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CONSOLIDATION OF
DOD AVIATION DEPOTS
REQUIRES
A JOINT DEPOT COMMAND

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL H. LEE HOLLOWAY III
United States Marine Corps

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CONSOLIDATION OF DOD AVIATION DEPOTS REQUIRES
A JOINT DEPOT COMMAND

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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Global and domestic environments necessitate a review of the resources that support the national military strategy. The resources to meet the national military strategy are the combat forces and the logistics establishment for sustainment. This paper focuses on a method for improving the sustainability of aviation combat power despite the expected decrease in resources, and advocates that the consolidation of the DOD depot maintenance program will positively improve sustainment. The argument is formulated in three segments: first, an overview of the DOD depot maintenance program and recent attempts to improve it; second, the argument will apply consolidation to resolve four existing problems within the aviation depot maintenance program (excess capacity, lack of standard business practices, no single manager, and no ties to the combatant commanders); and third, the paper will discuss the benefits of consolidation within the aviation depot maintenance program and advocate consolidation throughout the total DOD depot maintenance program. The premise of this paper and all supporting arguments is that a consolidation perspective should prevail, and that a joint depot maintenance command should be established and be appropriately named the Depot Command (DEPCOM).

As the states of the former Soviet Union struggle to form new democracies, war besets Yugoslavia, Japan becomes a dominant economic power, Germany unifies, Iran and Iraq compete for dominance of Southwest Asia and the United Nations becomes a strong influence in world events, a new world order is emerging. In light of these new developments, the United States, besieged by an ever growing deficit, must reexamine its role in the world. A large concern in this examination is the size and mission of US military forces. The Senate Armed Services Committee expected that the 1994 budget request by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff would report significant changes in the Department of Defense (DOD) to make the military more efficient.¹ Troop strength reductions had been mandated by 1997: Army from 640,700 to 536,000; Navy from 551,300 to 501,200; Air Force from 485,100 to 430,300; and Marine Corps from 188,000 to 158,800.² Civilian employment within DOD was expected to be reduced by 120,000 employees.³ These budget expectations and personnel reductions were to align the department with the previous presidential administration's goals. The new administration's goals appear to require even deeper resource cuts: 217,000 more personnel and 50 to 120 billion more dollars.⁴ It is imperative that this reduction of forces not deplete either the services' combat power or their ability to sustain that combat power.

Sustainment of combat power is the purpose of logistics. This paper will focus on a method for improving the sustainability of aviation combat power despite the expected decrease in resources. Two key definitions used in this paper

address sustainment, and the functional areas of logistics. Sustainment is defined as the logistics functions that provide peacetime equipment readiness, support of equipment during combat operations, and the return of equipment to readiness standards after deployment. Logistics is comprised of four primary functions: procurement, supply, distribution and maintenance. These sustainment and functional logistics definitions were formulated from a single source, DOD Directive 5100.1, "Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components."⁵

These definitions encompass a large range of logistical efforts. In an effort to be concise, this paper will discuss only a specific portion of the maintenance function, aviation depot maintenance, in an attempt to support an argument for the consolidation of all depot maintenance. This paper advocates that the consolidation of the DOD depot maintenance program will positively improve the sustainment of combat forces. The argument is formulated in three segments. First, an overview of the DOD depot maintenance program and a history of recent attempts to improve it. In this segment, the paper will point out the significance of aviation depot maintenance to the total program. Secondly, the argument will apply consolidation to four existing problems within the aviation depot maintenance program. This portion of the argument is intended to specifically present the positive improvements consolidated management will make to the aviation depot maintenance program. Finally, the paper will discuss the benefits of consolidation to the total DOD depot

maintenance program.

