

2

GEORGETOWN UNIVERSITY
GRADUATE SCHOOL

AD-A264 916



DTIC
ELECTE
MAY 13 1993
S C D

Edward John Majewski Jr.

The thesis of _____ entitled

The Impact Of German Reunification on Changing U

National Security Interests in Central Eur

submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

Liberal Studies _____ in the School for Summer and Continuing

Education of Georgetown University has been read and approved by the Committee:

Richard H. Hough

James W. Thompson

Deborah C. O'Leary

Director, Liberal Studies Program

June 15, 1992

Date

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A

Approved for public release
Distribution Unlimited

Accession For	
NTIS	CRA&I ☒
DTIC	TAB ☐
Unannounced ☐	
Justification	
By	
Distribution /	
Availability Codes	
Dist	Avail and/or Special
A-1	

THE IMPACT OF GERMAN REUNIFICATION ON CHANGING U.S. NATIONAL
SECURITY INTERESTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE

A Thesis
submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree of
Master of Arts in Liberal Studies

By

Edward J. Majewski Jr., B.E., M.S.

93 5 07 082

93-10131



School for Summer and Continuing Education
Georgetown University
Washington, DC
May 5, 1992

ABSTRACT

U.S. relations with Central Europe are largely driven by our policies towards modern Germany. Those policies comprise the weighing of various objectives, issues and concerns, old and new, and prioritizing them so as to promote U.S. national interests in our relations with Germany. Revisions of existing U.S.-German positions are necessary, due to the recently completed and ongoing changes occurring in Central Europe and in the U.S., and in a vastly different international system.

The United States should pursue objectives which provide for immediate safety of our public, property and resources and promote U.S. economic vitality and prosperity. We should seek Central European stability, since we are inexorably tied to Europe, while supporting a great German role in the region, the European order, and the Western world. We must maintain a watchful eye for historic German tendencies to destabilize Europe, enhanced in her reunification potential which could jeopardize our interests. Our policies should be consistent though malleable when necessary to enable us to select the options to attain our objectives.

Relations with a reunified Germany are influenced by remnants of past U.S.-German conflicts, by uncertainties of present circumstances and by anticipation of how global system changes will affect the future. U.S. policy towards Germany must also recognize the ominous possibilities of certain characteristics of German society, aim to promote common interests, purposes and values, and take into account non-security concerns like the environment and human rights.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I wish to acknowledge the steadfast attention provided by Dr. Richard Hough as the advisor to this thesis project, for without his help and sometimes stern guidance, I would never have completed this endeavor. I learned quite a bit about our foreign policy and Germany, and the differences between East, Central and Western Europe, in spite of what MacKinder claimed. I am also greatly in debt to Jamie Martin-Brown, for his insights into how to write, and what it is I really wrote about. I also owe many thanks to my friend and confidant Martha Oppenheim, a valued critic and wealth of support in the darkest hours. Finally, I am indebted to the United States Navy for providing me the opportunity to study at Georgetown University, especially in the pursuit of knowledge through Liberal Studies, rather than serving elsewhere as best I could. I hope this project serves the Navy as well as it has served me, and offers some measure of assistance to those far more capable than I, who are charged with determining our policies towards Germany today and tomorrow.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgements.....	iv
I. Aspects of Foreign Policy Determination.....	1
A. Introduction.....	1
B. Change and Continuity in U.S. Foreign Policy Formation.....	2
C. U.S. Relations with Germany: Past, Present and Future.....	5
D. U.S. and German National Interests and Security Concerns.....	11
E. Shifting U.S. Priorities regarding Central Europe and Germany.....	27
F. Dilemmas of U.S.-German Foreign Policy Determinations	33
II. U.S.-German Relations: Continuities and Discords.....	36
A. Bonds and Fears, Allies and Adversaries.....	36
B. Conflicting Objectives.....	43
C. Encouraging Aspects of Similar Security Aims.....	49
D. Cold War Imperatives: Those Lost and Those Remaining.....	55
E. Uncertainty and the Pace of Change.....	62
F. Costs of Change in U.S.-German Relations.....	64
III. Shifting Priorities in U.S. Foreign Policy.....	77
A. Setting the Stage for Policy Development.....	77
B. Domestic Influences on American Foreign Relations.....	81
C. Enduring Social Elements in U.S. Foreign Policy...	86

IV. Today's and Tomorrow's Foreign Policy with Germany....	91
A. Concerns and Issues, and Reorganized U.S. Priorities.....	91
B. Nation-state System Influences.....	101
C. Future U.S. Policies: Possibilities and Uncertainties.....	108
D. Future U.S. Policy.....	113
Bibliography.....	120

I. Aspects of Foreign Policy Determination

A. Introduction

The United States is poised on the brink of the twenty-first century, and while the past hundred years have included many events which have altered the pursuits of our great nation, others have reinforced our course towards attaining certain interests and objectives. Some of these events were of our own undertaking. Other events resulted from the ambitions and actions of other nations with whom the United States allied itself, competed against or were in conflict with. Some of these events have affected our position within the nation-state system, but the status of the U.S. in that system remains rooted in two factors. These are our domestic conduct as viewed by other peoples and nations, and the manner in which we interact with those peoples, their cultures, societies and governments. Within the U.S., our individual, group, community, and national desires, ambitions, needs and concerns, manifest themselves in popular opinion and then in political amendments to our governmental operations. These domestic mechanics of our society help to define our national goals then promoted by our government through our foreign policies and programs. In the context of our international relations, these goals become U.S. national objectives and are affected by both past and ongoing changes, internal and external to our

shores. They also reflect various lesser values and purposes which are then expressed in various U.S. international positions, and pursued through a variety of means.

Development of these objectives primarily consist of deliberations over and decisions about the possibilities which result from pursuit of our interests and the influences of present circumstances and changes. U.S. foreign policies towards another nation are often problematic because of the uncertainties which change fosters, our desire to accommodate present circumstances in our policies, and the often opposing influence of continuity in purpose which persistent policy aims provide in policy formulation. This problematic nature is evident in the ongoing evolution of our policies towards modern Germany, given the uncertainties brought about by ongoing global changes, the problems arising from Germany's recent reunification and the need to maintain certain national objectives foremost in our policy formation.

B. Change and Continuity in U.S. Foreign Policy Formation

Analysis of our foreign policies and resulting external actions is frequently clouded by the view that there is a constant need to reshape our present foreign policies to conform to extra-national changes. This view may be more case-specific than overarching, and is in fact

questionable relative to present circumstances facing the U.S.. Indeed, recent monumental global changes have brought about vastly different international situations. Despite these changes, many of the basic premises on which we have founded our past international positions remain sound, and are applicable today and presumably in the future. Such is the case in the analysis of the influence of security concerns on the formulation of U.S. policies towards Central Europe, and specifically the evolution of our policies towards a unified Germany.

Today, Germany is and will remain geo-strategically important to the U.S.. Located at one of the world's industrial, population and cultural centers in Central Europe, Germany has a special status in U.S. views and ambitions regarding Europe and the world. The status of Central Europe has been a traditional concern of U.S. foreign policy, and Germany has been the locus of this concern for many years: cross-cultural ties, economic interaction, common historical bonds and mutual resource dependencies, and many other facets link America and Germany.

It is frequently asked what exactly are our objectives relative to Central Europe or particular nation-states within the region? Why do we have these objectives? And what impact do changing circumstances have on them? Such

concerns lie at the core of this investigation into our past views of Germany, her recent reunification and the revision of our positions towards modern Germany and the Central European region.

The activities of foreign relations are well known and past relations between nations have been studied and analyzed in detail. Great thinkers seeking to identify and explain the nature of past relations between States, predict present event outcomes or those of the future, and debate and theorize over what comprises our international objectives. Deliberation continues today in the U.S. over what form and substance of foreign policy we will pursue, given the ongoing changes which are altering the global system in which we participate. These changes present policy makers with great challenges which, in addition to the demands of reacting to our domestic problems, are bringing new or different issues to prominence in the development of our foreign policies, as well as substantiating and reinforcing enduring components of those policies.

This analysis focuses on the persistent elements which have in the past contributed to present U.S. foreign policy objectives. The emphasis herein is to identify the tenacious purposes and values which underpin our past foreign policies towards Germany, and may help determine

present U.S. policies towards the Central European region and modern Germany in particular. These elements are then evaluated to ascertain their current role in our present foreign policy decisions with an eye towards their applicability in future circumstances.

This study will also evaluate the new influences impacting on U.S. foreign policy decisions; for example, issues promoted by domestic groups, interests of business entities, and, issues relative to the welfare of the entire nation. The latter include concerns relative to our national sovereignty and safety, and the principles, goals or standards we hold important and even seek to export. The focus of this study is also to investigate the prioritization of these components of our foreign policy towards Germany, and assess how and if this prioritization is shifting in response to transformations ongoing or already complete in the world.

By appraising aspects of our evolving policies towards Germany today, new insights into the questions of what our foreign relations aims are and how they are responsive to world power shifts may be developed. Focus on our relations with Germany, provides a window through which the entire field and depth of our foreign policy vision may be evaluated. Germany's importance as a geographic, political,

historic, population and cultural center within Central Europe makes her a productive object for scrutiny.

C.U.S. Relations with Germany, Past, Present and Future

Germany today is in many ways a reflection of its former self, in others a transformed entity, and in some respects entirely new. From the debris of a devastated and once-powerful nation following World War II (WW II), Germany experienced depravation preceding recovery, resulting from the demise of the Third Reich, and subsequent rejuvenation facilitated by the support of the Allies after their victory. The U.S. figured prominently in Germany's reconstitution and revitalization. Post-war Germany also experienced a multitude of other external influences and changes, most notably the rise of the Soviet Union and her dominance of the Warsaw Pact puppet-states, which presented formidable security, political and economic challenges.

The allies split in the twilight of WW II, the Soviets going down the Communist ideological path with socialist economics under Stalin's autocratic leadership. The British and Americans firmly retained their democratic ideals, and free market principals of capitalist enterprise. The lingering effects of this division and the ensuing confrontation between West and East still impact on Germany and her relations with the rest of the world. For Germany, the 1949 separation of East from West was especially

dramatic, coming close on the heels of her just-initiated, post-war recovery.

Several other aspects of the post-WW II situation are noteworthy. Germany's division left West Germany to recover under the U.S.-led Marshall Plan which had many policy purposes. These included the balanced recovery of the German and other European economies. The allies sought to put Germany on its own feet again without threatening the economic recovery or security requirements of her neighbors -- to re-establish and consolidate a stable political climate on the Continent.¹ During the Cold War, West Germany became a focal point of the bi-polar contest in events such as the Berlin crises, the erection of the Wall and cross-border disputes with her Eastern brethren. Eventually, West Germany became a power in her own right in the international system, and developed her own political approach to her eastern neighbors through German Realpolitik, called "Ostpolitik".²

West Germany grew into a capable nation and an economic entity of some magnitude, following in the steps of the Super-Powers and other economically strong states like

¹ Michael J. Hogan, The Marshall Plan (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987), pp. 29-31.

² Hans W. Gatzke, Germany and the United States: A Special Relationship? (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980), pp. 210-212, 227-229.

Japan, France and Britain. Today, Germany is a nation transformed, a modern global power, recently reunited with her Eastern half. United Germany is undergoing massive changes internally to accommodate her increased responsibilities to her under-developed, depressed Eastern half, as well as her emergence as a global power. Germany must also manage the problems particular to her geographic location, in particular, being at the center of Central Europe, and accommodate the impact of other external global forces.

Since October 1990, Germany has existed as a nation reborn following the end of Communist control over East Germany. Germany is struggling today, not against outside partition or conditions imposed on her by victorious powers, but against the need to meld social, cultural, economic and governmental differences across the fallen Iron Curtain. The challenge of integrating the East German population into the daily life of a united Germany is perhaps akin to that experienced by this nation following our own Civil War.³ This challenge results from the responsibilities Germany incurred through reunification of two diverse areas, the Western half prosperous and modern, the Eastern half

³ Catherine McArdle Kelleher, "The New Germany: Unification One Year On," The Brookings Review (Winter, 1992): 18-25.

socially and economically backward. Reunification requires massive resource transfers to the East which taps the strength of formerly West Germany. Reunification also holds the attention of the nations of industrialized Western Europe and of the U.S., each keenly aware of Germany's historic legacy of European aggrandizement and mindful of Germany's potential and increasing domination of the European Community (EC).

These issues play on the thoughts of U.S. foreign policy makers, many remembering the horrors of German Continental expansionism, cognizant of present German political-economic power, and sensitive to the potential of a unified Europe under German leadership -- likely a strong ally, but possibly, following resurgent nationalism or even virulent authoritarianism, the next hostile Super-Power.⁴

Germany is a nation critically situated in Central Europe, a region of centuries-old internal political conflict and upheaval. Germany retains oceanic access and lies across the vital land corridors, trade routes, and road and rail systems crossing industrialized Europe. Germany is also important in her axial position at the middle of both "East" and "West" European states, strategically straddling what MacKinder termed the "Middle-Tier" states of Eastern

⁴ Peter Jenkins, "New Hampshire: Does Europe Care," Washington Post, 18 February 1992, p. A19.

Europe, and the industrialized, developed states of Western Europe.⁵ Though this characterization was appropriate in Mackinder's view of the European Continent at the beginning of this century, it is equally relevant now, with the EC forging a united group out of previously diverse States, with the emergence of other interactive States from the remnants of the Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union, and with a united Germany potentially lying at the hub of all these, influencing or even controlling the course of the aggregate EC power, which some contend is an emerging reality.⁶

Today, Europe struggles with the process of Continental unification, under the EC, altering centuries of historic, cultural and social differences, divergent political paths and economic choices. Europe also faces external changes affecting the aims and activities of each member State. Relations between industrialized Western Europe, including Germany, the Eastern European States and evolving States of the CIS dominate their individual and collective foreign relations. Recent proceedings of institutions such as the infant European Community Commission (ECC), and observations of European diplomacy reflect this focus of most European

⁵ H.J. MacKinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1962), p. 160.

⁶ Henry Trewhitt, "The Question at Europe's Heart," U.S. News and World Report Vol. III, No. 24 (9 December 1991): 50-55.

governments, including Germany.⁷ Issues confronting EC members and their neighbors include reactions to the influx of refugees, the necessity to assist less-developed Eastern States seeking to develop market economies and, their relations with those states now defining themselves out of the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Another concern for these nations is the continued upheaval in what was Yugoslavia, and other regional security problems. These and many other issues require continuous attention of the present German government as reflected in the amount of external and internal media attention.⁸

The world outside Europe also continues to undergo a metamorphosis, all around the U.S., and in regions such as MacKinder's "Heartland" of Asia, that is, the area east of Eastern Europe, including the territories of North, Central and SouthWest Asia.⁹ This region quakes daily with the rumbling of new social, political and economic conditions, in areas formally regulated by a central government in most every respect. Freedom, and the attendant responsibility

⁷ Jim Hoagland, "Germany's New Export to Europe: Stability," Washington Post, 20 February 1992, p. A25.

⁸ A synopsis of the many issues and concerns confronting Germany and Europe as a whole, along with reflection on the media's attention to these issues is provided in "Securing Europe's Peace," The Economist Vol. 322, No. 7746 (15 February 1992): 59.

⁹ Mackinder, p. 160-172.

for self preservation, dominate social, cultural and governmental affairs in these previously subjugated areas.

