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**MILITARY ENGAGEMENT
IN THE PACIFIC RIM
CONTINGENCY REQUIREMENTS
FOR AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE**

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL K.C. MARSHMENT
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The Pacific Rim is the fastest growing economic region in the world. It is a tremendously diverse area of peoples and nations with whom the national interests of the United States are inexorable linked. Past contributions of U.S. Military forces to regional stability and the resulting opportunities for peaceful growth in the region are a matter of historical record. In a time of decreasing resources, the United States must find the best ways to apply the national elements of power to protect our national interests. The military element of national power; and its peacetime as well as wartime application; is a vital and highly visible tool which can demonstrate U.S. resolve, deter potential aggressors, protect U.S. interests, assist friendly nations, and allow us to remain credibly engaged in world affairs. Military engagement, as well as political and economic engagement, during peacetime is and will continue to be important in the Pacific Rim if we are to participate in it development and the resulting affects on our country. (See continuation)

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Further, we must be prepared for the effective use of our military forces when required. This study identifies and prioritizes U.S. interests in the region; presents an overview of the region's political, economic, and military environment; discusses threats to regional stability; reviews our current regional strategy and force structure; and then forecasts key future military requirements. Recommendations are made concerning U.S. plans for military contingency operations in the Pacific Rim, requirements for command and control of those operations, and ground force structure changes.

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MILITARY ENGAGEMENT IN THE PACIFIC RIM
CONTINGENCY REQUIREMENTS FOR AN UNCERTAIN FUTURE

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

BY

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The Pacific Rim is the fastest growing economic region in the world. It is a tremendously diverse area of peoples and nations with whom the national interests of the United States are inexorably linked. Past contributions of U.S. military forces to regional stability and the resulting opportunities for peaceful growth in the region are a matter of historical record. In a time of decreasing resources, the United States must find the best ways to apply the national elements of power to protect our national interests. The military element of national power; and its peacetime as well as wartime application; is a vital and highly visible tool which can demonstrate U.S. resolve, deter potential aggressors, protect U.S. interests, assist friendly nations, and allow us to remain credibly engaged in world affairs. Military engagement, as well as political and economic engagement, during peacetime is and will continue to be important in the Pacific Rim if we are to participate in its development and the resulting affects on our country. Further, we must be prepared for the effective use of our military forces when required. This study identifies and prioritizes U.S. interests in the region; presents an overview of the region's political, economic, and military environment; discusses threats to regional stability; reviews our current regional strategy and force structure; and then forecasts key future military requirements. Recommendations are made concerning U.S. plans for military contingency operations in the Pacific Rim, requirements for command and control of those operations, and ground force structure changes.

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Military Engagement in the Pacific Rim
Contingency Requirements for an Uncertain Future

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

This military studies project has two principal objectives. First, for those readers unfamiliar with the Pacific Rim, it presents a detailed regional overview. This portion of the study should be of aid to personnel assigned to work in the region. Second, and based on the regional overview presented, I have taken a look at contingency requirements in the post-cold war Pacific Rim. This portion of the study identifies potential military missions, looks at our current military preparedness for contingency operations, identifies shortfalls, and makes some recommendations for the future. I have intentionally kept the study unclassified to allow for the widest possible use. The introduction which follows will introduce the study in detail.

The Pacific Rim is the fastest growing economic region in the world. It is a tremendously diverse area of peoples and nations with whom the national interests of the United States are inexorably linked. Past contributions of U.S. military forces to regional stability and the resulting opportunities for peaceful growth in the region are a matter of historical record. In a time of decreasing resources, the United States must find the best ways to apply the national elements of power to protect our national interests. The

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STUDY **METHODOLOGY**




Figure 1-1

Recognizing the lessening of a global war threat in the current world environment still leaves the world a dangerous and volatile place. However, the types of situations which may require the application of military force are numerous both numerically and in their diversity. The majority of these situations will be addressed under a heading which military planners describe as contingency operations. JCS Pub 1-02 describes a contingency as "an emergency involving military forces caused by natural disasters, terrorists, subversives, or by required military operations. Due to the uncertainty of the situation, contingencies require plans, rapid response and special procedures to ensure the safety and readiness of personnel, installations and equipment."¹ Contingency operations are

further defined as, "Operations conducted across the operational continuum involving the use of U. S. military forces to achieve U. S. objectives or protect national interests, usually in response to a sudden or short-notice crisis or emergency. Contingency operations may be terminated in their own right or evolve into sustained military operations."2 There are numerous reasons for conducting contingency operations. These include; defense of U. S. interests and citizens abroad, support of foreign policy, promotion of regional stability, defusing sudden crises and contain spontaneous conflict, conduct of short notice humanitarian assistance missions, and noncombatant evacuation missions.3

Given these definitions, it is clear that contingency operations must be addressed in detail by military planners. Clearly, we must be able to employ joint forces in a synchronized manner to achieve limited objectives under time constrained conditions. Effective command and control of contingency operations is the key to success.

Determining objectives is perhaps both the most difficult and yet the most important part of contingency operations. Military force roles, missions, composition, and command and control structures must be developed which are capable of deterring our enemies; and if necessary, militarily enforcing actions in support of U.S. interests. The proper mix of forward presence and reinforcing forces must be available to maintain this capability. To begin this process, an understanding of our national interests is required to determine likely missions and contingency scenarios which military forces in the Pacific Rim might face.

U.S. Interests

Our National Security Strategy outlines five basic national interests:

"1. Foremost, the United States must ensure its security as a free and independent nation, and the protection of its fundamental values, institutions, and people.

2. Global and regional stability which encourages peaceful change and progress.

3. Open, democratic and representative political systems worldwide.

4. An open international trading and economic system which benefits all participants.

5. An enduring global faith in America--that it can and will lead in a collective response to the world's crises."⁴

America's inescapable links to the nations of the Pacific Rim require not only political astuteness in assessing the affect of regional events on our national interests, but close analysis to identify and act on potential threats to our national security.

In the past two decades, many countries in the region have experienced phenomenal economic growth. Regional military capabilities have mushroomed. Populations have continued to grow, and in spite of the economic growth, a tremendous gap has developed between the economic haves and millions if not billions of have nots. The economy and security of the United States are inexorably linked

to economic and political stability in the region.

U.S. specific interests in the Pacific Rim are:

"1. Maintain a strategic framework which reflects its (the United States) status as a Pacific power and promotes its engagement in Asia...

2. Continue to expand markets through bilateral, regional, and multilateral arrangements...

3. Carefully watch the emergence of China onto the world stage and support, contain, or balance this emergence as necessary to protect U.S. interests...

