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NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, R.I.

INTEGRATING THE ARMY'S ACTIVE AND RESERVE
COMPONENT COMBAT ARMS

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College, the Department of the Navy, or the Department of the Army.

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18 June 1993

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S E D
DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT
Approved for public release
Distribution Unlimited

93-15639



2023

UNCLASSIFIED

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

1a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION		1b. RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS	
2a. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY		3. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF REPORT DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION IS UNLIMITED.	
2b. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE		4. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)	
4. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)		5. MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)	
6a. NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT	6b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable) C	7a. NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION	
6c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) NAVAL WAR COLLEGE NEWPORT, R.I. 02841		7b. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)	
8a. NAME OF FUNDING/SPONSORING ORGANIZATION	8b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable)	9. PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER	
8c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)		10. SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERS	
		PROGRAM ELEMENT NO.	PROJECT NO.
		TASK NO.	WORK UNIT ACCESSION NO.
11. TITLE (Include Security Classification) Integrating the Army's Active and Reserve Component Combat Arms (v)			
12. PERSONAL AUTHOR(S) Robert K. Bauer, LTC, USA			
13a. TYPE OF REPORT FINAL	13b. TIME COVERED FROM TO	14. DATE OF REPORT (Year, Month, Day) 930618	15. PAGE COUNT 25
16. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION A paper submitted to the faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Operations. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.			
17. COSATI CODES		18. SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number)	
FIELD	GROUP	SUB-GROUP	
19. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number) The thesis is that Army reserve component (RC) ground combat forces should be deployed for the next major regional contingency. These units must be combat ready. They can be through better integration of the active components (AC) and the RC. The author tracks the creation of the Total Force concept and issues raised by the Army's roundout units during Desert Storm. He briefly reviews the preparation and readiness of combat units from the other services. He also reviews timelines stating how long it takes to get RC combat units ready and the capability of strategic mobility to deploy them. The proposed solution is to integrate AC and RC by assigning them to the same units during peacetime. Earlier deployers would be mainly AC; later deployers would be mainly RC.			
20. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT ☒ UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED ☐ SAME AS RPT. ☐ DTIC USERS		21. ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED	
22a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL CHAIRMAN, OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT		22b. TELEPHONE (Include Area Code) 841-3414	22c. OFFICE SYMBOL C

INTRODUCTION.

This paper addresses the role of the Army's reserve component (RC) ground maneuver combat arms. (I will refer to these units as RC combat units to simplify terminology even though there are other units which could be included under this description.) While the focus is on Army units, I will review the total force implementation of other services to gather lessons learned.

The basic thesis of this paper is that RC combat units should be deployed for the next major regional contingency. There is a critical corollary to this thesis. These RC combat units must be ready to fight at the time they can be deployed. My contention, that I will develop in this paper, is that the RC combat units can be ready to fight in the required time through better integration between the active component (AC) and RC.

One of the assumptions built into this paper is that the U.S. must be prepared to respond to more than one major regional contingency. "Our strategy also recognizes that when the United States is responding to one substantial regional crisis, potential aggressors in other areas may be tempted to take advantage of our preoccupation."¹

The variety of force structure implications in the integration of active component (AC) and RC are beyond the scope of this paper. I am making only two key assumptions. First, there will be RC combat units. Second, President Bush's proposed Army Base Force of 12 AC divisions, 6 full RC divisions, and 2 RC cadre divisions is the upper limit of forces likely to be

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available in the mid- to late-90s.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE TOTAL FORCE CONCEPT.

Before discussing methods to improve the AC/RC integration, I will first discuss the intent of the total force concept.

GEN Creighton Abrams, when Army Chief of Staff in the early 1970s, created the Total Force concept that we know today. There were two driving factors. First, Abrams had to create 16 divisions out of an Army that had 13 divisions. Also, Abrams wanted to avoid the type of alienation that existed between the American public and the military during the Vietnam conflict. "Abrams took these steps very deliberately, determined to stem the decline in authorized Army manpower and at the same time ensure that the Vietnam experience could not be repeated. 'They're not taking us to war again without calling up the reserves.'"² GEN Abrams considered the ". . . role played by the reserve forces as a link between the military establishment and the American people [to be crucial]. . . . He also believed that mobilized reserve forces brought with them the support, concern, and compassion of the American people for their armed forces."³ The reasons behind the Total Force include both dollars and national will.

