


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In This Issue

Army Chief of Staff Gordon Sullivan on
Power Projection and the Challenges of Regionalism

Book Reviews

A. J. Bacevich sizes up Russell Wootley's *The Age of Excess*
Arthur Hadley ponders Roger Hilsman's *George Bush vs. Saddam Hussein*
Guenter Lewy on Morton Halperin & David Schell's *Self-Determination*

A Deaf Ear to Clausewitz

Allied Operational Objectives in World War II

Martin Blumenson

The Ethical Odyssey of Oliver North

Anthony F. Hall

Facing the Facts: The Failure of Nation Assistance

David Jackson

Should Deterrence Fail

War Termination in Campaign Planning

James W. Reese

The Middle East Schisms and the Gulf War

Michael R. DeArment

Sendero Luminoso: Case Study in Insurgency

David W. Eastman

Alliance and Coalition Warfare

Wayne A. Isbert

US-China Relations: The Strategic Calculus

Michael R. Palmer

Korean Conflict Battle: The POW Impasse

William H. Riser

93 6 14 049

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From the Archives

Audie Murphy: Ever the Warrior

Audie Murphy—whose medals numbered among them the Medal of Honor, Distinguished Service Cross, Silver Star with Oak-Leaf Cluster, Legion of Merit, Bronze Star with V Device and Oak-Leaf Cluster, and Purple Heart with two Oak-Leaf Clusters—was simply the most highly decorated American soldier of the Second World War and, indeed, of any American war. His courage and pugnacity carried into civilian life after the war. Here, director John Huston recalls an episode occurring in 1950 in northern California where Murphy, now working as an actor, was filming *The Red Badge of Courage*:

One Monday Audie came to me and said he wanted to speak to me privately, and so we drew aside and he said, "I think you should know something, John, that happened to me yesterday. There may be repercussions."

He was driving along Ventura Boulevard alone in his car, and another car with two men in it was ahead of him making passes at some kids on motor scooters. What they were doing was dangerous, and Audie pulled up beside them and said, "You're damn fools to be doing that; somebody might get hurt."

And the kids turned off then, and Audie went on, and the next thing, he came to a stop light, and these guys pulled up beside him and invited him to get out of the car. He had been horseback riding, and he had his riding crop in the car. One of the men came forward, and Audie just leaned out and slashed him across the face with his riding crop. Then the other guy came, and Audie got out of the car. Now I heard some of the description of what happened from a bystander who recognized Audie.

When these two guys came at him, Audie would first knock one down and then the other; one would get up while the other was being knocked down, until he had them both down and was kicking the living shit out of them. According to this bystander, they were twice his size, which made no difference to Audie, of course.

And the next day, this was very funny, there was an account in the paper about how two men had been attacked by someone in a car with Texas license plates and had had to go to the hospital.¹

NOTE

1. "The Hero in Hollywood," sidebar to Roger J. Spiller, "The Price of Valor," *MHQ: The Quarterly Journal of Military History*, 5 (Spring 1993), 108-09. The sidebar was adapted from Don Graham, *No Name On the Bullet: A Biography of Audie Murphy* (New York: Viking Penguin, 1989).

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US ARMY WAR COLLEGE QUARTERLY

Vol. XXIII, No. 2

Summer 1993

Power Projection and the Challenges of Regionalism	Gordon R. Sullivan	2
A Deaf Ear to Clausewitz: Allied Operational Objectives in World War II	Martin Blumenson	16
The Ethical Odyssey of Oliver North	Anthony E. Hartle	28
Facing the Facts: The Failure of Nation Assistance	David Tucker	34
Should Deterrence Fail: War Termination in Campaign Planning	James W. Reed	41
The Middle East Scholars and the Gulf War	Norvell B. DeAtkine	53
Sendero Luminoso: Case Study in Insurgency	Daniel W. Fitz-Simons	64
Alliance and Coalition Warfare	Wayne A. Silkett	74
US-China Relations: The Strategic Calculus	Monte R. Bullard	86
Korea's Costliest Battle: The POW Impasse	William Roskey	96
Commentary & Reply		107
Book Reviews		111
From the Archives		inside back cover

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Power Projection and the Challenges of Regionalism

GORDON R. SULLIVAN

With the end of the Cold War, America faces a different world, one that from a political, military, and economic perspective is far more complex. The interests of the United States have never been more global, more interdependent with those of other nations and peoples, and there are risks to these interests throughout the world. Where America's relationships with the various regions of the world were once subordinated to and conditioned by the superpower confrontation with the Soviet Union, the regions are now becoming important actors in their own right. Within these regions, it might be added, certain countries are emerging as centers of estimable military power. These developments—which I will refer to as regionalism—are changing the power relationships between the United States and the rest of the world. Such ferment is not necessarily bad. For states or groups of states to pursue their national interests within the norms of accepted international behavior is to be welcomed and encouraged. On the other hand, the rise of hostile powers that could dominate various regions would be an unwelcome development so far as America's interests are concerned.

America's post-Cold War national military strategy recognizes the evolving power relationships within this new geostrategic environment. The elements of the strategy—strategic deterrence and defense (maintenance of a sizable nuclear and conventional stateside reserve), forward presence (discriminate overseas representation as opposed to large standing deployments), crisis response (appropriate reaction in any exigency), and reconstitution (mobilization in the face of a global threat)—address the need for a broad, flexible capability to answer not only expected threats but those presently unforeseen.

This national military strategy is creating demands for a new kind of United States Army. It requires something far different than simply a downsized version of the Army that successfully deterred Soviet aggression. Since

Vietnam we have made the Army the best land combat force in the world, and we can be proud of that accomplishment. Certainly that force serves as a superb foundation for shaping the Army of the future. But change we must. The particular conditions we find in the world today require us to make specific adjustments in roles and missions, force structure, training and leader development, and doctrine.

In this article I shall give my perspective of the challenges that regionalism poses for our nation's security strategy and the capabilities required by the Army in support of that strategy. These capabilities address the full range of military endeavor—from operations other than war (nation assistance, counterdrug, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, anti-terrorism, counterinsurgency, domestic assistance, etc.) to actual war in all its phases (mobilization, deployment, operations, conflict termination, etc.). It should be noted that domestic assistance, where the armed forces are used to service the civilian sector, is a traditional mission going back to the early days of the republic when soldier Zebulon Pike explored the West, and to the early days of this century when soldier George Washington Goethals built the Panama Canal. The Army's main focus must remain on fighting and winning the nation's wars, that is true. But in the new environment there is a growing role for our military in peacetime security activities that will go a long way toward precluding hostilities or bringing about their rapid and decisive conclusion if they cannot be prevented.

The Challenges of Regionalism

Since taking up my duties as Army Chief of Staff in the summer of 1991, I have traveled to virtually all the far-flung theaters and regions of the world, and I've been amazed at the degree of change—political, economic, and social—that has been wrought in these two short years. This is especially true in Europe, where I spent a good portion of my early career and am able to gauge personally the rapidity of developments. The struggle to establish new governments and adapt to democracy in Eastern Europe has been accompanied by the reemergence of traditional ethnic and religious animosities. Accompanying this

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political and cultural unrest has been enormous economic dislocation. With the artificial glue provided by the Warsaw Pact now suddenly dissolved, states of the region are free to express their own intrinsic individuality and historical imperatives. Not surprisingly, intense competition in matters of economic and geographic security is resulting.

Democracy is also trying to take hold outside of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, where a similar pattern of age-old animosities and competition is producing conflict as well. There is the obvious example of Somalia, where government has collapsed and gang violence and survival politics are the rule of the day. There are others, like Peru, Lebanon, and Afghanistan, where, though government is intact, the growth of democratic institutions faces staggering challenges nonetheless. The Cold War order of nations is thus disintegrating and assuming new forms. This new order and the changed relations between countries engendered thereby call for a rethinking of vital US interests and how we can best exert influence to further those interests.

But we must be careful as we forge ahead. We do not know whether the trends we see today will continue. We simply cannot predict the ultimate course of the winds of change nor can our uniquely tolerant American view of human intercourse easily fathom the bewildering ferocity and complexity of ethnic and religious conflict. Our euphoria over the triumph of democracy in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union has been tempered by the realities of Yugoslavia and the emergence of fascist nationalist organizations and political parties. Our policies and actions must thus be tempered by a high degree of contingency and prudence.

We cannot wish away historical enmities or naively assume they will not resurface. Neither can we assume that military intervention will necessarily lead to the peace and stability we seek. Unfortunately, relations between regional actors will not always be governed by the rationality of a common reverence for democracy. Rather, the struggle for regional ascendancy, defined in terms of political, ethnic, religious, economic, and military factors, will often be the dominant imperative. While these developments may seem quite removed from us today, the close interdependence of events everywhere means that such developments can pose significant danger to America's regional interests and to the broader interests of world peace and stability. However, we also must accept the fact that, in some instances, our ability to influence regional events through military power may be frustratingly limited.

To add to our concerns, there is the increasing international awareness of "environmental" problems. Under this rubric are such issues as disease control, industrial pollution, wildlife and plant extinctions, and global warming. While each of these may affect a given country disproportionately, most are transnational in character. Many countries, including the United States,

are beginning to understand that environmental problems are security threats just as much as hostile armed states or organizations, which further complicates the national security equation.

Confronted with this evolving regionalism, the United States Army is energetically reexamining the way it does business in the various regions of the world and will be ready to respond when the nation calls. In this context, let me share some of my thoughts on each of the major regions.

Europe and the Former Soviet Union

With the end of the Cold War, there is a great temptation to conclude that the requirement to keep forces in Europe no longer exists. After all, the threat of a ground invasion of Western Europe by a rejuvenated Warsaw Pact or even a residual threat from Russia or the Commonwealth of Independent States is now a distinct improbability. However, the very developments that have caused some to favor a removal of US forces from Europe may make the most compelling argument for their retention there.

As we have seen, the shattering of the rigid framework of the Soviet Empire has created a potentially dangerous instability. For example, consider the disagreement between Ukraine and Russia over control and disposition of nuclear weapons stored on Ukrainian territory. Given the problematic control of those strategic nuclear weapons, it is vital to the security interests of the United States that strong democratic governments emerge in these areas. Additionally, the ethnic and religious tensions that have turned to bloody and tragic violence in Yugoslavia, Azerbaijan, Armenia, and other areas continue to be dangerously unsettling factors.

Throughout this transition, the nations in the region have been seeking varying degrees of contact with the West. In many instances, military-to-military contact has provided the first tangible interaction. The stability and security represented by the West on a political and economic level are of course epitomized by NATO. Not surprisingly, many of the nations in this region have expressed interest in becoming members of NATO or of some future pan-European security organization. Today Russian and other Eastern European officers participate in exchanges with the US Army War College and the Army's Command and General Staff College. The US Army Russian Institute is being expanded into the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, which will focus on strengthening civil-military relations in the former Warsaw Pact countries. We are helping them learn not only what it means for an army to be responsible to democratic institutions in a free society, but more important what it means to be democracy's guardian.

US forces, as the linchpin of NATO, are essential for providing stability and continuity as the Atlantic community transitions to a new security framework. NATO provides an anchor of stability and security as the various

members of the new Europe sort out what their security relationships will be. As the sole remaining superpower, the United States provides a degree of escalation control and deterrence simply by maintaining a credible force in Europe.

Nevertheless, we have to recognize that the forces at work in the wake of the Cold War are causing fundamental alliance realignments. The commencement of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council on 20 December 1991 provides a good example. Under the aegis of NATO, the council gives formal structure to the growing links between the Western alliance and the former Soviet bloc, including the three Baltic states. Further, the Western European Union, possibly expanded from its present membership of nine states, will figure importantly in the emergence of a new European security order, one likely role being to serve as a link between NATO and the European Union. The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, though unwieldy by virtue of having 51 member states, promises to continue development of its peace-maintenance roles.

Southwest Asia

America's involvement with the Middle East has been a key aspect of our foreign policy for almost 50 years, and the Persian Gulf War has given an added dimension to that policy. Moreover, the spinoff effects—resurrection of the Arab-Israeli peace talks; military training and prepositioning of equipment in Kuwait; humanitarian assistance/protection operations; monitoring Iraqi compliance with UN resolutions; and the resurgence of Iran—will continue to dictate some level of American military presence in the region. The changing power relationships in the region and the pressures for increased democracy and civil rights create a less stable environment than we would prefer.

The Middle East well illustrates the global reverberations of regional issues—in this case, energy and religion. The action of Islamic states in the former Soviet Union may be influenced by the militant Islamic fundamentalism of Iran. At the same time, Islamic but non-Arab Turkey, a member of NATO, is bordered by Islamic states that are either unfriendly or unstable. The vexing Kurdish issue continues to plague the Turks in their southeastern provinces. Economically, the region will remain of great importance to other regions of the world—particularly the West—because of their dependence on its energy resources.

India/Pakistan

Next to the changing geostrategic environment in Europe, the situation in the Asian subcontinent is probably the most typical of the challenges that regional developments will present to the United States. Pakistan, having

common borders with Iran, Afghanistan, and India, and proximity to the Central Asian Republics of the former Soviet Union, is a key state in the region. Its conflict with India over Kashmir, while not resulting in major fighting in recent years, remains a source of tension. Though Pakistan has been a long-time U.S. ally, we have discontinued military aid because of congressional concerns about Pakistan's military nuclear program.

India's burgeoning population, which threatens to surpass that of China in the near future, is a diverse mix of races and religions creating severe internal strains. National fragmentation along ethnic and religious lines is an explosive trend in a nation such as India, despite its relative commitment to pluralistic democracy—witness, for example, the Hindu-Sikh violence involving riots and destruction of mosques and temples, the recent fundamentalist Hindu demonstrations in New Delhi, and the wave of deadly bombings. Moreover, India's size, resources, and increasing ability to project military power in the Indian Ocean are creating apprehension among its neighbors. Our concern in the region is compounded by the question of nuclear proliferation, particularly in the case of India and Pakistan, which is likely to continue to constrain our interaction and influence at the military level.

Pacific Rim/Southeast Asia

Because of North Korea's continued militancy and its repeated refusals to cooperate on nuclear weapons inspections, Northwest Asia is one region in the world where we face a significant threat to peace. While there has been some progress in improving bilateral relations between the two Koreas, it remains to be seen what North Korea's real objectives are, since it refuses to take the most elementary steps to reduce military tensions. In fact, North Korea's declaration of intent to withdraw from the Nonproliferation Treaty was a dangerous step in the opposite direction. It is unreasonable to assume that any meaningful moves toward disarmament will occur before the resolution of the leadership succession in North Korea. Consequently, the United States must retain a significant ground combat capability on the Korean peninsula.

China retains the potential to become the dominant regional actor in military, economic, and diplomatic terms. The Chinese face significant internal pressures for change while at the same time confronting discomfiting political ferment along its borders—everything from the radical devolution of independence upon the republics of the former Soviet Union to the more measured, yet no less historic, progress toward assimilation of Hong Kong. Moreover, despite some overtures with Taiwan, the prospects for reconciliation or affiliation remain distant at best.

Equally unclear is the shape of Japan's defense policy in the years ahead. Japan has taken the first fledgling steps in Cambodia to involve its military forces in international peacekeeping activities. While it is far too

early to make much of this, it is demonstrative of the types of changes that are beginning to dot the strategic landscape in the region. However, just as in Europe, we cannot let the appearance of normalcy in this area overshadow the very real historical quarrels and mistrust existing among the three major competing regional actors—China, Korea, and Japan.

Southeast Asia is a hodgepodge of the old, the new, and question marks. Our relations with Australia, New Zealand, and Thailand will probably change little over the next few years. We have positive new relationships evolving with Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia. As we consider our strategy of power projection and coalition operations, these nations could play a significant role. At the same time, despite our long-standing good relations with the Philippines, the figurative winds of change—helped along by a literal volcano—have made our future connection with that developing country somewhat problematic. Immediately to the west, we are expanding diplomatic and economic ties with Vietnam. Finally, in another instance of how our military is responding more and more to the world's trouble spots under the umbrella of the UN and other international organizations, we are contributing modestly to United Nations peacekeeping operations in Cambodia.

Africa

The African continent is the setting for what is potentially the greatest tragedy facing the world community. Daily we are engulfed by media images of emaciated populations living in unimaginable misery. Such conditions prompt calls for multinational—or, failing that, unilateral—military action to ensure safe havens for populations and relief workers, and to create an environment in which the restoration of normal political intercourse can occur. Somalia provides a graphic example. Elsewhere, equally tragic, though less visible, events are unfolding. Ecological disaster resulting from natural and man-induced factors looms on a scale that may become irreversible. The refugee problem has reached almost unmanageable proportions and threatens political stability in some countries. By various estimates, there may already be ten million children in Africa orphaned because of war, famine, and disease. AIDS is a catastrophe of unprecedented proportions in Africa. In some countries there, the population between the ages of 20 and 40 is being decimated by the disease. With only children and old people left, African society could take decades to recover. In the interim, it would probably fall farther and farther behind the industrialized societies and even other Third World regions.

This widening gap, exacerbated by low education levels, will create the climate for instability and revolution in which democracy will have great difficulty taking hold. Whether in a humanitarian role or in response to revolutionary violence, international military action will increasingly become



100th Light Cavalry, 10th Mountain Division, U.S. Army, Fort Carson, Colorado

Soldiers of the 2d Brigade, 10th Mountain Division, man their M-60 machine gun during a combined US-Canadian assault to seize the Belet Uen airfield in Somalia, part of Operation Restore Hope.

the remedy of choice. However, even with the demonstrated ability of the military to provide solutions where all else fails, the magnitude of the crises may well exceed our capacity to mitigate them.

Latin America

Closer to home, the prospects are somewhat brighter. The trend toward democracy remains strong but must overcome two major roadblocks: economic disparity and narco-terrorism. We are already deeply involved in addressing the latter. New trade agreements such as that among the United States, Canada, and Mexico signal the effort of Western Hemisphere countries to generate a widening economic prosperity that will undercut the monetary lure offered by the drug traffickers and strengthen democracy at the same time. It will be in our interest to enhance the internal security of nations in this region to combat the threat posed by revolutionaries and drug cartels, but we must do so in conjunction with a broader strategy that fosters the emergence of democratic institutions over the longer term. In most countries of this region, national armies have undergone remarkable changes, becoming far more positive forces in society than in the past. The US Army through its army-to-army contacts is proud of its contribution to that evolution.

Implications for the Army

From the foregoing regional survey, three important implications for the Army emerge. First, the result of such wholesale political metamorphoses may well be a change in the way we define regions. The traditional geo-strategic approach is already beginning to give way to groupings of nations based upon other considerations such as economic, trade, or technological ties. One such organization, for example, is the Group of 7 (G-7), composed of the seven major non-communist economic powers from around the entire globe. Another is the European Economic Community. Along with the realignment will come new power relationships that could present significant challenges to American interests. The ultimate configuration of the evolving security, political, and economic organizations among nations is impossible to foretell, but as the Cold War dichotomy disintegrates and old national antagonisms wane, the resulting realignments will certainly present new problems—and new opportunities—to US security planners. These factors provide the broad framework for determining the Army's role in meeting the problems posed by post-Cold War regionalism.

Second, each region of the world has specific requirements and challenges that will condition our training and preparation. We cannot hope to project power successfully into a region of the world that we do not know or for which we have not adequately prepared. We are confident, however, that we understand the nature of the challenges and their complexity and that we are trained and organized to accomplish our mission in concert with the other services. The main reason for this confidence is that we have a generation of leaders who are committed to our nation and its values, and who have the skills to adjust quickly to a rapidly changing and uncertain world. The Army is more than military forces. It is an institution that understands the dynamics of national power and the ultimate importance of projecting not only force but ideals.

Third, the shift to regionalism dictates that the United States have a trained and ready power-projection Army to execute the national military strategy in support of America's domestic and global interests. The Army prepares itself to respond to crises through hard readiness training and by conducting a variety of overseas exercises and operations. The Army's capability to generate power derives from its composition as a Total Force, that is, an integrated structure incorporating all components—active, Reserve, National Guard, and civilian. Such a force is trained and ready, serving the nation at home and abroad, and capable of decisive victory. The American people have every right to expect the Army to respond successfully to whatever missions are assigned—missions that are becoming increasingly difficult to forecast.

To be successful in the post-Cold War world, the United States must be capable of applying its power directly at the scene of the problem. The complementary capabilities of all the military services provide a degree of

strategic flexibility in catapulting forces to the far reaches of the globe that no other nation can achieve. Victory comes from the artful integration of the capabilities of the joint services, and we must resist the siren's call of single-service capability. Owing to complete joint doctrinal integration and firm mutual support obligations, we have long passed the day when individual services could think of going it alone.

Today, the Army contributes to the effectiveness of our nation's responsiveness by maintaining versatile forces organized, trained, and equipped to operate across the entire spectrum of war and operations other than war. The combination of active and reserve components provides the Army with the *unique* capability to tailor the correct force to respond to a given contingency. The Army provides support adjuncts to the joint force which, though often overlooked by both analysts and the public, are in fact indispensable to credible power projection. It is the Army, for example, that furnishes the military police, medevac and medical, communications, intelligence, civil affairs, and psychological operations support for the joint force. The Army is the sole provider of the theater logistics command and control and infrastructure. All these seemingly mundane functions are what actually enables a force to sustain itself, survive, and operate in an overseas theater. Moreover, the Army provides the bulk not only of active but of mobilized manpower. The Army is the glue that binds the joint force together. For after all, it is the commitment of ground force on the decisive terrain that finally resolves the contest of wills we call war.

Let us glance now at how the Army's unique status as a sustainable power-projection force contributes to each of the elements of our national military strategy.

Providing Crisis Response

Our primary concern as a power-projection Army is that we are capable of the appropriate response during crisis. For American military power to be relevant we have to be able to put our young men and women anywhere on the globe, and do so rapidly. The Army is committed to meeting the requirement to deploy three divisions anywhere in the world in 30 days and the remainder of a corps in 75 days. But we cannot do it alone; we need airlift, sealift, and adequate port facilities.

The Army will have to be prepared to deliver a correctly sized and tailored package of forces, along with those of friends and allies, that enables us to bring a crisis under control and deliver decisive results consistent with political objectives. This includes countering military threats across the continuum of conflict as well as accomplishing humanitarian relief and disaster assistance missions. For example, the operation against Iraq contrasts markedly with that of providing aid to the starving in Somalia or to the victims of Hurricane Andrew in Florida. What each operation had in common was the

flexibility to task-organize the force while the operation was in progress. Deployments such as Operation Restore Hope in Somalia may become routine, perhaps requiring fewer combat formations but far more support units and infrastructure—the type of support that is the Army's forte. In this regard, the Reserve and National Guard will have a key role. Much of our combat support and service structure resides in the reserve components. These units will have to be ready to respond rapidly, in some scenarios being among the first units to deploy.

Peacekeeping and humanitarian missions will probably be under the auspices of an international organization such as the United Nations, but in some instances we may have to act unilaterally, at least initially. Even though such operations are undertaken for benign reasons and without warlike intent, they may expose our forces to hostilities. Our soldiers therefore must be trained to operate in an environment that looks like war but in which we do not want to become a belligerent. The situation that has prevailed in Bosnia-Herzegovina poignantly illustrates this point: it is difficult to imagine a scenario involving the introduction of US combat forces in that beleaguered land where they would not likely become combat-engaged. We must recognize that whenever and wherever we commit ground force we have crossed a unique threshold signaling a high level of commitment and national will. Inherent to the use of military formations—even in seemingly noncombat situations—is a coercive message that we are prepared to employ combat power. As we consider the variety of “noncombat” missions that regional conflicts and crises will present, we must think in terms of streamlined formations that can respond quickly, perform peacekeeping or humanitarian assistance, and still be credible warfighters.

Finally, the American people will turn to the armed forces—the Army in particular—to handle domestic crises, whether they be civil disturbance or disaster relief. The primary role of the National Guard in accomplishing these types of missions is an essential and uniquely American aspect of our Army. The active component, of course, has a responsibility to assist as directed when the circumstances or magnitude of the crisis exceeds the Guard's capacity. An important point needs to be underscored in this regard: a disciplined warfighting organization is inherently capable because of its administrative and logistical expertise to accomplish many peripheral missions, but the reverse is not true. We cannot organize primarily to accomplish humanitarian relief and disaster assistance and then be capable of winning decisively on the battlefield.

Redefining Forward Presence

As part of joint and coalition forces, the Army will maintain its carefully calibrated degree of presence around the world to support our strategy. However, in a fundamental change, the Army will sustain its forward presence from the continental United States rather than from Europe. This

reliance on US-based forces, deployed overseas for circumscribed periods as necessary, will make them more flexibly available for broad regional missions anywhere in the world. At the same time, increased training deployments, particularly in coalition contexts, will enhance our readiness to operate in the highly contingent environments likely to face us in the future. The training gained from years of NATO exercises such as Reforger paid great dividends in the Gulf War, as did our foreign military sales and military education and training programs in behalf of the Gulf states.

The new reliance on projecting a forward presence on an ad hoc basis does not mean the end of major ground forces stationed in Germany and Korea. On the contrary, some measure of forces will probably be required in those locations indefinitely. Forward presence, however, complements and extends the forward defense principle by husbanding a versatile and powerful force, centrally located stateside, having the flexibility to respond quickly anywhere on the globe to perform any mission. A flexible force demands soldiers with multifaceted skills. Along with combat competencies, for example, we will need to make our soldiers and leaders more adept in their foreign language specialties as they respond to international peacekeeping missions. Our reserve components will be able to contribute particularly to this element of the strategy.

Forward presence can assume still other forms. Foreign area officers, exchange officers, training exchanges, military assistance, civic action, and humanitarian relief operations should be effective forms of Army presence in many regions of the world. Over the past year, we have witnessed a steady increase in operational deployments overseas. On any given day, not counting our forces in Germany and Korea, we now have, on the average, 20,000 Army personnel deployed in over 50 nations. These soldiers are building roads, supporting international organizations, attending foreign civilian and military schools, and participating in many other constructive activities. We can thereby share our experience on how to form institutions, develop leadership, and establish policies and programs for operating within a democratic governmental framework. For most Third World nations their army is the core of the defense establishment; America's ability to influence their military community therefore usually rests on army-to-army contacts. We also need to think in terms of joint service ventures to achieve the most effective forward presence for a given region, ensuring that such activities complement actions by other governmental, allied, and international organizations.

Power Projection as Underpinning for Strategic Deterrence

While the United States will retain strategic nuclear weapons as a counter to potential nuclear threats, the strategic emphasis has shifted to joint conventional force capabilities. We must project whatever power our national

military strategy requires. The Army is, of course, the core of America's strategic forces, and having the ability to project credible land combat force aids deterrence. Only the Army can literally seize the enemy and control his land and his population.

The previously mentioned George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, located in Garmisch, Germany, contributes both to maintaining a forward presence and to achieving strategic deterrence and defense. The center will help train civilians from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union in how to integrate and manage defense establishments within the context of emerging democratic institutions. The Department of the Army, because of its experience in training foreign area officers, will play a significant role in supporting the center. The Army will in this way help address the serious strategic security concern of the United States about the future of democracy in the former Soviet Union.

The Army also has a role in key strategic weapon programs. The duel between the Army's Patriots and the Iraqi Scuds during the Gulf War illustrates the importance of theater missile defense to the nation. In a world with growing proliferation of missile systems and the concomitant threat of nuclear and chemical munitions, the Army's missile defense capabilities become critical. Moreover, just as the Army has a central role in the use of arms, it has significant responsibility in the control of arms. For example, the Army has been responsible for the destruction of US chemical munitions and provides numerous Russian area specialists to help monitor nuclear arms treaties.

Finally, and perhaps most important, the United States through the judicious and timely commitment of force can often put a damper on the escalation of hostilities, thereby contributing to stability and preempting aggression in problematic regions. In this connection, having the right forces and the capability to tailor discrete force packages is mandatory. These features are, as we have seen, the Army's strong suit. In today's world, even small force commitments at the right moment can have strategic impact and therefore must be packaged carefully.

Generating New Power-Projection Forces

The Army is the key player in generating additional force structure when the active force is insufficient to meet the contingency at hand. This reconstitution capability gives us the luxury of maintaining a relatively austere base force during peacetime along with the flexibility to expand if necessary. The Army's reconstitution capability—that is, mobilizing beyond peacetime demands in the event of a large-scale crisis—is necessary if we are going to have depth on the bench to react to sudden new demands on the team. Our reserve components address the manpower aspect of reconstitution, but

there are other essential aspects as well, such as a continuing robust R&D program and an industrial mobilization plan that includes provisions for restarting war materiel assembly lines.

In reconstituting, we should not think in terms of replicating the Cold War force structure. Regional struggles require a military different from the nuclear and conventional force designed specifically to engage the well-studied, doctrinally predictable, homogeneously equipped military colossus of the Soviet bloc. Rather, we must now think in terms of flexible forces able to respond to the infinitely variable military challenges encompassed by the strategy of regionalism.

The potential for an aggressor state or coalition to threaten our regional interests and even to become a global threat is quite real. Conventional forces, as we saw in the case of Iraq's arsenal, may be a shield for the development of more dangerous capabilities. Thus reconstitution capability will be every bit as important under a regionalist strategy as it was during the Cold War. Of course, reconstitution can never take the place of a trained and ready Total Force in place. Our ability to achieve our national security objectives depends on having a force today, both active and reserve, sufficient to the tasks we anticipate based on historical experience and a prudent reading of the political, ethnic, religious, and economic tensions in the developing world. Reconstitution capability alone—in the absence of a forward presence and ready crisis response forces—would have little deterrent effect upon the calculations of would-be adversaries. In this world of ours, actions do indeed speak louder than words.

Conclusion

Those who would rejoice over the end of the Cold War, feeling that arms and wars are suddenly out of fashion, must be emphatically reminded that history did not begin with the Cold War's demise. Over 30 centuries of state conflict preceded the Cold War, and only the historically naive would assume that human nature has suddenly been purged of its bent for violence. As Plato reminds, "Only the dead have seen the end of war."

The US Army has a real stake in the global search for peace and is committed to supporting those international political structures designed to preserve amity among nations. But while we hope and work for the best, we must be prepared for the worst. Today the worst is no longer the great bipolar confrontation of the Cold War era, but rather the eruption of regional conflict whose ripple effects can threaten our security in ways that, while perhaps less spectacular, are no less injurious in the long run. The Army, as the nation's principal instrument for the projection of carefully modulated military force, will continue to adapt its doctrine and force structure to the evolving geo-strategic realities. ■

A Deaf Ear to Clausewitz: Allied Operational Objectives in World War II

MARTIN BLUMENSON

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How did the Anglo-American Allies win over Italy and Germany in World War II? According to Clausewitz and common sense, an army in wartime succeeds by defeating the enemy army. Destroying the ability of the opponent's uniformed forces to function effectively eliminates what stands in the way of military victory. Gaining final triumph on the battlefield renders possible attainment of the political goals triggering and sustaining the conflict.¹ The firm resolve to grapple with and overcome the adversary, however the method, is at the heart of the formula. Is this the way the Allies sought victory in World War II? Or did they have other things in mind as they formulated and pursued their strategy?

The Allies seem to have devoted little or no concentrated thought and effort on how best to beat the enemy. The desire to get at and do in the Italians and Germans appears to have seldom been in the forefront of their endeavors. What the Allied ground elements tried to do, above all, was to generate movement. They were always going somewhere. In an offensive context and in Clausewitzian terms, if movement is related to the purpose of overcoming the enemy, it is justifiable. For example, to proceed from one hill or crossroads to another is tactically valid if the maneuver puts the enemy at a disadvantage and makes him vulnerable to defeat. The same can be said for such activity on the higher operational and strategic levels.

Surprisingly, the top Allied echelons only occasionally attempted to knock out the enemy. The basic Allied motive was, instead, geographical and territorial. The intention was to overrun land and to liberate towns. In which direction were the Allies going? Toward the enemy homelands, specifically,

the capitals. Seizing these cities, the Allies believed, was sure to win the war. Once the Allied forces reached and occupied Rome, Berlin, and Tokyo, the struggle would be over; the Allies would stand triumphant.

The people back home, the British and American publics, understood this vision of how to obtain victory. Reading their newspapers, listening to their radios, they followed the progress of the Allied fronts moving toward showdowns at the enemy centers in the Mediterranean area, western Europe, and the Pacific. Swift military advances promoted excitement and approval; setbacks and stalemate provoked pessimism and doubt. Going forward, then, was the name of the game. And eventually, the method produced victory. On the way to the Axis capitals, the Allies defeated the enemy.

Despite the satisfying conclusion, the point is quite otherwise. Heading for the enemy capital cities with little regard for the main purpose of battle, the Allies lost time. Had their eyes been firmly fixed on the proper target—that is to say, the enemy forces—and had the resolve to destroy the enemy been in the forefront of their concerns, the Allies would no doubt have shortened the conflict and lessened its pain. Let us consider the evidence.

North Africa

The pattern emerges as early as the initial Anglo-American offensive operation. When the Allies invaded French Northwest Africa in November 1942, they entered a region where no German or Italian military units were stationed or located. Instead of tangling with the enemy, the Allies had quite a different program in mind. They were dubious of the combat effectiveness of the inexperienced American troops, and they preferred to introduce the Americans to battle against the obsoletely armed and equipped French instead of the tough Axis forces. They hoped to persuade the French in North Africa to come over to the Allied side. They looked to threaten and eventually to bottle up in Libya Erwin Rommel's Italo-German *panzerarmee* pinning down the British in Egypt. Ultimately and quite vaguely, they thought of expelling the Axis from all of North Africa.²

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All worked out as the Allies wished. Two weeks before they landed in the western part of North Africa, the British in Egypt defeated the Italo-German *panzerarmee* and sent it withdrawing across Libya toward southern Tunisia. As the British pursued this foe, the Anglo-Americans invaded French Morocco and Algeria and quickly defeated the French, who soon joined the Allied side. The Americans, having won quite easily, became overconfident of their prowess in combat. All three national components—British, American, and French—then struck into Tunisia, specifically toward Bizerte, a principal port, and Tunis, the capital. They immediately encountered the enemy.

The Axis powers, anything but loath to engage the Allies in battle, had, after the invasion of North Africa, poured substantial numbers of troops into Tunisia's northeastern corner. Their purpose was not only to throw the Anglo-Americans out of French North Africa but also to support and safeguard Rommel's *panzerarmee* still in retrograde movement across Libya. The entry of Axis troops into northeastern Tunisia stalled the Allied drive, while bad weather compelled the Allies to suspend offensive operations in December. Early in 1943, after the arrival of Rommel's army in southern Tunisia, the two Axis commands joined hands and occupied the eastern part of the country.¹

In February, the Axis initiated the battle of Kasserine Pass. They hit the poorly armed French and the overconfident Americans, surrounded and marooned sizable contingents, took numerous prisoners, hurt an American armored division badly by knocking out in two consecutive days 100 tanks and other weapons and equipment, and prompted the Americans to burn immense quantities of gasoline and supplies and to abandon an important airfield.⁵ The Axis attack sent the Americans and French reeling back for 50 miles, from one mountain range to another, and threw an enormous scare into the Allied camp. Then, as Allied opposition strengthened, the Axis called off the effort and returned to its original positions.

Turning to offense, the Americans and French, together with the British, regained the territory they had involuntarily given up. As before, they pushed for Bizerte and Tunis. The Americans finally took the former, the British and French the latter. The Allies then discovered a bonus awaiting them, a prize they had been unable to conceive of at the outset of the campaign. Der Führer and Il Duce had been unwilling to give up North Africa as the price for getting their soldiers back to defend Europe; as a consequence, 250,000 Axis troops found themselves penned up in Cape Bon. They could not escape because the British navy controlled the sea. Having hoped somewhat vapo-rously to expel the Axis from North Africa, the Allies were happy to do so by taking the surviving Germans and Italians prisoner. What had started without definite Allied thought of how to eliminate substantial Axis resources ended, quite accidentally and hardly according to plans, in gratifying manner and in line with the precepts of Clausewitz.

Sicily

If the Allies anticipated capturing and destroying enemy forces in Sicily, their next target, they showed no such predisposition in their planning. They regarded the triangular island not as a place to get rid of Axis defenders but rather as a stepping stone to southern Europe. Sicily, after all, is close to North Africa and, at Messina in the northeastern corner, only two miles across the strait from the Italian mainland.