4. Continue to play a critical role in the peaceful unification process on the Korean peninsula...

5. Encourage the normalization of Indochina and the expansion and development of the Association of East Asian Nations."5

It is important to remember that these interests support the previously stated national interests and cannot be taken in isolation. The first interest encompasses the notion that we must remain regionally engaged if we are to preclude the emergence of a regional power seeking regional dominance and possibly emerging as a threat to the United States itself. As stated previously, a precipitous military withdrawal from the region could leave a power vacuum which a regional power might try and fill. This could easily trigger a regional arms race. A power vacuum might tempt a country to attempt to gain regional hegemony in its own interests. Other nations would be left with no alternative but to match any buildup of power

or submit to the nation seeking hegemony. maintaining engagement in the Pacific Rim is a vital, and perhaps in its extreme case a survival interest. The other stated interests are either vital or major national interests. These other regional interests support the thought that promotion of regional stability, rule by law, and promotion of democratic governmental institutions promote world peace. Maintaining engagement in the region on all levels; economic, political, and military; is of overriding importance. Regional interests are easier to understand when broken down into their components. Below are the U.S. regional interests in the defense, economic, world order, and ideological areas. While some of the interests below are lifted from those stated in our National Security Strategy, I have subdivided some and added some lesser included interests to provide a more complete and detailed list. This more detailed list of interests is drawn from the 1992 DOD Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim, as well as the 1993 National Security Strategy. 6,7

Defense

1. Maintain effective nuclear deterrence and deter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. (Survival Interest)
2. Protect the U.S. and its allies from attack. (Survival Interest)
3. Prevent the emergence of a regional power capable of obtaining regional hegemony and ultimately possessing the potential to threaten U.S. national survival. (Survival Interest)

4. Maintain regional freedom of navigation. (Vital Interest)

Economic

Continue to expand markets through bilateral, regional, and multilateral arrangements to ensure the economic well being of the U.S. through promotion of regional economic stability and free, open, and equitable trading arrangements. (Vital Interest)

World Order

1. Foster global and regional stability which encourages peaceful change and progress through recognized international forums. (Vital Interest)

2. Maintain credible military deterrence, and political and economic engagement, to preserve regional stability and maintain an environment for a peaceful unification process on the Korean Peninsula. (Vital Interest)

3. Carefully watch the emergence of China onto the world stage and support, contain, or balance this emergence as necessary to protect U.S. interests. (Major Interest - would be upgraded if it presented a threat of regional hegemony.)

4. Encourage the normalization of Indochina, and the expansion and development of the Association of East Asian Nations. (Major Interest)

5. Reduce illicit drug trafficking. (Major Interest)

Ideological

Through political, economic, and military regional engagement; foster an environment where open, democratic, and representative governments can flourish. (Major Interest)

Interest Priorities

Generally interests are prioritized in the order of survival, vital, major, and peripheral. However, to aid in the development of national strategy, interests may also be prioritized within each interest level. Shown below are the integrated defense, economic, world order, and ideological interests sequenced in the priority I believe we should establish:

1. Maintain effective nuclear deterrence and deter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. (Survival Interest)

2. Protect the U.S. and its allies from attack. (Survival Interest)

3. Prevent the emergence of a regional power capable of obtaining regional hegemony and ultimately possessing the potential to threaten U.S. national survival. (Survival Interest)

4. Maintain regional freedom of navigation. (Vital Interest)

5. Continue to expand markets through bilateral, regional,

and multilateral arrangements to ensure the economic well being of the U.S. through promotion of regional economic stability and free, open, and equitable trading arrangements. (Vital Interest)

6. Maintain credible military deterrence, and political and economic engagement, to preserve regional stability and maintain an environment for a peaceful unification process on the Korean Peninsula. (Vital Interest)

7. Foster global and regional stability which encourages peaceful change and progress through recognized international forums. (Major Interest)

8. Carefully watch the emergence of China onto the world stage and support, contain, or balance this emergence as necessary to protect U.S. interests. (Major Interest - would be upgraded if it presented a threat of regional hegemony.)

9. Encourage the normalization of Indochina, and the expansion and development of the Association of East Asian Nations. (Major Interest)

10. Reduce illicit drug trafficking. (Major Interest)

11. Through political, economic, and military regional engagement; foster an environment where open, democratic, and representative governments can flourish. (Major Interest)

The turbulence of rapid economic, military, and population growth experienced in the last two decades in the Pacific Rim, makes conflict a more likely occurrence. Even with continued U.S. engagement in the region, conflicts over resources could occur between have and have not countries. Portions of populations that

feel disenfranchised within their own nations could cause internal instability. Given the large amount of U.S. trade with countries in the Pacific Rim, regional conflict would significantly affect the United States economically. There are also a particularly large number of U.S. citizens living and working in various countries in the region. Regional conflict could result in military involvement to protect U.S. lives and property, and potentially to assist regional nation-states in restoring regional stability.

Even more dangerous is the potential for initiation of a regional arms race should the United States precipitously disengage militarily from the region. Regional insecurity could trigger an arms race and result in the emergence of a regional power seeking regional hegemony. Should Japan emerge in this role, not only would regional peace be threatened, but Japan is the one regional nation capable of gaining the capability to threaten the survival of the United States.

Clearly threats to U.S. interests exist in the Pacific Rim. We must be prepared to deal with regional conflicts on an economic, political or, if necessary, military level. However, knowing our interests is not enough. We must also understand the region; its strengths, weaknesses, conflicts, and potential.

ENDNOTES

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2. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 3-00.1 Joint Doctrine for Contingency Operations, Initial Draft. Washington D.C.: Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, October 1991, p. GL-9.
3. Ibid., pp. I-1, I-2.
4. The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, January 1993, p. 3.
5. Ibid., p. 7,8.
6. Department of Defense. A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim: Report to Congress 1992. Washington D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1992, p. 9.
7. The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, January 1993, p. 7,8.
8. Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy of the United States, 1992. Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1992, p. 6.

CHAPTER II


REGIONAL ENVIRONMENT

The Pacific Rim is a vast area not only in terms of the ocean, but also in terms of peripheral landmass, population, and economic power. It includes the two largest nations in the world in China and India. In Japan we find one of the five leading economic powers of the world. Responsibility for U.S. military operations in the Pacific Rim is vested in the the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command (USCINCPAC).

Regional Definition

The Pacific Rim, as referred to in this paper, will be synonymous with that area defined as the U.S. Pacific Command's (PACOM) area of responsibility. PACOM is a combatant command with it's "general geographic area of responsibility for the conduct of normal operations being the Pacific Ocean west of 92 degrees west, the Bering Sea, the Arctic Ocean west of 95 degrees west and east of 100 degrees east, the Indian Ocean east of 17 degrees east (excluding the Gulf of Aden and the Gulf of Oman), Japan, The Republic of Korea, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, The People's Republic of China, Mongolia, the countries of Southeast Asia and the southern asian landmass to the western border of India, and Madagascar and the other islands in all assigned water areas. In addition, USCINCPAC's general geographic area of responsibility for the conduct of normal

operations other than air defense will include Alaska and the Aleutian Islands." Below is a map showing the PACOM area of responsibility.



The current PACOM Commander, Admiral Charles R. Larsen, has stated that, "America's future economic, and by extension political, wellbeing are inextricably tied to the Asia-Pacific economic dynamo."² The Pacific Rim is where our nation conducts more than fifty percent of its foreign trade.³ The sheer magnitude and diversity of the region requires a closer look at the major nations and regions which are found here. I have included significant detail in this discussion of the regional environment to make this study more valuable to readers without particular expertise in the Pacific Rim.

Japan

Japan has emerged from the ashes of World War II as one of the leading economic powers in the world. Strategically located, Japan not only possesses one of the most dynamic economies in the world, but also has tremendous military potential. The Japanese Self Defense force is already a capable military force. Japan's industrial base and technological advances could rapidly transform it into a military capable of force projection.

"Together, the U.S. and Japan account for about 40 percent of the world's combined gross national product."⁴ This economic strength makes Japanese opinion a voice which must be heard in world affairs. However, it is the latent Japanese military potential coupled with a new Japanese willingness to participate in overseas United Nations military missions that causes uneasiness in other regional states. Any real move by the Japanese to regain a military capable of power

projection, or the perception that this was taking place, would set off a regional arms race.

