


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THE FUTURE OF U.S. SEA POWER

Donald C.F. Daniel

Donald C. Hayes

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
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
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THE FUTURE OF U.S. SEA POWER

**Donald C.F. Daniel
Bradd C. Hayes**

May 1993

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
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FOREWORD

The authors of this study examine the current and future state of the Naval Service comprised of the U.S. Navy and the Marine Corps. The questions that abound concerning the future of sea power lend special importance to this paper, which addresses the roles, missions, and force structure of the Naval Service in the next decade.

Divided into five major sections, the paper describes Naval roles and missions, discusses critical elements of force structure, posits a National Maritime Strategy for the next decade, and recommends ways in which the U.S. military services can eliminate redundancy and support each other. In the final section, the authors lay out the conclusions of their study.

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to publish this report as a means of stimulating discussion in this critically important topic. In an era of sharply constricted budgets, projected base closings, and force reductions, the concepts presented hold special significance.



JOHN W. MOUNTCASTLE
Colonel, U.S. Army
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BRADD C. HAYES is the Assistant Director of the Strategy and Campaign Department of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies, Naval War College. He holds a bachelor's degree from the University of Utah and a master's degree from the Naval Postgraduate School where he was awarded the first U.S. Naval Institute Award for Academic Achievement. Captain Hayes participated in the Naval Force Capability Planning Effort which developed the concepts contained in the Navy's White Paper entitled, . . . *From the Sea: Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century*.

THE FUTURE OF U.S. SEA POWER

...the term "sea power," which now has such vogue, was deliberately adopted by me to compel attention and, I hoped, to receive currency. Purists, I said to myself, may criticize me for marrying a Teutonic word to one of Latin origin, but I deliberately discarded the adjective, "maritime," being too smooth to arrest men's attention or stick in their minds. . . . The effect produced was that which I fully proposed.¹

Alfred Thayer Mahan

We have been asked to focus on the "Future of Sea Power." We have interpreted our mandate to mean the future of American naval power since we were specifically directed to address "your service's perspective of its strategy including roles, missions, and force structure in the next decade. . . ." The Naval Service encompasses the capabilities of not one but two arms, both of which will be addressed herein but with the primary focus being on the Navy. Our charter also calls on us to provide recommendations as to how the services can mutually support each other and eliminate duplications of effort; and identify the most significant obstacles to getting where the Navy, Marine Corps and the National Military Strategy should be in the next 10 years.

Our paper is divided into five parts. Part One, on roles and missions, is itself divided into several sections. The first lays out contemporary perspectives of the Naval Service and is drawn largely from the white paper it issued in September 1992. The second briefly discusses how this new direction is changing the organizational persona of the Navy. The final section provides our attempt to predict the perspectives of the Clinton-Aspin administration in regards to how they may modify or specify how the Naval Service is to be used. Part Two, on force structure, focuses first on revised Base Force projections and associated developments. It then outlines implications of what the new President and Secretary of Defense have said.

We present our views in Parts Three through Five. Prior to laying out, in Part Three, where we think the national military strategy and the Naval Service should be in the next 10 years and specifying obstacles to getting there, we address the nature of the defense policy process. We believe this is necessary to understanding the limits of both the possible and of the probable. As the bases for recommendations—presented in Part Four—as to how the services can be mutually supportive and eliminate unnecessary redundancies, we first concentrate on identifying comparative advantages of the land, naval and air forces. Our final observations, conclusions and recommendations are in Part Five.

PART ONE: CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVES ON THE CONTRIBUTION OF NAVAL FORCES TO NATIONAL DEFENSE NEEDS

Working with the President, the Congress, and the services, the Department of Defense is the lead agency for defining service roles and missions within an overall joint strategy. The burden is on the services themselves, however, to state where they think they fit in such a strategy. The Naval Service did this when it issued its white paper entitled, . . . *From the Sea: Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century*.² The product reflected both a review of codified precedents and an acceptance of changed realities. Although the Constitution specifies that Congress will "provide and maintain a Navy," it does not outline specific responsibilities. One must look instead to Public Law and Department of Defense directives.³ The current U.S. Code reads:

The Navy shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations at sea. It is responsible for the preparation of naval forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war except as otherwise assigned and, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of the peacetime components of the Navy to meet the needs of war. (10 U.S.C. 5062)

The Marine Corps shall be organized, trained, and equipped to provide fleet marine forces of combined arms, together with supporting air components, for service with the fleet in the seizure

or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign. (10 U.S.C. 5063)

DoD Directive 5100.1 is richer in detail and specifies the primary and collateral functions of the services.⁴ The drafters of the white paper reviewed the directives and in a preliminary report summarized the list as follows:⁵

- Seek out and destroy enemy naval forces.
- Establish and maintain local superiority in an area of operations.
- Control vital sea areas.
- Suppress enemy sea commerce.
- Conduct amphibious operations.
- Seize and defend advanced naval bases.
- Operate and protect vital sea lines of communication.
- Provide forces afloat for strategic lift.
- Conduct strategic nuclear deterrence.
- Provide maritime defense and sea-based air and space defense of the United States.
- Provide sea-based support for space operations.
- Coordinate with Department of Transportation for peacetime maintenance of the Coast Guard.