The goals of liberty and self-determination, which the U.S. has consistently promoted in these areas, are in many instances taking hold.¹⁰ Upheaval also is frequently present as formerly dormant geographic nationalities exert themselves for long-sought after independence or struggle against similar competing desires of other groups, occasionally introducing new States into the international system. Evidence the States recently born from the breakup of Yugoslavia, or those republics still coalescing out of the remnants of the Soviet Union. These changes influence U.S. foreign relations in some obvious ways and others less so, such as in increased foreign aid requirements or new developmental assistance requests. However, the successes of the economically developing States of Eastern Europe or of the emerging republics of the CIS, also are evidence of the effects of several persistent characteristics of past U.S. foreign policies such as our continued promotion of self-determination and democratic political institutions, and free-market economics. Identification and evaluation of persistent foreign policy components is relevant to this

¹⁰ Peter Green, Robin Knight and Victoria Pope, "Europe's New Flags," U.S. News and World Report Vol. 112, No. 7 (24 February 1992): 44.

analysis due to the continued contribution of several security related elements to, even their necessity in, the ongoing evolution of our policies towards a reunified Germany.

D.U.S. and German National Interests and Security Concerns

Remarkable changes have altered the social, cultural, political and economic composition of national interests and objectives of both Germany and the U.S.. Economic and socio-political problems plague contemporary America. Problems such as national health care, debt reduction, quality of education, unemployment and the plight of our homeless are proving difficult to solve or at least approach.¹¹ Beyond the many debates over these domestic problems, U.S. citizens also question which foreign policies will carry this nation forward into the next century. Less prominent but equally important are popular questions about what role America will assume in relation to the nations of Europe.¹²

Some argue that increased priority be given to our domestic problems. Other American voices ask how the U.S. will manage the "New World Order" if we are the sole

¹¹ President George Bush, "State of the Union Address," Washington Post, 29 January 1992, pp. A14, A16.

¹² "Europe: The Gravel in America's Shoe," The Economist, Vol. 322, No. 7744 (1 February 1992): 47, 48.

remaining great power?¹³ Still others challenge our credibility as a global leader claiming we are being eclipsed by other powers like Japan, Germany, or Europe as a whole in the burgeoning EC. There seem to be as many views of the present stature and course of the U.S. as there are opinions on how we shall conduct ourselves along the way. Specific interests such as the promotion of freedom and the democratization process, stability abroad to facilitate peaceful diplomacy and commerce, and maximizing individual opportunities and achievement have consistently revealed themselves in the foreign policy objectives pursued by the U.S.¹⁴. New, or previously dormant social issues and concerns are today gaining increased public attention and political representation. These include, among others, environmental protection, disease control (i.e., AIDS), poverty reduction and elimination of discrimination or racism. Where these issues are also international in nature, they influence our foreign policy development, and

¹³ See James McCartney, "U.S. is Superpower No.1 (now what?)," Miami Herald, 9 September 1991, p. 11A. This author's title question is one prevalent in both public discussions and with decision makers. This topic is being addressed by forums like the CATO Institutes' recent conference, "The New World Order and Its Alternatives: America's Role in the 1990s," 31 March 1992, Washington, D.C..

¹⁴ Office of the President, National Security Strategy of the United States, (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 1991), pp. 3-4.

contrasted with the role of persistent national issues or concerns, may cause the foundations of U.S. foreign policy towards Germany to change. However, it is equally plausible that the bases of our foreign policy towards Germany will continue to be influenced most by security objectives and factors which have consistently been the underpinning of past U.S. relations with Germany.

Defining the enduring characteristics which underlie our national objectives as reflected in U.S. foreign policy should be a step down the road in this assessment. External changes or domestic interest shifts may truly reflect emerging important issues which should be addressed in our foreign policy. However, choices must also reflect the requisites for continued national survival and the essential factors which will allow the nation to prevail in the international arena. This requires consistency of purpose by which our international relations are planned and conducted, and choices which underscore the stature and power of the U.S.. The meeting of these two courses -- the consistency of purpose in foreign relations provided through persistent influences in our foreign policies, coupled with influences making those policies malleable to accommodate changing circumstances and unforeseen situations is exactly that which should comprise our policies towards modern Germany. Domestic or external changes may indeed challenge

us, and demand increased recognition and attention, but fundamental national security-related interests and values should remain consistent and powerful influences in our policy decision making. Our assessments of internal problems and solutions, our perceptions of the positions and activity of Germany, and thence our positions towards Germany should be framed and guided by the same underlying objectives of our past and present policy towards Germany. The goals of national survival and protection, economic advancement, European stability and maintenance of friendly relations with our Continental allies must be reassessed and then remain foremost in our views of Germany as we seek to account for her reunification in any policy revisions.

While some U.S. foreign policy components remain consistent, radical shifts in global relations are shattering previous U.S. thinking regarding our international security-based associations and alliances. The bi-polar struggle of the Cold War has given way to an uncertain multi-polarity in the global system. Nations no longer vie for the favors of one or the other super-power; rather, they seek economic support from any of several economic giants, including Germany and the U.S.. The very reasons for our past positions towards Germany may yield to different issues which garner increased public support and domestic political clout, and are becoming factors which

indirectly influence our foreign policies. Social concerns like economic improvement, education quality and availability, health care and employment opportunity are increasingly visible in our national politics, and also in our international relations. So while many of the fundamental purposes for which we pursue relations with other states remain steadfast, as evidenced in governmental decrees, and also evident in scrutiny of policy decisions and statements of the policy-makers themselves, influences are gaining ground in the shaping of our foreign policies, including our policy towards reunified Germany.¹⁵

One significant change impacting on the formulation of our policy towards Germany obviously is the end of the Cold War.¹⁶ Another is our changing domestic situation. These

¹⁵ Interview with RADM Donald L. Pilling, Director for Defense Planning, National Security Council, Washington, D.C., 14 February 1992. RADM Pilling recounted the development of the current version of the annual, National Security Strategy of the United States, noting the consistent influence of themes which promote objectives of defending our nation from external threats and promoting advancement of our welfare. He also highlighted the apparent shift taking place in international relations from political-military instruments of power to political-economic means. Finally, he offered that the change required in our foreign policy was to be more economically assertive, leading rather than reacting to activities.

¹⁶ Thomas L. Friedman, "After the Cold War-Rethinking Foreign Affairs: Are They still a U.S. Affair?," Washington Post, 7 February 1992, pp. A1, A10.

bring new or latent socio-economic factors to the forefront of public discourse, into political debate and then into foreign policy development. Progress in political transformation in other nations, as well as their socio-economic advancement also influence U.S. foreign policies. These changes also alter the positions of other nations towards the U.S.. However, one can argue that the core elements of our foreign policy objectives remain largely consistent.

A key factor contributing to the development of our policy objectives is the system in which nations interact. While a treatise on the international order is not offered here, it is necessary to define some assumptions regarding the State system. First, the U.S. is one member of a system of nations which relies largely on the principle of total State power. By this is meant the aggregate capability of any State to exert leverage on others -- including their abilities to coerce each other, to defend themselves and their territory, and their interaction with other States to facilitate their individual prosperity and advancement. These capabilities, by no means inclusive in a power-based system, are characteristic of the present international regime in which the U.S. interacts with other nations, and they in turn, recognize American strengths and weaknesses, are subject to our objectives, and we likewise, are affected

by their positions. Other nations, like Germany, impact on U.S. interests through their effect on the activities we pursue to try and reach our objectives, without necessarily affecting those objectives, or what comprises them.

This observation substantiates the previous claim that many elements of our foreign policies remain consistent, in spite of the changes occurring around us. It is our attempts to reach our goals which tend to shift, not the goals themselves. What does change, or, what is affected are those international activities we pursue. U.S. national interests reflect several invariant components evident in past U.S. foreign policy towards Germany, and present current policy choices available in the deliberation over optimal positions to take towards Germany following her reunification. The question then is what are these steadfast components which influenced policy choices in past circumstances, and are they applicable to the ongoing evolution of our policy towards Germany today?

Several components of our national interests are also active in U.S. foreign policy formation. The American way of life contributes to our international objectives. The international system also affects U.S. policy formation. To further define the persistent influences on our policies, especially those relevant to reshaping our positions towards Germany, requires identification of the principles and goals

U.S. society accepts and holds important. This includes defining what the threats are to our way of life, and identifying what characteristics of the international order promote or hinder the pursuit of U.S. objectives. Each contributes to our society's freedom and fear from danger.

Power among the world's states has been largely defined throughout the Cold War by a nation's capabilities to politically or militarily influence other States. This has substantiated much of the past forty-plus years of the West versus East contest, and is a basis for many of the institutions of the Cold War. The end of the Cold War along with the demise of the Soviet Union has brought this political-military nature of international influence into question in the development focus of our foreign policies. One might conclude that the prominence of a political-military focus has been in decline for quite some time, throughout the later years of the Cold War itself, and that another premise has gradually replaced it.

This proposition holds that political-economic priorities have supplanted political-military concerns in international relations. Many arguments support this position, while others promote the continued vitality of political-military power. However, regardless of which emphasis is accepted, the objectives of each seem consistent especially the security related goals of protecting and

promoting important purposes and values of the U.S.. These include maintaining our quality of life, ensuring access to those external resources which facilitate improving our way of life, and securing our territorial integrity.

Hence, in the evolution of our positions towards Germany, these enduring components are preeminent in their influence on the choices available in coping with German reunification, uncertainty and ongoing changes. Previous U.S. positions towards Germany included supporting certain German objectives and institutions to facilitate stability on the European Continent. These included U.S. diplomatic efforts such as our support for and recognition of West German nationhood in 1955, promoting and securing her membership in NATO, facilitating West German rearmament, promoting Germany's role in the G-7 and GATT economic forums and contributing to the Cold War security guarantees for West Germany against a threat from the East. The U.S. has frequently supported Germany, but we also retain fears over the historically dangerous German national potential if their political, economic or military capabilities are misdirected.¹⁷

Opponents of a political-military focus would

¹⁷ William Drozdiak, "Old Fears Stirred as Germany Asserts New Aggressive Role," Washington Post, 23 February 1992, p. A14.

argue that political-economic influences are now predominant. Economic issues and interests are replacing previously dominant political-military concerns in our international behavior. However, the key purposes which should underlie U.S. foreign policies remain the same. They are the fundamentals of national security, economic prosperity and international peace. These fundamentals include promoting our national ideals, our mores and essential characteristics of the American way of life which we value and strive to attain, individually, and collectively. The security considerations of these fundamental purposes underlying our past and present foreign policy support the needs of our nation relative to other States.

Exporting the core principles of America may also be an objective of our foreign policy. We do encourage and support the extension of basic freedoms in other nations. We promote the democratic political system world wide. However, this is not the foremost aim of U.S. foreign policy. Our view of the other States is tempered by the concepts of self-determination and tolerance of other people's choices, as long as paths taken by other States are stable relative to U.S. interests, and within the variance of currently accepted international practices.

Thus, consistent elements of our foreign policy include security interests related to our immediate safety and improvement, by design and by necessity. The security of our nation itself, and our democratic institutions ultimately must guide our relations with other nations. Maintenance of an international environment free from danger to basic U.S. security interests is always a major premise in shaping U.S. foreign policy. This was the case throughout the Cold War (and also long before, dating back to policies pursued by the Continental Congress), and should remain so in the foreseeable future. As long as members of the present international order continue to resort to threatening each others' security, all other foreign policy objectives are secondary to a secure national existence. This does not mean that America must actively promote our standards or purposes on other states in pursuit of our fundamental objective of a secure existence. Though these two aspects have often been part of our international activity, and were so during the Cold War, they are not imperative factors, particularly in the revision of our policy towards Germany. Although national security and international stability are stand-alone objectives, they also have features related to other States' characteristics, location and capabilities. One can derive other lesser policy objectives, but the aim of national security is

fundamental to the survival and longevity of the U.S. society and our way of life. It is the core purpose for our government.

We must continue to value these purposes as policy goals as well, giving them the highest priority.¹⁸ Though seemingly the case in present U.S. policies towards other nations, including modern Germany, we have actually let these security related foreign policy goals slip in priority compared to domestic problems, new and recently potent issues and concerns.

The next highest priority in our foreign policy should be that of national prosperity. If the dominant focus of international activity is now a political-economic one, then the vitality of our nation rests in succeeding in an environment subject to that focus, through our economic capability relative to that of other nations. U.S. national improvement depends mainly on our economic advances in competition with other nations in production and trade, and in our ability to draw on the world's resources to provide an ever-increasing standard of living for our population. If international power remains predominantly fixed through political-military means, national economic strength is also the means to attaining political-military ends. This is a

¹⁸ National Security Strategy of the United States, p. 3.

consistent theme in our past international relations, one which we must not lose sight of in redefining our policy towards Germany. Reunited Germany is a nation as economically potent as our own once she succeeds in stabilizing her eastern half.¹⁹ Though some might argue against the merits of prioritizing national prosperity second behind national security as a fundamental purpose of our foreign policy, a logical argument sustaining this precedence is offered.

The primary means of international goods and services transactions, since the mercantilistic period some five hundred years ago, has been the monetary and commercial exchange systems, and international economic activity. Today, the economic system is essentially the dominant means of cross-border goods and services movement, and as such, is the main means of attaining better materials, products, services, and improving a nation's living standards. National economic vitality sustains the U.S. ability to prosper in the current global economy. Our domestic economic improvement is tied to our commercial and financial relations with other nations.

While military might has largely been the dominant instrument of our international influence in the past,

¹⁹ Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, (New York: Random House, 1987), p. 426.

recent global changes towards less confrontational rivalries, and the very economic nature of that competition, make political-economic power the predominant form of international influence now in the years following the end of the Cold War. Hence economic priorities in U.S. foreign policy are of a higher importance than all but the most essential of our security interests. This heightened priority of national economic interests in the international arena must be reflected in our policy towards Germany, an economic competitor with the U.S..

For the German nation, this is a contention with both positive and negative possibilities. For our consideration, however, a shift from a mostly political-military focus in our international affairs to a mostly political-economic focus confers an increased importance on our economic relations with other nations like Germany. Previously, our international aim to support Germany as a Western geopolitical and military ally against Eastern opponents was a prevailing force in U.S. policies towards the nations of Central Europe. Other motivations also supported this position. As a Federation, Germany was akin to America politically, and also economically similar as we helped fashion her revitalized post-war economy along the lines of Western economic institutions following WW II. We promoted close social ties between common ethnic groups in both

nations. Cultural similarities forged unions between our two nations. However, given the emergence of political-economic concerns as the primary factors of international affairs, apprehension over Germany's economic potential is manifest, and requires consideration in determining our present and future policies towards Germany.

Therefore, to assert that the foremost objectives in policies towards Germany remain first, ensuring we provide for the immediate security of the U.S., and next, that we pursue policies which promote national economic prosperity, is sound. Finally, supporting policies that promote Continental stability as a means to achieving both national security and prosperity seems a logical third priority in our aims relative to the modern German state.

E. Shifting U.S. Priorities Regarding Central Europe and Germany

WW II was a watershed event. The conflagration brought about by the German nation, was fueled by unchecked nationalistic power. The Weimar German republic was transformed into a Continental power bent on territorial aggrandizement. This remains the enduring lesson to U.S. policy-makers of the consequences of idleness and isolation in foreign policy. But our transit through that conflict is but one chapter in our history. We have interacted with the German nation in various other ways, most of them positive

and encouraging since our nation's birth two centuries ago. These beneficial associations, the most prominent of which remains the NATO alliance, reinforce a third condition which should influence our foreign policy -- the necessity for global stability, a requisite condition of national security and national prosperity.

With respect to Germany, her ascending influence in the EC, and throughout Europe, is a necessary end the U.S. should prefer to other less stabilizing possibilities. The ability of Germany to anchor Central European politics and economics is a reality which U.S. policy must pursue. This is tempered by latent fears of German nationalism. U.S. support for German leadership in Central Europe is perhaps softened by this legacy, reinforced by recent instances of social denigration of foreigners by young Berliners, or abuse of the human rights of refugees and immigrants which reflect a potential for ethnic xenophobia. These social forces wait for an outlet which German domination over Europe might facilitate.²⁰ Remote as this may seem, it is nonetheless a possibility our policy deliberations must account for relative to the reunited Germany.

