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CONTINGENCY FORCES IN THE YEAR 2020 OPTIMIZING JOINT WARFIGHTING

BY

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Since 1989, the world has seen extraordinary changes as the Cold War drew to a close and the strategy of containment ceased to be appropriate for the new world order. The world is now moving into a new era--one offering opportunities as well as posing dangers--a future interdependent world that has potential for peace and prosperity but also is threatened by regional instabilities. The current 1993 National Defense Strategy has four fundamental elements: strategic deterrence and defense, forward presence, crisis response, and reconstitution. This paper reviews the element of crisis response and the ensuing requirement for U.S. contingency forces to support this strategic element. This paper looks to the future year 2020 for this review and presents recommendations for optimizing joint warfighting of contingency forces for this time period. These recommendations are based upon a review of future trends that will shape the year 2020 and a historical analysis of five recent U.S. contingency operations: Operations Power Pack, Desert One, Urgent Fury, Just Cause, and Desert Shield/Desert Storm. Prior to this analysis, a model for viewing crisis response situations is developed that includes a doctrinal basis for joint warfighting. This model provides a joint warfighting perspective for the historical analysis of past contingency operations and for future planning for crisis response situations.

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CONTINGENCY FORCES IN THE YEAR 2020 OPTIMIZING JOINT WARFIGHTING

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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INTRODUCTION

"ANOTHER TASK FORCE SMITH"--YEAR 2020

The time is year 2020--the place is the National Military Command Center (NMCC)--the "hot line" telephone is ringing. Reaching for the phone, Colonel James put down a book he was reading. He had been reading about the state of military unpreparedness present in the year 2020--U.S. inability to meet the strategic agility requirements for an uncertain world of regional crisis. The book argued that there was a grave mismatch between national requirements and military capabilities:

- > Manpower was lacking.
- > Superior national defense and military operational and strategic concepts were lacking.
- > Advanced weapons systems were not available to provide an edge over our adversaries--adversaries who had the money for and the access to hi-tech weapons.
- > The means of projecting rapid deployment of forces worldwide was lacking.
- > Most importantly, the U.S. lacked the ability to project a major force which was thoroughly integrated, highly capable, responsive, and had real time sustainability for decisive warfighting.

The book confirmed Colonel James' misgiving. Recent events in the world had the flavor of pending crisis--but it was hard to pin down the specifics. The daily intelligence report briefed that morning in the NMCC cited thirty five (35) hot spots that the U.S. was involved in. It was clearly a very uncertain world. Since he had been assigned a year ago the incident rate of world crises had continued to escalate as world order patterns "mixed it up" in the multipolar world of 2020.

A "hot line" message confirmed his premonition: a report that a country closely aligned economically and diplomatically with the U.S.

had undergone a coup d'état. A small, but capable, nationalistic group with the support of military fringe elements had brutally overthrown the democratically elected government. They were not supported by the majority of the population--but, emotions were high and sub-factions could be swayed if the new government could consolidate its gains, take control of media channels, and expand its influence and power throughout the country. U.S. civilians were already on casualty lists, and U.S. citizens and U.S. industrial facilities were being held hostage for international leverage. Chemical weapons had been used with devastating effects.

The parameters of this no-warning crisis were:

- > No plan was present for this contingency--it was totally unexpected.
- > U.S. resolve was immediately required to maintain support for the legitimate government and to protect U.S. lives and U.S. property within the country.
- > Immediate deployment and employment of forces was required.
- > A coalition effort was required due to regional states' political sensitiveness to U.S. intervention; a coalition would provide legitimacy for the operation, and, most critically would secure basing rights/overflight rights to support force deployment and sustainability.

Colonel James followed the crisis closely. An ad-hoc joint task force was formed to meet the crisis, was deployed, and was immediately employed. However, immediate success was not obtainable--a well equipped and capable enemy force challenged the U.S. Clearly U.S. objectives would not be met in the "early risk" period of the crisis (first two weeks).

Highlights of the initial two weeks were:

- > The "no-plan" start point problem for this crisis was compounded by the ad-hoc organization of the Joint Task Force; shortcomings in the planning, coordination, and dissemination of the operations order due to the limited time and the lack of integration within the joint task force were evident.
- > Projection of combat power was limited by strategic lift and by the lack of forward presence within the region. Sustainability for this high tempo operation was also lacking for the same reason.
- > Enemy forces were capable: they possessed hi-tech air, land, sea, and SOF forces. Chemical weapons were also used. American forces lacked the equipment to sustain operations in this environment.
- > Due to initial failures of U.S. forces, the local population was turning toward the new government. They wanted the destruction of their homeland to cease, they wanted peace under any government.
- > Most critically, due to the new government's success in withstanding the initial U.S. onslaught, nationalistic elements within the country were advocating use of nuclear weapons to force neighboring countries to join a coalition against U.S. imperialism. As a result of this, other world powers were being drawn into the crisis as 2nd and 3rd order effects combined to create new issues and conflicts. The crisis was expanding beyond regional boundaries.

In short, initial U.S. response to the crisis was "another Task Force Smith".¹ The no-warning, no-plan crisis response situation required immediate deployment and immediate employment of combat power. The adversary in year 2020 was well equipped and well trained--he also had a balanced force structure. The extensive deployment distances placed greater constraints on U.S. power projection and sustainability. U.S. forces suffered severe setbacks and casualties due to stiff resistance and the enemy's capable weapons systems. Several troop lift

aircraft had been shot down with hundreds of soldiers on them; fighter jets had likewise sustained numerous hits; and even the Navy reported several ships sunk--even one aircraft carrier hit by precision guided munitions. The U.S. was not going to win this war quickly and go home. Clearly, in the long run the U.S. would--"muddle through and carry on to eventual victory"²--but at grave costs in loss of life and loss of international influence.

American units were operationally outnumbered and outgunned during the initial crisis period. Strategic agility was lacking; in turn, forces could not be concentrated. U.S. forces had been given an impossible task at the outset. However, the cards were dealt for this failure in the late 20th century and initial decade of the 21st century--an era of downsizing and budget cuts. The national element of military power had neither been resourced nor organized to support the U.S.'s leadership role in this future--U.S. objectives and policies simply could not be supported with the contingency forces at hand.

Admittedly, the above situation seems overly dramatic. But, at the same time it is undoubtedly based upon existing trends³ and represents a distinct possibility. We must acknowledge that the U.S. military is at a turning point in our nation's history. Similar to the end of WW II, the armed services are being reduced (possibly excessively) due to fiscal constraints and domestic concerns. Further, this downsizing of the military is coming at a time when foreign policy and U.S. interests are expanding globally due to the interdependence of the world--a trend that will inevitably increase. Thus, we as military professionals must recognize that since "we have less", we must focus our efforts on the essential factors that relate to the warfighting

scenarios of the future. Clearly, one of these factors is the crisis response capability of present and future contingency forces.

Research Paper Focus: Recommendations for Optimizing Joint Warfighting for Contingency Forces in Year 2020

As the opening scenario indicates, contingency forces' capability to respond to--and resolve--crisis response situations will become increasingly important in the 21st century. This is due to the end of the cold war and the resultant shift to a world of uncertainty and instability; we have entered a world characterized by regional crises. Future contingency forces' readiness and capabilities will determine--to a large degree--our nation's ability to protect its interests and demonstrate firm resolve in time of crisis.

This paper reviews the crisis response requirements for U.S. contingency forces in the year 2020 and provides recommendations for optimizing the joint warfighting potential of present contingency forces so that these requirements can be achieved. This will be accomplished through three analyses: (1) a historical review of recent contingency operations; (2) an assessment of the current and future crisis response capabilities of contingency forces; and, (3) a review of the present trends that will shape our crisis response environment in the year 2020. Based upon these analyses, recommendations will be presented for optimizing joint warfighting of contingency forces for this time frame.

Historical Analysis-Crisis Response/Contingency Operations

To conduct a valid historical analysis of contingency operations, crisis response situations must be viewed from a common perspective if

sound recommendations for optimizing joint warfighting are to developed. This perspective should reflect the "parameters" of crisis response situations relative to contingency operations. It should also be based on sound joint doctrine.

This paper hypothesizes that the parameters of crisis response situations should be drawn from four over-arching principles relative to contingency operations. These are outlined below:

PARAMETERS OF CRISIS RESPONSE
(CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS)

1. **PLANNING**: Was there a plan present for the crisis? To what extent was it used? Was it up to date and current?
2. **WARNING TIME**: How much warning time was present prior to the crisis for planning and coordination? Was the situation time sensitive?
3. **DEPLOYMENT TIME/DISTANCE**: How much time was there between force alert and force deployment: Was an immediate deployment required? Was there time for gradual deployment? How much time was available for planning and coordination of deployment requirements? What was the distance to the objective area? Were intermediate staging bases required?
4. **EMPLOYMENT TIME**: How much time was available before units had to fight after deployment to the crisis area? Was immediate employment of forces required upon arrival? Were forces phased in and allowed to build up prior to initiation of warfighting operations?

Other than the time proven nine (9) principles of war, no single manual directly outlines approved joint warfighting principles. Thus, the doctrinal basis for this paper's historical review is based on a combination of principles found in various Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS)

Publications (Pubs)--many of which are still in draft form.⁴ A model which integrates these doctrinal concepts with crisis response parameters is conceptualized below:

VIEWING CRISIS RESPONSE/CONTINGENCY OPNS
"A COMMON PERSPECTIVE"

PARAMETERS OF CRISIS RESPONSE
(CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS)

1. Planning
2. Warning Time
3. Deployment Time/Distance
4. Employment Time

Principles of Joint Warfare/Opns

1. Unity of Effort*,**
2. Maximum Integration*,**
3. Full Utilization of Forces**
4. Interoperability*
5. Support*
6. Concentration*
7. Initiative*
8. Agility*

Joint Functions***

1. Maneuver
2. Firepower
3. Command and Control
4. Intelligence
5. Protection
6. Logistics

NOTES:

*=Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of U.S. Armed Forces,
"Principles of Joint Warfare"⁵

**=Joint Pub 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF),
"Principles of Unified and Joint Operations"⁶

***=Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations(draft papers),
"Joint Functions"⁷

Using this common perspective, let us turn to a historical review of significant crisis response situations that the U.S. has recently participated in. The term significant stresses that this review will focus on major combat operations in support of national policy objectives, rather than more limited operations such as the 1986 raid on Libya, Operation Eldorado Canyon. Also, humanitarian/ disaster relief/ show of force situations (operations other than war) will not be addressed since this paper will focus on warfighting situations. This is not intended to suggest that such operations are not critical to U.S. interests or are not likely in the future--quite the opposite, they are the most likely operations in future years. However, warfighting is the harder of the two tasks to achieve. The penalty for unpreparedness is more costly in terms of our nation's security and in terms of loss of American lives. As such, our armed forces' first priority must be warfighting--this must be the central focus of all planning, organizing, and training.