The 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between the United States and Japan⁵ remains the key to regional stability. This agreement not only provides for mutual defense, but more importantly to regional states, serves as a disincentive for full Japanese rearmament. While the Japanese Self Defense Force has grown into a capable defensive military force over the last two decades, Japanese leadership remains committed to a defense partnership with the United States. Japanese leaders have gone to great lengths to assuage any fears of a Japanese drive toward a power projection capability. Admiral Larsen has stated that, "The U.S.-Japan security relationship is the linchpin of our Pacific security strategy."⁶

Korea

The U.S. commitment to the defense of the Republic of Korea (ROK) dates to the Korean War, and in some measure to the end of World War II. The Japanese surrender to the Soviet forces in the northern half of the Korean Peninsula, and to the Americans in the southern half, initiated a division of the peninsula which remains today. The Soviets sponsored formation of a communist government in the north while a democratic government was elected in the south. In 1950 the North Korean government attempted a forced reunification on communist terms when they invaded South Korea. The failure of that effort and the resulting armistice resulted in an even deeper and more permanent division. An antithesis to the demise of the cold war

in the rest of the world, North Korea, or the Democratic People's Republic of Korea as it is properly called, continues to pursue a communist ideology while the United States continues as a defense partner with the Republic of Korea in the south.

Increasingly isolated from the world community, North Korea continues to expand an already immense military in relation to the size of the nation itself. North Korea has never publicly renounced its intention to reunify the country on its terms, by force if necessary. Yet this military expansion has come at great cost to its economy. Lacking an industrial base suited to production of consumer goods, North Korea has increasingly turned to sales of weapons and weapons technology as a generator of much needed hard cash. This continues to be a destabilizing force internationally. Strapped for hard currency, suffering from shortages of oil and consumer goods; North Korea is approaching a time where some change in the way business is done is inevitable. Under increasing international pressure, and strapped by dwindling resources at home, North Korea remains a particular threat to regional stability.

In contrast to North Korea, the ROK has experienced an economic boom since the Korean War. The nation has been rebuilt, agriculture is strong, and industrial growth has been phenomenal. The ROK has also built an impressive military. While inferior to that of the North Koreans numerically, the South Korean Army is a well trained and technologically superior force. As evidence of the improvements in the South's capability. "U.S. forces are transitioning from a leading to a supporting role, beginning with the transfer of greater responsibility for combined operations."7 However, the U.S. military

presence on the Korean Peninsula and the 1954 Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of Korea continues to be key to both deterrence of potential North Korean aggression and regional stability.

China

During the 1980s, economic initiatives improved the Chinese economic posture. Yet China continued to maintain a relatively hard line communist governmental structure. Well on the way to economic reform, the Peoples Republic of China's (PRC) crackdown on demonstrators in Tianimin Square in June 1989 caused worldwide protest and slowed the pace of economic reform. The U.S.-PRC relationship has been rocky since that time.

While economic reform again appears to be gaining momentum, there is no sign of any change in governmental policies or significant human rights advances. Chinese assertions concerning their sovereignty over Taiwan and the impending transfer of Hong Kong to the Chinese at the end of the century remain as unstabilizing influences on the region. Further, Chinese sales of weapons and associated technology have destabilized not only the region, but other international areas.

China and Russia have improved their relationship. "In 1990, both sides reached an agreement on principles for force cuts and for confidence building measures along the Sino-Russian border."⁹ This agreement will allow both sides to reduce military spending and focus on domestic concerns. However, no long term military alliance is

envisioned.¹⁰

The Chinese military continues to slowly modernize but it remains a force most suited for defense or internal control of the country. However, there are some disturbing signs that an attempt is being made to gain a power projection capability. Moreover, the presence of even a small number of nuclear weapon systems and the capability for their delivery remains an area of concern. Encouragingly there has been evidence of a shift from some military to civilian production as economic reforms continue taking hold.

The size of the Chinese military, great landmass, burgeoning population, and seat on the U.N. Security council make them an influential member of the world community and an extremely important regional force. As is readily apparent, the PRC is involved in numerous issues relevant to U.S. national interests which have the potential to generate conflict.

Philippines

Even with the removal of a permanent U.S. military presence in the Philippines, U.S. interests here remain strong. We continue to participate in a bilateral defense agreement.¹¹ The Philippines are strategically located along shipping lanes in the south Pacific Ocean. It is clearly in our national interest that a friendly democracy continues to flourish here regardless of our military presence. Further, not only do we conduct significant economic trade with the Philippines but there are thousands of U.S. citizens who continue to reside here.

There are problems here which could require U.S. involvement or assistance. The communist insurgency in the country continues to be an area of concern, however for the moment the Philippine government appears more than able to contain the problem. As evidenced by numerous coup attempts, the young democracy continues to be fragile. Certainly the recent peaceful transfer of executive power is encouraging. However, in the event of internal instability, U.S. noncombatant evacuation operations could be required. Finally, and perhaps most seriously, the economy continues to show "high inflation, underemployment, and little growth in industrial development."¹² The economic problems, if allowed to fester, are what would provide the impetus for either a resurgence of the communist insurgency or further coup attempts.

Southeast Asia

Southeast Asia contains a mixture of opportunities and threats to U.S. interests. Given our military withdrawal from the Philippines, "access to Southeast Asian facilities is needed to maintain and train U.S. forces and so we can sustain them west of the Strait of Malacca. Southeast Asia is the gateway for our forces to the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf, and the crossroads of Pacific Command's forward deployed operations."¹³ This region also boasts a number of rapidly growing economies with whom we are economically intertwined. At the same time, a number of Southeastern nations remain mired in poverty.

Normalization of relations with Vietnam still appears to be in

the future, however recent events are encouraging. Moreover, the Vietnamese appear committed to reentering and participating in the world community in a responsible manner.

Cambodia remains the most potentially destabilizing situation in the region. The U.N. peace process is well underway, yet intransigence by the Khmer Rouge in complying with disarmament agreements is discouraging.

Thailand continues as one of the more stable nations in Southeast Asia. Even the recent unrest appears to have strengthened the civilian government. Thailand's economy is continuing to grow. The 1954 Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty and the 1962 Thanat - Rusk Communique 14 forms the basis of the U.S. security commitment to Thailand. While the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization was dissolved in 1977, the treaty remains in force. Our relationship with Thailand remains a cornerstone to engagement in Southeast Asia.

The political and economic volatility of Southeast Asia, coupled with U.S. economic and political interests in the area, make this an area where U.S. involvement could be called for on short notice. The least likely scenario would be assistance required under one of the many bilateral defense arrangements. However, providing requested assistance to host nation training or stability operations, noncombatant evacuation operations, involvement in U.N. sponsored peacemaking or peacekeeping operations, or counternarcotics operations remain as likely potential requirements for U.S. regional involvement on a political, economic, or military level. Continued engagement in Southeast Asia must remain a vital strategy component.

Australia

The United States continues to share a longstanding defense security arrangement with Australia. This arrangement is codified under the Australia - New Zealand - United States Treaty of 1952. Although the United States suspended obligations with New Zealand over a dispute on New Zealand's ban of nuclear capable ships from its waters, the agreement remains in force as a bilateral agreement between the U.S. and Australia, and between Australia and New Zealand. 15 Further, Australia and the United States share economic and political interests in the remainder of the Pacific Rim. Australia will almost certainly be a partner in any combined action required to address regional problems whether on an economic, political, or military level.

