OPDEC Planning: A Commander's Imperative

Abstract

Successive generations of military commanders universally recognize as a principle of war that if surprise can be attained over the enemy, it may contribute to victory. To achieve surprise requires a stratagem, a means or tool to achieve ends. That tool is deception, recognized by commanders as a 'force multiplier' they must add to their operational art toolbox. The U.S. commander tasked to orchestrate joint and combined military operations and campaigns at the operational level of war must possess a solid understanding of what deception is and is not and can and cannot do for his campaign. This paper examines U.S. Joint Doctrine for Operational Deception (OPDEC), reviews and analyzes eight OPDEC planning considerations, provides historical analysis of OPDEC planning in conjunction with two Allied campaigns in World War II and the Persian Gulf War and reviews insights into the deception planning process from the commander's perspectives provided by General Eisenhower and General Schwarzkopf in their memoirs. It offers three conclusions which support vigorous attention to OPDEC planning by the operational commander.

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Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
May 17, 1993
Accession Number
ADA266583

Entities

People

  • Carol West

Organizations

  • Naval War College

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • Energy and Power Technologies
  • Human Systems
  • Materials and Manufacturing Processes
  • Weapons Technologies

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Classification
  • Contingency Operations (Military)
  • International Organizations
  • Joint Military Activities
  • Military Commanders
  • Military History
  • Military Operations
  • Military Organizations
  • National Security
  • New York
  • Operations Security
  • Persian Gulf
  • Reconnaissance
  • Second World War
  • Security
  • War Colleges
  • Warfare

Readers

  • Military History / Militaries and War Studies