Five specific operations within recent history best capture the nature of contingency operations within crisis response scenarios:

1. Operation Power Pack: 28 April 1965 Dominican Republic Intervention.
2. Operation Desert One: (Operation Rice Bowl): August 1980 Iranian hostage rescue mission.
3. Operation Urgent Fury: 25 October 1983 Invasion of Grenada.
4. Operation Just Cause: 20 December 1989 Panama Intervention.
5. Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm: 7 August 1990 deployment of U.S. forces to Saudi Arabia for defense of Saudi territories (Desert Shield) and subsequent offensive operations to liberate Kuwait and destroy Iraqi forces (Desert Storm).

All of the these operations responded to demonstrable crisis situations; they all required major movement and employment of joint warfighting organizations to support U.S. interests.

CRISIS RESPONSE FRAMEWORK-HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE PARAMETER OF PLANNING

Plans were available prior to the crisis in four of the five crises; however, only two used existing plans.

In Desert One no plans were present prior to the crisis. They were developed off line from the crisis action system established by JCS.⁸

In operation Power Pack, OPLAN 310/2-65 was Atlantic Command's (LANTCOM) newly published order for the Dominican Republic. But this plan did not have up-to-date troop lists. It lacked essential annexes (such as the airlift plan), and distribution of the plan had not been made to all participants. As a result, frantic activity was required to revise outdated plans at all levels.⁹

In Operation Urgent Fury, plans were present but they were not used or even considered. As in Desert One, plans for Urgent Fury were developed during the crisis period.¹⁰

In Operation Just Cause specific plans were present. Detailed updating and coordination had been ongoing for the year prior to the crisis. Further, major exercises, training exercises, and rehearsals, in and out of country, had been conducted based upon this plan. Specific revisions to the OPLAN had been approved by JCS in November 1989 (one month prior to the actual crisis).¹¹

Similar to Just Cause, the plans for Desert Shield/Desert Storm were present prior to the crisis. OPLAN 1002-90 was a product of the deliberate planning system; final coordinating drafts had been distributed to JCS and service components. Further, the operational concept had been examined during a Central Command (CENTCOM) sponsored command post exercise completed just days before the crisis.¹²

Thus in only two cases were adequate plans at hand prior to the crisis. In the other three situations, the plans had to be developed during the actual crisis action period.

CRISIS RESPONSE--THE PARAMETERS OF WARNING TIME, DEPLOYMENT TIME, EMPLOYMENT TIME

In the areas of warning time, deployment time, and employment time each of the five operations differs..

In Operation Power Pack, the crisis erupted on 25 April 1965 with little or no warning. Forces were alerted over the following two days with initial intervention occurring 28 April with the air assault of 500 Marines and follow on reinforcement by 3rd Brigade, 82nd Airborne Division on 30 April.¹³ Immediate employment of forces was required against relatively localized insurgent activities. Overwhelming military strength was also employed. Enemy forces were poorly trained and poorly equipped.¹⁴

Operation Desert One responded to a crisis that erupted 4 November 1979, again with little or no warning. Forces were alerted over the next 15 days but deployment did not occur until five months later--24 April 1980. This was due to the fact that no force or command existed that could meet the demands of the crisis.¹⁵ Plans were developed,

coordinated, and rehearsed during this five month period. However, JCS chose "ad-hoc" planning for operational security reasons. Further, planning and training were very compartmented. Immediate employment was required upon deployment; but, due to mission cancellation (because of insufficient helicopter transport at the initial insertion site) no direct enemy contact occurred.¹⁶

The crisis within Grenada erupted 19 October 1983. Forces were alerted over the next three days with initial force assaults occurring on 25 October. Immediate employment was required. Forces achieved all assigned missions and as in Operation Power Pack, overwhelming force was employed against relatively poorly trained and equipped soldiers.¹⁷

The Persian Gulf crisis, as with Urgent Fury, offered little or no warning prior to the crisis. The CENTCOM crisis action team (CAT) was established 20 July 1990, but had stood down by 27 July 1990.¹⁸ The actual crisis occurred 2 August 1990 when Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait. U.S. forces were alerted over the next few days when JCS issued a deployment order 6 August 1990--with forces deploying on 7 August 1990. The main difference between this crisis and previous ones was that the joint force did not have to fight upon arrival at the crisis area. On the contrary, the enemy allowed U.S. and coalition forces to build up within the theater. The actual air campaign commenced six months later (17 January 1991)--the ground campaign commencing 1 month later (24 February 1991).¹⁹

The one crisis which offered significant warning time was Operation Just Cause. We have noted that the Just Cause OPLAN had been in existence for some time. Major exercises and rehearsals had been conducted and selected forces had been moved from the U.S. and

prepositioned in Panama prior to the crisis. In short, the U.S. and the JTF were ready for the impending crisis. The crisis erupted on 15 December 1989. The President approved intervention on 17 December 1989; the actual assault began on 20 December at 0045 hours. Twenty seven (27) targets were hit simultaneously by six different task forces--which enjoyed complete surprise and quick success.²⁰ The enemy was primarily a ground self-defense force of modest capacity (military, paramilitary, police, and small naval contingent--approximately 32,000 personnel in all), with minimal combat vehicles and no tactical jet fighters. Enemy forces had no combat aircraft or armed helicopters and possessed only light mortars, twenty nine (29) armored cars, and a small number of naval craft. In this operation the U.S. committed overwhelming combat power, which thoroughly demoralized the enemy and prevented him from organizing.²¹

CRISIS RESPONSE--THE PARAMETER OF DEPLOYMENT DISTANCE

Another parameter of crisis response situations is deployment distance. This factor has a direct effect on the strategic maneuver and sustainability of contingency forces. In operations Power Pack, Urgent Fury, and Just Cause the deployment distances were relatively short. Sustainability bases could be operated out of the U.S.; intermediate staging bases (ISBs) within the Caribbean and Central American countries were readily available.

On the other hand, Operation Desert One and Desert Shield/Desert Storm were more complex due to the distances. Numerous intermediate staging bases were required, as were basing rights in other countries and overflight clearances. Further, in the case of the Persian Gulf

conflict, considerable theater infrastructure was required to support the major troop build up and subsequent offensive operations.²² Significantly, long distance crisis response situations impose complexity, require significant strategic lift assets, and complicate sustainability.

Using the parameters of crisis response developed earlier (see page 6) we can compare these five contingencies in light of these parameters and draw some conclusions. This comparison is graphically displayed on the next page.

CRISIS RESPONSE PARAMETERS--HISTORICAL ANALYSIS

(HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF FIVE RECENT CONTINGENCIES)

<u>OPN</u>	<u>ORDER PRESENT</u>	<u>WARNING TIME</u>	<u>DEPLOYMENT TIME</u>	<u>EMPLOYMENT TIME</u>	<u>DISTANCE DEPLOYED</u>
Power Pack (1965)	Yes, out- dated, had to be revised	none	immed	immed	short
Desert One (1980)	none	none	5 months	immed	long
Urgent Fury (1983)	Yes, not used.	none	immed	immed	short
Just Cause (1989)	Yes, fully developed	6-12 months	immed	immed	short
Desert Shield/ Storm (1990)	Yes, needed refining	none	Gradual Build Up of Forces	Six Months	long

Projected to the year 2020, the foregoing matrix leads to some tentative conclusions. First, it is apparent that the majority of these crises had little or no warning time, except for Just Cause, where the U.S. had significant forward presence. Second, the majority of these crises required immediate employment, but we should note that the enemy

was poorly trained and equipped. Third, the deliberate planning system was used for the two most recent crises and our responses were extremely successful. In terms of the year 2020, the worst case crisis response situation for contingency forces would be another Urgent Fury--no plan, no warning time, immediate deployment, and immediate employment. The best case scenario for contingency forces would be another Just Cause--solid planning that is well coordinated and rehearsed, sufficient warning time, good intelligence, and immediate deployment/employment which surprised the enemy. Concurrently, the complexity and sustainability demands increase as the deployment distances increase. Given these conclusions, let us now turn to the doctrinal lessons learned from these operations.

CRISIS RESPONSE SITUATIONS-DOCTRINAL LESSONS LEARNED

In conducting this historical review the "doctrinal model" developed in the first part of this paper will be used (see page 7) to ensure that a common perspective is utilized throughout. This will provide for clarity when comparing contingencies and ensure that a doctrinal framework is present for this analysis at all times. Further, this review will focus on the macro lessons learned at the strategic and operational levels of warfare for the most part. The operational and strategic levels reveal recurrent themes which support lessons learned and thus can impact significantly on contingency force operations.