The drafters did not feel it necessary to address each of these functions in their final product but rather focused only on those which seemed relevant in the context of changed circumstances which led to the need for a white paper in the first place. One circumstance was internal to U.S. forces. This was an emphasis on jointness, on how the services would work together and complement each other. The change represented by the white paper is extensive and in some ways as significant as changes which occurred a century ago with the Teddy Roosevelt-sponsored Mahanian revolution. Indeed, one critic

thinks this "hurtful doctrinal coup" must have been drafted by "Army and Air Force officers on the Joint Staff" because it treats open ocean naval operations "as something from another era."⁶

The fact is, they are of another era: that of U.S.-Soviet confrontation and the much debated Maritime Strategy. Accepting the premise that "seapower and its exercise must always be concretely linked to a historical context,"⁷ the drafters of the white paper saw naval warfighting requirements in a new focus. Table 1 shows the evolution of this focus.

<u>Cold War Focus</u>	<u>New Focus</u>
• Single Specific Threat • Open Ocean Anti-submarine Warfare (ASW) • Long-Range Open Ocean Anti-Electronic Warfare (AEW) • Complementary Allied Mine-Sweeping • Intelligence Centered on USSR • Autonomous Operations • Integrated Communications • Lift to Support NATO Reinforcement	• Range of Ambiguous Threats • Near Land/Shallow Water ASW • Near Land/Over Land AEW • Independent U.S. Capability • Shift to Regional Powers • Joint/Combined Operations • Interoperable Systems/Procedures • Reintroduction of Forces into Remote Regions

Table 1. Evolution of Naval Warfighting Requirements.

In light of both codified precedents and changed circumstances, the drafters of the white paper defined a three-pronged approach for consideration of naval responsibilities and force structure:

- "[T]he Navy has a continuing obligation to maintain a robust strategic deterrent."

- "The Navy and Marine Corps will now respond to crises and. . .provide the initial "enabling" capability for joint operations in conflict as well as continued participation in any sustained effort."
- "Of particular importance, sealift is an enduring mission for the Navy."⁸

The greatest amount of attention was directed to the second and third elements. . . .*From the Sea* moves Navy operations closer to shore, into the littoral, territory much more familiar to the Marine Corps.⁹ By doing so, the Navy and Marine Corps look to be more cooperative as they carve out a naval niche in joint regional warfare. This niche, or overarching role, is to provide "Naval Expeditionary Forces - Shaped for Joint Operations - Operating Forward From the Sea - Tailored to National Needs."¹⁰ From this perspective, the term sea power acquires a broader meaning than is normally ascribed to it since it focuses attention as much on the application of naval power over land as at sea.

When fighting closer to shore in the littoral, how close is close enough? The white paper identifies two segments of battlespace:

- Seaward: The area from the open ocean to the shore which must be controlled to support operations ashore.
- Landward: The area inland from shore that can be supported and defended directly from the sea.

It also specifies four key operational capabilities which must be maintained in order to enjoy success in the littoral: command, control and surveillance; battlespace dominance; power projection; and force sustainment.

Command, control and surveillance are described as the foundation stones upon which all other capabilities are built. Situational awareness helps win wars; it also bestows leadership. The commander in possession of the best information is the logical individual to put in charge.

The white paper asserts that "*battlespace dominance* is the heart of naval warfare. . . .[It] presupposes effective command

and control capabilities and serves as the logical prerequisite of the projection of power ashore."¹¹ Dominating the battlespace means being able to move freely within a desired area of operations while denying the adversary that same freedom. It involves not only sea control and air superiority, but the ability to utilize information sources and gather intelligence not available to the enemy.

Power projection involves everything from bayonets to bombs and from multiple-launch rocket systems to missiles. It encompasses maneuver warfare from the sea—a concept which implies taking advantage of mobility and firepower—which incorporates the ability to deliver air strikes and land Marines where they can most effectively secure a beachhead or seize a lodgment. Both combined arms and distributed firepower doctrines are stressed in this new focus.