There were two parts to this implementation of the total force concept. "Roundout units were one part of the Army's reconfiguration beginning [in the mid-70s]; the other was the transfer of support functions to the reserves."⁴ Specifically, roundout since the 1970s means brigade level RC combat units.

CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT FOR THE RC.

There is a variety of evidence showing congressional support for the RC. Among the reasons are jobs and votes. "The Guard and Reserve have powerful lobbying organizations here and wield considerable political clout in congressional districts, making them difficult to eliminate. When you cut 80,000 reserve forces, you cut 80,000 jobs."⁵ "Lawmakers have traditionally shielded the National Guard and service Reserves from deep cuts, partly because of the economic benefit their constituents reap from the part-time salaries and local armories."⁶ Congressmen also wanted assurances that the RC cut was not just an attempt to transfer the missions to the AC.⁷ A variety of states are also moving to protect their National Guard assets.⁸ The battle between the Department of Defense and the politicians in Congress and state governments over the size and roles of the RC is also fought in public.⁹

Congress believes in the Total Force concept as an expression of national will as well as just a jobs and votes issue. ". . . a large reserve force is not just good policy, but a good way to keep public support for military spending. I know of nothing that gains more support for the military generally than the Guard and Reserve. These are people who are in every community in the United States and they promote the military."¹⁰ Congress has told the military to ". . . recommit itself to the concept of the citizen soldier as a cornerstone of national defense policy in the future."¹¹ "I am convinced that

placing greater emphasis on our National Guard and Reserve Forces should be a key element of our military strategy in light of the changes in the threats to our national security. The increase in warning time of any large-scale conventional war allows us to place more missions in the Reserve Components."¹²

My conclusion from this portion of the discussion is that my assumption concerning continuation of RC combat units is valid.

DID THE TOTAL FORCE WORK FOR THE ARMY'S COMBAT UNITS?

The first real test of the total force concept was operation desert shield/storm (ODS/S). The Army's roundout brigades were activated but not deployed.

One argument used as the basis for not activating the round-out brigades in August and September of 1990 was the ". . . statutory time limits on the use of Selected Reserve units imposes artificial constraints on their employment."¹³

At least two sources¹⁴ cited ways to avoid the problem. There were ways to federalized RC units long enough to complete training and be available for Desert Shield/Storm. In actuality, Congress, on 4 November 1990, extended the active duty period for activated RC individuals and units from 90 days plus one 90 day extension to a total of 360 days.¹⁵ Activation orders for my unit demonstrate the available degree of flexibility. My unit was ordered to active duty ". . . for the period indicated [12 months] unless sooner released or unless extended."¹⁶

The real question was: could the RC combat brigades meet the requirement? GEN Schwartzkopf, when commander of the 24th

Division, felt that the 48th Brigade (the round-out brigade from the Georgia national guard to the 24th Division) was ready to fight along side the AC parts of his division.¹⁷ Also, the 48th Brigade (and the other two round-out units activated) had achieved the same readiness posture of "C-2, mostly ready" as the AC brigades that replaced them.

However standards were changed through the process used to validate RC units. "In the Army, commanders of the mobilization stations 'validate' unit capability and deployability status before reserve component units are sent overseas. This validation process . . . is unique to the Army."¹⁸

Stated theater requirements determined the amount of training time available when told to develop a training program for the activated roundout brigades. There was no stated CENTCOM requirement for the roundouts. The result was that time available, not achievement of specified standards, drove the validation program.