COMMAND AND CONTROL/UNITY OF EFFORT
MAXIMUM INTEGRATION OF FORCES/INTEROPERABILITY

A review of these contingencies quickly reveals that Just Cause and Desert Shield/Desert Storm offer good models for contingency operations, whereas Power Pack, Urgent Fury, and Desert One serve as examples of how not to execute contingency operations. Reasons for success and failure can be found in the areas of command and control, unity of effort, maximum integration of forces, and interoperability. From a solid command and control (C₂) base flows the maximum integration of forces and interoperability. In Desert Shield good planning was present prior to the crisis, based on the deliberate planning process. Further, the command and control relationships were well thought out, widely promulgated, and practiced. Just Cause has been cited as a model for deploying an overwhelming force and integrating it into a well coordinated and synchronized fighting force.²³ Similarly, Desert Shield/Desert Storm has been cited as a model for joint/coalition warfare that garnered unity through a single commander and a well thought out parallel command structure.²⁴ It should be noted that in Just Cause this C₂ base was established prior to the crisis. In Desert Shield/Desert Storm this base was established before and after the initial crisis event with the critical development occurring in Saudi Arabia as the coalition was formed.²⁵

In Operation Power Pack, C₂ was confusing and complex from the initial alert until General Palmer assumed command of U.S. Forces in the Dominican Republic on 7 May 1965--11 days after the initial deployment.²⁶ In Operation Desert One command and control was clearly in question at the Desert One site in Iran²⁷ and prior to deployment

within the joint task force command and subordinate elements during the preparation and training period.²⁸ During Urgent Fury, the C₂ structure did not integrate the fighting force optimally. Lack of communications was a serious shortfall, both in terms of capability and interoperability within the JTF.²⁹ All three crises were "no-plan" crisis response situations. Plans had to be developed prior to deployment during a severely constrained time period: There was no time to thoroughly think through the plan, revise it, adjust it, and thoroughly coordinate it. Also, the JTF headquarters was formed and organized in an "ad hoc" fashion. In the cases of operation Power Pack and Urgent Fury, this arrangement was especially significant in view of the limited warning and planning time prior to deployment. In Operation Desert One the ad-hoc nature of planning and the overly restricted compartmentalization of planning restricted the clear establishment of C₂. Thus, lack of a plan and the lack of an organized and established contingency force headquarters posed a major detriment to C₂, unity of effort, maximum integration of forces, and interoperability.

On the other hand, during Desert Shield/Desert Storm unity of effort and interoperability were greatly enhanced by the extensive use of U.S. liaison teams throughout the command (especially to allied units) and the emphasis on coalition planning/coordination. CENTCOM established a Coalition Communication, Coordination, and Information Center, so coalition coordination was accomplished quickly and efficiently.³⁰ In the future, coalitions will be increasingly used to respond to instabilities within regional areas. Contingency planners need to acknowledge this and integrate coalition planning into contingency force training, planning, and execution.

INTELLIGENCE

Intelligence was also a recurring problem in three of the operations. In Operation Power Pack, the intelligence system was focused on the "communist factors" and failed to provide intelligence on the real nature of the threat to the forces (rebel factions). Units and soldiers deployed to the Dominican Republic with little or no basis for identifying the enemy. Also maps were not available to the initial deploying forces.³¹ In Operation Desert One, the intelligence staffs lacked significant augmentation from the intelligence community as a whole to support a fully integrated intelligence effort at the national level and respond to short notice response.³² In Urgent Fury, the JCS operational/intelligence community did not provide the pre-crisis support/focus as it should have, considering the fact that President Reagan had gone on national television in March 1983 (7 months prior to the crisis) and outlined clearly the Cuban and Soviet threat within Grenada (to include intelligence satellite photos of the airfield which was being built). During the pre-deployment and initial assault periods detailed intelligence was severely lacking. Further, map support was again a serious shortcoming as was the case in the Dominican Republic operations.³³

On the other hand, Just Cause served as a model for intelligence focus and dissemination. This was facilitated by the forward presence/forward deployment of forces within Panama. Also, intelligence sources were well developed at all levels through human intelligence

sources (HUMINT), on going reconnaissance operations, and operational rehearsals/exercises within the country.³⁴

COMMUNICATIONS

Communications was a problem in three of the five operations. This was a serious shortcoming in Operation Power Pack because of the lack of a secure strategic/operational communication for the JTF during the initial stages of the crisis.³⁵ In Urgent Fury serious communication incompatibilities and technical limitations were present within the JTF force as a whole.³⁶ And, in Desert Shield/Desert Storm this problem recurred at the operational and tactical levels.³⁷

UNITY OF EFFORT--STRATEGIC/OPERATIONAL DIRECTION

In Urgent Fury, Just Cause and Desert Shield/Desert Storm (the three most recent crises) clear Presidential leadership was evident, providing clearly stated goals for these operations. Just as important, the President rallied political, domestic and international support for these operations, especially for Desert Shield/Desert Storm.³⁸ This reinforced the doctrinal theory of the "remarkable trinity", as cited by Carl von Clausewitz, that theorizes that the government, the military, and the will of the people must be working together--in a mutually supporting triad--toward a common aim to optimize the application of military force.³⁹ Contrary to this, Operation Power Pack had forces entering the Dominican Republic without a clear understanding of the operation's political aims. This became apparent in media interviews with military personnel and caused serious repercussions for President

Johnson.⁴⁰ Historically, clearly articulated political objectives--ones supported by the will of the people--reinforces unity of effort and allows the military chain of command to establish clearly stated military objectives for the strategic and operational levels of war. This, in turn, provides intent, purpose and direction for the entire operation. A lack of clearly articulated political aims obviously does just the opposite--creating disjointed operations, leading to a lack of direction/purpose and lack of unity of effort between the military and political elements of national power.

CONCENTRATION/AGILITY/SUSTAINABILITY

Essential to contingency operations is the principle of concentration, whereby commanders form a decisive or overwhelming force. Parallel with this is the concept of agility--the capability to move, think, communicate and act faster than the enemy can effectively react. Using these characteristics, the five contingencies can be broken down into the following categories. Operation Desert One was a special operations contingency, with limited objectives and forces. Operations Power Pack, Urgent Fury, and Just Cause could be considered lesser regional contingencies (LRC). Lastly, Desert Shield/Desert Storm was clearly a major regional contingency (MRC). Sufficient strategic mobility assets were available to meet the demands of the special operations contingency and the LRCs (note: Desert One failure was not due to strategic mobility). However, in the MRC (Desert Shield/Desert Storm) strategic agility and concentration of combat power were not present in the early risk (first two weeks) and late risk (first eight

weeks) periods of the crisis. Quite the contrary, a "window of vulnerability" was present from 7 August 1990 through 22 October 1990 when armored, mechanized, and air assault forces required to defeat a determined Iraqi attack into Saudi Arabia were en route to the theater.⁴¹ There was a significant shortage of fast sealift with a roll-on/roll-off capability for projection of these forces. Primary defense during this window relied upon a thin line of Saudi, French, Egyptian and U.S. forces. Though this force represented a light/air-ground task force it was not sufficient for defeating the Iraqi threat.⁴² It should also be noted that the LRCs had short deployment distances and modest enemy forces; whereas, the MRC involved significant deployment distances and significant enemy force. Thus, sustainability and complexity were dominant factors of the MRC; they further challenged the ability of the U.S. to concentrate overwhelming combat power for this operation. This is one of the most critical lesson learned for future contingency operations. Successful power projection of contingency forces is fully dependent on the U.S. ability to concentrate and achieve strategic/operational agility.

FIREPOWER/MANEUVER

Historically, maneuver and firepower have been major determinants in the success of a fighting force. This also proved to be the case in four of the five contingencies reviewed. Obviously, this doctrinal concept was not tested in Operation Desert One due to the decision to abort the mission early on. In Operation Power Pack maneuver was attained strategically by the rapid deployment of Naval, Marine, and

Army forces, whereby rebel forces were divided and defeated by overwhelming force. This, in turn, established the conditions for follow-on stability operations. Firepower was inherent within each service component of the task force, but it was used judiciously in order to minimize civilian casualties.⁴³

Operations Urgent Fury and Just Cause used strategic maneuver to rapidly deploy forces to the crisis area and then operational/tactical maneuver and firepower was used to overwhelm enemy forces and eliminate their will and ability to respond. Urgent Fury primarily involved SOF, Army, Naval, and Marine forces;⁴⁴ whereas, Just Cause involved SOF, Army, Marine, and Air forces.⁴⁵ The Panama intervention provides a textbook example of maneuver and firepower for contingency forces: twenty seven (27) targets were hit simultaneously with measured applications of firepower based upon each target's enemy/friendly situation.⁴⁶ In both contingencies the minimization of friendly and civilian casualties was of paramount importance as was the case in the Dominican Republic crisis. The key factors for success in this area were exceptional planning, synchronization of operations, clearly thought-out rules of engagement, and the excellent training of units and leaders.

In Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm the capability for fire and maneuver during the first 60 days of the operation was severely restricted--limited mostly to air and naval power. After the initial window of vulnerability this capability was extended to land forces. Strategic/operational maneuver and firepower were initially provided by the air campaign, followed by a ground campaign that enabled coalition forces to encircle Iraqi elements and defeat them in detail.⁴⁷

Clearly, contingency forces must have the ability to strategically maneuver air, ground, naval, marine, and SOF against an adversary. They must also possess the operational capability to employ maneuver and firepower. Historically, the factors that have directly affected this capability of contingency forces are strategic mobility and sustainability.

FIREPOWER/MANEUVER--OTHER COMBAT MULTIPLIERS

Clearly supporting the doctrinal principles of firepower and maneuver in these crises were the ever increasing use of high technology systems/weapons and precision guided munitions, expanded SOF capabilities, and the capability to conduct operations at night. These factors were clearly refined and employed in Operation Just Cause⁴⁸ and in the Persian Gulf War.⁴⁹ They were significant combat multipliers. As such, the "size of the force" became less of a factor in achieving overwhelming combat power; they directly enhanced maneuver and firepower. This interesting trend may have significant implications on how forces are organized and deployed/employed in the future. The use of combat multipliers, utilizing new technology and capabilities, offers some rich payoffs for optimizing joint warfighting in the future.

