Jointness for the Sake of Jointness in Operation 'URGENT FURY'

Abstract

This paper analyzes the use of multi-Service forces to project U.S. Power. It reviews the use of all four Services during contingency operations in Lebanon in 1958, the Dominican Republic in 1965, and in particular, the Grenada rescue operation in 1983. Of primary concern during these operations was the possible inappropriate assignment of forces from Services other than the Navy and Marine Corps that added unnecessary capabilities and therefore, added complexity to the operations. In the aftermath of Operation URGENT FURY in Grenada, there were calls for more jointness. The paper concludes that past employment of the Navy/Marine Corps team and the Air Force/Army team have been extremely successful in most, if not all cases, and that the formation of multi- Service teams consisting of the Army/Navy/Air Force/Marine Corps and Special Operations Forces unnecessarily complicate operations--especially short notice contingency ops. The involvement of too many Services does not create 'teams,' only jointness for the sake of jointness.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
May 17, 1993
Accession Number
ADA266578

Entities

People

  • S. J. Labadie

Organizations

  • Naval War College

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • C4I
  • Energy and Power Technologies
  • Human Systems
  • Weapons Technologies

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Air Force
  • Aircrafts
  • Amphibious Operations
  • Command And Control
  • Dominican Republic
  • Employment
  • Governments
  • International Organizations
  • Marine Corps
  • Military Operations
  • Security
  • Special Operations Forces
  • Task Forces
  • United States
  • War
  • War Colleges
  • Warfare

Readers

  • Educational Psychology
  • Joint Military Operations and Doctrine.
  • Maritime Combat Support and Expeditionary Logistics.