Realizing that depot maintenance existed prior to the establishment of DOD, this paper will begin the overview of the depot maintenance program with the creation of DOD in 1947, and the subsequent 1948 Key West Agreement which gave broad and overlapping responsibilities to the services.⁶ Logistics functions were included in these overlapping responsibilities. DOD Directive 5100.1 assigns the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps the responsibility to provide logistics support for service forces.⁷ To meet this responsibility, each service developed and operated a depot maintenance system. The systems were and are comprised of privately (commercial) and publicly (organic) owned depots. As a result of the Level of Repair Analysis (LORA) conducted incident to the supply provisioning process, these depots can be assigned to repair and overhaul components of weapon systems up to and including the weapon system itself. The depots also have a limited capability to manufacture items needed for the repair process. At present, these depots have limited dependency on each other and function primarily to support the weapon systems of an individual service. In 1961, in an effort to consolidate at least some of the supply management functions, DOD established the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) to serve as an inventory control and physical distribution agency for line items of supply that were common to all of the services.⁸ Although DLA has not become the single agency for DOD logistics support, their responsibilities have

significantly increased over time. As a result of recent Defense Management Review Decisions (DMRD'S), DLA has been tasked to take over most of the services' inventory control functions and all of their physical distribution functions. However, the inventory control of repairable components and the depot maintenance related to those components continues to be a service responsibility.

Depot maintenance is a complex and important contributing factor in the support plans of each service. The complexity of depot maintenance is illustrated by a comparison of the processing steps required to perform manufacturing versus those to perform repair. Manufacturing involves fabrication and assembly; while repair entails the steps of disassembly, inspection, repair, as well as the two steps of manufacturing.⁹ The importance of depot maintenance is evidenced by its existence in each services' support plans. The Air Force predominately plans for two levels of maintenance: organizational and depot. The Army, Navy, and Marine Corps plan for three levels of maintenance: organizational, intermediate and depot. Army and Marine Corps support plan variations place these three levels at different echelons within the combat service support structures. For the purpose of this discussion, organizational level maintenance is defined as maintenance performed by a unit on assigned equipment. Organizational maintenance is primarily scheduled maintenance. Intermediate level maintenance is defined as that maintenance performed by specific organizations in direct

support of the using unit. Intermediate maintenance is primarily unscheduled repair. Depot level maintenance is defined as major repair (ie. aircraft crash or battle damage repair) and scheduled overhaul. Because of its complexity and importance, depot maintenance has developed into a sizable portion of the total DOD maintenance program. The DOD depot maintenance program has become a large business enterprise. DOD employs approximately 150,000 civilian and military personnel utilizing facilities and equipment costing in excess of 17 billion dollars to accomplish depot maintenance.¹⁰ The annual depot maintenance cost within DOD is 13 billion dollars (45 percent to support aircraft, 33 percent to support ships, 13 percent to support miscellaneous equipment, 5 percent to support combat vehicles, and 4 percent to support missiles).¹¹ Depot maintenance is performed on 700,000 pieces of equipment, 36,000 combat vehicles, 660,000 wheeled vehicles, 500 ships and 33,000 aircraft.¹² It is obvious that DOD has invested substantial resources to operate this depot maintenance business enterprise.

This significant investment of human and financial resources has highlighted the need for a more effective DOD depot maintenance improvement reform program. Past attempts to improve the depot maintenance programs have not met DOD expectations. The Joint Logistics Commanders (JLC) have been the services' representatives tasked to recommend and initiate improvements.¹³ JLC membership is comprised of the Commander, US Army Material Command; the Commander US Air Force Material Command; the Deputy

Chief of Staff for Installations and Logistics, Headquarters, US Marine Corps; the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Logistics; and the Director, Defense Logistics Agency.¹⁴ To look specifically at depot maintenance, JLC created the Joint Depot Maintenance Analysis Group (JDMAG) in 1980.¹⁵ Because JLC and JDMAG have consistently concluded that each service should retain control over their depots, individual improvements have been small in magnitude. For example, in fiscal year 1991, budget savings were 3 percent from interservicing and .5 percent from competition.¹⁶

In 1990 the Secretary of Defense created the Defense Depot Maintenance Council (DDMC) to advise the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Production and Logistics and to participate in the Defense Management Review (DMR) process.¹⁷ DDMC membership is comprised of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and the JLC members.¹⁸ The DMR process was initiated by the Secretary of Defense to restructure and consolidate the functions of the department in a business-like operation.¹⁹ The DMR process has initiated dramatic organizational changes throughout DOD; many specifically aimed at the depot maintenance program.²⁰ DMR initiatives are staffed within the office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and given to the services for staffing and implementation as a Defense Management Review Decision (DMRD).

In 1992 the Secretary of Defense issued 2 DMRDs to restructure and consolidate the services' maintenance depots.