INTEGRATION OF COMBAT POWER--THE CRITICAL FACTORS "PEOPLE AND ORGANIZATIONAL DOCTRINE"

Joint force commanders must integrate the joint functions of maneuver, firepower, intelligence, C₂, and protection. This will be

accomplished through people and organizations. Since Operation Power Pack in 1965, it has become apparent that this integration/coordination effort has moved forward greatly. The elements that have supported this improvement over time have been:

1. Increased manpower quality.⁵⁰
2. Training and education for individual soldiers and units.⁵¹
3. Refinements in service and joint doctrine.⁵²
4. Better planning for joint/combined/coalition warfare.⁵³
5. Realistic and demanding training with sound assessment of performance.⁵⁴

Quality manpower is fundamentally important; it supports the subsequent four elements. Since 1965, the educational levels of leaders and soldiers have increased dramatically. In the U.S. Army alone, in the past decade high school graduates have increased from 50% of the active force to over 90% at the present time.⁵⁵ This quality, coupled with enhanced training and education systems, has provided the services with a better soldier/sailor/airman/marine. In turn, this highly capable, well-trained force has proved to be instrumental in meeting the demands of the high tempo and high technology demands of modern warfare.⁵⁶

Progress in joint doctrine development has contributed greatly to joint warfighting success over the last 30 years--more specifically, over the last decade. Operations Just Cause and Desert Shield/Desert Storm were the products of solid planning and progress within this arena--especially in the area of joint operations doctrine and contingency/campaign planning.⁵⁷ Contrasted to this was the lack of clearly articulated stability operations doctrine (low intensity conflict) and joint task force doctrine for Operation Power Pack.⁵⁸

With doctrinal improvements have come training improvements. High quality unit training has been a primary factor for success in crisis response situations. The U.S. Army Combat Training Center (CTC) program, the U.S. Air Force Tactical Fighter Weapons Center (and Green Flag/Red Flag exercises), the Navy Strike Warfare center (NSWC) and related training centers/ concepts, and the Marine Corps Air-Ground Combat Center (MCAGCC) have greatly contributed to increased success of modern operational and tactical warfare.⁵⁹ The key components of these centers are realistic training situations responding to realistic threats, in a simulated wartime environment. Live fire exercises are also integral to these centers. Underlying these training centers are sound, "call-it-like-it is" evaluation systems, which provide effective after-action reviews on units' performances. These centers have been instrumental in the most recent contingency operations, Just Cause and the Persian Gulf war. They provide the bedrock for focusing units on their wartime missions and improving combat readiness.

MAXIMUM INTEGRATION/FULL UTILIZATION OF THE TOTAL FORCE

In Operations Power Pack, Desert One, Urgent Fury and Just Cause, Active component forces were primarily used to meet the immediacy of these crises. All of these crises were LRCs; as such, they required less forces and sustainment. On the other hand, Desert Shield/Desert Storm resulted in the call up of over 1000 reserve component units and 231,000 reserve personnel.⁶⁰ This MRC required the integration of the reserve components and validated the Total Force concept. Some shortcomings have been identified, but on the whole the reserves'

integration into the fighting force was a success.⁶¹ Undoubtedly, in a fast breaking crisis, one that requires immediate employment of forces, active forces will be used for the most part. Less time-sensitive crises allow for reserve forces integration into the deployment. Further, reserve components may take up the daily missions of deployed continental U.S. (CONUS) active duty forces, if the active duty units' peacetime functions are critical for our nation's defense.

MAXIMUM INTEGRATION/FULL UTILIZATION OF FORCES--COALITION WARFARE

Coalition warfare was present in three of the five contingencies reviewed--Operation Power Pack, Urgent Fury and Desert Shield/Desert Storm. In Operations Power Pack⁶² and Urgent Fury,⁶³ coalition forces were not a critical warfighting factor in the initial stages of the crisis. However, in the follow-on security/stability phase of these operations they became instrumental. In Desert Shield/Desert Storm the coalition was crucial, perhaps the crucial aspect of this operation's success, especially its diplomatic success.⁶⁴ In all three of these operations, these forces provided legitimacy for the operation and reduced the number of U.S. forces required at various stages of the crisis. They also assisted in reducing contingency force vulnerabilities by providing additional support and local expertise on the characteristics of the country (people, cultures, geographical aspects, etc.). In the other two operations, Just Cause⁶⁵ and Desert One,⁶⁶ the U.S. acted unilaterally because of the nature of the situations. However, it is important to note that support from other countries was also most critical in executing these missions. Base

rights, overflight rights, and port access were instrumental to mission execution.

UNITY OF EFFORT/MAXIMUM INTEGRATION/INTEROPERABILITY
"INTERAGENCIES"

In the interagency arena, it is clear that contingency operations demand unity of effort among interagency actions if joint warfighting is to be optimized. In the five contingencies reviewed, a common shortcoming in all cases was lack of unity of effort at the interagency level and between agencies and military forces. In Operation Power Pack serious coordination problems were evident between the JTF and the State department in the initial phases of the operation.⁶⁷ In Operation Desert One, the national assets of the agencies were not optimized due to the extreme compartmentalization, ad-hoc nature of planning, and excessive concern for security. Operations Urgent Fury and Just Cause were classified, compartmentalized, and conducted exclusively within DOD channels⁶⁸--the interagencies were thus an afterthought. In Desert Shield/Desert Storm coordination was improved; however, it was noted that agency involvement in contingency planning prior to the crisis could be enhanced.⁶⁹ In short, interagency involvement is critical to crisis response situations; supporting agencies provide the means by which national resources are brought to bear on a crisis. In turn, these resources support contingency forces attainment of the strategic/operational objectives for the crisis. In recent history, critical government agencies have not been included in the contingency planning process and have not been fully integrated into the planning

phases of crisis response situations. This has hindered the optimization of joint warfighting.

CONTINGENCY FORCE-SUMMARY OF HISTORICAL FACTORS

The foregoing historical review of contingency operations indicates that the following factors should be closely reviewed as we prepare contingency forces for future crises:

1. NO WARNING READINESS: Contingency forces must be prepared for "no warning" crisis.
2. FORWARD DEPLOYED/PRESENCE--COMBAT MULTIPLIERS: Forward deployed/presence infrastructures such as pre-established C₂ headquarters, facilities, ports, bases, prepositioning of war stocks (in theater or afloat), intelligence systems and sources, and other such infrastructures are force multipliers for crisis response situations.
3. PLAN/NO-PLAN SITUATIONS: Success is more likely if up-to-date plans are available prior to the crisis. In "no-plan" situations, risk abounds and operational shortcomings are inevitable. Contingency forces need to train for both eventualities.
4. PRE-EXISTING CONTINGENCY HEADQUARTERS: Contingency forces headquarters should be in place and operational. They should be exercised and readily deployable; they need exercised standing operations procedures. They should be fully manned in peacetime and be fully joint in nature. "Ad-hoc" contingency force headquarters have not optimized joint warfighting in recent crisis response situations.
5. UNITY OF COMMAND/INTELLIGENCE: The overriding factors for successful contingency operations are unity of command and intelligence. Intelligence allows the contingency force to tailor its force and focus its efforts in response to the crisis. Unity of command facilitates integration of doctrinal factors to achieve the intent and mission of the contingency force. Without these factors, mission success is suspect and joint warfighting will not be optimized.
6. INITIAL RESPONSE SUCCESS: The strategic and operational success attained in the initial response period (first eight weeks) is the major determinant of how the crisis evolves thereafter.

7. STRATEGIC MOBILITY: Strategic mobility is the key factor for achieving concentration, initiative, and agility. The primary sub-factors of strategic mobility are:

- Tailoring of forces/Economy of force measures/Use of combat multipliers
- Strategic air (military/civil reserve air fleet)
- Strategic sealift (MSC assets, National Defense Reserve fleet, U.S. registered commercial ships)
- Positioning Options:
 - >Preposition of material in unit sets (POMCUS)
 - >Preposition of war stocks/equipment within the region
 - >Afloat prepositioning (APF) in or near the region
- Supply bases within the region
- Theater support infrastructures (air bases, ports, port access, over flight rights etc.)
- Host nation support
- Coalition/Alliance support

8. OVERWHELMING FORCE LRC: Lesser regional contingency (LRC) success has been obtained with minimum casualties (friendly and enemy) when strategic mobility allowed the application of overwhelming combat power early on in a crisis.

9. MRC SUCCESS: Major regional contingency (MRC) success has been achieved by projection of an initial response force that is tailored for the crisis and reinforced by a build-up of logistics and forces to achieve a decisive force for follow-on operations.

10. U.S. CRISIS RESPONSE EXPERIENCE-MODEST ENEMY CAPABILITIES: The U.S. experience in crisis response situations requiring immediate deployment/employment of forces has been against poorly trained and equipped enemy forces. Further, the civilian populations of these countries were friendly towards intervening U.S. forces. Thus, we should cautiously transfer lessons learned to future contingency operations. More capable forces may be encountered in future regional crises.

11. COMMUNICATIONS: Adequate communications must be present for contingency forces. Historically, serious communications incompatibilities and technical limitations have presented recurring problems, even in the most recent Persian Gulf war.

12. REMARKABLE TRINITY: The "remarkable trinity" of the government, the military, and the people--cited by Carl von Clausewitz--is applicable to crisis response situations.⁷⁰ Clearly stated political objectives that are supported by the "will" of the American people is essential for application of U.S. military power to a crisis.

13. INTERAGENCY INTEGRATION/UNITY OF EFFORT: Critical government agencies must be included in the contingency planning process and

be better integrated into the planning and execution phases of initial crisis response periods.

14. UNILATERAL/COALITION: Contingency forces must be prepared to act unilaterally; however, coalition warfare is required for establishing political legitimacy and maintaining long term presence for conflict termination activities as required by the crisis parameters.

15. FIREPOWER AND MANEUVER: Modern firepower and maneuver are influenced by:

- High technology systems/weapons
- Precision guided munitions
- Expanded SOF capabilities
- Expanded night vision capability

16. JOINT WARFIGHTING CAPABILITIES: Modern joint warfighting is based largely on:

- Quality manpower
- Quality Training/Education
- Realistic combat training
- Joint doctrine that is published, understood, and exercised
- Increasingly better joint planning
- Increasingly better combined/coalition planning

17. FRIENDLY CASUALTIES/COLLATERAL DAMAGE: Future contingencies will stress minimizing friendly casualties and collateral damage. This will have a major influence upon future courses of action for contingency operations.

18. TOTAL FORCE AND CONTINGENCIES: The reserve components are critical for a MRC but are less critical for LRCs. Reserves are not useful, for the most part, for immediate deployment and employment situations given the current reserve component organizational and training systems.

19. MAPS: Maps are critical for all levels of planning and execution within contingency forces. Maneuver of forces, targeting, and intelligence is totally dependent upon accurate maps being readily available to the warfighting force. This has been a major shortcoming in several recent crisis response situations.

Several of these factors note shortcomings that require remediation.

Other factors derive simply from observations based upon the historical analysis of contingency operations; they suggest ways to optimize joint warfighting.

CONTINGENCY FORCE-CURRENT CAPABILITIES ASSESSMENT/FUTURE ASSESSMENT

From the perspective of past contingency operations, we can assess present crisis response readiness of contingency forces. This assessment will then be extended out to year 2020 based upon present trends. Along with the previous historical analysis, this assessment will provide a valid basis for providing recommendations for optimizing joint warfighting of contingency forces.

