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**DISORDER
IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER**

BY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL STEPHEN D. BROWN
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
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The phrase "New World Order" has, over the last four years, become a much overused and relatively meaningless cliché. Its original intent was to provide a conceptual illustration of a tortured world community scintillatingly close to creating a new international order in the aftermath of the Cold War. This new international order would make possible a world without conflict, pain or hunger, where people of all regions could live in freedom as equals.

This concept, and its attendant utopian condition, brings tears of hope from that portion of humanity which has the time to spend thinking on such things. However, in reality, thus far in our international devolution from 40 years of Cold War, we have made little, if any, progress toward realizing a New World Order. In fact, not only have we yet to decide upon what course we should take in pursuit of this new order, we have not even decided what this new order should be. In the interim, conflict, tension and war continue to expand around the globe while the major powers of the world, those with the potential to control global events for the betterment of the world community, continue in their intellectual struggle to determine a role for themselves.

This study argues that the first step in our journey to a New World Order should be to understand that we must somehow break the mold of conflict cast and recast throughout recent history by virtually the same thoughts and actions. A new international order cannot be built upon the same foundation that caused the previous orders to collapse into conflict and war. A new approach, a new interpretation of reality, must be developed and implemented which allows sufficient creativity and flexibility in responding to the tremendous challenges which face the global community now and in the future.

USAWC MILITARY STUDIES PROGRAM PAPER

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DISORDER IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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United States Army

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Project Adviser

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INTRODUCTION

"The human drama, whether played out in history books or headlines, is often not just a confusing spectacle but a spectacle about confusion."

One of the most spectacular confusions ever attributed to the overall human societal condition is highlighted by the absence of a discernable goal for global political and economic affairs in the post-Cold War world. Equally confusing is the total lack of direction that exists today in the foreign policy efforts of the United States and other major powers. Could this current state of affairs be the ultimate confusion? Not only do we not know how to get where we are going - we don't yet even know where we want to go. The result is a fantastic, 100 mile per hour global merry-go-round, aptly named "Near Chaos." The only resemblance this carnival ride has to the one of our youth is its unending ability to make us dizzy and sick to our stomachs, and, to cause us a great deal of harm if we aren't careful during the ride.

Most observers of the international scene would argue that the final goal of our efforts in pursuit of some kind of order in the global community should be a New World Order that somehow breaks the mold of conflict cast and recast over the millennium by virtually the same thoughts and actions. Some would argue that we are already in the midst of this New World Order that began to take shape immediately upon the collapse of the Soviet

Union and the resulting end of the Cold War. Others would describe the current state of global affairs as the "New World Disorder." Whatever the case, the issues to be resolved and the means that must be identified to tackle them are more complex and transitory than at any time in history. The potential for increased conflict continues to escalate as we continue to ponder. The United States, Japan and Western Europe "face an analogous problem to that faced by the U.S. in 1945. Then it was how to relate peacefully and constructively with the Soviet Union. Now it is how to relate to the majority of the population of the entire world." ²

Claims to success in our confrontation with the post-WWII Soviet Union are that we survived and were ultimately triumphant, but, the costs were enormous, both in terms of life and resources. How do we now restructure our collective Cold War-tuned tunnel vision, in all its single-purposed, uncreative and inflexible glory, to the unenviable task of attempting to understand, appreciate and deal with the problems of the entire globe? These problems carry the same potential for disaster as did the Cold War. How are we to control the most destructive of the problems we face, that of conflict between nations, regions and groups?

This last question formulates the overall focus of my efforts in this paper: To determine the role of the United States and other major powers in managing conflict as the global community struggles to make the transition to a New World Order.

THE END OF THE COLD WAR

The changes that have occurred in the world community over the span of the last three years are the greatest since the end of World War II, and, in terms of global impact, represent one of the greatest periods of change in human history. This change is significant not only because of its scope and impact, but, also because of the speed with which it occurred. The ways in which people, groups, regions and nations conducted their day-to-day affairs, and, more significantly, the ways in which they viewed and perceived reality, changed almost overnight. Humans, grouped together as a region or nation, are adaptable to change. However, quick, catastrophic change is much harder to accommodate, and virtually impossible in the absence of strong leadership, without heightened levels of conflict. The end of the Cold War's bipolar world, created a vacuum in the global power balancing mechanism that has yet to be filled. The result has been a loss of control over the international situation and the stability which bipolarity helped to insure. This is not to say that bipolarity created a "heaven on earth" by any stretch of the imagination, but, although the Cold War spawned and nurtured tremendous tensions and potentially devastating problems, U.S. and Soviet bilateral relations did produce an era of remarkable stability. During the Cold War, the world witnessed many major, costly conflicts - however, when viewed in historical context, it

was also a long-term period of relative stability for much of the world.

The events of the past 3 1/2 years have left the global community in a state of virtual inability to deal with itself and its problems. In the words of Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "rather than the end of history, the post-Cold War world is witnessing a return of history in the diversity of sources of international conflict." ³

The end of the Cold War and the beginning of the transition to George Bush's proclaimed New World Order lacked two ingredients which were essential to success during this period of tremendous turmoil and change, visionary leadership and commitment to direction. Mikhail Gorbachev was, in my opinion, the only leader with a relevant vision. But, his vision appears to have lacked critical detail and was almost totally dependent upon engines of change outside his control. He also lacked understanding of the means required to arrive at his vision. This absence of global leadership and the resulting loss of focus on how to deal with the problems of the global community is, to a great degree, the cause of the current instability and conflict being experienced in many regions of the world. These regions are now overcome by age-old rivalries, ethnic upheavals and myriad problems which have lain dormant under the watchful eyes of the bipolar superpower structure of the past 45 years. Continued leadership failure will result in an ever-increasing cycle of global instability and conflict. We must turn our focus

to early recognition and timely development of solutions to the causes of instability and conflict as opposed to attempting to solve problems after they have already become raging infernos.