These DMRDs segregated aviation depots from non-aviation depots. DMRD 908 specifically pertains to the consolidation of aviation depots and estimates or projects a 6.2 billion dollar budgetary savings by 1997.²¹ DMRD 909 pertains to consolidation of non-aviation maintenance depots within the department.²² Guidance on how to achieve consolidation was not provided in either of the DMRDs. Without specific guidance to consolidate, the services attempted to address only cost reduction initiatives that would equal the projected savings. The services reacted to the DMRDs as they had to previous cost reductions; each sought to achieve their portion of the forecasted reductions from their separate depot programs. Since the services did not satisfy the consolidation issue, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff requested that the joint staff study the issue of depot consolidation.²³ This study, performed by four retired flag officers and a retired industry representative, all with strong logistics backgrounds, reiterated the need to consolidate DOD depot maintenance. Joint staff and DDMC recommendations were to consolidate depot maintenance by establishing a joint depot maintenance command or agency.²⁴ Recently the Deputy Secretary of Defense requested that the service secretaries prepare a list of maintenance depots that could be closed. In his guidance he also indicated agreement with the DDMC and joint staff consolidation recommendations.²⁵ In January 1993, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs recommended a consolidated depot maintenance command. At the same time, the services listed recommended depots

for closure within their 1993 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) submission. Three of these depots perform aviation depot maintenance.

It is the opinion of this author that the overview of the DOD depot maintenance program and the aforementioned attempts at reform poignantly show that the services' reform efforts to date have been primarily aimed at achieving improved management without consolidating. On the other hand, from a DOD and joint staff perspective, the primary goal of the consolidation initiative is not cost effectiveness or economizing the capital and human resource investments, but rather is to achieve management improvements that will yield both the sustainment readiness of the forces as well as the attainment of the DMR dollar savings goals.

It is the premise of this paper that the DOD and joint staff consolidation perspective should prevail, and that a joint depot maintenance command should be established and be appropriately named the Depot Command (DEPCOM). DEPCOM would provide consolidated management leadership to the entire DOD depot maintenance program. The balance of this paper will focus on the aviation depot maintenance program and how it could benefit from a consolidation initiative. Attention is directed to the services' aviation depot programs because they represent almost half of the total DOD depot maintenance program budget dollars, and also because the programs' problems are representative of those being experienced by the other DOD depot level maintenance

programs.

To accomplish DOD aviation depot maintenance, the services operate 12 primary depots (6 Navy, 5 Air Force, and 1 Army).²⁶ In view of this paper's premise, these 12 depots, their maintenance capabilities, and the requirements for force sustainment that they satisfy will be discussed promoting a transformation to consolidation. A discussion of a DEPCOM consolidated management approach which addresses the problems of excess capacity, lack of standard business practices, no single manager, and no ties to the combatant commanders will show the positive benefits that can be applied to the total DOD depot maintenance program.

Excess capacity within the aviation depots is a severe problem that plagues the depots. In a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Air Force stated that there is enough capacity within the five Air Force Logistics Centers (AFLC) alone to accomplish all Air Force as well as Navy and Marine Corps fixed wing aircraft depot maintenance requirements.²⁷ This memorandum further suggested that all Navy and Marine Corps rotor winged aircraft depot maintenance requirements could be accomplished by existing resources at the Army's aviation depot at Corpus Christi, Texas (CCAD).²⁸ Assuming that the assumptions and facts used by the Secretary of the Air Force are valid, it should be concluded that 6 of the total 12 aviation depots are excess capacity. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has stated that today there is 25 to 50

percent more depot capacity than the services will require during this century.²⁹ Additive to the existing excess capacity is the redundant capability of the individual service depots. For example, all 6 Naval Aviation Depots (NADEP) have the capability to repair different types of aircraft engines. In another example, NADEPs Cherry Point, Pensacola, as well as CCAD all have the capability to repair helicopter rotor blades.

To further aggravate the already existing capacity issue, the projected reductions to the active and reserve forces will increase the excess capacity in the aviation depots. The new Secretary of Defense, Les Aspin, has indicated that 5 fighter wings may be eliminated from the 43 wings existing in the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps.³⁰ This will eliminate aircraft from the current inventory that require depot maintenance. The force reductions have meant that procurement of new aircraft into the inventory have been reduced. The Navy has canceled or delayed the production schedules for the P-7 and AX aircraft.³¹ The Air Force has placed a final order for 3 F-15E aircraft and reduced the production schedule of the F-16 aircraft from 108 in 1991 to 24 in 1993.³² The Army has delayed production of the 1,292 RAH-66 Comanche helicopters.³³ Reduction of aircraft within the services reduces the amount of depot maintenance needed to be performed. Additionally, the personnel and budget reductions equate to fewer pilots, fewer flight hours, and fewer requirements for depot maintenance.