Presently, the U.S. Armed Forces possess only the minimal capability to meet national security objectives with low to moderate risk. This assessment is based upon Base Force 1 force levels, existing strategic mobility assets, and organizational structures for contingency forces that have remained relatively unchanged from that of the containment strategy of bygone days.⁷¹ This capability assessment is based on the 1991 Joint Military Net Assessment (JMNA),⁷² the Mobility Requirements Study (MRS) Volume One,⁷³ and the Final Report to Congress on The Conduct of the Persian Gulf War.⁷⁴ Further, the existing strategic mobility assets do not possess the ability to bring forces to bear quickly, effectively, and decisively.⁷⁵ Significantly, the MRS assesses that, even with the proposed sealift improvements, moderate risk is present for attainment of U.S. objectives. As such, contingency forces are capable of handling only one MRC at a time with the increased sealift of 1999. This assessment is based on the assumption that the MRS recommendations are implemented and that the Base Force 1 force structure is present--a questionable assumption in light of current budgetary and political trends.⁷⁶

Presently, the JMNS assesses the crisis response capabilities of the U.S. Armed Services (contingency forces) for the time period of 1993 to 1999 as: adequate in mobilization; marginal in deployment (improving in the out years as sealift capacity is improved and as the airlift capacity/capabilities are increased with the C17 aircraft); adequate with noted risks in employment; and marginal in sustainment throughout the time period because of noted shortfalls.⁷⁷ From this as starting point, it can be expected that (assuming trends are not reversed) by the year 2020:

- Power projection will become a critical military requirement.
- Contingency force structure will be further reduced by budgetary limitations.
- Strategic mobility assets may stabilize at the 1999 levels; however, overall cargo carrying capacity will most likely be eroded by aging C141 and C130 fleets by 2020.
- Current sustainment capabilities will most likely be reduced over time because of budgetary limitations.

The above projections forecast that the contingency force capabilities of the U.S. Armed Forces may not be adequate for the crisis response requirements of year 2020. If this occurs, the U.S. will have to withdraw from its position of leadership in the world and redefine its objectives and policies. In turn, this would put the U.S.'s capability to defend its vital interests in jeopardy. This assessment suggests that if actions are not taken to increase the joint warfighting capabilities of contingency forces, then these forces may not be able to meet the crisis response demands of 2020.

From this assessment of present and future readiness, let us turn to the future and fully explore the trends that will shape the new world order of year 2020.

FUTURE TRENDS-CRISIS RESPONSE 2020

The year 2020 has been consciously chosen as a key crossroads in our future. In all probability, the new world order will find the closing decades of the 20th century and the ensuing first decade of the 21st century as a "pause or interlude" period for the major world powers. It should be a time of relative peace as countries pause for self-reflection and collective reflection, with traditional relationships changing and new ones developing.⁷⁸ This paper further hypothesizes that the time period of 2010 to 2020 (+/- 5 years) will be a "sorting out" period of international relations based upon a fully developed multipolar world structure (similar to the 1945 to 1960 period following WW II from which the bipolar world fully matured), a time period with the potential for major crises as this "sorting out" evolves. Thus, our national strategy and, in turn, our national military strategy should focus upon this time frame as a key date for future planning.

The major world trends that will help shape the world of 2020 are:

1. A multipolar world of international powers.
2. Increased international interdependence of nations in terms of resources, economics, and trade.
3. Proliferation of conventional weapons and modernization of military forces in terms of equipment and training.

4. Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction - nuclear, chemical, and biological.

5. Increasing migration of U.S. industrial assets/factories (industrial base) to developing countries and a resulting international movement of U.S. citizens internationally in response to economic opportunities within the growing international market place.

6. Growing awareness of the importance of environmental factors for a nation's welfare and future growth potential.

7. Reduced active force strength offset by an increased capability to project an air-land-sea-space contingency force that is highly trained and hi-tech. Reserve forces will be larger but less mobile than active forces.

8. Emerging nations with growing economic power will seek to have a say within the international arena; a growing nationalism within countries will emerge with a steadfast dedication to the principle of sovereignty for these emerging nations.

9. Relative decrease in the U.S.'s power as the economic power of other nations grows at an increasing rate in relation to U.S. growth. In spite of its decreased relative power, the U.S. will continue to have global responsibilities and be viewed as a major leader and role model for economic/political development, however the manner in which the U.S. interacts within the multipolar world will change--possibly dramatically--more give and take, more acceptance of other nations' interests and power, etc.

10. Regional Crisis response/crisis oriented situations (emerging conflicts requiring immediate attention) will emerge due to increasing world interdependence, speed of communications/media and pace of events,

and the instability of a multipolar world that has yet to come to an agreement on a common world vision.

The above ten trends have been highlighted as ones which will significantly shape our world's future - especially between now and 2020. These trends are supported, more or less, by such respected futurists as: Charles W. Taylor in Alternative World Scenarios for Strategic Planning⁷⁹ and A World 2010. A New Order of Nations,⁸⁰ and Herman Kahn of the Hudson Institute in The Next 200 Years - A scenario for America and The World.⁸¹ It is also supported by such military oriented writers as: Rod Paschall in LIC 2010. Special Operations and Unconventional Warfare in The Next Century,⁸² Chris Bellamy in The Future of Land Warfare,⁸³ Steven M. Shaker and Alan R. Wise in War Without Men,⁸⁴ and Les Levidow and Kevin Robins in Cyborg Worlds. The Military Information Society.⁸⁵ Clearly, many other trends could be gleaned from these works. But the common thread among them is the world will change based upon existing trends. The exact future cannot be predicted; however, probable futures can be described, and scenarios can be examined.

The ten future trends presented above are of immense importance to planners of national strategy and national military strategy.

RECOMMENDATIONS-OPTIMIZING JOINT WARFIGHTING FOR CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS IN YEAR 2020

The recommendations that follow must be viewed in the proper perspective.

First, they will be presented from two levels of importance to help focus the reader: (1) Major recommendations, which are the essential foundation for optimizing joint warfighting of future contingency forces, will be presented first. (2) Secondary recommendations, which are supporting elements of major recommendations, will then be presented.

Second, both categories of recommendations (major and secondary) will specify macro trends/actions that need to guide future planning for crisis response situations involving warfighting.

Last, these recommendations for future contingency forces assume that certain broad requirements have been established for these forces. Based upon the trends outlined in the previous sections of this paper, it can be envisioned that future contingency forces will need to meet the following requirements to achieve minimal readiness requirements:

Contingency Force Requirements--2020

1. Global Orientation/Strategically Agile
2. Rapidly Deployable/Responsive
3. Highly Capable Combined Arms/Joint Warfighting Capability
4. High State of Readiness
5. Flexible/Tailorable
6. Balanced Mix of Forces
7. Multi-Dimensional Force (air, land, sea, SOF, and space)
8. Sustainability Inherent (structure, organization, planning and execution)
9. Credible Forced Entry Capabilities
10. Strong Unity of Effort and Command (simple and direct)

In short, the contingency force of year 2020 must be strategically agile, highly capable, responsive, and sustainable. Given these characteristics, these forces will be strengthened through the following recommended actions that are outlined on the following page:

MAJOR RECOMMENDATIONS

Listed below are the six major recommendations which form the essential foundation for optimizing the joint warfighting of contingency forces:

- #1. A new power projection paradigm is required for the U.S. Armed Forces.
- #2. A standing contingency command needs to be established.
- #3. The current momentum in development of joint doctrine needs to be maintained and built upon. A more systemized process and structure must be established for joint doctrine development, promulgation, testing, evaluation, and refinement.
- #4. Joint training needs to be expanded with the following initiatives: the efforts of the services' CTCs should be integrated; a National Warfighting Center needs to be established; joint training must be conducted under realistic conditions--an objective and thorough evaluation/after-action system must also be present (similar to the present services' CTC observer-controller team systems). Most critically, operational tempo (OPTEMPO) must be maintained for contingency forces so that high levels of combat readiness can be sustained--this requires the creative application of resources considering fiscal realities.
- #5. Services systems' must be reviewed for possible merging to enhance warfighting of joint forces, save monies, and increase interoperability.
- #6. Sufficient strategic lift must be purchased and integrated into contingency planning and training. The integrated mobility plan (a by-product of the Mobility Requirements Study--1992/93) need to be resourced and implemented as a minimal step in regards to this recommendation. This recommendation is most critical since contingency forces must have strategic agility to project decisive combat power.

The detailed explanations of the above recommendations are outlined in the following pages:

#1. POWER PROJECTION PARADIGM: A new paradigm must be established and internalized within the entire Department of Defense. The old paradigm of "forward deployed/reinforcing" strategy of the cold war era must be replaced by a new one of "forward presence/power projection strategy" for a regional defense.⁸⁶ The current U.S. Marine Corps doctrine for expeditionary forces provides a starting point for such a paradigm. The Marine-Air-Ground Task Forces (MAGTFs) are structured to provide the joint force commander with a readily available, self-sustaining, combined-arms force. MAGTFs are structured with an operational mindset--a commitment to strategic agility, rapid response, sustainability, and flexibility. The command and control structures, combat elements, and combat service support elements are organized with one purpose in mind--power projection world wide. MAGTFs are built upon strategically deployable modules (crisis action modules--CAMs), which are resourced with available lift (strategic air, amphibious lift/strategic sealift, and maritime prepositioning).⁸⁷

A significant difference between U.S. Marine Corps expeditionary doctrine and current contingency operations mindsets is the Marines' provision for sustainability, which is inherent and fully integrated within MAGTFs. For each type of MAGTF a corresponding sustainability package is resourced and is part of the force concept. For example, the four types of MAGTFs have the following packages: a Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) will deploy with 15 days of supply (DOS), a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) with 30 DOS, a Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) with 60 DOS, and a Special Purpose MAGTF (SPMAGTF) with a tailored package of supplies.⁸⁸

Further, MAGTFs are by their nature joint forces that integrate (under a single commander) air, ground and sustainability for warfighting. This is accomplished by the manner in which they are organized. Further, inherent flexibility is provided through the deployment options that have been developed--amphibious/sealift, airlift, prepositioning programs, forward basing, and sea basing. This is complemented by special organizations to enhance crisis response--including MEUs which are forward deployed aboard Amphibious Ready Groups (ARGs). Normally two MEUs are forward deployed at a time. Another special organization is the Air Contingency Forces (ACF), the fly-in MEF package that links up with the Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) equipment afloat within regions. Three squadrons of MPF are forward deployed worldwide: one in the Indian Ocean, one in the Atlantic Command, and one in the Western Pacific. These ships are loaded with unit equipment and 30 days of supplies. Thus, Marines are airlifted to the objective area and married up with the deployed ships--which gives them increased strategic agility. MPF ships can also support smaller MAGTFs as well.⁸⁹

This doctrine basically meets the requirements for contingency force for the year 2020. However, it will have to be expanded upon to suit the needs of a major contingency force of air, land, sea, and SOF elements.

