


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**IMPROVING
COMBAT MANEUVER TRAINING CENTER (CMTIC)
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT TRAINING**

BY

**LIEUTENANT COLONEL JOHN A. MANDEVILLE
United States Army**

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
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IMPROVING COMBAT MANEUVER TRAINING CENTER (CMTC)
COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT TRAINING

An Individual Study Project

by

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ABSTRACT

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As the world closes the door on the 20th Century and opens the door to the 21st Century, the political and economic climates shaping the Army are changing. The President's and Congress' highest priority is to reduce the size of the national debt and the federal budget. Defense budget cuts are a reality. American leaders and the public want a leaner, but just as effective, military force. To maintain fighting units and soldiers as credible components of America's national defense, tough and realistic training must be conducted. To do this, the Army must provide an environment where units and soldiers receive the best training possible at the most economic costs. Combat Training Centers provide realistic, performance-oriented training that ensures units achieve the standards spelled out in Army doctrine, and are one of the most cost effective training facilities. This paper provides my observations and recommendations as a senior observer and controller for Forward Support Battalions (FSBs) training at the Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC), a Combat Training Center (CTC) in Hohenfels, Germany. Specifically, the study discusses the CMTC environment, identifies FSB training shortfalls, and makes recommendations for FSB training.

INTRODUCTION

As the Army refines doctrine into the nineties and beyond, combat service support (CSS) operations must continue to focus on predicting requirements, tailoring support units, projecting support forward, sustaining deployed forces, and protecting rear areas. In order to accomplish these challenging missions, units must conduct tough, realistic training in peacetime to be prepared for contingency operations in the future. The combat training centers (CTCs) provide the only peacetime locations for realistic, performance oriented training.¹ This paper provides my observations and recommendations as a senior observer and controller for Forward Support Battalions (FSBs) training at the Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC), a CTC in Hohenfels, Germany. Specifically, I will discuss the CMTC environment, identify FSB training shortfalls, and make recommendations for FSB training.

ENVIRONMENT

The four CTCs: National Training Center (NTC), Fort Irwin, California; Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), Fort Chaffee, Arkansas; Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC), Hohenfels, Germany; and Battle Command Training Program (BCTP), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, were established to increase training effectiveness by conducting performance-based training.¹ Performance-based training requires soldiers and units to perform as they would in combat. CMTC's mission is to provide realistic combined arms training for United States Army Europe (USAREUR) brigade combat teams, maneuver battalion task forces, and brigade

support slices in force-on-force exercises against a realistic and professional opposing force (OPFOR). All direct fire engagements use Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement Systems (MILES). All obstacles and minefields must be physically emplaced and removed. All casualties must be properly treated and evacuated. Resupply must be done to sustain operations. Battlefield effects include smoke, pyrotechnics, and chemical events.

CMTC exercises accomplish three vital functions for the training unit. It wrenches up their standards. Second, CMTC rotations ensure that units, leaders, and soldiers are trained for combat. Third, the observations and feedback mechanisms provide data for improving a unit's homestation training, standard operating procedures (SOPs) and leader development.'

CMTC is only one-sixteenth (40,000 acres) the size of NTC (640,000 acres), so CSS units coming to CMTC conduct part of their training in maneuver rights areas (MRAs). MRAs are German contracted training areas 15 to 30 kilometers from CMTC that are located in towns and farms. A typical FSB comes to CMTC twice a year for a rotation of twenty-one to thirty-one days. The first and last three days are for deployment and redeployment respectively and include pre and post operations, road marches, and rail operations. The other fifteen to twenty-five days include support for battalion task force operations, internal brigade support area (BSA) functions, and BSA moves. Besides CSS functions and moves, the soldiers in the BSA will be observed and

provided feedback on their performance during persistent and nonpersistent chemical events, motorized rifle company attacks on the BSA, refuel-on-the-move operations, night operations, and partisan attacks. All the unit's planning, preparation, and execution will be observed and compared to the standards established in current doctrine. Professional observer controllers (OCs) observe, control, record, and provide feedback to the unit's leaders and soldiers after each event.'

