clausewitz believed that boldness is a requirement for higher level command as long as it is supported by a reflective mind. Mixed with intellect it becomes a significant attribute for the operational artist.⁷

Perseverance, the ability to stick with a decision, is the second trait. A campaign plan impacted by friction of

war often unravels, requiring the operational commander to adjust the plan. Perseverance is the extension of boldness in time throughout the execution of the campaign and serves the operational artist well during dark moments.⁸

Cunning is achieving surprise to ensure superiority of numbers at the decisive point in the theater of operations. Cunning implies secrecy, a requirement if one is to achieve surprise. It is doing the unexpected; and, contrasts with a straightforward approach to campaign conclusion by using the indirect approach.⁹

Theoretical Intellect

The intellect is the other component of military genius. The operational artist improves his intellect through one of three learning methods. The first is to experience the concepts in combat. The second is to learn these concepts in formal instruction, in the classroom. The third is to acquire these emerging concepts by self study. This process requires studying campaigns of former operational artists, retaining their concepts, and realizing that warfare is a dynamic process; it always changes. To improve one's intellect requires hard thinking and reasoning; mastery of one's cognitive skills. Intellect requires the identification and application of theory.

To investigate an operational artist's intellectual ability the student of military history must find a measurement device to judge the individual's intellect.

This study draws from the combined doctrinal resources of the U.S. Army and Marine Corps. These doctrines on campaigning reveal a possible measurement device for addressing the intellect's development.

The U.S. Army's tenets of campaign planning are found in the Army War College's text, Campaign Planning. This document provides strategic objective, commander's vision or intent, orientation on the enemy's center of gravity, phasing, organization of subordinate forces, clear and concise orders to subordinates, and synchronization of theater forces and adjacent theater efforts as its foundations.¹⁰

The U.S. Marine Corps' doctrine provides a somewhat different set of concepts that relate to modern war. The Marine Corps addresses strategic orientation, use of combat, perspective, maneuver, mobility, tempo, intelligence, surprise, logistics, and leadership.¹¹ The difference is that the Marine Corps sees battle as a means for an end, not an end in itself. This is an important differentiation because the Corps focuses efforts off the battlefield and between battles. The focus is toward the strategic goal and not the tactical goal.

At the tactical level, clearly, the aim is to win in combat (within the parameters dictated by strategy). But the overriding influences of the strategic and operational levels may put these actions in a different context. In this way, tactical defeat can amount to strategic success, as for the North

Vietnamese at Tet in 1968, while tactical victory can bring operational failure, as for Lee at Antietam.¹²

The other significant difference is in the concept of maneuver. For the Marine Corps, maneuver is not inexorably linked to firepower and the battle. The objective of maneuver is to gain an advantage over the enemy and accomplish the mission.

Tactical maneuver aims to gain an advantage in combat (on the battlefield). Operational maneuver, on the other hand, impacts beyond the realm of combat. In fact, it aims to reduce the amount of fighting necessary to accomplish the mission. By operational maneuver, we seek to gain an advantage which bears directly on the outcome of the campaign or in the theater as a whole.¹³

This study, although selecting concepts from both, concludes that the Marine Corps' doctrine is more contemporary and adaptive to modern demands. It is more comprehensive, concise, and less cumbersome. It is an evolutionary advancement from current Army War College doctrine. The Marine Corps waited so long to review and write their doctrine that it is better for the purpose of analysis. Most importantly, current Marine doctrine embraces the concept of maneuver and retains little pretense for firepower.

The doctrinal list used as a measurement device for assessing Sherman's intellect retains strategic orientation and perspective and the commander's intent. Use of combat,

maneuver, phasing, tempo, organization, intelligence, surprise, logistics and synchronization will complete the list. Having set the theoretical foundation, this study can now apply the theoretical discussion to General William T. Sherman's practice.