Some readers of this report will probably contend that other service doctrine (such as used by XVIII Airborne Corps, special operations units, Naval units, or commands such as the Joint Special Operations Command--JSOC) is just as appropriate for contingency forces. Such counterproposals will not be challenged because, to a degree, they

are true--but only to a degree. The MAGTF doctrine is a broader based approach in light of strategic agility and sustainment. Most importantly, it permeates the entire Marine Corps structure, whereas other contingency doctrine is primarily limited to specific units and commands. Nevertheless, incorporating other "contingency doctrine" with MAGTF doctrine should constructively contribute toward a new paradigm.

To develop this new paradigm, a National Contingency Command (NACON) should be established (see next recommendation for specifics pertaining to the creation of this command). NACON would be inherently grounded in an expeditionary mindset such as MAGTF. One approach for creating an expeditionary mindset within NACON is conceptualized in the following three pages.

EXPEDITIONARY CONCEPT FOR A NATIONAL CONTINGENCY COMMAND

FORCES:

CONTINGENCY FORCE PACKAGES

<u>IRE</u> (#1) <u>INITIAL</u> <u>RESPONSE</u> <u>ELEMENTS</u>	<u>IFE</u> (#2) <u>IMMEDIATE</u> <u>FOLLOW-ON</u> <u>ELEMENTS</u>	<u>FRE</u> (#3) <u>FOLLOW-ON</u> <u>REINFORCEMENT</u> <u>ELEMENTS</u>	<u>MRF</u> (#4) <u>MAJOR</u> <u>REINFORCE-</u> <u>MENT</u> <u>FORCE</u>
WITHIN 2 WEEKS	WITHIN 8 WEEKS	WITHIN 16 WEEKS	16 WEEKS TO ONE YEAR
ACTIVE 90% RESERVE 5%	ACTIVE 90% RESERVE 10%	ACTIVE 70% RESERVE 30%	ACTIVE 30% RESERVE 70%

INITIAL CRISIS	-----SELECTED MOBILIZATION-----	PARTIAL MOBILIZA- TION AND ROTATION OF UNITS
1. Initial Crisis	2. Selected Mobilization	3. Partial Mobilization and Rotation of Units

CHARACTERISTICS:

- > IRE/IFE organized for immediate deployment/employment.
- > Units are apportioned for training/planning.
- > Unit Readiness requirements and resource priorities are tied to the package (#1-4) to which units are assigned.
- > Packages reflect Total Force concept/inherently relates packages to NCA decisions and will of nation.
- > Fully joint packages.
- > Within each package sub-packages/sub-deployment options (crisis action modules) are built based upon resourced strategic lift.
- > Incremental deployment is possible for deterrence in slow building crisis (flexible deterrent options).
- > Rapid deployment is possible for time sensitive crises.
- > Total focus of this command is warfighting.
- > Flexible packages can be tailored for specific situations.

EXPEDITIONARY CONCEPT FOR NATIONAL CONTINGENCY COMMAND

COMMAND AND CONTROL:

C₂

JTF Assault/FWD

-IRE

First 2 weeks

-Active

-No

Augmentation

JTF(-)

-IRE

-IFE

-FRE

2-16 weeks

-Active

-Limited

Augmenta-
tion

Theater Command

-MRF

Beyond 16 weeks

-Active/Reserve mix

-Augmentation as
required

CHARACTERISTICS:

- > JTF Assault/FWD and JTF(-) organized and resourced for immediate deployment/employment.
- > Fully joint command with components collocated at same base/post with headquarters.
- > JTF Assault/FWD fully manned and resourced
 - 3 Duplicate headquarters present for readiness
 - Has forced entry capability with limited airland requirements
- > JTF(-) and Theater command requires limited augmentation.
- > Total Force concept integrated into C₂
 - Reserve component staffs (on active duty) integral to all headquarters packages.
- > Carries out and performs only warfighting duties by law.

EXPEDITIONARY CONCEPT FOR NATIONAL CONTINGENCY COMMAND

SUSTAINABILITY:

IRE (PACKAGE #1)

<u>AFLOAT</u>	<u>PREPOSITIONED</u>	<u>POMCUS</u>	<u>CONUS</u>
-30 DOS	-30 DOS	-One Set	90 DOS
1-Pacific 1-Atlantic or Med	1-Pacific 1-Europe or East	Positioned Based upon Threat	Precon- figured for deploy- ment based upon alert level

OTHER CONTINGENCY PACKAGES:

<u>IFE (PACKAGE #2)</u>	<u>FRE (PACKAGE #3)</u>	<u>MRF (PACKAGE#4)</u>
-CONUS 90 DOS -THEATER: AS REQUIRED BY THREAT	-CONUS 90 DOS -THEATER: AS REQUIRED BY THREAT	-AS REQUIRED BY THREAT

NOTE: Amounts outlined above are for illustrative purposes; however, a 90-180 DOS base for National Contingency Command elements appears prudent. Each specific class of supply and types within these classes would be prioritized to achieve prudent sustainability levels that are fiscally responsible.

The details suggested in the foregoing tables are obviously not as important as the NACON concept. This concept of a National Contingency Command (NACON) is based upon strategic agility, rapid response, sustainability and flexibility. The overall concept should be kept simple (similar to MAGTFs). It should stress force packages, deployment modules, C₂ packages, total force, and sustainability packages. This concept needs to permeate every level of planning and training in our armed services. Further, all resourcing of the services must to be tied to the readiness standards required of units. This high priority on contingency forces supports unity of effort during peacetime and assures on-going logistical and budgetary support for the force. This mindset would extend to all reserve components; the reserves must be integrated into contingency forces through a common doctrine, approach, and lexicon.

In summary, the MAGTFs concept is totally encompassing for the U.S. Marine Corps. The contingency force of year 2020 requires similar force-wide focus. More specifically, the armed forces need such a concept to pull together doctrine, training, and support for a common focus and direction. The armed forces should all share the paradigm, which would forge a common lexicon, common doctrine, and unity of effort in the C₂, training, sustainability, and resourcing of contingency forces for future contingencies.

#2. STANDING CONTINGENCY COMMAND HEADQUARTERS:

Clearly, given the history and the nature of crisis response situations, a standing contingency command is an absolute requirement for crisis response purposes. Recommendation #1 proposed that this command be called the National Contingency Command (NACON). The name is not all important, but the term "National" was carefully chosen to signify this is a unified and national effort--not a service effort. As the present Chairman of The Joint Chiefs of Staff has stated many times: "it best serves our nation".⁹⁰ We need a constant reminder that the military should support the nation's interests and the will of its people (the "remarkable trinity"). Further, the term "National" stresses the need to integrate interagency staffs (liaison cells) into this warfighting headquarters for unity of effort between the fighting forces and these agencies. A National Contingency Command would stress the importance of contingency operations--framing it in a national perspective, rather than a service enterprise.

The next challenge is to determine how this command would fit into the present Unified Command Plan (UCP) and thereby improve unity of command, unity of effort, and joint warfighting. There are many possibilities. However, a "regional defense/power projection" strategy depends upon forces in CONUS--forces that need to be trained, organized for deployment, and deployed from CONUS. Thus, a CONUS-based, unified command would facilitate these requirements. But, a unified commander has many other duties--such as strategic coordination actions, service coordination, JCS interface, embassy coordination--duties that would interfere with joint warfighting and joint warfighting training. As

such, it would not be appropriate to have the present unified commander for CONUS, Atlantic Command (LANTCOM), act as NACON. However, in the UCP the CINC has great latitude in determining the organizational structure of his command. The UCP allows him to establish sub-unified commands, joint task forces, service-specific commands, functional components or service components.⁹¹ Obviously, unity of effort can be best served by designating NACON as a sub-unified command of LANTCOM. This is even more appropriate considering the proposed change to the UCP in the 1993 Report on the Roles, Missions and Functions of The Armed Forces, whereby CONUS based forces of Forces Command (FORSCOM), Atlantic Fleet (LANTFLT), Air Component Command (ACC) and Marine Forces Atlantic (MARFORLANT) will be merged under LANTCOM. LANTCOM will be responsible for joint training, force packaging, and facilitating deployments during crises.⁹² In turn, NACON would be LANTCOM's executive agent for contingency forces--the C2, the trainer, and the warfighter. This command would be ready to deploy, ready to be immediately integrated into the theater CINC's warfighting effort, and ready to fight on a moment's notice.

NACON would have component commands for the Army, Air Force, Navy, Marine, and SOF. NACON would be a warfighting CINC and be fully deployable/employable. It would focus on operational/tactical planning, training, deploying, fighting and supporting contingency forces.

The next essential question is: should forces be assigned to NACON? The forthcoming "Expeditionary Concept for NACON" (on page 39 of this report) makes it clear that IRE and IFE units should be assigned (force packages #1 and #2). FRE and MRF forces would be assigned or

OPCONed for training/contingencies based upon the world situation and threat levels.

NACON would be able to form as many as three JTF Assault/FWD headquarters on a surge basis; but be able to fully handle two crises at a time (two full JTFs) with assigned strength and minimal augmentation (thus providing flexibility to NCA in times of crisis). NACON would have forced entry capability for its Assault/FWD headquarters and be resourced for immediate deployment/immediate employment. NACON should be located close to the majority of its IRE/IFE units and near a strategic airlift site. Further, component commands must be collocated on the same installation as the NACON headquarters.