South Pacific

The island nation-states of the South Pacific are becoming increasingly active in international affairs. Our most likely involvement with nations like Micronesia, Melanesia, and Polynesia will be in the form of "humanitarian and civic action efforts, and training and security assistance programs."16

India

The U.S. continues to maintain a delicate diplomatic balance in maintaining friendly ties with both Pakistan and India. The breakup

of the Soviet Union and the demise of the cold war has allowed us to greatly improve relations with India. India's size in terms of population, landmass, and growing military capability make her a clear regional power and possibly an emerging world power.

Russia

Although not formally included as part of the PACOM commander's area of responsibility, Russia's impact on the region must be included in any assessment. While the threat of Soviet expansionism has disappeared, a significant Russian military force remains in eastern Russia. Further, strategic weapon systems available to the Russians make it mandatory that PACOM monitor this potential threat.

Russia also has some historic points of friction with its Asian neighbors that have yet to be resolved. Japan is still demanding return of portions of the Kuril Islands that were seized at the conclusion of World War II. Historically, border disputes have marred Chinese - Russian relations. Whether recent rapprochement continues remains to be seen.

Summary

As introduced, the Pacific Rim is a highly diverse region that defies a capstone description. It is a region of tremendous growth side by side with economic incompetence. Its inhabitants range from rich to impoverished. The most positive aspect is a continuing move toward democratic governmental institutions and market economies

where the rule of law is generally accepted. Organizations such as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations have assisted in resolving disputes. However, a large number of these governments are extremely fragile as is the overall region's economic, political, and military balance. Four communist regimes controlling a significant portion of the region's population remain, and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as well as that of conventional weapons continues to be a concern. The Straits of Malacca and other waters contiguous to Southeast Asia remain troubled by piracy. The United States alone wields the economic, political, and military power to play the leadership role required to foster continued peaceful development of the region.

ENDNOTES

1. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Unified Command Plan. Washington D.C.: Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 24 April 1992, pp. 8,9.
2. Admiral Charles Larsen, Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command. Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Military Installations and Facilities. Washington, D.C.: Office of the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command, 10 April 1991, p.3.
3. Ibid., p. 3.
4. Ibid., p. 8.
5. Joint Chiefs of Staff. 1992 Joint Military Net Assessment. Washington D.C.: Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 21 August 1992. p. 11-27.
6. Admiral Charles Larsen, Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command. Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Military Installations and Facilities. Washington D.C.: Office of the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command, 10 April 1991, p. 8.
7. Ibid., p. 9.
8. Joint Chiefs of Staff. 1992 Joint Military Net Assessment. Washington D.C.: Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 21 August 1992, p. 11-27
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12. Admiral Charles Larsen, Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command. Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Military Installations and Facilities. Washington D.C.: Office of the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command, 10 April 1991, p. 11
13. Ibid., p. 12.
14. Joint Chiefs of Staff. 1992 Joint Military Net Assessment. Washington D.C.: Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 21 August 1992, p. 11-27
15. Ibid., p. 11-27.
16. Admiral Charles Larsen, Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command. Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Military Installations and Facilities. Washington D.C.: Office of the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command, 10 April 1991, p. 13.

CHAPTER III

POTENTIAL THREATS, CONTINGENCIES, AND OTHER MILITARY REQUIREMENTS

There are numerous threats in the Pacific Rim which could require the use of military force. Some are specific, such as the threat posed by North Korea. Others are generic, such as the potential need to evacuate noncombatants from any dangerous situation. Layed out below are the principal military missions which I believe PACOM must be prepared to execute.

The Korean Scenario

North Korea remains as the most imminent threat to peace and regional stability in the Pacific Rim. It possesses an immense military in relation to its size as a nation. The Army is forward deployed in the proximity of the Korean Demilitarized zone capable of an almost no-notice attack against the Republic of Korea. Diplomatic overtures in 1991 and 1992 seemingly portended improving relations between North Korea and other nations in the region. However, the continuing work on a nuclear complex at Yongbyon, believed to be capable of processing material for weapons of mass destruction, coupled with North Korean foot dragging on complying with international safeguards give great cause for concern. In March of 1991 CIA Director Robert Gates stated, "North Korea is between a few months and a couple of years from producing a nuclear bomb, and is continuing its quest for a nuclear weapon capability."¹ More

recently, North Korea's stated intent to withdraw from the nonproliferation protocol again raises questions about its intentions.

Response In Support of Bilateral Defense Agreements

Our bilateral defense agreements provide for defense of the United States and the involved regional nation-state. Further these agreements facilitate protection of U.S. lives and property in the region. U.S. military forces could be called on to respond to defense agreements with Japan, Korea, Thailand, Australia, and the Philippines. Moreover, stated U.S. policy could result in military actions to assist in the defense of a number of other regional countries should such assistance be requested.

Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO)

Noncombatant evacuation must be addressed by every combatant commander. Noncombatant evacuation operations are normally conducted to protect U.S. citizens but may also be performed to evacuate other country nationals based on bilateral or multilateral agreements, or for humanitarian reasons. Noncombatant evacuation may be a military mission in and of itself purely for protection of noncombatants from instability and conflict within a nation-state. However NEO operations may also be required incident to a military operation designed at obtaining other objectives.

As such, NEO operations would probably be conducted in

conjunction with execution of operations in response to any of our regional bilateral defense agreements. These operations can be planned as part of the concept summary, CONPLAN, or OPLAN supporting the defense agreements.

However, the most likely NEO operations are those that might be conducted to protect and evacuate U.S. and selected other country nationals due to instability or conflict within the regional nation-state which poses a danger to the noncombatants.

Security Assistance Operations

Security assistance operations are normally conducted to provide operational support, training, or both to a friendly regional nation-state to achieve goals which are in the interest of both the United States and the assisted nation-state. Security assistance operations are vital to displaying U.S. intent to remain engaged in the region and international decision making on issues affecting the U.S. within the region. They also signal U.S. resolve to meet commitments to allied and other friendly regional countries.

Support of UN Peacekeeping\Peace Enforcement Operations

The United Nations military commitment to peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations was larger in 1992 than at any time since the U.N.'s inception. The United States had and will continue to have a major role in these operations.

Currently within PACOM, the combatant commander is providing minor support to the peacekeeping effort in Cambodia, a U.N. contingent in Korea in accordance with the Korean Armistice, and is providing forces as a supporting CINC to Operation Restore Hope in Somalia. Other international conflicts could require the CINC to provide forces in support of U.N. missions on short notice. Yugoslavia serves as another example in addition to PACOM's support of the Somali operation. Conflicts which could entail future U.N. involvement and possibly require force support from PACOM include the Indian - Pakistani border dispute, the Philippine communist insurgency, and the Sri Lankan insurgency.

Counter-terrorism Operations

Although incident levels have decreased over the last few years, terrorism remains a threat which all combatant commanders face and against which they must plan. "Terrorism remains a potential threat to our national security--a threat we will oppose by all legal means available."2

PACOM's requirements with regard to terrorism rest primarily in two areas; deterrence of terrorism through preventative measures such as increased security, and actions as a supporting CINC to provide support to NCA directed and controlled Special Operations Force counter-terrorism elements deployed to address terrorist incidents. PACOM would of course address minor terrorist incidents with assigned forces.