There are five primary benefits that a FSB will gain from a CMTC training experience. First, CMTC provides USAREUR FSBs with their only opportunity to support a battalion task force in realistic combat conditions. Second, CMTC provides the only time a FSB commander can put on his BSA hat and lead and organize those soldiers and units (military police platoon, chemical company, brigade S1 and S4, maneuver battalion field trains, artillery field trains, engineer trains and command and control elements, air defense artillery elements, corps CSS units, Main Support Battalion (MSB) units, division support command (DISCOM) elements, intelligence personnel, and various transportation units) that are not organic to his unit. Third, the BSA commander must during a rotation not only accomplish his CSS role effectively but also perform security and terrain management responsibilities for the brigade commander. Fourth, CMTC provides the only realistic environment for the FSB to be fully integrated into the combat support and maneuver unit activities. Lastly, CMTC allows the FSB commander and staff to establish

staff procedures and working relationships with the brigade commander and his staff.⁶

FSBs receive two primary products from CMTC. A series of formal and informal after action reviews (AARs). These AARs are conducted at platoon, company and battalion level by OCs using maps, films, radio communications and other technical aids. An AAR is conducted after each major event. The unit discusses what happened, why it happened, and what improvements could be made. The battalion level AARs are filmed and incorporated into a take home package (THP), the second major product of a FSB CMTC rotation. The THP provides a unit with an audiovisual record of the CMTC training experience, a written report detailing individual and collective strengths and weaknesses, specific quantifiable unit performance data, and suggestions for developing and improving home station training programs.⁷

As described, the CMTC training environment is multi-faceted and very demanding. To be successful, FSB leaders and soldiers must know both tactical and technical doctrine and more importantly how to use the doctrine in various scenarios. Units must have streamlined standard operating procedures (SOPs) that are easy to use under adverse conditions. Units must have efficient procedures that soldiers habitually use to maintain mission capable equipment. Comprehensive planning and coordination must be continuous and forward looking. Lastly, the FSB leadership must retain flexibility to respond effectively to unexpected events.

TRAINING SHORTFALLS

My experience with CSS units during CMTC rotations coupled with discussions with the senior FSB OCs from NTC, JRTC, and BCTP; meetings with the experts at the CTC support branch at Fort Lee, Virginia; and documentation reviews of the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) CSS data bank provide me with an in-depth understanding of what training needs to be improved and emphasized in CSS units. Many of the points that I will discuss were verified with company level CSS OCs at CMTC.

The following observations focus on what my analysis concludes are the major areas needing emphasis in CSS units and are grouped by the battle operating systems (BOSs). I will list the FSB observations that reoccurred most often. After each BOS, I will describe the most significant areas needing improvements and make recommendations for enhancing training. Lastly, I will discuss pre-rotational training and offer a four phase training program to correct deficiencies.

Intelligence

- o Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB) Process
 - FSBs do not routinely receive intelligence estimates from brigade.
 - Brigade intelligence does not include the BSA area.
 - Doctrinal arrays and templates of threat are not developed
 - Spot reporting is not sustained.

- Military police (MP) are not used in the intelligence process.
- Reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) plans are not established.
- Listening and observation posts (LP/OP) procedures are unclear.
- o Battle Tracking
 - Battle tracking and map posting are poorly accomplished.
 - BSA threat implications not assessed effectively.
 - Threat analysis dissemination to BSA needs emphasis.

Recommendation

To enhance intelligence operations in a FSB, the FSB leadership must establish standard intelligence procedures that ensure continuous operational interface between the brigade tactical operation center (TOC) and the FSB TOC. This has been effectively accomplished in a few FSBs by establishing a dedicated FSB liaison officer who has specific instructions and responsibilities. The liaison officer spends the majority of his/her time coordinating and communicating with the brigade staff. Also during brigade field training exercises (FTXs), battle tracking in the FSBs should be observed by the brigade S2 to ensure it meets Army standards. Third, the FSB operations officer should develop a viable R&S plan that uses, collects, and analyzes data from LP/OPs, BSA units, MPs, patients, maintenance

support teams, truck drivers, medical aid station personnel, BSA air defense teams, and units moving through the BSA.

Fire Support

- FSBs need to utilize the expertise of the service battery commander.
- All BSA tenants need to receive and understand the fire support plan.

Recommendation

The BSA commander needs to make it SOP that the service battery commander is tasked to plan, prepare, coordinate, and practice the BSA fire support plan. The service battery commander is the best BSA source for fire support expertise, therefore, he should accomplish this responsibility in the BSA.

Air Defense (AD)¹⁸

- BSA is often not protected by AD assets.
- Soldiers in the BSA cannot identify friendly from foe aircraft.