DEFINITION OF MAJOR POWER

At this point, a definition of the term "major power" is necessary, particularly as it fits into the context of this inquiry. Until recently, major power status was conferred due almost solely to the possession of significant military capability. This capability was not defined just by the amount of military possessed but rather in the ability to project military strength to other parts of the world in order to influence events around the globe. In these terms, the world of the past 45 years was clearly bipolar. The U.S. and the Soviet Union were capable of influencing events anywhere in the world both through the threat of and actual use of forces, and, the potential for the introduction of nuclear weaponry. However, the term major power can no longer be tied to this old definition. In the current environment, "military prowess is a poor predicator of the outcomes in the economic and transnational layers of current world politics." ' A more "diversified portfolio" of power resources is now required to merit a rating of post-Cold War major power. The events which have taken place as a result of the end to the Cold War have produced an international environment which is far too complex to be defined

and structured in terms of military power alone.

Under our new definition of a major power, a nation strong both militarily and economically, the U.S. is the only nation which comes close to fitting the description. However, other nations come close for differing reasons and realities, and, as will become clear later in the paper, must be included as major power contenders. The European Economic Community (EEC), although out of its league in both categories, still has the capability of projecting its forces to other parts of the globe and, as a whole, possesses exceptional economic strength. Japan must be included simply because of its overwhelming wealth and the capabilities which that wealth allows it. Russia, although no player in terms of economic prowess, is still a significant force to deal with militarily. China, with its tremendous potential, is an emerging power in both categories. Germany, as is the case with Japan, must be included in its own right due to its tremendous wealth and economic strength, in spite of the recent downturn in its economy.

THE NEW WORLD ORDER

According to Dr. Kim R. Holmes, Director of Defense and Foreign Policy Studies at the Heritage Foundation, the idea that a New World Order was at hand surfaced between then-President George Bush and his National Security Advisor, LTG (retired) Brent Scowcroft, during a fishing trip in mid-1990. "The National

Security Advisor impressed Bush with his belief that a New World Order was at hand - an order of international cooperation based on respect for principles of law and democracy." ⁵ However, this idea of a world on the verge of creating a new international order appeared as early as December 1988 in a speech given by Mikhail Gorbachev to the United Nations General Assembly. This reference has little relevance other than to illustrate the irony of Gorbachev, the leader of the soon to be dissolved Soviet Union, introducing to the world community a concept so absent from previous Soviet thought and deed.

This New World Order thinking was a result of both the euphoria spawned by the end of the Cold War and the possibilities which people of vision saw for the future. It was also an honest attempt, albeit within a leadership environment structured by realist thought and foreign policy approach, on the part of the Bush administration to make some sense of the confusion that resulted from the end of that Cold War. The intent was to set a course for United States foreign policy which would fill the void created by 40 years of foreign policy dedicated almost exclusively to dealing with the threat of the Soviet Union and its communist ideology. "The United States has not yet lost all of its Cold War empire, but we have very definitely lost our enemy. And with the demise of not only the Soviet Union but of communism itself, we have also lost our role and have found nothing plausible to replace it." ⁶

President Bush defined this New World Order as one with "new

ways of working with other nations...peaceful settlement of disputes, solidarity against aggression, reduced and controlled arsenals and just treatment of all peoples." ⁷ In a speech to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the International Democratic Union on 29 July, 1991, Dr. Kim R. Holmes said, "There is much in Bush's concept of the New World Order that is right and good. It rightly reflects the American hope that the world will become more peaceful, democratic and free. Yet these utopian impulses are tempered by an acceptance of the world as it is - that the Soviet threat is diminishing; and that America still needs to be engaged in the world, if not merely for the good of others, then certainly for the good of itself." Tempering his praise however, he went on to say, "but, free floating abstractions that make good commencement speeches often are bad foreign policy." ⁸ Also, in a much more skeptical, and probably correct view, "George Bush's use of the term New World Order is mainly a rhetorical move within the realist framework, seeking to mobilize support for an activist foreign policy in the early stages of the post-Cold War period." ⁹ This "realist framework," and its impact on past and future U.S. foreign policy, will be discussed in more detail later.

So, what about this New World Order? Does it exist? Is it a possibility for the future, or, is it simply a term tossed around with little, if any, value or meaning? Can it provide, through its description, a conceptual validity upon which nations, and a "community of nations," can begin to build a

system or policy structure for use in meeting the tremendous challenges of the future?

Certainly, the end of the Cold War has thrust us into a "new world," but not one possessing any of the characteristics of order described in President Bush's vision of a New World Order. Quite to the contrary, the current international scene is replete with examples of knee-jerk reactions to all ranges of conflict and other potentially severe crisis situations with little semblance to what could be categorized as international order.