The cessation of the Cold War, also has had a major impact on U.S. policy concerns. Many of the ideological and

²⁰ "Europe's Immigrants," The Economist Vol.322, No.7746, (15 February 1992): 21-23.

cultural divisions of the contest are now diminished or vanishing. Western fears of a Soviet-led global Communist hegemony, have largely disappeared, altering present geopolitical circumstances and our views of other States.

Still constant though, is the need to secure our existence relative to other nations. The national security premise in U.S. foreign policies remains fixed, though the threat of Communist aggression has lifted. Equally pressing in the wake of the Cold War is the necessity for the U.S. to prosper economically to maintain our standards of living in a rapidly changing world economy. Socialist economics failed under Communist management which is obvious by the dilapidated economic conditions of the States in Eastern Europe and those emerging from the former Soviet Union. This reflects the success of Western capitalist enterprises and free market economics, and supports the contention that international activity is concerned primarily with economic power. Competition among the Western economies and relations between nations like those between the U.S. and Germany, rests soundly in economic influence. Hence, U.S. economic prosperity remains a policy objective in revising U.S. positions towards Germany, second only to immediate national security requirements.

Finally, though the Cold War spurred many confrontations between the super-powers, wherein each

attempted to gain greater influence in distant nations, each instance also brought about some measure of reaction among the participating and affected nations against aggression, aggrandizement and military conflict. This reflects that stability in the world environment remains a consistent international tendency, and as such should be a U.S. policy priority. However, the end of the Cold War has also left a world in which upheaval continues to occur.²¹

Central Europe was a region of great sensitivity for both contestants of the Cold War struggle. Lying in the path of any advance that the Soviet-led East might make into Western Europe, Central Europe fell into the orbit of power of the Western alliance, and acted as a unified block against the East. Central Europe, and especially West Germany, was a bastion of Western democratic political concepts and capitalistic economics. West Germany projected these characteristics into the Warsaw Pact nations and into the Soviet Union itself.

The most visible institution of Western unity was the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), formed in 1949 to oppose any military adventure by the East against any one or all of the Western European States. If a confrontation

²¹ Evidence the recent Gulf War, the Arab-Israeli stalemate, the continuing breakup of Yugoslavia, or the seemingly permanent division between Communist North Korea and the democratic Republic of South Korea.

between the two sides were to occur, it seemed most likely to do so with the West's defense of the Central European region, in which West Germany squarely sat. The Atlantic alliance was the strongest of the Cold War bastions, but there were other trans-national Western agreements to provide for mutual defense and to contain the spread of Communism presented by the Soviets and their camp.

West Germany participated in the Atlantic Alliance, and today Germany is forging new security associations within Europe. The U.S. position regarding NATO's future and the U.S. military presence in Europe continues to evolve. A development of concern is the potential inherent in a unified EC military capability absent a U.S. role. Potentially, this security institution could assert itself in international politics, even acting counter to U.S. interests. Hence, while Germany's leadership in present pan-European institutions is a legitimate aim in one perspective, there are also negative possibilities with which the U.S. may have to contend in the future. This is important in that the possibility of any Central European or Continental security institution under German leadership would require a review of U.S. policy objectives in our relations with unified Germany.

These possibilities are evidence of the intensely uncertain nature of the international system in which the

U.S. must now interact with Germany. Yet the policy problems facing this nation are not just modifications of existing associations or alliances. Rather, the uncertain scene confronting our nation is sufficiently different from any before that revisions of our policy components is at once obvious and necessary. New goals and principles are not necessarily required as much as revised priorities of traditional policy purposes. This revision should provide a clearer path towards the future prosperity and security for our country and similar benefits to our friends and allies. This is essentially the case with regard to our present policy towards unified Germany.

The resolution of interest conflicts between different policy priorities tests the prudence of our nation's leadership. This is the case today as we contemplate how to reduce our military presence in Europe while at the same time restructuring NATO. U.S. withdrawal from Europe also decreases our influence in Continental affairs, posing a problem for U.S. policy-makers of determining how to maintain our leverage over European nations' positions and activities with regard to our interests. The objectives of our revised policies towards Germany should be flexible enough to accommodate this sort of situation and other possibilities in the circumstances of any Central European State, including Germany.

The shifting sands of global and domestic changes like these present U.S. leadership with a challenge like none before. The special relationship which exists between the U.S. and Germany make this particular association of greater precedence than that of the U.S. and our other European allies, say Great Britain, France or now, Russia. The historic precedent of past Germanic prominence in European and world affairs, is in fact equal to or greater than that of present day Russia, and rivals that of British Empire actions.

The question of what fundamental concerns should drive our foreign policy towards Germany has been clarified in part, revealing that continuity is both necessary and possible through pursuit of certain key security, economic and international aims. These aims are supported by other lesser ones, which should also be identified and assessed in any review and revision of U.S.-German policy. However, revision of our policy is still fraught with uncertainties relative to the ever-changing nature of the Central European region and broader global concerns, which impact on U.S. policy towards Germany.

F. Dilemmas of U.S- German Foreign Policy Determinations

The pitfalls in determining positions to take regarding modern Germany in our foreign policies today are many; their origins are diverse in nature, and solutions are elusive.

Yet our perspective on the unified German state is essentially positive and optimistic, given our impressions rooted in past cooperative and beneficial associations and alliances. There are many questions for the U.S. regarding the role Germany should assume within the EC, and still others exist about the nature and potential of the EC itself, whether under German leadership or not. Other questions concern the ability of Germany to solve their own problems of reunification, and her will to manage external situations like assisting in the development of the Eastern European states and the republics of the CIS.

Other aspects of our present relations with modern Germany bear inspection. These include questions like what role the military capability of West Germany will play in the present revisions of NATO's mandate, or a similar security institution within the EC itself. Does a revitalized German military capability pose a threat to U.S. security, prosperity or international or European stability such that our policy purposes with unified Germany require representation of that possibility? Another contention is whether the economic ambitions of the unified Germany will hinder or benefit U.S. economic objectives, and if debilitating, whether a U.S. position towards Germany leading that possibility is a policy requisite. Further, does the U.S. accept the potential for increased competition

that a economically strong, unified Germany poses, or are our national interests better served by policy approaches to Germany which dampen their economic potential in favor of our own? These and many other concerns envelope the policy possibilities of our relations with Germany adding to existing uncertainty.

One possibility is to trust our intuition regarding the probable path Germany will take, and remain cognizant of potential deviations as we have before. Another possibility is to be pro-active and assertive in recognizing potentially harmful possibilities of unified German national power in regional, geo-political or economic competition, also fraught with possibly counter-productive outcomes. By examining some historic and situational specifics of possible circumstances in which the U.S. has interacted with Germany, continuities and discords in U.S.- German relations may be identified and assessed for their contribution to the clarification of revisions to U.S. policies towards modern Germany.

II. U.S.- German Relations: Continuities and Discords

A. Bonds and Fears, Allies and Adversaries

The future presents many quandaries and possibilities to the U.S. and Germany. Future relations between the two nations are subject to past events and decisions binding each nation as well as separating them. The mutual influence of transnational bonds and national apprehensions is a major element in the formulation of alliances or adversarial positions between the U.S. and Germany.

Our foreign policies are also influenced by the national objectives held by each country, and by fears each harbors about other countries or peoples. The differences between the two nations, either different characteristics intrinsic to their societies or those resulting from past actions, or the apprehensions held about some aspect of the other nation, may upset common interests. Continuity in ideals, values or aims fostered by social ties can and do influence American policy considerations. Discord prompted by differences in social, cultural, economic, political and security aims, also influence future U.S. relations with a reunited Germany. Identifying the ties between the nations can help ensure that proper weight is accorded their influence in ongoing policy determinations. Likewise, those ties founded in Cold War security issues are less relevant due to different world circumstances and may be discarded or

at least recognized for their diminished influence. Other ties founded in common political or economic interests or social concerns must be brought to the forefront in policy consideration to ensure they do not go unnoticed.

Commonalities which the peoples of both nations can identify with, facilitate positive and beneficial ties, while dissimilar concerns or issues will have the opposite affect.

An understanding of exactly what ties the U.S. have with Germany, and what impact they have on U.S. policies is necessary to evaluate any policy revisions which appear appropriate. Identifying which ties existed before and persist after Germany's reunification is also important, to assess the relationship between those ties and the directions of U.S. policy towards Germany. The ties must also be considered relative to their influence before the Cold War's end, today and if they will be influential in the future. There are ties between the two nations that were influential before the German Republic's reunification as well as some that have influenced U.S. policies towards Germany since her unification in October 1990. Social and cultural similarities constitute some of the ties between our two societies.

Certain issues, customs, concerns and activities which occur in both countries, constitute historic links between the two societies. Cross-pollination between the societies

occurred from immigration of Germans to the U.S. over the last two centuries forming a tie between each nation's peoples at the family and community level.²² American interest in reforming the "wayward" German political, social and economic orders after both world wars also contributed to many of our connections with Germany.²³ More recently, American ideological, security and economic aims have allied the two nations in associations like NATO. Other organizations such as the Stuben Society, which promoted improved American-German understanding following WW I, or the German Marshall Foundation, which today actively promotes American-German cooperation on a multitude of issues were encouraged by these ties.²⁴ Cultural and social bonds also exist between the nations, and are typified by educational and performing arts exchange programs, or tourism between the countries. Another example of enduring cultural strands linking the two societies are words or phrases in each nation's language (such as the words

²² Hans W. Gatzke, Germany and the United States: "Special Relationship," (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980), pp. 30-32.

²³ Ibid., pp. 277, 278. The Americans sought to correct their image of arrogant, imperialist "Bad Germans" by correcting German social and political fundamentals and institutions following the WW I Allied victory.

²⁴ Interview with Marianne Ginsburg, Program Officer, German Marshall Foundation, Washington, DC, 17 March 1992.

'Kindergarten' in American English or 'T-shirt' in German vocabulary) which have been transferred and assimilated by the societies.²⁵ While judgements vary over the influence of German-Americans (who were located primarily in our mid-west) on our national course and international relations, the ties between the societies have provided for exposure and knowledge of specific aspects of German life by the majority of Americans. Each enduring commonality which gains sufficient public attention or concern influences, at least indirectly, our German policy. Influence may occur through preferential consideration of German political purposes over those of other nations seeking U.S. support, favorable aid agreements, or other forms of benevolence in bi-lateral or multi-national activity.²⁶ Influence may also take the form of apprehension to activities which occur in

²⁵ Gatzke, p. 239.

²⁶ Gatzke, pp. 145-149. The WW II allies had begun planning the fate of Germany as early as 1943 in their outlines of future policies. Key elements included the denazification and demilitarization, war criminal punishment, government decentralization and reparations payments. Political and economic revitalization of Germany after WW II was a shared objective among the victors, realized by the U.S. in the Marshall Plan. The unity of Germany agreed to at the Potsdam Conference in 1945 gave way to division, when the allies fractured in the absence of a common cause following Hitler's defeat. Emphasis on reforming Germany, was replaced during the Cold War by the Western Allies' need for West German "help" against the threat of Communism, and modest reparations by Germany to the Western WW II allies were in part based on this common security interest.

Germany which go against the grain of acceptable mainstream American behavior, such as recent instances of German mistreatment of foreign nationals or Eastern Europeans seeking refuge or opportunity in Western Europe.²⁷ Each event which prompts a friendly tie between the two nations or elicits a negative feeling or memory, influences American social opinion, and cumulatively, our policies towards Germany.

These various bonds are reflected in specific agreements, alliances and associations wherein each country determined that its own interests were served by an agreement with the other nation. However, bonds between

²⁷ Recent American media coverage highlights this sensitivity. Articles note excesses in abuse and popular German sentiment against the influx, or political measures against immigrants or refugees, such as: "50 are arrested after clash of left and right" detailing the German Peoples' Party slogan 'Germany for the Germans' (New York Times, 15 March 1992, p. 13); "Germany wins Europe's backing for Tougher Controls on Migrants", noting Germany's concern that she has become Europe's gateway to the West, and experienced over 600 hundred instances of violence against foreigners by November 1991 (New York Times, 1 November 1991, p. A6); "Europe's Immigrants: Strangers inside the Gates" noting the conflict between Eastern Europeans seeking to escape poverty confronting unemployment and overt racism in their push westward. A British judge denied extradition of an Sudanese immigrant to Germany under the premise that he may be subject of neo-nazi racial persecution or attack (The Economist, Vol. 322, No. 7746 (15 February 1992): 21). Also note "Last Straw? Refugees Occupy Beer's Fabled Field" by S. Kinzer (New York Times, 19 March 1992, p. A4). This article detailed the relocation of homeless refugees to Munich's famed Oktoberfest fairgrounds sparking hostile reactions by German citizens and politicians.

nations are also sometimes outweighed by their different national objectives. America's interaction with Germany over the past century is spotted by both mutual agreement on certain issues, and outright disdain for German actions or aims on other issues, making the relationship one which has been characterized as one of "extremes in admiration and condescension".²⁸ Several contentious issues have plagued relations between the two, from the perceived influence and activity of Imperial Germany in Central and South America in the early years of this century, followed by apprehensions based on increased German immigration to Brazil, American security concerns regarding German ambitions towards naval outposts in Latin America, or political or territorial aims lying behind German economic moves in the Western Hemisphere before WW II. Similar fears and animosities surfaced over the Imperial German conquests of Europe in WW I, and the conquests of WW II magnified distrust as well.

Fear of overt German international ambitions is rooted in American observation of the events leading up to both world wars in this century, and many other events of lesser consequence. As Paul Nitze described his vivid impressions of German entry into the dispute between the Serbs and Austrians ultimately culminating in World War I, or of war

²⁸ Germany and the United States: A Special Relationship?, Ibid., p. 48.

torn and ravaged Germany later beseeching the victors of that conflict for mercy against their intended penalties in the Paris Peace treaties, the impression he and many non-Continental express of Germans is of an aggressive, opportunistic, domineering people bent on hegemonic control over their European neighbors.²⁹ These images and fears were also reflected in American views of Germans at the outset of Hitler's moves across the frontiers of Europe before and in WW II. American impressions or feelings spanned the range of character possibilities, from separate considerations of the inhumane motives of Nazi political leaders and the German peoples captive under their spell, to revulsion of the German ethnic group as a whole. Our international political positions were colored by our ethnic and nationalistic perceptions of the German race in the years before, during, and after the end of WW II. Although effective in mitigating or moderating this in the mid-west region, the efforts of German-Americans, cultural and social

²⁹ Paul H. Nitze, From Hiroshima to Glasnost (New York: Grove Weidenfield, 1989), pp. ix-xiii. These sentiments were more recently echoed in Western media's treatment of the plight of the European Community relative to reunified Germany's influence in the EC's development. See "The Trouble With Germans" by Josef Joffe, U.S. News & World Report, 30 July 1990, p. 26; or, David Lawday's article, "The Strongman and the Juggler," U.S. News & World Report, 3 February 1992, p. 38, in which he noted Western European diplomatic angst over German assertiveness in their plans for ensuring Europe's stability from the Atlantic to Siberia.

ties with Germany, economic cooperation, and other commonalities did little to dispel popular discontent against the Germanic people as a whole at various times during the past hundred years.³⁰ Following WW II, common security interests between the U.S. and West Germany became the key element bridging historic social reservations and fears and different national objectives through shared opposition to the threat of Communism.

B. Conflicting Objectives

Prioritization of different national objectives may hinder or encourage U.S. or German entry into potentially beneficial associations, or act to the detriment of alliances. Dissimilar national objectives may moderate U.S. or German adherence to agreements with one another, or promote activity to prevent disproportionate results to our individual interests. One historical economic affiliation between the U.S. and Germany (and possibly a forerunner of current U.S.-German coopération in economics), was the 1914 German-American Economic Association, founded to assuage the "numerous minor disagreements...haggling over tariffs, quotas and prices...".³¹ Counter-balancing differences are past and present social bonds. These bonds

³⁰ Gatzke, pp. 28-51.