The island was attractive in and of itself. In Allied possession, its ports and airfields would be valuable assets to support operations after Sicily; its territory was large enough to hold sufficient troops to threaten further action in a variety of localities—Italy, Corsica, Sardinia, or southern France—thereby bewildering the enemy as to the Allies' next move. Moreover, the presence of Allied forces so close to the mainland might persuade the Italian government to quit the war.⁶

As for trapping and eliminating the Axis forces in Sicily, no one seemed interested. To block Axis escape from the island, the Allies had to reach and seize Messina before the Axis departed. Two sensible options

existed: (1) land as close to Messina as possible, or (2) land on the eastern and northern shores and drive on converging lines to Messina in the corner. Instead, the Allies elected to come ashore with British and American armies massed in adjacent zones around the southeastern tip, about as far from Messina as possible.

After some 30 days of bitter fighting, the Allies overran the island but failed to catch significant numbers of Axis troops. Three small amphibious operations on the northern coast and one on the eastern face, all designed to speed progress to Messina and incidentally to trap enemy forces, were ineffective. By the time the Allies reached Messina, the Axis had gone. Almost 100,000 Axis soldiers and most of their arms and equipment had slipped from the island to the mainland as the result of their brilliantly organized and executed ferrying operation across the strait of Messina. The Allies were unable or unwilling to interfere with the evacuation. Vaunted Allied seapower and airpower remained strangely distant, or even absent, from what might have been a decisive stroke, the destruction of enemy elements trying to cross the water.⁷ No one to this day can explain why.



The most important consequence of the Sicilian operation was Benito Mussolini's fall from power. A new government in Rome quickly made contact with the Allies and surreptitiously offered to surrender, the necessary condition being an Allied entrance into the Italian mainland.⁸ To permit Italy to withdraw from the war, almost any Allied landing would have sufficed. But in furtherance not only of Italian capitulation but also of hurting enemy forces, which were concentrated in southern Italy after evacuating Sicily, when and where should the Allies go? As for the timing, the Allies might have invaded Italy immediately after the Sicilian campaign or, even better, before its close. As for the place, a descent somewhere near Rome would have facilitated the Italian surrender and, most important, prevented the Germans from escaping to northern Italy. For a variety of reasons, the Allies could organize no such operation. An airborne drop on Rome was called off at the last moment.⁹

While considering the possibilities of their next offensive, the Allies refused to take advantage of the geographical positions of Sardinia and Corsica. Landings there would have outflanked southern Italy and probably have compelled the Germans to withdraw at once to the area north of Rome, perhaps to leave Italy altogether. For if the Allies possessed Sardinia and Corsica, they would thereby have threatened invasions of northern Italy and southern France. The Germans would have been unable to cover both regions adequately.

Italy

Instead of trying to trap or otherwise destroy the enemy, the Allies moved into Italy proper two weeks after taking Messina. Units of Sir Bernard L. Montgomery's Eighth British Army crossed the strait of Messina into the Italian toe, the southernmost end of the Italian peninsula and the farthest point from Rome. In terrain difficult for offensive action, they tried to push the Germans to the north. One week later, forces of Mark W. Clark's Fifth US Army came ashore around Salerno in the main effort.¹⁰ As agreed, Italy surrendered. The Germans remained where they were.

The two Allied armies in southern Italy spread across the bottom of the Italian peninsula. They struggled northward and took their initial objectives. The Fifth Army seized Naples, a major port on the west coast. The Eighth Army gained the airfields around Foggia on the eastern side. Both fell into Allied hands on 1 October.¹¹ With these important supporting adjuncts to ground operations functioning, what did the Allies choose to do? They set out to climb methodically up the Italian boot. Their major objective was Rome.

Did this make sense? According to the Allied formula, the Italian surrender had stripped Rome of its relevance for concluding the war against Italy. But where else could the Allies go? They were trapped by circumstances, committed to fight in terrain overwhelmingly favoring the defense. And so they

assigned Rome a significance it no longer really had. The city became the geographical magnet drawing the Allies northward. In that quest, against skillful German opposition, the Allies made painfully slow and costly progress.¹²

By November 1943, the future could be clearly discerned. It was bleak. The Allies could reach a still-distant Rome only by continuing to exert bitter, grinding pressure. Was there a better method to get ahead? If Allied seapower transported ground troops around the opposition and deposited them in the enemy rear, say at Anzio, the Allies would be that much closer to Rome. Unfortunately, the Allies lacked the means to launch an amphibious operation at Anzio. Technically, the endeavor was too risky. And so the campaign continued as before, the frontal pressure resuming, the pain mounting. In January 1944, complete and irreversible stalemate seemed about to descend over the Italian campaign. The Allies were up against the German Gustav Line, an apparently impenetrable defensive barrier. Anzio lay more than 50 miles beyond. It was then that Prime Minister Winston Churchill obtained additional resources that made it possible to stage the Anzio landing, the attempt to go around the enemy by sea.¹³

To help the troops storm ashore at Anzio, Allied units prepared to cross the Garigliano and Rapido rivers. By thus threatening the Gustav Line defenses, the Allies hoped to prompt the Germans to send reserve forces from the Rome-Anzio area to the Gustav Line, thereby uncovering Anzio for the landing. Once across the rivers, the Allied troops were to race forward to link up with the soldiers at Anzio. Some troops crossed the Garigliano River, and that implicit threat was enough to get the Germans to shift their reserves from the Rome-Anzio area to the Gustav Line. This enabled the Allied invaders to land easily at Anzio. The other troops, however, failed to traverse the Rapido River. That deprived the Allies of a bridgehead from which to hasten contact with the soldiers at Anzio.¹⁴

Behind the Gustav Line defenses at Anzio, the Allied troops were in the best possible place to turn on the German rear and destroy the units defending the Gustav Line. But the Anzio operation was hardly designed to go after the enemy. It was supposed to get the Allies quickly to Rome. So they built up their forces at Anzio and waited for the Germans to panic and withdraw. The Germans, however, refused to panic. Reacting smartly, they sealed off and penned in the Allies at Anzio, then attacked them ferociously. They found it unnecessary to budge from their Gustav Line defenses. There were now two fronts in Italy, the main one at the Gustav Line, the other at Anzio where the Allies hung on grimly to survive. As the shadows of stalemate lengthened, the war maps showed no changes for several months. Allied progress to Rome had bogged down.¹⁵

In May 1944, after rest, reinforcement, and the receipt of new divisions in the theater, and after concentrating the bulk of their troops in the western

coastal zone, the Allies launched a massive effort against the Gustav Line. The French broke through, and the Allies on the main front began to move toward Anzio. Eventual overland contact with the Anzio troops brought to an end four months of cruel punishment in the Anzio beachhead.¹⁶ At this critical moment, with the Germans backing away from the Gustav Line northward up the Liri Valley, where should the Allies go, and what should they do?

In a startling reversal of the Allies' standard unimaginative practice, Sir Harold Alexander, the senior Allied officer in Italy, ordered Mark Clark, the Fifth US Army commander, to strike eastward from Anzio to Valmontone, a town at the head of the Liri Valley. By crossing the Liri Valley to Valmontone and erecting a barrier as they went, the troops would block the Germans withdrawing from the Gustav Line. Pushed by the British up the Liri Valley into American arms and prisoner of war cages, the enemy in southern Italy would be eliminated.¹⁷

Mark Clark complied with Alexander's order but only partially. He sent light forces toward Valmontone. He turned the bulk of his men toward Rome. Why? Whether he truly believed what he said later or was merely rationalizing his decision, Clark doubted his ability to trap the Germans at Valmontone. The ground between Anzio and Valmontone, he stated, was too rough for an American advance in strength and in speed. Furthermore, the existence of many roads leading out of the Liri Valley, he explained, made it impossible to keep the Germans from escaping.¹⁸

But an even stronger reason for Clark's behavior came from President Franklin D. Roosevelt and George C. Marshall, the US Army Chief of Staff. When they visited the theater some time earlier, they invoked the geographical frame of reference. Both instructed Clark to take Rome as soon as possible, and, in any event, before the cross-Channel invasion of western Europe scheduled for June 1944.¹⁹ Obeying Roosevelt and Marshall, Clark disregarded Alexander. The opportunity, whether good or slim, to destroy the Germans in the Liri Valley around Valmontone was never put to the test. The Germans escaped.²⁰ As for Roosevelt and Marshall's desire to have Rome before the Normandy invasion, Clark's men entered Rome two days before the Allies crossed the English Channel and came ashore in Normandy on 6 June 1944.

The capture of Rome had little significance on the course of the war. The act was newsworthy and provided great excitement. It was a wonderful public relations feat showing off Allied combat power. It allowed the Italian government, which had become an Allied co-belligerent, to establish itself in the capital. It secured several nearby airfields. It probably gave the Allies some emotional and psychological advantages. The Allied divisions poured through and around the city, pursued the withdrawing Germans, and gobbled up a large area of Italy.

The rest of the Italian campaign was anti-climactic. The Allies followed the Germans to the Arno River, then to the northern Apennines. Trying to reach the Po River valley, the Allies battered against the formidable Gothic Line defenses. They battled desperately and in vain to take Bologna. Not until the spring of 1945 did they finally overrun the northern part of Italy. Early in May, several days before the general surrender signed in Reims and Berlin, the Germans in Italy capitulated.²¹


The Allies had won the war in Italy by attrition. They gradually pushed the Germans to the top of the boot and thus liberated territory. But they permitted the German military organization to remain intact and functioning effectively to the end. Alexander's order to Clark was the only attempt during the long campaign to try specifically to destroy a substantial segment of the enemy's combat power.

The invasion of southern France in August 1944 turned out to be relatively easy. The Americans came ashore along the Riviera. The French besieged and took Marseilles. While some Americans chased the Germans up the Rhone River valley, others tried to head the enemy off at the pass. At Montelimar, where the valley narrows dramatically, Task Force Butler and other elements arrived in time but with too few forces to block the withdrawing Germans. Harassing the enemy, interfering with his movement, destroying much equipment, the Americans were unable to stop the German columns from escaping.²²

Normandy

The objective of Overlord, the invasion of Normandy, was to get ashore and then to secure a lodgment area, a vast region containing ports, airfield sites, space, and maneuver room, all prerequisites for the subsequent Allied advance toward Germany. Overlord thus sought to meet preliminary supporting and logistical needs for the eventual march to the enemy homeland.²³ But so intent were the Allies on spreading out over the lodgment area that they were unable to take full advantage of an inviting opportunity to encircle and destroy two German field armies. By counterattacking at Mortain in August, the Germans placed their head into a noose. The Allies closed around the Germans and fashioned the Falaise pocket. Just when the Allies were about to pull the noose tight, they lost interest in the maneuver and allowed the bulk of the Germans to escape. The Allies then muffed another chance to block the German withdrawal at the Seine River. A quarter of a million Germans traversed the stream in the last ten days of August and fled, only to turn and erect a defensive barrier barring entrance into Germany.

Although these early battles destroyed a great deal of German materiel and drove the Germans out of most of France, the Allies were unable to surround and eliminate the German field armies. The Allies preferred instead,



prematurely as it turned out, to strike toward Germany.²⁴ Had they concentrated on destroying the enemy, they might have won the war in the west in the fall of 1944.

The goal of Operation Market Garden in September was geographical and territorial. The object was to get Allied forces across the Rhine River at Arnhem in Holland. Three airborne divisions dropped along a corridor from Eindhoven to Nijmegen to Arnhem in order to form a protected passageway for an armored advance to and across the Rhine. Although German survivors of the battle of Normandy offered strong resistance, the Allies took all objectives save the final one, the bridge too far at Arnhem.²⁵

When the Germans launched their Ardennes counteroffensive in December and created the huge salient in the American line—the Bulge—they became vulnerable to counterthrusts all along their enlarged front. The best place for the Allies to strike was at the base of the Bulge, where they could have cut off and trapped the enemy inside. Their failure to do so is beyond belief.²⁶

In summary, Allied operational practices betrayed a primary concern with gaining ground. Instead of going after the enemy's throat, the Allies went after his territory. Rather than implementing a daring strategy aimed at eliminating the enemy, the Allies preferred to push him back. As a result, at

least as seen from this remove in time, 50 years afterward, the Allies unnecessarily prolonged the war.

Conclusions

How does one explain the Allied behavior? Four speculative reasons come to mind.

First, planning any military action brings a host of complications into play. These factors divert attention from the fundamental problem of how to do away with the enemy; they inhibit forthright activity to this end. Terrain and logistics impose their tyrannies. Security and intelligence pose their cautions. The estimate of the situation takes into account all manner of worst-case scenarios. These tend to obstruct and to cloud the basic task of discovering how best to liquidate the enemy in any battlefield situation.

Second, World War I experience shaped the Allied outlook. Once the western front in France stabilized along a line from Switzerland to the sea, there was no way of prying the enemy out of the trenches. Gas, tanks, and huge artillery expenditures failed to breach the defense; great battles of attrition, as at the Somme and Verdun, were no solution to static warfare. It took the infusion of fresh American blood, together with German weariness, to propel the front in 1918 inexorably toward the enemy homeland. When the Germans realized their inability to stop the Allied onrush into Germany, they capitulated and ended the slaughter. In the Second World War, wishing to avoid the frightful losses of the first war, the Allies tiptoed toward the capitals rather than plowing relentlessly after the enemy.

Third, the Allies wished to liberate the inhabitants from the horrors and indignities of the German occupation. Before the invasion of Normandy, the directive issued to Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme Commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force, instructed him to enter the continent in order to fulfill three objectives: (1) to gain "the liberation of Europe from the Germans," (2) to "undertake operations aimed at the heart of Germany," and (3) to provoke "the destruction of her armed forces."²⁷ The series must have appeared to list the missions in order of declining importance.

And fourth, a lack of confidence in their own capacities infected the Allied camp. Not only the capabilities of the soldiers, but also the competence of the troop leaders, including the generals, were matters of great concern. Compared to those of the enemy, the Allied armies were composed of amateurs, civilians in uniform. It seemed the better part of valor to refrain from challenging the enemy directly, to avoid attempting those great bold strokes which, if successful, could be decisive, but which if unsuccessful could be painful and humiliating.

Ultimately, the drive toward the enemy capitals was empty. As in 1940, when the Germans entered Paris with the French army already beaten,

the Russians in 1945 fought into Berlin only after the war against Germany had already been won elsewhere—that is, on the battlefield. So too in the Pacific, where, with the help of our naval and air force achievements, the island-hopping technique bypassed the enemy defenders. This technique was aimed not at conquering territory, but rather at neutralizing enemy defenders, leaving them to wither on the vine, eliminated from the contest. There was no need to enter Tokyo to win the war against Japan. Nor was it necessary to seize Rome to obtain the surrender of Italy.

What decided the outcome of the conflict in each theater was the destruction of the enemy forces. Had the Allies concentrated on fulfilling that task, had they bent their energies to that end from the beginning, chances are that they would have gained final victory in Europe before 1945.

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27. Harrison, p. 457.

The Ethical Odyssey of Oliver North

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A review essay on *Under Fire: An American Story*, by Oliver L. North. New York: Harper-Collins, 1991. 446 pages.

Lieutenant Colonel Oliver L. North, USMC Ret., once referred to as "the most powerful lieutenant colonel in the world," played a prominent role in US foreign affairs in the 1980s. That fact alone would make his book worth reading. In *Under Fire* we hear his story, presented as a fast-paced autobiographical narrative. From the man who mesmerized the American public through the Iran-contra hearings, we would expect nothing less than a bravura performance. Most reflective readers, however, will be disquieted by North's story.

Without question, the book makes fascinating reading. A distinct personality emerges from its pages. Others will have to determine whether that personality represents the real Oliver North, but I suspect that it does. The co-writer, William Novak, clearly deserves praise for the consistent tone and the straightforward style of presentation.

The brief sketch of North's family background and the highlights of his early career at the Naval Academy and in the Marine Corps help to delineate the character of the man who joined the National Security Council staff in 1981. He had established himself as a charismatic combat leader in Vietnam and as a man of uncommon determination. In his first year at the Naval Academy, he suffered severe injuries in an automobile accident. Doctors worried about the degree to which he would be able to walk, let alone qualify as a naval officer, but with the gritty persistence that characterized his later actions, he not only returned to graduate and become a Marine, but he also became a Naval Academy boxing champion along the way. By all accounts, he was a superb soldier who

generated fierce loyalty in his subordinates—and returned it. Both the Marine Corps and the nation would have been far better served had he remained a leader of Marines. The USMC would now have a highly competent senior officer, and the nation might have been spared the political turmoil of the Iran-contra affair, not to mention the expenditure of \$40 million that North reports the special prosecutor, Lawrence Walsh, has spent investigating those involved. For make no mistake, without Oliver North the Iran initiative would certainly have developed differently and the profits from the arms sales to Iran most probably would not have been diverted to support the contra resistance in Nicaragua. As he frequently said with pride, Oliver North made things happen.

Though he arrived in Washington in 1981 as an obscure staffer, he very quickly became involved in high-level activity, and he remained at the NSC for five and a half years—until he was summarily and publicly relieved of his duties by the President. During that period, he played an influential role in counter-terrorist activities, Middle East hostage release efforts, national planning for command and control contingencies for nuclear warfare scenarios, the activity of the Kissinger Commission on Central America, and the development of the Iran initiative in which the United States, in clear violation of the stated national policy of not negotiating with terrorists, secretly traded arms for the release of hostages. Perhaps most critically, after the CIA terminated its support in adherence to the 1984 Boland Amendment, he became the person who kept the contra resistance alive through financing, international liaison, political support, and his own inventive determination. In the process, he coordinated with heads of state, international arms dealers, a wide variety of American government agencies, and a host of shadowy figures from the intelligence community. Oliver North became a big-time operator. He reveals all these details in recounting the life and times of “this lieutenant colonel,” as he referred to himself in the hearings before the combined Senate and House select committees investigating the Iran-contra affair:

I'm not in the habit of questioning my superiors. If [Admiral Poindexter] deemed it not to be necessary to ask the President, I saluted smartly and charged up the hill. That's what lieutenant colonels are supposed to do. . . . And if the commander in chief tells this lieutenant colonel to go stand in the corner and stand on his head, I will do so.

In the course of telling his story, North understandably concentrates on the trauma of having his personal life made mercilessly public and of being minutely dissected by the extended investigations and his trial, all under the burning white light of intensive media attention. Of the sixteen charges in his indictment, he was convicted of three: helping to obstruct Congress; destroying, altering, or removing documents; and accepting gratis a security system installed at his home. While he indicates he was dismayed at the verdict, he

earlier made it clear that he had in fact done what the prosecution described. He also, of course, emphasized that he believed he had good reasons to do those things.

One aspect of his discussion of the trial strikes a painful note that will make his audience wince, whether they condemn him or idolize him: he suggests that the all-black jury found him guilty simply because he was white (p. 398), even though his own narrative includes in detail how he had done precisely what the three charges claimed. When in 1990 the courts on appeal reversed one conviction and vacated the other two, thus erasing the felonies from his record and allowing his Marine Corps pension to be restored along with his right to vote, it was not because he had been wrongfully convicted in view of the facts. The judges concluded that critical evidence against him was tainted as a result of his compelled testimony under limited immunity before the congressional committees. In the book North bitterly recounts the unfairness of the congressional hearings and especially the use in his later trial of information revealed in the hearings, but ironically the congressional hearings in the end freed him from any legal punishment for his actions.

North's story raises troubling questions about loyalty, morality, and professional conduct. Some will ask whether military officers should serve in positions of governmental authority outside the military (such as the NSC). What moral guidance emerges from the professional military ethic that can and should be applied to officers seconded to other government agencies? Is there ever justification for an officer to lie? When should an officer question orders? Given that an officer is willing to give his or her life for the nation, should the officer be willing to sacrifice honor as well? Must moral principles sometimes be violated in order to achieve critically important ends—are "dirty hands" sometimes unavoidable?

North gives us a complex, perhaps inconsistent view of lying as he relates the dramatic events of his NSC service. He accuses President Reagan, with some bitterness, of not being honest about the Iran-contra affair—what he knew and when he knew it. He also observes critically that while he admired the President's accomplishments in office, President Reagan "knew where he wanted to end up, and he didn't care much how he got there" (p. 409). North

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believes he was used as a scapegoat: "By the summer of 1987, the White House was willing to give up just about anyone or anything that would permit the upper echelons of the administration to survive" (p. 353). While North was willing to take the blame for Iran-contra, he makes it clear that he was *not* willing to go to jail for the Commander-in-Chief.

The issue of honesty arises again in North's criticism of Bud McFarlane's actions. When McFarlane, as the President's National Security Advisor, received pointed queries from the congressional intelligence committees about NSC support for the contras, long before the scandal broke, according to North, "Bud invoked his own form of executive privilege. He lied" (p. 316).

North notes as well that Admiral Poindexter, as had Bud McFarlane before him, purposely lied in written letters to Michael Barnes, chairman of the Western Hemisphere Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and to Lee Hamilton, chairman of the House Intelligence Committee. In those letters the Admiral reiterated assurances, blatantly untrue, that the NSC, and Oliver North in particular, were not involved in providing support to the contra resistance in Nicaragua. Later, when the covert operations were on the verge of disclosure, the NSC falsified the chronology of events in the Iran initiative when it submitted reports to Congress. According to North, "In changing the chronology and in destroying the superseded Finding [which revealed that arms were traded for hostages], Bud and the admiral had taken steps to preserve lives and to protect the President" (p. 315). Lieutenant Colonel North appears to have no quarrel with these falsifications, other than the "unfortunate" fact that they were discovered.

North relates another of the less flattering episodes that arose during the committee hearings: his attempt to backdate checks and letters to conceal the fact that a costly security system was installed at his home at someone else's expense (it is illegal for government officials to accept such gifts). He makes no attempt to justify his actions, though he does make it clear that "the system" was at fault for not providing his family the security it needed. The incident suggests that North might have set aside the moral discrimination between truth and falsehood that served him well as a midshipman at the Naval Academy and as a young Marine officer.

North details a number of additional instances in which he himself acted with less than complete honesty. He aided in falsifying the chronology of events submitted by the NSC in November 1986, as the Iran initiative came unraveled. He also misled members of the House Intelligence Committee that month at a meeting in which he denied his role in support of the contra resistance. In that instance, he admits, "I look back on that meeting today knowing that what I did was wrong. I didn't give straight answers to the questions I was asked" (p. 322). (Members of the committee later characterized North's answers more straightforwardly as "lies.") When these passages are compared with others in North's book, it becomes difficult to determine what circumstances, in North's view, justify lying. At one point, North talks about his false identity, that of "Mr. William P. Goode," which he used to travel to secret meetings with Iranian representatives and contra contacts. On one occasion when he landed at Heathrow, "the ever-vigilant and humorless British customs officials" questioned him in great detail about his baggage, his business, and his cover story. North relates the incident jokingly; it does not seem to register upon him that however standard such an exchange may be for an espionage agent, it may be questionable for a Marine officer, whose professional ethic places great emphasis on honesty and truth-telling, to lie purposefully and substantively to officials of a friendly nation. Lieutenant Colonel North may have become so swept up in the high stakes game he was playing that some basic values became obscured—including those he was serving to defend. Some critics have claimed of North that in his zeal to promote democracy abroad, he subverted it at home, specifically in subverting some of the fundamental tenets of the professional military ethic. North may have become so concerned about protecting foreign agents and contacts that he lost sight of his loyalty to American institutions and the Constitution.

He also reveals that he was willing to tell his Iranian contacts almost anything: "Later, in the midst of the inquisitions, I was asked whether I had any qualms about lying to the Iranians. The answer is no. My only reservation was that one of my lies might be discovered, and that the hostages would pay the price. I lied to them not because they were Iranians, but because lives were at stake" (p. 297). North does not appear to recognize that in addition to lying he was seriously misrepresenting American policy and that such misrepresentation could have unforeseeable and dangerous results; he falsely claimed his information came directly from the President. At one point, he reveals part of his reasoning:

Unfortunately, everything I told the Nephew [the Iranian government contact] about our attitude toward Saddam Hussein was a lie. I say "unfortunately" not because I lied to the Iranians, which I did whenever I thought it would help, but because our government's attitude toward Saddam Hussein *should have been* more along the lines I described. (p. 286, emphasis added)

Is it unethical for a military officer to mislead the enemy? We can confidently say no. The requirements of the practice of truth-telling extend only to fellow participants in the practice. Enemies in the relevant military sense know they are not included. They do not rely on the truth of propositions offered. Were the Iranians with whom North dealt the enemy? Because he traded on their expectation of good faith, the issue is unclear. Were members of the United States Congress the enemy? Sometimes North speaks of them in that vein, but he probably would not actually classify them as enemies of the United States. Were agents of the FBI and the NSC security staff the enemy, or, in November 1986, were the people directed by the President to investigate Iran-contra the enemy? In the end, it seems, they could all be deceived in the name of a greater good known only to North and other members of the covert operations group. Therein lies the great temptation, of course, and the seeds of obsession that the agent himself may fail to recognize. Therein as well lies the ground on which the democratic system may come to grief. When the inefficiency and lack of responsiveness of democratic procedures become too great a luxury or danger, and persons other than the people's elected representatives conclude that, because they understand the *real* priorities, democratic procedures must be set aside, then the republic is perhaps most endangered.

Having established that essentially ideological point, however, we must also recognize that individuals must sometimes in specific situations make deliberate decisions that have life and death impact on the lives of other people. Sometimes the price of ideology may appear to be too high.

In such situations, military officers have another set of considerations to bring to bear on decisionmaking. The American military ethic holds that a professional soldier owes primary loyalty to the Constitution and the values it manifests. That beacon may at times be difficult to discern in the turmoil of events, but it remains a steadfast guide. The military ethic further directs that professional soldiers conduct themselves at all times as persons of honor whose integrity, loyalty, and courage are exemplary. In considering the profound issues raised by Lieutenant Colonel North's story, we should ask whether an individual sworn to uphold those standards would be ill-suited to serve in governmental agencies outside the military sphere. But if we answer affirmatively, perhaps we should also weigh more carefully just what the governmental agency does and what its purpose is.

Ultimately, do we see here, as Patrick Buchanan claimed, "a patriotic son of the republic who, confronted with a grave moral dilemma—whether to betray his comrades and cause, or to deceive members of Congress—chose the lesser of two evils, the path of honor"? Now that we have North's own story, we may be better able to answer this question for ourselves. □

Facing the Facts: The Failure of Nation Assistance

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Counterinsurgency attracted renewed interest in the early 1980s as part of a broader effort to reverse the deterioration of our strategic position. Although the strategic situation was new, the counterinsurgency policy and strategy we followed was not. In fact, they were identical to those that formed the backdrop to our initial involvement in Vietnam. Terms such as "nation-building" connoted in the early 1980s what they had 20 years before: underdevelopment causes conflict and this cause must be treated or the counterinsurgency effort will not succeed. Now termed "nation assistance," this idea persists as an integral part of our doctrine for counterinsurgency and has even become, through mistaking a part for the whole, integral to our general doctrine for low-intensity conflict (or "operations other than war," the term now used in joint and Army doctrine).¹ This is a misfortune. However designated, this idea is a bad one, and should be expunged from policy, doctrine, and practice. To understand why, we must go back to the moment before it became an article of faith, when its assumptions were still visible.

On 28 June 1961, W. W. Rostow stood before the graduating class of the Army Special Warfare School at Fort Bragg. Then Deputy Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, he had come to explain what the new Administration was going to do about guerrilla warfare in the underdeveloped areas. While still a Senator, President Kennedy had publicly raised the issue of how the United States should respond to the revolutions flaring up amid the debris of empires destroyed in the aftermath of World War II. It had been a theme of his presidential campaign and one of the first national security issues he turned to upon entering office. For his part, Rostow had published in 1960 *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto*, which discussed these revolutions in the context of economic history, explained their connection to development and modernization, and suggested a policy for dealing with them. In the graduation address, Rostow summarized his book's argument and described the new Administration's policy.²

Rostow reminded his audience in four words why the Kennedy Administration took guerrilla warfare seriously: Cuba, Congo, Laos, and Vietnam. In each of these cases, Rostow argued, the international communist movement had exploited through guerrilla warfare and other means "the inherent instabilities of the underdeveloped areas," breaching Cold War truce lines. According to Rostow, these four examples could not be understood solely by reference to communist organization or willingness to use force and terror, although these were important. True understanding of these revolutionary wars required understanding "the great revolutionary process" of modernization that underlay them, for "the guerrilla warfare problem . . . is a product of that revolutionary process."

According to Rostow's analysis, modernization occurred when economic growth and technological development became self-sustaining. This self-sustaining growth transformed traditional society, eventually producing a society marked by high levels of mass consumption. North America and Europe were examples of such societies, to be joined soon, Rostow thought, by other societies in Latin America, Africa, the Middle East, and Asia. This "revolution of modernization," according to Rostow, was deeply disturbing to those societies undergoing it. "The introduction of modern technology brings about not merely new methods of production but a new style of family life, new links between the villages and the cities, the beginnings of national politics, and a new relationship to the world outside." These profound changes allowed men and women to realize that "new possibilities are open to them" and encouraged them to "express old resentments and new hopes." It was this fluid, transitional state that communists sought to exploit. "They are the scavengers of the modernization process," hoping to persuade "hesitant men faced by great transitional problems that the communist model should be adopted" as the best way to handle these problems, "even at the cost of surrendering human liberty."

For Rostow, the communist model represented not the natural result of economic growth but its perversion. Economic growth and technological development should increase freedom and individual autonomy, he argued, not limit them as the communist model did. Communism was deformed development, or, as Rostow put it, "communism is best understood as a disease of the transition to modernization." This disease affected not only

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transitional societies but the developed world as well. If not checked, the communist disease would eventually make the world unsafe for democracy. "We are struggling," Rostow told the graduates, "to maintain an environment on the world scene which will permit our open society to survive and flourish."

How was the United States to carry on this struggle? How was it to counter the disease of communism that ultimately threatened America's own well-being? Rostow answered simply: "Modern societies must be built, and we are prepared to help build them." Fighting the guerrillas, while necessary, was not sufficient. The United States had to address the whole process of modernization, in all its economic, political, and social aspects, in order to help steer it toward its goal of freedom and individual autonomy. This required "aiding the long-run development of those nations which are serious about modernizing their economy and their social life," as well as a willingness "to seek out and engage the ultimate source of the aggression" that such nations confronted. It required "programs of village development, communications, and indoctrination," and soldiers prepared "to work with understanding . . . in the whole creative process of modernization." The answer was to build modern, prosperous, democratic nations out of traditional materials.

Nation-building thus became the guiding principle of the Kennedy Administration's anti-guerrilla policy. This response was codified in National Security Action Memorandum 182 (24 August 1962), "U.S. Overseas Internal Defense Policy," which remained in effect until the early 1970s.¹ These ideas and this policy were resuscitated in the early 1980s as another administration confronted the guerrilla warfare problem.

The continuing influence of these ideas is unfortunate because their endurance is out of all proportion to their validity. In the years since Rostow spoke at the Special Warfare School, a host of problems has emerged with the notion of modernization and its use as a framework for understanding counter-insurgency and low-intensity conflict. For example, the goals of modernization collide among themselves in ways that frustrate our desire to help build modern, democratic, prosperous nations. Democratization and economic liberalization are not necessarily compatible, as the experience of various African and former Warsaw Pact countries indicates. To an important degree, therefore, modernization is a choice between democracy and prosperity. But both poorer democratic and wealthier authoritarian states could suffer from the resentment and frustrated hopes that Rostow argued led to conflict. This is particularly true in the case of prospering countries, since economic growth initially increases inequity.² Thus, in promoting modernization through nation assistance, we may achieve results the opposite of those we intend as a consequence not of failed programs but of the very nature of modernization.

Even if the goals of modernization do not conflict in a particular instance, modernization remains a problematic basis for dealing with low-

intensity conflict. Modernization theory assumes that the logic of economic development produces modern, democratic, prosperous nations. Indeed, we seem often to have assumed that history would replicate around the world versions of the United States. This assumption is unfounded or rather founded on a false universalism. Our ideal of a "wealthy, equitable, democratic, stable, and autonomous" society, like the notion of development itself, is not indigenous to most of the world, which may conceive of the good society as one that is "simple, austere, hierarchical, authoritarian, disciplined, and martial." Our efforts to build a nation, a good society as we conceive it, may founder because our image of the good society "may not constitute a meaningful model or reference" for those we are assisting.⁵

This is one reason why we have had such difficulty with various "friends" in our nation-building or assistance efforts. We do not speak the same language. Our principles, our notions of what a good society is, are not necessarily in agreement with theirs. This is not a problem we can solve by being more culturally aware. Rather, true cultural awareness would reveal these differences and give us some sense of how resistant to change they are. In fact, their persistence underlies one of the greatest weaknesses of our nation-building policies. They tend to assume that the leaders in what we hope are developing countries share our image of a good society and our commitment to bringing it about. That they often do not, and that the reforms we advocate often threaten their or their families' interests, explains why they resist our efforts.⁶ In Vietnam, faced with this resistance, we assumed more and more of the burden ourselves, contradicting one of Rostow's cardinal rules: "The primary responsibility for dealing with guerilla warfare . . . cannot be American."

The deficiencies of nation assistance as a policy for dealing with low-intensity conflict would not be overcome even if the goals of modernization were compatible or we found true friends overseas who shared our image of the good society and were willing to work with us to realize it. The policy of nation assistance has had from the beginning too narrow a view of why men are willing to fight and die. It has argued that conflict results from "root causes," as they are often called, and has largely understood these causes to be economic. Rostow admitted in *The Stages of Economic Growth* that "the behavior of societies is not uniquely determined by economic considerations," and his analysis took due account of political, cultural, and social factors. But, as befitted an economic historian, his focus was economic. After all, modernization in his view resulted from the interplay of economic growth and technology, and it was amid the problems of modernization that the United States and the Soviet Union would compete. Indeed, competition with the Soviet Union probably explains much of the original economic emphasis of nation assistance. Of the five issues that led Rostow to write *The Stages of Economic Growth*, which he intended as a replacement for the Communist

Manifesto, four dealt with US-Soviet competition. This competition, as Rostow told the graduates, turned on the Soviet and Chinese claim that communism and central planning were the best road to economic progress. In a peculiar sort of mirror imaging, as Rostow's analysis became policy, we adopted the view of our enemy, placing disproportionate emphasis on economic considerations. This overemphasis, present in virtually all subsequent discussions of nation assistance, was encouraged by the general climate in which academics discussed development. All post-World War II theories of development "identified the preeminent evil as economic."

Having witnessed the growth of Islamic fundamentalism and the resurgence of ethnic conflict in the world, we should understand now that economics, although a possible cause of discontent, is not a sufficient, necessary, or often even good explanation of why men are willing to fight and die. Men are willing to suffer economic loss and risk their lives for the sake of ethnic autonomy or their god. In neither of these cases has anyone been able to find a necessary connection between this willingness to sacrifice and a particular class or economic interest or condition. Such conflict is not only non-economic in character, it lacks any connection to the process of modernization. On the contrary, it is often caused not by exploiting modernization but by consciously opposing it. Some religious or ethnic groups, for example, resist nation-building because it means the destruction of their way of life. Thus, nation assistance, which seeks to encourage and direct modernization, cannot mitigate such conflict. It can only make it worse, as happened in Iran.

There are situations where economic problems appear to be most important in understanding why conflict occurs. El Salvador, Sendero Luminoso's rise in Peru, or some of the conflict in the Philippines might be cited as examples. But in these cases and others, efforts to pin down the relation of various economic conditions to various kinds or degrees of conflict have not produced any clear or consistent rules that would allow a nation-builder to design a program of action with confidence that it would succeed.¹⁷ Poverty may provoke some to fight but so may abundance, if only to overcome the boredom of wealth and safety, as appears to have been the case with certain middle-class Western European terrorists. Income inequality is a plausible but not inevitable cause of conflict. Peasants, like all people, always have grievances but do not always become rebels. There is no reason to believe, therefore, that improving socioeconomic conditions will necessarily decrease or mitigate conflict.