Humanitarian Assistance Operations

In recent years the National Command Authority has increasingly called on combatant commanders to provide forces in support of humanitarian assistance operations. Recent examples include assistance to storm victims in Bangladesh, aid to hurricane and typhoon victims in Florida and Hawaii. Operation Provide Comfort in northern Iraq, and Operation Restore Hope in Somalia. The propensity for typhoons in the Pacific Rim and numerous volcanic areas within the region will provide numerous opportunities for the United States to provide humanitarian assistance if it is determined to be in our national and regional interests to do so. In addition, the aftermath of any instability, conflict, or insurgency in the region or a regional country could result in a condition requiring humanitarian assistance.

Counternarcotics Operations

"The flow of illicit narcotics into the United States undermines our national security in many ways. It harms our society and degrades our economy, our competitiveness, and our international leadership as a champion of the rule of law."³ "The President and the Secretary of Defense directed that we deal with narcotic trafficking as a high priority national security mission."⁴ Southeast Asia remains a large source of illegal drugs. The interiors of Southeast Asian nations are often only tenuously controlled, if controlled at all, by the legal government. Even our own 50th state, Hawaii, continues to have

difficulty eradicating a home grown marijuana industry.

Political and economic means will surely be used to attempt to gain help from Pacific Rim nations in the battle against illegal narcotics. Military involvement could range from direct action, in concert with host nations, against narcotics growers/producers to more subtle actions such as assistance and training to host nation forces, interdiction of international narcotic supply lines, and intelligence support to U.S. and international law enforcement agencies.

Other Sources of Conflict

Not directly related to a specific PACOM mission, there are a number of other regional points of friction which could erupt into conflicts between regional countries, and eventually affect U.S. interests. The Spratley Islands are claimed all or in part by China, Vietnam, Taiwan, Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei. Potential oil reserves are the source of friction. The Dongsha Islands are claimed by both China and Taiwan, again oil is at the root of the conflict.

Tension continues to exist between India and Pakistan over border issues. Religious differences and the latent nuclear potential of both of these countries exacerbate this issue. India and Pakistan also both have unresolved border issues with the Peoples Republic of China. Moreover, Religious conflict driven instability within India itself could also threaten resurgent U.S. economic investment in the country as well as U.S. lives and property.

Summary

PACOM clearly faces one major regional contingency. the Korean scenario, the occurrence of which would consume the bulk of PACOM military resources as well as a large amount of reinforcing resources from CONUS and other supporting CINCs. In addition, PACOM must be prepared to respond with smaller, specially tailored military force packages to a host of smaller potential regional contingencies which could require military involvement. Thus, even with the demise of the Soviet Union, and the reduced potential for global war, PACOM's challenges remain sizeable.

ENDNOTES

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2. The White House. National Security Strategy of the United States (Final Draft). Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, December 21, 1992, p. 28.
3. Ibid., p. 29.
4. Admiral Charles Larsen, Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command. Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Military Installations and Facilities. Washington, D.C.: Office of the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command, 10 April 1991, p.13.

CHAPTER IV

REGIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY

The Military Requirement

Our national military strategy is derived from our national security strategy. To defend our stated national interests in today's world environment, our national military strategy has been constructed on four precepts: strategic deterrence and defense, forward presence, crisis response, and reconstitution.⁸ This strategy, dictated by a smaller military array of assets from which to choose, requires that military planners become more judicious and efficient in the use of their assets.

PACOM's strategy must in turn support the national military strategy. Former Secretary of Defense Cheney laid out six principles of security policy for American forces in the Pacific region:

- "1. Continued American engagement in the Pacific region.
2. Strong bilateral security arrangements.
3. Modest but capable forward-deployed U.S. forces.
4. A sufficient overseas support structure.
5. Greater responsibility sharing by our partners.
6. Deliberate policies of defense cooperation."

Combatant commanders, and Commander in Chief Pacific Command in particular, will be most directly involved in forward presence and

crisis response situations on a day to day basis. The Pacific Command must conduct a continuing and evolving assessment to determine what size forces, and what type forces in particular, are really needed. Plans must be developed to address likely contingencies. These plans must use Pacific Command forces in a manner to maximize their strengths. Further, considering the dynamic nature of a regional defense strategy orientation, Pacific Command contingency planning must plan for the requirement to address more than one minor regional contingency simultaneously. In summary, I believe that the three critical components to theater military readiness for contingency operations under a regional defense strategy are contingency plans; joint command and control; and availability of a well trained, mission tailored force mix.

"PACOM's specific mission is four-fold: To defend the United States against attacks through the Pacific Ocean area; to support and implement the national policies and interests of the United States; to discharge U.S. military responsibilities in the Pacific Far East, South Asia, Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean; and to prepare plans, conduct operations, and coordinate activities of the forces of the Pacific Command in consonance with directives from higher authorities."2 Within that broad mission, low intensity conflicts or operations other than war in support of regional allies are the most likely type of regional contingency which might be faced. CINC PACOM has stated that, "Our strategy to deter low intensity conflicts and promote stability in the Third World must be one of peacetime engagement - a coordinated combination of political, economic, and military actions aimed at countering local violence and promoting

nation building."3 Further, all CINCs must plan for contingency missions involving humanitarian assistance, noncombatant evacuation operations, security assistance, counter-narcotics operations, and counter-terrorism.4

Given these missions and, the threats and potential contingencies identified in the previous chapter; PACOM has based their regional military strategy on a concept of regional engagement. This strategy is designed to retain sufficient forward presence forces to deter conflict while maintaining the capability to respond to contingencies if the need arises. A series of bilateral defense agreements are key to this strategy. Further, numerous binational exercises and military security assistance efforts give visibility to the strategy to convince regional countries of continued American engagement in the region.

Should conflict occur despite our best efforts at deterrence, forward presence military forces must be sufficient to accomplish assigned tasks. These military forces must be capable of rapid power projection, forced entry if required, operations in all types of terrain and weather conditions, and the capability to receive follow on forces when necessary. Most critically, PACOM must be prepared to command and control these forces with a command and control structure that is capable of joint and combined operations.

ENDNOTES

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3. Admiral Charles Larsen, Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command. Testimony before the House Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Military Installations and Facilities. Washington, D.C.: Office of the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command, 10 April 1991, p.7.
4. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 3-0 Doctrine for Unified and Joint Operations, Test Pub. Washington D.C.: Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 1990, pp. II-6, II-7, II-8.

CHAPTER V

CURRENT FORCE STRUCTURE

Forces

Major combat assets assigned to PACOM include two marine expeditionary forces (MEFs), one in Okinawa and one on the west coast of the United States; seven army brigades, two under the 2d Infantry Division in Korea, two in the 6th Division in Alaska, and three under the 25th Infantry Division in Hawaii; the U.S. Seventh Fleet normally containing one carrier battle group (CVBG), and the 13th Air Force with three (+) active and one (-) reserve component fighter wing equivalents (FWE) from which it can draw assets. In addition, PACOM can draw on an additional five carrier battle groups for crisis response when approved by the NCA. 1

The 2d Infantry Division in Korea, the MEF in Okinawa, the CVBG, and the two(+) active fighter wing equivalents are considered forward deployed forces. The 25th Infantry Division in Hawaii, the 6th Infantry Division in Alaska, two(-) fighter wing equivalents in Hawaii, and the other CONUS based forces are considered as crisis response forces. The following figure depicts PACOM combat elements:

PACOM





Figure 5-2

PACOM currently has only one major contingency for which it must plan; defense of the Republic of Korea. That contingency would be fought by the sub-unified command already present in Korea. Almost any other contingency PACOM might have to face, the type of contingencies commonly referred to as lesser regional contingencies, would initially be addressed through use of a JTF or in rare instances, a single component commander.