³¹ Ibid., p. 50.

indirectly influence the formulating of U.S. national positions, by affecting our national objectives and even their prioritization in our policy towards Germany. Social concerns of Americans, from questions about Germany's humane treatment of Eastern European refugees, to their ecological efforts in reforming East German industry, may foster alliances or foment disputes between the U.S. and Germany.

Continuities in U.S.-German relations based on social ties may similarly motivate U.S. movement towards compromise in bargaining with Germany. Similar values, ideals and customs, or common ethnic origins have occasionally mitigated our political or economic positions relative to Germany in the past. This is evident in many U.S. positions throughout much of this century, except for confrontations during WW I and II. Positive relations were facilitated by friendly diplomatic dialogue between statesmen such as Theodore Roosevelt and Kaiser William II, in their sincere or "official" goodwill.³² The "Friendship in Freedom" group is a more recent example of a association seeking to promote friendly relations between the U.S. and Germany. This group's particular focus is the support of American-German

³² Ibid., pp. 48, 49.

leadership in the NATO alliance.³³ America at large, however, has had a mixed view of German international positions based on tensions real and perceived. This ambivalence continues in our present considerations of Germany's international aspirations.³⁴

Differing national objectives on the part of both countries, also influence how each envisions potential gains from cooperating with and committing to one another. Our national objectives may converge or skew apart, as reflected in each nations willingness to enter into agreements, or the

³³ This group sponsors current Public Broadcast Station commercial advertisements in favor of the longstanding partnership between the U.S. and Germany, founded in like values and principles, and manifested in the NATO alliance.

³⁴ Gatzke, p. 49. This is also reflected in media reports on the NATO reorganization negotiations of last fall, wherein stories related fears over Germany's latent fascist tendencies. The Franco-German Joint Force proposal, the elimination of some but not all tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, debate over the "new" threats to the NATO allies from weapons proliferation, instability in the Mediterranean or East European states, and the question of how involved the U.S. should be in questions of European security are some issues. See "Germany's New Army," Defense & Diplomacy, Vol. 9, No. 9-10 (August/September 1991): 7-13; "NATO: Life After the Threat," The Economist, Vol. 321, No. 7731 (2 November 1991): 46; "French, Germans Propose Joint Force," 17 October 1991, p. A40; "NATO Approves 50% Cut in Tactical A-Bombs," 18 October 1991, p. A28; "Nato's Outlook Clouded by French-German Plan," 19 October 1991, p. A20; "NATO Finds New Role, With Soviet Threat Gone," 2 November 1991, p. A17; "NATO Leaders Seek New Role," 7 November 1991, p. A45; or, "Defensive Bush Takes Offensive Stand on U.S. Role in NATO," 9 November 1991, p. A21, Washington Post. Also, see "Germany: No Nukes," Associated Press, 16 March 1992.

positions each nation takes to actions of the other. German reunification in particular was viewed both favorably and uncomfortably by the U.S. from the onset of Germany's division in the late 1940s. American aims have vacillated to include both sides of the then "German Question", such as how to resolve Central European German issues to achieve either a Germany reunited, but neutral and independent, or accept a divided nation, both halves quite possible rearming, and each then clearly becoming a greater security threat. America generally maintained a declared policy for reunification, qualified both domestically and in Europe by fears of the potential of a reunified hegemonic Germany, based on her past history.³⁵

The influence of historic U.S.-German bonds, and of differing and similar national objectives on present associations with Germany is a major aspect in determining our contemporary policy towards Germany. Recent German history, especially in the post-WW II period, includes the overwhelming influence of anti-communist ideology in her politics, beginning with Konrad Adenauer's government in 1949, and continuing up until and after Germany's official

³⁵ Nitze, p. 70. Also see David Mayers, George Kennan and the dilemmas of U.S. Foreign Policy, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 236.

reunification in October 1990.³⁶ Future relations between our nation and Germany will be in part determined by this factor. The possibility that different circumstances and divergent foreign policy objectives will result in conflictive relations between the two nations, or that a widening gulf in our relations may occur given the absence of shared anti-communist security interests is a real possibility. Assessing the influence and importance of traditional security links and other ties between the U.S. and reunified Germany is the major means through which relations will be planned and policies fixed.

Differences in U.S. and German views may be found in past events or policies which were detrimental to the interests of one of the two nations or their friends and allies, in their individual national experiences or in their particular national needs and desires. Each nation aspires to certain conditions or results through the world's system, and each also has differing perceptions of their surroundings which influence national and international policy choices. From the political similarities and differences between the U.S. and Germany, potential causes for future alliances or agreements may be drawn, or the seeds sewn for divergence.

³⁶ Gatzke, pp. 179-180, 181.

It is these similarities and differences, in past and present political positions, and in social, cultural and economic arenas, from which security ties related to each nation's survival, stability and freedom from threats are being developed. Potential barriers to mutual security activities have also arisen in the past from differences, perceived or real.

Hindrances to cooperation between the U.S. and Germany have in the past usually been dealt with later rather than complicating beneficial security alliances. Such was the case with the dispute over basing of NATO tactical nuclear weapons on W. German soil, the German NATO cost burden-sharing or the dispute over Germany's recent contribution to the coalition efforts in the war with Iraq.³⁷

The challenge today lies in determining which ties bind our nation to Germany, determining if these ties are relevant given Germany's potential inherent in her reunification, and if these ties offer the prospect for continued support of and achievement of our national objectives. There is room for optimism based on the continued common objectives both nations have regarding the

³⁷ See comments regarding Germany's role in both the recent Gulf War and about her role in the EC, in "Blaming Others," U.S. News & World Report, letter by D.J. Lutkowski, 9 March 1992, p. 6; and, "The Strongman and the Juggler," 3 February 1992, pp. 55-57.

threats they perceive in the ever-changing international system, and in the shared commitment to democratic values and institutions.

C. Encouraging Aspects of Similar Security Aims

The U.S.-German alliance founded on the common threat of Communist expansion and Soviet domination was a pervasive link between the two nations throughout the post-WW II years till 1989 and the beginning of the fracture of the Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union. Now the absence of the unifying objective of containing Communism and Soviet expansionism, has been replaced by other national concerns in both the U.S. and reunified Germany. Chief among Germany's concerns are costs and problems surrounding her reunion. While American isolationist motives immediately after WW II gave way quickly to interests in Central Europe and specifically Germany in security and economic realms, there would appear to be some resurfacing of isolationist tendencies today because of our domestic difficulties.

U.S. post-war relations with Germany were first defined by Stalin's activities regarding the divided city of Berlin, heralding in the beginning of Cold War stand-off confrontations with the Soviet-sponsored siege of the city and the West's airlift response. As Kennan and Nitze charted the West's containment policy in response to perceived Communist aggression and expansion, Germany became

a key element in the strategy to halt Soviet westward expansion into Europe through Central Europe. Central Europe acquired the status of the political, economic and military demarcation zone between West and East, and West Germany's revitalization dramatized the West's aim of demonstrating its superior ideology and economics over the Soviet's command economies and totalitarian controls. The roots of American security interests in Central Europe, and specifically Germany, date back even further.

Security interests dominated American foreign policy towards Germany during the years leading to WW II. Our view of the world was that of a dangerous place and of Europe, a region torn by traditional wars fought by corrupt princes, culminating in our tendency towards avoiding involvement in Continental conflicts. This tendency became a conventional U.S. foreign policy premise. President Wilson altered mainstream American convictions in convincing America that involvement in the first World War "could end all war." However, the traditional view to keep us out of European conflicts remained a significant foreign policy perspective until our entry into WW II.³⁸

³⁸ I. M. Destler, Leslie H. Gelb, and A. Lake, Our Own Worst Enemy, (New York: Simon & Schuster, Inc., 1984), p. 38.

Following WW II, the predominance of American global power, the lessons we learned from the isolationism of the 1930s, and the growing American hostility towards Communism made disengagement from Central Europe and especially Germany, impossible. American foreign policy goals shifted to those of maintaining global peace and stopping Communism. American foreign policy included efforts to rebuild the shattered European economies and stabilize their political systems, to bring the former Axis powers into the democratic political community, and establish the Atlantic Alliance to defend all of the West. These purposes reflected a realization by U.S. policy makers that peace could not be kept through U.S. strength alone.³⁹ The U.S. European Recovery Program and, later, the Marshall Plan, typified American governmental programs in post-war Europe, and especially in Germany, seeking to guide post-war economic transition into the Western mold.

The security premise which championed the promise of "peace through containment" was stressed in American foreign policy towards Europe and Germany, but was somewhat of a fallacy. The premise was essentially soft. It directed, or at least implied, American-European policies based on avoiding the "Munich analogy" in our constant interface with

³⁹ Ibid., pp. 16, 28.

the Soviets and Eastern nations. In spite of confrontations between West and East, like the Soviet moves against Hungary, the Cuban missile crisis, or the invasion of Czechoslovakia, containment wore a peaceful guise. Even in the Central European instances of conflict between East and West, compromise was the keynote of the West's response to many Eastern actions, evidence the reactions to Khrushchev's Berlin conquest, the erecting of the Wall, or the many incidents of border transgressions and attempted defections from East to West across the Iron Curtain. The misrepresentation of the West's chief aim, to halt the Communist advance, championed largely by the U.S., remained intact throughout the twenty years following the end of WW II until the Vietnam War. This debacle distorted our conventional plans regarding international conduct in advancing our principles or pursuing U.S. objectives, and brought about the view that global containment must be based on America's and the West's willingness to fight for peace, not always to seek stability through compromise. This war spurred a watershed in the security perceptions promoted in our foreign policies, which have also altered our relations with Germany.⁴⁰

⁴⁰ Ibid, pp. 61, 81, 105.

Throughout the thrust and parry by East and West during the Cold War, Germany remained spot-lighted among her European neighbors as a major security focal point of the struggle. Post-WW II American interests may have included economic advances through free-enterprise and the revitalization of European economies, but U.S. national interests were seen as inexorably tied to European security and stability. Hindsight evaluation of the events in the first thirty years after WW II reveals that American interests were really dominated by thoughts of our national survival relative to Soviet aggression, and our ambitions were towards maximizing improvement of that situation. By influencing global events, and by taking advantage of regional situations, like the circumstances of West Germany, we sought to further our anti-Communist aims. The pivotal location of West Germany, and her common politics, economics and security positions made her the most important Western nation in the Cold War. In spite of the priority we accorded relations with West Germany then, Soviet expansionism was still envisioned as the key impediment to global stability and the effectiveness of U.S. power. Hence, Western (American) containment of Soviet-led Communist expansionism was the main thrust of U.S. Central European strategy, and our policies towards West Germany one element in the furtherance of our this broader scheme.

Active containment was contested on occasion by West German overtures to Eastern Europe and the Soviets, such as West German 'Ostpolitik'-- Germany's attempt to "get-along" with their Eastern neighbors -- while maintaining their alliance with the U.S. and Western Europe through NATO. Such instances of divergence from Western priorities caused tensions between the U.S. and West Germany. Other instances of political stress include the cold shoulder experienced by Helmut Schmidt from President Carter after Schmidt's open support of the Ford administration in 1976. Even with these occasional deviations, West German positions in supporting Western and especially U.S. decisions and actions were fairly consistent throughout West Germany's domestic leadership transitions. On the other hand, American premises for relations with Germany, were perceived by West Germans as fluctuating from U.S. administration to another, causing Chancellor Schmidt to lament in 1983 that "...the alliance needs continuity; we've put all our eggs in your basket."⁴¹ Changing U.S. national objectives relative to Europe, as evidenced in the different geo-political positions regarding Western Europe and the remainder of the world as stated by subsequent American administrations substantiated this view.

⁴¹ Ibid., p. 13, 27, 87.

Differences between the U.S. and West Germany in political and security issues over the course of the Cold War occurred frequently and did impact upon our relations. The cohesive element of common opposition towards Communism and Soviet hegemony held the two nations on the same security path, despite many potential derailments. In the wake of the recent demise of the Soviet Union, the Warsaw Pact nations have begun to transform themselves into viable members of the Western world community, and to look to the European Community for leadership, assistance and common interests. In the diminished if not evaporated threat of Communism to the U.S. and Western European allies, the question is what security concerns remain between the trans-Atlantic partners? This concern is integral to NATO's reorganization and in other mechanisms of the coalescing EC. As American foreign policy makers consider our present and future relations with Germany, not only her reunified status, but also her position in the developing Continental power structure of the EC, will partly or entirely replace previous common security concerns between the U.S. and Germany over Communism.

D. Cold War Imperatives: Those Lost and Those Remaining

The enduring purposes of mutual security and alliance flow from common social values shared by both the U.S. and Germany, and from considerations of geography and of each

nation's place in the international system. Defining the social issues and concerns which become the purposes of national foreign policy also involves consideration of each nation's domestic values and objectives in addition to existing trans-national ties and bonds. Lord Palmerston's nineteenth century dictate that "Britain had no permanent allies or enemies, only permanent interests" is applicable to the evolution of our relations with Germany, in the sense that shared interests become mutually sought purposes and are enduring in their lasting effect to prompt continued positive foreign relations decisions, compared to individual interests which are temporary and situational.⁴² The interaction between America and Germany in the years following WW II seem possibly the most influential due to the development of lasting non-security interests from common issues and concerns which now influence America's post-unification positions on Germany. The most influential of all the associations and activities which the nations engaged in throughout past years are those surrounding their security relationship, founded in Cold War pressures. The other arena of interactions contributing the most to stabilized and positive relations between the two nations

⁴² Ibid., p. 262.

has been mutual economic progress based on similar free-enterprise and market-based economies.

Ties between the two nations are also social and cultural, but those ties foster bonds which are narrow in their focus and in relevance to the influence each has upon the total populations of each nation. Immigrants in the U.S. from Germany form a large political constituency, as do many other nationalities in our melting pot republic. From German immigrants, customs are passed on by each generation, and particular social events are enjoyed and learned by other segments of our populace, becoming part of our culture. Sauerkraut, wurst, beerfests, and other foodstuffs of German origin are one example. Classical music, literary works, automobile quality, and other materialistic examples are laced throughout the lifestyles comprising modern America.

Recently, issues surrounding human rights, environmental protection and nonproliferation of weapons of mass-destruction, have gained an increased share of public attention and political representation in both countries. These issues are displacing traditional security concerns rooted in anti-Communism to an ever-larger extent, but are not necessarily replacing those national interests related to threats to our security, which the U.S. champions in the West and has shared with West Germany in the past. The

common security objectives are based on similar national objectives for freedom from external threats, access to global opportunities for economic advancement and maintenance of a stable world system.

Many aspects of post-WW II German society reflect similar characteristics to those of American society, due to American influences on German life during the post-war years. Many particularities typical of Germans are also typical of America, and are part of each nation's cultures. Common cultural attributes link each nation's peoples as do similar social attitudes and activities. Post-war Germany developed under Allied supervision with guided political and social institutions. This resulted in many similar U.S. and Germany national and international financial enterprises.

Given the prosperity West Germany has been able to achieve over the forty-five years since Potsdam and Yalta, American views of unified German positions and actions are now increasingly colored by new security considerations based on economic issues. America's own economic recession and sluggish growth are but one aspect. Close behind in importance are problems facing Germany over her role in the EC. The range and form of her leadership relative to other European nations is in continuous debate within the EC. Next in importance are the problems modern Germany must contend with regarding renovation of her eastern half, and

industrialized Europe's eastern neighbors, and the tie between continental stability and continued economic evolution of these nations.