Sherman's Intellect Capacity

General Sherman possessed and developed his intellect throughout the Civil War. The United States Military Academy at West Point, New York had a curriculum which concentrated on engineering and tactical instruction. It lacked the preparation required for the modern warfare that evolved during the Civil War. Sherman listened while serving under generals Henry W. Halleck and Ulysses S. Grant. He understood how they thought about this new war. Halleck was the more orthodox and Grant taught Sherman how to adapt.¹⁴ Throughout the Shiloh, Vicksburg, and Chattanooga Campaigns Sherman expanded his intellect, acquiring better understanding of this warfare than any other of Grant's subordinates.

The battle of Shiloh in early April 1862, unlike previous battles, taught Sherman that type of character required for modern war. Battle was a dangerous affair; the technological advance of the rifle had dramatically increased casualties. Sherman learned the value of tactical boldness and perseverance. Shortly after the battle, he

reported in writing how one of his brigades thwarted one of the Confederate cavalry attacks. Shaken infantry regiments reformed under Sherman's personal bravery and leadership. Shiloh prepared him for future trials.¹⁵

Throughout the Vicksburg campaign from late 1862 until July 1863, Sherman learned the finer points of modern campaigning. The internship under Grant provided him an opportunity to develop his intellect and exercise partial independent command, holding the outer line against relief attacks. He learned to value the importance of logistics and the Navy's ability to provide safe lines of communications. The campaign revealed that an army could live off the land which supported so many civilians. He gained an appreciation for concentration and incorporating sister services into the campaign plan.¹⁶

The important lesson that he acquired, during this formative period, was that battle was not an end in itself. At Shiloh, Grant taught him that you were not beaten unless you thought you were. Staying on the battlefield, after suffering many casualties, could offset tactical defeat.¹⁷ He realized that a campaign was a series of battles not one decisive battle. The important lesson, to master, was to preserve the army's strength and remember that the enemy had suffered too.

Meridian Campaign: Rehearsal for Brilliance

The Meridian campaign of January and February 1864 is often overlooked by military professionals and historians but, it provided Sherman his first independent command and an opportunity to test his operational art - the laboratory for testing his conduct of modern war. He displayed a keen sense of understanding modern warfare while incorporating its tenets and managing to skirt tactical failure. This campaign, rarely discussed or studied, provides fertile ground to discover the finer aspects of Sherman's blossoming operational art.

Continued guerrilla raids and activity throughout the Mississippi eastern valley prompted the campaign.¹⁸ In late December 1863, Sherman corresponded with his brother, stated his desire to remain active (keeping pressure on the enemy) and punish the Southern people who were supporting the war. He indicated his preference to seize Mobile, Alabama or move East from Columbus, (North and East of Meridian along the Tombigbee River) toward Montgomery, Alabama.¹⁹

Sherman's operational art included both aspects of modern warfare and current doctrine. This section will analyze the Meridian campaign in its three parts: planning, execution, and lessons learned against the doctrinal concepts previously established.

Planning

Strategic Orientation

The campaign possessed strategic orientation for four reasons. Achieving the campaign's goals would cut two vital rail lines of communications, separate two vital cities from their protecting forces, and destroy indispensable supplies. Most importantly, the campaign would free up vital combat power for the subsequent campaign. Sherman had mastered the ability to look beyond the current series of battles. His strategic orientation enabled him to scan beyond the current military horizon and clearly see the next strategic step or campaign. The Meridian campaign would free up forces from protecting the Mississippi for the subsequent campaign, the invasion of Georgia.

As such, the objective of the campaign was to clear the Eastern Mississippi River valley of enemy troops and logistical bases.²⁰ Secondly, the capture of Meridian would sever the railroad intersection of the Mobile and Ohio Railroad (North-South Railroad from Memphis to Mobile) and the Southern Mississippi Railroad (running East-West from Vicksburg to the Georgia interior).²¹ Lastly, the corn supply in Meridian, if captured, would cause serious logistical problems for the Army of Tennessee, then facing Grant in the Chattanooga area.²² On the strategic setting, this campaign would result in freeing Union forces from

garrison duties in the Mississippi region. It would free forces in the Tennessee River valley allowing for force concentration and lead to the invasion of Georgia and the ultimate defeat of the Confederate Army of Tennessee.