To execute contingency plans currently envisioned, CINCPACOM would normally designate a subordinate headquarters to serve as a JTF to execute the operation. Commanders and headquarters available for designation as a JTF for execution of contingency operations include the Army's I Corps, the Marine Corps' III MEF, and the Navy's Seventh Fleet. The 13th Air Force Headquarters is available, however it is not resourced, equipped, or trained to serve as a JTF.

PACOM intends to execute contingency plans through a two tiered command and control structure; the CINC's unified headquarters providing the mission, guidance and resources; and a JTF performing the detailed planning and commanding and controlling execution of the operation. Power projection under the command and control of a JTF could address the following crises with the contingency responses shown in figure 5-2 below:

CONTINGENCY CRISES AND RESPONSES 3

SPECTRUM OF CRISES	CONTINGENCY RESPONSES
COUPS	
DISASTERS	LIMITED POWER PROJECTION
RELIGIOUS/ETHNIC CONFLICTS	SHOW OF FORCE
DRUG TRAFFICKING	PERMISSIVE/NONPERMISSIVE NEO
LOCAL INSURRECTION	DISASTER RELIEF
ECONOMIC FAILURES	HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE
TERRITORIAL DISPUTES	

Figure 5-3

These types of contingencies are more likely than a major regional contingency. As I have stated, Korea, PACOMs principle concern for a major regional contingency, has an in place sub-unified command structure to deal with that eventuality. The other potential contingencies require quick response and power projection, a simple joint command and control structure, and a tailored force. The JTF provides the best answer to the command and control requirement. PACOM has chosen to have service component commanders and their headquarters prepare to serve as JTFs for conduct of contingency operations when required.

To assist component commanders with the problem of forming temporary JTFs for contingency operations, PACOM has formed a

Deployable Joint Task Force Augmentation Cell (DJTFAC) which can be dispatched to a service component commander, and around which a JTF staff can be constructed. 4 The DJTFAC is made up of PACOM staff personnel who are drawn from their permanent duties when required. Shown below is the current PACOM concept for formation of a contingency JTF. 5




Figure 5-4

Summary

PACOM currently has a balanced mix of forces from all services on which it can draw to address contingency requirements. A detailed command and control structure continues in place to deal with the North Korean threat. PACOM is now refining concepts for use of joint forces under a structured JTF to deal with other contingencies. The questions which now must be examined: What are the future requirements, are current strategies correct, and do the envisioned strategies go far enough?

ENDNOTES

1. Department of Defense. A Strategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim: Report to Congress 1992. Washington D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, 1992, p. 17.
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3. USPACOM. USCINCPAC Two-Tiered Command and Control System Overview. Camp Smith, Hawaii: USCINCPAC, undated.
4. Ibid.
5. Ibid.

CHAPTER VI

REQUIREMENTS FOR THE FUTURE

The vast responsibilities faced by PACOM make it clear that a significant joint military force capability is required. "Much of the success of the joint force hinges on the Joint Force Commander's capability to integrate the capabilities of the joint team and synchronize their full dimensional efforts."¹ I believe that the three key components required to effectively apply military force to address contingency operations are: an efficient, tailored force; a properly resourced, trained, and deployable joint command and control structure; and effective plans to address potential contingencies. Available U.S. forces are currently sufficient to meet PACOM's requirements. Any drawdown of these forces as our nation continues military reductions must proceed with caution to avoid losing desired capabilities. This is particularly true when the our military strategy requires us to be able to simultaneously address two major regional contingencies. However, our ability to command and control a joint force, particularly in a warfighting or peacemaking role, needs to be improved. Finally, theater contingency planning needs to be enhanced.

Joint Command and Control of Contingency Operations

Short notice regional contingencies in the mid to lower end of the battlefield continuum are the most probable future conflicts

which may require involvement of U. S. military forces. These missions can only be accomplished through use of a joint, and often combined, application of military force. Development of joint task force (JTF) doctrine and structure to meet command and control needs for contingency missions has been a particularly difficult issue. Our most significant problems in past contingency operations have been rooted in flawed command and control structures for the operations; structures which were not truly joint in structure or intent. One of the keys to success in the future will be adherence to the principle of war; unity of command. The current world environment and likely military employment scenarios will require joint and possibly combined application of military force under a well trained command and control structure. PACOM must have a contingency JTF command and control structure which could be deployed within the PACOM area of responsibility in support of NCA assigned contingency missions.

Contingency operations in the Pacific Rim will most likely be conducted under the direction of CINC PACOM. The CINC can command and control the operation directly with his staff or designate a subordinate commander. Generally given the CINC's large area of interest, he will normally designate a subordinate to conduct the contingency operation. This subordinate will obviously meet the CINC's operational intent but should have the flexibility to run the operation within that intent without undue interference.

Some operations can be conducted by a single service. In these cases, a service component commander will be given the mission. That component commander and his staff will plan and execute the mission with assigned forces. When two or more services are involved, the

operation becomes joint. Designation and use of a JTF has proven the most effective method of commanding and controlling joint contingency operations. Service or functional components subordinate to the JTF can then be assigned by the directing headquarters.

Designation of a JTF and its commander can occur at different levels depending on the operation. While the NCA or a CINC could designate the JTF and its commander, additional layering in the chain of command to the joint commander executing the contingency mission may be present. Whatever command chain is chosen, the designation of the responsible joint task force commander for execution and his operational chain are key issues which must be resolved.

There are a number of factors which must be considered when designating the joint task force commander of a contingency mission. If there is a standing joint task force in existence with the capability to execute the mission, the commander of this force would be a logical choice. This option provides a joint force commander already possessing a joint staff, communications, and equipment to plan and execute the operation.

Designation of a subordinate service component commander as the JTF commander may be required in some instances. When this is done there are a number of considerations. The designated commander will have to decide whether to form a joint staff or use his service staff to command and control the operation. Use of his own service staff requires that his staff wear two hats; one to run the joint operation and one to provide command and control for that commander's service component within the operation. Formation and use of a joint staff facilitates staff unity of effort and provides additional expertise.

but requires assets which will probably have to be taken out of other organizations. Organizations losing assets will be weakened; a particularly important consideration if they are participating in the contingency operation at hand. Moreover, formation of a joint task force on short notice can result in a JTF headquarters with limited training in functioning together as a command and control entity.

A single service commander designated as a JTF commander to conduct a joint contingency operation will also have to decide whether to remain as commander of his service component as well as running the joint operation. In essence, should he wear two hats or one. The more complex the operation, the more difficult it will be for him to function in both capacities. Even if he chooses to run the joint operation with his service staff, dual hatting the staff, he may want to give his deputy the mission of running his service component so he can devote his attention to command and control of the joint operation.

There is no right answer, but certain factors should be considered when making the decision. These factors include; size of the operation, complexity of the operation, force contributions of each service component in both size and mission, and availability of staff personnel and equipment to form a joint headquarters. All things being equal, a single hatted JTF commander with a single hatted JTF staff is probably the best solution. Unfortunately resources do not allow this option in many cases.