Nation assistance, then, far from being a universally valid technique for preventing low-intensity conflict by treating its supposed root causes, is instead a waste of time and resources. It pursues conflicting goals, falsely assumes we share these conflicting goals with "friends" in underdeveloped countries, rests on a simplistic view of human motivation, and misunderstands

the causes of conflict. In seeking to treat the supposed roots of conflict, therefore, we are likely to achieve nothing and may even harm ourselves and those we seek to help.

Expunging nation assistance from low-intensity conflict doctrine will not only allow us to deal with low-intensity conflict more effectively by removing a distraction, it will also make doctrine more consistent. As it now stands, doctrine discusses nation assistance as if it were applicable to low-intensity conflict generally. However, in discussing all the specific cases of low-intensity conflict except counterinsurgency (combatting terrorism, peacekeeping, and peacetime contingency operations), doctrine does not mention nation assistance or the supposed socioeconomic roots of conflict.¹¹ It ignores these ideas because they are in fact as irrelevant for these kinds of conflict as they are misleading for counterinsurgency.

But what about counterinsurgency? If we do not try to build nations, what can we do? We might take a hint from contemporary analysts of revolutionary violence. They have come increasingly to the conclusion that "exactly who becomes revolutionary, and when, is a preeminently *political* question."¹² Since repression can stifle revolution and broadly based political participation removes the need for it, political structures are crucial in determining the rise and outcome of conflict. Thus if a government wishes to decrease its repressiveness and increase participation in the governing process, we may be able to assist. For example, we may assist by giving technical electoral advice or by supporting public works projects and psychological operations intended, again, not to remove the causes of conflict but to build goodwill toward the government and encourage participation during the difficult transition toward more representative government. We may also be able to assist by supporting internal security.

This approach is not a panacea, nor is it free of problems and pitfalls. We should not assume, for example, that increased participation is identical to free and regular elections. Token gestures toward participation can amount to nothing more than cynical efforts to build goodwill domestically and abroad. Nor should we assume that various forms of participation, or even elections, will be sufficient to deal with ethnic and religious problems. If manageable at all, these may require quite complex measures, including some unacceptable to one group or another (for example, autonomy or preferential treatment).¹³ This brings us to the critical point. In the absence of a genuine commitment on both sides to resolve problems by other than violent means, we will be faced with a choice among assisting suppression, supporting revolution, or accepting stalemate. Depending on circumstances, one of these might be the right choice. Where none is, we may at least console ourselves with the thought that now, with the end of the global threat posed by the Soviet Union, when our advice is not heeded, we have no reason to insist on giving it.

However problematic, this approach to counterinsurgency may occasionally allow us to achieve our objectives. This is more than can be said for efforts based on the hope of building nations.

NOTES

1. For the continuing influence of nation-building or nation-assistance ideas, see Joint Pub 3-07 (Proposed Final Pub), "Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Short of War," November 1992, p. 1-10-11, II-1-3, 16, 25, 27, B-3; Joint Pub 3-07.1 (Final Pub), "JTTP for Foreign Internal Defense," March 1993, pp. C-1-2; Joint Pub 3-57 (Test Pub), "Doctrine for Joint Civil Affairs," October 1991, pp. II-9-10; FM 100-20, "Military Operations in Low-Intensity Conflict," December 1990, p. 1-2; "Report of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America" (Washington, 1984), pp. 22-25; Jerome W. Klingaman, "Policy and Strategy Foundations for Low-Intensity Conflict," CADRE Paper, Airpower Research Institute, Air University, Maxwell Air Force Base, #AU-ARI-CP-86-2, September 1986, p. 6; Sam C. Sarkesian, "Designing U.S. Forces and Security Assistance for a Low-Intensity Conflict Environment," in Robert L. Pfeltzgraff and Richard H. Schultz, Jr., eds., *U.S. Defense Policy in an Era of Constrained Resources* (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1990), p. 227; Terry L. Rice, "Forging Security Through Peace," *Military Review*, 72 (April 1992), 15-16; A. J. Bacevich, et al., *American Military Policy in Small Wars: The Case of El Salvador* (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1988), p. 45; Steven R. David, "Why the Third World Still Matters," *International Security*, 17 (Winter 1992/93), 158. For a recent collection of essays that, with one exception, support nation assistance, see John W. De Pauw and George A. Luz, eds., *Winning the Peace, The Strategic Implications of Military Civic Action* (New York: Praeger, 1992). Richard D. Downie, "Low-Intensity Conflict Doctrine and Policy: Old Wine in a New Bottle," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*, 15 (January-March 1992), 53-67 provides a good overview of the current state of LIC doctrine and policy. For the terminological change from "low-intensity conflict" to "operations other than war," see, for example, the January 1993 Final Draft version of FM 100-5, *Operations*. This change is presently being reflected throughout the Joint Pub 3-XXXX and AR 100-XXXX series.

2. John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1982), p. 176; Douglas S. Blaufarb, *The Counterinsurgency Era: U.S. Doctrine and Performance, 1950 to the Present* (New York: Free Press, 1977), pp. 52-88; W. W. Rostow, "Guerilla Warfare in the Underdeveloped Areas," *Department of State Bulletin*, 7 August 1961, pp. 233-38; W. W. Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto* (3d ed.; New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1991). Unless otherwise noted, all quotations from Rostow are from the article in the *Department of State Bulletin*.

3. For NSAM 182, see D. Michael Shafer, *Deadly Paradigms, The Failure of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1988), p. 112.

4. Samuel P. Huntington, "The Goals of Development," in Myron Weiner and Samuel P. Huntington, *Understanding Political Development* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1987), pp. 13-14.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 25.

6. Benjamin C. Schwarz, "American Counterinsurgency Doctrine and El Salvador. The Frustrations of Reform and the Illusions of Nation Building," RAND R-4042-USDP (Santa Monica: n.d.), p. 59; Blaufarb, p. 65; Bacevich et al., p. 26.

7. Rostow, *Stages of Economic Growth*, pp. xlv, 106, 150.

8. Huntington, p. 11.

9. For ethnic groups, economic interests, and modernization, see Donald Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: Univ. of California Press, 1985), pp. 73, 120-21, 134-35; see also Walker Connor, "Nation-building or Nation-destroying?" *World Politics*, 24 (April 1972), 319-55. Consider also, Anthony D. Smith, "State-Making and Nation-Building," in John A. Hall, ed., *States in History* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1987), pp. 228-63.

10. Jeff Goodwin and Theda Skocpol, "Explaining Revolutions in the Contemporary Third World," *Politics and Society*, 17 (1989), 489-509; Cynthia McClintock, "Why Peasants Rebel: The Case of Sendero Luminoso," *World Politics*, 36 (October 1984), 48-84; Mark Irving Lichbach, "An Evaluation of 'Does Economic Inequality Breed Political Conflict?' Studies," *World Politics*, 41 (July 1989), 431-70; Theda Skocpol, "What Makes Peasants Revolutionary," *Comparative Politics*, 14 (April 1982), 351-75.

11. Compare Joint Pub 3-07 (Test Pub), "Doctrine for Joint Operations in Low Intensity Conflict," I-3.4.8; II-1.7; III-1.2; IV-1.2.3; and V-1.2.3.4. A similar but less evident contrast is apparent in FM 100-20, *Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict*.

12. Goodwin and Skocpol, p. 495, emphasis not in the original. See also, Charles Tilly, "Does Modernization Breed Revolution?" *Comparative Politics*, 5 (April 1973), 425-47, and Robert Hix, "Why Revolutions Succeed & Fail," *Polity*, 16 (Spring 1984), 423-46.

13. Horowitz, pp. 563-680, discusses various techniques for reducing ethnic conflict.

Should Deterrence Fail: War Termination in Campaign Planning

JAMES W. REED

Among those who occupy themselves with matters of military strategy and operational art, war termination has been a neglected topic both for academic study and, more particularly, for doctrinal development.¹ The American strategic culture, with its tendency to view war and peace as wholly distinct states, has left little room for consideration of war termination as a bridge between the two. Moreover, our strategic thinking has for good reason given preference to deterrence, while our operational thinking has focused more on concepts of warfighting that would allow us to "win" without resort to nuclear escalation. Recent events, however, suggest that discussion of war termination should perhaps be assigned a higher priority in our thinking about strategic and operational matters.²

This is not an essay about the Gulf War against Iraq, but growing dissatisfaction with the apparent outcome of that war suggests a need for more refined thinking about how we end our involvement in wars.³ Nor do we need to refer to the Gulf War to find instances where Americans were dissatisfied with the end state resulting from a particular war; in fact, postwar debate over a given war's ending has always interested Americans more than prewar debate. As our national military strategy evolves away from a fixation on global war with the Soviets toward a focus on ethnic and other forms of regional conflict, war termination will likely become an increasingly salient issue.

As the link between a war's end state and the post-hostilities phase, conflict termination poses one set of difficult issues for the grand strategist and different but equally challenging questions for the operational commander. In the broadest sense, the question for the theater commander is how to connect military means to the larger political objectives of a conflict. As it relates to campaign planning, the issue is this: how does the operational

commander, generally a theater commander-in-chief, translate the political objectives of a conflict into military conditions to be achieved as the product of a campaign?

Our current operational doctrines display a serious blind spot with regard to the issue of conflict termination. The argument offered here is simple and straightforward: war termination deserves equal billing with other aspects of the campaign planning process and should be guided by a set of principles or guidelines which, like other dimensions of that process, are best considered in the earliest stages. Existing strategic theory, leavened by the empiricism of historical example, provides clues to those guidelines on conflict termination that should become part of our operational art and doctrine.⁴

A Military Role?

It is not self-evident that the business (or, more exactly, the politics) of ending a war is one which properly admits the military commander. Parallel-ing a Western tendency to see a clear division between war and peace, many observers tend also to see an equally sharp demarcation between political and "purely military" activities. Under such a view, the process of war termination displays greater political than military content and, thus, is more properly the province of civilian policymakers rather than military leaders. During the Franco-Prussian War, for example, Moltke urged upon the German Crown Prince his view that, even following the fall of Paris, Prussian military forces should continue to "fight this nation of liars to the very end . . . [so that] we can dictate whatever peace we like." But when asked by the Crown Prince for the longer-term political implications of such an approach, Moltke replied merely, "I am concerned only with military matters."⁵

Both theory and practice, however, suggest the interrelationship between warfighting and the post-hostilities result. The chaotic aftermath of the 1989 US invasion of Panama makes the point: a decapitated government initially incapable of managing basic governmental functions, a sizable refugee problem, and a widespread lapse in civil law and order all threatened to mock the attainment of the operation's stated objectives.

The process of war termination should be viewed, then, as the bridge over which armed conflict transitions into more peaceful forms of interaction.

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War termination may, in some circumstances, lead initially to a cease-fire followed by negotiations during which the original political objectives are pursued at lower cost. The process of war termination displays a strong military as well as political component. To deny the political component is to risk making war something other than the servant of policy; equally, to deny the military dimension is to risk failure to attain the policy aims for which the war was fought. As William Staudenmaier correctly observed, "If the goal of the political decisionmaker is to resolve the political issues for which the war was begun, then the emphasis of military strategy should shift from its narrow preoccupation with destroying enemy forces to a consideration of how military means may be used to resolve political issues."

Military strategy properly concerns itself with applying military means to attain political ends; as these ends go beyond the mere destruction of enemy forces, it is equally appropriate that our operational doctrine address matters of war termination.

The State of the Art

In the past, consideration of war termination has centered almost exclusively at the strategic level. Such studies have typically identified various patterns by which wars end. These patterns may include: attrition or exhaustion of one side; capitulation by one party; imposition of a settlement by a third party; or the internal dissolution of one of the belligerents.⁷ Clausewitz reminds us, however, that political interactions do not cease with the onset of war, and either implicit or explicit bargaining and negotiation—Schelling's "diplomacy of violence"—occur as an inherent and continuing aspect of war, extending even beyond the cessation of hostilities. Empirical data bear out this observation: historically, fully two-thirds of interstate conflicts have ended as a result of negotiations either before or after an armistice.⁸

Classical strategists have thus typically viewed conflict termination as a process of bargaining or negotiation. From this perspective, such theorists have generally agreed upon several broad principles designed to steer the process of war termination toward successful outcomes, including:

- Pre-conflict planning for war termination;
- Sustaining communications with the adversary even while fighting;
- Employing pauses, thresholds, or "break-points" in fighting as opportunities for intensified bargaining;
- Holding forces in reserve as a further deterrent or as added bargaining leverage; and
- Demonstrating good faith, even through unilateral gestures, as part of the implicit or explicit bargaining that leads to conflict termination.⁹

From this broader strategic perspective, military forces contribute to conflict termination not only by direct measures designed to achieve particular

policy objectives, but also by supporting the tacit endgame bargaining process through infliction of losses on the adversary that affect his cost-versus-benefit calculus and create an incentive to cease hostilities.

Transitioning from the strategic to the operational level, one might expect to find somewhat less ethereal guidance on the incorporation of war termination considerations into campaign planning. However, to the extent current policy or doctrinal publications address conflict termination at all, they offer little to the operational planner that is of any greater use than the classical strategic precepts. The National Military Strategy addresses the issue only in the broadest strokes by stating that, should deterrence fail, we seek to "end conflict on terms favorable to the United States, its interests, and its allies."¹⁰

Nor does the armed forces' principal doctrinal publication on joint warfare offer guidance on how to translate this national objective into operational terms.¹¹ In fact, Joint Pub 1's conceptual division of the joint campaign planning process into four distinct parts (the operational concept, the logistic concept, the deployment concept, and the organizational concept) is perhaps most striking for what it omits—that is, any explicit reference to war termination—than for what it includes.

A review of service doctrines reveals little more in the way of operational insight into the problem of war termination. In suggesting fundamental questions that define the nature of operational art, the Army's keystone doctrinal manual hints at least *indirectly* at the war termination issue: "What military conditions must be produced in the theater of war or operations to achieve the strategic goal?"¹² That fundamental question cannot be fully answered without addressing equally crucial considerations related to war termination. Having posed the central question, however, the Army's doctrine stops short in at least two respects: it fails to offer guidance on *how* to relate military conditions to strategic aims; and, equally important, it falls silent on the question of how those military conditions serve the transition from war to peace, a fundamental aspect of conflict termination.

Marine Corps doctrine similarly recognizes the importance of war termination considerations in the campaign planning process:

[The] focus on the military strategic aim is the single overriding element of campaign design Given the strategic aim as our destination, our next step is to determine the desired end state, the military conditions we must realize in order to reach that destination, those necessary conditions which we expect by their existence will provide us our established aim From the envisioned end state we can develop the operational objectives which, taken in combination, will achieve those conditions.¹³

As with the Army's operational doctrine, however, Marine Corps doctrine does little more than cite the necessity to determine a "desired end

state" that is somehow related to larger strategic purposes. In contrast to their treatment of, for example, logistical, deployment, or organizational concepts, neither joint nor service doctrine currently suggests principles according to which war termination should be integrated into the campaign planning process. To ensure that our operational planning effectively serves the requirements of our national military strategy, this doctrinal gap is one we can ill afford to ignore.

Expanding the Doctrinal Frontier

A concern for war termination suggests three fundamental requirements that our joint and separate service operational doctrines must address. First, conflict termination doctrine must assist planners in defining military conditions and relating those conditions to strategic aims; second, it must contribute to the tacit bargaining process inherent in the terminal phases of a war; and finally, it must offer guidance on how best to make the transition from active hostilities back toward a state of peace. Let us discuss these in turn.

Since it is highly dependent upon the nature of the conflict scenario, defining terminal military conditions that relate to overall strategic aims—the first of our fundamental requirements—is perhaps the most challenging of these tasks. The difficulty of the task, however, also underscores its importance. Morton Halperin asserts that, at the strategic level, “unspecified, non-rigid objectives increase the chances of arriving at an acceptable compromise and eliminate the domestic costs which would stem from a failure to gain a stated objective.”¹⁴ The American experience in Lebanon in 1983, however, suggests that flaccid strategic objectives are perhaps more likely to produce confusion and failure at the operational level. Clarity of strategic objectives is the essential precondition to the adequate definition of operational military objectives; there is, after all, little to be gained by confusing or deceiving ourselves. Of course, it must be recognized that conditions defined early in a war—ideally, even prior to the outbreak of hostilities—may change as events unfold. Nonetheless, the process of explicitly and clearly defining terminal conditions is an important one, since it requires careful dialogue between civilian (strategic) and military (operational) leadership which may, in turn, offer some greater assurance that the defined end state is both politically acceptable and militarily attainable.¹⁵

Our second requirement for doctrine explicitly recognizes that war termination is a game within a game involving aspects of bargaining and negotiation. Warfighting doctrine must be cognizant of this less visible aspect of war termination which aims at the opponent's decision process. Simply stated, by manipulating the cost-versus-gain equation, a commander's operational decisions can influence an opponent's strategic decisionmaking. In the recent Gulf War, for instance, the US Central Command's sweeping envelop-

ment maneuver was brilliantly effective not only because it neutralized the Republican Guard forces, the Iraqi army's center of gravity. It also placed a significant allied force in position to threaten Baghdad, thus creating added incentive for Iraq to agree to an early cease-fire. An operational decision had affected an opponent's strategic calculus by creating additional allied leverage.

At the operational level, then, the military contribution should serve to increase (or at least not decrease) the leverage available to national decision-makers during the terminal phases of a war. This task becomes more difficult when a war goes badly and the initial objectives are not attained. Even a "totally defeated" power such as Japan in August 1945, however, retains some leverage: the possibility that Japan might not submit cooperatively to Allied occupation provided an inducement for the Allied Powers to modify their terms of "unconditional surrender" to include retention of the Japanese Emperor.

Lastly, recalling the dog in the old joke who chases the fire truck (has he considered what he will do should he catch it?), our doctrine on conflict termination should cause us to think through the implications of successfully attaining our objectives. It should suggest ways to make the transition from battlefield success to a post-hostilities environment in a manner that preserves and reinforces our political objectives. During this aspect of the war termination process, the role of various civilian national or international agencies may become increasingly prominent, and particular responsibilities may transfer from the military to the civilian domain at this stage. Various civil affairs functions, especially refugee control and humanitarian assistance, come to mind as examples in which a transition toward greater civil relief agency involvement may be prudent.

As the bridge between war and peace, war termination doctrine should address the issue of when and how to move from a military-dominant role in the post-hostilities phase. History is replete with examples of warfare that solved one set of problems only to give rise to other, if less acute, difficulties. Both the Gulf War and the US invasion of Panama typify the civil-military challenges likely to be a common product of regional war: providing food, shelter, and medical care to refugees; reinstating civil order; restoring civil government. Our doctrine must recognize that effective war termination must link the war-fighting phases of a conflict with the post-hostilities environment, which may well require tapping into the resources, expertise, and authorities of agencies outside the Department of Defense. Like planning in the low-intensity conflict arena, then, formulation of war termination plans can truly be effective only if accomplished in an interagency context.¹⁶

War Termination in the Korean Case

For those who have considered the issue of conflict termination at the strategic level, the Korean War has often provided a common basis for

discussion of problems inherent in the process. And at the operational level as well, the Korean case brings to light many of these requirements for war termination doctrine.

The Korean War had clearly entered its terminal phase by June 1951; by that date, an informed, objective observer could certainly have predicted the general outline of the eventual outcome.¹⁷ MacArthur's brilliant stroke at Inchon in September 1950 had given United Nations forces the upper hand and had prompted an upward revision in US war aims from restoration of the status quo ante bellum along the 38th parallel toward reunification of the entire peninsula under South Korean control. Pursuit of this expanded objective triggered massive Chinese intervention in November, prompting MacArthur's laconic comment, "We face an entirely new war."

By March 1951, however, the Chinese offensive had effectively been blunted, and an objective observer could certainly have concluded that the Chinese and North Koreans, having thrown their best punch, had been denied the opportunity to achieve their maximum political objective of unification of the peninsula under communist rule. As the United Nations pursued its spring offensive, the Eighth Army Commander, General James Van Fleet, would later comment that "in June 1951 we had the Chinese whipped. They were definitely gone. They were in awful shape. During the last week in May we captured more than 10,000 prisoners."¹⁸

Likewise, while the United States had not necessarily been denied its maximum objective, the evident costs of pursuing reunification under a South Korean regime, together with growing anxiety over Soviet intentions in Europe, caused the Truman Administration to step back from that expanded war aim. Restoration of the 38th parallel accompanied by an armistice at an early date became the principal American objective. Throughout the 24-month stalemate that followed, continued hostilities produced only marginal adjustments in each side's position along the 38th parallel, while indirect and direct bargaining addressed issues that were largely ancillary to the original war aims of each. Mindful of MacArthur's earlier misfortune, Van Fleet elected to halt the United Nations offensive in mid-June along the 38th parallel, defending this decision in his memoirs as follows: "The seizure of the land between the truce line and the Yalu would have merely meant the seizure of more real estate."

Bernard Brodie, among others, has argued that Eighth Army's operational decision to halt its spring offensive at mid-peninsula forfeited an opportunity to terminate the war at an early date:

The reason for continuing the extraordinarily successful enterprise that the U.N. offensive had become had nothing to do with the acquisition of more real estate. Its purpose should have been to continue maximum pressure on the disintegrating Chinese armies as a means of getting them not only to request but actually

to conclude an armistice. The line they finally settled for two years later, or something like that line, might have been achieved in far less time if we had meanwhile continued the pressure that was disintegrating their armies.¹⁹

Negotiations, commingled with intermittent military action by both sides, continued fitfully for two years. Not until Eisenhower credibly threatened in February 1953 to resume the United Nations offensive with the use of nuclear weapons did the Chinese truly begin to bargain in earnest.²⁰ By July 1953 both sides had agreed to an armistice under terms not significantly different from those proposed two years earlier. The terminal phase of the Korean War illustrates the potentially adverse consequences that may attend a campaign that fails to abide by the three fundamental requirements we have set out here for terminating a conflict.

If by June 1951 restoration of the 38th parallel accompanied by an armistice at an early date had become the principal American strategic objective, the historical record does not indicate an effort by planners at either the operational or strategic level to define explicit, observable conditions that would achieve this strategic aim in its totality. Restoration of the 38th parallel speaks for itself, but what of the other two components: a cessation of hostilities (an armistice) and a time constraint (an early date)? What specific military conditions might have achieved all three dimensions of the strategic objective? As opposed to a positive statement of specific operational conditions that should be sought, planners seemed more concerned with framing operational conditions in a negative sense—that is, defining what should *not* be done (e.g. do not go back to the Yalu), reflecting concerns that the result to be avoided would be either ineffectual (just “the seizure of more real estate”) or counterproductive (inciting Chinese or Russian escalation). Decisionmakers seemed guided by a belief that holding the 38th parallel would over some ill-defined period of time result in some unspecified level of increased casualties or other costs to the Chinese that would eventually produce an acceptable truce. What level of costs and what period of time? Whence would come the leverage necessary to compel termination on terms favorable to us?

Clearly, answers to such questions cannot always, if ever, be obtained with certainty, but by defining military conditions with a high degree of specificity, operational planners allow civilian leaders the opportunity both to examine critically the assumptions that underpin the plan and to assess whether the military conditions will, in fact, accomplish their intended political objectives. Again, we underscore the importance of communication between military and civilian leaders in order to ensure congruence between operational outcomes and intended political objectives. Defining both strategic and operational objectives in explicit, unambiguous terms will do much to ensure this congruence.

If one accepts, as this writer does, Brodie's view that the US Eighth Army erred in failing to press its June 1951 offensive beyond the pre-hostilities demarcation line, perhaps northward to the peninsula's narrow neck, the consequences of that omission—12,000 additional US casualties over the following two years—provide a compelling argument for the advantages that accrue if military forces are used to gain greater leverage during the war termination process. In the regional wars likely to be the dominant pattern for the foreseeable future, adversaries are prone to seek the attainment of limited objectives, with the understanding that some trade-offs are likely to be required on both sides if the conflict is to remain limited. As in Korea, Vietnam, and the more recent Persian Gulf conflict, war termination becomes a contest in which political leverage borne of battlefield success is the dominant theme. This may at times require planners to define operational objectives that exceed bottom-line political objectives in order to gain leverage that will promote expeditious termination of hostilities and the effective transition to a post-hostilities phase.

Some Guidelines for Campaign Planners

The central argument throughout this essay has been that the current gap in our operational doctrines regarding conflict termination seriously hampers our ability to plan effective military campaigns. Working from commonly accepted war termination precepts at the strategic level and armed with an appreciation of war termination issues in recent conflicts, let us propose some tentative first steps toward an appropriate doctrine in this arena.

- Identify a distinct war termination phase in the campaign planning process.²¹ Simply stated, war termination is too fundamental an issue to be subordinated as a lesser included component of some other aspect of the campaign planning process.

- Emphasize a regressive (i.e. backward-planning) approach to campaign development. Ever mindful of Fred Iklé's caution that decisionmakers not take the first step toward war without considering the last, every aspect of a campaign plan—target selection, rules of engagement, psychological operations, to cite but a few examples—should be designed and evaluated according to contributions made or effect upon the explicitly defined end state to be achieved. This can be accomplished most efficiently in a regressive planning sequence.

- Define the operational conditions to be produced during the terminal phase of the campaign in explicit, unambiguous terms. The absence of definition or detail in operational objectives may produce unintended consequences in the course of a campaign. More important, the process of defining operational objectives with a high degree of clarity should prompt increased communication between the civilian and military leadership that will help to ensure congruence between operational objectives and the larger policy aims of a campaign.

- Consider establishing (in consultation with appropriate civilian decisionmakers) operational objectives that exceed the baseline political objectives of the campaign. Remember that the war termination process is a part of a larger implicit bargaining process, even while hostilities continue, and that the military contribution can significantly affect the leverage available to influence that process. This may include the seizure of territory or other high-value objectives whose possession would enhance our government's ability to secure a favorable political outcome.

- Consider how efforts to eliminate or degrade your opponent's command and control may affect, positively or negatively, your efforts to achieve particular objectives. Will your opponent be able to effect a cease-fire or otherwise control the actions of his forces? Efforts to target command and control facilities should carefully consider the trade-offs involved: at what point might the military advantages to be gained from targeting command and control be outweighed by potentially adverse effects on the goal of stopping the fighting?

- Consider the manner in which the tempo of the terminal phase of an operational campaign affects the ability to achieve established policy objectives. Once a campaign has reached the point of irreversibility, experience suggests that aggressive exploitation is most likely to secure the desired objectives at lower costs. A high operational tempo continues the pressure on the adversary and makes it more difficult for him to engage in destructive acts that raise the costs of your victory. Witness, for example, the wanton Iraqi destruction of Kuwaiti oil fields in the Gulf War. At other times, depending upon one's knowledge of the enemy's decision process, it may be prudent to consider pauses or break-points in the terminal phases of a campaign to allow the opponent's decisionmaking machinery opportunities to cease fighting. This may be especially important where degraded command and control hampers an opponent's ability to consider and communicate a decision to quit.²² In either circumstance, operational tempo is clearly a key consideration in war termination.

- View war termination not as the end of hostilities but as the transition to a new post-conflict phase characterized by both civil and military problems. This consideration implies an especially important role for various civil affairs functions. It also implies a requirement to plan the interagency transfer of certain responsibilities to national, international, or nongovernmental agencies. Effective battle hand-off requires planning and coordination before the fact.

Viewed independently, none of these proposed guidelines appears startling; some will even suggest, quite correctly, that these prescriptions are, like so many other aspects of warfighting doctrine, more exemplary of common sense than of any particular revealed wisdom. What is startling,

however, is the absence of any fully developed approach to conflict termination in our current warfighting doctrines.

In closing, it seems worth repeating our refrain that the war termination component of a campaign plan represents a transitional phase: a transition from war to peace; a transition from a military-dominant role toward a civilian-dominant role; a transition from a set of circumstances and problems generally familiar to operational planners toward others with which they may be decidedly less familiar. These points reinforce the importance of a high level of dialogue and coordination between civilian and military decision-makers regarding the conflict termination process. As Fred Iklé notes, "In preparing a major military operation, military leaders and civilian officials can effectively work together . . . to create a well-meshed, integrated plan."²³ The ability of military leaders to contribute to that joint planning process will in part depend upon the extent to which they have carefully considered the challenges posed by the war termination problem in the period before deterrence fails.

NOTES

1. Neglected, but not ignored. War termination studies were briefly fashionable in the formative years of nuclear war theorizing, the premier examples being Thomas Schelling, *Arms and Influence* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale Univ. Press, 1966), and Morton Halperin, *Limited War in the Nuclear Age* (New York: John Wiley, 1963). Interest in the topic, at least at the strategic level, was resurrected following the American retreat from Vietnam, with Fred Iklé's *Every War Must End* (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1971) representing one of the most thoughtful contributions to the subject during this period. For a recent treatment, see Michael R. Rampy, "The Endgame: Conflict Termination and Post-Conflict Activities," *Military Review*, 72 (October 1992), 42-54.

2. Studies of war termination have also been colored by ideological considerations, with more conservative viewers espousing MacArthur's abhorrence of compromise: "In war, there is no substitute for victory." Those of a more liberal persuasion have likewise found war termination studies, especially those relating to strategic nuclear warfare, equally unpalatable since they feared that "thinking about the unthinkable" might in fact make the unthinkable more likely.

3. For an early argument that the United States failed to win a "decisive victory" in the Gulf War, see U.S. News & World Report Staff, *Triumph Without Victory* (New York: Times Books/Random House, 1992), pp. 399-415.

4. While recognizing that principles of war termination may vary as one moves along the spectrum of conflict from low to high intensity, we focus here principally at the mid-intensity level. Moreover, at the mid-intensity level, one can distinguish between *terminal campaigns*, which seek war termination as an end state, and *enabling campaigns*, which serve some intermediate strategic objective short of termination. In World War II, Operation Overlord, the Allied cross-channel attack and drive toward central Germany, provides an example of a terminal campaign aimed at ending the war in Europe. Overlord's predecessor, Operation Torch in 1942, aimed at expelling the Axis powers from French North Africa and offered no pretense that its success would end the war. Rather, as an enabling campaign, it served the strategic aim of engaging the Axis forces early on while allowing time to marshal the manpower and materiel required to mount Overlord. Our discussion here centers on the terminal campaign.

5. Michael Howard, *The Franco-Prussian War* (New York: Collier Books, 1969), p. 436.

6. William O. Staudenmaier, "Conflict Termination in the Nuclear Era," in *Conflict Termination and Military Strategy: Coercion, Persuasion and War*, ed. Stephen J. Cimbala and Keith A. Dunn (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1987), p. 30.

7. Stephen J. Cimbala, "The Endgame and War," in Cimbala and Dunn, p. 1-2.

8. Paul R. Pillar, *Negotiating Peace: War Termination as a Bargaining Process* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1983), p. 25. Pillar's observation is drawn from a survey of 142 conflicts over the

period 1800-1980. His analysis suggests that 68 percent of interstate conflicts, and 48 percent of all categories of conflict, have ended through some process involving negotiation between belligerent parties.

9. Gregory F. Treverton, "Ending Major Coalition Wars," in Cimbala and Dunn, p. 93. From this perspective, war termination has, generally of necessity, been viewed as a rational process admitting little room for non-rational factors such as anger, a desire for revenge, concerns with prestige, etc. For discussion of non-rational factors in war termination, see Michael I. Handel, *War Termination: A Critical Survey* (Jerusalem: Hebrew Univ. of Jerusalem, 1978), and Ikle, *Every War Must End*.

10. Department of Defense, *National Military Strategy of the United States* (Washington: GPO, January 1992), p. 5. Note also that the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act now requires the Secretary of Defense to provide the military services "written policy guidance for the preparation and review of contingency plans." Published annually, the Contingency Planning Guidance provides the Secretary of Defense, among other things, an opportunity to go beyond the general language of the national military strategy and prescribe more specific requirements for war termination; these, in turn, are transcribed into the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, the document which transmits operational planning guidance to the theater Commanders in Chief.

11. Department of Defense, *Joint Warfare of the U.S. Armed Forces*, Joint Pub 1 (Washington: GPO, November 1991). Reference is to Chapter IV, "Joint Warfare." However, in the current draft version of Joint Pub 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations*, there is a brief section titled "Conflict and War Termination."

12. Department of the Army, *Operations*, Field Manual 100-5 (Washington: GPO, May 1986), p. 10. It should also be noted that the 1986 version of FM 100-5, which sets out the Army's AirLand Battle doctrine, is currently being revised. The successor doctrine, AirLand Operations, is expected to deal more explicitly with issues related to conflict termination. See Colonel James R. McDonough, "Building the New FM 100-5: Process and Product," *Military Review*, 72 (October 1991), 12.

13. Department of the Navy, US Marine Corps, *Campaigning*, FMFM 1-1 (Washington: GPO, January 1990), pp. 33-35.

14. Halperin, p. 130.

15. Perhaps more illustrative of a military "requirement" is an "objective," McNamara's definition in the early 1960s of "assured destruction" (20 to 25 percent of the Soviet population and 50 percent of its industrial capacity) represents the sort of judgment call and precision that ultimately can come only from civilian authorities. See Alain C. Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith, *How Much Is Enough? Shaping the Defense Program, 1961-1969* (New York: Harper & Row, 1971), p. 175.

16. See John T. Fishel, *Liberation, Occupation, and Rescue: War Termination and Desert Storm* (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: USAWC Strategic Studies Institute, 31 August 1992), pp. 66-67.

17. Gay Hammerman defines war termination as beginning at "the point at which an informed, objective outside observer could predict the outcome of the war." Hammerman notes the coincidence between this and Clausewitz's concept of the "point of irreversibility" — the moment at which a commander's reserves become inferior to those of his adversary. See Gay M. Hammerman, *Conventional Attrition and Battle Termination Criteria: A Study of War Termination* (Loring, Va.: Defense Nuclear Agency Rpt. No. DNA-TR-81-224, August 1982), p. 11.

18. Bernard Brodie, *War and Politics* (New York: MacMillan, 1973), p. 92.

19. *Ibid.*, p. 94. Brodie suggests that in large part the offensive was halted in June 1951 because the Chinese had hinted through intermediaries of their interest in an armistice.

20. For a perceptive analysis of the role nuclear weapons played in terminating the Korean War, see Halperin, *Limited War in the Nuclear Age*, pp. 47-50.

21. Indeed, the conflict termination phase may itself be divided into sub-phases reflecting, for example, the transition from military to civilian preeminence as the process unfolds.

22. Note, for example, after the capture of Napoleon III at Sedan, the difficulty Bismarck encountered in locating a French "government" duly empowered to negotiate an armistice. See Howard, *The Franco-Prussian War*, pp. 230-34.

As a counterpoint, critics have justifiably suggested that, as with the 1972 bombing halts in Vietnam, such pauses may allow an opponent to renew his resources or, alternatively, may signal a lack of resolve — or both. See, e.g., Colonel Harry G. Summers, Jr., *On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War* (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1982), pp. 156-57. Ironclad principles are not to be found here. Had seizure of Baghdad been an allied objective during the Gulf War, for example, a strong case can be made that the Allies would have been well advised to communicate that intent clearly to the Iraqis, and momentarily pause outside Baghdad in an effort to negotiate its surrender prior to incurring the costs (on both sides) inevitably associated with either the siege or offensive campaign that would have been required.

23. Ikle, *Every War Must End*, p. 85.

The Middle East Scholars and the Gulf War

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The Arabist revisionists have been hard at work dissecting the causes and results of the 1991 Gulf War. Their passionate and often acerbic outpourings are everywhere evident. It would seem that in order to be published, the first requirement is that the piece either push a thesis that we should not have initiated military action against Iraq or that the war was pursued with unnecessary brutality, e.g. striking Iraqi columns on their way out of Kuwait—or conversely that the war was terminated too early, allowing Saddam Hussein to regroup and remain in power. A frequent ancillary argument to these positions has been to point to the intervention of US forces as the reason for the plight of the Shia or the Kurds and a host of other ills in the region.