These effects are a direct result of an absence of vision, or, at the very best, a lack of resolve or commitment to a vision for the global community, on the collective part of the major power's and their leaders. The global community is unarguably in the throes of transition to some kind of new order and is, as Daniel N. Nelson calls it "a world order in flux."¹⁰ As we have seen, what that order will be is unknown. However, for better or worse, it will be defined by the ways in which the United States, as the primary leader, and, to a lesser degree, the other major powers of the post-Cold War world, approach the problems which face the world now and will in the future. Hopefully, the right decisions will be made when these world leaders, "review the opportunities now available to create a genuinely peaceful new world order under which is not just a group of northern states exerting control by any means possible."¹¹ As already discussed, there is great challenge in trying to define exactly what is meant by the phrase "New World Order," and, we must

attempt to address it through some means other than the views of an ex-president. One strategic planner in the State Department described the complexity of the issue very succinctly; "we never use the New World Order at the State Department. It is a buzzword for nothing. I don't know what it is." ¹² Without a definition, or at least a general statement of meaning, the phrase "New World Order" will mean very different things not only to individuals, but, more important, to nations. A logical progression from vision to actuality requires that the vision be defined in understandable terms. A perfect but unrealistic definition would describe a world without conflict, pain or hunger, where people of all the world's regions could live in freedom as equals. But, humanity is flawed and incapable, in its current state, of realizing such a utopian dream. More realistically, we must accept that conflict, pain, hunger, inequality and the lack of freedom of choice will continue in many parts of the world. Decisions must be made on how to deal with these serious issues while still recognizing that the U.S. and other major powers can do nothing to preclude all of the bad things that can happen to people and nations. However, that does not mean that nothing should be done. An isolationist U.S. is certainly not the solution and would lead to even greater problems in the world community.

The answer to this perplexing issue seems to lie somewhere in the complex jungle called the "interaction of nations." It must somehow be possible for enlightened leaders and their

nations to see the utility in occasionally subordinating the perceived best interests of their respective nations in support, and, to the benefit of, a greater portion of the global community. Self-perceived sovereign nations subordinating their interests? The obvious problem with this idea is to identify which interests, when subordinated, will best help the effort while, at the same time, least affecting those who view themselves as sacrificing. For example, is it in the best interests of the United States to allow special trade access to this country by poor countries of the so-called "third world," without equal access to their markets? In the short-term, this situation would hurt the U.S. worker and economy. However, the potential long-term benefits, a phrase which is beyond the patience capability of most Americans, of a growing, healthy global economic system would provide for a consistently increasing standard of living for all. Another example involves the use and steady depletion of the world's sources of energy and other natural resources. Is it in the best interests of the U.S. and other advanced nations to cut back on their ravenous appetites for the dwindling resources of our planet? Yet, how can we proceed in our current plunder, and still chastise a struggling country like Brazil for the uneducated ravaging of their rainforests? It is in our long-term interests to curb our appetite for resources through prudent use and development of alternate sources.

A prerequisite to the establishment of a New World Order is

then, for nations, particularly the U.S. and other major powers, to think in terms of global interests rather than national interests. Establishment of any real New World Order is impossible if nations continue to think and act only in terms of what is best for them alone.

Through all of this, we must recognize the fact that change must be accepted as a fundamental tenet of world events. U.S. foreign policy efforts must, therefore, be focused on creativity and flexibility in order to deal with these constant changes and challenges. The United States must accept the mantle of leadership, defined in terms of New World Order direction, in some sort of concert with the other major powers, to guide the world community through this period of transition to a New World Order reality in 40 to 50 years.

CONFLICT

In order to proceed with our analysis and attempt to come to some conclusion on how to deal with the problems of the global community, we must first take a closer look at conflict since it is one of the primary causes of these problems.

What causes conflict between nations and states? A cursory glance at conflict and its nature almost always leads the international observer to a preoccupation with war. The fault in this view is that although war is the frequent result of conflict, it is its product and not its cause. This is an

important point in our analysis because, as I have alluded to briefly in earlier parts of this paper, we often see international actors focusing their attempts to manage conflict on resolving disputes after they have become armed conflicts, as opposed to recognizing and attempting to resolve or control them before they evolve into deadly force scenarios.

Conflict analysis is an extremely complex and detailed field of inquiry. As in any philosophical or psychological study, the opinions, choices and proposals are many and varied. It is not my purpose to dwell on the various concepts of conflict as exemplified by subjectivist versus objectivist or realist versus liberal capitalist points of view. However, the need does exist to set the stage, so to speak, for further discussion by broadly defining conflict for the purposes of this paper as: a clash between nations, regions or groups based upon their individual perception of needs and their so-called, "power based" views on interests, such as material resources or other sources of power and control.

An important corollary here, which is tied to our definition of conflict, and always hampers efforts to manage or mediate conflict, is that throughout human history the successful resolution of conflict has almost always been defined in terms of a winner and a loser. The problem with this mindset is that it sets the conditions for conflict, preordaining the rules to be played (each side views success only in terms in winning) by causing it to end in some form of war. The consequences for the

global community, as defined by these pre-set conditions, are wars of varying degrees.

Another enticing view of the cause for conflict among nations defines the problem in terms of the anarchic nature of the international structure which has evolved over the last several centuries. "The anarchic nature of the world system is the fundamental trait of international political life."¹³ Anarchy (defined here as absence of authority or government) is seen as the starting point for international political analysis,¹⁴ and is the product of a world composed of many sovereign states without a recognized, single authority to which each state answers for its actions. The view here, that, "the international system is often understood as largely characterized by anarchy under the mantle of sovereignty,"¹⁵ again, presets the conditions for conflict since each state, due to its sovereignty, has the right to pursue what it views as its own best interests. This, each nation contends, is so regardless of the consequences to other sovereign nations.