Sherman also selected Meridian because the city was the Confederate's regional center of gravity. Lieutenant General Leonidas Polk had his corps headquarters there and two infantry divisions in the general vicinity. Meridian was the location where the enemy concentrated his regional power and it possessed the necessary items for the Confederates to continue the war in that theater.

Seeing the enemy's concentration against Grant at Chattanooga, Sherman decided to place strength against enemy weakness. He knew from excellent intelligence that Meridian was lightly defended. But, as soon as his opponent knew Sherman was moving on Meridian, the Confederates would move reinforcements to the threatened area. Sherman realized he would have to attack swiftly.²³

Tempo

Swiftness or tempo was an important campaign plan consideration. Sherman knew he had to act rapidly to prohibit enemy leadership from shifting operational forces. He had to confuse Polk, his opponent, as to his real intention. Therefore, he leaked information through the ranks and rumor mill that he would attack Mobile.

To maintain the tempo, Sherman improvised in two areas. With the slow moving infantry forces, Sherman planned to advance in two supported columns from Vicksburg. If one corps engaged the enemy, the other could swing into the enemy flank. Both would move simultaneously; instead of one long column, he would present the enemy with two. This was twice as much combat power up front. The second technique was to travel light. Sherman ordered the trains stripped to the bare minimum. And this was a winter campaign! He ordered the units to leave the sick and lame behind so that they could move fast, strike hard and finish rapidly.²⁴

Organization and Synchronization

To achieve this aggressive tempo, Sherman decided to apply pressure simultaneously against all enemy forces and maintain the initiative throughout the theater. Therefore, Sherman organized the available forces into three groupings. He located himself with the main effort at Vicksburg with two corps and a small cavalry force. His mobile arm, General William Sooy Smith's two cavalry divisions, would initiate the campaign from Memphis. The third group was a small infantry brigade and five tin-clad gunboats. This group's mission was to move up the Yazoo River protecting the plantations there and distracting enemy forces.²⁵

Additionally, Sherman coordinated with neighboring theater commanders. He realized the importance and the interconnectivity that railroads and fast moving formations

could wreck on his plan. He asked Grant to maintain pressure against Johnston's army south of Chattanooga and attempted to prompt Major General Nathaniel Prentiss Banks to pressure Mobile's defenses in synchronization with his campaign's initiation.²⁶ Without their assistance his plan would be too risky.

Finally, to concentrate sufficient forces for the campaign, Sherman had to consolidate remaining combat power and reorganize. He combined available garrison forces into two Corps; General McPherson on the right commanding the seventeenth corps of two infantry divisions and General Hurlbut to the left commanding the sixteenth also of two divisions. This stripped the area of security forces and uncovered the area to enemy raids.²⁷ To offset this vulnerability, Sherman had created the small gunboat force to keep the local guerrillas off balance and Smith's cavalry force to distract if not destroy Forrest's raiders in northern Mississippi.

Phasing

This campaign's phasing or sequencing is indicative of the operational art practiced.²⁸ Before actual campaigning, Sherman and staff began to assemble units, reorganize, gather intelligence, and conclude resupply. Next, Smith's cavalry force departed Memphis, since it had the farthest distance to travel and the movement would attract Major General Nathan Bedford Forrest's attention. Simultaneously

the tin-clad gun boats and infantry force would steam up the Yazoo, also attracting attention. Then, the main effort would cross the Big Black, transit Jackson, cross the Pearl River, and then race for Meridian. If all went well, they would isolate Mobile from General Johnston's army; break up Polk's army; and finally, turn against Mobile.