As a result, the validation authority included a higher level of cognitive training and proficiency.¹⁹ "By all accounts, the active Army trainers of the brigades prescribed an extraordinarily rigorous training regimen for the brigades."²⁰ In fact, the round-out brigades had to achieve a readiness status of C-1 (fully combat ready) then AC units or other RC units actually deployed.²¹

According to a Congressional Research Study report, one of the reasons the brigades met the rigorous standards was "...the intrinsic capabilities of most Guardsmen and small units in the

brigades were quite high, and required only a rigorous reorientation to a full-time military environment, a technical 'brushup,' and some intensive training for battalion and brigade leaders and staffs, to be ready for war."²²

The first roundout brigade was validated 91 days after its activation.²³ If activated as part of the initial call-up in August, this roundout brigade could have been validated and in Southwest Asia before the VII Corps divisions.

Another significant question is: were the roundout units needed? The decision to train to time rather than to standard kept the roundout brigades from being deployed. This raised a potentially serious situation. ". . . by day three of the ground campaign, all combat forces were committed -- USCINCCENT and CG Third (US) Army, had released their only ground reserve, the 1st Cavalry Division to VII Corps. There was no TA [theater army] ground reserve, larger than platoon size, available in the theater of operations after 26 February 1991."²⁴

There was some real irony in the situation. Abrams' fear had always been that in some future crisis, the political leadership would fail to call up the reserves, just as Lyndon Johnson had failed to do so during Vietnam. Preventing that was the real purpose of integrating the active and reserve forces. But now [during Desert Shield/Storm], when the first real test of that policy arose, it was the military leadership that did not want the combat reserves.²⁵ [emphasis in original]

Finally, a third critical question: were there other overriding reasons for not using the RC combat units. Two generic concerns are still cited and may appear valid, even after ODS/S. "The decision to activate reserves may require excessive dependence on unambiguous strategic warning to justify a timely

callup. . . [and] successful contingency operations often require rapid execution."²⁶

I contend that the first issue is not valid. We did not have unambiguous strategic warning for ODS/S. However, as described in this paper, we did have time to activate and deploy the RC.

The issue of rapid execution is a valid concern. There was no time to activate the RC combat units for the initial invasions of either Panama or Grenada. Rapidly deploying forces will not have even the minimal time needed to activate RC combat units, therefore should not have them at part of their units. Also, activating U.S. reserves would have given strategic warning to our adversaries in these countries. I will address how much time it takes to get RC combat units in a subsequent section.

DID THE TOTAL FORCE WORK FOR OTHER SERVICES' COMBAT UNITS?

"The Marine Corps activated almost all of its combat reserves, which consisted of infantry and armored reserve units. . . . Marine Corps reservists were integrated with deployed active forces in Southwest Asia in accordance with the Defense Department's Total Force policy."²⁷ "Two of the five maneuver battalions deployed to Southwest Asia were employed in frontline combat."²⁸ One of their tank companies transitioned from the M60A1 (a hydro-mechanical tank) to the M1A1 (a computer driven tank with advanced night vision capabilities). This company arrived in Saudi on 19 February, and went into combat five days later, killing 59 enemy tanks, with no losses.²⁹

"The Air Force activated three Air Reserve Component combat squadrons. . . . No post-mobilization validation or significant additional training was required."³⁰

The Navy activated over 1800 "ship augmentees." These Navy reservists performed duties including minesweeping.³¹

DO WE HAVE TO USE RC COMBAT UNITS?

General Sullivan, the Army Chief of Staff, provided his vision of how we will use the Army in the future. "In those crisis or conflicts involving U.S. military forces, the action will be characterized by military power employed in an overwhelming way with as much precision as possible to complete the mission in the shortest time possible and - again - at the least cost in lives and resources."³²

RAND Corporation published a series of reports required by

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 [which] required that the Secretary of Defense submit to Congress 'an assessment of a wide range of alternatives relating to the structure and mix of active and reserve forces appropriate for carrying out assigned missions in the mid- to late-1990s.' . . . under projected budget constraints.³³ [emphasis added]

RAND gave an unequivocal answer. "In the future, if the planning scenarios are at all correct, we will not have the capability to deploy forces to a second contingency unless we take the deliberate steps to restock our military capability by calling up reserve combat forces as soon as active units are deployed to a combat theater."³⁴

The Rand reports address why we can not redo ODS/S. Their answers also focus on the impact of the ongoing drawdown.

