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PROLIFERATION AS A FRAMEWORK FOR ADAPTIVE PLANNING

by

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A paper submitted to the faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Operations Department.

This paper reflects my personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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ABSTRACT

Throughout the forty years of the cold war, the military proficiently demonstrated planning, exercising, and employing against weapons of mass destruction -- specifically nuclear weapons. However, this planning has never targeted the spread of those weapons.

This paper examines the high priority the National Command Authorities place on proliferation but explains how the military failed to plan operations countering the spread of weapons of mass destruction. The four stages of proliferation (supply, demand, indigenous, threatening) provide a framework for using the adaptive planning concept and identifying proactive military objectives.

The existence of nuclear technology, command and control of the weapons of mass destruction, associated moral issues, or the value of assured deterrence between two nuclear weapon states are not addressed.

Weapons of mass destruction are the example used to examine the stages of proliferation. Once planning for proliferation of weapons of mass destruction has been proven effective, this framework can be applied to other types of proliferants such as narcotic trafficking and transfer of conventional/high technology arms.

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INTRODUCTION

A world with three or four major, global military powers would confront American strategic planners with a far more complicated environment than does the familiar bipolar competition with the (former) Soviet Union. In any such multipolar world, the United States would have to manage relations with several different global powers and form appropriate coalitions with them. Wars might break out between powerful nations not aligned with the United States. Alliances might shift. The next twenty years will be a period of transition to this new world of several major powers.¹

As the remaining super power, the United States (US) must manage the safe arrival of the equilibrium of power in the international environment through appropriate relations and coalitions. Through these relations the US has the opportunity to influence international policy on weapons of mass destruction (WMD) for the first time since the use of nuclear weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Certainly work continues in political and diplomatic avenues to encourage reduced nuclear arsenals, a chemical weapons ban, elimination of nuclear weapon testing and continued support of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The military now has an opportunity to plan and employ its influence proactively to combat proliferation within the realm of peacetime contingency.

Traditional deterrence, in the broadest sense of the term, attempts to contain WMD and their proliferation using the threat of massive US military retaliation -- be it conventional or nuclear. Yet, Iraq used chemical weapons

against the Iranian civilian population in the mid 1980s and neither US deterrent capability nor the international community discouraged or condemned the use of those chemical weapons. Deterrence apparently does not affect the possibility that early into the next century 40 or more countries around the globe will have the technical capability to build nuclear arsenals.²

Historically, deterrence served as a military strategy in support of the policy of containment. The threat of mutual destruction between the two superpowers created a balance of power but did not prevent proliferation of WMD to third world countries. In recent years, political and diplomatic gains in controlling the level of WMD between the two superpowers resulted in several treaties and agreements restricting numbers and kinds of weapons. US and Soviet agreements point toward considerable reductions in the total global arsenals, although the breakup of the Soviet Union has complicated the process and could delay it indefinitely. Proliferation still is the root threat, now coming of age with the struggle to attain super power status. The international community defines super power status by owning WMD assets.³

The US has the opportunity to redefine what constitutes a world super power by de-emphasizing WMD and concentrating on the prevention of WMD proliferation. That involves refocusing the military national element of power from the traditionally exclusive usage of the military after other elements fail to a

multilateral application of all the elements of national power.

In a February 1992 speech, (former) U.S. Representative Les Aspin referred to proliferation as "the chief security threat we face in the post-Soviet era." He continues by stating the US needs to develop a package of responses to nuclear threats, because traditional deterrence may not work against potential users who are not rational or hope to escape retaliation by concealing their identity.⁴ Secretary of Defense Aspin's recent strong stance on the subject could indicate he expects the unified and specified Commanders in Chief (CINCs) to develop just such a package of responses to nuclear threats and proliferation of WMD. In an attempt to begin such a planning process the relatively new adaptive planning concept provides a guide within which the deliberate planning process produces operational plans useful to decision makers in times of crisis.⁵ I suggest throughout the forty years of the cold war the military has become proficient at planning, exercising, and employing a strategy to counter nuclear threat. However, the military has never actually targeted the root of the problem -- the spread of WMD. We have never had adequate plans to counter proliferation of WMD. In an article for the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists science fiction writer Arthur C. Clarke quotes a 1986 speech by Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi (underline added):

"Forty years ago, Dr. Clarke said that the only defense against the weapons of the future is to prevent them from being used. Perhaps we could add to that. We should prevent them being built. . .It's time that we all heed this warning. . .I just hope people in other world capitals are listening."⁶

As Prime Minister Gandhi points out, we have never really put the same effort into preventing the proliferation of WMD as we have in preparing for retaliation against the use of WMD.