To eliminate the excess capacity in the aviation depots,

DEPCOM management could restructure the complete program. A possible DEPCOM programmatic solution to excess capacity would structure the aviation depot maintenance program around a small number of Aircraft Overhaul Depots (AOD) supported by a complementary number of Component Overhaul Depots (COD). The AODs would repair and overhaul the airframe. The CODs would repair and overhaul the components and assemblies that comprise the complete airframe. The fundamental considerations defining the maintenance to be performed at the AOD and COD would be aircraft and component similarity and quantity. Aircraft and components that are similar and require depot maintenance in sufficient quantities will warrant workload capacity within an AOD or COD. An aircraft, such as the C-12, that is not similar to others and exists in small quantities within the DOD aircraft inventory would not be overhauled or repaired by any AOD. Correspondingly, components of the C-12 aircraft would not be repaired or overhauled by a COD because they lack similarity and sufficient quantities. Such aircraft and components would be repaired commercially.

The number of AODs could be determined by the type of aircraft to be overhauled; 1 aircraft depot for large airframes such as transports and bombers; 1 aircraft depot for smaller aircraft such as fighter and attack aircraft; and 1 depot for helicopters. The rationale for the supporting CODs would be to consolidate all component type production lines (repair capability) at a single depot; for example, all engines done at a

single depot and all rotor blades done at a single depot. The similarity and quantity of aircraft and components in the depot maintenance cycle assures capacity utilization. AOD maintenance capabilities used to overhaul C-141 aircraft may be used to overhaul C-5 or C-130 aircraft. COD maintenance capabilities used to repair H-46 rotor blades may be used to repair H-53, H-1, or H-64 rotor blades. The AOD/COD concept would not only ensure maximum utilization of capacity, but it would define the amount of depot capacity necessary to accomplish DOD aviation depot maintenance. By defining the aircraft and components that are to be maintained in the DOD depot maintenance capacity, the AOD/COD concept would also define those that must be maintained by commercial sources. The AOD/COD conceptual solution demonstrates that the resolution to excess capacity must be a total program restructure.

DDMC studies and DMRD implementations have highlighted the need to utilize standard business practices throughout the aviation depot maintenance program. Because each service has been given the authority to manage a separate aviation depot maintenance program, there are three autonomous management systems (Navy and Marine aircraft are serviced by a single Naval depot maintenance program). The DDMC decided that, in order to better formulate improvement recommendations, studies to establish standard business practices had to be accomplished. Studies to standardize the definitions of capacity and utilization rates, performance measurement, and cost

comparability have been initiated and discussed in the DDMC corporate business plan.³⁴ The DMR process has generated three DMRDs that will standardize the business practices throughout DOD, including the services' aviation depot maintenance programs. These DMRDs address Corporate Information Management (CIM), the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) and the Defense Business Operating Fund (DBOF).³⁵ Through consolidation of information systems and better application of information technology, CIM will standardize the different information systems.³⁶ DFAS will standardize the accounting systems by consolidating the over 150 separate DOD accounting systems.³⁷ DBOF standardization is the result of consolidating all of the different funds used by DOD depot maintenance activities.³⁸

To facilitate the establishment of standard business practices throughout the DOD aviation depot maintenance program, DEPCOM could reduce or even eliminate the service specific orientation of the existing programs. A non-service specific management orientation and the application of standard business practices are essential for improvement to the aviation depot maintenance program. As with the past attempts to consolidate depot maintenance, the services have endeavored to delay the DMR process. The services view the consolidation efforts of the DMR process and the standard business practices of the DMRDs and DDMC as programs that diminish their control of service unique organizations.³⁹ It is evident that to make improvements to the aviation depot maintenance program, DEPCOM must have a