Recommendation

BSA commander must emphasize to the brigade commander and his staff the need for AD assets in the BSA. Standardized AD signals must be established and practiced throughout the BSA to alert soldiers of enemy aircraft. Passive (alarms, evacuation plan, dispersion, camouflage, early warning, fighting positions, etc.) rather than active (weapons fire) measures need to be used in the BSA to enhance air defense.

Mobility and Survivability

- BSA defense plan should incorporate all BSA tenants.
- LP/OPs are vital in BSA defense.
- Military police assets must be incorporated into BSA defense.
- The defensive plan must be updated when mission or organizational changes occur.
- Radio (FM) and wire communications must be effective to make the system work.
- A hasty displacement plan must be developed and rehearsed.
- Fields of fire and areas of responsibility must be coordinated.
- Company sector sketches are inaccurate and not timely submitted.

Recommendation

A detailed BSA security plan that incorporates all the BSA assets (weapon systems, personnel, radios, night vision equipment, vehicles, barrier material, NBC assets, medical assets, etc.) must be planned, resourced, coordinated, and rehearsed daily. The two keys to the plan are establishment of an early warning system (battle tracking, R&S procedures, LP/OP's, patrols, etc.) and an evacuation system for critical assets that includes a location for alternate CSS operations.

CSS - Supply Company (A Co.)⁽¹⁾

- Every attempt must be made to conduct CSS operations outside the BSA area.
- Ammunition (CLASS V) site selection, materiel handling equipment (MHE) employment, 24 hour operations, forecasting, management, and accounting are weak.

Recommendation

Rations (CLASS I) and bulk fuel (CLASS III) operations often hamper BSA security. The BSA commander must attempt to perform these missions outside the BSA and at night. Two reasons many units do not place CLASS III (P) forward are lack of transportation assets and loss of mobility. The FSB needs more trucks and trailers (HEMTTs) built into the force structure to provide FSBs with the capability to conduct CSS operations outside the BSA. Currently, FSBs must play a shell game with transportation assets to match competing demands for limited resources.

The supply company in the FSB will be increasingly hard pressed to provide quality and timely CSS to maneuver units on the nonlinear battlefield of the future without the necessary quantities of personnel (key NCOs and officers). Critical shortages exist in the supply platoon to conduct ammunition, rations, fuel, and other supply functions effectively and efficiently for three separate battalion task forces. Based on my analysis, there will be major shortcomings on future battlefields without additional manpower and trucks in the supply

platoon of ALPHA Companies in FSBs thus limiting their ability to conduct CSS operations outside the BSA.

CSS - Maintenance Company (B Co.)¹³

- Maintenance support teams (MSTs) are not used efficiently by the task force commanders.
- Communications is lacking between MSTs and the Maintenance Company.
- Maintenance priority is not enforced.
- Maintenance reporting is not timely or accurate.

Recommendation

MSTs augment the maneuver units repair capability, and they can be a vital combat multiplier. MSTs need to be pushed forward, and the task force commanders must be educated on the MSTs capabilities and limitations. A thorough understanding is required by both the users (task forces) and providers (MST) concerning what types of maintenance can be performed under different battlefield conditions.

Health Service Support (HSS) - Medical Company (C Co.)¹⁴

- HSS plan (patient workload estimates, resources, locations, routes, etc.) must be included in the brigade operations order.
- HSS plan must be developed by the brigade surgeon, Charlie Company commander, and brigade adjutant.
- HSS plan preparations need to focus on troop leading procedures and identify cycle times and lift capacities.

- Synchronization and coordination of HSS plan are lacking between the users (Maneuver Units) and providers (Medical Company).

Recommendation

The key HSS person is the brigade surgeon. Currently, habitual relationships do not exist between the physician and the medical company. In addition, the physician is generally not tactically trained to be a successful medical company commander. He/she is not available for training with his/her assigned unit. Often a different doctor is assigned to the unit during training. The Professional Filler System (PROFIS) needs to be fixed and adequate tactical training needs to be provided for physicians.

Command and Control¹⁵

- Unit SOP is not understood and not used.
- More movement planning and rehearsals are needed.
- Automation capabilities need to be enhanced and used more effectively.