I suggest an examination of the components of proliferation will provide a planning framework within the guidelines of adaptive planning to allow a proactive military involvement in the countering of proliferation. Chapter 1 will discuss proliferation. Chapter 2 will review the adaptive planning concept and the flexible deterrent options (FDOs). Chapter 3 reveals the framework to use FDO to counter proliferation. Finally, the conclusion suggests this framework is suitable to other less threatening forms of proliferation such as narcotics.

CHAPTER 1

PROLIFERATION

Webster describes proliferation as to grow or reproduce rapidly by cell division, budding, etc; to multiply fast, grow by multiplying; to cause to increase greatly in number. Proliferation in its most threatening and destructive form is most commonly associated with Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). The threat seems to have increased as the official number of Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) of five (with four others recognized as nuclear capable) is expected to increase into the double digits in the near future. This multiplication of nuclear capable countries points to the increasingly threatening problem of proliferation.

In the broad sense, deterrence counters proliferation of WMD only through the threat of US retaliation. The massive destructive capabilities of WMD (principally nuclear weapons) lends deadly weight to the threat posed by proliferation. Since the late sixties, the world has recognized the inadequacy of depending on deterrence alone to stop any nation or leader from obtaining, using and/or threatening the use of WMD. The 1968 negotiations of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) began the process to halt proliferation. However the increase of possible NWS by the turn of the century testifies to the inadequacy of the treaties.

Saddam Hussein disregarded the fact that Iraq is a signatory of the 1968 NPT and covertly obtained the technology

and materials to produce nuclear weapons. While continuing political and diplomatic means to obtain mutual consensus on halting proliferation of WMD, the US must prepare regional action plans addressing the root components of proliferation.

In describing proliferation, one must first assume four basic premises to use as parameters. First, the technology exists and it cannot be undone. Disavowing the technology is like an ostrich with its head in the sand, it does not fix the problem of WMD or the proliferation of WMD.

Second, the control of WMD was impossible after the demonstration of the destructive power of the explosions at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The destructive power of the weapon represented a tool to gain hegemony within a region or the world: a desirable tool for ensuring national security and elevating international status. Once a country within a region begins the acquisition of WMD, other regional nations feel compelled to obtain similar capabilities to maintain the regional balance of power. The cycle of proliferation becomes self-propelling. Command and control of WMD is internal to each country and is not transparent to the world. Even if a country professes absolute control over their WMD, no other nation can assume that control to be absolute. We cannot assume rational leadership or military subservience within a country possibly jeopardizing secure command and control of WMD. In the bipolar world of equal WMD arsenals between the US and the former Soviet Union, hard won confidence in command

and control of WMD was developed and solidified after the Cuban crisis of the 1960s. A similar positive outcome cannot be guaranteed in the future multipolar world.

Third, it is not the purpose of this paper to argue the moral issues of the existence of WMD. Lastly, the escalating threat of third world proliferation can no longer be countered by mutual assured destruction between two superpowers. The belief that the two superpowers would have come to the aid of any country threatened by WMD is no longer valid with the demise of the former Soviet Union. The international community associates ownership of WMD with super power status. This definition probably cannot be changed in time to prevent the profuse proliferation of WMD. This is especially true if the United States does not demonstrate a reduced arsenal, destruction of WMD, continued demonstration of no intention of ever using the weapons, and a proactive stance against proliferation. Even with those assurances, a nation challenging the US will seek a equal level of WMD capability. Can we then afford not to try to halt the process of proliferation beginning at its earliest stages?