America faces the challenge of providing *force sustainment* over enormous distances. In addition to providing for its own forward deployed forces, the Navy is committed to providing strategic sealift and protecting it in route to areas of crisis. The Marine Corps is equally committed to its Maritime Prepositioning Force which proved its value in both DESERT STORM and RESTORE HOPE.

Numerous roles, missions, and/or functions are subsumed in the above capabilities. Warfare in the littoral means an increased emphasis on controlling offshore air and sea approaches to coastal regions, obtaining necessary intelligence, supporting special operations forces, suppressing enemy air defenses, eliminating critical command and control nodes, landing Marines to seize and hold lodgments and other vital territory, providing close air support, transporting men and equipment and enabling their entry into a crisis area, and resupplying forces ashore and at sea.

While these roles or missions are seeing an increase in emphasis, others are, in the words of the former Secretary of the Navy, Sean O'Keefe, "already being adjusted."¹² The white paper notes that because the "free nations of the world [can] claim preeminent control of the seas and ensure freedom of commercial maritime passage," the Naval Service "can afford

to de-emphasize efforts in some naval warfare areas."¹³ Contrary to what some have suggested, the white paper does not dismiss the importance of controlling the high seas; it assumes it.¹⁴ Similarly, the white paper stresses the requirement for naval aviation to shift to close air support and medium-range strike. Former Secretary O'Keefe observed, "Rather than. . . extraordinary interdiction missions going out 750 miles or more, I think you'll see the primary role of naval aviation shift to short strike, close air support type missions that have characterized Marine aviation in the past."¹⁵

The white paper is ambivalent concerning forward presence. On the one hand, it argues that naval forces should "become even more relevant in meeting American forward presence requirements,"¹⁶ but on the other it provides a nearly equal amount of support for those favoring reduced forward deployments and increased surge responses. The concern that prompted this ambivalence is that force level reductions will inevitably reduce naval forward presence capabilities.

Making an Attitude Adjustment. Within the historical context, the most significant change made by the white paper may be toward jointness and away from the Navy's traditional organizational independence. Former Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson once noted that the Navy Department "frequently seemed to retire from the realm of logic into a dim religious world in which Neptune was God, Mahan his prophet, and the United States Navy the only true Church."¹⁷ Carl Builder more recently asserted that, "If tradition is the altar at which the Navy worships, then one of the icons on that altar is the concept of independent command at sea, which, like the Holy Grail, is to be sought and honored by every true naval officer."¹⁸

The Navy's willing recognition of civilian control has often turned to reluctance (if not resistance) when its leadership felt civilian oversight was turning from control to command. Such was the wartime tension between the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Ernest King, and the Secretary of the Navy, James V. Forrestal. Though he remained highly sympathetic to naval concerns, Forrestal continued to encounter this tension when he became the first Secretary of Defense.¹⁹ The Navy's reluctance to join the team was

nowhere more highlighted than during the Cuban Missile Crisis when the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral George Anderson, told a frustrated Secretary of Defense, Robert MacNamara, "Now, Mr. Secretary, if you and your deputy will go back to your offices, the Navy will run the blockade."²⁰ More recently, General David Jones stated, "The Department of the Navy is the most strategically independent of the services—it has its own army, navy and air force. It is least dependent on others. It would prefer to be given a mission, retain complete control over all the assets, and be left alone."²¹ Navy reluctance to hop on the joint bandwagon was also a direct result of the belief that such cooperation would lead directly to reductions in force structure. As a result, then-Congressman Les Aspin, following a 1990 House Armed Services Committee hearing, said that naval leadership (in particular, Secretary of the Navy Lawrence Garrett and CNO Admiral C.A.H. Trost) had "been unhelpful in the extreme."²²

If independence has been the Navy's icon, jointness has become the Department of Defense's icon. The white paper clearly demonstrates that the current naval leadership has either changed religions or at least become more ecumenical. There was also a recognition that congressional impatience with implementing Goldwater-Nichols had reached its limits.²³

Clinton-Aspin: A Course Change? President Clinton has relied heavily on Senator Nunn and Secretary Aspin in developing his national security positions. Like them, the President has called for a comprehensive review of service roles, missions and forces as the military adjusts to the realities of a post-cold war world. Harkening back to the Key West Agreement of 1947 where the services forged a workable division of roles and missions for the post-World War II era, the President has promised to convene a meeting during which the services will be forced to "hammer out a new understanding about consolidating and coordinating military roles and missions in the 1990s and beyond."²⁴