programmatic orientation and not a service orientation. By definition, a joint command is not oriented to the inclinations of any individual service. The establishment of DEPCOM and the AOD/COD restructuring of subordinate depots would alleviate the service orientations that have prevented consolidation and the application of standard business practices. Standard business practices are a prerequisite for the aviation depot maintenance programs to progress to an integrated system. Interdependency and the ability to communicate are characteristic of an integrated system. Depots within the AOD/COD concept would be dependent on each other to produce a final product. For example, the AOD overhauling helicopters would depend on the COD or CODs repairing components to complete the overhaul of the helicopter. In order for DEPCOM to manage the subordinate depots and for the interdependent AODs and CODs to transmit requirements, they must be linked by standard business practices which deal with the requirements of planning, production, supply, quality, information management, budgeting and cost accounting, and other similar needs of management. Only by restructuring to obtain interdependency and applying these standard business practices would DEPCOM form an integrated aviation depot maintenance system.

The problems of excess capacity and no standard business practices are directly attributed to the problem of no single manager. The services' desire to maintain the service specific orientation to the aviation depot maintenance programs has

created the excess capacity and the three different management systems. A review of the DDMC corporate business plan, dated October 1992, points out that the first goal of the depot maintenance vision of the future is to maintain service management of depot maintenance programs.⁴⁰ Past failed attempts to consolidate the depot maintenance organizations denote that such a dramatic change is not eagerly sought. One particular hurdle to consolidation implementation has been the lack of enthusiasm on the part of the service chiefs, the JLC, or the DDMC to demand strategic changes to the organizational structure. However, current and planned reductions in manpower, dollars, and requirements strongly signify that a major vertical reform of the aviation depot maintenance program is necessary.

As the single manager of aviation depot maintenance, DEPCOM would provide both the vertical organization as well as the programmatic management leadership required for further horizontal reform initiatives. The service specific orientation, that to a great extent has impeded and delayed overall program improvements, would be replaced by a DEPCOM management structure conducive to expeditiously implementing change. As the aviation depot management advocate, DEPCOM would be a catalyst for programmatic improvements. Individual service management parochialisms would be replaced by a centralized management responsible for program effectiveness and efficiency. Any DEPCOM restructuring of the aviation depots, the AOD/COD concept as an example, would create a system of interdependent depots. To

advance the interdependency of the program depots, DEPCOM would institute standard business practices. Standard business practices would be the communication link for program management. Through the synergistic impact of all of these key elements, an effective single-manager for the aviation depot maintenance program would emerge.

Another problem of the existing aviation depot maintenance paradigm is that the program is not directly tied to the combatant commanders. I have defined those commanders as the geographically assigned Commanders in Chief (CINCs). Lack of any direct ties has diminished the responsiveness of the aviation depot maintenance program to these combatant commander customers. It should be obvious from the discussion of past and current attempts to improve depot maintenance, that the program is responsive to numerous entities not inclusive of the combatant commanders. The service specific orientations of the depot maintenance program mean that they are primarily responsive to the desires of the individual services. Because the service chiefs are outside a combatant commander's chain of command and are responsible for the service segments of the aviation depot program, the combatant commander has no direct influence concerning aviation depot matters. It must be assumed that a combatant commander addresses requirements for aviation depot maintenance support through the chain of command: through either the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs or the Secretary of Defense. The combatant commander has no direct tie to the depot that is

supporting assigned aircraft or the service that provides the aircraft and that is responsible for the depot support of the aircraft. This indirect routing of maintenance support requirements hinders the ability of the aviation depot to provide responsive support to the combatant commander, and for that commander to communicate with supporting depots. Further diminishing the aviation depot responsiveness is the absence of requirement prioritization. Unless one of the combatant commanders is involved in a current crisis response situation, the services have no means to determine the priorities of the support requirements from the different combatant commanders.

DEPCOM would provide a direct tie between the aviation depot maintenance program and the combatant commanders. DEPCOM would integrate the three aviation depot maintenance programs into a single entity. Combatant commanders would obtain aviation depot maintenance support from a single responsive source, comprised of centrally managed interdependent depots utilizing standard business practices. In a crisis, all or a portion of the DEPCOM consolidated aviation depot resources could be focused on improving or sustaining the combat effectiveness of a combatant commander's aircraft. During peacetime, DEPCOM would be capable of working directly with the Joint Staff and the CINCs to determine desired aviation depot maintenance requirement priorities. DEPCOM would become the single point of contact and source for aviation depot maintenance support during war and peace.