A leading European issue and American foreign policy concern is the dilemma of Germany's pivotal position in assisting the economic recovery and development of both the Eastern European nations and the states emerging from the Soviet Union's breakup. The amount of German assistance already rendered to Eastern Europe and the CIS and the resulting influence Germany gains from these actions pose an economic and regional security concern. The amount of German influence on these nations which Germany's developed neighbors and the U.S. desire or will allow is one element of our policy towards Germany, while promoting Germany's assumption of a greater share of the burden of assisting neighboring States is another.⁴³ These political-economic questions are further complicated by lingering social and cultural problems within and between the industrialized

⁴³ In "Germany's Eastern Question," The Economist (Vol. 322, No. 7748 (29 February 1992)), the question is posed that Germany's neighbors debate whether to "cheer or tremble" when Germany turns East in ambitious efforts now termed 'Ostpolitik-II'. The author speculates if Germany can afford to foot the costs of asserting herself with the Eastern Europeans and CIS states. Others debate if the post-WW II economic and political successes experienced by Western Europe are possible in Eastern Europe, and which potential recipients of assistance should be brought into the EC fold. See "Europe's Open Future," The Economist, Vol. 322, No. 7747 (22 February 1992): 47.

nations of the Continent. Owing to factors such as their independent origins and differing international courses over the past four decades, and the individual costs each bears in shifting to common allegiances required in the EC, the impact of German assertiveness is further magnified.

Some of these concerns are shared by the U.S.; others are separate due to our distance from the Continent and our different histories and national interests. The similarities tie the U.S. to Germany, while the differences separate the two countries, in development and implementing their respective relationships with the world, the other European nations and with each other. It is similarities and differences, which the two nations must come to agreement on or divergence over in immediate or long-term considerations of various situations.

From these similarities, future U.S.-German security-related alliances may develop. From the manifold differences, the paths of each nation may diverge and adversarial postures between the U.S. and Germany become not only possible but probable when and if each perceives their interests threatened by the stance or actions of the other. Resolving these differences before confrontations arise and building upon similarities to forge lasting associations like both nations have experienced under the NATO flag is the true test of foreign policy and diplomacy, both U.S. and

German. Understanding the common security issues and concerns, and the disruptive differences in security interests and perceptions of both Germany and the U.S. is the key to our selecting proper and beneficial policies to pursue.

From the preceding discussions, several policy imperatives are immediately obvious. The U.S. is no longer able to neglect her domestic economic and financial situation while in pursuit of geo-political and international security interests, as she was during the heyday of the Cold War. Nor is she able to economically assist those nations requiring large financial inflows to initiate or sustain their transitions to free-market economies, although our present administration does see fit to continue to outlay a fair sum in foreign aid and assistance. Hence, a leading U.S. policy objective should be the promotion of our own economic prosperity to facilitate our domestic economic recovery and competition in the years to come. The safety of our population, property and institutions remains a foremost concern, as weapons proliferation, instability and continued reliance of many states on force to influence others in the international order appear a condition of short-term and even long-term permanence. Finally, to support and enable both our safety from external dangers and our recovery and continued

economic competitiveness, a policy objective seeking continued Continental equilibrium is necessary. These prescriptions meet the immediate security needs of our nation, given the current absence of a major global threat to the U.S.. These recommendations also facilitate improvement in America's economic means of conduct relative to Germany. These possibilities are however, caveated by the uncertainty and speed of ongoing global changes, and the flux of the present international system.

E. Uncertainty and the Pace of Change

Germany is plagued by fears harbored by her Western European neighbors about the potential danger of united German power dominating their political, economic and security interests. These concerns, among others, are also concerns for the U.S.. Having led the West and Europe throughout the Cold War, the affairs of the European nations still remain central to U.S. perceptions of the world.

The U.S. has occasionally toyed with and or considered withdrawal from an active role in the geo-political arena. However, America has always been a participant, even if not a key player, in the geo-political power "game" by virtue of our location, size and resources. Today, the U.S. faces its own serious domestic problems, chief among them the economic recession and how to turn the economy around. These problems are exaggerated by the increasingly dependent

nature of the present global economy, and the rapid pace in which geo-political changes are occurring. In past decades, time was a buffer between action and reaction; present events seem so fluid and regional conditions malleable, that positions which hold one day may not the next. Hence, a tension is prompted by America's tendency towards an inward focus, the pace of change and resulting uncertainties it causes, and European consternation over Germany's regional assertiveness. Present relations between States are less able to evolve over a long period, wherein transient activities and reactive national positions could even out before further reaction was required from those nations affected by such events.

Americans face numerous social concerns such as the state of our health care system, the problem of reformulating our educational system, the continuing failure of our efforts to counter drug abuse, and the complex problems of ecological protection and conservation. These concerns are primarily domestic, and sometimes part of but not necessarily completely reflected in, our thoughts over what the rest of the world is saying and doing, or where they are headed.

An additional concern which America contemplates is that of what path we will take as a Super-power in the present international order, possibly the sole remaining

Super-power, and if that role is still applicable in an increasingly dependent system which now confronts us. We debate if we still even should consider ourselves a Super-power! In contrast to this quandary, we are influenced by past events, where the proverb "history portends the future" may be applicable to the uncertain circumstances which confront U.S. decision makers regarding policy towards Germany.⁴⁴

F. Costs of Change in U.S.-German Relations

The path to alliance or division for the U.S. and Germany, over issues like security positions or economic cooperation, is one frequently strewn with the remnants of international ventures attempted in the past. Along that path are remnants of associations which never came to fruition, or went astray before the participants could culminate a union. Sometimes these faulty alliances failed before they could effect hostilities towards another nation. Sometimes these associations were destroyed through their

⁴⁴ Inscription outside the Pennsylvania Avenue entrance to the National Archives Building, Washington, D.C., on one of two figures symbolizing the past and the future, whose admonishments read, respectively, "Study the Past" and "What is Past is Prologue." The later phrase from Shakespeare's The Tempest, correctly conveys one attitude some Americans take regarding current international associations and the impact of historic events in portending future possibilities. See Herman Viola, The National Archives of the United States (New York: Harry N. Abrams, Inc., 1984), pp. 19, 49.

own flaws, or through the efforts of nations witnessing the hostile formation and its potential evil. Thus, nations contemplating new security associations or binding agreements for a particular course of action, are affected by the successful or failed attempts of other nations before them.

Reflection on past alliances and their lessons has merit in deliberations over U.S. policy towards Germany much as the proverb earlier confers. The possibility of an overly nationalistic or ethnocentric Germany leading the EC, Eastern European nations and parts or all of the CIS, is one ominous possibility. Though unlikely, this possibility nonetheless is one American policy makers must consider in the quest for appropriate positions to take with a reunited Germany.

Similar American and German aims ranging from local self-determination to ecological restraint and industrial rehabilitation, joint economic cooperation, free-market capitalism, or cultural and educational exchanges, often reap nation-wide social benefits for the participants. However, caution and prudence are watchwords for either nation contemplating entry into new binding security agreements, which may prevent them from acting independently when their interests dictate such actions, despite the outward promise of these agreements.

An observer of U.S.-German relations might reflect on the cautious manner in which both nations crossed the portal of commitment to mutual actions, while at other times turned away from an approach by the other. For example, the U.S. initially opposed Germany's proposal for early recognition of Serbian and Croatian nationhood, but ultimately concurred with Germany in this diplomatic recognition after a period of tension over Germany's forward behavior. Not all associations hold the same promise for each nation.

One might also note that in the past, either the U.S. or Germany had initiated a particular course of action or taken a position on an security related issue unilaterally, when both their interests were at stake. Each instance lends credence to the idea that regardless of the dependencies of the international system, powerful nations like the U.S. and Germany have and will continue to act in their own interests regardless of the consequences when the situation requires. Each occurrence weighs in the minds of U.S. policy makers as a bench mark against which to gauge the expected reaction of Germany, to a particular position America might take. There are many such instances, like the divergent positions of the U.S. and Germany over the trans-European natural gas pipeline during the 1970s, which linger in our minds when considering how to revise our policy towards Germany, to account for the greater economic,

political and even military power potential inherent in her reunification.

Today, ongoing changes throughout Europe and in the U.S. are influencing our foreign policy determinations as much as past events. One new difference is that the pace of changes today are occurring at a rate greater than ever before. This poses questions of how quickly to respond to change in another corner of the globe, and what costs we will incur if our response is delayed. Present European circumstances frequently will no longer tolerate contemplation by either Americans or Germans to assess policy alternatives. The interactive and interdependent nature of the international system makes delays costly, either directly or indirectly, in almost every type of endeavor, security related or otherwise.

Even with these new influences on policy making much of the way we appreciate the pace of change or its costs may hinge on our memories of how we or other nations reacted to change. Legacies of past positions and responses alter not only the issues and concerns which we debate in our policy reviews, but actually the manner or context of those policy revisions themselves. While U.S.-German positions today are founded in circumstances that are in part fixed, but also evolving, the process of evolution itself is changing.

Policy evolution was once only affected by the overall

power of nations which could counter-balance the effects of rapid change or the costs associated with delayed response. Today, national power is only one aspect of the evolution process. Other components include domestic concerns, extraneous or temporary influences, persistent themes or fears of other nations contributing piece-meal to our policy composition like immediate national safety, economic prosperity and regional stability objectives. Hence, the aggregate power of a reunited Germany is only one important aspect in our analysis of policy development towards Germany.

Several other types of anxieties remnant of past Germanic power are also influential in altering our policies towards unified Germany. Nationalist aggrandizements continue to haunt American perceptions of the possibilities inherent in the reunion of the two German republics. These thoughts are reminders of the troubles of past German hegemonic actions, where in each instance a wayward German government wielded a disciplined and productive German nation to conquest throughout the European continent. Each memory also reminds us of events which necessitated eventual American military intervention in another Continental conflict, and the costs to our nation and populace. The tensions resulting from worry about the potential involvement in new instance of Continental upheaval and the

costs incurred in meeting these instances of trans-European aggression are further heightened by the costs of forging alliances, such as those incurred by the U.S. in the recent Gulf War. In creating and leading the Coalition formed prior to that conflict, America bore the lion's share of the military, economic and political requirements to counter Iraq's threat to Western oil access and regional stability. America does not wish to repeat that burden in any future European conflict. These cost factors influence American politics and our positions towards modern Germany, much as the costs of EC development, or East German assimilation impact Germany's policies towards other European nations.

The economic burdens of Germany's reunification and of her participation in EC development may be compared with the costs Germany shouldered during her reconstitution after WW II. The burdens of reconstruction were more easily carried then when America sustained Germany, when we were at the apex of our industrial capability and national wealth. The same persistence, intense cultural dedication and industrious capabilities which afforded the Germans a fearful WW II military might, also enabled post-WW II Germany to turn the rubble of their State into a modern industrialized nation, today with the third largest Gross National Product (GNP) in the world. That particular social and economic potential ascribed to Germans, which has made

Germany the modern power she is, also mar her achievement.

There remains a memory with many nations of the world of the potential for Germany's power to go awry when she is improperly governed. This lingering fear of potentially misdirected German power may be more than a worry, or it may be merely an unpleasant national memory. Either way, our anxiety over potentially errant German power, residing in her cultural ability, enhanced by her increasing regional clout, and evidenced by frequent social deviations make for another force influencing the revision of American policy towards Germany. The key to understanding and accounting for our apprehension over German power rests in determining what would guide such deviant capabilities--nationalism, ethnocentrism, a combination of the two?

Unlike Germany's neighbors who suffered devastation or occupation at German hands in the last world conflict, Americans have no lasting impressions of the horrors which the Wehrmacht occupation brought to Central Europe and the entire Continent. So, while Europeans have similar apprehensions over the power of Germany reunited, they are more credible given historic realities which have plagued the region under a German sword, resulting in three regional wars between 1870 and 1945. Europeans' thoughts today also center on German military power, regional economic control and possible political or social domination of the EC.

These concerns of our other European allies, plus our pressing domestic problems, along with the influences of the pace of change and costs of changes, all combine to make for complex deliberations over our positions towards Germany.

Today the issue of German nationalism attracts our attention in another way. Concern over this derives from a social trait with both positive and negative aspects.⁴⁵ In a positive light, nationalism is a strong force in providing cohesion to social groups seeking political representation as expressions of solidarity. In its negative sense, nationalism bears the mark of one means of national socialism's rise to power. How Europeans and Americans view the recent instances of nationalistic German's violating the human rights of non-Germans are too limited to generalize about. However, the potential for this force to misdirect Germany politically remains suspect and contributes to fuel our fears of aspects of German society. The recent difficulties experienced by America in dealing with Germany during NATO restructuring negotiations play directly to this theme.

The concerns of Europeans as a group are reflected by more immediate considerations than those of America, given the altered circumstances of the Continent, and the movement

⁴⁵ "Europe's Open Future," The Economist Vol. 322, No. 7747 (22 February 1992): 48.

away from military geo-political instruments of power to economic instruments. European nations remain adamant over retention of their individuality within the EC, where a European identity has not yet taken root as a means of gradually blurring traditional nationalism. Hence, future actions by Germany in a nationalistic vein, would easily catch the skeptical eye of her neighbors.

Nationalism is a powerful social and cultural force with a checkered historic record. Nationalistic cohesion has enabled great independence movements in the past. However, xenophobic nationalism has manifested itself in harsh governments and inhumane treatment of minorities in States subject to the whims of leaders controlling their destinies under the guise of nationalism. This was the case with the politics of Nazism, which unleashed its wrath on Europe in WW II.

Nationalism is evident in a negative sense today in Europe. As thousands flee westward towards the prospects of better living conditions and employment opportunities present in industrialized Western Europe, they have been frequently confronted by hostile reactions of Western Europeans, Germans included. Seeking to stem the flow of refugees, these activities manifest resentment of many Western Europeans, of the taxing weight of immigrants from Eastern Europe, even in Germany relative to East Germans.

The large economic costs of unification are another factor weighing on Germany. Germany also bears the economic costs of financial integration and monetary assimilation of her eastern half, in addition to the economic requirements of pan-European EC consolidation, such as capital devaluation when the shift to a common monetary unit occurs. The presently large and even-greater looming burden of economic revitalization of the Eastern Europe is an issue which also must be coped with in coming years. Each new economic burden taxes the industrious capacity of unified Germany. However, the possibilities of resurgent regional power are concomitants of these new responsibilities. There is another aspect of power which contributes to anxieties over Germany's reunification. Americans and Europeans also fear the potential growth of German militarism.

Germany might someday be able to exert political or economic leverage on the EC to dominate their unified military capability. An American fear lingers over this possibility. With military might and economic strength, Germany could dominate the course of events across the Continent, coercing her European neighbors and evolving Eastern states to the detriment of American interests. Though as of yet unsubstantiated by fact, when Germany recently led the EC to recognize the independent states of Croatia and Serbia, pulling her European neighbors onto her

desired path ahead of the wishes of the U.S., typified German ability to marshal sufficient leverage from her present strengths among the Continent's nations.

Whether Germany might ever be able to again wrest extensive socio-economical control and political clout to drive European conduct as she did in past situations is doubtful. Ambassador and retired U.S. Army General Vernon Walters recently commented that he felt the days of armies traversing the continent's hills and plains were over. Germany is so preoccupied with her economic recovery and assimilation of her new territories that the possibility of German power threatening European regional stability is remote at best.⁴⁶

There are other social fears, prompted by recently demonstrated German mistreatment of visitors and foreigners in major German cities, like Munich. Events such as these bother American's concerned with historic German attitudes on rights and individual freedoms. These events provoke discord between the U.S. and Germany over circumstances internal to Germany. German's argue that these instances are small events rather than prevalent conditions. Germany also responds that isolated instances of violence are of

⁴⁶ Comments by Ret. Gen. Vernon Walters to William F. Buckley Jr., during an interview for the television program Firing Line, 23 February 1992.

concern to the German government and public as well, and besides that they are domestic problems, not international ones. Conservative Americans vent frustration over the premise of inhumane treatment within a European bastion of freedom and liberty. Liberal Americans criticize the hypocrisy of U.S. relations with a nation which condones such activity through its inactive public response, while encouraging German leadership in the EC and within European Continental affairs. Still, instances like these possibly belie a negative social tendency towards misdirected nationalism, which has in the past driven portions of the Continent to war.