Though Clinton has little background in defense policy making, Aspin claims "Clinton's program starts with the cold-eyed, correct premise that power is the basis for successful diplomacy, and military power has always been

fundamental to international relationships."²⁵ Clinton himself said of his administration, "We do not relish the prospect of military force but, when necessary, we will not shrink from using it when all appropriate diplomatic measures have been exhausted."²⁶ Clinton has identified "four generic categories of military competence" which vary significantly from President Bush's "fundamental elements" of the Base Force²⁷ (see Table 2).²⁸

BUSH

- Nuclear Deterrence & Defense
- Forward Presence
- Crisis Response
- Reconstitution

CLINTON

- Nuclear Deterrence
- Better Intelligence
- Rapid Deployment
- Technology

Table 2. Essential Military Capabilities and Elements.

What President Clinton has said relative to the first three categories may provide some insight into how he will approach the role of naval forces.

Nuclear Deterrence. "We can dramatically reduce our nuclear arsenals through negotiations and other reciprocal actions. But as an irreducible minimum, we must retain a survivable nuclear force to deter any conceivable threat."²⁹

This statement supports the white paper's position and indicates no obvious changes in plans for strategic nuclear submarines (SSBNs). Survivability has always been the hallmark of sea-based strategic forces. Expectations are for the United States to place about one-half of its allowable warheads under START and subsequent agreements on sea-based missiles. Clinton's main difference with Bush is his lack of support for a space-based strategic defense system.

Better Intelligence. "In an era of unpredictable threats, our intelligence agencies must shift from military beancounting to a more sophisticated understanding of political, economic and cultural conditions that can spark conflicts."³⁰

The intelligence community certainly has a better track record for beancounting than prognosticating. Recently, however, the services have been tailoring a greater portion of their intelligence collection efforts against regional threats. The continuation of plans for regionally-focused joint fusion centers will help achieve the President's vision. The white paper directs the Naval Service to "continue to reorient naval intelligence resources from the former Soviet Navy to regional, littoral threats."³¹

Rapid Deployment. "We need a force capable of projecting power quickly when and where it's needed. This means the Army must develop a more mobile mix of mechanized and armored forces. The Air Force should emphasize tactical air power and airlift, and the Navy and Marine Corps must maintain sufficient carrier and amphibious forces, as well as more sealift. We also need strong special operations forces to deal with terrorist threats."³²

Herein may lie Clinton's greatest divergence from the Bush strategy, which readily accepted that military forces ought to be forward-based and engaged in influencing friends, building likely coalition partners, and deterring potential adversaries. Clinton seems unwilling to maintain the same level of peacetime presence of military forces endorsed by Bush. He also seems to have accepted Aspin's argument that today's threats are non-deterrable.³³ In contrast with Clinton, the drafters of the white paper generally supported maintaining a significant forward presence if the resources were available to do so. Like Clinton, they accepted the importance of rapid deployment and the need to enhance U.S. air- and sealift capabilities.

For the Navy, in particular, Clinton's signals are mixed. Although he states, "the Navy and Marine Corps must maintain sufficient carrier and amphibious forces," he has endorsed Senator Nunn's view that the Navy needs fewer carriers. He

has also stated, "[W]e will have to be more flexible on the deployment schedule and operating tempo to ensure that sailors are not required to endure longer tours of sea duty."³⁴ That translates into fewer forward deployed forces and could make the Navy less responsive to national needs. As one observer noted, "The carrier reduction coupled with Clinton's call for more basing of forces in the United States and smaller complements of forward-deployed troops would seem to lead to a greater role for the Air Force in force projection and crisis response."³⁵ On the other hand, Aspin's recommended force structure options, formulated when he was in the Congress, "tend to lean more heavily on naval power projection forces, Marines and aircraft carrier battle groups, than [did the Bush] Administration."³⁶ The interesting point is that, since President Clinton's statements as a candidate suggested he would rely on such forces even less than his predecessor, the difference between Clinton and his Defense Secretary may be more than minor. Whether the President chooses to move in Aspin's direction or forces his Defense Secretary to move instead remains to be seen.