An international political system composed of many sovereign states and answerable for their actions to no higher authority, no one other than themselves, will cause conflict as each pursues its own narrowly defined interests. In this environment, armed conflict becomes the only means to resolve disputes. "In politics, force is said to be the *ultima ratio*. In international politics, force serves not only as the *ultima ratio*, but indeed as the first and constant one,"¹⁶ and, in a typically human

chain of events, as one nation arms itself to better enable it to pursue its interests and provide for its own security, or to thwart some perceived aggression, it raises its threat profile to other nations in the area who, in turn, begin to arm, etc, etc, etc. The problem then becomes one in which "war is always possible and often probable given the inherent desires of malevolent men to dominate others,"¹⁷ in pursuit of their own self-interests, which they define as needs, outside of any concern for international harmony. The one positive point of this system appears to be that the relative power of states or groups, as viewed by others, does establish some rules for conduct. "In contrast to the equality of man in the state of nature, the differences in state's capabilities allow the great powers to play a special role in establishing a degree of order in the international community."¹⁸ If we assume, and we certainly must at this point in our history, that we will be incapable of readily changing the anarchic nature of the international order (through the disestablishment of the nation-state system) then, we must continue to hope for the existence of well-intentioned major powers to maintain some semblance of order and peace. The conclusion here then, is that relations among states without shared rules, institutions and common objectives, are fundamentally anarchic and prone to conflict by nature. The very foundation of the international political system, the sovereign nation state, is flawed to the point of being a prime mover on the stage of conflict between nations. The reality of

the current global nation-state system is that conflict is inevitable at any given time somewhere within the system due to the nature of the interaction caused by that system within and between states. This scenario will continue for the foreseeable future and must be understood by all who participate in the system.

THE CONTINUING TREND TOWARD NATIONALISM

As we have seen, nation states tend to be concerned with their own self interests and wary of the intentions of other nation states. Nationalism, rather than retreating since the end of the Cold War, as was hoped, "in fact is becoming stronger in most of the world, not weaker. Instead of one global village, there are villages around the globe more aware of each other. That, in turn, increases the opportunities for conflict." ¹⁹ The end of the Cold War, unarguably to the benefit of all humankind, and the lack of a replacement for bipolar-induced stability, has left a vacuum which is being filled by increasing levels of nationalism. The absence of any plan or design to lead the global community from the Cold War to an environment of greater international cooperation and consensus, has resulted in a return to the past, before the Cold War, where nationalism and the potential for conflict were always the norm. Continuation of this situation will perpetuate the problems which accompany it and multiply the chances for increasing levels of conflict. In

such a continuing scenario, "nationalism will beget nationalism and we will be that much farther removed from the real world order challenges... the transition from conflict to co-operation between East and West, (hemispheres) the redress of inequality that divides North and South (hemispheres) and the harmonizing of economic needs with environmental requirements, to name but a few...." ²⁰

REALISM AND POWER POLITICS

A discussion of realist ideology is an important goal in this paper since it has colored and dominated U.S. foreign policy thinking since the end of World War II. "Despite the uncertainty of all power calculations, the language and policy precepts of *realpolitik* have dominated U.S. policy since World War II." ²¹ Nationalistic tendencies and the Cold War led the U.S. and the Truman administration to embrace the realist view of international politics, as first espoused by Hans Morgenthau in his 1948 book, Politics Among Nations. All major decisions in the post-Cold War foreign policy arena have been made within the confines of this ideology.

What is Realism, the political ideology? The realist view, "attributes great significance to the hierarchy of power between states as a means of creating order," ²² and, "emphasizes power as the fundamental commonality of international relations, national interests as the guiding principles of policy makers,

and balance of power as the means by which to pursue such interests without war." ²³ This same realist view of how the U.S. should interact in the global community has endured to the present. As with many ideologies, it is different things to different people. There are, however, commonalities in realist thinking - ways of looking at or responding to issues and/or events which are common among virtually all realist proponents. These commonalities are addressed and summarized below. Realism:

- Focuses on the sovereign nation state as the basic unit of international relations, and the strongest state(s) as the provider of international order.

- Accepts the system of interacting sovereign nation states as the only possibility for international order.

- Accepts conflict as the primary, but not exclusive, motivator of political relationships among antagonistic states.

- Threatens the use of unlimited force to discourage attack and hostile action from enemy states.

- Is "an acknowledgment that the character of conflict is influenced by international economic policy, by the degree to which war is perceived as a rational instrument of statecraft, and by the domestic political culture and prevailing ideological outlook of principal international rivals." ²⁴

Realist thought, and its accompanying view of the world, has dominated not only those responsible for directing and steering U.S. foreign policy within the government since the end of WWII,

but has been the dominant ideology even in academia; "In academic life, virtually all serious search for appointments in higher education and major research proposals to leading foundations can succeed only if they survive realist screening criteria... Nonrealists and surely anti-realists are rejected if identified or, at most, given token status at the outer regions of discussion." ²⁵ This is a critical point since it is from within and through academia that realist thought has been sustained and fed to successive U.S. government administrations in the form of political appointees. As one can imagine, the result of this has been, for the most part, that alternative processes and approaches to global problems and issues have been totally excluded from the policy making and problem solving agenda.

There are many problems with realist thought and action as they pertain to the post-Cold War world. Foremost is the tendency of realist power politics and its balance of power approach to be almost Machiavellian in dealing with global problems. "The principal (and fatal) defect of modern realist theory is its supposition that Machiavellianism can actually be subordinated to the objective of preserving a balance of power system... by its very nature, Machiavellian power politics requires the employment of violence against putative adversaries in order to achieve ultimate objectives. This dictate traps governments into a interminable cycle of force and counterforce." "We see a great deal of this "force and counterforce" scenario in

today's international politics. Current events seem to be uncovering a more consistent Machiavellian thought process in the U.S.'s approach to international politics and the establishment of a New World Order. This is extremely contradictory in that;

"Machiavellian power politics violently contradicts several of the most fundamental normative principles upon which the United States is supposed to be founded: the inalienable rights of the individual, the self-determination of peoples, the sovereign equality and independence of states, non-interventionism, respect for international law and organizations and the peaceful settlement of international disputes."²⁷

Realist proponents tend to reduce the concept of international relations to tests of military capability between nations, while at the same time discounting the possibility of any alternative to their approach and view of the world. They have displayed little, if any, optimism in the ability of international organizations to assist in dealing with global community problems and, in fact, they have a very poor record of even recognizing, much less dealing with, the new global agenda items that have become important issues over the past few years, e.g. environment, ocean, space, population migration, and the redistribution of global wealth.