Having followed events in the Middle East for more than 25 years, including nearly eight years living in the region, I have become concerned that Middle East scholarship and reporting appears to be increasingly colored by political or personal agendas. Despite some earlier misgivings with the leading lights and gurus of the Middle East academic community, I had always felt that somehow they—owing to impressive academic credentials or an assumed direct line to a cabal of Middle Eastern movers and shakers—were in the know. Prior to the Gulf War, at the many gatherings of these icons of Arabist wisdom—The Middle East Institute, The Middle East Studies Association—I listened in growing dismay as the experts forecast, often in graphic terms, the coming disaster in the Gulf.¹ Predictions of massive upheavals in every Islamic country, Americans slaughtered in the streets of Arab cities,² airliners blown from the skies,³ Arab units turning their weapons on their Western coalition allies, and Saudi Arabs emerging from their villas to toss Molotov cocktails at American tanks⁴ were duly and gravely intoned to audiences in symposiums and disseminated through the media.

In actuality very little of this happened, despite some 43 days of well-publicized coalition pounding of the Iraqi military and civilian infrastructure. There were some minor media events in Jordan, well orchestrated and controlled by the Jordanian authorities,⁵ and there were massive demonstrations in Algeria and Morocco, although they were more anti-government than anti-American.⁶ Moreover, there is little doubt that Arab public opinion, such as it is, was probably pro-Iraqi.⁷ Whether this was all visceral anti-Americanism or flavored by an equal amount of distaste for Kuwaitis and Saudis is very difficult to say.⁸ The fact remains, however, that little of the predicted upheaval in the Arab and Islamic worlds occurred. In an admission that some of the gloom-and-doom thinking had infected even our own State Department, ex-Ambassador to Iraq April Glaspie told a congressional committee, "We misjudged the Arab street."⁹

Why were the Middle East pundits so wrong? Let us say for starters that there has been an unfortunate trend among post-Orientalist¹⁰ scholars and journalists to justify every inanity, every brutality, every outrage, with some sort of cultural-relativity outlook. Just the fact that the act perpetrated was anti-Western or inexplicable seems enough justification for these scholars to dredge up some lingering residue of Zionism, imperialism, or colonialism to explain it. This attitude has become firmly lodged in the collective outlook of the Middle East community of scholars. The frequent meetings, seminars, and symposiums were *not* the vehicles for an "exchange of views" as they are so often advertised, but in actuality were simply keyboards for reinforcing the harmonies of a distinctly anti-Western ideological agenda. Dissents to the prevailing caving pessimism were generally received and interpreted as official government platitudes conveyed by lackeys of the Administration.¹¹ As Joseph Sobran sagely observed in a recent column, moral issues are arguable, but once they are enshrined as an article of etiquette, they are not. Over the years certain views of Middle East issues seem to have metamorphosed into such articles of etiquette, or axioms, rather than legitimate points of dispute. These axioms, as it turned out, were part of the problem.

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From that prologue comes my central thesis. The Middle Eastern scholars and pundits—their views having proven embarrassingly wrong prior to, during, and after the Gulf War—have come forth with a plethora of presentations, articles, and books denigrating the source of their embarrassment, i.e. the outcome of the war. It was not a victory, or it was a “victory without triumph,” or it was an unjust war, or it was something else to be decried. So let us look at the revisionists’ salient arguments.

First, we often hear the revisionist view that the war was unnecessary.¹² This view has many permutations: the incursion was an Arab problem, requiring an Arab solution,¹³ or the Iraqis had a justifiable claim to Kuwait,¹⁴ or Kuwait was unimportant and there was no danger of an Iraqi invasion of Saudi Arabia.¹⁵ An adjunct to these arguments is that we should have “allowed sanctions to work,” that is, we should have sat in the desert for some indeterminate time, hoping an economic embargo would bring Saddam to his knees.¹⁶ These claims are without substance. In the first case, it was and remains obvious that there is no such thing as an “Arab solution” to anything. Beyond some antipathy to Israel, ranging from *genuine* to *feigned*, the Arabs agree on nothing, and Kuwait was no exception. After a period of harsh verbal exchanges, the anti-Iraqi Arabs would simply have accommodated themselves to the *fait accompli* of Kuwait’s demise, leaving that intolerable situation unresolved. Kuwait was “an Arab problem” to the same extent that Hitler’s absorption of the Rhineland, Austria, and Sudetenland was “a European problem.” A corollary to the aforementioned “axioms” is that, despite evidence to the contrary spanning 70 years of modern Middle Eastern history, there is a viable entity called “the Arab World.”¹⁷ No one would dispute cultural, linguistic, and emotional affinities among Arabs, but to ascribe political unity to those affinities involves reifying an idea which was reality only for a short time 1200 years ago. An “Arab solution” remains a chimera, a fact trenchantly embodied in an Iraqi-born scholar’s observation: “Nothing so divides the Arabs as the question of unity.”¹⁸ An extension of the Arab solution argument was the “Muslim solution.” Imagine the prospect of the Iranian clerics working out a peaceful and mutually agreeable solution with the Ba’athis of Iraq! Four years after the end of their conflict, they still cannot account for each other’s prisoners of war.

Second, we hear the view that while Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait may have been a bit extreme, it was justifiable based on historical legacy. The fact that there was or could be or just might be a revealing document residing in some dusty cabinet of a dragoman’s Ottoman claim file, or a letter recording injudicious border agreement wording by some bumptious British colonial officer, has the same relevance as reviving Christopher Columbus’s claim on India for the King of Spain or now asserting an American claim to the territories above the Great Lakes. Are the revisionists actually proposing that the Ottoman Empire be reinstituted? One of my professors at the American

University of Beirut did in fact constantly remind his unappreciative students that the only era of peace in the area was Ottoman-imposed. In fact, if the Middle East were returned to a pre-World War I concept of Arab allegiances, the holocaust ensuing would make the Armenian exodus from Turkey seem like a nature walk by comparison. Even the present war in the Balkans can be considered a delayed reaction to the breakup of the Ottoman Empire.¹⁹ The Ottoman Empire was an Islamic spiritual state in which allegiance was a matter of one's religious faith, not of his location. The modern nation-state with inviolable geographic boundaries was a totally alien concept.²⁰ Until Iraq's invasion and attempted absorption of Kuwait, the boundaries imposed by colonial powers, while universally proclaimed as an evil legacy of imperialism, were nevertheless generally accepted.

Third, the oft-heard revisionist argument that there was no intention on the part of the Iraqis to push farther into Saudi Arabia misses an obvious and essential point, which is that Iraqi control of Saudi oil would have inevitably followed had the absorption of Kuwait been allowed to stand. Anyone who has followed the trends of Saudi foreign policy for the past two decades cannot escape the conclusion that a salient feature of that policy has been accommodation.²¹ For years the Saudis paid to the Palestine Liberation Organization what amounts to protection money, notwithstanding some altruistic motivation as well.²² For their donations the Saudis received assurances that the PLO would play in other peoples' yards. Why in all these years has there never been a significant PLO incident in Saudi Arabia? The point here is simply that the Saudi



VII Corps, SFC Bob Cinkett

A Bradley Fighting Vehicle waits at the first border berm separating US forces from the enemy, 27 February 1991. Neither the Iraqi defenses nor the dire predictions of Middle East "pundits" would hold up against the coalition's brilliant offensive.

royal family, astute and alert to the prevailing political winds, would eventually realize after an unchallenged Iraqi occupation of Kuwait that they faced a fateful choice: either accept a long-term US military presence in their eastern province (assuming that the American public's patience would remain constant, in itself an unlikely prospect) to counter Iraqi enmity; or institute a policy of accommodation toward the Iraqis. Accommodation with a despot such as Saddam Hussein would not have been bought as cheaply as with the PLO. Within a short period of time, the liquid gold under Saudi sands would have been controlled by Iraq—directly or indirectly.

Fourth, as to "Why didn't we let sanctions work longer?" the irony is that many who asked the question are now pointing out how the Iraqis are working around the sanctions that were in fact put in place.²³ The history of the efficacy of sanctions and embargoes is not encouraging.²⁴ Given the volatility of the Arab World and the precarious position of King Hussein in maintaining the Jordanian sanctions,²⁵ a long-standing embargo would never have been successful in dislodging Saddam from Kuwait. Moreover, as has been repeatedly pointed out, the sanctions now in place seem to have had little adverse impact on the elites who are keeping Saddam Hussein in power.²⁶

The view of the post-Orientalists that the war was unnecessary has become intertwined with criticisms of the war from other quarters. The view that the war was pushed with undue vigor is a favorite theme of some of the mainline church organizations. Their perspective of the Gulf War seems to be centered on the belief that there were disproportionate casualties and damage to the Iraqis. This perspective follows from their general world view, which all too often is much more forgiving of Third World tyrants. Having been outraged that the war was initiated at all, they invoked "just war" concepts to depict barbarism on the part of the US military in decimating the Iraqi forces and inflicting "the destruction of a country and the deaths of hundreds of thousands of people."²⁷ Some went beyond even the just war principle to embrace the total rejection of Western involvement in a Middle Eastern war for any reason—a principle which, if observed, would be sure to leave the victims in splendid and eternal bondage to the Saddam Husseins, Moammar Gadhafis, and Idi Amins in this messy, not-so-nice world.²⁸

The one common element in all these probably sincere and well-intentioned objections to the amount of force applied is a lack of understanding of the brutality institutionalized by the Iraqi regime. Thus Saddam Hussein is not responsible for the mass butchery of the Kurds—the "war" was! It reminds me of a line in the movie *The Killing Fields*, in which the lead character imputes the wholesale genocide of the Cambodian people to some sort of mass insanity to which the Khmer Rouge were driven by American bombing. In fact, a calculated Iraqi policy of eradicating Kurdish identity pre-dates the 1991 Gulf War.²⁹

Another aspect of the Western cruelty-and-brutality thesis is the steady torrent of stories emanating from Iraq detailing the sorry plight of the people—the starvation, deplorable health conditions, destroyed roads and bridges, etc.—but, in the same articles, the authors will point to the monumental rebuilding efforts going on in Iraq.³⁰ To my mind, this massive reconstruction of the infrastructure by a starved, sickly people doesn't compute. But many gullible people continue to swallow the Iraqi line.

Finally, my favorite thesis, heard often after the war, is that the Bush Administration failed to push the war hard enough. This theme emanated from a segment of the American press which has a problem separating Israeli interests from American. A prime example is *U.S. News and World Report*,³¹ which eviscerated President Bush for ending the war too quickly. While it may appear to be in Israel's short-term interest for Iraqi power to be destroyed, it is by no means certain that an Israel separated from an implacably hostile Iran by only a weak Jordan would be in their long-term interest. Certainly that result would not appeal to the United States.³² A viable Iraq is the only Middle East actor with the means to block the hegemonic aspirations of the militant Islamic fundamentalism of Iran.

Those who advocated the extension of the war or criticize the abrupt termination of the offensive have no sense of history nor appreciation of the complexities of long-term occupation and subjugation of an alien nation. Most of all they do not understand the limitations of force. In terms of history they should recall the ill-fated Mesopotamian campaign of 1915-16 in which British forces, harried by Arab irregulars and enfeebled by the climate of one of the most inhospitable areas of the world, surrendered to Ottoman forces at Kut.³³ Even with the advances in military medicine and modern communications, the notion of hundreds of thousands of American soldiers combing the cities and countryside looking for an elusive Saddam Hussein (who, perhaps in the manner of a predecessor, would be clothed as a woman, sans mustache) would seem to be a dismal prospect. It is hardly the sort of operation in which American soldiers excel. The counter-argument, of course, is that the physical apprehension of Saddam would be unnecessary, that we need only to have destroyed his institutions of power—the Ba'ath Party infrastructure, Saddam's security apparatus, and the Republican Guard. Just how American occupation forces would have gone about this delicate and long-term task has never been explained. It would ultimately have required our total immersion in the byzantine world of Arab political culture. There would have been little if any help from our Arab allies, who would have avoided at all costs overt entanglement in Iraqi politics.

The installation of a leader acceptable to all parties—the coalition nations, Iraq's Sunni Arabs, Iraq's powerful neighbors, and Iraq's restive minorities—was and is an impossible dream.³⁴ If such a leader had been found,

his tenure would not have extended beyond the withdrawal of the coalition forces. His image as a stooge or quisling would have resulted in a very short life span.

Most of all, the destruction of the instruments of oppression and power in Iraq would have led to the one thing none of Iraq's neighbors want—the fragmentation of Iraq. The prospect of an Iran-dominated Shia state on the Saudi border is indeed a frightening one. A Kurdish republic in Iraq would provide a powerful incentive for renewed efforts by Iranian and Turkish Kurds to achieve the same.³⁵ Moreover, the deep suspicions with which Iran and Turkey view one another would be exacerbated at a time when both are competing for influence in Central Asia.³⁶ The Iranians believe, for example, that the Turks harbor a desire for the incorporation of oil-rich northern Iraq into their dominion.³⁷

In short, a further and prolonged military campaign in Iraq would have ultimately ended in disaster. The “missed opportunity” to totally destroy the nucleus of Saddam’s power, the Republican Guard, is viewed by the “not enough” detractors as the major error of the war. In my view this would have resulted in the inability of Saddam and his coterie of followers to hold on to Iraqi Kurdistan and the Shia south, resulting in a fragmented Iraq and a power vacuum. A more dismal prospect from the vantage point of stability is hard to imagine. Undoubtedly it will come as a surprise to him, but sooner or later the Iraqi despot will pass from the scene and it is to everyone’s interest that Iran, the most powerful state in the region, be kept within its present boundary. Iraq serves that purpose.

Two other views held by segments of the Middle East academic community were also far off base. First, there was the belief that the Islamic bond and common virulent antipathy toward the United States were sufficient to bring together Iran and Iraq against the allied coalition.³⁸ Whatever has been said of Persians, to my knowledge no one has characterized them as stupid. To believe that the Iranians would throw overboard an immense advantage they obtained by simply doing nothing for some esoteric metaphysical link with their arch enemy boggles the imagination.

Second, the mother of all absurdities was the oft-heard conspiracy theory that the Americans, Israelis, Saudis, Kuwaitis, and a host of other nefarious actors encouraged the Iraqis to attack Kuwait in order to create a public opinion environment enabling the United States to launch a preemptive attack against an Iraq nearly ready to challenge Israel.³⁹ Several times I have sat and listened in disbelief as speakers detailed various permutations of this theory.⁴⁰ Even more disconcerting was the response of the academic audience nodding approvingly. As a military and civilian functionary for my country for some 30-plus years, my experience has been that one US government agency has trouble getting a directive across the street to another. To believe

that we could orchestrate the massive number of national and individual actors required in this conspiracy would be conceivable only in the mind of an Oliver Stone⁴¹ after prolonged overindulgence in controlled substances. I only wish we were as good as our conspiratorial-minded critics allege!

The fact that much of the commentary coming from the Middle East academic and journalistic community during the crisis turned out to be wrong is not the problem. The problem is that there has been no hard reassessment of why they were wrong. Midst the avalanche of revisionist articles and books on the Gulf War, I have yet to see one examining the analytical response of the academic community prior to the war.⁴² A responsible and professional academic and journalistic community would have simply acknowledged they were mostly wrong and gone back to the basics to find out why. But they did not. They chose to obfuscate and compound their misjudgments with what appears to be a process of disparagement of the war's results.⁴³ Unfortunately there is no self-adjustment mechanism within this academic community, and accountability for their views has thus not become an issue of analysis.

I brought this subject up at a Foreign Service seminar about a year ago, and the moderator seemed incensed that the question was asked. His answer was basically that the members of the Middle East academic community who were featured in the media were mostly second-stringers, not the first team.⁴⁴ To some extent his response was true, which then engenders another question. Where was the first team during the Gulf crisis? It would seem that duty to country and, indeed, the world should have required that they provide their assessments.⁴⁵

While my intention has not been to analyze the reasons for the weak showing of the Middle East academic community, we might mention two good ways to begin such an analysis. First, read (or reread) the essay "The State of Middle East Studies" by Bernard Lewis, who develops the valid point that there is a generally low level of competence in Middle East studies.⁴⁶ Second, take a hard relook at the status of the Arab-Israeli dispute in Middle East studies, where it is the *de rigueur* cause of all evils. To borrow again from Joseph Sobran, we should eliminate the obligatory Arab-Israeli issue from the etiquette of political science studies of the Middle East by placing it in its proper perspective. It has never been, and is not now, the primary issue in the Middle East, yet numerous scholars have been nurtured on the concept that the Middle East issue equals the Palestinian issue. Saddam Hussein did not invade Iran nor Kuwait because of Palestine. The conflicts in Sudan, Western Sahara, Eritrea, Kurdistan, and Afghanistan were not instigated by Israel. The fact that tyranny reigns almost everywhere in the Arab World is not a by-product of Zionism or imperialism. Until the Middle East academic establishment begins to educate scholars free of personal agendas so that they can appreciate the whole complex tapestry of

national motivation in this vexed part of the world, and until their institutions break free of teaching a lock-step liturgy in place of a truly liberal perspective, its diminished reputation will not improve.

NOTES

1. Robin Wright of the *Los Angeles Times* keynoted the Middle East Institute meeting in Washington, D.C., on 12 October 1990, stating among other things that any alliance against Iraq was an "illusion," and that there were no attractive alternatives. The presence of Americans on Saudi soil would "undermine" the royal family. Ms. Wright stated that she had no confidence in sanctions, and there could be no solution to the Gulf problem without first solving the Arab-Israeli dispute. Dr. Charles Doran of the School of Advanced International Studies at John Hopkins followed with an even more pessimistic view, i.e. the crisis would drag on and Saddam would outwait the United States, the embargo would leak, the coalition would crumble, Saddam would become a folk hero, US troop morale would decline, US public support would quickly erode, etc., etc. The Middle East Studies Association meeting in San Antonio, Texas, in November 1990, was the forum for a similarly gloomy assessment. Dr. Rashid Khalidi stated that the war would be much bloodier (in US casualties) than the public expected, that there would be a terrible backlash against Americans, and that a power vacuum would be created causing long-term problems. In the halls during these conferences, private views were even more emphatic in painting a gloom-and-doom assessment. If there were dissenting views, I did not hear them.

2. Robert Kupperman and Jeff Kamen, "War Over There, Terror Over Here," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 24 September 1990, p. 18.

3. Marshall Ingwerson, "U.S. Experts Cite Warning Signs," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 21 September 1990, p. 1.

4. Judith Caesar, "Dissent in Saudi Arabia," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 24 August 1990, p. 19. "American soldiers may find themselves in more danger from Saudi opposition forces than from the Iraqi Army."

5. Depiction of Jordanian reaction based on interview with senior US Foreign Service Officer of US Embassy in Amman, 16 October 1991.

6. Mohammad Muslih and Augustus Richard Norton, "Political Tides in the Arab World," *Headline Series*, Foreign Policy Association (Summer 1991), p. 58. This was also my own observation gathered during a visit to North Africa in December 1990.

7. Ann Mosely Lesch, "Contrasting Reactions to the Persian Gulf Crisis, Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and the Palestinians," *Middle East Journal*, 45 (Winter 1991), 30-50.

8. Generally speaking, the wealth and sometimes the conduct of Gulf Arabs in other Arab nations engendered resentment. In one study conducted at the American University of Cairo, Saudi students were considered more socially distant than Westerners. Ralph R. Sell, "International Affinities in Modern Egypt: Results from a Social Distance Survey of Elite Students," *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, 22 (February 1990), 71.

9. Testimony to Senate Foreign Relations Committee, C-SPAN, 19 March 1991.

10. The term "post-Orientalist" here is used to identify the newer genre of Middle East scholars for whom the term Orientalist has become a pejorative. The Orientalist is seen as a Western scholar who views Islam and the Middle East through a Eurocentric prism with a sympathetic but condescending viewpoint. The neo-Orientalist viewpoint, popularized by Dr. Edward Said, seems to be marked by a knee-jerk anti-Western ideology that all too often results in simplistic conspiracy theories. See Georges Corm, *Fragmentation of the Middle East: The Last Thirty Years* (London: Hutchinson, 1988), pp. 6-7.

11. An attitude I encountered in the gatherings of scholars and academicians, typified by the usual rejoinder, "Oh well, you're in government service; you have to say those things." On the other hand, articles published by government agencies which seemed to support their views were and continue to be quoted ad nauseum. A case in point is *Iraqi Power and U.S. Security in the Middle East*, published by the Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College (1990). In its well intentioned effort to impress policymakers with the importance of establishing friendly relations with Iraq, the authors glossed over Iraqi treatment of the Kurds and overestimated the fighting capability of the Iraqi army. To cast doubt that the Iraqis used gas on the Kurds at Halabja, Godfrey Jansen in an article in the 26 June 1992 issue of the *Middle East International*, "The Truth is Emerging" (p. 20), cites from one of numerous anti-Gulf War books a passage referring to the Army War College study.

12. Many recent revisionist books contained this theme. See Michael Rubner's review of the two books, *George Bush's War* and *Mr. Bush's War*, in *Middle East Policy*, 1 (1992), 174-78.

13. Rashid Khalidi, presentation to the Middle East Studies Association, San Antonio, Texas, 11 November 1990.

14. Mention of the fact that the borders of the Gulf states were drawn largely by or under the influence of the British was de rigueur in every apologia for the invasion of Kuwait. For example, see Edward Said,

"Behind Saddam Hussein's Moves," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 13 August 1990, p. 18. Another view includes not only the border factor but "the moral equivalency" shibboleth, i.e. "You're not OK, but I'm not either." Piero Gleijeses, "It's Not Worth Fighting a War," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 26 October 1990, p. 12. For the best short summary of the issue see Alfred Prados, "Iraq and Kuwait: Conflicting Historical Claims," *Congressional Research Service Report*, Library of Congress, January 1991.

15. George Joffe review of Dilip Hiro's book *Desert Shield to Desert Storm: The Second Gulf War in Middle East International*, 29 May 1992, p. 22.

16. Stanfield Turner, "Hang Tough on Iraqi Embargo," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 30 August 1990, p. 18. He wrote, "Thus our only choice for the near future is to see what the political and economic isolation of Iraq can do."

17. According to Elie Kedourie, only after Sharif Hussein of Mecca in 1920 proclaimed himself King of Arabs can we speak of Arab political culture ("Democracy and Arab Political Culture," Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1992, p. 26). The Pan-Arab idea retains considerable emotional strength among the elite. See As'ad Abukhalil, "A New Arab Ideology? The Rejuvenation of Arab Nationalism," *Middle East Journal*, 46 (Winter 1992), 22-36.

18. Dr. Abbas Khaledar at a symposium at London University, March 1969.

19. See Ferdinand Schevill, *History of the Balkans* (rpt.; New York: Dorset Press, 1991), pp. 393-96. The Bosnians, who converted to Islam, acted as overseers for their Ottoman rulers, subjugating the Serbian serfs who remained Christian.

20. "So alien was the idea of the territorial nation-state that Arabic had no word for Arabia, while Turkey, until modern times, lacked a word for Turkey." Bernard Lewis, *The Middle East and the West* (Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1964), pp. 72-73.

21. A good recent examination of Saudi foreign policy is Adeed Dawisha, "Saudi Arabia" in *Security in the Middle East*, ed. Samuel F. Wells, Jr., and Mark A. Bruzonsky (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1987), pp. 89-100.

22. A figure frequently quoted is about \$10 billion since 1967, not counting philanthropic grants to Palestinian institutions such as Bir Zeit University and Mokassed Hospital. Some recent references are Richard C. Hottelot, "Palestinian Prospects Never Dimmer," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 19 February 1991, p. 19; and Paul Adams, "Cuts in Gulf Funding Pinch Palestinian Economy," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 6 September 1990, p. 3.

23. A typical story to this effect is by Shatiga Daulet, "Why Are You Doing This to Us?" *The Christian Science Monitor*, 10 January 1992, p. 19.

24. The historical record of sanctions is examined and their effectiveness disputed in Robert A. Doughty and Harold E. Raugh, Jr., "Embargoes in Historical Perspectives," *Parameters*, 21 (Spring 1991), 21-30.

25. See Alfred B. Prados, "Jordan: Persian Gulf Crisis and U.S. Aid," *Congressional Research Service Report*, Library of Congress, 11 January 1991.

26. Elaine Sciolino, "Iraq: Prospects for Assimilation," presentation at Persian Gulf Conference of Middle East Institute, Washington, D.C., 13 June 1991. See also Raymond A. Schroth, "UN Sanctions in Iraq: Deadly Weapon—Wrong Target," *Commonweal*, 11 September 1992, pp. 4-6.

27. Michael K. Duffey, "The Just War: Teaching from Tonkin Gulf to Persian Gulf," *America*, 2 February 1991, pp. 83-89; Drew Christiansen, S.J., "The Ethics of U.S. Strategies in the Persian Gulf," *America*, 8 December 1991, pp. 450-52, 460, 462. Ron Scherer, "Church Leaders Urge Cease Fire: Delegates at World Council of Churches Conference Lambaste U.S.-Led Gulf War Effort," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 20 February 1991, p. 6.

28. William Shannon, "Christian Conscience and Modern Warfare," *America*, 15 February 1992, pp. 108-12. Martin van Creveld, in his article, "The Persian Gulf Crisis of 1990-1991 and the Future of Morally Constrained War," *Parameters*, 22 (Summer 1992), 21-40, makes the key point that a moral stance which equates all wars as equally abhorrent has the effect of removing all civilized restraints on conduct of war. All too soon forgotten has been Saddam Hussein's use of force to "abolish a sovereign state" and his threat to use poisoned gas, taking civilians hostage, deliberate destruction of Kuwait's economic infrastructure, and using his own civilians as hostage by placing military targets in civilian neighborhoods. With further regard to the moral aspects of war, there was some indignation that Iraqi casualties were so high, while coalition forces were so low. The Bush Administration was criticized for thinking only about American costs. Keith Berner, "Morality and Bush Foreign Policy," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 17 April 1991, p. 18. This concept inspires images of American soldiers being ordered to commit *seppuku* (suicide) in order to even the casualty score and assuage the tender consciences of the morally correct.

29. U.S. Congress, Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, 102d Cong., 2d sess., 19 March 1992, S. Hrg. 102-682, p. 3.

30. Daulet, "Why Are You Doing This to Us?" p. 19.

31. Observing the ferocity with which Mortimer Zuckerman has gone after the "Iraq-gate" story, it appears that the intention is to somehow pin the blame for Iraqi power on American largesse. See "The Cloud Over Desert Storm," *U.S. News and World Report*, 31 August - 7 September 1992, p. 106. The Administration "ult" toward Iraq was a plausible response to the Iranian threat to the Gulf and its oil. I remember at the time many of the Middle East observers were expecting Iranian moves toward Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia had already begun a process of accommodation to Iran, i.e. setting oil prices to comply with Iranian interests. See also Albert Wohlstetter and Fred Hoffman, "The Bitter End: The Case for Re-Intervention in Iraq," *New Republic*, April 1992, pp. 20-24. For the best rebuttal of the not-enough argument see William L. Dowdy, *Second Guessing the End of Desert Storm*, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa., February 1992.

32. Though the post-Orientalists do not want to advance the cause of Israel, of course, they could scarcely contain their glee over Bush's discomfiture as his post-Gulf War popularity waned. See stories in such publications as *Middle East International* (seemingly dedicated to the view that if Her Majesty is not the preeminent power in the Middle East then it is incumbent upon it to undermine the Americans), e.g. "The Albatross Around Bush's Neck," 12 June 1992, and "Bush's Desert Storm Laurels Slip," 7 August 1992.

33. See A. J. Barker, *The Bastard War: Mesopotamian Campaign 1914-1918* (New York, Dial Press, 1967).

34. Twenty-three different opposition groups gathered in Beirut in March 1991. Laurie Mylroie, *The Future of Iraq*, Washington Institute Policy Paper Number 24, 1991, p. 33.

35. Robert Olsen, "The Creation of a Kurdish State," *Journal of South Asian and Middle East Studies*, 15 (Summer 1992), 1-25.

36. Shireen T. Hunter, "Will Azerbaijan's New Rulers Safeguard Western Interests?" *Middle East International*, 24 July 1992, pp. 19-20.

37. Just one of many editorials coming out of Iran expressing this concern was contained in Iranian daily ABRAR broadcast on 2 November 1992. "Iran in no way will give in to disintegration of regional countries and changes in borders, because any alteration of borders will provide a prelude for break-out of a war and a general crisis." Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Near East South Asia 92-213, 3 November 1992, p. 39.

38. Thomas Stauffer, "A Possible Iran-Iraq Axis," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 23 August 1990, p. 18. Bahman Baktiari, "War's Havoc in Iran and Saudi Arabia," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 17 December 1990, p. 19.

39. See Godfrey Jansen, "A Year After Desert Storm: Differing Views of the War," *Middle East International*, 24 January 1992, pp. 15-16.

40. One in particular occurred at the Southeast Regional Middle East and Islamic Studies Seminar, Savannah, Ga., 15 April 1991, in a presentation by Dr. Ali Altai titled, "The Gulf Crisis: What the Iraqis Say." On Middle Eastern predilection for conspiracy theories, see Daniel Pipes, "Dealing with Middle Eastern Conspiracy Theories," *Orbis*, 36 (winter 1992), 42.

41. An allusion to Oliver Stone's 1992 cinema *JFK*, portraying the view that John F. Kennedy's assassination by Lee Harvey Oswald was the result of an elaborate conspiracy.

42. There have been a number of people who have indeed recognized not only the misjudgments of the Middle East scholars and journalists, but the defense analysts as well. See Mr. Krauthammer's response to a question on this subject in the Conference Proceedings of the SOREF Symposium "American Strategy after the Gulf War," Washington Institute for Near East Policy, April 1991, p. 79. See also Jacob Weisberg, "Gulfballs: How the Experts Blew It Big Time," *The New Republic*, 25 March 1991, pp. 17-19.

43. One example is Robin Wright, who, after being wrong on nearly every prediction earlier, returns to the fray to write "that Kuwaiti sovereignty may be restored and Saudi security ensured, but the long-term cost-benefit ratio on a host of other fronts is almost certainly not in favor of U.S. interests" ("Unexplored Realities of the Persian Gulf Crisis," *Middle East Journal*, 45 [Winter 1991], 29). Denigration of the allied military achievements is part of the revisionists' litany. For example see Martin Walker, "Dateline Washington: Victory and Delusion," *Foreign Policy*, No. 83 (Summer 1991), 161. "It [Iraq] presumed to deploy a makeshift, obsolete version of a Soviet field army."

44. For an example of talking heads during the Gulf crisis, see David Segal, "Shrink Rap," *The New Republic*, 25 March 1991, p. 18, profiling the remarkable career of Judith Kipper.

45. Dr. Edward R. Said wrote that the mainstream scholars "affiliated themselves with the Administration" ("The Intellectuals and the War," *Middle East Report*, 21 [July-August 1991], 16). Having examined almost all national Middle Eastern periodicals published within the past two years, I can find very little support for his contention. In fact, it was the exact opposite with few exceptions. One such exception was Fouad Ajami, whom Dr. Said characterizes as a "mediocre scholar" in the same article.

46. Bernard Lewis also makes the point that the polarizing effect of the Arab-Israeli issue creates an unhealthy environment for scholarship. Moreover, he decries foreign grants to universities and a mind set within universities that only people "sympathetic" to their area of studies should teach it (*The American Scholar*, 48 [Summer 1979], 365-81).

Sendero Luminoso: Case Study in Insurgency

DANIEL W. FITZ-SIMONS

The September 1992 capture of Abimael Guzman (Comrade Gonzalo), the terrorist leader of Peru's mysterious Sendero Luminoso, has received a lot of attention. Yet despite Guzman's capture, Sendero Luminoso, Spanish for "Shining Path," remains Peru's largest and most serious security problem. Sendero has grown from a few hundred cadre in 1980 to at least 15,000 active supporters and is now considered the most ruthless terrorist insurgency in Latin America. The insurgents have been responsible for approximately 24,000 deaths and \$22 billion in damages to Peru's infrastructure.

Originally a rural insurgency founded in the department of Ayacucho ("the corner of the dead"), Sendero began by exploiting the grievances and centuries-old government neglect of impoverished peasant areas.¹ Its ideology is a hybrid of Marxism-Leninism, Maoism, and nihilism, emphasizing indigenous Indian values while rejecting both Hispanic culture and democratic ideals. Sendero's utopia is premised on the spiritual rejuvenation of its chosen people, the Quechua-speaking "cosmic race." This messianic movement seeks to cleanse Peru of its corruption, arbitrary power centers, and foreign dependency. Sendero professes an ideological affinity with the reactionary Khmer Rouge in Cambodia and has adapted its long-term (50-100 year) Maoist strategy to fit Peru's unique circumstances. Moreover, its brutality, fanaticism, and ethnic socialism combine to give it the flavor of Pol Pot's movement transported to the Andes. Sendero's war of attrition is aimed at the total destruction of the existing society, and its tenacity is on par with its viciousness.²

Sendero's founding dates back to 1970, when Manuel Abimael Guzman Reynoso, then a philosophy professor at the University of Huamanga, organized a breakaway faction of Peru's Communist Party. The Jesuit-educated Guzman grew up in Arequipa, where he learned that violence could produce radical change. He was also influenced by the Peruvian Marxist Jose Carlos

Mariategui, who wrote that "Marxism would provide a shining path to victory." Within the movement Guzman is a messiah known as Dr. Puka Inti (Red Sun), and his followers believe that his ideas are "the fourth sword" after the legacy of Marx, Lenin, and Mao.³ On a more practical level, one observer has compared Guzman and his militants to "Charles Manson with an army."

After traveling to China, Guzman spent ten years cultivating his Maoist ideology and developing a unique dogma of Inca communism. Before going underground in 1979, Guzman recruited a small group of university students and instructors from whom he expected fanatical loyalty. This hard core cadre formed clandestine cells and deliberately began to infiltrate key government institutions. The Quechua-speaking top echelon also provided a link with the Indian masses whom Guzman hoped to politicize. At the same time, however, his movement is an ideological enigma because while it champions Indian culture, most of its victims are Indians. Moreover, Sendero's leadership is typically made up of middle class mestizo intellectuals, not Indian peasants.⁴

Strategy and Tactics

The group's original base was in the southern Sierra, or Andes, region, but the insurgency steadily expanded north and west. Sendero now controls significant portions of the countryside and has links with drug traffickers in the Upper Huallaga Valley, who provide funding and a continuing base of operations. The movement also uses its ties with the narco-traffickers to exact a higher payment to the coca growers, thus expanding its popular support. More recently, Sendero set up fund-raising front groups in Europe and the United States. For the most part, however, the dogmatic, self-reliant movement refuses to consider a united front with the traffickers or other insurgent groups.⁵ Nor does it purchase arms on the international black market; instead, its militants assassinate policemen or soldiers and take their rifles. Dynamite, which is plentiful in rural mining areas, is one of the Sendero's principal weapons. The explosive is hidden in automobiles and detonated in front of banks, or packed on burros and driven toward military

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posts. Sendero guerrilla columns usually consist of 10 to 15 personnel armed with AK-47s, Uzis, and occasionally RPG-7s. However, in the Upper Huallaga Valley, Sendero columns are often of company-size, numbering 60 to 120 insurgents; deals with drug lords have provided them with M-60 machine guns, 81mm mortars, and grenade launchers.

Sendero's strategy has evolved through several stages. After secretly recruiting, training, and organizing party cadre in the remote Andes during its first stage, the movement launched its second stage in 1980. Safe houses and supply networks were created, and the obscure terrorist group soon made its presence known by attacking government officials. Police were driven from rural outposts; judges and locally elected officials were murdered. Village

elders, teachers, and agricultural professionals were targeted for assassination. In the third stage, liberated zones were established in which Sendero militants imposed anti-technological, subsistence-level peasant economies by brutal methods. Modern farm equipment and crops were destroyed, regional markets closed, and reluctant supporters tortured and killed.