PART TWO: FORCE STRUCTURE

The Base Force Minus. In 1992, General Powell defined the Base Force as the "core capability to deter aggression, provide meaningful presence abroad, respond to regional crises, and rebuild a global warfighting capability."³⁷ This definition is much softer than those used in early discussions when the Base Force was characterized as the minimum necessary to meet national security objectives. This language had to be abandoned when it became evident that the Base Force had a better chance of becoming a ceiling for force structure than a floor. For example, even though the Base Force was officially supported up to Clinton's inauguration, the Bush administration's own projections didn't maintain Base Force levels for the Navy. Table 3, from Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney's last Department of Defense report, remains the official projection of the Base Force for ships. Notice how even the "base" year for the Base Force, 1995, projects naval ships

20 units below target figure of 450 and that number steadily drops to 416 by 1999.³⁸

That the Pentagon is developing a Base Force II is well-known. Whether this latest effort will be published is arguable in light of Aspin's appointment as Defense Secretary.³⁹ Even a strong political supporter of Secretary Cheney, former Secretary of the Navy Sean O'Keefe, publicly admitted the Base Force, in some areas, exceeded requirements.⁴⁰ Faced with the inevitability of reduced forces, the naval leadership has wrestled with how to meet continuing commitments. Experimentation with tailored forces and flexible deployment patterns is being tried. Continued procurement of more capable combatant ships will also allow some commitments to be met with smaller forces (e.g., 3-ship vice 5-ship amphibious ready groups).

	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
Strategic Submarines	30	22	16	16	17	18	18	18
Aircraft Carriers*	15	14	14	13	13	13	13	13
Surface Combatants**	138	133	137	141	145	148	148	147
Attack Submarines	86	89	86	87	84	79	76	70
Amphibious Ships	58	58	55	51	51	51	51	51
Mine Warfare Ships	9	14	15	15	16	16	16	16
Other Support Ships	110	103	100	91	88	86	85	85
Mobilization Force (Cat A)	19	18	16	16	16	16	16	16
Total Ship Battle Forces	465	448	435	430	430	427	423	416

*All aircraft carriers, including ships in extended overhaul and the training carrier.

**Includes hydrofoil patrol boats. Figures for 1994-99 are planning figures.

Table 3. Navy Base Force Projections.⁴¹

Following Clinton's inauguration, the Navy floated a trial balloon concerning one possible option for the fleet of the future.⁴² Under this option, major savings would be made by dramatically reducing personnel, from 585,000 in 1992 to 375,000 in 1999, to ensure funds are available for a modern force structure. Personnel cuts would be complemented by the

retirement of 140 older ships. The remaining fleet of about 320 ships would include 12 aircraft carriers and 45 nuclear attack submarines. Such a fleet would bring Navy plans generally in line with the option "C" proposals made by then-Representative Aspin.

Beyond the Base Force. President Clinton has not specified what other force mix he thinks the Navy and Marine Corps should have beyond stating that he thinks the Navy can reduce to 10 carriers. He has, however, identified "technology" as one of his categories of military competence—the others, as noted earlier, being nuclear deterrence, better intelligence, and rapid deployment. "The Gulf War proved," he said, "that the superior training of our soldiers, tactical air power, advanced communications, space-based surveillance, and smart weaponry produced a shorter war with fewer American casualties. We must maintain our technological edge."⁴³ Economics seems as important as diplomacy or military strategy as a factor driving his aim for the United States to maintain its technological edge. Both maintenance of an industrial base in crucial areas as well as jobs seem to be at play. He has endorsed development of the V-22 Osprey for the Marines and improvement in fast sealift technology. The President sees both as the kind of dual-use technology (i.e., having both military and commercial applications) that should be pursued. He has also suggested he will continue building nuclear submarines—including one or two expensive Seawolves—and nuclear-powered aircraft carriers to preserve their perishable industrial bases.

As for overall force levels, the President may use a modification of one of former Representative Aspin's future force structure options presented in February 1992. Aspin claims his Force C option will save \$91 billion over the original Bush Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP) for FY 92-97, while his Force B option would save \$164 billion (see Table 4).⁴⁴ President Clinton's proposed levels for defense spending during that same period might save approximately \$100 billion.⁴⁵ That means a naval force very close to Aspin's Force C is possible, but that alternative calls for two more carriers than Clinton has called for. Since one of the clear messages

of Clinton's inaugural address is that "sacrifice" has become as much a watchword as "change," more than just those two carriers may be placed on the altar. Programs that looked to benefit from a Clinton presidency, like Osprey and additional Seawolves, may once again find themselves in financial jeopardy.

	ASPIN		
	BASE FORCE	FORCE C	FORCE B
Navy			
Ships (total)	450	340	290
Carriers	13	12	8
SSNs	80	40	40
Assault Ships	50	50	50
Marine Corps			
Active Divisions	2 $\frac{1}{3}$	2	2
Reserve Divisions	1	1	1
Sealift			
Fast Sealift	8	24	24
Afloat	8	24	24
Prepositioning			
MPS	13	13	13

Table 4. Comparison of Force Structure Options.