Intelligence and Surprise

Throughout the planning phase, Sherman relied on good intelligence and the element of surprise. He planned that speed, rumors and neighboring theater commanders' actions would ensure surprise. After all, who would expect a winter campaign when the logistical and transportation problems exceeded what technology could support? Sherman trusted his spies to bring him good intelligence on the enemy; and they did on the eve of the campaign, providing information on the enemy's dispositions and intentions.²⁹ Surprise and deception worked so well that as late as 8 February, Polk sent a reinforcing infantry brigade from Mobile back to Mobile. He was positive that Sherman, only twenty-five miles from Meridian, had Mobile as his objective.³⁰

Campaign Execution

The execution of the campaign did not go well from the beginning. Sherman's instructions to General Sooy Smith had been specific; he was to strike rapidly via Pontotoc, Okalona, and Columbus, then Meridian (two hundred and fifty miles distance). Sherman expected Smith to strike rapidly

and effectively any large force that got in their way. He told Smith, before the advance, that Forrest only had four thousand available forces. Sherman saw the cavalry linking with the main effort by 10 February.³¹

Forrest's aggressiveness, Smith's inexperience with this new command, bad weather, and general disorganization combined to cause the cavalry's defeat at Okolona. Although rushed into command Smith's correspondence does not indicate severe problems; in fact, he gives the impression that he could beat Forrest.³²

For Sherman, things went better. He departed Vicksburg on 3 February and contacted enemy cavalry on 5 February at Champion Hill. Sherman's dual columns and speed caught the enemy off guard. The two corps pushed the Confederates back and entered Jackson during the night of 5 February. This unhinged the Confederate plan to concentrate both available infantry divisions and Major General Stephen Dill Lee's cavalry division at Jackson. Gaining momentum with a captured pontoon bridge, the campaign crossed the Pearl River on 6 February. The following three days saw rapid advances with Sherman constantly pushing the now combined corps column. Prior to the Ocktibbeha River the road was obstructed with felled trees. Sherman left his trains and pushed on rapidly seizing the burning bridge over the Ocktibbeha. In two hours the bridge was repaired and within hours the first troops entered Meridian.³³

General Polk had not responded well to Sherman's swift advance. Even with Sherman East of the Pearl River, Polk maintained that the Union force was attacking Mobile. He even returned an infantry brigade to Mobile on 8 February with Sherman only twenty-five miles from Meridian. But, by 10 February Polk realized his mistake and ordered the evacuation of all militarily valuable equipment from Meridian. On 11 February, Polk ordered an infantry division entrained for Mobile to defend Meridian. This desperate move bought the Confederates sufficient time to evacuate most of the rail, equipage, and military items from the town.³⁴ Polk's indecisiveness almost gave Sherman a more valuable victory.

During the conduct of the campaign, Sherman realized the valuable lesson of conserving the army's combat power or strength. When General Smith failed, Sherman realized that without this strength he could not continue the campaign.³⁵ He also understood that the enemy would soon concentrate sufficient force against him. Unconcerned about saving face and retaining Meridian against this counter blow, Sherman rapidly withdrew. Northern and Southern newspapers view this rapid withdrawal as an indicator of Sherman's failure. However, a military professional, studying history, could view it as understanding modern warfare and its complexities.

Sherman had learned the valuable lesson that battle was not all important. Battle was not mandatory. Maneuver had been subordinate to battle. Sherman realized that battle could be servant to maneuver. Battle was only necessary if the enemy combat power prohibited one from reaching the objective of the campaign.³⁶ Sherman could accomplish the objectives of a campaign without battle. This lesson was important to Sherman's intellectual development and is important to military professionals today.

Lessons Learned

Sherman learned many lessons from this campaign but, his realization that destruction of the enemy population's will to support the war was the vital one. He also came to appreciate the value of secrecy, deception, and logistical planning.

Although Sherman does not list destruction of the populace's will in any of his professional orders related to the Meridian campaign's objectives, it was an objective. Sherman wrote to his brother before the campaign: "We will take all provisions and God help the families! I warned them last year against this last visitation, and now it is at hand".³⁷

Sherman understood he could save soldiers' lives by waging war against the enemy's population and not engaging the enemy army in battle. Total war against all belligerents in the theater of operations is one of the

lessons of modern warfare. Sherman's realization of this important concept empowered him to transcend the war fighting paradigm of his era.