Proliferation is driven by demand and/or a surplus of supply. Demand stimulates supply inducing economic benefits for the supply country. Eventually, the demand country may acquire an indigenous capability to produce the commodity. The new WMD capability provides another card to deal in the international political arena. Once the domestic requirement

is met, surplus can be stockpiled or sold to an emerging demand country. Thus, the cycle continues.

For purposes of analysis, it is useful to establish four categories of countries representing different states in the proliferation process: supply, demand, indigenous, and threatening. Supplier countries are motivated principally through economics, although ideology could play a role. A supplier country provides technology and/or materials to a demand country. Indigenous capable countries are those that have obtained all the components and capabilities necessary to produce WMD. These countries have the potential to become supply countries, as well as to continue to develop the weapons and eventually use them as a reinforcer of national power. This category has the highest risk for escalation into an emerging NWS and a threat to the US.

The fourth category is a country's capability to field WMD: in other words a threat. Threatening countries are able to produce or have produced WMD and now are applying that capability to their political or diplomatic aims. This is the category of proliferant military planners have traditionally addressed in plans. In fact, the military planners have exclusively focused on this last stage of proliferation, excluding the earlier stages. Military response is limited to the high end of the spectrum of conflict excluding the earlier stages of proliferation.

The spectrum of conflict is currently labeled as an operational continuum. It is intended to assist in the articulation of the strategic situations within a theater. CINCs use this as a basis to define needs, devise strategies and project resource requirements. This operational continuum defines the theater strategic environment where military forces can be employed in three possible states: peacetime competition, conflict, and war. There is no precise distinction where a particular state ends and another begins.⁷

If the cycle of proliferation is continuous with no end in sight how can military planners interrupt this cycle? The Cold War concept of deterrence has been the answer to the proliferation of WMD yet it addresses only the far right end of the operational continuum -- war. A warfighting CINC has at least one or two supply, demand, indigenous, or threatening countries within the area of responsibility. Plans can be developed using the adaptive planning component of flexible deterrent options (FDO) to affect the cycle of proliferation. Since proliferation has a high priority in the strategic guidance given to the CINCs, it only seems appropriate to target the perpetual cycle of proliferation.

The 1993 National Security Strategy states that the proliferation of WMD is the most serious threat to the national security of the US. The US non-proliferation policy is guided by four principles:

- 1) Build on existing global norms against proliferation and, where possible, strengthen and broaden them.
- 2) Focus special efforts on those areas where the dangers of proliferation remain acute, notably the Middle East, Southwest Asia, South Asia and the Korean Peninsula.
- 3) Seek the broadest possible multilateral support, while reserving the capability for unilateral action,
- 4) Address the underlying security concerns that motivate the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction, relying on the entire range of political, diplomatic, economic, intelligence, military, security assistance, and other available tools.⁸

The first and third principles encourage continued diplomatic and political focus on treaties, international law, and agreements. The second principle dictates to the CINCs specific regions needing plans on the shelf ready for immediate response. I suggest these "hot spots" be the first to receive proactive military support to prevent further proliferation and to reduce current inventories and/or development of WMD to include the supply and demand cycle. Additionally, the former Soviet Union should not be discounted. At this point the inventories of WMD remain on several republics soil. The instability of the Commonwealth of Independent States threatens the command and control of the nuclear weapons.⁹ Economic troubles make the sale of WMD components an attractive option.

The fourth principle encompasses the central focus of this paper. Underlying security concerns (and/or desires for regional hegemony) drive the demand for WMD. The CINCs should target not only the security assistance to nations preventing

them from wanting WMD but should target those countries supplying components of WMD, having the indigenous capability to produce WMD, and threatening the use of WMD against perceived enemies internally and externally.

Supporting the National Security Strategy, the 1992 National Military Strategy of the United States lists the proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons combined with the means of delivering them as heading the list of significant forces impacting the national security environment.¹⁰

Both the national and military strategies recognize the important role proliferation has in defining the international strategic environment. However, this recognition does not extend into service doctrine or joint publications. The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) draft publication 3-12, Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations, provides guidelines for the employment of forces in nuclear operations. The focus remains on countering the weapons and not the proliferation of weapons.