As America interprets these events relative to our pursuit of relations with reunified Germany, one question remains unanswered. How will Germany react to the future demands of Continental evolution resulting in even greater movements of people from the States in the Asian Heartland, potentially adding to the existing turmoil on the Continent? If small refugee influxes cause such problems today, will larger infusions of Easterners seeking opportunities in Western Europe spur greater discord and violence? If this were to occur, if circumstances like the upheaval in Yugoslavia should result in Europe due to western movement of masses seeking relief, what part should the U.S. play?

These circumstances just proposed are fictitious, yet perhaps plausible, given what is occurring today in and around unified Germany. Extrapolation of ominous implications for the potential problems of German power on the Continent from these limited circumstances to situations of a larger scale, is fallible in determining revisions to our existing or future policy towards Germany. Germany's government could easily prevent or control larger incidents of hostile or inhumane activity, compared to that now occurring infrequently on the streets of Berlin and Munich. But extrapolation is also a means of assessing possible outcomes which limited instances may enlarge into. Given the continued possibility of instances of mistreatment outsiders, or the possibility of a crisis brought about by continued changes within the Continent, popular sentiment for outsiders may be spurred into open hostility. This is worth considering in evaluating Central European stability combined with growing unified German national power, and also influences American policies towards Germany.

This analysis of possible circumstances leads to new insights and perceptions. How we determine our future policy towards Germany rests in part on the shifting momentum of ongoing changes, on our domestic concerns and their influence on policy choices, and in the new issues affecting foreign policy choices.

III. Shifting Priorities in U.S. Foreign Policy

A. Setting the Stage for Policy Development

Many views of the present condition of the global nation-state system consist of theories about the nature of the system, explanations of the characteristics of system members or types of interaction between them, convictions about how the participants in the system will act and react in certain situations, or predictions of their future activities. In contrast, current events commentators in the world's media provide views of the goings-on between nations, interpretations of their objectives and analyses of consequences of their actions in reports of worldly events.

This information, carried directly to average people in increasingly timely, accurate and vivid detail, along with the media's own insights and opinions on the situations, have of late caused a revolution--popular interest in global affairs. Media's transmission of ever-increasing amounts of complex information on relations between nations has made those relations between nations a house-hold interest, especially in America. Peaked public consciousness about foreign policy occurs along with a heightened awareness of other social, cultural, political, and economic issues, both domestic and international in nature. Increased public interest in foreign policy is brought about by the mass media and facilitated by communications advances of the

information age. The politicization of issues previously tangential to foreign relations has elevated those issues to greater prominence in our national politics and foreign policy development. These issues and concerns historically had been largely the purview of diplomats and statesmen and not the general public.

Improved American public awareness and increased interest in the issues which comprise U.S. foreign policy, is important because of the effect which public interest has on traditional, newly prominent or totally different policy related problems. Public interest motivates national sentiment and, in turn, domestic political power, which then influences foreign policy determinations.

This influence in foreign policy development, plus other traditional policy influences, are increasingly altering the manner in which American positions towards other nations, especially unified Germany, are determined.

Our current positions towards modern Germany are no longer derived solely through the influence of traditional policy characteristics, namely security issues and concerns. Revisions to existing policies are not excepted from these effects, and examples are ever-present in media's presentations of daily events to the public. This is also evident in past and present sentiments of Germany's populace

towards the U.S..⁴⁷ Media-promoted public foreign policy interest and influence are also responsible for other issues and concerns gaining a larger share of political attention, compared to traditional issues of international relations.⁴⁸

Formerly dominant international security issues of the Cold War are now diminished in importance and sometimes overshadowed by concerns about the economics of nations and their respective living standards, by environmental and energy issues, by interest in political determinations of human rights abuses, or by social problems like drug abuse, abortion rights, the quality of education and employment opportunities. This reflects modern media's ability to elicit public response to previously less-visible subjects, and to foster public sentiment and spur popular action on a

⁴⁷ Pierre Hasner, "Implications for U.S.-E Relations" in Soviet Policy toward Western Europe: Implications for the Atlantic Alliance (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1983), p. 279. Hasner notes the similarity between American and {then West} German popular sentiments, in views on security topics, such as mutual distrust of the Soviets, favoring the Atlantic Alliance and the American presence in Europe, and arms control, countering the anti-U.S. German reputation.

⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 282. Hasner highlights the dimensions of change in the global system, in domestic politics and between the participants of that system. He contends that the altered global order has been influenced by the end of the Cold War, reoccurring economic crises, and new or renewed popular interests in social issues like quality of life and poverty levels, national identity crises, and efforts by various national, ethnic, generational or sexual groups seeking self-fulfillment to affect policies.

grand scale over a multitude of different issues, many unrelated to political and security premises of the previous historic bi-polar contest.

This increased attention to non-security concerns brings them to the forefront of social and political debate, often resulting in vocal public positions and attendant strong political stances. If the topics or interests are international in character, the political power arising from public interest in those topics is reflected in influence on foreign policy development. With different or new issues taking the lead in influencing foreign policy development, the increased momentum of these interests and purposes may greatly sway the re-stabilization of relations between nations after changes or upheaval occur. Today, U.S. relations towards Germany seem to be settling into place again after the monumental changes in the European region and especially those specific to Germany.⁴⁹

⁴⁹ An assessment of the impact of pan-European changes on Germany, and the impact of those changes on U.S. relations with European states, is constantly a topic of political discourse. See articles such as: Catherine M. Kelleher, "The New Germany: Unification One Year On," The Brookings Review 10 (Winter 1992): 18-25; Heinrich Oberreuter, "Reflections on Liberty," and Heinz Stadlmann, "Focus on Europe '92," Scala 5 (October-November 1991): 20-27 and 28-31, respectively. What is less prominent is an assessment of the direction those changes are taking American foreign policy objectives and perceptions of our own situations.

The influence of new purposes and interests may alter established priorities in U.S. foreign policy choices. Their impact is again offset or diminished by the influence of persistent elements of a higher priority. A third force which influences U.S. foreign relations, is the momentum and compelling nature of the existing and evolving nation-state system. These forces also influence the direction of U.S. positions towards Germany.

Finally, our unstated objectives towards various regions of the world, tend to impact on policy aims and choices in revisions or when they are cast anew. Central Europe is among the most important and prominent in American foreign policies due to its geo-political position. Our policies towards this region seem firm in some respects and malleable in others.

These forces also affect the evolution of existing U.S. policy towards Germany. They impact our considerations of commonalities and differences in social, cultural, political and economic interests, and security concerns. Each of these forces also contribute uncertainties to our deliberations over future directions of U.S. foreign policy, in addition to those already present caused by changes.

B. Domestic Influences on America's Foreign Relations

Social pressures are making new or different interests and values more influential in determining the course of

American foreign policies. Relative to reunified Germany, these include economic competition, environmental protection, energy utilization, income and wealth distribution, health care availability, and living standards improvement. There are economic cross-currents between the U.S. and Germany. Germany's movement to dominate Europe's economy, her own economic strength relative to that of the U.S., and her increasingly assertive geo-politics often compliment but sometimes conflict with U.S. insistence on increased German responsibility in global economics and financial affairs problems. The U.S. is at odds with Germany even today, over proper environmental controls on industrial emissions and over agricultural policies in the ongoing GATT round negotiations. Efforts to decrease the dependency of Western Europe's industrialized nations and America on global oil sources pit America, Europe and her industrialized nations against each other over solutions and costs relative to each nation.⁵⁰

⁵⁰ Ibid., Soviet Policy towards Western Europe. Hasner also provides a view of Cold War upheaval which changes were promoting between the U.S. and Western Europe, specifically West Germany, noting the domestic dimension of changes on both nations. Internal changes resulted from the lack of consensus on where the threat was coming from (compared with the clarity of the Communist threat during the Cold War), combined with the rebirth of the military versus social expenditures quandary in Western nations, making easily justified or overarching arguments for security-based foreign policies increasingly difficult.

Increased public interest in social institutions like the family and community, the education of our young in accepted norms of behavior, and concerns over social issues like the causes of greater urban crime and continued drug abuse, are other factors influencing our foreign policies due to the linkages between crime, narcotics and international travel and relations.⁵¹ Popular perceptions of other nations' peoples also contribute to muddy U.S. policy waters.

A further difference in U.S. domestic affairs which leads to a foreign policy influence is renewed public sentiment over humanitarian concerns. The global AIDS epidemic, poverty levels in less-developed nations, or natural disasters and relief efforts are but a few. Each of these motivates politico-social demands and pressures which impact on the evolution of our foreign policy, especially towards Germany.

Each of these forces have gained or are gathering increasing momentum in their ability to impact on U.S.

⁵¹ William J. Bennett, The Devaluing of America, (New York: Summit Books, 1992), pp. 100, 118, 193. Bennett notes the ties between street crime and international narcotics trafficking which begs foreign policy attention. These point are highlighted by Andrew Young in his discussions about national and international city-life, in "Thinking about Cities in the 1990s," Thinking about America: The United States in the 1990s (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1988), pp. 413-414, 423-425.

foreign policy formation. Popular consensus on new social concerns are now making different purposes and values policy determinants. Previously, international social concerns like progress towards national self-determination, the freedom of oppressed peoples from totalitarian regimes, and elimination of human rights abuses, were visible American issues but were of only moderate influence on U.S. foreign policies. These less-traditional social concerns were close to but behind the security priorities of the East-West struggle.

Yet today's headlines portray other disputes capturing public attention and gaining political support. The present negotiations between the U.S., Germany and other nations over the level of support for the economic recovery of Eastern Europe and financial assistance to the new nations born of the fall of the Soviet Union are two such issues. While both are less confrontational than economic competition or institutional disputes and ultimately it is in benefits for all concerned, one nation or another must bear the costs of such ventures, in comparison to the benefits.⁵²

⁵² Many recent media reports signal this increased interest in the U.S. over social issues and concerns unrelated to security themes. Some current headlines include: "Bush may Boycott Earth Summit" by L. McQuillan, *Reuter's World News*, 28 March 1992, or "Europe Orders New Pollution Curbs" by Marlise Simmons, *New York Times*, 24

Given these and other non-security issues increasingly influencing U.S. public opinion and resulting in political positions more significant to U.S. foreign policy determinations, a proposition may be forwarded regarding the evaluation of our existing positions with the nations of Europe, especially unified Germany. The scope of concerns in foreign policy determination is increasing in complexity over that which typified our foreign policies when Cold War security premises dominated. This trend is making future geo-political associations less likely to be based solidly on broad themes, and therefore less stable. This argues that U.S. policy towards Germany today and in the future may increasingly be driven by values issues, by purposes related to current public perceptions, versus the influence of long-

March 1992; p. A6, detailing the conflict between the U.S. and world's nations over carbon dioxide and sulfur dioxide industrial gas pollution controls relative to the impact of those restraints on the U.S. economy; "Leaky Russian Atom Plant Renews Fears in West", Reuter's World News, 24 March 1992, wherein CSCE Western nations criticized Russian failure to shutdown all Chernobyl-style nuclear reactors after another released irradiated gases, reaffirmed by Germany, but whitewashed by American experts; or, "Let Germany Do It" by Robert G. Livingston, Washington Post. in which the case for German support of Eastern European and specifically Russian economic recovery is promoted over the U.S. bearing the burden, owing to our own economic problems and German abiding interests engaged in the region's economies making her the better instrument for successful transition of the ex-Soviet republics over the U.S..

term security objectives, such as concern over our domestic situation and the inward focus of our resources.⁵³

C. Enduring Social Elements in U.S. Foreign Policy

Some aspects of our domestic situation seem concrete in their persistent influence on U.S. foreign policy. Enduring social aspects of American relations with other nation-states owe their origins and longevity to the peculiarities of the American way of life, and to shared values like freedom, liberty, and equality. The cultural fabric of our nation is rooted in institutions like the family, community, schools and religious worship, and in social service organizations like the Boy and Girl Scouts, Peace Corps, the American Red Cross, 4-H clubs or YMCA, and the particular standards they instill. Each acts as a source of influential social purposes or values which may find their way into policy construction.⁵⁴ Each may also be the origin

⁵³ The current political impasse over passage of a foreign aid bill is evidence of a shift in American foreign policy influences. Both social and security-related issues currently deadlock the approval of the 1991 version. This dispute centers on concern over funding abortion programs through family planning institutions overseas, providing large amounts of foreign aid while jobless benefits are constrained at home, an IMF quota augmentation to offset costs for economic assistance to CIS republics, and the Israeli loan guarantees.

⁵⁴ The basis of American attainment of some ultimate social objectives like "...true moral, intellectual and artistic values along with maintaining a high standard of living..." through the activities and co-operation of many social institutions like families, churches and schools is a

of reasons for our manner of establishing foreign policy priorities.

These social characteristics help to motivate the public interest in foreign policy questions much as do the exposure to and availability of information facilitated by the media. The identification of social influences on policy development is in many respects easily done, but those influences are often difficult to validate once isolated.

American values of fairness and equality are two fundamental qualities which influence our decisions in daily life and also effect public sentiments regarding international relations and policy positions. These beliefs of social conduct are elements in most individuals' lives, community activities and in the formation of national public opinion. They are transformed into underlying factors of U.S. foreign policy. Evidence for this exists in the way Americans favor the underdog in sports or political contests, or, the way we seek to ensure all participants in contests have some support, especially if disadvantaged or less capable than their opponents. From our sense of

much scrutinized aspect of our way of life. These particular institutions are depicted as key in the provision of social foreign policy influences, in John U. Nef's The United States and Civilization, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1967), p. 320.

fairness springs forth public insistency on level-playing-field situations in contests, and we react to disparate contestants by modifying the rules, according privileges, or altering the circumstances of one or another contestant in an attempt to see both sides enter with the same opportunities and potential for success.

We favor basing the outcome of contests on the perception that it was a fair contest, and that the winner became so based on what he or she did with their assets rather than their superior entering advantages. Such social principles underlie U.S. approaches in foreign relations negotiations, where the perception of equality or equitable share permeates international activities and is reflected in U.S. positions like calls for greater burden sharing by our European allies during the Cold War, or increased support and assistance by Germany (and Japan) during the Middle East conflict.

Americans frequently highlight the value we place on the equitable treatment for all, in situations ranging from domestic equal rights debates to the assistance rendered to needy persons around the globe. Humane treatment of Eastern European refugees seeking opportunity in industrialized Europe is posed as a challenge by Americans to Europeans, and Germans in their dealings with immigrants and Eastern Europe refugees, as discussed above.

In our domestic conduct we strive to ensure conditions in which none receive preferential or favorable privileges not granted to all. We harken back to the Constitution and Bill of Rights, as the basis for such values.⁵⁵ We also look for similar attitudes in the affairs and conduct of others, witness the present administration's irritation with Germany over her actions in the EC, role in the ongoing GATT negotiations, revisions to NATO, and positions towards the strife in what was Yugoslavia.

We accord international proponents of self-determination and liberty great stature. Other nations' lifestyles come under scrutiny in our view of other nations' political conduct.⁵⁶ We also revolt against the outrage of conquest on grounds of the immoral and illegal usurpation of the sovereignty of any nation. The coalition efforts to oust Hussein in 1991 were supported by unified Germany

⁵⁵ See Archibald Cox, The Court and the Constitution (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1987), pp. 100, 113.

⁵⁶ M. Krauss, How NATO Weakens The West, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986), p. 58. We rushed to provide popular support for social groups like the Polish Solidarity organization during their confrontation with centralized Communist government controls in the Jaruzelski administration during the late 1970s and early 1980s. Though this grass-roots support was insufficient to motivate a similarly strong U.S. national stance in support of Polish labor over other Cold War interests and objectives of the day, it did continue to vitalize that movement until the fall of the Polish tyranny.

politically in the U.N., financially, and in spirit even though their troops did not participate.