In my opinion, the two greatest shortcomings of applying the realist approach to the post-Cold War period are: (1) Its

inability to reduce threats of conflict and, (2) The inability of the primary tool of realism, military power, to deal with the varied threats to world stability once they appear. Military power is of little value in dealing with economic problems, religious and ethnic strife, mass poverty, hunger and environmental concerns, to name but a few. Realists, by nature, are unequivocally tied to their primarily Hobbesian view of individual, and, therefore, nation state interaction. This view defines the interaction as being essentially quests for power based upon fear and distrust of one another. It requires a single-focused response to any form of conflict - military. It dwells on the product, conflict, as opposed to dealing in any substantial manner with resolving or managing the causes of potential conflict before they become severely threatening.

Although, in the opinion of a great many political observers, the realist agenda was right for the post-WWII period and the Cold War itself, it is not, however, a view that holds any hope in the more complex and diversified post-Cold War period, for a truly peaceful, stable New World Order. It is not inherently capable of providing alternative solutions outside of the realist structure which allow the creativity and flexibility necessary in dealing with a world of increasingly varying and diverse conflicts. It is a response appropriate to a single enemy and has outlived its usefulness. It must be replaced by a more flexible view of the world, capable of providing creative alternatives and solutions to the tremendous problems facing us

now and in the future.

Given the tremendous changes which have taken place in the global community since the collapse of the Soviet Union, I am convinced that a new view is required to provide solutions to the potentially destructive challenges facing us. As an example, how long will the impoverished nations of the world, located primarily in the southern hemisphere, continue to sit back docilely and allow the Euro-Atlantic community, which comprises approximately one-fifth of the world's population, to control four-fifths of the world's wealth? ²⁸ A realist approach to this and similar issues, as defined by the previously addressed commonalities in realist thought, would probably view it in confrontational terms with containment as its recommended response. The political, economic, environmental and social problems of the global community must be addressed. Realism, as I have shown, is incapable of viewing the world in this context.

THREATS TO WORLD STABILITY

The problems facing us can be reviewed each day simply by reading a newspaper or watching the evening news. What are some of the major threats to world stability which are and will be capable of leading to conflict?

- Regional instability caused by poverty, ethnic strife, environmental concerns, religious turmoil and power grabbing: Regional instability represents the greatest threat to peace in

the current world environment. Regions which show the greatest proclivity for conflict now are; the Middle East, Eastern and Central Europe, Africa, and, to a lesser extent at this time, South and Central America. ²⁹

- The proliferation of nuclear technology and capability: The threat here is particularly valid when viewed in the context of "rogue" nation states which would view this capability as a legitimate means of acquiring power, status and recognition from the global community and within their own regions.

- The current increase of nationalistic tendencies among nations of the world: ³⁰ As we have discussed earlier, nationalism has always been and will continue to be an underlying cause for conflict among nations.

- Greater contradictions and therefore greater potential for conflict among nations as they attempt to respond to the challenges of the post-Cold War environment: ³¹ This issue relates to the threat caused by the evolution of, and resulting changes to, the way in which nations interact. "Power is more multidimensional, structures more complex and states more permeable." ³²

- The existence of alliances and security commitments among nations against other nations: Although alliances and security arrangements are most often viewed as ways to discourage hostile action, the possibility for armed conflict always exists when, as hostile action is initiated against a partner, the other partners are forced into the conflict, sometimes even when it is

not in the partner's best interests to do so.

- The potential for Europe to "devolve" from its current quest for a European community to a scene of multipolarity which has been played out on the European stage often in history: It has always ended in war. ³³ On the other hand, there is also the possibility that through the creation of the European Economic Community, individual European nations could actually create instability through their interdependence. ³⁴ Dependence on others is often viewed as weakness by other nations and has great potential for exploitation.

- A unipolar United States: As it pushes its own, very often, "intrusive global agenda" ³⁵ in an attempt to create stability through a U.S. view of international law and conduct and overzealousness in attempting to democratize the globe.

- The Russian nuclear capability: Although not currently viewed as a serious threat to peace, the potential does exist, particularly in a change of governments, for Russia's vast nuclear capability to become a threat to regional and world peace. A subcategory threat, which is probably more realistic, also exists here in the sale of weaponry or the transfer of weapons technology to "rogue" states in an attempt, on the part of Russia, to acquire hard currency in an effort to solve its pressing economic dilemma.

In this high threat environment, it is reasonable to assume that world instability, tension and conflict will probably get worse, particularly if we continue in our realist approach to

conflict management and problem solving. This is particularly true since none of the major threats to world stability lend themselves to solution by a process which is predicated on military response and action to threat resolution. In the majority of cases, military confrontation, or, military conflict as the logical progression from confrontation, is very often not the appropriate response to these threats. The realist approach then, must logically be discarded in favor of some process having a better chance of enhancing and maintaining world stability.

CONFLICT MANAGEMENT ALTERNATIVES

Given these tremendous challenges, and the probability that they are beyond the ability of realist proponents to solve, what then is the role of the United States, other major powers and international organizations, in moving the global community along in its transition to a real New World Order? Opinions on this are diverse and run the spectrum of approaches and ideologies. The realities of current and potential international conflict and instability demand, however, that some means be developed to confront and address the security issues listed above in a realistic, as opposed to realist, attempt to solve each over time.