The general learned to value and trust his spies. The intelligence he gained from these sources was invaluable. He could uncover enemy locations, strength, and intentions. From this information, Sherman could plan his deceptions, ruses, and demonstrations; if he knew what the enemy was planning, he could plan his deceptions accordingly. To protect his plans and gain the element of surprise, Sherman mastered operations security (OPSEC). He protected his true intentions by keeping the press uninformed.³⁸

Lastly, Sherman became aware of the importance of logistics and its ability to influence operational momentum (tempo). He dictated what the columns carried and allowed no excuses. By reducing his trains he gained valuable operational momentum.³⁹ This lesson gained the campaign success and it would help in the future campaigns as well.

Sherman's Character

As stated above, operational art evolves as a result of both the artist's intellect and his temperament or character. Character development is as important as mastery of the intellect. Personality can override the finest qualities of generalship or intellect. Sherman displayed character traits required of a successful operational

artist. Besides cunning, perseverance, and boldness, he displayed adaptability and compassion.

Personality develops according to the individual's previous learning experiences. Years before the Civil War Sherman in California participated in a rebellion, commanded militia, conducted joint operations with the U.S. Navy, managed a Bank, participated in the Gold Rush, suppressed Indian uprisings, speculated real estate, coped with shipwrecks, as well as travelled the world, practiced law, farmed, speculated stocks, been an Army Quartermaster and Paymaster, and started a men's college as superintendent.

Sherman developed perseverance early in the war. During the First battle of Bull Run, he demonstrated remarkable perseverance in battle, staying on the field when other leaders fled, reforming his troops, selecting tactically protective terrain, and providing good example of his determination to achieve victory.⁴⁰ He again exhibited developing perseverance at Shiloh. Although badly shaken from the two day battle, he persisted in advancing after the conclusion of the battle.⁴¹ He wanted to secure his forces and maintain contact with the enemy.

Many students studying Sherman see this trait as impatience. However in his own words Sherman admires patience in leaders.⁴² Perhaps his perpetual motion and perseverance, was a result of his total dedication. Sherman seldom remained still. Even when not on campaign, he was

busy inspecting and visiting subordinates, units, or contemporaries. Before the Atlanta campaign he busied himself with logistical matters preparing to support his army group. Students can see this same activity during the Vicksburg campaign and after the Meridian campaign, when he traveled to New Orleans to confer with General Banks.⁴³

Boldness is the most important trait an operational artist can possess. Its value is not lost on youth, where it is found in abundance. Boldness must be stored and saved for the lonelier moments of senior operational command. Sherman revealed boldness and moral courage shortly after First Bull Run, while performing garrison duty outside Washington, D.C. He personally crushed the rebellion of one of his units. The units enlistment had expired and a unit officer surrounded by soldiers confronted Sherman. Boldness and courage in battle is one thing but standing alone against a mob is an important accomplishment.⁴⁴

Boldness did not leave Sherman as he advanced in rank. During the Meridian campaign, he was almost captured. When Confederate cavalry raided his unprotected headquarters, he remained calm, sent for help, and fought along side his personal staff and guard until help arrived. This boldness persisted, a weaker leader would have been shaken and called off the campaign.⁴⁵ But, not Sherman, his perseverance made him bold even in high command.

Sherman displayed a high degree of cunning during the Meridian campaign. He had learned not to trust newspaper reporters during his first unsuccessful attempt to seize Vicksburg. Therefore, before advancing toward Meridian, he leaked information that Mobile was his objective. Besides secrecy, cunning requires swift action. Everything Sherman executed during the Meridian campaign was swift.

Historians normally entitle Meridian a raid because once Sherman realized that Smith's cavalry would not link up with his two corps, he quickly withdrew to Vicksburg. Sherman's swift decisiveness has surprised some contemporary historians.⁴⁶ On the contrary, the Meridian operation is a campaign because it was planned to be a campaign. Circumstances dictated that Sherman terminate the campaign early. This decisiveness is a testimony to Sherman's art; thorough understanding of operational situation and events effects campaign design.