The net effect of these social purposes and values in our foreign policy is to sway U.S. political positions in terms of popular conscience, emotion, or evaluations of what is proper for ourselves and therefore for others around the globe. These influences will continue to impact on U.S. foreign policy towards Germany in cumulative, indirect ways. Particularly with regard to U.S.-German relations, they will be part of the foundation upon which American decisions are made on the primary issues that define our relations with Germany.

IV. Today's and Tomorrow's U.S. Policies towards Germany

A. Concerns and Issues, and Reorganized U.S. Priorities

Changes to existing U.S. policies towards modern Germany will be influenced directly by ongoing global changes and those already complete, and by changes occurring within the U.S.. Policy revisions will also be effected directly by major international events such as the ongoing economic competition problems, or indirectly swayed by social issues like international humanitarian assistance and environmental concerns. However, any revisions of U.S. foreign policy towards Germany must be guided by and continue to promote the enduring security elements of past and present U.S. foreign policies in spite of other direct or indirect influences. The impact of change in the international order, and of new domestic issues or emerging international concerns must follow, not lead, fundamental policy objectives.

To facilitate foreign policy revisions, a re-prioritization must first occur in the policy objectives which the U.S. promotes towards reunified Germany. This re-prioritization should take place under the overarching premise of a U.S.-German partnership in European and world affairs. These revisions should also occur with a view towards decreasing the U.S. security presence in Europe and also account for the possibilities associated with German

leadership on the Continent, a region to which America is inexorably tied.

Any policy change should also be accompanied by recognition of the different directions unified Germany herself may take relative to U.S. interests. This may occur with regard to economic issues, Continental stability and security, and regional and international cooperation. Such was the case in Germany's forward approach towards recognizing the nationhood of Serbia and Croatia, and is also true of the continuing dispute between Europe and America over Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in the current GATT round negotiations, where the U.S. hoped German ties would lead to some effort by the Bonn/Berlin government to counter the French opposition.⁵⁸

The approach taken by U.S. policy-makers in this re-prioritization requires some guiding consideration to account for the uncertainties resulting from various local and international changes, such as those arising from Germany's reunification, and the impact of different policy influences, domestic and external. The strategic premise which will foster a peaceful trans-Atlantic atmosphere and sustains existing ties, and most strongly further American

⁵⁸ "The Gravel in America's Shoe," The Economist, Vol. 322, No. 7744 (1 February 1992): 47.

interests, is to establish our German policies on an equal basis.

This aim should overarch the re-organizing of existing U.S. policy objectives towards Germany, to retain particular security-based objectives for U.S. national safety central to all policies while reordering other objectives and accounting for new influences. Re-prioritized national objectives relative to Germany should account for differences in the present international order, changes in the allocation of U.S. resources, promote the maintenance of and strengthening of existing U.S.-German institutions and facilitate forging new U.S.-German associations over issues of mutual interest. This partnership would stand as a pillar supporting the trans-Atlantic alliance, a much-sought-after U.S. goal in relations with Europe since WW II.

The U.S. should operate with clear deference to Germany's rise as one of the three major powers in the world today. We should promote this reality in our policies towards Germany while aiming to maintain and assert our own power over European events. Policy decisions which forge associations with reunified Germany based on outward recognition of her capabilities and therefore her ability to assume an increased share of responsibility in issues and events of mutual concern make for a more stable European power structure rather than weakening Continental stability.

This policy direction also takes into account the potential growth in capability and power possible through Germany's reunification, and should also facilitate the maintenance of U.S. influence in both German and Continental affairs for the furtherance of American interests. Reorganizing policy objectives in this manner should also account for the existing competitiveness between the U.S. and Germany in the international economy.

Different policy priorities guided by a partnership concept will also allow the U.S. to play a significant role in the new regional power structure now taking shape in Central Europe, the EC, and centered in Germany. America must maintain a channel for expressing our positions and intentions in European affairs, as well as means to influence European nation's actions in economic, political and security affairs. On the Continent or internationally, this objective seems easily attained if our interests are promoted through associations of mutual interest with Germany, without appearing to manage relations from strictly an American perspective.

Europe remains a key element in U.S. international relations, and our influence in the region a necessity for the foreseeable future. Previous relations with the nations comprising Europe, including Germany, were based largely in security considerations of the East-West political-military

struggle. Today, and probably in the future, our relations with European nations seem increasingly centered in economic policies and activity, and less in mutual security concerns. Where economic interests motivate our foreign policy decisions, we must then elevate those concerns to higher priority than was accorded them in previous years under the auspices of security-based relations with Germany, and throughout Europe.

Although possibly a transient situation, present circumstances require America to consider allying ourselves or cooperating with agencies and institutions in Germany which have similar economic objectives while distancing ourselves from competitive European institutions which seek similar market resources or profits. Where economic issues loom large in the present and future international power structure, America should act vigorously to assert herself, not merely survive, in financial and monetary affairs when Germany is also a participant, but with negotiation and cooperation.

Re-prioritizing our policy objectives under a partnership tenet also provides a path to pursue reductions in American military presence on the Continent, necessitated by the end of the bi-polar political and military contest. The decreased, if not eliminated, threat of Communist aggrandizement against Western and Central Europe obviate

the need for a large American military force in Europe to guarantee security against the East. While instability on the Continent continues, as evidenced by recent events in Yugoslavia, and remains a concern for both Europeans and to the U.S., it is a concern which the Europeans themselves essentially must deal with while the U.S. moves to a less active role. U.S. support of democratic political regimes and social institutions akin to our own, such as Germany's Federal republic, and our continued alliance with European nations sharing common interests, should be our primary thrust in revising U.S. policies towards Central Europe.

However, security-related problems continue to occur on the Continent, near Germany specifically, which impact on regional and even international stability. The civil war in Yugoslavia remains a destabilizing element in European affairs and a major hinderance to pan-European concord, a necessary condition for the revitalization of Eastern Europe and the development of democracy and capitalism in the CIS republics.

Though Germany's early move to recognize the nations of Serbia and Croatia may have been an effort to resolve the festering dispute and end the crisis, it also sparked apprehensions in other European nations over Germany's willingness and ability to drive political decisions in the newly empowered EC Parliament. The conflict continues

today, with the EC appearing powerless to halt the bloodshed at worst, or at least disinterested in the costs of possibly intervening and separating the belligerents. The net effect of this conflict on the stability of the Continent as a whole has perhaps been negligible, but leads to questions over the ability of the EC to resolve its own security-related crises, and ultimately to U.S. concerns for the steadiness of her trans-Atlantic partners. While the Yugoslavian crisis took root and ultimately exploded into open warfare, a concurrent military movement within the EC organization was afoot to deal with just such problems, the Western European Union (WEU).

The revitalizing of the WEU, the EC institution formally responsible for overall European security poses uncertainties to both Europeans and Americans. While resting on the EC's perceived need to provide itself a capability to take military action in instances where it deems its interests threatened, the potential for unilateral or independent EC military action, on the Continent or elsewhere, poses a threat of sorts to American interests.

An EC empowered with major military might also means a EC able to act independent of the U.S.. This may become a new catalyst for division of the trans-Atlantic alliance, or at least an impediment to maintaining the security alliance, such as now exists in NATO. A militarized EC also poses a

security concern to the emerging republics of the CIS, and brings into question the reduction of the very capable military forces created by the former Soviet Union.

Finally, an EC with a potential military power like that possible in the WEU faces a still undetermined course regarding nuclear armament. Germany must yet wrestle with the question posed by nuclear capable states to her East and West, and whether to stay the non-nuclear course she has maintained thus far, or yield to sizeable pressures to also empower herself with weapons of mass destruction in an attempt to balance the military power equation across Europe.

A shift in our positions towards Europe like outlined here in no way suggests a U.S. retreat from a leadership position in international affairs, or specifically Central Europe. Rather, it signals a move to elevate politico-economic interests and objectives to a higher priority in the scheme of our foreign policies towards Germany, and to the objective of attaining a partnership with reunited Germany is the essence of that scheme for mutual benefit. It also suggests we alter our efforts and our resource allocations relative to Germany to deal with pressing problems at home while maintaining our influence in Central Europe through another policy focus.

As U.S. domestic issues, such as resolving the current economic crisis, demand greater efforts and resources and since global security demands have decreased, our policy objectives seeking to affect European affairs may be more indirect in some issues seeking cooperation with Germany. This avenue of policy influence should also allow the U.S. to continue to support American interests where they are at stake on the Continent while showing U.S. restraint from being overbearing in the evolution of and conduct of the EC. A partnership approach with Germany is conducive to security and stability in Central Europe and all the more important in light of recent events in Germany such as the increase in political power of German Rightist parties, the ongoing public-sector pay strike, and the fall of several key German cabinet officials.⁵⁹

A partnership oriented policy towards Germany with reordered security and economic priorities also provides the foundation to deal with potential social and political problems underlying German power and leadership in the EC.⁶⁰ Currently, internal and regional problems consume

⁵⁹ "The New German Question", The Economist Vol. 323, No. 7757 (2 May 1992): 15, 57.

⁶⁰ Many commentators now envision problems in Europe's unity resting in the political and economic troubles reunified Germany is experiencing, in advancing herself despite the drawbacks of a more complicated Federation, a sluggish economy under the burden of East German absorption,

the lion's share of Germany's diplomatic efforts, from the economic burdens of reunification to the uncertain political and economic course of the EC, to the increasing requirements of revitalizing Eastern Europe and the as yet unrealized burdens of renovating the nations of the CIS. As much as each taxes Germany, they also provide other possibilities for increase in Germany's power. Beyond the many obvious demands on Germany's political and social fabric are the less-visible problems associated with German culture.

Fears of Germany's persistent ambitions towards European domination linger behind recent domestic political changes such as the increased popular support of right-wing political parties like the German Peoples Union, or the resurfacing of German nationalism in her treatment of the Eastern European immigrant and refugee problems. The economic leverage which Germany exerts over the EC financially is both a stabilizing and threatening factor, as typified in the recent move of Germany's banks to raise interest rates while other European nations hoped for

a weakened political fabric and social unrest. See "A New Era for Germany," The Economist Vol. 323, No. 7577 (2 May 1992): 57; "Germany's Struggle to keep Federalism on the Road," The Economist Vol. 323, No. 7756 (25 April 1992): 55; or, "Queasy Germany, Queasy Allies," Washington Post, 7 April 1992, p. A27.

Continued relief but were forced to accommodate German economic initiatives.⁶¹

While political nightmares and domestic economic woes nip at Berlin's heels today, they could also be the initial fissures in the foundation of an EC under Germany leadership from which even another Yugoslavia could emerge. Coupled with less-than-congenial cultural traits like latent nationalism or fervent ethnocentrism, Germany reunified portends almost as many problematic possibilities as she does positive ones. Still the U.S. can take no other course but a optimistic one in supporting Germany's interests when they coincide with our own, and pursuing policies to influence Central European affairs in our own interests when they conflict.

B. Nation-State System Influences

Among the many circumstances resulting from the ongoing changes in the international system and the order of nation-states, the most important views being altered are those towards security of the participants in that system. There is at present the restructuring of old and construction of

⁶¹ Western Europeans rely on Germany's BundesBank as the "anchor of the European Exchange rate-mechanism (ERM)" making Germany's economic leverage all the greater. See "The New German Question," The Economist Vol. 323, No. 7757 (2 May 1992): 15.

new security institutions affecting both the U.S. and Germany.

Recent events related to these changes in the international system reveal some issues which impact or are now influential on our policy towards Germany. Cold War premises of arms control and reduction, over which the U.S. and Germany have a checkered but mostly concurrent policy record, is viewed by some as the most important aspect of the post-Cold War world. This foreign policy security focus is centered about the means of destruction and nature of nuclear weapons where "...self-preservation, for the first time in history, depends less on war than on peace."⁶² Emphasis on arms has carried over from the Cold War into the present, where daily the U.S., Germany and other nations confront arms proliferation, nuclear weapons control and reduction situations.⁶³

⁶² The United States and Civilization, Ibid., p. 320.

⁶³ See Richard Ullman, Securing Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), pp. 106, 166n28. Current events highlight this foreign policy influence, such as the present dispute with Iraq over destruction of her means of producing nuclear weapons or the issue of Germany's potential acquisition of a nuclear weapons in her ongoing reunification militarization. In evaluating the potential for and consequences of a modern Germany rearming with nuclear weapons, Ullman describes the possibility as "...a failure of (American and Western nation) hope...troubling in many ways." Germany has already dealt with this issue publicly, refuting the possibility as Chancellor Kohl did during his July 1990 summit with then Soviet President Gorbachev, when he forswore Germany against the production,

The Central European region, and specifically Germany, are accorded greater stature in U.S. security relations with Continental nations. This immediately calls attention to the evolution of the EC security regime. Given the many concerns we have regarding Germany's past and present capabilities and her cultural anomalies, the U.S. should weigh each to determining our present and future positions relative to German positions on security. One important development is the EC's formation of a new European security pact. Fostered by the EC owing to the changes occurring across the Continent, especially those affecting existing security institutions like NATO, this carries both promise and reason for caution in revising U.S.-German policies.

Pan-European security has been assigned by the EC to the WEU. This revitalized European security institution both parallels and contrasts other security associations like NATO. Based on European security interests rather than Euro-American security, a new regional military power heralded by the WEU results in renewed fears. These apprehensions center less on the idea that Eastern forces might sweep across the heart of the Continent through

possession and command of any nuclear weapons, and more recently reiterated in Kohl's official response to the possibility. See "Germany-No Nukes," Associated Press, 16 March 1992.

Western Germany and Central Europe, and more on external influence.⁶⁴

The changing world presents different security situations with equally different perceptions and solutions on both sides of the Atlantic, as evidenced by EC justifications for reactivation of the WEU. Originally chartered as a watchdog against German post-WW II rearmament, Europe claims the necessity to reestablish a Continental security capability through the WEU to enable the EC to take unilateral action when it deems necessary.⁶⁵ This move is couched in terms of the EC being able to respond with force when existing or other security institutions are unable or unwilling.⁶⁶ However:

⁶⁴ Some Western analysts contend that there was precedent for NATO expecting a massive strike from Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces in the event the East felt threatened by economic disparity between West and East, bringing tensions to a height from which the East's politicians could claim a move into Western Europe to re-stabilize the region. See P. H. Vigor, Soviet Blitzkrieg Theory (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), pp. 2, 185, 192-194, 202. Also see supporting arguments such as H. F. Scott, The Armed Forces of the USSR (Boulder: Westview Press, 1979), p. 227. The rationale may still remain a possibility if Eastern European recovery and CIS republic transition to Western ways fails.

⁶⁵ How NATO Weakens the West, Ibid., p. 123.

⁶⁶ Address by Dr. F. Van Eekelen, Secretary General, Western European Union to the World Affairs Council of Washington, DC. on 23 March 1992. In this recent presentation, Dr. Van Eekelen outlined the objectives of the WEU and its guiding principle, asserting that a decreased priority for collective defense in U.S.-European relations exists, and a "...convergence of European views on political

premise of the revitalized WEU also heralds some questionable possibilities, such as independent EC military activity which may impact U.S. interests. One dubious characterization is the threat to U.S. international stature attributable to the mere existence of an independent regional security and military capability in Europe, a power element outside U.S. control. Formed by and comprised of multi-national European forces, one component of which would be the recently consolidated Franco-German Brigade, along with contributions of all EC members, this WEU military arm of the EC could be an equivalent to the U.S. military in size and abilities. Given the existing forces of EC nations and those possible in addition if they were to militarize, this capability may be viewed as a destabilizing measure.

Actions by this force could pose new challenges to American interests. When such interests were resonant with EC interests, a struggle might ensue, reminiscent of traditional power relations.

One foreboding aspect of this newly potent European security institution to U.S. interests is the potential the

and economic cooperation and of social, environmental and energy dimensions {has occurred} resulting in a wider view of the use of force where necessary." He described roles for a WEU force might include the potential application of military forces in "active foreign policy measures, in humanitarian assistance situations, in peace-keeping roles or in crisis-management missions," where it is necessary to enforce an ordered Peace or support efforts outside Europe.