The total force that existed when ODS/S began was developed to meet a global threat from a large Soviet empire. . . . As a result, we managed the call-up in ways that are not likely to be appropriate, or possible, in the future. Even with the focus on regional rather than global contingencies, the project force structure is not so robust that the active components can go it alone. . . . Getting the reserve combat units into the fight will be more important than ever.³⁵

There is a critical component of this answer which is frequently overlooked. The AC has the requirement to support the training of follow-on forces. This is true whether the follow-on forces are other AC units, RC units, units being reconstituted, individual ready reserves or individual National Guardsmen (IRR/ING), or new recruits. Quoting a RAND analyst, an article in the Army Times states:

The post-drawdown military will have fewer active-duty troops available to train the reservists. In Operation Desert Storm [the analyst said], active units not being used in the Gulf did much of the training for mobilized reserve units. Most of these active units won't exist anymore. It's unclear who will do the training.³⁶

Nearly 9,000 active Army personnel were assigned to train soldiers in the roundout brigades . . . Senior Army officials believed that, because of the large number of Active soldiers and leaders committed to training the roundout brigades, the readiness and operations of the two [supporting] active divisions were significantly affected. . . . For example, training in the 4th Infantry Division was reduced to the individual soldier level because the majority of the NCOs and officers were involved in training the roundout brigades.³⁷ (ref i, p. 27)

Even assuming the Base Force, the Army will not be able to meet its mission without deploying RC combat units to the first major regional contingency. The Chairman's guidance, quoted previously, make it clear that we must be ready to handle both a major regional contingency and a subsequent contingency. There will simply not be enough AC forces left after deploying to an

ODS/S to either train RC or newly generated forces to handle the second contingency or to handle it themselves.

HOW LONG DOES IT TAKE TO GET THEM READY?

If we need RC combat units, the next question is how long does it take to get them ready.

FORSCOM has the mission of getting RC units ready to deploy upon mobilization. General Burba, CINC FORSCOM explained the problem of training reserve component maneuver combat units in testimony before the House Armed Services Committee. The following is a portion of an oral summary of written testimony quoted by Goldrich.

Why couldn't we have had the roundout units at sufficient readiness posture to have deployed quickly with their parent divisions? Why is it so challenging to keep our reserve combat units at high readiness when we have reasonable good success with our support units?

The answer is these latter combat support and combat service support units generally have uncomplicated unit functions, even though many of their individual skills are complex. . . .

On the other hand, combat units, such as [armored] cavalry, infantry, and armor have maneuver skills and complex synchronization skills at company level and higher that are difficult to train during weekend drill periods. The training of these combat units at company level and higher integrates not only maneuver skills but those of Army aviation and Air Force lift and fire support, artillery, air defense artillery, engineer, signal, military intelligence, maintenance, supply, transportation, medical, military police, chemical, and a whole host of others.

They have to synchronize everything that we do on the battlefield. The tasks and standards associated with these synchronized skills change at all levels as battlefield conditions change. Their execution is more an art than a science, and they take considerable time and effort to master.³⁸ REF f, p. 42-43.

General Burba explained why it would take a long time to train a RC brigade. The issue of "how long" remains. According

to the Government Accounting Office, Army officials stated, in September 1991,

that reserve roundout units, given an adequate level of pre-mobilization readiness and post-mobilization training time, could be assigned the role of early reinforcement units . . . these brigades should be expected to be part of early reinforcing forces (forces that would depart for a crisis between 30 and 90 days after its commencement).³⁹

A more comprehensive answer comes from the series of RAND reports to the Secretary of Defense. RAND deliberately ". . . chose to be conservative to minimize risk to the country and individual reservists themselves. We follow [then Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee] Aspin's lead: 'Where inadequate training and preparation would cost lives, any error should be on the side of safety.'⁴⁰ They stated that combat arms units should be able to prepare for deployment after mobilization in 60 days for a company, 70 - 90 days for a battalion, and 128 days for a brigade.⁴¹

A critical component of these RAND estimates is that established command and control relationships are retained. This means that the AC commands AC units and the RC commands the RC units. "Provisions of this regulation do not alter established chains of command or responsibility for command, control, and supervision of either AC or RC units."⁴² Yet in spite of differences between AC and RC systems, RAND described the post-mobilization training times listed above as being conservative.