In 1982, the fourth stage was initiated. This consisted of hit-and-run guerrilla strikes against government military forces in rural areas. Sendero then gradually moved toward the fifth stage, a people's war in urban areas including the capital.⁷ Sendero is attempting to divide Peru by expanding along the spine of the Sierra mountain range and gradually cutting Lima off from its food supplies. Comparisons with guerrilla strategies around Beirut and Kabul are frequently heard. Sendero also controls vast jungle areas in the Mantaro, Ene, and Perene river valleys, where it has set up training bases and indoctrination centers well away from military bases. The army, short of fuel and equipment, cannot conduct search and destroy missions in these remote regions.⁸

All Sendero combatants are indoctrinated party members, and their highly mobile columns travel from village to village providing a military shield for the political cadres. In addition, communities organized under Sendero undergo savage discipline and puritanical regulations. Bars and houses of prostitution are shut down in villages taken over by the guerrillas, and Sendero prisoners in government jails keep their cells spotless. While Sendero is brutal, it is not indiscriminate in the use of terror, its tactics being calculated rather to set an example or carry symbolic meaning. In carefully chosen sectors, government officials, social workers, missionaries, and foreigners are targeted for assassination. Horrible methods are employed, including hacking up the body or sewing the victim's lips so the soul cannot escape. Spies are everywhere ("the party has a thousand eyes and ears") in Sendero-controlled territory, and local cadres remain clandestine.⁹ A sophisticated infrastructure is established, and agricultural production in Sendero villages is divided in two, with half going to the people and half going to the party apparatus.

Politically, the movement is organized on the national level under a Leninist-model politburo, central committee, and secretariat, which oversee party operations. Rigid operational zones are assigned on the local level. These overt organizations are paralleled by a clandestine party pyramid consisting of cells whose members don't know each other, making it difficult for government intelligence agencies to penetrate the underground network.

Much of Sendero's support among the peasants is based on blatant terror as opposed to the Maoist doctrine of winning hearts and minds. For example, in 1991 leftist reformer Elena Moyano was shot dead and her body blown up with dynamite as her children watched. In addition, five priests and two nuns became targets of "annihilation teams" simply because they, like Moyano, were helping the poor. Sendero's policy of decapitating the leadership

of popular organizations to create a vacuum that its cadres can then fill follows an earlier strategy of eliminating the state's presence.¹¹ This campaign of rural terror has gradually spread so that the insurgency now threatens Lima itself, where squatter villages on the capital's outskirts remain fertile grounds for insurgent penetration. The government has made little effort to control these migrant populations, where unemployed newcomers are ripe for Sendero propaganda and intimidation.¹²

In July 1992 residents of Lima's plush Miraflores district were stunned by the explosion of a car bomb loaded with more than 1300 pounds of dynamite. The blast—which killed 25 people, demolished two apartment buildings, and left 500 homeless—signaled a new urban offensive against Lima's middle and upper classes. More bombs exploded around the city, and Sendero commandos rained machine gun fire on police stations as an armed strike was called to paralyze Lima. Just before Abimael Guzman's arrest, Sendero appeared to be tightening the noose around Lima, positioning itself to cut the central highway leading east from the city into the mountains.¹³

Weaknesses

Sendero's gradual rise to prominence has not occurred without difficulty. As events have recently showed, its underground terrorist network is far from invincible, and like any other insurgency it is vulnerable to attack on a number of fronts.¹⁴ Moreover, Sendero successes are largely attributable to a lack of government infrastructure in areas where guerrillas frequently fill politico-military vacuums left by government default. Sendero's rigid doctrine has also made it extremely unpopular among rural populations under its control, and on several occasions Indian peasants using home-made spears or sharpened stakes have revolted and killed Sendero members. Villagers have also been willing to cooperate with counterinsurgency forces and have pleaded with the government for modern weapons to defend themselves against the guerrillas. The ideological support of Sendero-controlled regions is therefore tentative, with some support based solely on terror. Many Indians simply want to be left alone to pursue their traditional living patterns. Large segments of the political left are also opposed to Sendero because they have been targeted by its terrorists or because both are competing for the support of the urban masses. Finally, while Sendero works with drug traffickers, the alliance is strictly a marriage of convenience. Neither the traffickers nor rival Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA) insurgents are trusted by Sendero.¹⁵

Starting as a rural guerrilla organization, Sendero is now finding it more difficult to operate in urban areas. Peruvian intelligence has improved with time, and over the last two years high-ranking Sendero members were arrested and their underground newspapers shut down even before Guzman's capture. Another problem for the insurgents is the poor coordination between the

political and military branches (talkers vs. fighters). At times, coordination of guerrilla columns in the field has been lacking. Historically, Latin American guerrilla organizations have had unification problems resulting in break-away splinter groups or rival factions. Moreover, the cult of the person is a strong regional tendency which could cause leadership problems in the future, especially with the capture of Guzman and some of his top party cadre.¹⁶ Thus, as the movement is forced to recruit additional members, the quality and dedication of its membership could decline.¹⁷ On the ideological front, Sendero also must contend with the Catholic Church, its greatest adversary in the competition for allegiance of conservative Indian peasants. Militarily, Sendero does not possess the sophisticated weapons or manpower for a showdown with the armed forces. Even though the insurgents control large segments of the country, they are still unable to confront the military in set-piece conventional combat.

Drug Trafficking

In many cases, Sendero has allied itself with the narcotraffickers to gain needed financial support. Peruvian narcotraffickers are estimated to net an annual profit of about \$700 million. Sendero also plays off both sides in the cocaine trade by charging the traffickers for protection and shipment rights, and mediating higher prices for the coca growers. Thus, the insurgents are able to gain the loyalty of the 500,000 to 600,000 peasants in the Huallaga Valley who cultivate coca.¹⁸

On the counternarcotics side, rivalries between the army and national police are a serious problem. With the exception of a few elite units, the politicized police are abysmally paid, and many Peruvians regard them as just another group of armed thugs. The army controls all areas of operations and on several occasions has harassed or forbidden police anti-drug patrols from entering its area of operations. The army high command also considers the drug issue a distraction from its real enemies, Sendero and the MRTA. In addition, some army commanders are fearful that counternarcotics operations will drive peasants into the ranks of the guerrillas, while others use coca growers as an intelligence source against Sendero. Corruption within the army is a constant problem, with the average soldier being paid the US equivalent of only \$12 a month. Some officers compete for commands in the Upper Huallaga Valley because payoffs from coca growers are so lucrative.¹⁹

The Human Rights Issue

Sendero activities in some regions have been crushed by ruthless army counteroffensives, frequently by resort to mass murder, torture, and unexplained disappearances. These army tactics proved to be strategic failures, however, because the peasants were alienated and the guerrillas simply moved elsewhere.

Moreover, the human rights group Americas Watch accused the Peruvian government of having the worst human rights record in Latin America and of using Indian patrols as cannon fodder in its war against Sendero.

Peru's human rights record also has damaged US-Peruvian relations, with Washington refusing to send military aid to Peru.²⁰ In addition, some Peruvian officers continue to view Argentina's counterinsurgency doctrine favorably in spite of the so-called "Dirty War" during the 1970s in which thousands of Argentines were executed by the military on suspicion of terrorist sympathies. Human rights concerns were heightened by Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori's promotion of General Jose Valdivia to Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, since Valdivia had been implicated in a peasant massacre.²¹ Nevertheless, the army has taken measures to change its image as a brutal occupation force, and soldiers are now encouraged to protect Indians against corrupt judges and police as well as against guerrillas. This strategy appears to be working in provinces like Junin, where the insurgents are losing the support of local inhabitants. Moreover, while most civilian casualties in the early 1980s were caused by the army, most deaths now are attributed to Sendero.²²

The Armed Forces

While Peru is one of the dominant military powers in South America, its military remains organized, trained, and equipped for conventional war against Chile and Ecuador rather than for counterinsurgency operations. Only about 13 percent of the military's staff college curriculum concentrates on operations other than war, and the army is still planning to purchase more tanks and fighter planes.²³ Even more important, approximately half of the armed forces are garrisoned along Peru's borders, away from the centers of guerrilla activity. Peru's officer corps is plagued by personnel problems, and there is some feeling that the high command is largely composed of incompetent Fujimori yes-men who rarely remain in their areas of expertise more than a year.²⁴

Fujimori's policy of basing promotions on loyalty as opposed to ability is causing resentment among the officer corps; a semi-clandestine group—COMACAS (Commanders, Majors, and Captains)—aims at restoring professionalism to the armed forces. To guard against a coup, Fujimori has appointed Vladimiro Montesinos, a cashiered captain once accused of selling information to the CIA, as his intelligence czar. Montesinos is tasked to keep files on all of Peru's senior military officers. In November 1992, several retired high-ranking officers were accused of plotting a coup against Fujimori, and the controversial Commander-in-Chief, General Valdivia, was sacked for alleged complicity in the coup. However, many Peruvians remain skeptical about the accusations, viewing the incident as a move by Fujimori to purge the military.²⁵

In the rural areas of Peru, fighting has taken on the aura of classic guerrilla warfare, and analogies to Vietnam are frequently made. While government troops are usually better armed than the guerrillas, the insurgents have the advantages of terrain, ambush, and interior lines of communication. As with most guerrilla conflicts, the war is particularly vicious, and the majority of casualties are civilians who get in the way during fire-fights between government forces and guerrillas.²⁶ Also characteristically, some civilian deaths are deliberate. It is not unusual to see decapitated bodies of women and children floating down a river in contested areas. Buses and trucks are frequently held up or hijacked, the rivers are devoid of boat traffic, and light planes are considered "aluminum coffins" because they make easy targets for guerrilla snipers. Complicating the problem, many communities in mountainous areas are widely scattered, making them difficult to protect.

In some instances the war has taken on genocidal aspects. Sendero openly boasts of its extermination campaign against the fiercely independent Ashaninka Indians, who have violently resisted efforts to subdue them. The Ashaninka speak no Spanish and communicate outside their ranks only with Catholic missionaries. The war took an even more complex turn when the Ashaninka decided to help the army drive MRTA guerrillas out of their valley but in the process clashed with another tribe, the Yaneshas, starting a brutal inter-tribal conflict.²⁷

The armed forces generally lack mobility to operate against insurgents in the highlands and jungles, and government units are seldom at full strength. Moreover, Peru's mixed weapons inventory makes it difficult to substitute repair parts, and many vehicles are inoperable because of cannibalization. Ammunition and fuel supplies are often depleted by either high costs or corruption, thus limiting training. In addition, rank-and-file troops often lack boots and rifles that fire properly. As Peru obtains more sophisticated helicopters and armored personnel carriers, standard foot patrols, an essential part of counterinsurgency conflict tactics, may be eliminated.

The army improved its force structure in 1990 by trading in aging Soviet Mi-8 transport helicopters for new Mi-17s. The Mi-17s carry more than 30 troops and can be used by rapid response units. The army also hopes to purchase more scout helicopters capable of flying over the Andes without their engines overheating. These light helicopters could be fitted with machine guns and rocket pods to provide fire support for ground forces. Both the army and navy have special commando units (modeled on the British Special Air Service) which were reportedly trained by ex-Israeli army officers. These elite units operate in the Mantaro Valley near Lima, where guerrillas continue to cut power lines.²⁸

Until 1990, army patrols were usually sent out only in response to terrorist attacks or deployed guerrilla columns. Such patrols routinely sustained

heavy ambush casualties because they were transported by trucks over major roads. Since then, however, a change in tactics employing helicopter gunships and airmobile troop carriers has proven more successful. The army has also deployed more troops to guerrilla areas, especially elite special forces and marines who are well trained and highly motivated. In Lima, the army is challenging urban terrorist attacks by selectively combing shanty towns (so-called red zones).

Another positive aspect of this new anti-guerrilla strategy has been the formation of armed militias, which were originally organized to defend remote Indian villages from Sendero attacks. In many cases poorly armed militias bravely stood up to guerrillas, driving them out of their valleys. Until recently, the army was reluctant to arm the militias with sophisticated weapons, so that civilian patrols were forced to go up against guerrilla machine guns with only a few shotguns and hand grenades. Nevertheless, the militia forces have grown from 14,000 to 50,000, covering huge tracts of rural hinterlands, and the Ministry of Defense is planning to provide them with modern automatic weapons. In still another positive development, army detachments now patrol jointly with Indians, incorporating them into counterinsurgency operations as scouts, translators, and intelligence collectors.²⁹

Conclusion

Abimael Guzman was captured in Surco, a middle-class Lima neighborhood, along with seven other Sendero leaders. Others arrested included the movement's number two leader, Elvia Iparraguirre, and members of the policymaking central committee. According to General Antonio Vidal, leader of the government's elite anti-guerrilla police unit, the arrest was an important political victory. It followed a three-month intelligence campaign to locate Guzman, who was forced to move to Lima because he had developed a skin problem while hiding out in the high altitudes of the Andes.³⁰ Previous arrests of Sendero cadre had already caused an organizational crisis and may have been responsible for the switch in Sendero's strategy from rural to urban guerrilla warfare.³¹

Guzman's arrest, coming less than three months after the capture of MRTA leader Victor Polay, was part of a government intelligence strategy targeting both Sendero and MRTA political cadres. However, Sendero's guerrilla infrastructure is still largely in place, and the capture of Guzman could precipitate even more terrorist vengeance against the government. Sendero activities usually have been meticulously planned, and a contingency operation previously drawn up for use in the event of Guzman's capture could already be in motion.³² As long as Guzman remains in jail, there is a very real danger that Sendero will stage a spectacular hostage-taking or terrorist scenario to free him.

While small numbers of Sendero guerrillas have voluntarily surrendered to government authorities, it remains to be seen if a demoralized Sendero will collapse as a result of Guzman's capture. One thing is certain, however: if President Fujimori and the newly elected Peruvian legislature fail to alleviate the country's massive socioeconomic problems, stability in Peru will remain extremely tenuous.

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Alliance and Coalition Warfare

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"I was about ready to agree with Napoleon's conclusion that it is better to fight allies than to be one of them."

— Lieutenant General Mark Clark, 1944

How can anyone examine the complex, confusing, fascinating record of the Napoleonic era without reflecting upon the strange array of full-time, part-time, and sometime friends, allies, and enemies—all variously siding with or against each other? During the turbulent Napoleonic wars (1792-1815), seven coalitions formed at one time or another against France, few boasting the same or even most of the same participants. For various reasons, some combatants, notably Austria, Prussia, Spain, and Russia, even changed sides several times during the period.¹ The first startling feature of alliances and coalitions, then, is their composition. But an even more startling feature is that once formed, alliances often work.

Like Thomas Jefferson, political purists may well long for "peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations—entangling alliances with none."² Pragmatists, however ruefully, know differently, tending to find truth in Charles Dudley Warner's old saw, "Politics makes strange bedfellows."³ Accordingly, the cooperation implicit in an alliance is not necessarily willing. It is usually reluctant at best, sometimes even coerced. Only the most wishful-thinking observer substitutes "friendship" for "interest" when addressing the roots of alliances.⁴

What better explains this century's nefarious on-again, off-again love match between the Germans and Russians? They were bitter foes in World War I yet cooperative allies from 1921 to 1932. Jointly, secretly, and in violation of the Versailles Treaty, they developed poison gases, tanks, aircraft, and combined-arms techniques. This "fierce friendship"⁵ eventually dissolved into another, even fiercer war. But before it did, Germany and Russia signed a nonaggression treaty and divided Poland in 1939; in that same

year Russia provided Germany a temporary naval base on Soviet territory near Murmansk (good until Germany obtained better-situated bases in Norway a year later).⁶ In 1940 Soviet icebreakers broke the way through the Arctic's northeast passage for a German armed merchant cruiser en route to the Pacific,⁷ and in November 1940 Germany even invited the Soviet Union to join the Axis.⁸ Clearly, political interests imply no affection or even affinity.

We should begin with the understanding that alliances and coalitions are not the same. From a military standpoint, a coalition is an informal agreement for common action between two or more nations.⁹ An alliance, on the other hand, is a more formal arrangement for broad, long-term objectives.¹⁰ In the military vocabulary, both require *combined operations*—meaning operations involving two or more forces or agencies of two or more allies.¹¹

Necessity drives nations to form coalitions, as going it alone normally imposes serious limitations. Individual nations are usually insufficiently capable of addressing a given threat. Mobilization resources or time may not be available, and few factors contribute to public legitimacy like a coalition effort.¹²

Alliances and coalitions hardly began with the Napoleonic era. Historically, they have been the rule, not the exception. When the Israelites fought the worshippers of Baal about 1100 B.C., Gideon's side included the Abiezrites and the Clan of Mannassa against Zebah and Zalmunna's Midianites, Amelekites, and Arabians.¹³ Both sides in the Trojan War were coalitions, including even, in Homer's account, heavenly allies for each. When Alexander the Great fought in Persia, he arrayed the Hellenic League against Darius III's Persians, Scythians, Parthians, Yrcanthians, Bactrians, and Chaldeans.¹⁴ On the part of the United States, save for the War of 1812, Mexican War, Civil War, and Spanish-American War, all American wars and conflicts—including the Cold War—have been coalition efforts.¹⁵ The degree of integration, unity, and cohesion has varied widely, but all were coalitions and several were even alliance efforts.¹⁶

The 1990-91 Gulf War provides the most recent example of a substantial and successful coalition. There, 37 nations eventually provided support for the coalition cause. Once coalition aims were achieved, the coalition disbanded. NATO, on the other hand, provides the most recent, most enduring example of an alliance. Created in 1949 as a bar to Soviet aggression, NATO has enjoyed

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expansion (from 12 to 16 members), endured crisis (Greece's strained relations with NATO allies, 1980-83), survived defection (France's 1966 withdrawal from the integrated military structure), and weathered endless storms of debate, deliberation, and delay. Even today, American military strategy continues to rely on collective security, and US deterrence and warfighting doctrine rely on "working with our allies and friends in regional and international coalitions, to include operations as part of the United Nations."¹⁷

To be sure, coalition and alliance efforts merit mixed reviews, particularly in the area of unity of effort and command. During World War I, on the Allied side were France, the British Empire, Russia, Italy, and eventually the United States; on the Central Powers' side, Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Turkey. The Allies never achieved full unity of command. From the beginning of the war, mutual Anglo-French distrust and age-old animosities prevented any unity of command and even hampered cooperation and coordination. True, in April 1918 the Beauvais Agreement entrusted strategic direction of military operations to French Marshal Ferdinand Foch. But the agreement left tactical employment to national commanders and allowed those commanders the right of appeal. Given the Allied strategic setting at this time—America was in the war but still forming an army, while Russia, in the wake of 6.6 million casualties and the Bolshevik Revolution, was out—this arrangement was not much of an improvement.

The United States entered World War I without specific political objectives, treaties, or military alliance arrangements. President Woodrow Wilson, seeking not to prematurely link, nor bind, the United States to any stated or implied Allied war aims (although even by April 1917, there were precious few of them) decided to make the United States an "associate" rather than an "ally." This legalistic distinction provided time for him to determine just what American objectives would be.¹⁸ In January 1918 he grandly announced these—his Fourteen Points—as a peace proposal. In the military arena, US General John Pershing resisted efforts to employ American forces as piecemeal fillers among French and British formations, seeking instead to preserve an integral American field army.¹⁹

If the Allied cause lacked unity of effort and boasted little integration, the same cannot be said for the Central Powers. Beginning with Turkey's official entry into the war on Germany's side in October 1914 (their actual alliance, however, dated from 2 August 1914), German officers came to occupy a remarkable number of important posts in the Turkish army. Eventually German officers commanded one Turk army group out of two, four armies out of ten, five corps, and 12 divisions, while 13 Germans served as army group or army chiefs of staff.²⁰ During the Turkish army's most celebrated and successful campaign, Gallipoli, initial Turk defenses found its Fifth Army, one of its two corps and two of six divisions commanded by Germans while all troops were

Turkish. The German-Turkish experience, however, was unique and not duplicated between Germany and Austria-Hungary.

Not only was the Austro-Hungarian Empire weak, its ethnic diversity made national unity of effort, let alone coalition unity, all but impossible. And if internal diversity created one set of problems (in 1914, announcement of mobilization had to be posted in 15 different languages!), widespread and long-standing bad feeling toward the German ally manifested itself in unusual ways. For example, German-speaking Austro-Hungarian officers, whether communicating in German or any other imperial tongue, could be ejected from the officer corps if they "behaved with German arrogance."²¹

During World War II, coalition efforts were even more common than during World War I, and—for the Allies—much more successful. The American Fifth Army in Italy represents the best American, and probably the best Allied, coalition experience of the war. Non-US components composed almost half its manpower. Though not all assigned at the same time, Fifth Army fielded three US corps (11 divisions), two British and one Commonwealth corps (six British, one New Zealand, one South African, and three Indian divisions), a French corps (one French, one Algerian, and two Moroccan divisions), two Italian combat groups, and a Brazilian division.²² Difficulties—logistics, language, and doctrine among them—were substantial, to be sure, but not insurmountable.

On the Axis side, Germany and Japan signed the Anti-Comintern Pact in 1936. Aimed at thwarting the spread of Soviet communism, this pact was annulled in August 1939 when Germany unilaterally, and without consultation with Japan, signed a non-aggression treaty with the Soviet Union. In September 1940, the Tripartite Pact linked Germany, Italy, and Japan, but for all practical purposes only Germany and Italy cooperated to any significant degree and then only until Italy's surrender in September 1943.²³ Eventually, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Finland fought on the German side (Franco's fascist Spain also contributed one division²⁴). Except for Finland, the non-German Axis partners suffered from uneven training at all levels, utterly inadequate equipment, language problems, and huge differences in national character, fighting spirit, and political views. To get the best out of her World War II allies, Germany relied on an extensive liaison system down to division level and also employed "corset stays"—German units in reserve positions behind allied formations, intended to intervene as the tactical situation demanded.²⁵

By far Germany's greatest allied success was with Finland. This was largely the result of Finland's antagonism against Russia as a result of their 1939-40 Winter War, a long-standing military relationship with Germany, and the status of German as the principal second language in Finland. Even so, the Finns shared no common strategic goals with the Germans, the former seeking return of territory lost in the Winter War, the latter seeking destruction of the Soviet state.

Despite poorly known, misunderstood, and ignored aspects of the Korean War, it, too, exemplifies a successful coalition. Sixteen nations eventually participated in the Korean War under the United Nations flag. All UN units acted in concert with American and South Korean forces, most of them attaching their formations to American divisions. And if the military difficulties of non-American battalions serving with American divisions – difficulties of language, weapons, training, readiness, and doctrine – were often pronounced, the political value and impact more than compensated.²⁶ The Vietnam War only a few years later saw little of the Korean War's unity, cohesion, and multilateral participation.

Practical necessity dictates most coalitions. Once established, a coalition normally requires coordination of effort to achieve common political, economic, and social objectives; agreed strategic plans to achieve military objectives; and, of course, unity of command. During World War II and the Korean War, these requirements largely were met. During the Vietnam War, they largely were not.

Although unity of command is important to coalition military success, this does not necessarily mean, and historically it has usually not meant, full compelling authority over allied commanders and formations. Authority, therefore, tends to be collegial, and a successful coalition leader will be persuasive rather than coercive. Thus, despite an environment of great ambiguity, a Dwight Eisenhower or H. Norman Schwarzkopf will be more successful in a coalition environment than a "Vinegar Joe" Stilwell.²⁷ Although a highly capable soldier, in World War II Joseph Stilwell did not get along well with most of his Chinese and British allies. Despite his experience during four tours in China, he remained "impatient, acid, impolitic"—in short, "not the ideal man for the role."²⁸

One of the most extraordinary mechanisms ever applied to the problems of coalition warfare was the unique, ad hoc, and highly successful Coalition Coordination, Communication, and Integration Center (C³IC) established early in Operation Desert Shield and used so effectively in Operation Desert Storm. It was designed to "fuse and integrate the efforts of 37 nations into a functional and efficient warfighting organization." Conspicuously and deliberately absent from the C³IC's title is the word "command." US Central Command was acutely sensitive not to appear as the outsider coming in and taking over. Doing so would have been harmful and disruptive to the coalition, if not simply fatal.²⁹ In actual fact, the coalition had no supreme allied commander. The US Commander, Central Command, and Saudi Commander, Joint Forces Command, conducted strategic planning through an informal but equal and cooperative relationship.³⁰

The C³IC succeeded most of all because the proper personalities—co-directors Major General Paul R. Schwartz for the United States and Major General Salah al Garza for Saudi Arabia—made it work. General Schwartz has acknowledged the specific pains required "to demonstrate the coalition"

by a visible and vital personal relationship within the C³IC. This relationship, however, was not limited to the co-directors. It was expected, indeed, demanded at all C³IC levels.¹⁰

Key to the C³IC from top to bottom was the conviction that the Desert Shield and Storm cause was a *coalition* cause. And just as World War II Anglo-American cooperation resulted in British and American staffs working closely together to achieve common Alliance aims, so, too, the C³IC remained focused on a coalition solution to a coalition problem. If the allied Gulf coalition was the "heart and soul of the enterprise," the C³IC was the military heart and soul of the coalition.¹¹

The ambiguous environment a coalition leader must contend with stems from often huge differences in operational-level realities such as goals, training, capabilities, equipment, logistics, culture, doctrine, intelligence, and language. Unilateral action, of course, dramatically reduces ambiguity. But since unilateral action is the exception, not the rule (in this century alone, all major wars have been coalition wars, excepting the Russo-Japanese and Iran-Iraq), the areas listed above demand attention. They will not likely be fully resolved no matter the degree of integration, but coalition partners must learn to manage them. Let us look briefly at them individually.

- *Goals.* A coalition would seem naturally to be united by common goals. Superficially this may be so, but participants seldom share identical aims. Britain and France, for example, entered World War I sharing the goals of liberating Belgium and defeating Germany, but little else. Britain particularly sought to secure its African and Mideast colonies but also to acquire Germany's overseas possessions. France desperately sought return of Alsace-Lorraine and domination of Europe in the wake of a defeated Germany. Goals also tend to change during a coalition's lifetime. Britain, for example, entered World War II to help Poland. Eventually, that goal expanded to include the defeat of Germany, Italy, and Japan.

Even when goals are harmonized there may be considerable disagreement over the means to attain them, as with the World War II American-British debate over the direct versus indirect approach for defeating Germany. Smaller coalition partners in particular tend to feel bullied or neglected. Conversely, larger partners may perceive inequitably shared risks and burdens. In military terms, because allies share a compelling need to maintain political cohesion to enhance military effectiveness and solidity, "accommodation of differences in political/military objectives is therefore of the highest importance."¹² Harmonizing goals requires strong, assertive leadership, but not at the expense of tact, understanding, respect for each coalition member, and—insofar as possible—accommodation of individual countries' aims.

Goals will normally be harmonized politically before they are handed off to the military for execution. While determining military ends, ways, and

means for accomplishing these goals, planners must ensure common understanding of coalition political goals and strive for full unity of effort.

- *Training.* Training emphases, resources, and standards vary from army to army, and few coalitions will ever boast common unit and individual competency levels. During the Korean War, training standards among participants varied dramatically. Since most UN ground formations served with US units, they were provided American weapons, equipment, and training as required. Some needed little training; others needed a great deal.¹⁷ As recent US Gulf War experience confirms, however, quality training, regardless of nationality, pays great dividends. But the process is demanding and expensive.

If circumstances do not permit comprehensive training and retraining programs, formations trained to different or lesser standards must be used within the limitations of their training state by astute and diplomatic assignment of roles and missions.¹⁸

- *Capabilities.* Closely related to differences in training levels are differences in overall force capabilities. Allies are not equally capable. Accommodating differences in allied military capabilities "requires careful planning and tailored coordination and liaison between the forces."¹⁹ Reconciling differences, however, can occur only after determining what they are. This can be difficult, and determining and taking account of shortfalls may be very sensitive. Coalition planners must give member forces tasks within their means. In the Gulf War, General Schwarzkopf and his coalition planners clearly understood this and proceeded accordingly.

For example, one problem was how to integrate the forces of Britain and France so as to acknowledge their status as major powers and avoid wounding national pride. US planners were particularly concerned with providing British and French units roles sufficient to be central but not so critical as to jeopardize success should those roles prove too great for them to handle. This was especially difficult in the case of the French 6th Light Armored Division.

While France had committed forces to the coalition effort early, the French government insisted on "not being seen as under the US shadow."²⁰ Thus, the French insisted on isolating their forces from other coalition elements. Further complicating matters was French law prohibiting conscripts from being compelled to serve overseas. But while the 6th Light Armored Division was made up of professional soldiers, it was manned, organized, and equipped much more like an American brigade than an American division. Therefore, its capability was limited. Still, a mission had to be assigned that neither overtaxed nor underutilized the French contribution. Fortunately, coalition planners allocated a flank security mission that not only was within French capabilities but that also satisfied French self-esteem in that their division saw combat.²¹

Similar concerns shadowed planning for the British 1st Armored Division. More comparable to an American division than the French, there

was still only one British division in the coalition, even though it represented almost one fourth of the British army. Here, too, however, good fortune and planning prevailed, with the UK 1st Armored Division passing through a US 1st Infantry Division breach in the Iraqi defenses and attaining its objectives, managing to engage three Iraqi divisions in the process.⁴³

In another example, Arab forces were arrayed together to take advantage of cultural and language similarities. The Saudis in particular proved "quite capable of assigning missions based on capabilities."⁴⁴ In simpler cases, a formation's function defined its role, as for example medical units or the Czech chemical defense unit in the Gulf War.⁴⁵

- *Equipment.* Differing quality, quantity, and interoperability of equipment constitute three significant coalition equipment shortcomings, with interoperability probably the most serious. National pressures to favor domestic defense industries, lack of funding for modernization or standardization, different defense doctrines—all limit employment options owing to equipment differences. Time and resources permitting, coalition members should be provided the best quality and most interoperable equipment possible. Nevertheless, at all times prudent planners must realistically reconcile differences, exploiting interoperability where it exists and compensating where it does not. Additionally, potential problems must be anticipated and dealt with appropriately and early. For example, in the Gulf War, to have mingled Syrian forces fielding Soviet equipment with US VII Corps units would have invited substantial fratricide, given the almost reflexive nature of VII Corps' association of targets with Soviet-made equipment. Most important, perhaps, is ability to execute command and control functions. Communications unquestionably pose "one of the greatest challenges in the conduct of war."⁴⁶ Here, the C³IC proved especially valuable, becoming as it did the "transfer case" or "gear reduction mechanism" between US Central Command and the member nations' command structures.⁴⁷

- *Logistics.* Next to common goals, logistics may be the most important ingredient for coalition success. And no nightmare looms larger for a coalition than logistics. While easy to dismiss it as a national responsibility, logistics will usually see larger, richer coalition partners supporting at least some of the smaller partners, if they can. In the Gulf War, time, substantial infrastructure, and Saudi funding led to tremendous coalition logistical success, but future coalition efforts will not likely benefit from similar conditions. Far more likely will be a repetition of the logistics disorder Matthew Ridgway recounted from his experience during the Korean War: "The Dutch wanted milk where the French wanted wine. The Moslems wanted no pork and the Hindus no beef. The Orientals wanted more rice and the Europeans more bread." Even footwear was a problem, needing "to be extra wide to fit the Turks," and "extra narrow and short" to fit the Koreans, Filipinos, and Thais.⁴⁸ In such cases,

logistics planners will need patience, wisdom, and near magical skill to understand, anticipate, and accommodate tremendous variety in requirements.

- *Culture.* Each coalition partner will represent at least one culture. Cultural differences, subtle or substantial, may easily become debilitating if not understood and appreciated. Differences in discipline, work ethic, class distinctions, religious requirements, standards of living, traditions—all can cause friction, misunderstanding, and cracks in cohesion.

Again, the Gulf War showed the critical need for cultural awareness.⁵⁷ Fundamental to this awareness is realization that “different” may have nothing to do with better or worse. Fortunately, in the Gulf War, unlike many previous American coalition endeavors, the United States “showed great consideration for foreign sensitivities.”⁵⁸ The Gulf experience also demonstrated the need for a pool of personnel with in-country experience, ideally including language and cultural expertise. In any future coalition undertaking, such personnel must not only be available but must be among the first ones deployed.⁵⁹ In most cases, it will be these personnel who initially educate their fellow nationals to cultural differences as the first step toward displaying the proper sensitivities.

- *Doctrine.* Military doctrine, the fundamental principles by which forces guide their actions in support of national objectives,⁶⁰ clearly reflects national character. Doctrine determines force structure and procedures. Doctrinal differences among allies may be minor or significant, but whatever their nature, failure to adjust to those differences—whether in command structure, the decisionmaking process, the format of orders, or anything else—will at least result in surprises and probably something far more serious. Standardization agreements such as NATO’s, combined exercises, and liaison officers can alleviate some doctrinal differences. As with adjusting any other differences, planners must first understand coalition partners’ doctrinal deviations and adjust to the degree possible. This may require assigning special missions or reallocating other assets or forces to support a given doctrinal variation. Again, awareness and appreciation of differences are the keys.⁶¹

- *Intelligence.* National intelligence resources vary substantially and users will seldom contribute proportionally to the intelligence effort. Even today, for example, NATO relies far more on nationally produced and somewhat shared intelligence than on any special NATO products. Sharing intelligence, of course, is a sensitive issue and in some cases may violate cultural norms concerning secrecy and exclusivity. In the Gulf War, the C³IC on occasion had to compel coalition members to share intelligence—Main intelligence producers will seldom share everything with everyone. Here again, firm leadership, especially in the intelligence section, will be critical to intelligence collection, processing, and dissemination.

- *Language.* In any coalition, communication is vital. But if miscommunication amuses in peacetime, it can be disastrous in wartime.⁶² Dedicated

linguist efforts and liaison teams are vital, and the degree to which planners address language limitations—in effect, communication limitations—will determine the level and degree of operational integration. Even in a well-established alliance such as NATO with only two official languages, French and English, difficulties are endless. But when language demands are more immediate and resources less available, obstacles are greatly magnified. For example, when President Bush drew his line in the sand, less than one percent of the US armed forces' active-duty Arab linguists—only 16—were trained in the Iraqi dialect.⁷⁷ While inadequate numbers of trained linguists may constitute a serious handicap, eroding language proficiency is an even more serious problem. Few skills are as perishable as language skills. Developing and maintaining such skills is expensive and difficult. But as one author reminds, "If you think education is expensive, try ignorance."⁷⁸ Truly, "language is too important to be left to chance."⁷⁹

Coalitions remain the historical norm and are a core element of US national security strategy. In reality, coalitions mean friction, inefficiency, and the whole amounting to less than the sum of all the parts. And "when coalition politics intrudes," as one author notes, "military logic often will have little relevance."⁸⁰ But for whatever reasons, whether practicality, expediency, or necessity, they will continue.

Today, NATO is considering multinational divisions as part of Allied Command Europe Reaction Corps proposals. Such notional formations include a combined Belgian-German-Dutch-United Kingdom airborne division; a Greek-Italian-Turkish infantry division, and an Italian-Portuguese mechanized division.⁸¹ Outside NATO, France and Germany have already fielded a joint brigade, and as a "token of the two countries' growing cooperation," they project that it will expand to a corps.⁸² While such a development may satisfy certain French and German security concerns, it has not persuaded many Americans that such an organization is necessary at all or, more important for NATO members, good for them.⁸³ Nothing in coalition history suggests these organizations will be free from difficulty.

Successful coalition partners, particularly coalition leaders, will be those who best handle operational realities by applying the proper blend of vision, determination, patience, tolerance, and flexibility. It has been done before and it will have to be done again.

NOTES

1. David G. Chandler, "Coalitions," *Dictionary of the Napoleonic Wars* (New York: Macmillan, 1979), pp. 96-98.

2. Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural Address, 4 March 1801.

3. Charles Dudley Warner, *My Summer in a Garden* (quoted in Burton Stevenson, ed., *The Home Book of Quotations* (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1964), p. 1541).

4. "I hate the prostitution of the name of friendship to signify modish and worldly alliances." Ralph Waldo Emerson, *Essays*, First Series, "Friendship," in Stevenson, p. 1741.

5. British Prime Minister Lloyd George's term, in Trumbull Higgins, *Hitler and Russia* (New York: Macmillan, 1966), p. 5.