Should deterrence fail, forces should be structured, deployed, and ready to provide a variety of options designed to control escalation and terminate the conflict on favorable terms. These forces must provide capabilities across the entire spectrum of military challenges to national security -- from global war to low intensity conflict.¹¹

This statement uses deterrence in the broad sense of maintaining our WMD arsenal to deter an enemy from using theirs. It should include the interruption of the

proliferation cycle as an additional objective for the structuring and deploying of forces.

So far the discussion on proliferation argues deterrence has not prevented the spread of WMD. Attempts to control proliferation remain in the political and diplomatic realm and have not been successful in stemming the spread of WMD. The future strategic environment is evolving into a multipolar world where superpower status might be shared among several nations. Yet, superpower status is still defined with arsenals of WMD. Our efforts to stem the proliferation of WMD require the coordinated application of all of our elements of national power to interrupt the proliferation and redefine the super power status. How can the proliferation stages of supply, demand, indigenous capability, and threatening capabilities apply to the CINCs adaptive planning process?

CHAPTER 2

ADAPTIVE PLANNING PROCESS

Adaptive planning is a concept for contingency planning in the context of the post-cold-war world... without a single, well-understood, primary foe with global aspirations and capabilities to plan against, the world is a less predictable place.¹²

The adaptive planning concept is designed for flexible contingency planning within an evolving strategic environment. It provides a menu of options with multi-apportioned forces to apply all national elements of power to a given situation. Adaptive planning categorizes those situations as major regional contingencies (MRCs) or lessor regional contingencies (LRCs). While the MRCs are addressed by traditional military operations the LRCs include operations short of war. It is within this portion of the spectrum of conflict that a proactive US national stance against proliferation will fall.

Adaptive planning has three menus of options which key decision makers may use in response to a situation. They are flexible deterrent options (FDOs), deploy-to-fight options, and counterattack options. Flexible deterrent options, used primarily in LRCs, are designed to avoid a situation from escalating into a conflict. Deploy-to-fight and counterattack options represent the traditional use of the military and provide definable threats for planning. Deploy-to-fight response is implemented when a crisis or imminent conflict is identified. Operation URGENT FURY is an example of the deploy-to-fight option. A no warning attack requires a

counterattack option. Operation DESERT STORM could be considered an example of counterattack. The deliberate planning process focuses on deploy-to-fight options. However, effective interruption of proliferation requires a major shift of focus to FDOs.

Planning for WMD proliferation must refocus on the FDOs to contain situations from developing into crisis or imminent conflicts. FDOs are used in concert with and support of political, diplomatic, economic, and informational elements of national power.¹³ There is a menu of FDOs supporting each element of national power but there is no framework within which to apply these FDOs in a planning process against proliferation. Establishing such a framework means grouping FDOs by proliferant country categories: supply, demand, indigenous, and threatening. Each category represents a separate threat level escalating from supply to threatening. FDOs drawing upon all the national elements of power should be implemented against each category of proliferant. (Examples of each FDO are listed in Appendix A. Bold face items in the first three categories may require military support.) Within each category there are likely to be friendly and/or unfriendly countries. Obviously an unfriendly country might require a higher level of military involvement to influence the situation. It might be more difficult for the CINCs to influence a friendly country where the military could not be readily used.

CHAPTER 3

PROLIFERATION FRAMEWORK

Under peacetime contingencies two subcategories in operations less than war are required: prevention and persuasion. These two subcategories plus crisis management will be the focus of the CINCs efforts against proliferation.

Prevention is used in a proactive mode. The health industry has evolved in the last ten years into a preventive mode. More emphasis is placed on moderation in all things with exercise dominating the concept as the best way to prevent future health problems. Preventive medicine attempts to stop the problem from developing thus saving costly surgical procedures and possible lives.