The variety of differences between AC and RC personnel, supply, medical, and dental systems (well documented in on pages 18 - 22 of GAO Report NSIAD91-263, cited earlier in this study) would have to be resolved after mobilization. These problems

would delay the start of technical and tactical post-mobilization training. The differences between AC and RC maintenance would (and did) have a more direct impact once the technical and tactical training began. These resulting problems would have been disastrous during actual combat operations.

In the area of maintenance, the two combat brigades that trained at the National Training Center had difficulty maintaining their tanks and Bradleys because, during peacetime, most tracked vehicles belonging to the Guard had been maintained by state civilian employees. As a result, many mechanics did not know how to diagnose equipment problems or repair the vehicles in a timely manner. For example, during one force-on-force exercise that we observed at the National Training Center, brigade mechanics could not accurately diagnose problems or repair their vehicles and, as a result, had more vehicles disabled in its support area than it had to use against the opposing forces.⁴³

HOW LONG DO WE HAVE?

The Army's leadership provides some general guidance on the mix of AC and RC based on deployment times.

As the Army shapes the Total Force for the future, the size and composition of both the active Army and the Reserve Components will evolve . . . The immediate deployment capabilities required by the unpredictability and uncertainty of the future international environment will require units that are prepared for deployment without delays for additional training. Hence, initial deployment capabilities must be provided by primarily Active Component units. [Next], because of the Army's significantly smaller size, we will continue to rely extensively on the RC to reinforce extended contingency operations, to deal concurrently with a second major contingency and [as a hedge against other possibilities].⁴⁴

Strategic mobility plans match this guidance.

[The Army's Chief of Staff] set the mobility parameters for the future. In testimony before Congress, he indicated that the Army must be prepared to provide from CONUS a sustainable, tailored corps, consisting of five divisions, that is capable of forcing an entry into an overseas theater. The lead brigade of this force must be on the ground by

C+4, and the lead division by C+12. The two armored divisions in the corps must arrive from CONUS and close on the theater by C+30. The full five division-corps, with the supporting corps support command, must close by C+75. . . . [In addition to deploying the contingency corps,] the Army must also be prepared to reposition the forward deployed division. . . . Currently, the most significant inhibitor to meeting Army rapid-deployment milestones is strategic sealift.⁴⁵

However, there is another significant inhibitor. ". . . [including two days for each division to load,] both heavy divisions in the contingency corps must clear the seaports by C+10!."⁴⁶ The authors also describes the additional aircraft and ships needed to approach meeting the requirements. The clear implication is that the requirement will not be met.

Reality matches neither the guidance nor the strategic mobility plans. Let's look at what actually happened during ODS/S. On 7 August, President Bush ordered U.S. military forces to Saudi Arabia. The 82nd's ready brigade began their deployment the next day. The first of the heavy divisions began movement to the port on the 10th. Ten days after being told by the President to go, the next two heavy divisions ". . . began preparation for deployment to SWA."⁴⁷ Comparing ODS/S to the strategic mobility requirements, this means the second of the heavy divisions in the contingency began their preparations for deployment on C+10; the day they would have to clear port.

HOW DO THE OTHER SERVICES DO IT?

"The types and level of integration strongly affect the rate at which reserve forces can train up and deploy in contingencies. The Services differ considerably in the types and

extent of active/reserve integration in war and peacetime."⁴⁸

"Prior to ODS/S, the Marines made a substantial investment to develop and maintain their Selected Marine Corps Reserve (SMCR) units' readiness. . . . the same training standards applied for active and reserve units."⁴⁹ Within the Marine Corps, ". . . reserves are integrated at the battalion or company level."⁵⁰ During training, "the Marines routinely mixed and matched reserve units with their active counterparts."⁵¹ Recently, the Marines integrated selected instructor-inspectors into the RC Tables of Organization. The remaining instructor-inspectors deploy to the mobilization site with their RC units and assist in the post-mobilization training.⁵²

The Air Force uses an "associate unit" concept.