Recommendation

If there is one key step that a FSB commander could take to increase efficiency and correct problems that occur in a tactical field environment, it should be to develop a usable SOP. A SOP that can fit into a soldier's pocket, is comprised mainly of checklists, can be separated, is weather and soil resistant, and can be updated easily and quickly would be the most effective.

Automation assets are vital on present and future battlefields to maximize efficiency and to accomplish the

mission. Unit Level Logistics Systems (ULLS) and other automated information systems are used at CMTC but lack a secure system to transmit critical and sensitive data long distances. This shortcoming needs to be fixed. The Tactical Combat Service Support Computer System (TACCS) is on hand to provide hardware for tactical logistics automation. However, many units do not train with their TACCS boxes when they deploy to CMTC. Precious logistics automation assets must be effectively utilized in order to accomplish the CSS mission. Units should be required to bring all their war time automation assets to CMTC.

PRE-ROTATIONAL TRAINING

In addition to the recommendations that were made concerning the battle operating systems' shortfalls, there are other training improvements that would greatly enhance a FSBs training experience at CMTC and thus ensure a taxpayer's training dollar is maximized. Most units do pre-rotation training prior to their CMTC rotations, but in CSS units the training lacks focus and professionalism. A more systematic, thorough and comprehensive training approach is needed if the same mistakes made each rotation are to be eliminated.

A four phase training approach is needed. Using this four phase scenario, all FSBs would be required to complete each phase prior to coming to CMTC. CMTC observers/controllers would be an integral component of the training. Phase one would be mail-ahead information that each unit would study and understand. Phase two would be core training conducted by a CMTC mobile

training team. Phase three would be CMTC subject matter expert training. Phase four would be unit training with their slice elements.

As part of phase one, CMTC would develop unit read-ahead packages containing CMTC training and administrative regulations, maps, CSS lessons learned, a list of suggested TADSSs (training aids, devices, simulators and simulations) to use during training, copies of items (CSS matrices, fill-in-the-blank order formats, checklists, SOPs, meeting formats, battle drills) that successful units have used at CMTC, safety requirements, rules of engagement (ROE) and practical exercises on doctrine. Also this phase would allow the Commander of Operations Group (COG) at CMTC the opportunity to present any command interest topics (safety, environmental concerns, new training opportunities) that he/she feels are important to rotating units. This phase would be completed prior to any additional training. The importance of this aspect of the training is to get the leaders and soldiers to think about their rotation and the challenges that they will face, to provide an overview of the CMTC environment, to allow the unit to assess their current knowledge of tactical and technical doctrine, to identify training shortfalls, and to incorporate into their SOPs some of the techniques, formats, and procedures that have made other units effective at CMTC.

The key item in the read-ahead package would be the doctrine tests. These tests would be of two varieties. One test would be focuses on basic doctrine which every sergeant and above leader

would take. The second test would be a group of technical quizzes. A different technical test would be provided for the adjutant, operations officer, brigade and battalion logistics officers, each company commander, and the battalion maintenance officer and non-commissioned officer. These technical tests would be taken without any preparation and graded by the individual taking the test. The purpose of the tests would be to provide each key leader in the battalion with an understanding of his/her weak and strong points so that individual self-study could be conducted prior to a CMTC rotation. By doing this self-analysis, an individual would set his/her own personal training goals for CMTC, study, and then check and reinforce his/her knowledge at CMTC. In addition, each individual would be better prepared to take advantage of the other pre-rotation training opportunities.

The second phase, core training, would be the most important training. During this training facet, CMTC observers/controllers (OCs) would provide structured training sessions for the BSA leadership. It would be essential that all the BSA leadership (NCOs and officers from the FSB, field trains, rear CP, and tenant organizations) attend the training. Not only would beneficial training be conducted by experts, but the FSB commander would have the opportunity to take off his FSB hat and put on his BSA hat in order to provide BSA guidance. In many cases this would be the FSB commander's first opportunity to

establish ground rules and standard procedures for all BSA tenants.

The core training conducted would include rules of engagement, MILES and training device training, lessons learned, safety instructions and doctrine training. The purpose of this portion of the training program would be to standardize the application and interpretation of the Rules of Engagement (ROE), MILES use, lessons learned, safety, and doctrine to help eliminate training distractors. Also specific situations would be discussed to identify gray areas in ROE, safety, and doctrine. The end results of these discussions would be to create a common sense approach to solving problems and to explain judgment calls made at CMTTC. The bottom line for the unit leader to understand is that doctrine rules at CMTTC, and units need a solid doctrinal understanding in order to handle tactical situations effectively.