PART THREE: DEFENSE POLICY AND NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY

Despite the influence of economics and politics in the security process, there are some verities around which a national military strategy can be built regardless of the fiscal environment or the party in power. Military forces should:

- Deter and, if necessary,

- Defend against external activities inimical to U.S. interests or the interests of international actors to whom the United States extends military support;
- Otherwise persuade, and, if necessary,
- Compel designated adversaries to restore what they acquired illegally by force or undertake other activities specified by the President, possibly in support of international organizations;
- Reassure American citizens and others that they live and work in an environment which, from a military perspective, is secure and stable (that is, not a matter of undue concern or anxiety); and
- When called upon, support civil authorities as they engage in humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and, within legal bounds, enforce law.

These functions are constant. So too are some vital interests—i.e., those the United States is willing to protect by force.⁴⁶ Foremost among these are the integrity of the homeland; the welfare of American citizens; and the safety of American commercial carriers transiting international sea- and airways.

Modifying the National Military Strategy and the Naval Service.

Less constant are determinations of who else—international organizations, individual states, nongovernmental groups—should receive the extended protection of American military forces and, particularly, which should receive an explicit *a priori* commitment to that effect. The latest recipients of such guarantees would seem to be the moderate oil states of the Persian Gulf. Also subject to modification or changes in emphases are the overall American policy objectives which provide the framework within which decisions are made as to who should receive protection or be given guarantees. Two days before taking office, Clinton stated

that the foreign policy of his administration would be built upon three pillars:

First, we will make the economic security of our own nation a primary goal of our foreign policy. Here in America we cannot sustain an active engagement abroad without a sound economy at home. And yet we cannot prosper at home unless we are engaged abroad. We will, therefore, seek economic strength at home through increased productivity, even as we seek to ensure that global commerce is rooted in principles of openness, fairness and reciprocity.

Second, our foreign policy will be based on a restructuring of our armed forces to meet new and continuing threats to our security interests and the international peace. We will continue to prudently reduce defense spending. But potential aggressors should be clear about American resolve. We do not relish the prospect of military force but, when necessary, we will not shrink from using it when all appropriate diplomatic measures have been exhausted.

Third, my Administration's foreign policy will be rooted in the democratic principles and institutions which unite our own country and to which so many now around the world aspire. The spread of democratic values has given the hope of freedom to millions all across the world, who have endured decades of oppression. Whenever possible we will support those who share our values because it is in the interests of America and the world at large for us to do so.⁴⁷

Relevant to the second pillar, the President identified two generic categories of events justifying the use of force. One was the protection of vital American interests, and the other was when "the will and conscience of the international community is defied."⁴⁸ With the latter, he opened the door to the exercise of force in support of U.N. or other international resolutions even when vital U.S. interests are not threatened—at least not directly. Clinton is said to support a State Department idea of dedicating two U.S. brigades specifically to peacekeeping/peacemaking missions and creating a four-star level staff to oversee them.⁴⁹

We readily accept the above formulations as the proper context within which to view the role of U.S. forces as one of the instruments of foreign policy. Where our greatest difference

may lie with the President—though it remains too early in the administration to be a certainty—is on the perceived value of maintaining forces overseas to accomplish or carry out what the President has outlined in his foreign policy statements. Specifically, the President may deemphasize the maintenance of forces overseas, especially ground forces in Europe.⁵⁰ We would probably draw down more slowly than he and seek to maintain more than just token levels of naval and air forces.

We believe that American forces around the world can serve as a significant part of the security backdrop consistent with Clinton's foreign policy pillars—including, possibly, his concern for economic openness and fairness. After acknowledging that "theories about the relation between economic openness and military power are not well developed," Robert Art sees a link between "today's economic openness" and the establishment of a "global American military presence" over the last four decades.⁵¹ While there is no guarantee that what may have been true in the past will remain so in the future, he concludes, "Much like the nuclear issue, then, the case for a continuing overseas U.S. military presence to shore up economic interdependence is not iron-clad, only suggestive, and is based upon the principle of hedging bets."⁵²

On a broader level, we agree with Art that, while there is also no assurance to the following effects, forces maintained forward can help dampen arms races, including desires to acquire weapons of mass destruction, and can contribute to reassurance and stability which allow nations to concentrate their efforts on economic development and internal well-being.⁵³ In a world of complex interdependence and global communications, where even the nonthreatening, starving population of Somalia has an impact on the American psyche, we believe that providing a stable backdrop is in America's interest, especially when the United States works in conjunction with regional states and with organizations such as the United Nations. That numerous governments and peoples, evidently seeing the United States as a balancer or an "honest broker," have expressed a desire for U.S. presence in their region only helps further legitimize the stabilizing role we can play.⁵⁴

Implications for Capabilities and Forces.