Persuasion is used when the US is no longer able to control the proliferation environment because the proliferant has already achieved indigenous capability. An analogy is a teenager pulling a gun on a law enforcement officer. Before the teenager obtaining the gun, law enforcement, parents, teachers, and/or peers had the opportunity to prevent the acquisition of a gun. The teenager represents the demand and a criminal willing to sell the teenager a gun represents the supplier. The gun could have been intercepted between the demanding teenager and the supplying criminal thus preventing loss of control of the environment surrounding the teenager. Once the teenager has the gun, the officer is faced with the possibility the teenager could injure or kill the officer, a

bystander, or himself. The officer employs persuasive tactics to disarm the youngster. These persuasive actions range from negotiations to threat of force or punishment. If the persuasive actions fail the officer moves into forcible disarming of the teenager, analogize to crisis management.

Persuasive actions are directed toward indigenous countries which hold the "gun" in their hands. These actions bridge the gap between prevention (supply and demand countries) and crisis management actions (threatening countries). The time between prevention and crisis management actions shortens based on the manufacturing process and intent of the country. Due to the short time frame the application of multi-national elements of power to a given indigenous situation may rapidly shift to a predominately military solution.

A country may want WMD if threatened by the possibility of WMD attack. If a country does not have the means to produce WMD yet it perceives this threat, how can the regional CINC influence the country from acquiring WMD? First, assure demand countries threats can be countered through a coalition using conventional means. Second, convince supply countries with economic motives not to engage in the sale of WMD components. Persuade indigenous countries to seek other methods to support their national objectives. Specifically, the CINCs must plan for establishing security assurances and

regional stability, and applying conventional and WMD weapons in a crisis response situation.

Establishing security assurances and applying conventional or WMD weapons are nothing new to the current method of countering any type of regional threat including WMD. However, the CINC can take additional actions to influence the WMD acquisition process. CINC actions escalate from supply to demand, demand to indigenous, and indigenous to threatening. At each level of escalation the degree of military power applied (or in some cases withdrawn) depends upon the friendliness of the target country. The CINC can support political, diplomatic, and economic means of US national power with military informational support, presence and military assistance, and military interdiction of economic lines of communication. These are actions the CINC can take before using the full military means of US national power in a crisis management situation.

The CINC must address information as the first step of prevention, persuasion, and crisis management. Informational military support includes surveillance, interpretation and analysis, electronic interception or jamming, satellite management, electronic psychological operations, and skillful manipulation of the information for media dissemination.

When dealing with a friendly demand country, gathering information to identify the root cause of the demand country need is the primary concern. Areas identified include other

regional countries capable of WMD, possibility of insurgent overthrow (for or against democracy), and the internal desires for regional hegemony. Selective information can be used to influence a demand country by providing information on insurgents or their enemy. Selective information can influence internal desires either by sharing or withdrawing information to the target country or its regional enemies.

The informational focus in dealing with a friendly supply country is much more tuned to using information to prove the demand country intentions. However, if a supply country opts for the economic benefits restrictive or selective restriction of all types of information sharing with the supply countries can be used to influence compliance. In dealing with an unfriendly supply country information can be used to build international coalitions to support multilateral acts to influence compliance.

The speed with which the CINC must react to the changing situation demands previous planning based on the typical actions of a demand and supply country. Neither category of country can be totally satisfied nor convinced not to participate in proliferation. Therefore, the CINC must be prepared to instigate further applications of military power. The second group of actions a CINC may use is presence and military assistance (traditionally considered parts of nation building or security assurance.) Actions within this group can be interpreted as escalatory (dependant on strategic

environment) by either the US, the target country, or its regional neighbors.

Presence and military assistance include Naval offshore presence, joint/combined exercises, show of force, military civil affairs, military training teams, foreign exchange officer programs, military arms/equipment sales, and military logistical and security support for humanitarian efforts. If a demand country is concerned with the threat of WMD from another regional country the US military guarantee its protective umbrella must be demonstrated to the demand country. US use stealth technology and precision weapons in Iraq has given the CINC an alternative to using regional nuclear weapons.¹⁴ The possibility of a no-notice WMD strike could still undermine the credibility of the capability to extend her protective umbrella. Preventing the spread of WMD should be the foremost strategy to eliminate the possibility of no-notice strikes.