An associate unit is a hybrid that combines active and reserve personnel into a single unit when mobilized. An Air Force Reserve associate unit trains on its affiliated active unit's equipment; its air crews are commonly mixed with active personnel for peacetime missions; and its maintenance personnel help maintain the equipment.⁵³

In addition to the organizational structure, "the Air Force has established an extensive and well-organized volunteer program, which includes the budgeting of extra days of active duty per year per reservist."⁵⁴

The Air Force has a program to grant extra days of training to selected reserves based on their need to maintain proficiency. An example is the extra days given to reserve Naval aviators. These reservists require extra training to meet currency and proficiency gates. The time and required dollars are programed. Also, there are selected units that get less than the standard 48 drills per year. LtCol Behrens last unit got 24

paid drills per year based on its required readiness.⁵⁵

The Navy uses at least two different programs. For a number of selected naval warships (called the selected reserve fleet), the US Navy has an integrated AC/RC crew. The AC portion is 60 - 80%. On board the USS Clark, the approximately 170 AC sailors are augmented by about 50 reservists. The reservists get 60 drills per year instead of the standard 48. Key personnel get additional paid drills. These additional drills are programed by duty position. The AC makes arrangements to have the ship available for reserve training monthly. If the ship is not at home port, the reservists are flown to the ship at what ever port is appropriate.⁵⁶ For aviators, the Navy has a program similar to the Air force to maintain currency.⁵⁷

ARE THERE SUGGESTED IMPROVEMENTS FROM PREVIOUS STUDIES?

The short answer is: yes. The general theme of previous studies is that better AC/RC integration would improve the readiness of the RC combat units. As part of their recommendations to the Secretary of Defense, RAND wrote, "In sum, our model for the future stresses a more integrated and internally cooperative total force that brings active and reserve personnel together in new and innovative ways to build a better and more robust force."⁵⁸ Among RAND's conclusions are that "reforms could lead to significant improvement for Army reserve component combat arms forces under any assumptions to include those of ODS/S."⁵⁹

A 1988 study analyzed the Army's ability to conduct

continuous operations (against the Soviet threat). One of its chapters dealt with AC/RC integration as a way to maintain that continuous tempo.⁶⁰ Authors recommended establishing a "kindred unit relationship to accomplish force reductions and maintain robustness by transferring percentages of unit combat power from the AC to the RC. A second suggestion was to mix AC and RC within the same unit (the way the Navy does on its selective reserve fleet). The ratio of AC to RC would depend on the deployability. Earlier deploying units would have a greater AC contingent. Later deploying units would have more (75% or more) RC. A third suggestion dealt with pre-mobilization training. The analysts suggested additional drill time and extra annual training for high priority units. This would be similar to what the Air Force and Navy already do.

The most often repeated recommendation in the series of RAND reports analyzing the future mix of AC and RC is the suggestion to implement the roundout program at lower levels.

Our analysis indicates that rounding out at lower levels should decrease preparation time. . . . [Alternatives developed by RAND, at the same budget levels, include:] integrated selected reserve units into active formations at lower levels (battalion or company roundout) to ensure that early reinforcing divisions can deploy, when required, with a fully trained reserve component.⁶¹

The Government Accounting Office supported both the recommendations of the 1988 study group and the RAND reports in their 1992 report on the roundout brigades.

The Army is now estimating that at least 90 days of post-mobilization training for combat brigades is needed. However, expanding the roundout concept at the battalion and company levels might make it possible for some combat reserves to deploy earlier. Other alternatives might be to

(1) selectively increase the number of required training days for reserve units designated as early deployers.⁶²

RAND also quoted recommendations of the House Armed Services Committee which included:

Create new "report cards." This would be done by modifying reporting systems to accurately assess unit deployability. Every ARNG combat unit would be required to formally associate with an active unit. . . .