Consistent with the above discussion, we see the United States in the next 10 years needing to maintain:

- A strategic nuclear deterrence capability. We gladly accept reductions to 3000-3500 strategic nuclear warheads as agreed upon by Presidents Bush and Yeltsin. Even less may be sufficient, but there is no rush to get there, especially since that both the United States and former Soviet republics are finding it difficult to finance current destruction rates. Waiting until we are closer to the 2003 deadline to make further decisions is adequate. If warhead numbers are reduced further, it makes sense to us to retire land-vice sea-based ballistic missiles since the premium will be on survivability.⁵⁵ With nearly half of U.S. ballistic missiles based at sea by 2003, favoring the most survivable leg of America's strategic deterrence is logical, helps maintain a critical military-industrial capability, and makes the homeland more secure by eliminating land-based targets.
- Some theater tactical nuclear capability if only to buttress deterrence against nuclear use by an enemy against U.S. forces. We believe, however, that this should be an exclusively Air Force mission. Both gravity bombs and air-launched cruise missiles can be more securely stored in and launched from bases in the United States. Since release of nuclear weapons is decided at the highest political levels, we expect any launch decision to be so deliberative that arguments for forward deployment of such weapons cannot be logically justified.
- As a minimum, conventional forces capable of undertaking up to one major regional contingency (e.g., Aspin's Iraq equivalent) and one lesser contingency lest an international rogue believe he can misbehave while U.S. attention is focused elsewhere. Sufficient forces should be forward deployed to protect U.S. interests, meet peacetime commitments

and foster coalition building, but the vast majority of heavier forces can be stationed on U.S. territories supported by an extensive surge lift capability.

Although these conventional force assumptions do not answer all the questions concerning how many forces and from what services meet these requirements, we realize there are no easy answers. This is especially true when discussing naval forces. In his outstanding study of the Navy in post-World War II American security policy (covering the period through 1983), James Lacy concludes:

The size, composition, roles and missions of the Navy have never been determined in a political vacuum or by means of an orderly process in which strategy follows from national objectives, naval strategy from overall military strategy, and naval forces from naval strategy. but always in the real world where relationships are much more complicated, and in which naval policy is both a product of and a reaction to the competition, interaction, and ambiguities of broader conceptual, technological, fiscal political, and organizational factors.⁵⁶

Lacy affirms a common theme running through the literature on American defense policy, i.e., that its formulation process is highly complex, decentralized and politicized. One reason is the chronic difficulty to come up with objectively compelling or definitive, hence widely accepted, answers about what general purpose force structure best serves U.S. needs. There is no assumption-free, factually-based, and logically-driven method for determining requirements and comparing alternative...⁵⁷ During years of budgetary largesse (such as the first 4 Weinberger years), that problem is somewhat obviated by avoiding the making of choices as much as possible and accepting instead as many alternatives as a generous budget allows. Nevertheless, even in the period from 1981 through 1985, when the cumulative real growth of the defense budget authority compared to 1980 was an amazing one-third of a trillion dollars and when all of the U.S. services saw substantial increases in appropriation,⁵⁸ there was still considerable controversy over whether the Navy had done too well at the expense of forces for fighting on and over the ground

in Europe. Such controversies sharpen when resources are cut back.⁵⁹

As compared with ground and air forces, establishing the requirements for general purpose naval forces may be particularly difficult. During the McNamara years, the Office of the Secretary of Defense placed great faith in and was fully committed to developing systematic and rigorous analytic methods to determine military requirements. It found that nuclear force scenarios were by far the easiest to analyze from the point of view of comparing weapons systems and strategies, but "[w]here limited war and the forces required for it were concerned, . . . the difficulties proved substantially less tractable" with naval analyses being the least tractable of all.⁶⁰ As McNamara himself put it when describing a project conducted at his behest:

In each of [sixteen] situations [studied], the *specific requirements* for ground and tactical air forces were examined in considerable detail. Requirements for naval forces, because of their special character, were examined primarily on a worldwide basis. This latter study proved to be particularly complex and difficult to define. . . . We do not yet have acceptable. . . analyses of naval requirements comparable to those now available for ground and tactical air forces.⁶¹