He also adapted technology to augment this swiftness, which modern war required. Prior to Shiloh, he learned quickly the importance of the telegraph and railroads in this fast war.⁴⁷ Additionally, steamboats dominated the western rivers allowing swift movement of operational forces between theaters.⁴⁸ Technological advances provided the means of moving operational forces between theaters of war quicker than in any other war.

Besides cunning, boldness, perseverance, and adaptability, Sherman possessed an additional temperament trait that was invaluable to his operational art. He was a caring subordinate and leader who genuinely exhibited these tendencies. The best example of this important trait is the compassion and feeling he had for General Grant, who was younger in age but outranked Sherman. Sherman persuaded Grant to remain on active duty and serve the nation.⁴⁹

Sherman, Operational Artist

Sherman was an operational artist because he combined the necessary intellect and character traits to qualify as one. This brief study has revealed that Sherman possessed the intellect encompassing operational artistry. His strategic orientation coupled with organizational ability, his reliance on operational maneuver, tempo, phasing, surprise, intelligence, and synchronization of operational components marked him as an operational artist.

Coupled with his character traits of cunning, boldness, perseverance, adaptability, and genuine caring Sherman was a formidable operational artist. It is no wonder that he did not lose a campaign in his distinguished career. The combination of intellectual and character traits combined to form a synergy that was remarkable and, indeed, a mark of operational artistry.

Institutionalization Of The Operational Art For Today's Military Professionals

This study was undertaken to uncover how Sherman learned the operational art and developed his character traits; to reveal if contemporary unschooled military professionals could develop this same sense of operational artistry. It revealed that Sherman shaped his intellect and character in the best school - hard experience. This method is, fortunately, rarely available to today's military professionals.

But, this study revealed a rather astonishing fact; contemporary military professionals can learn now to grasp the operational art from tools available outside the classroom. Campaign case studies that focus at the operational level provide the military professional a valuable source of material. This material, often undisturbed on a library shelf, is rich with examples of how unschooled and challenged minds developed and grasped new concepts.

The source material discussed here is the primary material available in the writings and the War of The Rebellion Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. Modern historians use this material to interpret their understanding and grasp the details of the period. Military professionals often rely on these interpretations rather than uncovering for themselves the pristine documents

that their predecessors created. These pristine documents contain the pearls of character development and intellect necessary for today's military professionals to uncover operational artistry.

Today's officer corps must learn to harness that untouched source material in order to win the first battle of the next war. Contemporary formal and informal military education must provide a climate where students can acquire a clearer understanding of the operational art. With budget cuts and downsizing, fewer professionals attend formal advanced military instruction. This study revealed that military professionals can learn on their own in the informal classroom.

To foster this education, military educators and course administrators should accept the challenge and restructure current curriculum allowing for both the formal and informal process to change. The three factors that constitute this change are the availability and use of primary source material, understanding operational art, and examining case studies to reveal operational art.

In today's computer/information age there is little excuse for not accessing primary source material. There is abundant information available in the War of Rebellion Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. This information records how historical figures thought not after the event but before and during it. The old commanders used

the written word more often than we do now. Written correspondence reveals not only the facts surrounding the events but the thought process that occurred inside the commander's mind. Students must make the attempt and modern educators must direct students in the right directions. As technology advances, the ease of transferring this data over great distances via electronic means will become easier and cheaper.

The second step requires the student to develop their cognitive skills. One way to learn how to think is to read how others thought. Again this encourages a return to primary source material. Only by reading memoirs and letters of historical figures can the student uncover the thread of thought development that evolves over the course of time.

This step also requires the reading of current doctrine, which enables the student to better understand the concepts of operational art. Doctrine also develops over time and can be traced through operational campaigns, the third step in institutionalizing this excellence.

Current U.S. Army doctrine often incorporates historical examples to illustrate doctrinal concepts. These examples provide direction to students on which campaigns to study. The student only needs to find the primary source material available for that campaign. But, in reading campaign studies students will also uncover the adaptability

of successful operational commanders. This discovery will in turn lead to the realization that thought and doctrine evolve over time. Reading historical operational campaign studies can result in the formation of mental flexibility.