WEU will have to act independently, including the application of force in global situations, outside the auspices of the existing trans-Atlantic security regime.⁶⁷ This potency should concern U.S. policy makers, lending credence to the potential formation of a European regional power bloc, with a military capability, which could replace the bi-polar geo-political contest of the Cold War.

The U.S. is without doubt today's major international military power, but in past crises has usually employed forces in concert with global, and specifically European, allies in instances where the interests at risk or objectives were other than just our own. Another major global power, like a European regional power, should strike a defensive chord in our development of policies towards nations like Germany. Were unified Germany to determine the course of the WEU, by political leverage or economic clout, the differences between U.S. and European (German) objectives might foment opposing geo-political positions on particular issues and perhaps be catalytic to a significant foreign policy conflict between the U.S. and Europe.

⁶⁷ Ibid. Dr. Van Eekelen described one possible mission for the empowered WEU as "the application of forces to a crisis in Eastern Europe," where the forces could mitigate or dispel a dispute to ensure minorities could remain in present locations rather than becoming refugees to Western European industrialized nations.

Much as in confrontations which characterized power-based relations between states in earlier Continental struggles, a regional power bloc rivalry evolving between Europe and America may be fraught with possible conflicts. This situation could involve the U.S. in Europe's crises as we attempt to turn over the helm of Continental security to the Europeans, with Germany's strong leadership.

These speculations lend some pessimistic overtones to the WEU, while the overall positive possibilities of Europe's consolidation through the EC allow European unity to hold its ground. With the support of the U.S. through our pursuit of partnership with Europe's leaders, especially Germany, an optimistic view may be taken.⁶⁸ The WEU may in fact facilitate the achievement of two long-term U.S. security goals relative to the European region, that of getting France more involved in NATO planning and activity, and securing Germany's support in multi-national security operations outside Europe.

The U.S. recently criticized Germany's failure to play a more active role in the recent Gulf war. Interestingly

⁶⁸ Hoagland, Jim. "The Case for European Self-Defense," Washington Post, 19 March 1992, p. A27. Hoagland provides a positive interpretation of the recent Franco-German agreement over the shape and missions of their new joint force, noting the institutions security framework looks beyond the Cold War. The question of this development relative to our discussion is what is Europe looking at when they peer beyond the Cold War?

enough, it is the German Constitution, or its "Basic Law", carried over from earlier Weimar Republic legal and political principles, which prohibited German troop deployments to the mid-east while her allies did so.⁶⁹

The inclusion of the Franco-German Brigade in the WEU, which has been described as the "European pillar of NATO" by its leadership, should allay American fears over EC regional power or WEU military activity opposing U.S. interests.

C. Future U.S. Policies - Possibilities and Uncertainties

Germany also has certain objectives which she is pursuing relative to Central Europe, the U.S., and the rest of the world. Observation of past and present German activities reveals that, like the U.S., unified Germany's future seems dependant on global stability. International peace and security facilitated German post-war economic recovery, domestic growth and international prominence and ultimately Germany's ascendance to a position of international economic power. The European Continent has known stability for most of the past forty-five years, with only minor deviations, and none which greatly deterred German social or economic growth and advancement.

Modern Germany's acquired power has also given her geopolitical clout, which she has wielded in her own interest

⁶⁹ Dr. Henri J. Warmenhoven, Western Europe, 2nd ed. (Guilford: Dushkin Publishing Group, Inc., 1991), p. 31.

independently, and in concert with other Western States. Today, Germany uses that leverage to influence domestic and external Continental events, towards those ends which sometimes are more in her own interest than Europe's or our own. For example, reunited Germany has heavily influenced the culmination and final structure of the EC, and coalescence of the EC's common monetary system. Germany has forwarded her own beliefs about how European affairs should be conducted, such as promoting the use of the German language in the diplomatic affairs in the EC instead of solely English, and moving to recognize the nationhood of the two belligerents of the Yugoslavian civil war ahead of her European allies and friends, including the U.S..

Germany has also moved forward independently in other security-related aspects of international affairs, sometimes affecting the entire Continent. In Germany's early positions against the positioning of nuclear weapons on her soil, or her call for increased European nations' input in Continental security decisions of NATO, Germany is assertive for herself foremost and then for the region. Recently, her strong advocacy for increased European control over Continental security activities during deliberations by the Atlantic Alliance over revisions to NATO's strategy was disconcerting for U.S. diplomacy, and brought into question our own leadership role.

The most startling security-related initiative, to the U.S. and to other industrialized nations in and outside Europe, was perhaps the coordinated formation of the Franco-German Brigade. Germany created with France this combined army land unit, providing for joint control, which nullifies some fears of a major force under German direction. However, while this endeavor did move towards achieving long-standing U.S. desires to involve the forces of France to a greater extent in the security affairs of the Continent, it also reflects the willingness of Germany to act independently of the U.S. or other members of the Atlantic alliance.

This will has both good and bad connotations. It portends the possibility and capability of Germany to seize the initiative and directly influence the nature of the Continent's security positions. It is also ominous in its implications for Europe's stability, and therefore the safety of American interests, in that Germany's move in forming this large land force, even if in concert with France and under joint control, implies German willingness to further militarize in support of her own interests. It may also imply an increased German intent of maintaining a standing military force as an instrument of influence for trans-Continental and international applications. German armed forces are not new, for West Germany maintained

standing land, air and naval forces as part of the overall Western effort to deter Eastern aggression. However, those German forces were, in a sense "hamstrung", in that they were specifically under NATO's control, and not a potential facilitator of national objectives wielded by a reunified Germany.

One might also infer from this military venture that Germany realizes the necessity for and possibly her responsibility as a powerful nation, to act with force in those situations which might threaten global stability and Western or European interests. An independent, enhanced German military capability is requisite to Germany's ability to contribute to efforts to influence pan-European, and global events, which she previously had been unable to do. This should help relieve the U.S. of carrying the larger military burden in crises or future peace-making efforts, thereby contributing to meeting our own aim for increased defense burden-sharing on the part of European nations, especially Germany.

Another security aspect related to Germany's maintenance of military forces, is the challenge facing Germany in the economic renovation of East Germany, and united Germany's role in supporting the revitalization of Eastern Europe and of the republics of the CIS. The costs of economically restructuring, and socially and culturally

assimilating the five new states of Germany's Republic is larger than any previous domestic social or economic problem Western Germany has encountered during her post-war recovery and growth.⁷⁰ These burdens are magnified by the costs of supporting the stalled recovery of Eastern Europe, where economic backwardness and social lethargy plague transition to more Western economic and political models. Despite their moves to shake off the trappings of centralized government and command economies for democratic politics and capitalistic economies, Eastern Europe's pace of change is slow and places additional stress and strains on Germany.

The magnitude of social, political and economic effort required of Eastern Europeans to change is in many ways greater than that Germany is expending in revitalizing her eastern half. Throughout this past winter this has fostered discontent brought about by declining living standards. Popular aspirations for improvement in those States make Eastern Europe, and neighboring Central Europe, ripe for social upheaval and territorial disputes. As different peoples in the East observe the continued economic vitality in Western industrialized Europe, the persistent inability of their fledgling democratic governments to turn around years of unequal wealth and resources distribution may force

⁷⁰ "Kohl's Debterdammerung," The Economist, Vol. 323, No. 7753 (4 April 1992): 57, 58.

even larger segments of Eastern European populations into flight to the West for better opportunities and living conditions.

The human influx has already caused dissent in Western industrialized European nations, those struggling to cope with both the influx of refugees and immigrants, and at the same time assist in economic recovery of their Eastern neighbors. Meanwhile, industrialized European nations, especially Germany, are striving to maintain stable national economies with continued economic growth during a period of regional economic transition and attendant crises. Today, the "Eastern European Question" looms large in the policy debates of Germany as an issue of major social and economic importance, and one with trans-European stability and security implications.

D. Future U.S. Policies

The interests which America promotes through our foreign policies towards Germany today, are in many ways the same as those of past generations, especially our objectives relative to Central Europe. America values our European heritage in the arts and sciences, our common political and social institutions, and our common standards and principles, characteristics born of European ways of life. Segments of our population maintain close contacts across the Atlantic, and tourism here and abroad, trade and

commerce, and exchange programs in education, medicine, business, and the sciences facilitate cultural cross-pollination and trans-Atlantic ties. Each links aspects of America with those of Europe's various nations, and foment mutual interests at both the community and national levels. This is true of issues and concerns grown to national importance in the U.S., and in Germany. These mutual interests continue to influence both U.S. and German foreign policies, though less directly than objectives of national safety and economic vitality, which have been considered security interests in the past and at present.

However, our interests relative to Europe are less driven by Cold War security requirements, and are more attuned to and shaped by the necessities of present circumstances and uncertainties of change affecting each nation. The increasing dominance of political and economic activity and the continued reliance of various nations on the instruments of war to influence other States, complicate revisions of our policy towards Germany. The rise in number and importance of non-security influences like global environmental preservation, poverty reduction, disease prevention and improving education opportunities, increase the complexity of revising all of our foreign policies.

Today our political and economic relations with Germany have greater stature than before when they were secondary to

issues related to containing Communism. Economic positions and means are more influential in the day-to-day measure of global prestige, power and influence. This makes U.S. national economic growth and prosperity the primary objectives relative to our ability to not only survive but to compete effectively with Germany, and other economic powers. Therefore, national economic prosperity is a national security concern, and must be treated as such in objectives we pursue in our policies towards reunified Germany. When push comes to shove, this nation must consider economic success factors such as reducing national debt, and increasing national productivity, domestic growth, and international economic capability integral to our survival as a nation. We need to pursue domestic economic vitality with renewed importance in the present, and forward this objective in our revised policies towards Germany.

This suggests addressing major national economic issues as primary U.S. foreign policy objectives. This view is not new. Economic objectives have consistently been part of our strategy and policies, including those towards Germany. Rather, pursuing partnership with modern Germany while promoting policies which favor our economic interests have seemingly been separate from political and military security requirements in past policies.

When considering the increased economic power potential of united Germany once the entire nation is transformed into a productive and capable State on the order of the accomplishments West Germany has been able to achieve alone in the past, this economic policy imperative is even more important. Today U.S. national security, more than ever before, rests on our economic capability and should be promoted through not only specific economic policies in trade and international finance regimes like GATT or the G-7, but in all our foreign policies with reunified Germany.

European stability is also important in furthering U.S. interests and objectives, not only because it facilitates progress in international economic ventures of both the U.S. and other European nations, but also because other facets of our trans-Atlantic relations depend on the equilibrium of the Continent. European stability is and has been a security concern for America, and a U.S. foreign policy priority for much of our recent past, and it should still be considered of the highest priority today. Continental equilibrium facilitates the survival and advancement of societies much the same as our own.

Through European stability, common U.S. and European social values and principles are advanced in other lands, like the promotion of human rights, personal liberty and freedom, political self-determination, and promotion of the

peaceful resolution of conflicts over the use of force. These are social and political principals which we and Germany pursue in our own activities. European stability is also the guarantor of the survival of our historic social and cultural legacies, and many of our political institutions. Pan-European stability is important in our society's perceptions of the world, and is an objective of our policy towards Germany both past, present and future, perhaps third in priority behind the safety of our population, protection of our sovereignty, and achievement of national economic prosperity.

Central European stability is the key to Continental equilibrium, and to security for most of the nations of the Eurasian landmass. Germany is the pivot of Central European stability. Revisions to our positions towards Germany must account for not only our own and Germany's immediate and indirect concerns, but also provide for the promotion of Continental stability.

These interpretations and perceptions about our foreign policy choices, and the identification and evaluation of influences on our policy towards Germany, lead to several necessary revisions to existing U.S. positions. The prescriptions detailed herein are more than conjecture based on idealistic views of U.S. desires for influence over Continental affairs, or slanted interpretations of existing

realities in relations with Germany. Rather, these revisions account for the needs of our nation in a changing global system, by shifting previously misplacing emphasis on economic concerns to the forefront as policy objectives, while also promoting the stability of Germany and Europe as a whole, and still not losing sight of U.S. security needs. These prescriptions account for the current absence of a major external security threat to the U.S., and threats to U.S. interests possible in a German-led Europe.

The U.S. must maintain its influence in European affairs in spite of the changes throughout Europe and especially in Germany, as we attempt to disengage militarily from the Continent. A partnership with Germany facilitates continued U.S. leverage over German positions and also pan-European activity affecting our interests while we withdraw. In attempting to resolve our domestic economic problems, we can not lose sight of the importance of European stability and the crucial role of Germany in Europe. Fostering and supporting a co-equal partnership with Germany today and in the future will facilitate maintaining U.S. influence over Continental affairs, and provide an avenue to mitigate any harmful possibilities which Germany herself could foster before they become unmanageable.

The stability of Central Europe in particular with reunited Germany at its heart, is important also in that

peace on the Continent enables the increasingly important social, economic and political transformation of the Eastern Europe nations to Western ways, and encourages the initiation and maintenance of democratic institutions and capitalist economies in the emerging nations further East. Each of these is a security requirement as well, for failure of any of the new democratic governments or economies could lead to regional instability and crisis which could spread into Western Europe. In the pursuit of these objectives and an environment conducive to their fruition, America and Germany must work hand-in-hand to achieve both shared aims and to attain our own individual interests.

Germany's reunion poses special challenges to the U.S., given her historic tendencies towards hegemony in Europe, and social anomalies like ethnocentrism and nationalism. Revision to U.S. foreign policy towards Germany also account for these security needs. The end of the Cold War has altered the focus of our policy towards Germany as well as her own grand transformation. A different global system is forming, and trans-Atlantic security is no longer rooted in defending Europe and halting Communism. These necessitate a policy revision for U.S.-German cooperation and responsibility sharing today and tomorrow, to manage the complex problems each nation faces at home and external to our respective borders.

Bibliography

Anderson, Annelise, and Bark, Dennis L., eds. Thinking About America. Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1988.

Bennett, William J. The Devaluing of America: The Fight for our Culture and Our Children. New York: Summit Books, 1992.

Cox, Archibald. The Court and the Constitution. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1987.

Destler, I.M.; Gelb, Leslie H.; and Lake, Anthony. Our Own Worst Enemy: The Unmaking of American Foreign Policy. New York: Simon & Schuster, Inc., 1984.

Ellison, Herbert J. Soviet Policy Towards Western Europe: Implications for the Atlantic Alliance. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1983.

Gatzke, Hans W. Germany and the United States: A Special Relationship? Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980.

Green, Peter; Knight, Robin; and Pope, Victoria. "Europe's New Flags." U.S. News and World Report Vol. 112, No. 7 (24 February 1992): 44-50.

Hogan, Michael J. The Marshall Plan. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1987.

Kennedy, Paul. The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. New York: Random House, 1987.

Krauss, Melvyn. How NATO Weakens The West. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986.

- Mayers, David. George Kennan and the Dilemmas of U.S. Foreign Policy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988.
- McArdle-Kelleher, Catherine. "The New Germany: Unification One Year On." The Brookings Review (Winter 1992): 18-25.
- Nef, John U. The United States and Civilization. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967.
- Nitze, Paul. From Hiroshima to Glasnost. New York: Grove Weidenfield, 1989.
- Office of the President. National Security Strategy of the United States. Washington, D.C.: The White House, 1991.
- Phillips, Kevin. The Politics of Rich and Poor: Wealth and the American Electorate in the Reagan Aftermath. New York: Random House, 1990.
- Trehwitt, Henry. "The Question at Europe's Heart." U.S. News and World Report Vol. III, No. 24 (9 December 1991): 50-55.
- Ullman, Richard H. Securing Europe. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991.
- Warmenhoven, Henri J. Western Europe. 2nd ed. Guilford: Dushkin Publishing Group, 1991.