PACOM has wrestled with the problem of joint command and control as have all combatant commanders. During my discussions with PACOM staff members, I was briefed that either the III MEF, Seventh Fleet,

or I Corps Commander would most probably be designated as a JTF Commander to conduct required military operations. The commander would be selected based on the mission and the preponderance of forces which would be involved. The designated commander would then face the problem discussed previously; how to command and control the joint operation and his service component at the same time. To aid the selected JTF commander with this dilemma, PACOM has established a Deployable Joint Task Force Augmentation Cell (DJTFAC) which forms the JTF core staff around which the selected JTF commander can build the organization. A step in the right direction, this cell still has many of the problems that have been discussed. Personnel assigned to the DJTFAC are dual hatted; their primary duties are in other PACOM positions. The DJTFAC only forms the JTF core; component commanders must still flesh out the JTF structure. Finally, training opportunities with designated JTF commanders are limited.

As stated earlier, a jointly manned JTF command and control element which can focus on synchronization of the entire operation while component or functional commanders accomplish their specific missions is normally the CINC's first preference. However, we have discussed the difficulty in creating and employing a JTF which is not permanently established. The PACOM Commander's DJTFAC is his solution as the best alternative to a permanent standing contingency JTF. This allows PACOM to have a trained and supposedly ready JTF cadre command and control element when needed. As discussed, members of this element are dual hatted from other functions. As such, this CINC created contingency JTF headquarters suffers from lack of permanently assigned personnel, insufficient training time, and equipment

shortfalls.

Operation Urgent Fury shows what can happen when a JTF is designated without adequate personnel, communications, resources, or planning. The bulk of the U.S. forces for Grenada were placed under JTF 120 commanded by Vice Admiral Joseph Metcalf III. JTF 120 had army, navy, and SOF components. Marine forces remained under naval control. JTF problems which occurred were not so much a problem of external organization of the JTF and its components; but rather emanated from internal JTF staff structural deficiencies, and lack of JTF directed synchronization of component plans. Admiral Metcalf was designated COMJTF 120 during the JCS crises action sequence and while he was already afloat enroute to the middle east. He was charged with executing a plan developed during the crises action sequence; a plan which was newly developed and into which he had little time to input and little staff expertise on which to base that input. Key shortfalls faced by JTF 120 included:

1. The operation was conducted using a new, not existing plan.
2. JTF 120's location afloat, and communications capabilities, made it unable to adequately communicate with all JTF components and drive the planning effort as it unfolded during the crises action sequence.
3. JTF 120 was inadequately staffed both numerically and qualitatively to plan and conduct a joint operation the size of Urgent Fury. In fact, the lack of jointness on the JTF 120 staff was the reason then Major General Schwartzkopf was dispatched to serve

under Admiral Metcalf.

4. JTF 120 was not equipped to adequately communicate with all subordinate elements.

The results of these shortfalls were an unsynchronized planning effort and a poorly coordinated execution of the operation. Insufficient command and control, and operational detail were placed into the developed contingency plan. During crisis action planning, operational planning was compartmentalized between JCS, the JTF, and the service components to such an extent that coordination between JTF subordinate elements was impeded. As such, the JTF could not drive and synchronize crisis action planning.

The poorly coordinated planning effort resulted in; an operation lacking unity of command during execution, and needless U.S. and civilian casualties due to uncoordinated fire support. Only overwhelming U.S. force, lack of real enemy preparation and resistance, and luck allowed accomplishment of the mission without excessive military casualties or casualties among the U.S. noncombatants that were to be evacuated.

PACOM has worked to correct many of the deficiencies found in operations such as Urgent Fury. However, the steps taken may not be all that are required. Contingency operations can and often will be required on short notice. Ideally, the JTF should participate in all phases of the crisis action sequence. However, even with PACOM's current plans; the JTF must be assembled, linked up with the designated COMJTF, and the staff fully fleshed out based on the COMJTF's desires. By the time this occurs, the JTF may well be

committed to executing a CINC staff or service component developed plan into which the JTF as an organization had little input. The more complex the operation, the more serious this problem becomes. It will always be extremely difficult for a command and control headquarters to execute a plan in whose development that headquarters was not involved. Potential exists for loss of intent, lack of understanding of what the planners intended, poor synchronization in execution, and problems with command and control during execution.

Service component staffs and the CINC's unified staff exist as permanent organizations; we would not dream of anything less. Yet we continue to believe that a JTF can be assembled in the midst of a crisis, conduct necessary planning, and then command and control the force projection and employment of forces in the operation. It seems that we need a further look at permanently established contingency JTFs which can participate in the full spectrum of crisis action phases from situation development through execution.

Planning Requirements

While PACOM has detailed plans to address the Korean situation, current contingency plans for other requirements provide principally for a flow of forces with little attention to employment of forces. Each of the potential JTF headquarters; III MEF, I Corps, and Seventh Fleet; have assigned contingencies for which to prepare if designated as the headquarters to command and control a joint operation. The primary planning requirement therefor falls on the service component commander who is expected to become COMJTF for a given operation.

Whether assigned a noncombatant evacuation, security assistance, peace enforcement, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, or other type of military mission; the component commander designated as COMJTF would have to put together a JTF headquarters using the DJTFAC and plan the operation, often in a time constrained environment. The designated COMJTF would have to primarily rely on his assigned component forces with the addition of whatever other forces CINCPACOM gave him for the operation.

The existence of the DJTFAC is an aid, however if the DJTFAC came to the designated COMJTF with an array of CINC and supporting JTF plans for the various contingencies envisioned, the DJTFAC would be of much further assistance. These plans would have to be generic in many cases, with an escalating series of force packages which could be chosen from based on the type and size of the contingency. The CINC and his DJTFAC have the ability to include elements from all services in these building block force packages in advance. For example, a NEO package might include a CVBG, MEB, and light Army brigade under a Marine JTF commander.

If planning is left to service component commanders who might become JTF commanders, the lack of JTF generated plans containing detailed execution concepts; coupled with the requirement to designate the COMJTF and assemble the JTF staff to complete planning; could result in an environment where the mistakes of Desert One and Grenada might be repeated. The solutions are within our capabilities even under today's austere conditions.

Force Requirements

The size of CINCPACOM's theater and the diversity of missions faced make any change to currently assigned forces one which must be undertaken with great care. PACOM's historical role as an economy of force theater while we took a Europe first approach has left PACOM little military fat to cut. No immediate reductions of assigned air, naval, or marine combat elements are prudent. However, potential Army downsizing is expected to effect the 6th Infantry and 2d Infantry Divisions. The Army reductions could take in theater army brigade numbers from seven to five. I believe this can be fully accommodated only if a resolution is reached with the North Koreans on the nuclear issue.

Regardless of the final decisions reached by the Clinton administration, PACOM will continue to need a force mix containing elements of all the services. It is incumbent on PACOM's planners that they articulate the threat and the plans to address that threat to justify the required forces.

ENDNOTES

1. Joint Chiefs of Staff. A Doctrinal Statement of Selected Joint Operational Concepts. Washington D.C.: Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 23 November 1992, p. 22.