A byproduct of this change in curriculum could also be the students understanding of character trait development. Reading correspondence, message traffic, orders, campaign histories, official reports and autobiographical accounts will expose students to the importance of character development. Students will discover desirable and undesirable operational commander traits and how historical figures developed those traits or corrected undesirable traits. They will also learn how to interact professionally with senior and subordinate commanders. The byproducts of this method of study are endless.

This study selected Sherman as its focus; future students and educators can widen their focus to study the many Civil War campaigns and leaders available. This study also narrowed its focus on Sherman during a very limited span of his career. He had come a long way in forming his character traits and intellect by 1862. To gain a better understanding of this character and intellectual development would require a lengthier study, focusing on earlier phases and a broader range of topics.

Sherman did not possess a monopoly on mastering the operational art. Research for this study revealed that

Grant, Lee, Porter, S.D. Lee and Forrest may also have possessed an understanding of operational art. The difference is that Sherman not only revealed a keener grasp of what contemporary military professionals consider the operational art but he captured his thoughts in writing for contemporary students to read, understand, and critically analyze. Today aspiring operational artists can learn from Sherman's experience. Without the value of formal instruction military professionals can utilize these methods to uncover the operational art and they can use this method to teach other aspiring professionals. The military can institutionalize the development of operational artists.

If the contemporary military professional believes that war is a dynamic process changing due to science and technological influences and political evolution, then he must learn to form those character traits and intellect, which are adaptable and versatile. Only then will the military profession develop future military genius trained and ready to meet the ever changing concepts of modern warfare.

ENDNOTES

1. James J. Schneider, Theoretical Paper #4: Vulcan's Anvil: The American Civil War and the Emergence of Operational Art, p. 16.
2. Albert Castel, Decision In The West: The Atlanta Campaign of 1864, pp. xiii-xv. Castel does not write for the military professional when he neglects Sherman's operational art during the Atlanta campaign. Castel's emphasis on tactical efforts typifies modern historians' reluctance to break the tactical paradigm of battle, which is to concentrate combat power at a single point. Again one sees the neglect of the operational aspect of modern war.
3. FMFM 1-1: Campaigning, p. 65. See also The Civil War Battlefield Guide, pp. 176-177.
4. The West Point Atlas of American Wars: 1689-1900 Ed. Vincent J. Esposito, pp. 145-147.
5. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, p. 100.
6. Ibid., p. 111.
7. Ibid., pp. 190-192.
8. Ibid., p. 193.

9. Ibid., pp. 202-203 and 194-201. The first reference is the chapter defining cunning. The second reference refers back to Clausewitz's previous chapters, which deal with Superiority of Number and Surprise. These chapters are important to the discussion of cunning because they precede the discussion of cunning and in Clausewitz's logic are the objective of cunning's use.

10. FM 100-5: Operations, pp. 22-25. Also see William W. Mendel and Floyd T. Banks, Campaign Planning, pp. 100-101. The 1986 version of FM 100-5 focuses on the traditional focus of war, battle. The Airland Battle Imperatives are battle/combat focused; the U.S. Army War College concepts, used here, are applicable to modern warfare and modern operational art. Therefore, this study relies more on the War College's Concepts than FM 100-5.

11. FMFM 1-1: Campaigning, pp. 55-83. The U.S. Marine Corps' doctrine is refreshing in its reliance on the operational level of war as opposed to the U.S. Army's reliance on combat and the tactical level while prescribing the operational art as the key to critical strategic answers. Marine Corps' doctrine sees combat as a tool (ways to an end) and not an end in itself. Current Army doctrine can confuse the reader, implying that combat and firepower can be an end in itself.

12. Ibid., p. 56.

13. Ibid., pp. 64-65.

14. William T. Sherman, Memoirs of General William T. Sherman, p. 254 and pp. 220 & 229. All three passages demonstrate Sherman's learning strategy from General Halleck. They are not vindictive passages and demonstrate, that no bad feelings were held between the two.