6. P. Sweet et al., eds., *Documents on German Foreign Policy, 1918-1945*, Series D (Washington: US Department of State, 1949), VII, 204-13 and 277-88.
7. "Courtesy of the Russo-German Pact," the Soviet icebreakers *Lenin* and *Stalin* opened parts of the passage for the German armed merchant cruiser *Komet*. The German government paid the Soviet government the equivalent of \$300,000 "for the service." Edward Von der Pott, *The German Navy in World War II* (New York: Galahad, 1969), p. 124.
8. Sweet, et al., XI, documents 309 and 404.
9. Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Basic National Defense Doctrine*, Joint Pub 0-1 (Final Draft, 24 July 1990), p. III-35.
10. Ibid.
11. Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense, *Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Joint Pub 1-02, 1 December 1989, p. 76.
12. Neutrals most often try the go-it-alone approach, although with highly colored results. During World War II, for example, neutrality did not spare Denmark, Norway, Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg, or the United States, although neutrality plus varying degrees of complicity, geography, or both did spare Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, and Sweden.
13. *Book of Judges*, chapters 6-8.
14. J. F. C. Fuller, *The Generalship of Alexander the Great* (New Brunswick: Rutgers Univ. Press, 1960), pp. 36-37; see also maps 2, 3, and 4.
15. France played a crucial role on the American side during the American Revolution, and even the American Indian Wars saw extensive reliance on allies—other Indian tribes.
16. Too much should not be expected of coalitions. After all, two organizations as fundamentally similar as the US Army and US Marine Corps have not always achieved suitable harmony and cooperation in combat. In World War I, Marine Major General John Lejeune capably commanded the US Army 2d Division, composed of two Army and two Marine regiments (the two Marine regiments were themselves commanded by Army Brigadier General James Harbord). Similarly, Marine Major General Roy Geiger with comparable, if briefer, success commanded Tenth Army on Okinawa in 1945 following Army Lieutenant General S. B. Buckner's death. Other joint Army-Marine operations, however, point up substantial difficulty. On Saipan in 1944, Marine Major General Holland Smith relieved Army Major General Ralph Smith, provoking a controversy to this day undecided. Similarly, Marine and Army commanders in Korea and Vietnam failed to reach suitable accord on too many occasions.
17. US Army Training and Doctrine Command, TRADOC Pam 525-5, *AirLand Operations: A Concept for the Evolution of AirLand Battle for the Strategic Army of the 1990s and Beyond*, 1 August 1991, p. 4.
18. At Compiegne, 11 November 1918, armistice signatories were French, British, and German—no Americans.
19. On 26 May 1917, Secretary of War Newton Baker ordered Pershing "to cooperate with the forces of the other countries employed against [the] enemy, but in doing so the underlying idea must be kept in view that the forces of the United States are a separate and distinct component of the combined forces, the identity of which must be preserved." John J. Pershing, *My Experiences in the World War* (New York: Frederick Stokes Company, 1931), I, 38-39. Nevertheless, despite General Pershing's much-vaunted insistence that Americans fight as part of an American effort, four black US regiments, the 369th, 370th, 371st, and 372d, did serve with the French army. Arthur Barbeau and Florette Henri, *The Unknown Soldiers: Black American Troops in World War I* (Philadelphia: Temple Univ. Press, 1974).
20. Ulrich Trumpener, "Suez, Baku, Gallipoli: The Military Dimensions of the German-Ottoman Coalition, 1914-18," in Keith Neilson and Roy Prete, eds., *Coalition Warfare: An Uncanny Accord* (Ontario, Canada: Wilfrid Laurier Univ. Press, 1983), Appendix A, pp. 49-51. See also Otto Liman von Sanders, *Five Years in Turkey* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1927), for a fascinating firsthand account of a German officer's service with the Turkish army.
21. Norman Stone, "The Austro-German Alliance, 1914-18," in Neilson and Prete, p. 20.
22. Chester C. Starr, *From Salerno to the Alps* (Washington: Infantry Journal Press, 1948), pp. 461-83.
23. Italy's surrender was not unique among allies. In fact, all of Germany's World War II European allies—Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Italy, and Finland—surrendered before Germany did, Italy first and the rest by January 1945.
24. The Spanish Blue Division went off to the Russian Front three weeks after the German invasion. It returned to Spain in 1943. George Hills, *Francisco* (New York: Macmillan, 1969), p. 337.
25. US Army, *Foreign Military Studies*, MS#B-661, *Wartime Alliances*, and MS#P-108, *Germany and Her Allies in World War II* (Washington: Department of the Army, 1954).
26. For example, the Greek and Thai battalions served with the 1st Cavalry Division, the French and Dutch battalions with the 2d Infantry Division, the Colombian battalion with the 7th Infantry Division, and the Philippine

battalion with the 3d Infantry Division. Eventually, all three US corps in Korea--I, IX, and X--were integrated with UN and South Korean forces. The most international of these was I Corps, which by 1951 consisted of three US divisions, two South Korean divisions and a South Korean marine battalion, British, British Commonwealth, and Canadian brigades, a Turkish brigade, and battalions from Belgium, Greece, Thailand and the Philippines.

27. In retrospect, even General Schwarzkopf's touted coalitional success has been thrown into question. See Judith Miller, "Saudi Prince Disputes Schwarzkopf Book on War," *The New York Times*, 21 October 1992, p. A8, where the Saudi co-commander, Lieutenant General Khalid bin Sultan, casts aspects of General Schwarzkopf's account of the war in *It Doesn't Take a Hero* (New York: Bantam, 1992), p. 20.

28. Barbara Tuchman, *Stilwell and the American Experience in China* (New York: Macmillan, 1970), p. xi.

29. Transcript of interview with Major General Paul R. Schwartz, 23 April 1991, interviewed by Colonels John Connolly and William Barry and Lieutenant Colonels Joseph Englehardt and Douglas Johnson, US Army War College, p. 8.

30. Marc Michaelis, "Communication in the Coalition: Saudi Arabia (1990-1991)," unpublished manuscript, 8 April 1991, pp. 7-8.

31. Schwartz, pp. 14 and 18. So invaluable was the trust this relationship fostered, one author called it "the glue" that held the coalition together. Michaelis, p. 6.

32. Forrest C. Pogue, *The United States Army in World War II: European Theater of Operations: The Supreme Command* (Washington: Office of the Chief of Military History, GPO, 1954), p. 42.

33. Schwartz, p. 94.

34. Headquarters, Department of the Army, *Operations*, Field Manual 100-5, May 1986, p. 164.

35. Martin Blumenson and James L. Stokesbury, *Masters of the Art of Command* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1975), pp. 244, 305.

36. For a unique, if hyperbolic, account of this process, see *The History of The United Nations Forces in the Korean War* (Seoul: The Ministry of National Defense, 1972), vols. 1-6.

37. Schwartz, p. 59.

38. Field Manual 100-5, p. 164.

39. Bruce Watson, ed., *Military Lessons of the Gulf War* (Novato, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1991), p. 28.

40. Still, the entire experience resulted in France sustaining a position familiar enough to her allies: "integrated and yet alone," Watson.

41. Norman Friedman, *Desert Victory* (Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1991), p. 229.

42. Schwartz, p. 36.

43. *Ibid.*, p. 37.

44. Michaelis, p. 4. Desert Shield and Storm communications difficulties included language, incompatible equipment, and host-nation overuse of nonsecure communications means to pass classified or sensitive material.

45. Schwartz, p. 28.

46. Matthew B. Ridgway, *The Korean War* (New York: Da Capo, 1967), p. 221.

47. See Schwartz.

48. Watson, p. 29.

49. *Ibid.*, p. 61.

50. Joint Pub 1-02, p. 118.

51. See Schwartz.

52. *Ibid.*, p. 41.

53. Who cannot identify with the difficulties in using another language? If we have not stumbled ourselves in another tongue, how often have we noted the awkwardness of someone else stumbling in our own? Two harmless but unforgettable examples from personal experience as a Foreign Area Officer are "Ladies are requested not to have children in the bar," and "How is your wife raining tonight?"

54. James C. McNaughton, "Can We Talk: Desert Storm's Language Lessons," *Army*, June 1992, p. 23. This is an excellent treatment of the Gulf War language issue, although the overall lessons are readily applicable to any other language and virtually any other situation.

55. *Ibid.*, p. 24.

56. *Ibid.*, p. 28.

57. Friedman, p. 58.

58. From "Rapid Reaction Forces (Land)," MC 57/3, Brussels, North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

59. "Esprit de Korps," *National Review*, 18 November 1991, p. 18. See also Alan Riding, "Paris and Bonn Seek to End Unease on New Joint Force," *The New York Times*, 1 December 1992, p. A8.

60. Notes former US Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, such developments are "bound to undermine NATO." "The European Community's New Army," *Forbes*, 25 November 1991, p. 33. "It is extremely unlikely that a Eurocorps will strengthen the Atlantic Alliance." Jeanne J. Strick, "Eurocorps Shows Ambivalence About American Military Role," *Army*, July 1992, p. 12.

US-China Relations: The Strategic Calculus

MONTE R. BULLARD

Dr. Henry Kissinger's secret trip to Beijing on 9 July 1971 was primarily for strategic military reasons and based on a balance-of-power approach to international politics.¹ During the next 20 years, and especially in the last three years, the fundamental rationale for America's China policy shifted from one of predominantly global strategic factors toward one based on economic and humanitarian concerns—an internationalist approach. The logic of using China as a strategic counterweight to Soviet military power is now gone. Indeed, the changes that have occurred in the international strategic environment with the end of the Cold War have called into question the degree to which strategic calculations will affect future American foreign policy decisions. Even in this age of increasing economic interdependence and global convergence, however, it is too soon to conclude that strategic military factors no longer influence the foreign policy process, particularly in Asia. This article will examine some of the factors that shape the US-China strategic relationship and how that relationship, in turn, might affect general American foreign policy toward China.

The current American foreign policy approach to China, called "constructive engagement," is based upon the belief that it is better to maintain some type of relationship than to become estranged and not be able to exercise any influence on political and economic change in China.² This belief, however, is not unanimous in the United States. Many citizens and members of the US Congress are calling for greater isolation of China because of its human rights abuses, weapons proliferation, and unfair trade practices.³ American congressional leaders continue to try to link China's "most-favored-nation" status to China's behavior in those areas.⁴

In addition to the problems of China's domestic and international behavior, American policy is also conditioned by the global strategic picture.

The end of the Cold War has resulted in a complete adjustment of threat perception, strategic approaches, alliance relationships, and peace-keeping roles. Whether China will represent a threat or a partner in the new world environment is still an open question.

The Threat Has Changed

With the demise of the Soviet Union, threat assessment in the 1990s is much more complex, but military power and ideology are still important components. American analysts now perceive two major threat sources: Iran/Iraq with a militant Muslim fundamentalist ideology, and China/North Korea/Vietnam with a communist ideology.¹ Neither of these sources presents the equivalent of a superpower's military threat, but both have the potential to cause significant problems for the world community.

Strategic threat analysis in the 1990s is focused more on the activity than the source. Terrorism, regional instability, and the proliferation of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons of mass destruction, as well as ballistic missile systems, are now considered the principal challenges.² China plays an important role in all three. Historically, China has supported and trained terrorists and has never condemned the use of terrorism in principle. China also has supported "wars of national liberation," a stance that undermines regional stability. China's export of nuclear and missile technology, however, represents the most important threat at the strategic level. Chinese weapon systems in the hands of irresponsible Third World countries have already confronted the US military: Iran deployed Chinese Silkworm missiles in the Persian Gulf in 1987,³ and Iraq used Chinese weapons against the coalition forces in the 1991 Gulf War.

Numerous reports show a Chinese proliferation pattern that is not in the world community's interest. In 1983 China agreed to supply a nuclear research reactor to Algeria. Even though the reactor may not have been capable of producing weapons-grade material, the Chinese and Algerians kept the relationship secret from the International Atomic Energy Agency. China

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"Whether China will represent a threat or a partner in the new world environment is still an open question."

at first denied the sale, then later acknowledged it.⁸ China has furnished nuclear information or materials to a number of other countries which aspire to become nuclear powers, including Argentina, Brazil, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Pakistan, and Syria.⁹

China also has been extremely active in the sale of ballistic missiles, missile components, missile technology, and manufacturing techniques to the same nations that are attempting to develop nuclear technology. Some of these nations have been active in acquiring chemical and biological weapons. In one case, China was even reported to have supplied "technological assistance to match nuclear warheads to delivery systems."¹⁰ The important point, made by Timothy McCarthy, relates to the *character* of China's missile-related exports:

[It is] the proclivity for providing technical and manufacturing assistance, rather than the transfers of complete systems, that is a long-term cause for proliferation concern. China is assisting in the creation of new and powerful missile-producing states [which], in turn, are likely to operate outside of any limitations (international or otherwise) on the sales of such systems.¹¹

China's assistance to North Korea, followed by North Korea's sales to Iran, allowed Chinese leaders to make official denials that China sent any Silkworm missiles *directly* to Iran.¹² Yet China set in motion the process that put the missiles in Iranian hands.

The Chinese proliferation activity of greatest concern to American strategists is the sale of medium-range ballistic missiles to Syria, Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan. The United States sent high-level delegations to China in 1991 to discuss proliferation issues. The Chinese then promised to ratify the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and to adhere to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).¹³ The National People's Congress did subsequently ratify the NPT on 11 March 1992.¹⁴ Because the MTCR is not a formal agreement, however, there is some question about future Chinese adherence. Already there are problems of definition: China's idea of a medium-range missile, for example, is not the same as that of the United States.¹⁵ There is also the question of dual-use technology. Some parts of industrial satellite technology can be used in ballistic missile development.

American strategic planners have little optimism about China's willingness to comply totally with proliferation agreements. The most salient reason is that sales of ballistic missiles, missile components, and missile technology provide a major source of revenue for China. It is a multibillion-dollar business (\$7.5 billion in the years 1986-90). Profit comes in hard currency that can be used in China's modernization effort.¹⁶ China also uses such sales to garner political support in the international arena from its customers.¹⁷

Chinese leaders are quick to use their participation in global arms control talks as leverage in US-China bilateral relations. The August 1992 announcement that the United States would sell 150 F-16 fighter aircraft to Taiwan in response to China's purchase of 24 advanced Soviet Su-27 long-range aircraft is an excellent example. Beijing's first reaction, just one day after the US announcement, was to withdraw from scheduled global arms control talks.¹⁸ They seemed to be looking for a pretext to withdraw; the United States provided it. US leaders, in election-year politics, bolstered the Chinese position by publicly rationalizing the sale to Taiwan more in terms of maintaining jobs for American aerospace workers than in assisting in Taiwan's defense.¹⁹ Such announcements immediately opened the door for the Chinese to employ a similar rationale for continued arms sales and for avoiding participation in arms control talks.

Perhaps because American strategists have not forgotten past Chinese proliferation activities, they are cynical about the possibility that China might become more responsible under its current leaders. Chinese statements promising compliance with the Missile Technology Control Regime under certain conditions offer encouragement to some. However, such statements are considered by others as no more than expedient propaganda.²⁰

The collapse of the Soviet Union had a profound effect on China as well as on the United States. As China perceived a diminished threat, it began to talk of reducing its own defense budget and the size of its army.²¹ At the same time, however, China has begun to increase its power-projection capability. It has continued to develop a deep-water navy, it has purchased advanced fighters from Russia, it has developed an in-flight refueling capability, and it is reportedly negotiating for the purchase of an aircraft carrier from Ukraine.²² These activities increase China's military capability and make it a more credible threat to the United States.

New Approaches to Managing Conflict

One of the principal concerns of American leaders in recent years has been how to play a responsible role in maintaining world peace and stability without being a global gendarme.²³ The collapse of the Soviet Union has certainly left the United States as the world's paramount power; yet

possessing the instruments of military power has not always assured the ability to prevail. We have learned the hard way that military power comes in many forms. Smaller states and even non-state actors have found effective ways to use force and violence while remaining untouched by the overwhelming conventional and nuclear force of the world's powers.

The strategic implication of this combination of circumstances (lack of utility of major weapon systems, American reluctance to police the world, and political constraints on any use of force) is that new strategies will have to be found to manage conflict. These new strategies will include international relationships at global, regional, and bilateral levels. China is an important actor at all three levels.

At the global level, the United Nations should be a key forum for the expression of US-Chinese relations. During the Gulf War of 1991, the UN gained credibility in the eyes of many American leaders as an institution that can play a much greater role in conflict resolution. It was the first time in the history of the United Nations that the Security Council voted unanimously to take action against a member state. The solid front against Iraq in behalf of Kuwait set a new and hopeful precedent.

The five permanent members of the Security Council provide a critical forum within which China and the United States meet to discuss global and regional security issues. China's voting patterns in that group will influence the US-China strategic relationship by illustrating the degree to which China is likely to act as a responsible member of the world community. For example, when the Security Council voted on 2 October 1992 to impound Iraq's assets, the vote was 14 in favor, none opposed, with only China abstaining.²⁴ Already the East-West confrontation was being replaced by a North-South conflict, with China failing to vote with the North Atlantic nations. The essence of the new conflict is the demand by poor nations (the so-called South) for wealth redistribution and for increased support in their economic development. In effect this is a demand for a global taxation system by which the rich nations (the North) will subsidize the development of their poor sisters.

The United Nations is also viewed at the global level as an organization that can assist in economic and humanitarian programs. Chinese participation in these activities will be under increased scrutiny to assure that China wants to reduce the causes of conflict. China will be monitored closely for behavior that might be perceived as exhibiting a double standard. For example, if China were to participate in programs for the alleviation of refugee suffering in the Middle East, that certainly would not square with its behavior generating refugees in Tibet and causing friction with India.

World leaders want to satisfy themselves that China is prepared to undergo peaceful but steady changes in its economic and political systems. As

one of the last four countries under the communist banner. China represents a potential drain on the rest of the world economically and therefore a threat to peace and stability. The Soviet precedent warns that the bankruptcy of any large communist power center eventually forces the world into a position of pumping billions of dollars into salvaging an unworkable economy or else putting up with a chaotic country that may destabilize its neighbors. Evolutionary change to a market economy and a democratic system is much less costly in the long run than a complete collapse of political and economic systems.

Regional ties are also important in understanding the US-China relationship, and they are undergoing fundamental change as the United States withdraws military forces from South Korea and the Philippines.²⁶ Instead of focusing exclusively on the Cold War dichotomy, the US concern is now more with regional threats. In Asia, this concern is with how China might cause problems rather than support efforts to build stability in areas where the United States has strong collective security commitments, such as with Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand. Korea is still considered the most likely area of instability; there, especially, American planners must take China's potential influence into account. They believe China could mitigate North Korea's aggressiveness.

As the United States withdraws from Asia, the Chinese are apparently attempting to fill the power vacuum.²⁷ Already they have reversed an agreement with Vietnam which would have delayed any oil exploration of the Spratly Islands until the sovereignty of the area is settled, and they are rumored to be negotiating with Myanmar (Burma) to acquire port access for naval vessels.²⁸

China has the potential to influence security issues in Korea and Cambodia. To this point they have played a responsible role, and that is encouraging. Their declarations, however, are not so positive where Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Tibet are concerned. While China believes strongly that these three areas are within its sole jurisdiction and that the rest of the world has no business interfering in its "internal" affairs, these areas are still likely to be of concern to Americans and others. It ceases to be an internal affair when international trade and commerce are disrupted, when refugees are

*"Regional ties are also important in
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created for other nations to absorb, when basic human rights are flagrantly abused, or when a nation's actions threaten peace and stability. The disagreement as to what is considered a Chinese domestic affair and what should be the concern of the outside world is an important issue for the future of US-Chinese relations.

From the US perspective, the bilateral level is still likely to be the most important of the three levels of interaction. During the past 12 years, America's overall China policy has been inextricably linked with the strategic military relationship. Until 1979 China was considered a potential enemy. After the United States recognized China, Americans believed that it was possible to have some form of strategic partnership—"friends, but not allies." Actual implementation of this change began in 1979 when military attachés and high-level defense visits were exchanged. At times the relationship has been friendly, at other times distant and formal. Throughout the period the military relationship has been influenced by external factors such as the US defense connection with Taiwan, China's domestic economic and political situations, and China's human rights record. China's activity in nuclear and missile proliferation, particularly with regard to Pakistan and the Middle East, also has affected the relationship in significant ways. On balance, while some degree of mutual enmity has always prevailed and likely will continue, American leaders trace the evolution of the Chinese-US relationship as follows: 1949-71, outright hostility; 1972-89, mutual suspicion but necessary cooperation in counterbalancing the Soviet Union; 1989-present, a return to a milder form of enmity but with a hope on the American side of influencing China to change in a more democratic direction.

The present phase of the US-China relationship has coincided with a downturn in the American economy. Economic factors thus have become increasingly important in all aspects of American politics, domestic and international. The 1992 US presidential campaign was dominated by economic issues, two of which have implications for the US relationship with China: the trade imbalance and the US unemployment problem. The trade imbalance has become an increasingly important factor in American foreign policy choices. Trade connections, even with close allies, produce frictions. As China becomes more competitive in the world marketplace and as economic reforms take hold, the tensions are likely to increase even more. The annual trade imbalance between the two nations has been about \$13 billion in China's favor and may have now reached \$15 billion. Much of the imbalance is caused by closed markets in China and by unfair practices in international trade. Whatever the reason, the increased media coverage of international economics causes American politicians to react in ways that affect foreign policy.

The August 1992 announcement of the sale of US F-16 jet fighters to Taiwan serves as an example of the power of domestic political and economic

pressures. As we have seen, the sale was rationalized more as a means to save American jobs than to strengthen the security of Taiwan. While the military rationale for the sale was solid, domestic economic and political pressures were what prompted the leap from discussion to action. The decision may or may not indicate that American leaders have changed their perceptions of the global strategic environment. They seem to have downgraded Russia as a potential strategic threat and at the same time upgraded China. For example, US leaders have plainly stated that China continues to threaten regional stability in South Asia and the Middle East through continued proliferation of weapons and weapon technology. But our leaders have not explained so clearly that China also has come to pose a military threat to regional stability in East Asia itself by increasing its long-range bomber capability and by refusing to renounce the use of force against Taiwan. The US action to allow sales of F-16s to Taiwan implicitly suggests that American leaders have had second thoughts about trying to influence political and economic change through confrontation avoidance and non-reciprocal compromise.

Military trade with China also has changed significantly in the last few years. The motivation for military trade in the early 1980s, including technology transfer, was twofold: profit for private corporations and providing China with sufficient capability to be a credible threat to the Soviet Union. The US government was not so concerned with the first rationale except to the extent that officials in government were influenced by private company lobbying. As for the second, now that the Soviet threat has disappeared the partnership between the government and private industry to provide military assistance to China has dissolved.

Many American companies had unpleasant experiences while exploring potential military business with China in the 1980s and are reluctant to pursue further commercial ventures there today, even with the promise of large profits. They found that the Chinese strategy for technology acquisition was one-sided and not in the best interests of their American companies. The Chinese military had a four-tiered scheme based on the principle of ultimately achieving self-sufficiency. First, they tried everything possible to steal the secrets of American industry or to purchase single items and then produce those items themselves through reverse engineering. Second, they encouraged joint ventures in which the American company would bring the blueprints to China and allow the Chinese access to the secrets of production. The Chinese plan to eventually squeeze the American company out was always transparent, and even written into contracts on occasion. The third approach was to establish coproduction with the American company, allowing the American company to furnish some of the components, which allowed some secrets to be withheld from the Chinese. The fourth way the Chinese would deal with the American companies was to purchase military equipment outright. The

Chinese were unfailingly crude in their negotiations and blatantly played international companies off against each other, usually lying about what the other companies were offering. All in all, many American companies reached the conclusion that it was just not worth the aggravation to deal with the Chinese. That feeling was reinforced when the American companies could not rely on US government support for their activities.

In Sum

American and Chinese foreign policy in the 1990s will be influenced less by geostrategic concerns, but some strategic security considerations will still be important. American policies will depend on many variables: how China fits into the new world order as a strategic power; China's handling of human rights issues (domestic, Tibet, Taiwan, and Hong Kong); China's behavior in the United Nations; China's relationships with its neighbors in Asia; China's conduct in nuclear and missile proliferation; China's reaction to the American relationship with the states of the former Soviet Union; and a myriad of domestic and international economic considerations.

Whether China is considered a military threat or a partner in security affairs in the 1990s, there is likely to be a period of minimum activity at the strategic military level. The military bilateral relationship is likely to continue more as confrontation than as cooperation. China will not pose a serious threat to peace and security in any traditional sense of cross-border invasions. However, it could present a potentially serious problem in its role in the proliferation of weapons and in its handling of areas it considers to be internal—the Spratly Islands, Hong Kong, Tibet, and Taiwan. If China deals with these problems to the satisfaction of Americans, and if China joins the side of the world majority on conflict resolution issues in the UN Security Council, particularly in furnishing support to multilateral peacekeeping operations, this populous giant could make an important contribution both to its modernization and to world peace and stability. The probability of that happening, however, is not high.

NOTES

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2. *National Security Strategy of the United States* (Washington: The White House, August 1991), p. 9. Also see Richard Solomon, "China and MNC Engagement, Not Isolation, Is Catalyst For Change," *US Department of State Current Policy*, No. 1282, June 1990, B5.

3. On human rights abuses, see James Tyson, "Dalai Lama Presses Tibet's Case in U.S. Visit," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 17 April 1991, p. 6. The Dalai Lama met with members of Congress in April 1991 to explain his view of human rights abuses in Tibet. Also see Nancy Pelosi, "The Chinese Puzzle," *The International Economy*, August-September 1990, p. 62; Clifford Krauss, "Democratic Leaders Divided

on China Trade," *The New York Times*, 9 October 1990, p. A7, and "House Votes to Deny Trade Status for China," *The Washington Post*, 19 October 1990, p. A18. On proliferation, see Bruce W. Nelson, "For Sale: Tools of Destruction," *Time*, 22 April 1991, p. 44. And on unfair trade practices, see Charles Gray, "China: Most Favored Prison," *The Washington Post*, 15 July 1990, p. B5, and Paul Magnusson, "Beijing's 'Blatant Piracy' Could Slash Its U.S. Trade," *Business Week*, 22 April 1991, p. 46.

4. Guy Gugliotta and Ann Devroy, "White House Targets Senate on Passage of China Trade Bill," *The Washington Post*, 24 June 1991, p. 5A. On 29 September 1992, President Bush again vetoed a bill that would have placed conditions on China's most favored nation status.

5. *National Military Strategy of the United States* (Washington: GPO, January 1992), p. 3.

6. Dick Cheney, *Annual Report to the President and the Congress* (Washington: GPO, February 1992), p. 8.

7. Joseph Bermudez, "North Korea's 'HY-2' 'Silkworm' Programme," *Jane's Soviet Intelligence Review*, May 1989, pp. 203-07. Also see Gerald M. Boyd, "U.S. Says China is Arming Iran, Despite Denial," *The New York Times*, 7 June 1987, pp. A1, A15.

8. See Monterey Institute of International Studies, Emerging Nuclear Suppliers Project, *Eye on Supply*, No. 5 (Fall 1991), 48. Eight sources are listed to support the statement that "the PRC denied allegations that it had supplied a research reactor to Algeria, then later, on 4/30/91, admitted to the deal." Sources included *Washington Times*, *Nuclear News Week*, *Time*, *Nuclear Developments*, and *Trust and Verity*.

9. Monterey Institute of International Studies, Emerging Nuclear Suppliers Project, *Eye on Supply*, No. 6 (Spring 1992), 45-50.

10. Bill Gertz, "China Helps Algeria Develop Nuclear Weapons," *Washington Times*, 11 April 1991, p. 1.

11. Timothy V. McCarthy, *A Chronology of PRC Missile Trade and Developments* (Monterey: International Missile Proliferation Project, 12 February 1992), p. 1.

12. David K. Shipler, "U.S. Informs China High Tech Exports Could Be Widened," *The New York Times*, 10 March 1988, pp. A1, A11. Also see Edward A. Gargan, "U.S. Shift Is Shrugged Off in China," *The New York Times*, 14 March 1988, p. D4.

13. David Shambaugh, "China in 1991," *Asian Survey*, 32 (January 1992), 29. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency, which is an intergovernmental organization closely associated with but not a part of the United Nations. The Missile Technology Control Regime is not a treaty, organization, or executive agreement. It is merely a pledge, made on 16 April 1987, by Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States, to consider criteria designed to reduce the proliferation of ballistic missiles. Since 1987 another 13 nations have declared support for the guidelines.

14. "China Accedes to Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty," *Beijing Review*, 35 (30 March-5 April 1992), 16.

15. John Lewis, Hua Di, and Xue Litan, "Beijing's Defense Establishment: Solving the Arms Export Enigma," *International Security*, 16 (Spring 1991), 50. The United States defines a medium-range ballistic missile as one that can deliver a 1,000-kilogram payload 260 kilometers or more. The Chinese consider a medium-range ballistic missile one that can travel between 1000 and 3000 kilometers without regard to payload.

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17. Harry Harding, *A Fragile Relationship: The United States and China Since 1972* (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1992), p. 332. This is the best overall book on the US-China relationship.

18. "China Warns Taiwan Deal Could Sour Arms Talks," *International Herald Tribune*, 4 September 1992, p. 1.

19. "Bush Backs Sale of 150 F-16s to Taiwanese," *International Herald Tribune*, 3 September 1992, p. 1.

20. "China Responsible for Its Arms Sales," *Beijing Review*, 35 (2-8 March 1992), 33.

21. Tai Ming Cheung, "Fit to Fight: Latest Plans to Reduce the Size of the PLA," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 28 May 1992, p. 24.

22. "China Puts the Squeeze on Vietnam," *The Asian Wall Street Journal*, 30 September 1992, p. 6.

23. *National Security Strategy of the United States*, p. 2.

24. Paul Lewis, "U.N. Council Votes to Use Iraqi Assets Frozen Abroad," *The New York Times*, 3 October 1992, p. 2.

25. American intentions to withdraw 15,000 troops from Asia were openly announced in the official publication *National Security Strategy of the United States* (1991), p. 28. Actual withdrawals in the three years 1990, 1991, and 1992 have been about ten percent, reducing the force to 120,000. See Susumu Awanohara, "Leaner and Meaner: Reduced Forces to Have Better Arms," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 21 January 1993, p. 27.

26. "China Puts the Squeeze on Vietnam," p. 6.

27. *Ibid*.

Korea's Costliest Battle: The POW Impasse

WILLIAM ROSKEY

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Few military professionals ever imagine themselves playing a vital role in complex peace negotiations with representatives of hostile foreign governments. Most think that's the purview of the civilian striped-pants set. But negotiations to end the Korean War were, from beginning to end, carried out by senior military officers on both sides. It's entirely possible that this could happen again in some future conflict, and just as possible that the fate of prisoners of war will be a major issue. In the last half of the 20th century, the fate of POWs has become a sensitive, emotional, and politically explosive subject.

Korea's costliest battle lasted a year and a half, and the total casualties on both sides exceeded 375,000.¹ It occurred around a peace table, and it was a battle over a single issue: the fate of approximately 132,000 Chinese and North Korean POWs held by the United Nations Command (UNC), and of the approximately 13,000 UNC POWs held in North Korea.²

The struggle began some 41 years ago, on 2 January 1952, when Rear Admiral R. E. Libby of the UNC delegation to the truce talks at Panmunjom dropped a veritable bombshell right in the middle of the conference table. The Chinese and North Korean delegates were stunned, then outraged, to hear that the UNC would not force any prisoner of war it held to return to his homeland against his wishes. Few people, including many of the men who fought in the Korean War, realize that if not for the issue of voluntary repatriation of prisoners, the war almost certainly would have ended in the early months of 1952.

The truce talks had begun on 10 July 1951, a little over a year after the North Koreans had invaded South Korea, precipitating what many feared to be the overture to World War III. In the first year, the battle had seesawed up and down the ill-fated 600-mile-long peninsula, resulting in incredible devastation and loss of life. Now both sides were dug in solidly, the war of maneuver had

ended, and the peace talks had begun. But both the talks and the war were to continue for another *two years*, during which neither side gained anything it hadn't already won when the talks began.

Why did it take two years of negotiation to end a war that neither side was winning? Even before the subject of voluntary repatriation came up, negotiations were hardly going smoothly. From the day the talks began, they were characterized by hostility and suspicion. In an uncharacteristically emotional cable to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Matthew B. Ridgway, who had succeeded MacArthur as Commander-in-Chief, Far East Command, referred to the communist delegates as "treacherous savages," declaring that "to sit down with these men and deal with them as representatives of an enlightened and civilized people is to deride one's own dignity and to invite the disaster their treachery will inevitably bring upon us."¹ Harry G. Summers, Jr., in *Korean War Almanac*, writes, "Marked by bitterness and recrimination, the talks often broke down and were frequently boycotted by first one side and then the other."² The delegates labeled each other's statements "incredible," "absurd," "arrogant," "illogical," "rude," "discourteous," "irrelevant," and "groundless."³

It took the negotiators from 10 July to 26 July 1951—more than two weeks—simply to agree upon an agenda. The communists insisted that one agenda item be an agreement that all foreign troops be withdrawn from Korea. The UNC delegation, led by Vice Admiral C. Turner Joy (Chief of US Naval Forces in the Far East), disagreed on the grounds that this was a political issue, and, as such, inappropriate for military leaders to discuss in arranging a cease-fire agreement.⁴ Finally, the communists were satisfied with a compromise. An item titled "Recommendations to the Governments of the Countries Concerned on Both Sides" would be added to the agenda. This, they evidently felt, would provide them with a sufficient opportunity to beat the propaganda drums in an effort to get United Nations (particularly US) forces off the Korean peninsula.

The agenda items were these:

1. Adoption of the agenda;
2. Establishment of a demilitarized zone;
3. Concrete arrangements for the realization of a cease-fire and armistice in Korea, including the composition, authority, and functions of a supervising organization for carrying out the terms of a cease-fire and armistice;

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
Major General Blackshear M. Bryan (2d from left), senior member of the military armistice commission, and Major General Lee Sang Oho (3d from right), chief communist delegate, exchange credentials at Panmunjom.

4. Arrangements relating to POWs; and.

5. Recommendations to the governments of the countries concerned on both sides.⁷

Having agreed upon the agenda itself, the negotiators turned their attention to agenda item number two in the closing days of July 1951. Since this item called for the establishment of a demilitarized zone (DMZ), the first step was to agree upon a demarcation line. Both sides would then withdraw their troops a specified distance on both sides of the demarcation line to form the DMZ. The struggle over where to draw the line was expected to be long and bitter, a forecast that proved absolutely accurate. The Chinese and North Koreans demanded that the demarcation line be the 38th parallel. They said that this had been the legal boundary between the two Koreas before the South Koreans had started the war by invading North Korea (!), and it was only logical and just that the armistice should restore that line. The UNC delegation maintained that the truce line should be the actual battle line. The UN forces held a considerable amount of hard-won territory north of the 38th parallel and were not about to give it up. "To have withdrawn our troops to the 38th parallel," Ridgway later wrote in his book, *The Korean War*, "placing them along a line that could not have been held, would have been indeed surrender."

The talks ground on, with neither side budging an inch. At one point, on 10 August 1951, the intransigence reached its zenith when Admiral Joy said that the UNC would no longer discuss the 38th parallel at all." When the communist delegation protested this as an attempt to limit the discussion, Joy replied that the communists were free to discuss the 38th parallel among themselves, but that the UNC delegation would not take part. For the next two hours and ten minutes, both sides stared at each other across the table, with not a word spoken. Finally Admiral Joy broke the frozen silence by suggesting



that since they had reached an impasse on agenda item number two, they move to the third agenda item.¹⁰ The communists refused, and so ended another day at Panmunjom. Finally, on 27 November 1951, both sides agreed that the actual line of contact of the opposing forces would become the demarcation line, and that, when the armistice agreement was completed, both sides would withdraw two kilometers from it to form the DMZ.¹¹

The world breathed a huge collective sigh of relief. The worst, everyone thought, was over. The issue expected to be the most hotly contested, the only issue that seemingly could have deadlocked or even ended the peace talks, was at long last settled. It had been an uphill battle and had taken four and a half months, but now the end was in sight. No one expected serious difficulties to arise over the remaining items. And at first none did. Rapid progress (rapid compared to the struggle over the demarcation line) followed on agenda item number three, "Concrete Arrangements for the Realization of a Cease-Fire and Armistice in Korea."

These deliberations centered around machinery for enforcing the armistice, including setting up an armistice commission, inspections by joint observer teams, troop rotation, how to deal with armistice violations, joint aerial observation and photographic reconnaissance, policies on the rebuilding of roads, railways, and airfields destroyed or damaged during the war, and related matters. Despite initial tough stances taken by both sides on all these issues, compromises were reached, and only the issue of rebuilding the airfields presented any significant difficulties.