John Lewis Gaddis provides us with an excellent opening frame of reference in our search for alternatives; "It had been necessary, Madison wrote in The Federalist, no.51, so to contrive

the interior structure of the government as that its several constituent parts may, by their relations, be the means of keeping each other in their proper places. This may not be a bad design to follow concerning the international community as all of us think about how to come to grips - as the Founding Fathers had to - with the centripetal and centrifugal forces that are already shaping our lives." ³⁶ In other words, an alternative may lie in some form of restructure of the international order, or possibly, the elements that make up that order, which changes relationships and interaction in such a way to better maintain international stability.

There is no lack of proposals for alternative systems of global conflict management. The following is a discussion of several proposed by observers of the international political scene:

1. A return to Classic *Realpolitik*. An alternative course of action for the United States is, "to act as Britain did a century ago as the great balancer of power." ³⁷ The United States, in this proposal, would act as the sole authority in the global community. The thought here is a return to, or continuation of, as some would argue, neorealism. However, the difference is now that the U.S. would no longer be able to portray itself, as it did during the Cold War, in the accepted role of power balancer against the "Great Satan" - the Soviet Union and communism. Its role would much more resemble that of a world policeman. I would argue, as does Charles Krauthammer,

that, "unfortunately, it (the U.S.) is entirely unfit (for this role) psychologically. There is no stomach and very little tolerance in the United States for a foreign policy of *realpolitik*." ³⁸ As discussed previously in our look at realist thought, *realpolitik*, which asserts a realist balance of power approach to foreign policy, also assumes a continuing condition of war or the threat of war between nations as the basic premise from which any discussion of security must begin. *Realpolitik* would put the U.S. in the precarious role of defining, balancing and enforcing peace in this New World Order.

2. A systematic expansion of democracy. Of all the options, world democratization is by far the most intriguing and, at the same time, complex. A great deal of thought and writing on this idea has been accomplished by a wide diversity of observers. All agree that a world composed of democratic nations would be a peaceful world, since history teaches us that democracies very seldom find themselves in conflict with one another. The issue to be resolved for expanding democracy to the degree necessary to allow for global peace lies in the problems inherent in the mechanics of actually making it happen.

This concept was first studied by Immanuel Kant in his famous, Essay on Perpetual Peace (1795). According to Georg Sorensen, Kant based the potential success of his thesis of a world "pacific union of democracies" on three "pillars": "first, the mere existence of democracies with their culture of peaceful resolution of conflict; second, the common moral bonds which are

forged between democracies on this basis; and third, the democracies' economic cooperation towards mutual advantage." ⁴⁰ Kant's early analysis of democracy has proven valid in the modern period as addressed in an article by Dean Babst and William Eckhardt. "It is encouraging to know, therefore, that independent, freely-elected democracies have never fought one another. In addition, extensive research by Dr. Rudy Rummel has shown that democratic governments are far less likely to kill their own people. Of the more than 119 million victims of genocide, killed in cold blood, in our century, virtually all were killed by nondemocracies, especially totalitarian ones." ⁴⁰ The study which is specifically addressed by the Babst and Eckhardt article, and covers the history of all independent countries from the period 1950 - 1991, had some intriguing conclusions:

- Only 23% of the democracies were involved in wars of any kind, while 93% of nondemocracies were.
- 23% of democracies have been involved in foreign wars and 72% of nondemocracies have.
- There have been no internal wars in democracies while 90% of the nondemocracies have had civil wars.
- 16 countries became democracies during this 42-year period. All had participated in wars before becoming democratic while only two have since. ⁴¹

The most accepted theory as to why this is so is that, "people in a democracy perceive themselves as autonomous,

self-governing people, who share norms of live-and-let-live and respect the rights of others to self-determination, if those others are also perceived as self-governing and hence not easily led into aggressive foreign policies by a self-serving elite." ⁴²

To carry the theory even further, Bruce Russett and William Antholis did an interesting study of "the only other well-documented state system with a large number of democratic regimes - the city-state system in Greece during the late fifth century B.C." ⁴³ The results of this exhaustive study are complex, detailed and often outside the scope of this inquiry - however, one aspect that does apply is that "clear democracies were very much less likely to fight other democracies than to fight those either probably or certainly nondemocratic." ⁴⁴

However, as alluded to earlier, even when provided with overwhelming data showing that democracies do not fight one another, the real problem lies in the act of trying to expand global democracy to the levels necessary in order to achieve what Kant viewed as a pacific union. The road to true democracy is long and rocky even for nations which are well prepared to begin the journey. It is definitely a mistake to think that nations in the early stages of democratization, or ones which do not have the necessary moral or philosophical foundations, or the basic levels of economic interdependence, can move quickly, or even at all, towards a clear, effective, functioning democracy. In spite of this, and the probable fact that global democratization is an unlikely reality, it is clearly in the best interests of the

global community for the United States and other democratic nations to support the expansion of democracy to as many nations as possible.

3. Multipolarity. This alternative is based on the balancing of power among several nations, sufficiently equal militarily to offset the aggressive designs or intentions of each other, or of a lesser nation or group of nations. As we have already seen from our earlier discussion of the term major power, the flaw in this view is that since there are not currently several, or even two, powers which sufficiently complement one another, in terms of militarily balancing, the basic prerequisites do not exist for this alternative to be realized. As an added fault inherent in the multipolarity view, "indeed, recent history and empirical efforts suggest that multipolarity entails more violence, more countries at war and more casualties." ⁴⁵ Having stated my case in this way, I conclude here by saying that if the United States and the other major powers allow current events to run their course, a multipolar world scenario will be the result. It is the logical ending to the current situation where several nations of the world are expending great effort and wealth to achieve the recognition, status and power that accompany the major power label.