A great amount of detailed instruction would be spent on MILES. This is the only system at CMTTC that allows immediate feedback of battlefield actions of individual soldiers, weapons, and vehicles. Everyone forward of the brigade rear boundary must wear a complete set of MILES gear. Units would receive an in-depth understanding of how MILES works, operating instructions, and maintenance procedures.

Phase two training would be conducted based on a unit's schedule and would be approximately one week in length. Ideally, the training would be completed four to five months before a rotation to provide a unit a training quarter to correct OC

identified training shortfalls. The execution of the training would be conducted in small groups training sessions with each OC training the elements that he/she would observe and control during the rotation. Doctrinal practical exercises would be administered and self-graded. Reviews of the practical exercises would be used to reinforce and clarify vague or difficult doctrinal concepts. Normally, doctrine is good at telling leaders and soldiers what to do but weak in the "how-to-do" area. Because OCs have seen numerous units try to implement doctrine in realistic combat training, they have seen many techniques and procedures that work and many that don't work. During the training sessions, OCs could share this valuable practical information with unit leaders. Lastly, these training seminars would be informal and provide open discussion and question and answer sessions.

After the core training has been accomplished by the CMTC OC mobile training team, the units would have subject matter expert training. This instruction would be on a one-on-one basis or for a selected group for a specific subject. The unit would request training assistance in a specified subject such as medical planning, mounted land navigation, terrain management procedures, BSA security, CSS night operations, refuel-on-the-move operations, etc.; and the CMTC expert for this topic would contact the officer or NCO needing extra instruction and schedule a training session. The purpose of this system would be to provide in-depth and intensive instruction to a targeted audience

to enhance the capabilities of a unit in a specific area.

The final phase of training would be unit training with their BSA slice elements. During phase two, the FSB commander had the opportunity to establish communications and standards for the units that operate and are members of the BAS, but which are not organic to the FSB. Lessons learned from many CMTC rotations indicate that the FSB leadership spends an inordinate amount of time orienting and instructing nonorganic units and soldiers on BSA standard operating procedures. Normally, the most casualties and problems that occur in a BSA are caused by BSA tenants that lack an understanding of BSA procedures. This training would be crucial to eliminating misunderstanding, increasing efficiencies, and creating a team environment in the BSA. The bible for this training would be the BSA SOP. Reports, meetings, alarms, active and passive defensive measures, battle drills, rehearsals, safety, sanitation, communication processes, troop leading procedures, orders process, base cluster operation center (BCOC) systems, terrain management, pre-execution checks, pre-combat checks, BSA movement and relocation techniques, and individual soldier skills would be some of the areas to be covered in the training. The purpose of the training would be to build a team environment, identify equipment (radios, weapons, NBC, night vision goggles, transportation) problems, establish routines for BSA activities, validate SOPs, establish support relationships, and generally ensure all BSA units understand the BSA environment and their responsibilities.

CONCLUSION

Today's Army must prepare for tomorrow's contingencies. Budget and manpower cuts are already occurring as domestic budget pressure increases. Our large military establishment is a thing of the past, and at the same time the threats to world peace by ethnic and regional powers are increasing. The Army challenges are clear: maintain a high quality, professional Army capable of deploying, fighting and winning anywhere in the world. The Army must accomplish this mission with a smaller force that is more lethal, ready, and capable than our current force. In addition, entry-level soldiers coming out of basic combat and advanced individual training (BCT and AIT) from the Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) schools are receiving less formalized training in the classroom because of funding and personnel cuts.¹⁵ The solution necessary to these challenges is training. Hard, disciplined, and realistic training will play an essential part as our Army transitions into the 21st Century. CMTC provides a facility where units can train for an extended time in essential combined arms operations. This facility provides the ideal training for CSS soldiers and units and gives the taxpayer the best deal for his/her training dollar.

In this study, I have discussed the CMTC environment, identified FSB training shortfalls, and made recommendations for FSB training. To ensure the taxpayer continues to obtain the most for his/her tax dollar, leaders must continue to search for economic training alternatives and ways to optimize current

training. This study offers some suggestions and recommendations to enhance rotational and pre-rotation training at CMTC for FSBs.

ENDNOTES

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