#3. JOINT DOCTRINE: The current momentum in the development of joint doctrine needs to be maintained. Since 1986, over seventy-five (75) new doctrinal documents have been written; however, to date many are still being revised. For example JCS Pub 3-0, which is the keystone document of the joint operations series, is still being revised at this time.⁹³ It is essential that the U.S. Armed Forces lead the way globally in creating doctrine. We must assume that potential threat forces in the year 2020 will possess similar levels of technology and weapons as the U.S. due to conventional weapon proliferation. As such, superior doctrine and tactics to out-think, out-plan and to out-fight our adversaries is essential. To this end, a more systemized process and structure must be established for joint doctrine development. Robert A. Doughty states the case very well in a recent issue of Parameters: a center for excellence for joint doctrine should be established, a center that has "responsibility for evaluating and writing historical studies

on doctrine, conducting simulations to test doctrinal concepts and conducting exercises to ensure common understanding and application of doctrine"⁹⁴ Joint doctrine MUST rise above parochial interests. Joint doctrine needs to be fully disseminated and used. Training centers and exercises must stress this in their evaluation systems. Further, simulations and exercises need to be refined to provide wargames that can make significant contributions to the development of doctrine. The senior service schools, universities, branch schools, and warfighting centers need to be linked together to ensure common understanding and application of joint doctrine.

#4. JOINT TRAINING: Joint training has been instrumental in the success of past contingency operations. But improvements can be made. Operations like Ocean Venture 92 and Tandem Thrust 92 were major joint warfighting exercises; they were invaluable in furthering units' readiness in their joint wartime tasks. However, joint training needs to be expanded. Simulations, wargames, CPXs, training exercises, and training at the various services' combat training centers (CTC) should reflect and reinforce power projection doctrine and joint warfighting. We must seriously consider creative joining/merging of the services' CTCs. For example, NACON could conduct joint warfighting exercises using the Army National Training Center, USAF Tactical Fighter Weapons Center, Navy Strike Warfare Center, and the Marine Air-Combat Center simultaneously, thereby exercising C₂ structures over vast distances.

A National Warfighting Center (not necessarily tied to one location in CONUS) needs to be established, through which joint warfighting commands and elements can be realistically exercised. Such

a center should have an objective evaluation system in place to provide valid after-action critiques of units' performances.

Clearly, simulations and wargaming will be expanded, while budgetary constraints will most certainly constrain field training of units/soldiers. Nevertheless, it is critical that "creative" joint exercises with headquarters and unit/soldiers be conducted on a frequent basis. Simulations cannot create the stress, pressures, demands, and realities of thoughtful, organized, and demanding training. The word "creative" stresses that there are ways to conduct such exercises while minimizing cost, but we must go about this in creative ways. Commands can be alerted and assembled. Planning can be conducted. Then only a representative sample of forces would be deployed--with even less being actually employed in short duration scenarios. Headquarters commands can conduct CPXs in conjunction with these exercises from home station. Contingency forces must have continual exercises which realistically test/stress the systems, the planners, the commanders, the supporters, and the soldiers. Alerts, assembly, and crisis action planning are an absolute necessity. Alerts need to be "no notice" and "no plan" crisis response situations to develop the inherent capability of contingency forces to deal with such crises. Also major command headquarters must be alerted, deployed, and employed within demanding scenarios. These elements need the same demanding training as soldiers and tactical units.

In summary, joint training must be expanded. We must find ways for the services CTCs to be used together. A National Warfighting Center needs to be established. Joint training must be conducted within realistic conditions that stress C₂, planning, deployment, for units and

soldiers alike. This realistic training requires an evaluation/after-action report system to offer sound evaluation of performance, doctrine, and tactics. Further, we must initiate creative ways to ensure adequate operational tempo (OPTempo) is maintained for contingency force training in order that high levels of combat readiness can be sustained.

#5. JOINT SYSTEMS DEVELOPMENT: This recommendation is very broad. It should encompass our entire defense establishment. All systems (all needs to be stressed strongly) within our services must be reviewed for possible merging with other services' systems if the following criteria are met: 1. Warfighting of the joint force is improved/enhanced in the long run. 2. Money is saved. 3. Interoperability is increased. This recommendation may have implications for the roles, missions, and functions review of the Armed Forces that is required by law every three years. Further, this recommendation may be a means by which significant funds can be saved, which can then be applied to other critical areas.

Examples of joint systems development would be:

- > Development of a common base jet aircraft for the USAF, Navy, and Marine Corps. From this base other models could be developed to meet specific operational requirements. Commonality in maintenance, supplies, spare parts, training, sub-components (radars, commo, safety systems etc.), flight line support, and many other second and third order savings would stem from this action.
- > Common communications systems for all services.
- > Common basic training for all soldiers.
- > Common skills training centers.

These specific recommendations are intended as illustrations; they are not comprehensive, and none of them may be entirely desirable or feasible. However, combining and integrating separate service functions into joint systems have the potential for tremendous cost savings. In addition these potential savings form a basis for better joint training. It allows for a better understanding of fellow services at all levels--soldier to general officer. Most of all, it has the potential for enhancing interoperability.

#6. MOBILITY REQUIREMENT STUDY-STRATEGIC MANEUVER, AGILITY, AND CONCENTRATION. Clearly, strategic maneuver is critical to contingency forces in year 2020. The Mobility Requirements Study conducted by DOD in 1992/1993 produced an integrated mobility plan that establishes the requirements for strategic lift for the U.S. This program must be funded and executed. As the study shows, strategic lift is inadequate at this time. Even with the fielding of additional sealift, new aircraft, and improvements in the U.S. strategic mobility infrastructures, attainment of U.S. objectives by year 1999 will still expose us to moderate risk.⁹⁵ Extending this risk out to year 2020 compounds the problem if additional lift is not procured for expected retirement of aging systems.

We must recognize that strategic mobility goes beyond strategic lift. Creative uses of the following "mobility enhancers" need to be considered by contingency forces.

STRATEGIC MOBILITY/AGILITY ENHANCERS

1. Strategic/Operational Surprise.
2. Combat Multipliers/Tailoring of Forces
3. High Technology Integration.
4. Strategic Air (Military/Civil Reserve Air Fleet-CRAF)
5. Strategic Sealift.
 - >Military Sealift Command (MSC) Assets.
 - >National Defense Reserve Fleet (RRF)
 - >U.S. Registered Commercial Ships
6. Supply Bases Within Theater.
7. Theater Support Infrastructures.
 - (Prepositioned C₂, air bases, ports, port access, overflight rights, etc.).
8. Prepositioning Options-Supplies/Equipment.
 - >Preposition of Material in Units Set (POMCUS).
 - >Preposition of War Stocks/Equipment within theater.
 - >Afloat Prepositioning (APF).
9. Host Nation Support/Contracting.
10. Coalition/Alliance Support.

The ongoing initiatives to increase units' capabilities (without increasing their size), to reduce equipment weight and size, and to stringently tailor task force size and accompanying supplies/equipment loads must continue. Such initiatives will reduce lift requirements and enhance strategic agility of the force.

"SECONDARY RECOMMENDATIONS"

Eleven secondary recommendations are presented to support the previously outlined major recommendations. The term "secondary" is used to stress that these recommendations, in and of themselves, will not necessarily optimize joint warfighting--they are not a panacea. However, their combined synergistic effect with the major recommendations have the potential for major advances in contingency force readiness. These eleven recommendations relate to the following areas:

- #1. Intelligence
- #2. Manpower Quality
- #3. Coalition Warfare--Coalition/Alliances
- #4. Interagency/Contingency Force Unity of Effort
- #5. Professional Development--Training/Education
- #6. Military Engagement/Forward Presence/Forward Deployment
- #7. Host Nation Support
- #8. Technology
- #9. Total Force
- #10. Weapons of Mass Destruction
- #11. Adequate Active Force Strength and Risk

The detailed explanation for each of the above recommendations are outlined in the following pages.

#1. INTELLIGENCE. A fully integrated and coordinated intelligence system should be established under the National Contingency Command (NACON). Contingency force planning and execution are driven by available intelligence. Intelligence must be precise, timely, and of

value to the operational and tactical levels of the contingency force. This integrated system must be wired to national agencies, must possess mobile equipment of the highest technology, and must possess units that can obtain and disseminate appropriate/meaningful intelligence. In turn, subordinate units must be linked into this system with similar equipment. Intelligence systems must provide NACON with real time intelligence that is user oriented. With superior intelligence systems, contingency forces can deter/preempt a crisis with tailored responses.

#2. MANPOWER QUALITY: The quality of U.S. Armed Forces personnel must be number one priority in the future since they will be responsible for the manning, maintaining, and fighting of the hi-tech systems of year 2020. Further, they will be the ones who develop the strategies and plans to execute missions. Obtaining and maintaining quality people will also require employment strategies of matching salaries, benefits, and other professional reinforcements for active and reserve force to ensure parity with American norms in 2020. Highly competent and intelligent soldiers/leaders will be critical for the flexibility required of contingency forces in the future.

Obtaining and maintaining quality manpower should be the highest priority in future years.

#3. COALITION WARFARE-COALITION/ALLIANCES: Future contingency forces must be able to easily adapt to and build upon the advantages of coalition/alliance situations. Coalition operations serve to concentrate strength, reduce vulnerabilities, and provide legitimacy.⁹⁶ These factors add to the combat power that contingency forces can bring

to bear in a crisis. Therefore contingency forces should routinely train with and exchange members with prospective coalition national forces. We should conduct combined planning and exchange units/personnel in peacetime.

Further, combined coalition contingency force organizations should be considered as the world becomes more interdependent. Bilateral or multilateral contingency forces with prearranged C₂ relationships would provide potential for increasing the available combat power that can be concentrated in response to a crisis area. Periodic coalition crisis response CPXs/training exercises should reinforce such forces. Economies of effort should be possible through combining strategic mobility and sustainability assets. Such forces would offer a strong deterrence to adversaries and provide a means of maintaining a regional balance of power for stability.

#4. INTERAGENCY/CONTINGENCY FORCE UNITY OF EFFORT: Agencies should be incorporated into the contingency planning process and integrated into the National Contingency Command (NACON). This could be accomplished through liaison cells from selected agencies attached to NACON. These cells would be deployable with the headquarters as required. This initiative would most likely require executive guidance to facilitate this unity of effort. Such action would have some very important advantages:

- > It would reinforce wartime functions of these agencies, especially in crisis response situations.

> Visibility of these agencies would be maintained within the contingency force headquarters, thus providing integration of the agencies on a daily basis.