15. Ibid., p. 243.

16. J.T. Headley, Grant and Sherman; Their Campaigns and Generals, pp. 148-149.

17. Ulysses S. Grant, Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant, pp. 179-182. Also see Bruce Catton, Grant Takes Command, p. 133.

18. Official Records, Series I, Vol. XXXII, Part II, p. 228. This passage demonstrates that raids against the Mississippi valley continued throughout January 1864.

19. William T. Sherman, The Sherman Letters; Correspondence Between General and Senator Sherman from 1837 to 1891, pp. 217-222.

20. John F. Marszalek, Sherman: A Soldier's Passion for Order, p. 255.

21. Official Records, Series I, Vol. XXXII, Part II, pp. 259-261. This is Sherman's own justification and plan written to General Halleck before the campaign. Also see Samuel W. Bowman and Richard B. Irwin, Sherman and His Campaigns, p. 159.
22. M. A. Howe, Home Letters of General Sherman, p. 283.
23. Headley, Grant and Sherman; Their Campaigns and Generals, p. 164.
24. Howe, p. 283.
25. Official Records, Series I, Vol. XXXII, Part II, p. 310. Also see Bowman, p. 160.
26. Official Records, Series I, Vol. XXXII, Part II, pp. 198-199. Grant ordered Major General John A. Logan to cooperate with Major General George H. Thomas to pressure Rome Ga. This attracted Johnston's attention away from Meridian. Grant further explained Sherman's plan to Logan so he would understand the mission's importance. Also see Official Records, Series I, Vol. XXXII, Part II, pp. 189-190. This is Sherman's correspondence with the neighboring commander of the Department of Arkansas, Major General Frederick Steele. It notified Steele of the impending Meridian campaign and how Sherman had stripped security forces from the Eastern Mississippi River bank.

Additionally, see B.H. Liddell-Hart, Sherman-Soldier, Realist, American, p. 225. This explains Sherman's correspondence, in which he requested General Banks apply pressure at Mobile simultaneously with Sherman's advance on Meridian.

27. Sherman, Letters, p. 220-221. Also see Sherman, Memoirs, p. 390.

28. Headley, Grant and Sherman; Their Campaigns and Generals, p. 164.

29. Marszalek, pp. 252-253. Also see Sherman, Memoirs of General William T. Sherman, p. 390.

30. Lloyd Lewis, Sherman, Fighting Prophet, p. 333. Also see Official Records, Series I, Vol. XXXII, Part II, p. 254. Major General George H. Thomas reported to Grant that Johnston's forces in the vicinity of Dalton, Ga. were smaller than before and some were currently located in Mobile, Al. due to Sherman's successful ruse.

31. Official Records, Series I, Vol. XXXII, Part II, pp. 201-202. Sherman detailed General Smith's route, mission, timetable, and expected troubles in a message to U.S. Grant. See also Liddell-Hart, Sherman-Soldier, Realist, American, pp. 224-225; and Sherman, The Sherman Letters; Correspondence Between General and

Senator Sherman from 1837-1891, pp. 221-222.

32. Official Records, Series 1, Vol. XXXII, Part II, pp. 241 and p. 251.

33. Bowman, pp. 159-161.

34. Castel, pp. 47-49.

35. Howe, p. 285.

36. FMFM 1-1; Campaigning, pp. 56-60 and pp. 64-70.

37. Howe, p. 283.

38. Ibid., pp. 284-286. See also Lewis, p. 333.

39. Howe, p. 282. and Marszalek, p. 253.

40. Sherman, Memoirs, p. 187.

41. Ibid., p. 245.

42. Ibid., p. 225.

43. Ibid., pp. 396-397.

44. Ibid., p. 189. See for a personal account of his individual boldness on the battlefield: Sherman, Memoirs, p. 182.

45. Ibid., pp. 391-392.

46. Marszalek, pp. 253-256.

47. Sherman, Memoirs, p. 224.

48. Ibid., p. 259.

49. Ibid., pp. 250-254.

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