CHAPTER VII

RECOMMENDATIONS

The Pacific Rim has been, and should continue to remain a vital area of American engagement in support of our national interests. "It is essential that the United States maintain our commitment to this region."¹ Engagement is required on a political, economic, and military level. The dynamics of the region dictate that we continue to have a trained and ready military force to deter potential enemies, and if necessary to respond to protect our interests. Key to this force will be our ability to plan and execute contingency operations with tailored forces under effective joint command and control. Based on this study, the following recommendations are made as a contribution toward that objective.

Joint Command and Control of Contingency Operations

Improvements to the PACOM DJTFAC construction should maintain a lean structure but ensure that the structure developed is resourced both in personnel and equipment on a full time basis. The DJTFAC should be easily deployable by air and have a robust communications capability. Ideally, it should have an assault element that is capable of either airborne or over the shore entry if forced entry operations are required. Previously developed JTFs, such as in the old Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, became so large in structure and bureaucracy as to be unworkable; this problem must be avoided.

One of the ways overmanning can be avoided is to focus the scope of responsibility of the JTF. The CINC's staff, not the JTF, must write the unified command strategic contingency plans. The JTF should be responsible for writing the implementing plans based on the CINC's plan. The CINC's plan must be written with the capabilities of the contingency JTF in mind; and include a tailored force package options in each plan. The contingency JTF will have to develop implementing plans, and work with forces assigned to the JTF for each contingency plan as they develop supporting plans. This methodology will place selected JTF commanders in a much better posture during the crisis action sequence. The selected COMJTF will have a plan and a force package which can be used as a base from which to deviate rather than starting from scratch.

As an adjunct to its planning role, training will be an imperative for the contingency JTF. The contingency JTF headquarters should participate in an aggressive series of exercises under each of the commanders who have COMJTF roles for various contingencies.

Finally, once employed, the JTF's employment should be of limited duration to allow reconstitution of the contingency JTF capability. While the length of employment will be dependent on the situation, any long term operation should allow for maturing of the JTF's theater of operations and development of a more permanent command and control structure.

Planning Recommendations

CINCPACOM must develop detailed plans for anticipated

contingencies; NEO, stability assistance, peace enforcement, peacekeeping, and humanitarian assistance. Many of these plans may have to be made based on assumptions, and focused on a generic target representative of potential targets. An example would be a generic NEO operation in a capital city with a major airport. A JTF controlled CONPLAN could be developed with three force options; Army heavy, Naval - Marine Corps heavy, and a balanced force package. Parameters in the plans assumptions, such as the availability of a sea port, would drive the choice of the plan option to be used. A number of force packages, varying both by type and size could be developed to support the plan.

The existence of detailed plans of this type would facilitate the training of units as well as the training of the JTF command and control headquarters. It would also provide detailed plans which could serve as a point of departure during an actual crisis. The planning process, particularly as it addresses force mix for various scenarios, would aid the development of plans with optimum tailored force mixes for each type of contingency addressed. Service component commanders designated to serve under the JTF for specific contingencies must be required to develop detailed supporting plans. This requirement adds additional weight to the argument for existing plans with detailed execution concepts.

Force Structure Recommendations

Assigned air and naval forces are the minimum required to meet CINCPACOM's requirements. While a single MEF would probably be

sufficient to meet PACOM's requirements; the requirement for PACOM to act as a supporting CINC and provide marine forces to other CINCs for certain contingencies and existing OPLANS mitigates against eliminating any marine combat forces.

Army forces currently assigned to PACOM should be reduced over time from seven brigades to five brigades. The 6th Infantry Division can be immediately inactivated and replaced by a brigade sized unit. The 2d Infantry Division can be inactivated and replaced by a brigade sized unit stationed in Korea once resolution has been reached with North Korea over their nuclear development program and compliance obtained with internationally required inspections. Appropriate agreements will also have to be made with our Republic of Korea ally before inactivation of the 2d Division and replacement by a brigade proceeds. In addition, the 7th Infantry Division, a CONUS based unit available for employment in Korea, is also being considered for inactivation and replacement by a single brigade. Assuming the 2d, 6th, and 7th Infantry Divisions are each inactivated and replaced by brigade sized units; consideration should be given to linking the individual brigades which remain in Korea, Alaska, and California under a single division headquarters; ostensibly for employment in Korea as a Division entity, should that be required.

Linkage of the three remaining brigades raises the question of where to locate the division headquarters, artillery, and support structure. The structure of each of the individual brigades will also have to be determined; are they each constructed as separate brigades, or do they resemble a conventional divisional brigade? Locating the division flag, support, and artillery in Korea makes

reinforcement of PACOM's major regional contingency easier but limits the CINC's flexibility for employment of the unit elsewhere. However, given the current situation on the peninsula, placement of the division headquarters in Korea probably is prudent. This configuration can be changed later when required. Moreover, the brigades remaining in CONUS could be limited to conventional divisional brigade organizations; relying on post support units and agencies to fill the roles that the division support command normally would if they were colocated. This saves manpower and resources over trying to maintain separate brigade structures.

The 25th Infantry Division and its three brigades in Hawaii should be retained to provide the PACOM commander a flexible force which can be used to reinforce Korea if required, but just as important, to provide forces in conjunction with other services to address other theater contingencies.

Summary

The Pacific Rim is and will remain an area of vital interest to the United States. As such, it is imperative that we remain politically, economically, and militarily engaged in the region. Our military forces remain a visible and therefor, key component of our ability to demonstrate regional engagement and intention to meet regional commitments to our friends and allies. The ability to project military forces to address likely regional contingencies, normally in concert with allies or other coalition forces, is an absolutely vital capability. As a result of a regional assessment and

our current military posture, the following actions should be taken with respect to our ability to plan for, project, and command and control contingency forces in the Pacific Rim:

1. Develop the PACOM DJTFAC into a permanently manned and resourced deployable Contingency Joint task force headquarters.

2. Study current command and control headquarters in PACOM to ascertain where spaces for the permanent contingency JTF can be obtained. Candidates for downsizing or elimination include USARJ and USARPAC. Either could pick up the mission of both given the current regional situation. Further, Army downsizing in CONUS may help with the problem of obtaining spaces to form a permanent contingency JTF.

3. Develop a series of CINC generated detailed plans, generic if necessary, to address likely types of contingency operations. The DJTFAC should develop implementing plans based on the CINC plans. These plans must include options for various force mixes.

4. Maintain assigned air, naval, and marine combat forces at current levels.

5. Reduce army combat forces from seven to six brigades; accomplish this through inactivation of the 6th Infantry Division and replacing it with a single brigade.

6. Once North Korean compliance with nuclear inspection requirements is obtained, further reduce army forces from six to five brigades; accomplish this through downsizing 2d Infantry Division maneuver forces in Korea to a single heavy (armor-mechanized) brigade.

7. Link the army brigades remaining in Alaska, and

California under the 2d Infantry Division headquarters with primary employment planning directed at Korea; secondary priority for planning to other Pacific Rim areas as directed by CINCPACOM.

PACOM has already seized the initiative to address theater military requirements under the post cold war paradigm. In an immense geographic theater, current force levels, with a prudent reduction and refinement primarily in Army ground forces, will suffice to address regional missions and maintain continued military engagement in the region. However, it is crucial that the momentum gained with the creation of the DJTFAC not be lost. Planning for, and command and control of contingency operations will remain the most critical theater imperative for the foreseeable future. As such, it is time to step up to the table and resource the pieces to meet that critical theater imperative; we must build fully developed plans and tailored force packages to address potential contingencies; and we must resource a lean, robust, fully manned theater contingency joint task force.

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