Clausewitz's Concept of the Culminating Point and Its Application in the Gettysburg Campaign
Abstract
With the publication of the 1982 edition of Field Manual 100-5, Operations, the U.S. Army presented a fighting doctrine rooted in classical military theory. Yet, doctrine, to be useful, must be accepted and understand in its own right by those who have to apply it. Clausewitz's idea of the culminating point is a good example. FM 100-5 cites the concept of the culminating point as central to understanding Airland Battle and operational art and, consequently, explains it to its readers. The Clausewitzian concept of the culminating point is even more important to officers who plan and conduct theater operations. The paper offers a critical analysis of the theory of the culminating point in the well known Gettysburg Campaign conducted by General Robert E. Lee in 1863. Was the Clausewitzian theory of the culminating point evident in the campaign? Did Lee consider the concept and apply it to his decisions regarding the campaign? Did the campaign support the concept and add validity to it? In looking for these answers, the reader can better understand the application of the concept of culminating point, and thereby, become a better practitioner of turning scientific theory into artful tactics and operations
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Apr 15, 1993
- Accession Number
- ADA264855
Entities
People
- James D. Coomler
Organizations
- United States Army War College