Presence and military assistance applications can be given or denied to demand and supply countries, to their enemies, or used to demonstrate US intent and will concerning the proliferation of WMD. Actions within this group can be construed to be escalatory depending on the strategic environment and manner in which these actions are applied. Given the absence of an appropriate response from a demand or supply country, a higher degree of military action may be required to achieve the objective.

Since demand and supply countries are connected with a line of supply between them the obvious choice to force compliance of both types of countries is through military interdiction. Military interdiction includes quarantine of proliferation exports and imports and military support of the international regimes such as International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspections.

The threat of insurgent overthrow within a demand country can be countered with military training assistance, civil affairs, US military presence offshore, joint/combined exercises with the demand country, and a show of US force. The focus is on nation building to reduce the environmental support to the insurgents followed by US military presence and support of the existing government.

A demand country's desire for regional hegemony requires a combined diplomatic, political, and military regional stability approach. Regional stability is a basic desire for all threats to the US national security including the proliferation of WMD.

Failing all other means to influence the process of demand and supply, military intervention includes the interdiction of proliferation imports/exports and support of IAEA inspections.

Moving from preventive to persuasive actions the CINC now deals with countries having indigenous capabilities. Persuasion is the ability to influence a country that has

obtained all the necessary components for production and employment of WMD. Persuading a country to forgo the use of WMD and recognize the threat posed to the international environment begins in operations less than war but may quickly escalate into crisis management.

Persuasion replaces prevention once the proliferant ceases to depend on external sources of supply. The threat to the US national security is heightened with an indigenous capable country, whether friendly or unfriendly, because the country has acquired the major WMD components. The CINC is now operating in a time critical mode dependant on the level of the country's ability to produce the WMD. Nuclear weapons have a long production cycle whereas chemical and biological weapons can be produced in a matter of days or months.

Persuasion actions require all the national elements of power to support the main actor -- the military. Actions directed at friendly and unfriendly countries differ by the degree of military force is employed. Military actions directed against unfriendly countries include show of force with military exercises, joint/combined exercises with regional friendly countries, and the threat of force against the unfriendly country. If a friendly country perceives a regional WMD threat, the proper demonstration of the strategic mobility and intertheater application of US forces could convince them of our ability to rapidly deploy, employ, and achieve the objective of protection against WMD.

Crisis management of either a friendly or unfriendly country assumes the use of WMD is imminent. The threat to use WMD means all attempts to apply national elements of power to prevent or dissuade the threat of WMD have failed and the only option remaining is application of military combat force. Traditional operational plans and concepts of operations have addressed this category of proliferation of WMD.

CONCLUSION

Can the US Military respond to proliferation in its traditional connotation and successfully apply that concept to any type of proliferation? I believe that regional action plans¹⁵ that begin with prevention and persuasion can address all types of proliferation to include proliferation of drugs, conventional and high technology arms sales, and WMD.

The adaptive planning concept uses flexible deterrent options to provide a flexible menu to address operations short of war. Proliferation can only be arrested within operations short of war. The four stages of proliferation provide a framework to regroup the flexible deterrent options into action packages.

A unified or specified CINC can use these newly framed flexible deterrent options to plan operations and consolidate requirements of the military from peacetime contingency operations through crisis management. By directing plans and operations to the root causes of proliferation the US can influence the strategic world environment preventing crisis management from occurring. This focus on the stages of proliferation could reap benefits in future force planning and in controlling proliferation.

APPENDIX A
FLEXIBLE DETERRENT OPTIONS (FDOs)

POLITICAL FDOs

Heighten public awareness of the problem
Gain popular support
Gain congressional support
Take measures to increase public support
Maintain an open dialogue with the press
Promote US policy objectives through public statements
Heighten informational efforts
Take steps to gain and maintain public confidence
Keep selected issues as lead stories

DIPLOMATIC FDOs

Alert and introduce special teams
Reduce international diplomatic ties
Increase culture group pressure
Initiate noncombatant evacuation procedures
Promote democratic elections
Identify clearly the steps to peaceful resolution
Restrict activities of diplomats
Alter existing meetings, programs, or schedules
Heighten informational efforts
Prepare to withdraw or reduce US Embassy personnel
Take actions to win support of allies and friends
Pursue measures to increase regional support
Identify the national leader for solving the problem
Coordinate efforts to strengthen international support
Use the UN or other international institutions
Develop/work within existing coalition
Show International resolve