Thus, with agenda item number three now out of the way, the negotiators moved confidently on to number four, dealing with the disposition of POWs. Their confidence in disposing of this issue quickly was misplaced, however; in the words of Joseph C. Goulden, "within several days in early January 1952 the UN Command and the communists were at loggerheads on the issue that was to dominate the peace talks for eighteen more months."¹² Almost certainly, the communists expected the POW issue to be resolved in a matter of days. What they could not know was that on 29 October 1951 Harry Truman had rejected a complete all-for-all exchange of prisoners.¹³

Truman had been advised that many thousands of North Korean and Chinese POWs had told their UNC captors that they had no desire to go home. Many had been forcibly impressed into the Chinese Communist Forces or the North Korean People's Army. Others had been nominal volunteers who no longer had faith in the cause for which they had fought. Many, with their lives in shambles, simply wanted freedom and a fresh start. Consequently, Truman made the decision that no prisoner would be released to any nation against his will, publicly proclaiming that "we will not buy an armistice by turning over human beings for slaughter or slavery."¹⁴ In his memoir, *Years of Trial and Hope*, Truman wrote, "This was not a point for bargaining."¹⁵

***"If not for the issue of voluntary repatriation of
prisoners, the war almost certainly would have
ended in the early months of 1952."***

Many senior American officials and military leaders disagreed with the President. Secretary of Defense designate Robert A. Lovett cautioned against "bargaining with the welfare of our own prisoners."¹⁶ General J. Lawton Collins, Army Chief of Staff, disagreed with Truman, as did the other members of the JCS.¹⁷ So did Dean Acheson, who said the President's position was a violation of the Geneva Convention of 1949.¹⁸ Ridgway opposed voluntary repatriation on the same grounds.¹⁹ Turner Joy believed that the enemy would never agree to it and that the UNC was on unsound ground in demanding it.²⁰ But Harry Truman was adamant: the United States would sign no armistice that did not include voluntary repatriation.

Accordingly, the UNC dropped that bombshell on 2 January 1952. In *The Forgotten War: America in Korea 1950-1953*, Clay Blair writes that voluntary repatriation "infuriated the Communists, threw the negotiations into utter turmoil, led to bizarre twists and turns which enormously damaged the United States in the eyes of the world, and ultimately prolonged the Korean War for another year and a half, during which time United States forces suffered 37,000 more battlefield casualties."²¹ Other historians agree.²² Walter G. Hermes writes that safeguarding the rights of nonrepatriates cost

over 125,000 UNC casualties during the fifteen-month period while the enemy lost well over a quarter of a million men. . . . Viewed from this angle, the precedence given the 50,000 nonrepatriates and the 12,000-odd prisoners held by the enemy over the hundreds of thousands of soldiers at the front raised a complicated question. In negotiating a military truce, should the prime consideration be for the men on the line and in action or for those in captivity?²³

The difficulty of this moral dilemma was compounded by the fact that Article 118 of the Geneva Convention of 1949 was unequivocal on the legalities of the matter: "Prisoners of war shall be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of hostilities." When the Korean War broke out, the United States had signed but had not yet ratified the Convention (it was ratified in mid-1951),²⁴ and on 4 July 1950 the United States had informed the Red Cross that it intended to abide by it.²⁵ Shortly after the war broke out, the North Koreans also announced that they would abide by the Geneva Convention of 1949.²⁶

Nevertheless, proponents of voluntary repatriation could, in their view, claim the moral high ground. First, Article 118 had not been written with a situation like Korea in mind. The intent of Article 118 (despite the unfortunate way in which it was worded) was to prevent a recurrence of what had happened after the end of World War II. The Soviet Union had kept thousands of German and Japanese POWs literally years after the war ended, and many had died in slave labor camps without ever seeing their homelands again. The framers of the Geneva Convention could not have foreseen a situation in which thousands of POWs begged *not* to be sent home.²⁷

Then too, there was at least some precedent for voluntary repatriation in American history. The Treaty of Paris of 1783 (which ended the Revolutionary War) had made provisions for voluntary repatriation. A number of the prisoners of war held by the Continental Army wanted to settle in the new United States of America rather than return to Europe, and they were permitted to do so.²⁸

Truman and other supporters of voluntary repatriation could also argue that the United States stood for certain ideals, one of them being freedom. They could argue that a country which willingly handed over human beings, against their wishes and pleadings, to communist dictatorships—and which at the same time announced it was fighting for freedom—was hypocritical at best. This view of America's mission was articulated in John F. Kennedy's inaugural address just ten years later and served as the philosophical basis of America's military commitment to South Vietnam: "Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe, to assure the survival and success of liberty."

Opponents of voluntary repatriation had arguments that were at least equally powerful. Shouldn't the United States abide by the Geneva Convention if it expected and demanded that other nations do the same? Even more fundamentally, isn't a nation's first loyalty to the men who fight for it, rather than to those who actively fought against it until their capture? Each day that the talks ground on in deadlock, more American soldiers and their allies died on the battlefield. Yet even if there had been no fighting whatsoever while the talks were going on, each passing day was still another day that American fighting men and their allies spent in Chinese and North Korean prison camps. And plenty of dying was going on in the camps.

Opponents of voluntary repatriation believed that American soldiers should not be kept indefinitely under such circumstances merely to guarantee freedom of choice for the men who had been killing their friends and allies and who had been trying to kill them. Even laying aside the moral responsibility of a nation toward its fighting men, opponents of voluntary repatriation could point out that more men on *both* sides died every day while the talks went on. Each day without an agreement meant that much longer that

men on both sides would spend in POW camps. One might therefore argue that the truly humanitarian course was to end the suffering on both sides.

By the first months of 1952, agreements had been reached on virtually everything else at Panmunjom. "In the interminable struggle in which each side labored for face," Max Hastings writes, "the fate of the prisoners held at the two extremities of the Korean peninsula remained the dominant issue. The prisoners. It always came back to the prisoners."²⁹

To find out just how many of the approximately 170,000 POWs it held actually wanted to be repatriated, the UNC conducted a screening in early April 1952. Most of the prisoners (132,000) were soldiers of the North Korean and Chinese armies; the remaining 38,000 were North Korean civilian internees. On 19 April 1952, the UNC informed the communists that only about 70,000 of these 170,000 people wanted to be repatriated.³⁰ The communists were predictably incredulous and outraged, and the revision of that figure upward to 83,000 by the UNC on 13 July 1952, as more accurate figures became available, didn't assuage their feelings in the least.³¹

Both the talks and the war continued to grind away for the remainder of the year, with no one gaining anything in either arena. As the world ushered in the new year of 1953, it seemed to many that the war would go on forever. Both sets of delegates at Panmunjom had unshakable orders from their respective governments: give no ground on the POW issue. People began to liken Korea to a meat grinder.

The deadlock finally broke in the early months of 1953, and to this day the reasons remain elusive.

For whatever reason or reasons, on 28 March 1953 the communists agreed to a UNC proposal put forward more than a month before, which they had rejected. The UNC had suggested an immediate exchange of sick and wounded prisoners as a goodwill gesture. Now, the communists not only agreed to that exchange, they said it should "lead to a smooth settlement of the entire question of prisoners of war, thereby achieving an armistice in Korea, for which people throughout the world are longing."³² China's premier, Chou En Lai, publicly endorsed what came to be known as "Little Switch" in a radio broadcast two days later, and Russia's Foreign Minister Molotov endorsed it two days after that.³³ Suddenly, inexplicably, light began to appear at the end of what had been a very long tunnel.

No one knows what influence the death of Stalin on 5 March 1953 had to do with what Bevin Alexander calls "the sudden melting of Communist intransigence,"³⁴ but some believe it was substantial.³⁵ Others suggest that the sudden progress in negotiations was due to American threats to use nuclear weapons or to unleash Chiang Kai-shek.³⁶ It is just as reasonable to credit America's unremitting military pressure all along the front and its stepping up of bombing attacks in the spring of 1953. By continuing to fight even as the

talks were going on, America demonstrated its resolve in a much more convincing and tangible way than words, or even threats, could have conveyed.

Thus the breakthrough came on 28 March 1953 when the communists agreed to an immediate exchange of sick and wounded prisoners. The agreement to exchange sick and wounded POWs was signed at Panmunjom two weeks later, and the actual exchange began on 20 April 1953 and was completed on 3 May. The communists turned over 684 UNC POWs, of which 471 were South Korean soldiers, 149 American, 32 British, 15 Turk, and 17 from other UNC countries. The UNC turned over 6670 POWs, of which 5194 were North Korean, 1030 Chinese, and 446 civilian internees.¹¹

Then, at 1000 hours on 27 July 1953, the armistice was signed. The guns fell silent 12 hours later. "Big Switch," the exchange of the remaining POWs, began on 5 August and ended on 6 September 1953. The UNC turned over a total of 75,823 prisoners; of these, 70,183 were North Korean and 5640 Chinese. A total of 22,604 prisoners held by the UNC refused repatriation: 14,704 Chinese and 7900 North Korean. The communists returned 12,773 prisoners: 3597 Americans, 7862 South Koreans, 945 Britons, 229 Turks, and 140 others. Of the UNC prisoners held by the communists, 359 refused repatriation: 335 South Koreans, one Briton, and 23 Americans.¹² Under the terms of the armistice, all prisoners on both sides who refused repatriation were turned



A United Nations Command soldier freed under Operation Big Switch steps down from a truck upon his arrival in Panmunjom, 5 August 1953.

over to the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission in the demilitarized zone. There they were given 120 days in which, after listening to talks given by representatives of their side, they could change their minds. Two Americans and ten South Korean soldiers did just that, and 440 Chinese and 188 North Koreans changed their minds too. The final tally, then, of UNC nonrepatriates was 325 South Koreans, one Briton, and 21 Americans.³⁹ The 14,264 Chinese and 7712 North Korean nonrepatriates, when added to the approximately 25,000 released by Rhee on 18 June,⁴⁰ gives a final total of 46,976 Chinese and North Koreans who chose not to return to their homelands.

Most of the Chinese settled in Formosa, while the Koreans remained in South Korea. These figures spoke loudly and eloquently, but a terrible price had been paid. Between 10 July 1951, when the talks began, and 27 July 1953, when the armistice was signed, during those 575 meetings at which 18 million words were spoken,⁴¹ the killing and the dying went on unabated. Forty-five percent of all US casualties in the Korean War were suffered *after* the talks began.⁴² And most of these casualties were incurred when the only obstacle to an armistice was an agreement allowing voluntary repatriation.

Whether we were right in prolonging the war to achieve voluntary repatriation cannot be answered in any universal sense. A Chinese POW who went to Nationalist China to start a new life is almost certain to have a view different from that of an American POW who had to spend more than an extra year in one of the hell holes near the Yalu River to secure that freedom for his Chinese POW counterpart. And how does one answer for the killed and maimed, who paid an even higher price?

Did we learn anything? Did we carry anything away from this experience? Probably so. At the conclusion of the Paris peace talks ending the Vietnam War on 27 January 1973 neither the US nor South Vietnamese representatives balked at Article 6 of the Protocol, which stated, "Each party shall return all captured persons . . . without delay and shall facilitate their return and reception. The detaining parties shall not deny or delay their return for any reason."⁴³

We've learned that voluntary repatriation of POWs is a noble concept, but that it is also a luxury. No matter how desirable the outcome, we cannot hope to impose this doctrine on an enemy unless we have achieved absolute victory, at least not without paying an enormous cost in blood and national treasure. Before Korea, America had become accustomed to dictating terms to enemies who at war's end could only stand hat in hand, in the rubble of Hiroshimas or Berlins, and hope that the American terms wouldn't be too tough. Korea taught us that when one wages limited wars with limited objectives, one must be prepared to accept limited success at the peace table. When an enemy's army remains strong in the field, and when his government remains a going proposition, we have to be prepared to accept less-than-optimum results if we

expect to end the war. In the POW arena, that has come to mean getting all of our own people back or accounted for, and not concerning ourselves overmuch with the postwar aspirations of those we've captured. Like all lessons learned the hard way, we're not likely to forget it soon.

NOTES

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6. *Ibid.*, p. 942.
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11. Joseph C. Goulden, *Korea: The Untold Story of the War* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1983), p. 581.
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13. Actually, Truman qualified his rejection of an all-for-all exchange. Such an exchange might be accepted if the enemy offered "some major concession which could be obtained in no other way." Schnabel and Watson, p. 684.
14. Harry S. Truman, *Memoirs*, Vol. 2, *Years of Trial and Hope* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1956), p. 460.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 523.
16. Schnabel and Watson, p. 681.
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18. Goulden, p. 588.
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21. *Ibid.*, p. 962.
22. Max Hastings, *The Korean War* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987), p. 305; David Rees, ed., *The Korean War: History and Tactics* (London: Orbis Publishing, 1984), p. 118; Alexander, p. 483.
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24. Goulden, p. 587.
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27. Blair, p. 963.
28. George G. Lewis and John Mewha, *History of Prisoner of War Utilization by the United States Army, 1776-1945* (DA Pamphlet 20-213, June 1955), p. 20.
29. Hastings, p. 320.
30. Blair, p. 965.
31. Hermes, p. 274.
32. *Ibid.*, p. 412.
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34. Alexander, p. 473.
35. John Toland, *In Mortal Combat: Korea, 1950-1953* (New York: William Morrow, 1991), p. 556.
36. Beckett, p. 119.
37. Hermes, p. 514.
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39. *Ibid.*, p. 515.
40. Goulden, p. 630.
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43. *Facts on File* (New York: Facts on File, 1973), Vol. 33, No. 1682, 21-27 January 1973, p. 52.

Commentary & Reply

ATTRITIONISTS—OR TECHNOLOGISTS?—VS. MANEUVERISTS

To the Editor:

One of the endearing traits of the United States Army, and one that contributes mightily to its institutional health, is the service's ability to subject its most sacred cows to intense scrutiny. The Army seems willing to tolerate, even encourage, a good number of very bright and well-read scab-pickers. Major Richard D. Hooker's "Mythology Surrounding Maneuver Warfare" (*Parameters*, Spring 1993) is a good case in point.

But I am left wondering why Hooker should seem to insist upon a dichotomy between "maneuverists" and "attritionists"—whom I prefer to call "technologists," which is perhaps a less pejorative term. Hooker himself is anxious to deflate the myth that maneuver is divorced from fires, so why not place maneuver and technology along a continuum? Why should one method of placing sufficient fires upon the decisive place on the battlefield be preferred to another? As long as combat leaders retain the mental agility and flexibility needed to find the key to victory, why not give them as many tools as we can? And why is the ability to synchronize logistics support and fire support less important to victory than other forms of maneuver? Killing your enemy is a pretty effective form of maneuver.

Hooker is right to protest that the technologically sophisticated battlefield will remain chaotic, especially against capable opponents and especially at the tactical level. But by the same token it is clear that technological superiority can contribute significantly to a relatively ordered and understandable battlefield. Militarily useful technologies—precisely those which buttress the human factors Hooker champions—certainly go hand in hand with maneuver. Perhaps they constitute a different dimension of maneuver.

Further, articles like Hooker's make me wonder whether the Desert Storm campaign has been understood as well as it might. He contends that at the tactical level, the Gulf War "resembled traditional smash-mouth warfare, with huge quantities of firepower being poured on an enemy in lieu of maneuver." Leaving beside the point that a sitting duck enemy equipped with a lot of fairly modern combat equipment is just begging to have huge quantities of firepower delivered upon it, my own review of the ground campaign reveals that many units conducted fairly sophisticated maneuvers.

In this regard, perhaps the experiences of the 1st Armored Division serve to represent the case Army-wide. In initial engagements, units would do as Hooker suggests they did, suppress the enemy and maneuver to the flank. One may demean this as a conditioned response, but it did require a certain level of command competence to synchronize and execute. However, after these first encounters, commanders realized that because of their superiority no such maneuvering was required. That is, they went through the precise "true thought process" Hooker recommends, coming to the conclusion that they could better preserve their own forces yet still decisively defeat their opponents with little risk. Indeed, the division's advance against the bulk of

the Republican Guard, and its climactic battle at Medina Ridge, saw the kind of hub-to-hub linearity Hooker so criticizes. Yet that battle was essentially over in ten minutes, terminated after 45, and resulted in the complete extinction of a brigade-sized Iraqi force. That seems to me to be forcing a decision about as quickly as possible.

Hooker also contends that command and control, especially control of fire support elements, was rigidly centralized. I cannot dispute that, particularly as Hooker's note cites only anonymous interviews with field-grade officers. Yet again, the measure of any system of command should be its battlefield effectiveness. Indeed, this objection seems to contradict his earlier complaint about the overreliance on pouring on the artillery: if battalion commanders didn't get to call for fire support themselves, apparently their superiors must have been responsive to their needs. At any rate, the effect on the Iraqis was dramatic. In the Medina Ridge battle, there was no use for the attack aviation support: the US tankers simply were too efficient at destroying the Iraqis. Apache pilots complained that every time they acquired a target, an M1A1 or Bradley would take it out before they could fire. The division commander, unwilling to waste such a valuable asset, chose to send the helicopters deeper into the zone. That may have been a centralized decision, but it strikes me as a smart one.

Finally, in recognizing the "outlines" of operational-level maneuver in the Desert Storm ground campaign, Hooker marks how far the Army has come in the last two decades. Coming out of Vietnam, it barely recognized the operational level of war. Further, success at the operational level, or the strategic level, is far more important and enduring than tactical success. The Soviets may never have matched the tactical prowess of the *Wehrmacht* in World War II, but they devised a tactical system that suited them and which they used to win devastating victories at the operational and strategic levels of warfare. (We should recall who actually won from time to time.)

Hooker is right to say the US Army has not been challenged seriously at the tactical level since Vietnam; I would respond, "Thank God and the American taxpayer." Our investment in technology and smart soldiers trained more or less according to the tenets of AirLand Battle paid itself back with interest in the Gulf; it was also a strategic investment against the threat of the Soviet hordes. Ultimately, maneuver warfare is more a mental rather than a physical principle: it "eschews absolute rules absolutely." How this will translate into future missions and campaigns, with the reduced forces and slowed modernization certain to follow from declining defense spending, no one can say. But mature consideration and reflection demand that we deconstruct the myths of technology and attrition as we do the myths of maneuver.

Tom Donnelly
Editor, *Army Times*

The Author Replies:

Mr. Donnelly raises some interesting points, and I appreciate the spirit of thoughtful criticism that informs his comments. I found it particularly refreshing to be noted for "scab-picking" by the editor of the *Army Times*! This debate is an important one. It may even be elemental, given the nature of the changes which face us as we move into the next century.

Most criticism of maneuver warfare centers on Donnelly's first point, namely, that the distinction between "maneuver" and "attrition" is overblown, or that it is situational, or that emphasis on firepower or technology (always preferred to "attrition") is in fact a strength and not a weakness at all. Elsewhere I have written that, just as Donnelly suggests, land warfare exists along a continuum of maneuver and firepower. But I continue to believe, and here I think I am in good company, that our history and organizational culture predisposes us to favor one approach to warfare—namely, an "industrial" or "attrition" approach—at the expense of a maneuver-oriented approach which is far more concerned with the dislocation of the enemy in time and space than with his methodical destruction by fire.

Put another way, the important point is not the amount of fire vs. the amount of movement. It is, rather, the effect one seeks to achieve relative to the enemy that lies at the heart of maneuver warfare. Destruction by fire is generally more costly and time-consuming. Dislocation and disruption, which fundamentally target an enemy's will, not his means, are generally cheaper and less costly, and usually more decisive (John Antal characterizes these two competing themes, respectively, as "pushing" the enemy as opposed to "trapping" him.) Either may succeed. Against weak opposition, the choice of one approach to land combat or the other may be irrelevant. But against credible opponents, and most particularly when fighting outnumbered, this choice may become supremely important.

Donnelly implies that had things been different in the Gulf War, we might simply have called on our native "mental agility and flexibility" to prevail using other methods. Would that it were so easy: certainly, the memoirs of the more successful practitioners of this alternative approach suggest that it is not. The replacement of centralized by decentralized command and control; the supersession of the mission statement in favor of commander's intent and focus of effort; the supervaluation of time, even at the expense of detailed planning; the acceptance of friction, fluidity, and uncertainty as the natural media of war—all these, and many more besides, speak to more than a casual switch in tactics. Armies, like nations, have cultures which profoundly influence their behavior. To change the way armies fight, one must begin not with field manuals, but with the way an army thinks about itself.

Two other themes emphasized in Donnelly's critique deserve comment. The first concerns my interpretation of our performance in the Gulf. The second is Donnelly's inference that Germany's failure in the Second World War destroyed the *Wermacht's* credibility as a superior instrument of war. Both conclusions are based on what I consider to be a dangerous and superficial form of historical shorthand—namely, a readiness to assume that the victor, by definition, stands confirmed in the absolute superiority of his ways.

No serving soldier could be less than proud of our performance in the Gulf. As I wrote, our soldiers "were well trained and fought courageously . . . [our] leaders proved themselves masters of the art of coordinating fire support, movement, and logistics . . . while US forces [carried] traditional methods, techniques, and doctrine to new heights." While perhaps not sufficiently adulatory for some, these comments reflect my genuine assessment that the Army that went to the Gulf was a very good Army indeed. My conclusion that our appreciation for the essentials of maneuver warfare at the operational level was not matched at the tactical level results not from

a glance at the scoreboard, but from the attempt to look at what really happened through a different lens.

In the desert, we crushed an inferior opponent by exploiting massive fire superiority and highly centralized command and control. While mobility was central to the outcome, it is not synonymous with maneuver warfare. The use of massed artillery brigades, even artillery divisions, was effective—but it was not maneuver warfare. This approach worked well at that time and place. Our technology and gunnery completely outclassed an opponent pinned to the ground by airpower. There is much to admire about our performance in Operation Desert Storm. Yet the argument that what was effective in the Gulf must be our prescription for success in the next century ignores the scope and scale of the changes being forced upon us by the times.

Germany faced a similar conundrum in 1916-1917 and again in 1940-1941. Inferior in manpower and resources, and strategically compressed between rival forces, the German army was forced to look to doctrine, training, and superior combat leadership to gain an edge over its adversaries. In the middle of World War I, the *Wermacht* turned first to more elastic defensive tactics and later to more fluid decentralized "von Hutier" tactics in the offense. This new approach tore a hole in the western front during the summer of 1918 that very nearly cost the Allies the war. When married with the tank, the dive bomber, and the wireless in 1939-1941, this new style of war made the *Wermacht* the master of Europe from the English Channel to the gates of Moscow, and from the Arctic Circle to North Africa.

Undeniably, Germany committed grave strategic blunders which ultimately cost her any chance of victory. Yet just as clearly, she possessed a unique form of military excellence—what T. N. Dupuy called a "genius for war"—that deserves respect and close study. While the Allies continually improved as they gained combat experience, most historians conclude that Germany was defeated through a combination of grossly inferior airpower, numerical inferiority, and strategic overreach. Nevertheless, the German experience, and that of the Israeli Defense Forces (which, in one of history's most striking paradoxes, consciously studied German methods and combat practices), provide perhaps the best working model of success in war, not through overpowering might and technological sophistication, but through superior doctrine and leadership.

Again, the rules are changing. The question now is how will a small Army fight, and how will it maximize its combat power with far fewer resources? I see little in our military literature that addresses this vital point. A serious reduction in troop strength on the ground will, in all likelihood, be paralleled by sharp cuts in training funds and a drop in operating tempo. Thus it becomes important to search for ways which will enable those divisions and brigades that survive the drawdown to fight more effectively than they did before. Even with fewer resources, this is not a hopeless task. Other armies have met similar challenges by relying on superior doctrine, leadership, and unit cohesion to offset their disadvantages in size and mass. So, I believe, can we.

Major Richard D. Hooker, Jr.

Book Reviews

The Age of Battles: The Quest for Decisive Warfare from Breitenfeld to Waterloo. By Russell F. Weigley. Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1991. 579 pages. **Reviewed by Dr. A. J. Bacevich (Colonel, USA Ret.),** Visiting Fellow of Strategic Studies, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University.

Having established himself as perhaps the foremost living student of American military history, Russell F. Weigley with this book turns to a broader canvas. *The Age of Battles* is Weigley's attempt to write a general survey of warfare during the long interval—just short of two centuries—encompassed by the rise of Gustavus Adolphus and the final defeat of Napoleon. The result is a formidable book, constituting in many respects an admirable achievement, yet failing in the end to sustain the argument on which it is based.

Weigley's premise is that the era from 1631 to 1815 was unique in military history. During this period—unlike earlier and later ones—"the grand-scale battle" served as "the principal instrument of the military strategist." Throughout this period, the jockeying for power among Europe's newly risen nation-states provoked a succession of wars. Beginning with Breitenfeld and ending with Waterloo, Weigley builds his narrative around the principal battles in each of those conflicts, providing descriptive accounts that individually are models of cogent historical writing. To the great good fortune of his readers, Weigley gives attention to much else besides. In addition to battle history, this is also institutional history. Weigley's reflections on technology, doctrine, and organizational reform that provide the backdrop to actions on the battlefield are alone worth the price of the book. Unfortunately, Weigley is not content simply to describe and analyze changes in the art of war. Instead, he reaches for a Grand Thesis—and in doing so overreaches himself. Having declared 1631-1815 to be an age when military leaders "placed a new emphasis on the waging of battle to impose a new decisiveness upon warfare," Weigley concludes that the effort failed miserably: despite Herculean efforts, "the persisting recalcitrant indecisiveness of war" remained intact. Indeed, the age of battles was "an age of prolonged, indecisive wars." If wars remained indecisive even in such circumstances, concludes Weigley, then "the whole history of war must be regarded as a history of almost unbroken futility." In short, Clausewitz got it all wrong: war is "not an extension of policy but the bankruptcy of policy."

Even restricting oneself to the evidence upon which Weigley relies to make his case—he ignores altogether military developments outside of Europe and North America—the argument fails on three counts. First, the assertion that the period 1631-1815 was a distinctive "age of battles" is arbitrary and unpersuasive. Second, Weigley's own narrative belies the contention that war throughout the period remained indecisive. Finally, the contention that the history of warfare is one of "almost unbroken futility" and that the use of force represents a "bankruptcy of policy" is not only ahistorical but also abdicates any hope whatsoever that the study of history might ameliorate—however modestly—the effects of war.

Ignoring for the moment the abundant evidence that both before 1631 and after 1815 "battle" possessed the capacity to obtain (though *never* guaranteeing) decision, we learn from Weigley's own narrative that even during his "age of battles" nations found ways *other* than battle per se for exploiting military power to good effect. To be sure, many nations showed a decided preference for combat aimed at a decisive overthrow of one's adversary—battle in the classic mode of Austerlitz or Jena-Auerstädt. Yet recognized alternatives existed, among them the use of military power aimed at achieving objectives by wearing down an adversary. Weigley's description of the American Revolutionary War makes this point precisely: losing one battle after another without suffering decisive effect, the Americans prevailed by adhering to a strategy of "unconventional, partisan war." Pitched battles between British regulars and the Continental Army were incidental to the outcome of the struggle.

Nor was guerrilla war the only alternative to battle for employing military power. England's rise—largely through reliance on sea power—provides another example of battle being incidental to the effective employment of force. In what may be the least convincing part of his analysis, Weigley strains to minimize England's achievement, suggesting that sea power was not so much "an instrument of war that built the British Empire . . . so much as . . . a means of moving into power vacuums." But this is rhetorical sleight of hand: the Royal Navy was indeed an instrument of war—as Weigley's succinct account of British naval triumphs from Aboukir to Trafalgar makes clear. Yet even when that navy was not directly engaged in combat, it served as a powerful instrument of statecraft, undergirding a great empire that survived more than two centuries. In short, during the period 1631-1815—as throughout modern history—nations could employ force in a variety of ways, only one of which relied on seeking a climactic encounter to achieve its purposes.

Similarly, Weigley's assertion that when battles did occur they failed to yield decisive results doesn't square with the story he tells. His narrative testifies repeatedly to the strategic payoff deriving from battlefield victories. Such victories allowed England to frustrate Louis XIV's efforts to impose French hegemony on Europe, helped Frederick the Great elevate Prussia to the status of Great Power, and enabled the allies to topple Napoleon. Ironically, even Weigley's account of the unconventional war for American independence credits conventional battle with making a pivotal contribution in its penultimate phase. Although contending that the British "were probably fighting an inherently unwinnable war," Weigley acknowledges that the American strategy of attrition was a two-edged sword: the struggle did not exhaust the British alone. Thus, by 1781, "American leaders, particularly Washington himself, were coming to believe that the revolution had lost its momentum, that it was approaching death through inertia. . . . [T]he cause seemed about to wither away." What restored momentum to the American cause? A French fleet operating off the Capes of the Chesapeake won one of France's infrequent victories over the Royal Navy just in time "to resuscitate the American cause"—independence following shortly thereafter.

How is it that none of these impressive martial achievements qualify for the encomium of "decisive"? The answer lies in the extraordinarily stringent definition that Weigley applies to the term. Although nowhere explicit, that definition emerges from the context of Weigley's judgments—most readily apparent in his assessment of Marlborough. Weigley admires Marlborough, describing him as "truly the rare individual without whom the past would be different," one of those heroes "who by his

own will and accomplishments alters the course of events [and] still strides across the record of the past." Weigley credits the great English commander with having "restored decisiveness to the battlefield." It was thus thanks to Marlborough that "the hegemonic ambitions of France could be broken, and Great Britain could be raised to an eminence among the powers." Yet as huge as Marlborough's achievements were, Weigley insists that they fell short of being genuinely decisive. Even in this case, "brilliant generalship's restoration of decisiveness to battle proved insufficient to restore decisiveness to war." Why? Because despite Marlborough's triumphs, "*France as a power could not be broken*" (emphasis added). In essence, Weigley implies that only an outcome resulting in a permanent and final resolution of the sources of political conflict would merit the term decisive. No war can meet such a requirement short of guaranteeing eternal harmony among nations. To conclude from such criteria that "strategic decisiveness in war has been forever elusive" obliges us to view all of human endeavor as similarly flawed and likewise futile: government for having failed to order human affairs on the basis of perfect and lasting justice, education for having failed to banish ignorance, religion for having failed to persuade us to love God and one another, and so on. For a historian to assume such a gloomy vantage point is singularly unhelpful. It is the perspective not of understanding but of despair.

To meet Weigley's definition of decisiveness would require that war supplant politics. For military historians utterly sickened by study of the pageant of miscalculation, ineptness, and carnage in which they have immersed themselves, this forms an honorable line of retreat. For the rest of us, however, it holds out only utopian illusion. For no matter how loudly the well-meaning may rail against the bungling and stupidity that have so often characterized the efforts of nations to employ force, war and politics remain inextricably bound together. However much we may wish otherwise, Clausewitz had it right.

War may be evil, but to imagine that even our supposedly enlightened era will eliminate its horrors anytime soon is pure fancy. At any rate, it is not the task of history to transform the world. With regard to the phenomenon of war, the most history can do is to remind citizens and statesmen alike that in choosing to apply force to political problems they take up a dangerous and unpredictable instrument. At the same time, history can convey to practitioners of the military art some appreciation for the all but unfathomable complexity of war, thereby perhaps reducing the likelihood of their repeating the misjudgments and blunders that have characterized the prosecution of war even more in our own century than in the "age of battles." This is neither a glamorous nor morally uplifting task. But it is a difficult and essential one, worthy of the talents of distinguished historians such as Russell Weigley.

George Bush vs. Saddam Hussein: Military Success! Political Failure? By Roger Hilsman. Novato, Calif.: Lyford Books/Presidio Press, 1992. 273 pages. \$21.95. **Reviewed by Arthur T. Hadley,** author of *The Straw Giant*.

This is a difficult book to review. Parts of it are excellent and thought-provoking and deserve considered reading. Other parts of it seem either filler or psychological speculation based on newspaper and magazine articles. One is reminded of poet James Russell Lowell's description of Edgar Allen Poe's work: "There

comes Poe, with his raven, like Barnaby Rudge, three fifths of him genius and two fifths sheer fudge." I do not mean to apply those proportions stringently to this book, but the quotation summarizes this reviewer's problem.

The book opens with a brief historical overview of the rise of Saddam Hussein, the vagaries of the Iran-Iraq War, and the dilemma posed for the Carter Administration by the taking of the US Embassy hostages by Iran. The book then deals with the attack on Kuwait by Iraq and with the US and UN responses to that aggression. The book points quite correctly to the problem the United States faced: having followed the well-known but not always wise principle of international relations holding that "the enemy of my enemy is my friend." America found itself in an awkward position when our "friend" Saddam Hussein—the enemy of our enemy Iran—suddenly attacked Kuwait, making him our enemy.

As part of this historical overview, Hilsman details the confusion over what the American Ambassador to Iraq, April Glaspie, did or did not indicate to Hussein about what would be the US response to an invasion of Kuwait. He rightly seizes on this to indicate the complex conflicts that had begun under Carter and continued and deepened under Reagan and Bush over how to treat Saddam.

Hilsman's narrative then picks up speed and strength as he describes how Bush and a handful of close advisers made decisions to deploy US troops to Saudi Arabia. As a reporter who had covered the Pentagon during the Truman Administration's decision to commit troops in defense of South Korea, I was struck by how "out of the loop" the Pentagon was once again during a moment of national military crisis in 1990. I am also concerned by Hilsman's extensive use of secondary sources here, particularly news accounts. As a newsman myself I am painfully aware that it is not just the military that gets facts scrambled in the difficult first hours of a developing crisis.

The book then moves on to its key part, an important and valuable discussion of the alternatives to the destruction of large portions of the Iraqi army by the coalition forces that eventually took place. There was the bombing strategy, the blockade strategy, the embargo strategy, and even a let-the-Saudis-buy-their-way-out-of-it strategy. Also, there were alternative courses of action that could have been taken before Iraq invaded Kuwait which might or might not (Hilsman is inclined to feel they might) have stopped Iraq from the act of invasion.

As in all such discussions, 20/20 hindsight provides advantages not available to mere mortals at the time. However, they are no less valuable for that. Properly analyzed and digested they can help the mere mortals involved in the next jaw-dropping crisis. Richard Betts' masterful analysis of alternative courses of action possible in the Cuban missile crisis (*Soldiers, Statesmen and Cold War Crises*) offers a fine example.

My problem with Hilsman's discussion of some of the alternatives is that they appear to me to be a bit otherworldly. I do not doubt that the reduction of US dependency on petroleum products both through higher taxes on oil and through fusion energy research are important projects. However, I frankly have my doubts that they could be considered as an alternative strategy for dealing with Saddam's invasion of Kuwait. But having said that, one should cast the net widely when considering alternatives, and Hilsman is commendably evenhanded in both his presentation and his criticism of many of the possibilities.

Former guerrilla leader Hilsman well details the moral as well as the military consequences of US efforts to foment indigenous resistance to Saddam inside

Iraq. From Korea through Vietnam to Iraq, being a US-supported guerrilla inside hostile territory has been a no-win occupation. While US support of guerrilla operations inside Iraq was by no means as extensive as support for such operations in Korea and Vietnam, the tragic consequences for the resisters was similar.

Coverage of the military action itself is skimpy, and there are bothersome omissions. One example: in discussing the friendly-fire deaths, Hilsman fails to make the point that traditionally most such incidents occur in a unit's first few weeks of combat. Since this combat lasted only a few days, a high number of such deaths was to be expected, particularly with the new, more-accurate weapons. Similarly, omissions mar his chapter on the press, which smacks of hasty writing. As for Hilsman's overarching theme—that the war became almost a personal contest between George Bush and Saddam Hussein—readers will have to judge the validity of that viewpoint for themselves.

Every War Must End. By Fred Charles Iklé. Revised Edition. New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1991. 160 pages. **Reviewed by Major General Edward B. Atkeson, USA Ret.,** author of *The Final Argument of Kings: Reflections on the Art of War*.