4. A unipolar world centered in a confederated West. This view, one of several espoused by Charles Krauthammer, visualizes a new "super-sovereignty," made up of North America, the "new" Europe and democratic Asia. "As the industrialized democracies

become increasingly economically, culturally and technologically linked, they should begin to think about laying the foundations for increasingly binding political connections." ⁴⁶ Krauthammer views the success of this idea through the fact that it will establish a unipolar superpower confederation that "could have no rival." ⁴⁷ He views the strength of this arrangement as its unique ability to speed global democratization. "It is based on the further assumption that the centripetal forces generated by continued Western success at the center will, as in the 1980's, lead inexorably to the spread of democracy to the Second and Third World." ⁴⁸ Krauthammer himself, however, while recognizing the promise of a New World Order, also recognizes the very reason it will not work. "Moreover, it is perhaps as unlikely that Americans are psychologically prepared to subsume their sovereignty in some kind of great Western confederation as they are to adopt nineteenth century *realpolitik*." ⁴⁹

5. A concert of powers. Another option, popular among many observers, is rule by a central coalition or concert of powers. Richard Rosecranz provides an excellent discussion of this concept in his article A New Concert of Powers, ⁵⁰ According to Rosecranz, a ruling central concert, similar to the Concert of Europe that emerged after 1815, which included France, Prussia, Britain, Austria and Russia, would assume the mantle of global leadership in the post-Cold War world. This concert, according to Rosecranz, would again include the "five great bases of power" ⁵¹ to control the world order. These "great bases"

are: the United States, Russia, the European Community, Japan and China. Here, as opposed to the original Concert, "the assumption is that there are no longer any important differences among the major states and that all have an interest in preserving the status quo." ⁵² This concert is distinct from multipolarity and balance of power because it "is based on the shared values of the big powers, or at least convergence of their perceptions of common interests." ⁵³ A similar view places great emphasis on the correlation between a successful concert and the economic interdependence of the members of the concert. "History may tell little about the future, but it seems to indicate that a central coalition - united by economic interest in an open and growing world economy - is not doomed to fail." ⁵⁴ This thought is based on the assumption that one of the great failures of the original concert was that "the world economy did not create an interdependence that prohibited war," ⁵⁵ and "economic relations forged few necessary links among industrialized states themselves." ⁵⁶ Rosecranz views the success of any new concert as dependent upon the same three principles that created the relative success, and ultimately the failure, of the original concert: "involvement of all; ideological agreement; and renunciation of war and territorial expansion, giving liberal democratic and economic development first priority." ⁵⁷ Rosecranz recognizes all the problems involved in bringing these five powers together in agreement on his three principles but says, "if such cooperation occurs, the balance of power begins to

work in reverse: once a strong central group has been consolidated, others will not try to balance against it. In this way even China, in time, will become a member of the Concert of Powers, with the Third World next in the train." ⁵⁸

Although I agree with the enormous possibilities of this concept, I also agree with Andrew C. Goldberg's assessment of the possibility for success of such a concert of powers; "the contradictions among major powers may intensify rather than diminish as they are subjected to new post-Cold War challenges,"⁵⁹ and, "just as in the earlier concert system, which fell apart with the rise of the Second Reich, a concert is viable only if everyone can stay in tune." ⁶⁰ The vast disparities which exist between how each of the current great powers view reality would make "staying in tune" a "trial" in true Kafkaesque detail.

6. Collective Security. "A coalition of all 'peace loving' nations unites in order to defend the international community against a threat to international peace posed by a universally recognized menace." ⁶¹ In this type of security arrangement, "powers identify the aggressors on the basis of universal and unbiased standards and then support the 'victim' impartially regardless of political alignments and ideology or ethnic affiliation." ⁶² Collective security is likened to domestic security in that the members of both the international community and individual nations have rights and duties, "in both, the principal right of the members is that of security against

physical attack, and that the principal duty is that of abstaining from the initiation of armed force." ⁶⁴ The idea of collective security "rests on the refusal in principle to discriminate among aggressions on grounds of power, interest and circumstance of course." ⁶⁴

A primary problem with this concept of collective security is the very foundation from which it springs, "the belief that collective security would be distinguished by the ease with which it was implemented." ⁶⁵ This will certainly not always be the case. Not only in the realization of effective responses by members of the system, but also in costs, both resources and blood. "This persistence of belief in the ease with which collective security may be implemented responded to the deeply ingrained American habit of willing grand ends through only modest means." ⁶⁶

An offshoot alternative proposal to the international collective security concept is Regional Collective Security as proposed by Daniel N. Nelson. ⁶⁷ In this proposal, regional groupings of nations, tied much more closely by common sets of interests and values, unite against an aggressor(s) in their, or possibly, to their region. Mr. Nelson favors this concept over other alternatives because of the implied concept of shared values as opposed to "opposition to a clear and ominous adversary." ⁶⁸ He views the benefit here to be, that as opposed to trying to limit conflict through containment, deterrence or balancing, regional collective security draws its strength from

threat reduction. "Collective security (regional) begins with the premise that threats may arise from within, not only externally, and that their avoidance is at least as critical as countering those external threats with military capacities. Collective security arrangements are bound to include, not exclude, concern for peace, stability and the well-being of all participants." ⁶⁹ And further, "collective security does not deny a right of self-defense, but is intended to minimize the exercise of that right through the abatement of threats." ⁷⁰

7. Balance of power. This instrument of conflict management, although conceived and utilized well before the documented development of realist thinking, now belongs to it. Balance of power is a system whereby nations continue to pursue their own sets of national interests, which do not necessarily correspond to, or have a common goal consistent with, any other nation. However, each nation's power is sufficient by itself, or through alliances, to offset any aggressive design or intention of any other or group of others. Balance of power politics is the system which presided over the Cold War and is clearly defined in realist terms; "Without necessarily changing the parties' fundamental intentions, the balance of power should structure their (military) behavior by making clear to all parties that the costs of the resort to violence will far exceed the benefits." ⁷¹ This realist view of the nature of international affairs, one must admit, was the system which brought about the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end to the