ECONOMIC FDOs

Freeze monetary assets in the US
Seize real property in the US
Freeze international assets where possible
Embargo goods and services
Enact trade sanctions
Cancel US-funded programs
Encourage corporations to restrict transactions
Reduce security assistance programs
Heighten informational efforts

MILITARY FDOs

Employ readily in-place assets
Upgrade alert status
Increase strategic reconnaissance

MILITARY FDOs (Continue)

- Increase collection efforts
- Initiate or increase show of force actions
- Employ electronic measures
- Conduct aircraft fly overs
- Increase exercise activities, schedules, and scope
- Increase military exchanges and staff visits
- Increase Naval port calls or air squadron visits
- Increase mobile training teams
- Impose restrictions on military personnel leaves, retirements, separations and establish curfews
- Institute provisions of existing host nation agreements
- Open-prepositioned stockage facilities
- Use naval or air capability to enforce sanctions
- Deploy tactical fighter squadrons
- Order contingency forces to initiate actions to deploy
- Deploy AWACS to area
- Move MPS to area
- Deploy surface action group to the area
- Deploy CVBG to area
- Begin moving forces to air/sea ports of embarkation
- Move Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) to area
- Deploy the forward deployed ARG/MEU to area
- Activate procedures for reserve call up
- Pre-stage or deploy contingency ready brigades
- Increase the use of SOF activities
- Pre-stage airlift with support assets
- Pre-stage sealift
- Emplace logistics infrastructure where possible
- Open and secure sea/air lines of communication
- Increase informational efforts

ENDNOTES

1. 'Discriminate Deterrence' Report by the Commission on Integrated Long-term Strategy. War, Peace, and Victory; Strategy and Statecraft for the Next Century. NY: Simon and Schuster, 1990. Page 303-304.
2. Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy, Discriminate Deterrence, (Washington: Jan 1988), p 10.
3. The five members of the United Nations security council happen to be Nuclear Weapon States (NWS). This fact alone gives weight to the impression that owning WMD means an increase status in world affairs.
4. Aspin, Les. "From Deterrence to Denuking: Dealing with Proliferation in the 1990's." Speech. Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University: 18 Feb 1992.
5. Armed Forces Staff College Pub 1, Draft Supplement, The Joint Staff Officer's Guide 1991, (Washington: May 1992), p 3-11.
6. Clarke, Arthur C. "What is to Be Done?" The Bulletin for Atomic Scientist, May 1992, p. 13.
7. Test JCS Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Unified and Joint Operations (DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1986) p I-6.
8. The White House, National Security Strategy, (Washington: Jan 1993) p 16.
9. Thomas-Durell Young, NATO's Substrategic Nuclear Forces and Strategy: Where Do We Go From Here? (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1992) p 5.
10. Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Security Strategy, (Washington: 1992), p 1.
11. Joint Chiefs of Staff, JCS Pub 3-12 Initial Draft, Doctrine for Joint Nuclear Operations, (Washington: Sep 90) p I-2.
12. Armed Forces Staff College, Draft Supplement to The Joint Staff Officer's Guide, 1991, (Washington: May 1992) p 3-11.
13. Information is increasingly becoming a vital part of national power. The technological revolution and the ability of CNN to influence the operational level of the war in Kuwait has pushed information management forward as a national element of power. During the 1992 Global War Games held at the Naval War College, Newport RI, information was recognized as an element of national power.

14. The Russian military planners note that the advanced conventional munitions used by the US in DESERT STORM accomplished the equivalent results of a nuclear mission. Mary C. FitzGerald, "Russian's New Military Doctrine," Air Force Magazine, Sep 1992, p. 78.

15. Regional action plans is a term used to substitute for campaign planning. Historically, campaign plans constituted the war plan in its entirety. In this context I use regional action plans to shift the focus of campaign planning from crisis management/total war to prevention and persuasion/crisis management. Each phase continues an escalation process to mobilize forces in dealing with the new strategic environment -- regional conflicts.

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