Fred Iklé's original work on this subject was published in 1971 by the same press. With the exception of the preface, the revised edition is not much different from the first book. *But the difference is significant.* In the preface Iklé provides the reader with the only reference to be found in the volume to the longest and costliest of America's wars in the latter half of our century, Vietnam. And the lessons he draws for us two decades after the fact seem particularly appropriate regarding some of the dilemmas we face today in the Balkans.

On 10 February 1993, Secretary of State Warren Christopher announced that the United States would become diplomatically engaged in the struggle in the provinces of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. While Mr. Christopher made no reference to a dispatch of troops to the fray, he clearly laid the groundwork for the deployment of forces in the future. Such forces might appear as enforcers of a peace accord, if one were to be attained, or they might appear as defenders of Kosovo or Macedonia in the face of Serbian aggression. Either way, they could well find themselves heavily engaged in firefights with armed enemies.

We should hope that President Clinton and his counselors are reading Iklé's preface, with its strong admonitions against the temptations their forebears fell victim to in Vietnam. The United States entered the Vietnam War, Iklé argues, with no overarching strategy for bringing it to a successful conclusion. While the best and the brightest might have agreed that "every war must end," according to Iklé's preface the architects of our Vietnam policy had no notion of how we were going to bring about the final act of that drama. Moreover, Iklé asserts, we dispatched troops to the scene with no clearer idea of the purpose of the enterprise than that of demonstrating our resolve to the opponent. He finds our policymakers innocent of any understanding that demonstrations may be badly misunderstood, or simply ignored, by the other side.

Iklé's point is so well sharpened that one wishes he had expanded the preface into another complete chapter. It would be interesting to know, for example, where he might have come down on the notion entertained in some Western capitals

in the 1960s and 1970s regarding nuclear demonstration strikes prior to escalation to full theater nuclear war. Critics at the time joked about firing high-burst blasts over Europe while Soviet tanks were running down the streets of Frankfurt and Bonn. What, we might wonder, would constitute a legitimate military power demonstration in Iklé's pantheon of sensible operational purposes?

Finally, the new edition of the book diagnoses our principal motive for the bombing campaign in Vietnam as one of punishing the foe—punishment, of course, which any gentleman on the receiving end would recognize as “unacceptable” and turn from his errant ways. The problem was that the North Vietnamese weren't such gentlemen. This is not to say that Iklé has hang-ups about bombing per se. He simply argues against such operations when they make little or no worthwhile contribution to the war. He points out that despotic rulers are not inclined to sue for peace merely because their soldiers and civilians suffer pain and death. He seems to be suggesting that “punishment” and “resolve,” like beauty, are in the eye of the beholder.

We should not conclude that Iklé would flinch from bombing an aggressor state, such as some people believe Serbia is coming to be today. He is quick to point out that any future tyrant will have to be deprived of mass destruction weapons to which he might have access, before he is tempted to use them. Presumably, aggressive bombing could be the most effective technique for fulfilling that goal. The lesson he dwells on, however, is the ineffectiveness of punishment operations as a strategy for achieving political ends.

The main body of *Every War Must End* is a useful primer on how conflicts are brought to a conclusion. More often than not, Iklé argues, the specific aims of the parties at the close of the war—of both victor and vanquished—are very different from their aims at the inception of fighting. Those willing to accept peace in return for significant concessions on the eve of battle may be transformed at its end into enthusiasts for unconditional surrender. Similarly, victors in seats of great power, such as Stalin in the USSR, may be satisfied to settle for far less than the complete subjugation of a spunky small opponent, like Finland, when convinced that the effort is not worth the candle.

Iklé's point is not so much that the test of battle alters leaders' expectations, but that often so little effort is devoted at the outset to the identification of hard national interests and minimum goals and to thinking through how they might be protected or achieved in the process of the war. Too many leaders fight on in pursuit of gold at the end of the rainbow, only to fall back exhausted months or years later with much less to show for the effort than they might have been able to settle for earlier.

Columbia University Press has done us all a great service in updating and making this handy little book available again. It contains much wisdom for policy-makers and their counselors. It may even help keep us out of yet another war before the curtain rings down on this most violent of centuries.

Self-Determination in the New World Order. By Morton H. Halperin and David Scheffer with Patricia L. Small. Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1992. 178 pages. \$21.95.
Reviewed by Guenter Lewy, author of *America in Vietnam*.

One of the authors of this book, Morton H. Halperin, is a former Vietnam dove who until late 1992 was director of the Center for National Security Studies,

jointly sponsored in Washington by the American Civil Liberties Union and the Fund for Peace. Over the years, the Center for National Security Studies, part of what Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick has called the group that tends to find America more culpable than her enemies, has been a staunch opponent of all US covert action and has generally rejected an activist American foreign policy. It is indicative of the changed political lineup of the post-Cold War era that Mr. Halperin, together with many others who for years did their best to lessen America's penchant for playing a leading role in world affairs, today is an advocate of greater US intervention abroad. From the fringes of the foreign policy community, Mr. Halperin on 1 November 1992 moved to become a senior associate of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and holder of an endowed professorship for international affairs at George Washington University. In January 1993, he was chosen to assume the new post of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Democracy and Human Rights. The dust jacket of the book lists Mr. Halperin's brief service on the National Security Council (where he ran into conflict with Henry Kissinger) and other posts, but makes no mention of his association with the Center for National Security Studies that lasted for 19 years.

This book was prepared as part of the Project on Self-Determination of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. The "new world order" that was to follow the collapse of communism, the authors point out, has so far not come to pass. As a result of the disintegration of the Soviet empire, the world today faces military conflicts in Georgia, Armenia, Tajikistan, and other parts of the former Soviet Union that have already cost thousands of lives. The breakup of Yugoslavia has resulted in an estimated 30,000 dead and more than one million refugees. The struggle of the Kurds and Shia of Iraq to protect their very existence continues unabated. So does the civil war in the Sudan. The human suffering resulting from these conflicts is staggering, focussing new attention on the mixed consequences of group attempts to achieve self-determination. This laudable goal, it turns out, is often fraught with great danger for the peoples involved and threatens serious consequences for the rest of the world as well.

The United States, as the only remaining superpower, this study proposes, must take the lead in helping the world community develop a comprehensive set of principles and standards for responding to self-determination movements. Broadly speaking, there are three options: remain neutral, support the preservation of an existing state within its current borders, or back the creation of a new independent state. In order to decide upon a proper course of action in concrete cases, the authors suggest several topics for fact-finding and criteria for judgment. The most important of the topics involve the character and conduct of the movement seeking self-determination, an assessment of the way in which the established government treats its people, an understanding of how a particular region came to be incorporated into a larger state, and the potential for violent consequences. In some instances, timely diplomatic intervention will suffice to resolve a conflict. The conditioning of aid and economic sanctions are other means at the disposal of the international community. As a last resort, there is military intervention under United Nations auspices.

The authors oppose the repeal of those provisions of the UN Charter prohibiting the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any UN member or interference in any member's internal affairs. The authors stipulate, however, that "when American interests in the new world order,

including the humanitarian imperatives of so many distant conflicts, demand international or regional action, the US government (led by a determined president) should use its leverage as a superpower to forge the necessary domestic and international consensus to respond."

In the closing days of his period of office, President Bush successfully rallied the international community to undertake a collective military intervention in Somalia. On the other hand, Bush chose a far more cautious course in his handling of the tragedy of Bosnia-Herzegovina. As of this writing, President Clinton has done little better in stemming the suffering of this small Balkan country. The intractable nature of the problem of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the equally widespread loss of life in other troublespots such as the Sudan and Mozambique point up the difficulty faced by the world community in coming to grips with the problem of self-determination. The criteria for action suggested in this book make sense, but their implementation will be far from easy.

Foundations of Moral Obligation: The Stockdale Course. By Joseph Gerard Brennan. Newport, R.I.: Naval War College Press, 1992. 269 pages. \$10.00 (paper). **Reviewed by Colonel John F. Connolly**, Deputy Commandant of the Army War College and former philosophy instructor at the US Military Academy.

Years ago, browsing in a discount bookstore, I invested one dollar in Joseph Gerard Brennan's *The Education of a Prejudiced Man*. This bargain-basement memoir portrayed with wit and grace one man's journey from hard times in the Irish-Catholic Roxbury section of Boston to Emeritus Professor of Philosophy, Barnard College, Columbia University. Along the way Professor Brennan experienced life as teacher, World War II sailor, saloon piano player, and father of six children. In 1975, Brennan's interest in philosophy led to an exchange of letters with ex-POW Admiral James B. Stockdale. Stockdale had relied on the teachings of the Greek stoic philosopher Epictetus to endure seven years of brutal captivity in North Vietnam. He eventually served as President of the Naval War College where he teamed with Brennan in teaching a survey of moral philosophy. *Foundations of Moral Obligation: The Stockdale Course*, resulted from their collaboration, but in the main it represents Brennan's scholarship.

Foundations of Moral Obligation was written for educated readers, rich in experience, but new to traditional philosophy. It represents a rare opportunity to calibrate one's moral compass using some hearty perennials from Western thought. Plato, Aristotle, Immanuel Kant, John Stuart Mill, and Ludwig Wittgenstein, among others, are discussed in non-technical language to uncover notions of good and evil and what one ought to think about when facing value-laden choices. Hard-core philosophers may be disappointed with the book's survey level, but given the intended audience I find little cause for complaint. In fact, recorded classroom dialogue, appropriately edited, is integrated into the book's text, a technique that chases out some of the stuffiness one usually associates with works on moral philosophy.

Without hesitation, I recommend *Foundations of Moral Obligation* for the military reader. He or she will find Brennan's commentaries crammed with wisdom,

without a hint of the slickness that too often passes as contemporary ethics. Treat the book as a reference work left by the bedside, paging through it not to find the right answers, but, like TV's *Jeopardy*, to find the right questions.

Military Necessity and Homosexuality. By Ronald D. Ray. Louisville, Ky.: First Principles, 1993. 122 pages. \$12.95 (paper). **Reviewed by E. L. Pattullo**, former Director of the Center for the Behavioral Sciences, Associate Chairman of the Department of Psychology, and Director of the Psychological Laboratories at Harvard University.

Colonel Ronald D. Ray, USMCR, has done the armed forces no favor in privately publishing his polemic, *Military Necessity and Homosexuality*. His purpose, he says, is "to give military leaders and policymakers a full body of information on homosexuality from which to evaluate the necessity of retaining the ban [on gays in the forces]." Unfortunately, the result is a hodgepodge of fact and fiction presented in a format reminiscent of some of the less reliable fulminations of fringe groups on the far right and left. If widely circulated, it is likely to be most useful to those who insist that only prejudice prompts the military's opposition to President Clinton's decision to enlist gays.

The author appears to be moved, in considerable part, by religious conviction, as first evidenced by a dedication that includes reference to "America One Nation Under God" (complete with capitals) and a quotation from II Corinthians. Given our insistence, at the end of the 20th century, on separating church and state—to a degree that would astonish our forefathers—this is not a happy augury. The penultimate chapter on the morality of homosexuality is also heavily dependent on Biblical teachings, as can scarcely be avoided if the argument from morality is to be considered at all. (The difficulties with including it, to which Colonel Ray is not entirely blind, are interesting, but would require a separate essay.)

Colonel Ray is persuaded that there exists a conspiracy on the part of gays "to completely overturn America's moral order to reflect their own 'moral' orientation." This is detailed in the first chapter describing the campaign of organized gays to get into the military. The theme is pursued throughout the book and reiterated again in chapter 5, "Homosexual Disinformation, Deception and 'Politically Correct' Strategies for Advancing Homosexuality."

In between, the author argues his case in terms of (1) the legal doctrine of "military necessity," (2) the need for broadbrush selection procedures that sometimes ignore individual characteristics, (3) the aspects of the gay lifestyle that militate against success in the armed forces, (4) refutation of some of the arguments made by proponents of gay enlistment, and (5) morality.

Colonel Ray is a practicing attorney and I have no legal training, so I may grossly underestimate the force of the doctrine of "military necessity" on which he relies heavily. The doctrine reflects the practice of the federal courts, in years past, of giving great weight to the mere assertion by military authorities that a given practice is essential. I have no doubt the legal history is as Colonel Ray details it. However, anyone with a layman's knowledge of federal judicial activity in the past half century will wonder about the strength of this bulwark. The recent finding by Los Angeles

Federal District Judge Terry Hatter that the existing ban on gays is unconstitutional suggests the vulnerability of the doctrine, regardless of whether his decision stands.

That military recruitment needs to be selective, as Colonel Ray argues, few will question. It is understandable, too, that the military must paint with a broad brush, sometimes ignoring the merit of individuals as it winnows out those unlikely to prove able soldiers. But the author makes less of a case as to why gays as a group will be a burden to the military than, in fact, could be made. It is not helped by such assertions as, "If forced to make a choice, the homosexual will often choose his own good over the good of the unit." In support of so sweeping a statement, Colonel Ray instances one case in which, in his view, a gay man failed to put the good of the service first. No doubt instances may be found in which straight men and women have also acted selfishly.

Clearly, for Colonel Ray, the heart of the matter is the distastefulness of gay sexual practices, detailed in a lengthy chapter on "The Case for Maintaining the Ban. . . ." and referred to throughout the volume. Drawing from lurid accounts in the homosexual press as assembled by Dr. Judith Reisman (a scholar unremittently anti-gay, and author of a notoriously unreliable critique of the Kinsey Report), Colonel Ray paints a picture certain to disgust most readers. A problem with this is that comparable accounts of similarly outrageous (and sometimes identical) heterosexual shenanigans could be assembled from the popular, soft-porn press. The other problem is that just as there is great uncertainty about the incidence of homosexuality, little is known about how most gays live. The raunchy "gay lifestyle" of popular imagination is almost certainly followed by only a relatively small fringe group.

Buried within a text that keeps erupting with Colonel Ray's personal distaste for homosexuality are some of the reasons that persuade many more tolerant citizens that the services are wise to exclude gays. Unfortunately, Colonel Ray devotes a scant three pages to what I believe to be the principal reason for continuing to reject gays: that is, the consequences of infusing all ranks with considerable numbers of individuals who look to those of their own gender for sexual satisfaction. It is a pity that Ray scants this argument because it is one that gays and straights alike can understand. Even President Clinton acknowledges it, weakly insisting that strict rules of behavior can control the foreseeable difficulties. Given the failure of strict rules of behavior to contain sexual harassment in the 9-to-5 civilian workplace, the President's hope for its containment in the round-the-clock armed forces suggests a naivete disturbing in the Commander-in-Chief.

After Tet: The Bloodiest Year in Vietnam. By Ronald H. Spector.
New York: The Free Press, 1992. 390 Pages. \$24.95. **Reviewed by**
Colonel John W. Mountcastle, Director of the Strategic Studies
Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pa.

Shared experiences, those that evoke emotional responses, seem not only to withstand the passage of time, but frequently grow fuller, stronger, more meaningful over the years. Americans alive in 1941 will not forget their response to the news of Pearl Harbor. The assassination of John F. Kennedy evokes a flood of memories for today's over-40 set. And, more recently, the graphic coverage of the first air attack on

Baghdad provided millions of television veterans a green-tinted impression of war as seen through an infrared lens.

This book brings to mind another set of images etched in our collective experience, the pictures sent back to us from Khe Sanh, Hue, Saigon—the pictures from Tet '68. The intervening quarter century has not lessened the impact of National Police General Nguyen Ngo Loan shooting a VC prisoner in the head while being photographed by AP photographer Eddie Adams and NBC film cameraman Vo Suu. The fear, determination, and fatigue felt by the Marines fighting to retake the Hue citadel were all visible on their young faces in *Life* magazine photos. All of these memories are a part of America. All of them capture a moment in time. This book, *After Tet: The Bloodiest Year in Vietnam*, does the same thing for a critical year during the Vietnam War. It is the best account I've found of the period.

Ronald Spector has produced a meticulously researched and readable narrative, writing with the added insight derived from having spent part of 1968 and most of 1969 in Vietnam as an enlisted Marine. He thus knows what questions to ask. He saw firsthand the effects of high explosives on the human body; he can sense "ground truth."

Spector knows that despite all the public attention attracted by the communist assaults on population centers during February 1968, the bloodiest single week of the bloodiest year was actually in May 1968, not February. That month Army and Marine units fought dozens of essentially nameless battles with North Vietnamese regulars across the length and breadth of Vietnam. May was the month peace talks opened in Paris, and May marked the beginning of a series of brutal fights taking place on the ground lying between Hue and the DMZ, along the infamous "Street Without Joy." From January to July 1968 the overall rate of fighting men killed in action exceeded the highest rate for Korea and the Mediterranean and Pacific theaters during World War II. However, it is the First World War, not these later conflicts, that in Spector's view provides the closest analogue to the war in Vietnam:

An examination of the events of 1968 makes it clear that rather than World War II or Korea, to which it is often compared, the most appropriate analogy to Vietnam is World War I. . . . The war in Vietnam was a stalemate and had been a stalemate since the early months of the conflict. As in World War I, neither side was prepared to admit this first, and each side grossly underestimated the determination and staying power of the other. Both sides persisted in the belief that the other side was near to collapse and that just a little more pressure, a little more perseverance, would lead to victory.

As a soldier who had two very different experiences in Vietnam (tank platoon leader in 1967 and advisor to an ARVN unit in 1970), I found this book especially valuable in helping me better understand what happened to the Army in Vietnam after I returned to the United States in December 1967. Clearly, the USARV units with which I worked as a MACV advisor in 1969-70 were different from those I remembered from my first tour. Spector takes us through the changes in US forces, commenting on growing racial unrest, increasing drug abuse, the disillusionment of junior officers and NCOs, and the glacially slow change brought about in the ARVN forces through the efforts of their American and Australian advisors.

While President Bush might have been justified in exclaiming that "we've kicked the Vietnam syndrome" following the fighting in the Persian Gulf, the future

of warfare in our topsy-turvy world may provide more struggles like Vietnam than replays of Desert Storm. If the video images from Sarajevo remind us of the street-fighting in Hue, if you understand the confusion of Marine PFCs being vilified by Somali villagers they've been sent to help, if the inability of UN peacekeeping troops to halt tribal fighting in Croatia disturbs you, then read this masterful history. It broaches dozens of questions we should be asking ourselves today as we look to the future.

Jedburgh Team Operations in Support of the 12th Army Group, August 1944. By Samuel J. Lewis. Fort Leavenworth, Kans.: Combat Studies Institute, 1991. 96 pages. \$4.00 (paper). **Reviewed by Major Daniel P. Bolger**, author of *Scenes from an Unfinished War: Low-Intensity Conflict in Korea, 1966-1969*.

In a world of military uniformity, special operations forces (SOF) have the impertinence to look different, speak in strange tongues, and perform unusual missions, perhaps even "unmilitary" tasks, out on the territorial and tactical fringes of a campaign. Conventional soldiers, typically ignorant of the secret SOF world, regard these picked troops with suspicion. Are the tangible benefits of special warfare worth the investment of an army's best and brightest troops? Armies around the world field special operations forces, but conventional commanders and staffs don't quite accept, let alone trust, the "snake eaters."

Dr. Samuel J. Lewis of the US Army's Combat Studies Institute at Fort Leavenworth suggests that such misgivings are nothing new, and that the unfortunate misunderstandings between regular line commanders and special forces leaders carry a significant cost in lost battlefield opportunities, not to mention human lives. In his concise, perceptive study of SOF operations in support of General Omar N. Bradley's 12th Army Group, Dr. Lewis highlights the actions of Allied deep penetration teams inserted at the height of the American pursuit across France in the late summer of 1944. What these teams did, and did not do, for their conventional brethren lies at the core of Dr. Lewis's provocative analysis.

Lewis recounts the fascinating story of the Jedburgh teams, one of several distinct SOF elements operating in the German rear area as the Allies broke out from the Normandy hedgerows. The "Jeds," as they called themselves, were three-man teams drawn from the ranks of the British Special Operations Executive (SOE), the American Office of Strategic Services (OSS), and a mix of soldiers drawn from the countries of Nazi-occupied Europe. A typical Jedburgh team would include an American or British officer, an American or British sergeant schooled as a communicator, and a French, Belgian, or Dutch officer.

Taking their name from a small town on the Scottish border where they trained, the Jedburghs underwent grueling selection and pre-mission preparation during the winter of 1943-44, including everything from hand-to-hand combat and parachute jumping to Morse code and local customs. Intensive language work paralleled the combat and intelligence training. By the last days of June 1944, the Jedburgh teams stood ready, and a few had already jumped into embattled France.

The Jeds' intended mission would be a tough one: coordinating the diverse French, Belgian, and Dutch resistance groups in direct actions and deep reconnaissance

in support of the advancing Allied armies. Dr. Lewis explains how this coordination was supposed to occur. Jeds in the field, having linked up with local partisans, would use specially designed long-range radios to talk to Special Forces Headquarters (SFHQ) in England. Each Allied army, corps, and, in some cases, division had a special forces liaison element attached to pass messages and orders through SFHQ to and from the Jeds behind enemy lines. Not surprisingly, this cumbersome system broke down more often than it worked.

Dr. Lewis recounts the activities of 11 teams in some detail. These dramatic combat narratives sparkle. The stories serve to remind readers almost 50 years removed just how dangerous it was to jump in far behind a very fluid front, armed only with hand weapons, sharp wits, and a trust that the French resistance would be there before the Germans.

The 11 exciting vignettes serve Dr. Lewis well as he argues that these elite troops promised more than they delivered. Lewis believes that the teams proved only marginally successful. Four failed outright, with numerous casualties among the teams and their resistance friends. The remaining seven contributed more as evidence of Allied resolve to free occupied Europe and gatherers of intelligence than as controllers of direct-action missions.

Lewis pulls no punches in explaining what limited the Jedburghs' contributions. He emphasizes the "inability of senior ground commanders to appreciate the value of SOF and operations in the enemy's rear," tracing it to the prevailing American and British military cultures, which showed "very little interest in unconventional warfare." Indeed, American commanders and staffs rarely even extended their boundaries much past the next day's objectives, so that deep reconnaissance and sabotage hardly concerned them. The Jedburgh effort also endured chronic radio problems, troubles with timings and locations of drops, difficulties coordinating with the headstrong resistance groups, and a disturbing tendency to bump into other disparate long-range intelligence outfits fighting their own private wars. It is amazing that the scattering of aggressive, dedicated Jedburgh trios achieved as much as it did.

Special forces are here to stay, as fully a part of our modern power-projection US Army as heavy and light units. The trick involves building teams that complement the strengths of these different communities. In confronting that challenge, both conventional and unconventional warriors will find a lot to ponder in Dr. Lewis's intriguing work on the Jedburgh experience.

Terrain and Tactics. By Patrick O'Sullivan. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1991. 182 pages. \$42.95. **Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Kent Hughes Butts,** author of *Geopolitics of Southern Africa: South Africa as Regional Superpower*.

Perhaps no academic discipline has greater potential for contributing to our understanding of the military art of warfare than does geography. Focusing as it does on man's relationship to the land, geography systematically explains the effect of the landscape on man's interaction with his fellow man.

Unfortunately, since the Second World War, geographers have avoided the topic of military geography. This is a partial result of the embarrassment geographers

felt when German geographer Karl Haushofer sullied the name of their discipline by using it to justify Hitler's expansionist strategies. As editor of *Zeitschrift für Geopolitik*, the former Imperial German army general used geographic knowledge to sanctify military expansionism under the academic concept of geopolitics. At the same time geographers were attempting to distance themselves from Haushofer, they moved aggressively to join the quantitative revolution, seeking to make geography more scientific through mathematical modeling. This effort had the unfortunate side effect of generating within the geography community a bias against non-quantitative research and scholarship and a de-emphasis of regional and military studies.

Thus, when much of the Cold War was being fought in the developing world at a regional level, and often through insurgencies where geographers could have helped explain the phenomenon, practitioners of the discipline were institutionally discouraged from applying their substantial skills to discovering explanatory variables. It was only in the 1980s when geographers began finally to overcome these biases in their profession and make scholarly contributions to geopolitics and military geography. It is against this historical backdrop that I read Patrick O'Sullivan's work *Terrain and Tactics*. It was my hope that Dr. O'Sullivan would provide a significant contribution to the military reader's understanding of the value of geographical analysis to the military art. Toward this goal he has been partially successful.

The continued ambivalence toward military geography is made quite clear on the first page of the book, where the author justifies his book by writing, "The moral hope underlying this endeavor is that war will prove futile, that the benefit of the outcome will prove to be swamped by the enormous cost in lives and resources inevitably involved." Fortunately for the military reader, the author does not pursue this philosophical vein in the bulk of the book. Indeed, what the work seeks to achieve is a "material and impersonal" evaluation of the impact of different geographical settings upon the relative advantage afforded combatants. The author hopes to educate the reader in the relationship between terrain and tactics. He does this by providing brief historical summaries of military events and using them to demonstrate general principles of military practice. Having done so, he examines the variety of physical terrain in which wars occur and battles are fought. He then discusses the geopolitical underpinnings that cause wars, and finally he provides a geographical analysis of selected battles, recent and historical, driving home the geographic variables that explain the phenomena of battles and campaigns.

Written by the chairman of the Department of Geography at Florida State University and author of two other military geography books, *Terrain and Tactics* is shallow and brief in its discussion of geopolitical and geostrategic issues. The book's theme does not embrace these areas, and the author quite rightly discusses them only enough to provide the underpinnings for the tactical and operational analysis that are his main concerns. The emphasis of the book is clearly on guerrilla and counterinsurgency operations, oftentimes set in urban terrain such as that of northern Ireland.

One of the difficulties facing operational planners is lack of familiarity with foreign geography. Tactics and equipment suitable for broad plains and temperate climates have often been mistakenly employed in tropical situations, in dense forests, or in jungles, with disastrous results. Many military planners and strategists grew up on the study of European battles, and the great strategists of our time were preoccupied

with the Eurasian landmass upon which European history unfolded. The revolutionary war milieu that quite often characterized the post-World War II era has brought about different battle landscapes having little in common with those from European history. A major contribution of this book is the intimate description of common battlefields of the Cold War era and their impact upon the weaponry, tactics, and operational considerations of combatants. The military reader will indeed gain from it a greater appreciation of geography's impact upon operational and tactical art.

An additional strong point of the book is its use of mathematical modeling to examine popularly held beliefs concerning operations other than war. In quite a positive departure from impressionistic books on low-intensity conflict, *Terrain and Tactics* tests the relationship between successful insurgent operations and such variables of the physical landscape as precipitation, vegetation, and the slope of the topography. The author's regression analysis tests add significant credence to his assertion that the most important variables in the successful outcome of insurgencies are low slopes, high route density, and the availability of cross-border sanctuaries. The discussion of geographic concepts such as the friction of distance adds a new dimension to our understanding of low-level conflict and guerrilla movements, and speaks to the greatest strength of O'Sullivan's work. This part is useful to the military profession because it exposes practitioners and empirical researchers to a heretofore missing academic and (at times) theoretical perspective on a level of conflict that continues to be one of the more important in today's defense environment.

While *Terrain and Tactics* does make contributions to our understanding of the effect of terrain on operations other than war, it fails to live up to its stated objectives and its name. The book appears to be more a collection of essays than a well-integrated work dedicated to the topic of terrain and tactics. Perhaps it would be better titled "Essays on Military Geography." Such chapters as "The World at War" shift the focus from the tactical to the strategic, thus digressing from the original objectives of the book. Ultimately, the book fails to tie together all elements and lacks a good summary of the key points the author seeks to communicate.

The book would prove more useful to those teaching or researching military geography and unconventional war than to senior members of the defense community. Nevertheless, the work makes a significant contribution by introducing new geographical concepts to the study of tactics and insurgent conflict. Perhaps the geographic community will now see fit to devote further study to military geography, thus providing a more inclusive explanation of the phenomenon of warfare.

There's A War To Be Won: The United States Army in World War II. By Geoffrey Perret. New York: Random House, 1991. 623 pages. \$30.00. Reviewed by Colonel John B. B. Trussell, USA Ret., former Chief of the History Division, Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission.

To find any fault with a book which starts with the assertion that the United States' World War II Army was "one of the supreme American achievements of the 20th century" and concludes that "this was one of the greatest armies in history" goes against the grain. To find *major* faults with a book that has received so many favorable

reviews is daunting. Nevertheless, while portions of *There's a War To Be Won* certainly have merit, as a whole it is seriously flawed.

This book is actually both less and more than the story of the Army in World War II. It is less, for despite its subtitle it deals not with the entire Army, but solely with the Army's ground forces—or, at least, some of them. However, since the Army Air Force was semi-autonomous, its omission from all but passing mention is acceptable; given the detail in which the book purports to address its subject, this omission is necessary.

It is *more* than the title implies because it attempts not merely to describe the Army's ground operations, but to do so against a background of the evolution of organization, weapons, equipment, training, and tactical and logistical doctrine from 1918 through 1945. Interwoven throughout are profiles of leading figures and their interrelationships, with emphasis on their conflicts. In the book's favor, it maintains coherence while shifting from one topic to another and back and forth between combat theaters, and preserves reasonable chronology even while dealing sequentially with major episodes that occurred more or less simultaneously. It balances vital logistical factors with strategic considerations. While the maps provide little support for descriptions of tactical operations, they adequately complement strategic discussions. Finally, the presentation of certain episodes—the French resistance to US landings in North Africa, the Smith-versus-Smith controversy on Saipan, and the case for using the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs—makes insightful contributions to understanding.

Regrettably, these virtues are heavily outweighed by defects. The account of the Army's development and its institutional character and programs lacks balance. Admittedly, treating so vast and complex a subject in one volume compels subordination of some aspects to others, but many of the priorities are curious. Blow-by-blow accounts are provided of the difficulties (contractual as well as technological) in developing the M-1 rifle (eight pages) and the jeep (three pages), while entire combat arms and technical services are completely ignored or given only cursory treatment. There is a lengthy discussion of factors affecting soldier morale and well-being—e.g., medical evacuation, graves registration, decorations policies, V-Mail, USO shows, and even official brothels—but it includes not one word about courts-martial or the operation of the military justice system. And these represent only a few examples.

Pervading the entire book are misstatements (by no means all of them trivial) of readily available facts, suggesting research that was careless at best. In other cases, accuracy is sacrificed for the sake of attention-grabbing hyperbole or sweeping generalizations that cannot stand up under examination. Examples abound, but one of special interest to *Parameters* readers is to be found in the statement that after becoming Chief of Staff in 1930, MacArthur "revitalized" the Army War College, which "had become a somnolent place where gray-haired colonels spent a pleasant year doing nothing much . . . before plodding gently into retirement." Actually, of the War College's 752 Army graduates of the pre-MacArthur 1920-1929 classes, 328 (43.6 percent) became general officers, among them one five-star, eight four-star, and 11 three-star generals; they included Eisenhower, Somervell, Simpson, and McNair, whom the author ranks among the chief architects of the World War II victory.

Overshadowing all the other faults, however, is the blind partisanship of the accounts of interservice and inter-Allied disagreements. Given the book's subject, it

is acceptable for the American ground forces' views to be emphasized. What is not acceptable is the failure to concede any merits (and many issues in fact did have more than one side) to opposing viewpoints. Beyond this, opposition is unfailingly portrayed as being not merely wrongheaded but wicked, prompted only by base motives. Indeed, the distinct implication is that the Army's chief enemies were not the Axis powers but the Navy, the Army Air Force, and the Allies—above all, the British, whose treatment without exception can be described only as venomous.

At the outset, the author concedes that "some readers may feel . . . the tone of this work is overly critical at times. . . . We live, nevertheless, in a critical age and this is a work of its time." Apart from the fact that his statement is only an explanation, not a justification, there is a difference between critical analysis and the cheap shots with which this book is rife. In *There's a War To Be Won*, what has been produced is not a history but a diatribe.

There can be no argument with the thesis that the creation and performance of the Army's ground forces in World War II represent a magnificent achievement. However, even ignoring the fact that the development of this thesis is weakened by factual errors and distortions, this book is grievously marred by seeking to make its point through heavy reliance on belittling and denigrating all other participants in the struggle. The record of the World War II ground forces, by itself and without invidious comparisons, is ample to support the impressiveness of their achievements. Seeking to enhance the perception of those achievements at the expense of the Army's comrades in arms is unnecessary. To this reviewer, moreover, it is offensive.

Off the Press . . .

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- Boyd, Carl. *Hitler's Japanese Confidant: General Oshima Hiroshi and Magic Intelligence, 1941-1945*. Lawrence: Univ. Press of Kansas, 1993. 271 pp. \$25.00.
- Calhoun, Frederick S. *Uses of Force and Wilsonian Foreign Policy*. Kent, Ohio: Kent State Univ. Press, 1993. 172 pp. \$15.00 (paper).
- Chinworth, Michael W. *Inside Japan's Defense: Technology, Economics & Strategy*. McLean, Va.: Brassey's (US), 1993. 245 pp. \$26.00.
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- Heleniak, Roman J., and Lawrence L. Hewitt, eds. *Leadership During the Civil War: The 1989 Deep Delta Civil War Symposium—Themes in Honor of T. Harry Williams*. Shippensburg, Pa.: White Mane, 1993. 196 pp. \$18.95 (paper).
- Higham, Robin, and Donald J. Mrozek, eds. *A Guide to the Sources of United States Military History: Supplement III*. Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books. The Shoe String Press, 1993. 531 pp. \$55.00.
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- Hoge, William M. *Engineer Memoirs*. Washington: US Army Corps of Engineers, 1993. 269 pp.
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- Katzman, Kenneth. *The Warriors of Islam: Iran's Revolutionary Guard*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1993. 192 pp. \$42.50 (paper).
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- Metz, Steven. *Eisenhower as Strategist: The Coherent Use of Military Power in War and Peace*. Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, 1993. 95 pp.
- Moran, Theodore H. *American Economic Policy and National Security*. New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993. 100 pp. \$10.95 (paper).
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- Post, Gaines, Jr., ed. *German Unification: Problems and Prospects*. Claremont, Calif.: The Keck Center for International and Strategic Studies, 1993. 160 pp.
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- Shultz, Richard H., Jr., and Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., eds. *The Future of Air Power in the Aftermath of the Gulf War*. Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air Univ. Press, 1992. 374 pp.
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- Welcher, Frank J. *The Union Army, 1861-1865, Organization and Operations: The Western Theater, Vol. II*. Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1993. 989 pp. \$75.00.
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From the Archives

Audie Murphy: Ever the Warrior

Audie Murphy—whose medals numbered among them the Medal of Honor, Distinguished Service Cross, Silver Star with Oak-Leaf Cluster, Legion of Merit, Bronze Star with V Device and Oak-Leaf Cluster, and Purple Heart with two Oak-Leaf Clusters—was simply the most highly decorated American soldier of the Second World War and, indeed, of any American war. His courage and pugnacity carried into civilian life after the war. Here, director John Huston recalls an episode occurring in 1950 in northern California where Murphy, now working as an actor, was filming *The Red Badge of Courage*:

One Monday Audie came to me and said he wanted to speak to me privately, and so we drew aside and he said, "I think you should know something, John, that happened to me yesterday. There may be repercussions."

He was driving along Ventura Boulevard alone in his car, and another car with two men in it was ahead of him making passes at some kids on motor scooters. What they were doing was dangerous, and Audie pulled up beside them and said, "You're damn fools to be doing that; somebody might get hurt."

And the kids turned off then, and Audie went on, and the next thing, he came to a stop light, and these guys pulled up beside him and invited him to get out of the car. He had been horseback riding, and he had his riding crop in the car. One of the men came forward, and Audie just leaned out and slashed him across the face with his riding crop. Then the other guy came, and Audie got out of the car. Now I heard some of the description of what happened from a bystander who recognized Audie.

When these two guys came at him, Audie would first knock one down and then the other; one would get up while the other was being knocked down, until he had them both down and was kicking the living shit out of them. According to this bystander, they were twice his size, which made no difference to Audie, of course.

And the next day, this was very funny, there was an account in the paper about how two men had been attacked by someone in a car with Texas license plates and had had to go to the hospital.¹

NOTE

1. "The Hero in Hollywood," sidebar to Roger J. Spiller, "The Price of Valor," *MHQ: The Quarterly Journal of Military History*, 5 (Spring 1993), 108-09. The sidebar was adapted from Don Graham, *No Name On the Bullet: A Biography of Audie Murphy* (New York: Viking Penguin, 1989).

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