The correlation between the DEPCOM concept and the tenets of Total Quality Management (TQM) can also be made. Three elements essential to TQM are quality information, cooperation and authority.⁴¹ The DEPCOM management concept satisfies all of these elements. DEPCOM management would provide quality information by incorporating standard business practices and implementing CIM. The interdependency of the DEPCOM subordinate depots would enhance internal organization cooperation. The essential element of cooperation between the supplier and the customer would be further advanced by the supporting role relationship that DEPCOM would have with the combatant commanders. By consolidating all aviation depot maintenance under a single commander, the Secretary of Defense would have provided single-source programmatic authority to DEPCOM. Because of the current period of restructuring and budget cutting, it is paramount that TQM be applied to the decision making process. Decisions related to personnel downsizing, base closures, and budget cuts demand TQM. People, bases, and dollars that are eliminated from the DOD structure will not be retrievable. The TQM oriented DEPCOM management concept insures that the downsizing decisions related to aviation depot maintenance would be programmatically sound.

It is clear that the centralized leadership provided by DEPCOM would improve the management and productivity of the aviation maintenance depots. The significant factor that DEPCOM could contribute to the successful implementation of aviation

depot maintenance program improvements would be centralized management and decision making. DEPCOM's single concern would be managing the most effective and efficient depot maintenance program. The inefficiency resulting from excess capacity would be eliminated by DEPCOM program restructuring. A system of interdependent depots communicating through standard business practices would provide unity of effort. Individual service orientations would be replaced by the centralized DEPCOM management, thereby ensuring that the management infrastructure is more universally and centrally aimed at common objectives. Better support for combat forces would be provided because DEPCOM would be the direct tie for the aviation depot maintenance program to the combatant commanders. These benefits to the specific logistical function of aviation depot maintenance provided by consolidating DEPCOM management could be ultimately applied to the total DOD depot maintenance program.

Global and domestic environments necessitate a review of the resources that support the national military strategy. The resources to meet the national military strategy are the combat forces and the logistics establishment for sustaining those warriors. Consolidating DOD's depot maintenance capabilities within DEPCOM will guarantee support for the nation's combat forces. DLA is an excellent example of how a joint support agency can successfully manage a significant portion of DOD logistics. During 1988, DLA employed approximately 53,000 civilian and military personnel and procured more than 12 billion

dollars of material and spare parts.⁴² During this same time, DLA maintained an overall 89.4 percent supply availability.⁴³ During operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, DLA proved that a joint support agency could produce required logistical support during crisis operations and mobilization.⁴⁴

By consolidating all DOD depot maintenance, DOD could better meet the challenges of declining resources and sustainment of combat forces. Consolidation of all DOD aviation depot maintenance under DEPCOM is now the logical, progressive step. In the long run, DEPCOM management could be expanded to accomplish the consolidation, formulation and execution of the entire depot maintenance support structure to meet future national military strategy requirements. Consolidation would guarantee that we have one joint commander, DEPCOM, solely accountable for satisfying all depot maintenance requirements within the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS).

In conclusion, if the sustainment of combat forces is to improve, and the initiatives from the DMR process are to be achieved throughout the DOD depot maintenance community, the DEPCOM management concept must be eventually applied to all DOD depot maintenance programs. The depot maintenance programs that support ships, combat vehicles, missiles, munitions and electronics would gain the same benefits afforded to aircraft from DEPCOM management. Excess capacity, no standard business practices, no single manager, and no ties to the combatant commanders are problems that currently exist throughout the DOD

depot maintenance community. In theory, DEPCOM management would resolve these problems within the aviation depot maintenance community as well as throughout the rest of the DOD depot maintenance community. The obvious fact is that the services, the JLC, and the DDMC have made suboptimized improvements to the DOD depot maintenance program. Service orientations have been the major impediment to better improvement. The argument in support of a joint depot maintenance command conclusively reveals that programmatic leadership is required. DEPCOM is that program oriented leadership.

Endnotes

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⁵DOD Directive 5100.1, "Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components", 25 September 1987, p. 12.

⁶James Kitfield, "Deconstructing Defense," Government Executive, January 1993, p. 10.

⁷DOD Directive 51001.1, "Functions of the Department of Defense and Its Major Components," 25 September 1987, p.12.

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