Cold War. However, it was also the system in place preceding both world wars. In spite of this defined approach to conflict management, it seems that parties to a balance of power system very often have problems in determining how to respond to the aggressive policies and/or actions of other parties. The flaw in this system, for our purposes, is that there is no effort made by the system's participants to determine underlying problems and attempt to resolve or manage them before conflict becomes a reality as opposed to a probability. "It (Balance of Power) does not attempt to address the underlying issues in disputes, but only to deter and to manage the balance of forces in such a way that there will be powerful disincentives for the use of force."⁷²

8. Unipolar hegemony. In this scenario, the observer sees an era of the United States as the world's only true superpower, ⁷³ marking "the beginning of a Pax Americana in which the world will acquiesce in a benign American hegemony."⁷⁴ It is true that the U.S. is currently the only power capable of imposing its will, through military means, on the other nations of the world. However, this alternative is insufficient for several reasons, not the least of which may be the lack of American resolve to sacrifice to the extent necessary to fulfill such an awesome role. Additionally, military might and projection capability must, in the current global environment, be accompanied by a relatively strong economic and resource base through which this military capability can be sustained. Whether

this capability truly exists in the United States is a matter of great debate, particularly when judged against the degree necessary to act effectively in the role proposed by this option. Joseph S. Nye points out this and other factors which argue against the U.S. in a unipolar role:

- "- The global economy is tripolar, the U.S., Europe and Japan, which does not allow the U.S. to exercise economic hegemony.
- Current global power is diffused through transnational interdependence.
- The complexity and diversity of problems facing the global community today argue against solutions provided through military means and military capability, which is the only area where the U.S. has a clear hegemony."

CONCLUSION

First and foremost, in order to initiate any change in the transition to a New World Order, realist thought and approach to problem solving must be tempered with an increased degree of idealism. As has been stated previously, realist power politics, by its very nature, is incapable of providing a system or vehicle capable of responding effectively to the primary security issues of the present and the future. Its structure and view of international politics and nation state interaction provide only the framework for continued confrontation, conflict and

instability. A new view must be developed and implemented which accounts for the complexities and realities of the post-Cold War global community. It must also, simultaneously, provide ideals for the future international order and identify alternatives for solving conflict before it becomes a destabilizing influence.

This new view understands that ideals are just that, lofty goals or aspirations, the utopian world environment for which we all wish. Culture, religion, ethnic background and perception of the world and what you want and expect from it and life color your ideals. However, consensus would probably be obtained on most of the following as ideals for the global community; racial harmony, freedom, equality, economic well-being, good health and lack of conflict as the norm and not the exception. This new approach must also be realistic in recognizing the short-comings of mankind, the limitations on his ability to interpret and respond to the realities of international politics and the limitations of the current structure of international politics to achieve these ideals. However, even in understanding and accepting these realities, should that, in and of itself, stop us from pursuing it? I think not.

My proposal, therefore, is as lofty and complex as its intended aim. It is a direction based upon four paths which together could culminate in not only a more flexible and creative system of conflict management, response to international events and threat abatement, but also in the realization of a New World Order through the integration of this direction into the

international body politic. The four paths are:

1. The major powers, led by the U.S., initiate action to strengthen the role of the United Nations. This is done over time, with the goal of enabling it to deal realistically and effectively with, not only the complex security issues facing the global community now and in the future but also, with the other, nonmilitary issues, e.g. economic, environmental, human rights, poverty, hunger, etc., which have the great potential of continuing to cripple any efforts made to create stability. This path carries several assumptions which are critical to its success. They are:

- That the role of the United Nations in dealing with global problems will be strengthened through a mandate from its members, particularly the permanent members of the Security Council.

- That the United Nations will undergo a restructuring consistent with its proposed new role.

- That most nations, to include the major powers, will accept a certain, and increasing, level of decreased sovereignty in favor of the United Nations.

- That, as addressed in the United Nations Charter, the U.N. is not the answer to all issues. For example, regional security organizations should have the primary claim on coping with regional problems.

- That the United Nations should have immediate and unconstrained access to contingents of rapid deployment forces

from member nations which are specifically identified and trained for United Nations work.

2. The United Nations, U.S. and other major powers must begin to encourage and nurture regional collective security arrangements whereby regions begin to deal with their own problems to the betterment of the entire global community.

3. In the interim, the United States must continue to take the lead, with its other partners, to deal with major regional crises.

4. Lastly, the U.S. and other major powers, should form a "great concert of powers" specifically to deal with problems and conflicts in the Third World which are outside of established regional arenas or beyond their capability to effect.

Obviously, my approach is original only in its combination of ideas posed by others. But this combination is critical. The reason for this is clear; that no single mechanism is capable of dealing with the overwhelming complexity of today's global community. Each mechanism has its own strengths and weaknesses. However, each, due particularly to its expressed or assumed view of reality, is incapable of resolving the multitude of diverse issues which must be addressed, solved or resolved on the path to a New World Order.

The basic premise of this new, four-fold direction is that all nations will have to subordinate, to a certain and ever-growing degree, their own national interests for the eventual benefit of all. This will create some sacrifice and

hardship, particularly to the major powers, since they are the nations most capable of pursuing their own interests. Foolish? Maybe. But would this combinitive option provide the global community the capability of moving to a New World Order? Absolutely. The strength of this formula lies in its ability, if adopted, to deal with all issues while still moving on a path towards a new direction in international order.

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