"Reform" the active Army by making it accept responsibility for Army National Guard readiness and require that the ARNG be integrated into planning for regional contingencies and allocate resources accordingly.⁶³

WHAT INITIATIVES ARE CURRENTLY UNDERWAY?

The Army has started changing the training for way RC combat units General Sullivan has directed that the pre-mobilization training for combat arms focus on individual, crew, and platoon levels. Companies will operate in the field only to train subordinate units but will not conduct company-level training. All pre-mobilization tactical training at company, battalion, and brigade level will be in a command post exercise (CPX) or simulation mode. The goal is to have proficient small units that form a base for post-mobilization training of the larger units. GEN Sullivan uses the term "Bold Shift" to describe the revised RC training focus.⁶⁴

Each branch within the Army has been developing a combined arms training strategy (CATS). This CATS is part of a shift from a "device-supported" to a "device-based" training philosophy. The Army had used devices, such as helicopter simulators, to support its technical and tactical training. The predominant training tool for individuals and units had been the actual

operational equipment. The cost of procuring and operating this equipment increased. Also, maneuver space for tactical training, especially around RC unit armories, has limited training opportunities. About two years ago, the Army directed a shift to using devices to teach all possible technical and tactical skills, especially at the lower cognitive levels. Actual equipment would be used to reinforce and integrate skills learned on cheaper training devices. Concurrently, the Army directed each of its branches to develop a RC-specific CATS. In its current form, the RC CATS recommends the type, frequency, and in some cases the certification gates to be used for RC platoons, companies, and battalions.⁶⁵

IS THERE A BETTER ANSWER?

It is now time to review, draw some conclusions, and make some recommendations. I believe I have shown that RC combat units must be part of the package used for the initial contingency. The strategic mobility capabilities mean there is time for at least some RC combat units to be ready. RC combat units will not be part of the 82nd because of the C+12 requirement. However, RC combat units at company level can be ready, even assuming the strategic mobility plans can be met and the conservative RAND estimates for pre-mobilization training do not overstate the time lines.

I argue that this is not enough. A critical assumption of these RAND estimates which drive the post-mobilization training times is that established command and control relationships are

retained. The description provided by General Burba on the difficulty of integration of combat units means we will run out of time if we do business as usual.

I suggest changing the command and control relationships. Early deploying RC combat units should be assigned, at company or perhaps battalion level, to AC units. These should not be roundout units that join their AC sponsor after mobilization. They should be permanently assigned for training, logistics, administration, and rating purposes. Integrate RC companies into AC battalions, RC battalions into AC brigades, and RC brigades into AC divisions. The AC headquarters at the next higher level will train their subordinates. They will work through the personnel, supply, medical, dental, and maintenance problems during pre-mobilization. Additionally, early deployers should have additional training time. The Navy and the Air Force both have integrated AC/RC organizations and provide additional time for gaining and maintaining critical skills. It works for them. It can work for the Army.

There are some downsides to this proposal. All the personnel, supply, medical, dental, and maintenance problems mean extra work for the AC unit. Also, there are problems with RC units not co-located or near their AC counterparts.

My answer is to go back to one of the earlier conclusions. The Army needs RC combat units as part of the contingency force. To be used, they must be ready. To be ready, they must be trained. If we deploy a RC combat unit, it will work with AC combat units.

For later deployers, the RC to AC mix can be adjusted. Integrate AC companies into RC battalions, AC battalions into RC brigades, and AC brigades into RC divisions. This has several advantages. The most ready units deploy first. It allows time for the less ready units to train. Also, there is, as a minimum, an AC cadre to train follow-on forces.

The first sentence of the Army's capstone manual, FM 100-5: Operations, reads, "The Army's doctrine lies at the heart of its professional competence."⁶⁶ Army training doctrine has, as one of its basic principle to be used by all Army forces, "train as you fight."⁶⁷ Let's get on with it.

NOTES

1. Colin L. Powell, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, The National Military Strategy of the United States, January 1992, p. 7.
2. Joseph Kruzal, ed., 1991 - 1992 American Defense Annual (Lexington, Mass, Lexington Books, 1992), p. 187.
3. Kruzal, 190.
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