> Agencies would be involved on a real time basis with the crisis at the operational level of warfare to reinforce the linkage between strategic goals and tactical warfighting. Their involvement would serve as a two way channel of communications between the military and the agency (higher to lower, lower to higher).

> Agencies would be involved in the contingency planning process.

> Agencies would be involved in all training exercises to work out crisis action procedures and increase awareness of the requirements of various OPLANS. Thus, the agencies could maximize their contribution to the mission execution.

In short, unity of effort and integration of critical governmental agencies would be increased by this action and joint warfighting would be further optimized as a result.

#5. PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT-TRAINING/EDUCATION: The successes of the armed services in developing professional NCOs, officers, and soldiers must be continued into the future. This must be a major priority. Joint warfighting requires thoroughly professional soldiers at all levels. Even more directly, crisis response situations require soldiers and leaders who can make independent judgements, develop creative approaches to problems, and exercise initiative. The professional development programs of the services should therefore be continued and

strengthened. This must be a high priority for service and joint budgets.

#6. MILITARY ENGAGEMENT/FORWARD PRESENCE/FORWARD DEPLOYMENT: Future contingency forces must be engaged in all regions of the world if they are to be ready for the interdependent world of 2020. Such engagement can run the spectrum from one man exchange programs, to major exercises, to port calls, to over-the-horizon presence, to show-of-force operations, to security assistance, and so on. If the world is becoming more interdependent, then the military must understand this world by maintaining military-to-military contact with allies and by conducting liaison/deployments outside CONUS to understand the separate regions' cultural and operational characteristics.

Likewise, forward presence and forward deployed forces should be used as flexible deterrent options (FDOs) prior to a crisis. In this context, HUMINT assets are of critical importance for intelligence gathering in fast breaking crisis situations. In fact, such assets need to be "on the ground" well prior to crises. Additionally, preestablished C₂ facilities, basing rights, airfields, ports, port access, overflight rights, and storage sites are essential for high threat regions.

Finally, we need access to training areas outside CONUS for conduct of major training exercises, for live fire exercises, and for conduct of crisis response exercises to fully rehearse and test strategic mobility/employment capabilities of contingency forces in real time/distance conditions. This initiative will also support military engagement/forward presence operations within regions.

#7. HOST NATION SUPPORT: Contingency force commands and unified commanders need to increase the level of host nation support available within regions. In times of crisis this support can be provided by the country at a "no cost" basis, or the U.S. can contract for it in country. "Hauling it" to the crisis simply reduces contingency force options, constrains operations and reduces operational flexibility. Host nation support can range from major contributions such as Japan's support of U.S. forces within their country (billions of dollars and facility support) to such simple actions as prearranged contracting or renting of in-country transport, engineer equipment, supplies, fuel, rations, etc.

Contingency forces must move away from "bring everything plus the kitchen sink" deployments of past days. The new paradigm must stress host nation support as a combat multiplier for strategic agility and sustainment.

#8. TECHNOLOGY: Contingency forces must possess the highest levels of technology available in order to maximize the combat power of the joint force while maintaining an edge over our potential adversaries. In the world of 2020, many military forces will possess hi-tech weapons systems and equipment due to their proliferation. The U.S. must take special care to enhance such technologies as strategic mobility, firepower, targeting, intelligence, communication, chemical and biological detection/protection gear, night vision equipment, ballistic missile defense systems, advanced lift and assault helicopters, advanced jet

aircraft systems, space resources, light assault vehicles, and specialized SOF equipment/weaponry.

Further technological advances in computers and software also have potential for integration into the battle systems of future contingency forces, but only if their acquisition and fielding are carefully planned and systematically integrated. Systems need to be jointly standardized with common architecture and software. Further, supporting training programs must be established to fully integrate these systems throughout the joint force. Contingency forces must have a standardized computer system available in all units down to company level; the system should be designed to support the joint warfighting planning/execution system.

These technologies must be supported by a creative program of research and development. Such systems have the potential to produce cost savings if efforts are combined. Research and development must continue but within a constrained budgetary environment. Therefore, joint cooperative efforts between services and with our allies will be essential in the future to ensure contingency forces can maintain an edge in the large fraternity of capable military forces in the year 2020.

#9. TOTAL FORCE: A total review of reserve component forces should be conducted to increase their utility for contingency operations and in support of our national security strategy as a whole. The Total Force has proven to be a success, but we have experienced shortcomings. Clearly, in year 2020 reserve forces will play a larger role in contingency operations. Thus, the Total Force successes need to be built upon and shortcomings need to be addressed. Future reserve

components will have to be more responsive, possess higher levels of skills and readiness, and be linked more directly to active forces for integration into the fighting forces in times of crises. Contingency force packages in year 2020 will require the use of reserve forces to offset the lack of active force. We must address this requirement now to shape a reserve component structure that will meet the readiness requirements of contingency operations in the future.

#10. WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION: Future contingency forces must be capable of disarming nuclear weapons and conducting limited clean-up operations for nuclear, chemical, and biological contamination in the early stages of a crisis. Contingency forces must also be able to operate in chemical and biological environments. Lastly, contingency forces must have the capability to detect nuclear weapons, radiation levels, and chemical/biological threats. Thus, contingency forces should contain the force structures for these specialized forces, possess the equipment for these tasks, and have staff personnel within contingency force headquarters for planning and execution of these operations.

A contingency force unit like NACON should have the most up-to-date protective gear and detection equipment. Such equipment needs to be prioritized for IRE/IFE (package 1 and 2 elements) or provided to special task forces within NACOM. Other equipment especially needed for selected contingency force elements are assault vehicles with overpressure systems for operation in contaminated area.

Contingency forces must also be able to operate under a nuclear deterrence umbrella in the event that a crisis poses the threat of

nuclear weapons use. By the year 2020 it is expected that 30 countries will possess some form of nuclear weapon capability. Therefore, NACON will require a staff for the planning of tactical nuclear employment; NACON must be prepared to accept special task force elements for employment of such weapons if NCA so directs. This capability will increase the deterrence value of U.S. contingency forces in year 2020 and serve to stabilize the use of such weapons within regions.

#11. ADEQUATE ACTIVE FORCE STRENGTH AND RISK: The last recommendation comes more as a comment but carries with it serious considerations for contingency forces, for our nation, and more directly for our soldiers' lives. Dennis M. Drew stated in the article "Recasting The Flawed Downsizing Debate":

The final hidden issue in the defense debate concerns the consequences of error. Only the consequences of building a future military that is too large have been vetted. Those consequences are important--money and manpower wasted that could have been better spent on other pressing national needs. But erring on the low side also leads to serious consequences.⁹⁷ (emphasis added)

The consequences of "erring on the low side" are:

1. It ties the hands of policy makers. Deterring and defeating threats to our national interests are at greater risk. Further, such lack of readiness would encourage transgression, not deterrence.
2. Victory would be at a high price. The U.S. may "carry on and muddle through to eventual victory."⁹⁸ but at a grave cost to lives (i.e. another Pearl Harbor, Bataan, Corregidor, Kasserine, and Task Force Smith).
3. The U.S. loses (i.e. Vietnam or Desert One) with a resulting loss of life and reduced influence in the world.⁹⁹

We must acknowledge that there is a level at which our active duty strength will not be able to meet national security objectives. This level will be determined by the "remarkable trinity"--the military, the government, and the will of the American people. However, the military must be fully engaged in this debate, because history has shown one thing for sure--conflict is inevitable.¹⁰⁰ Where, when, and how large a conflict is unknown. But without question the U.S. will one day again be challenged. In the year 2020, with adequate contingency forces, conflicts can be deterred. If deterrence fails, it can then be resolved in the best interests of the U.S. and its allies. On the other hand, inadequate forces mean failure and, in turn, reduced U.S. influence in the interdependent world, with the accompanying increased risk to other U.S. interests.

Finally, then, the military must identify what is "too little" and clearly communicate this in a responsible manner to our government and the American people alike as the downsizing debate continues.

(for closing comments see the next page)

CLOSING COMMENTS--NO MORE TASK FORCE SMITHS

This research paper began with a worst case crisis response situation in the year 2020. The situation was similar to the one awaiting Task Force Smith--the first unit to deploy to Korea to counter the North Korean Assault in the summer of 1950. It was a no-warning, no-plan, immediate deployment, and immediate employment crisis response situation--the most challenging crisis for a contingency force. The ensuing battle which followed Task Force Smith's deployment ended in defeat--disastrous defeat. The U.S. Armed Forces were unprepared for war.¹⁰¹ Since WW II the military had been downsized, no new weapons had been procured, training and discipline were lax. After all the "push button technology" of the atomic bomb had replaced ground warfare! But, the reality of the Korean War changed this pipe dream quickly. As T.R. Fehrenbach stated in This Kind of War:

Korea showed, or should have shown, that all is not easy in this world, that for the rest of this century things may not get better but will probably get worse, and to talk despairingly of going up in smoke or frying in hard radiation is no answer. If the free nations want a certain kind of world, they will have to fight for it, with courage, money, diplomacy--and legions.¹⁰²

Based on present trends projected out to year 2020, it is clear that the prospects for future "Task Force Smiths" are on the horizon. The difference, however, is that future potential adversaries will be well trained and equipped with hi-tech equipment. Will we be ready? Will we be able to deter these conflicts or decisively react to them if deterrence fails? The answer really lies within the will of each one of us as professional soldiers. History has repeatedly stressed the lesson

that we can shape the future or be shaped by it! This paper has presented recommendations for optimizing the joint warfighting of future contingency forces in the year 2020. The challenge is to act in the nation's best interest and in our soldiers' best interests. We must build upon these recommendations to ensure we do in fact shape the future to secure our national interests.

A quote from the late General Abrams (former Chief of Staff of The Army in the early 1970s) is most appropriate for closing this paper. General Abrams had grave concern about the Army's readiness to meet future threats. Speaking to audiences he would comment on the three wars he had served in (WW II, Korea, and Vietnam). Eventually he would, quite emotionally, outline how unprepared America was for each of them. He would carefully cite the enormous costs unpreparedness entailed-- costs paid by the soldier. In this regard he would say:

...We have paid, and paid, and paid again in blood and sacrifice for our unpreparedness...I don't want war but I am appalled at the human cost that we've paid because we wouldn't prepare to fight...103

As professional soldiers, the challenge is clearly ours not to be unprepared for the future year of 2020.

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