There is no indication that McNamara ever got comparable analyses even though he did press the then-CNO, Admiral David McDonald, to "justify the service's 15 carriers with a situation-by-situation analysis."⁶² Unable to provide such an analysis, McDonald fell back on arguments about the Navy's overall presence commitments within the context of a rotation cycle where, for each carrier forward deployed, there be a second in post-deployment standdown and repair and a third in pre-deployment workups. Dr. Alain Enthoven, McNamara's Assistant Secretary for Systems Analysis, concluded that

analytical efforts to quantify the combat requirements for carriers—much as was done for strategic nuclear forces and sea and airlift—were infeasible. The exact number needed. . . becomes a matter of judgment, he said, especially in view of the wide range of uses of carriers in the past. He therefore accepted. . . McDonald's

"very commonsensical argument" for 15 carriers based on the commitment to keep five. . . forward deployed.⁶³

At least two factors severely complicate establishing requirements. One is that the United States assumes global responsibilities in a world where the present is fraught with uncertainties and the future is difficult to predict. As John Chipman notes, "The fact that there is no coherent threat within or from the Third World limits the possibilities for establishing a grand strategy to deal with the instability of the developing states."⁶⁴ Hence, the number and type of contingencies it might have to deal with are open-ended. A requirements study that limits the number in order to bound the analysis must still contend with whether more than one contingency might be occurring at one time. The second factor is that technology has blurred the distinction between forces, thereby increasing the difficulties in comparing them. Ready examples are the debates about which forces should undertake quick-reaction expeditionary campaigns or debates about the use of ground-based versus sea-based aircraft to attack targets ashore and at sea or to provide air defense to littoral states.⁶⁵

Factoring in Jointness. At the President's direction, the Secretary of Defense, Chairman, Vice Chairman and Joint Chiefs of Staff will sit down and hammer out force structure issues. No one argues that the U.S. military ought not be equipped for a repeat of a conflict at least comparable to the Gulf War. Assembling a force of that proportion is an option that must be available to the President. But crises span a broad range of activities—from rising tensions to retaliation—and National Command Authorities must have a full quiver of options which can be used in situations short of a major regional conflict as well.

How then does one proportion forces so that in these fiscally austere times their whole equals more than the sum of their parts? The services have come to accept that the answer begins with joint warfare. Interoperability of equipment and doctrine helps ensure the close and effective integration of all services. Eliminating *unnecessary* duplication of generic capabilities is another part of the answer, but total elimination is unwise. For example, while it may seem to make economic

sense to have only one service with responsibility for air missions, militarily the differences in the services' missions make such a proposal dangerous. We can become **too** joint. As Colin Gray and Roger Barnett noted,

The idea that the inarguable need for a national, overall perspective upon military strategy might be met by creating (through cross-appointment and higher education) a superior, non-service-oriented American Military Person, is romantic nonsense. Experience and common sense suggest overwhelmingly that the unexciting, even prosaic, solution to the difficulties of creating coherent national military strategy can lie only through the coordination of the environmental-specific elements of the U.S. Military power.⁶⁶

The final part of the answer is found in building on the comparative advantages offered by each service as they currently exist. No recommendations concerning force structure can be made without such an analysis.

PART FOUR: PURSUING JOINTNESS

Jointness has too often been misinterpreted as service equality. Even-handed sharing of defense budgets says more about the political process than it does about rational security choices. Intra-service rivalries are not immune to this political process either. Recent Navy and Air Force reorganizations were aimed as much at eliminating intra-service politics as they were at promoting efficiency and effectiveness. The Navy's past protestations that as it reduced it needed to preserve a balanced force reflected the difficulty it had in overcoming its own version of the one-third, one-third, one-third budget split which annually faces the Department of Defense. One of the reasons that . . . *From the Sea* has been warmly received by Congress is that it prioritizes the Navy's requirements in response to realistic security challenges. The Navy staff reorganization is aimed at ensuring these priorities will be met with minimal disruption from the "platform barons."

That said, we believe it necessary to stress the obvious: which and how forces are used in specific circumstances ought to depend on their comparative advantages. There may be

times when only the Navy and/or the Marine Corps are relevant. There may be times when neither are relevant. And there will surely be times when they genuinely complement the other services. Perhaps this principle is so self-evident it was deliberately eliminated from the white paper.⁶⁷ Another reason is that they may have felt that to emphasize the advantages of the Naval Service was injudicious in an era when jointness is a major guiding concept in both the Pentagon and Congress.

*What Different Forces Have to Offer: Comparative Advantages.*⁶⁸ The ideal U.S. force posture would reassure friends and allies while simultaneously either deterring the initiation of crisis or limiting rogue behavior to such an extent that the United States need not deploy additional forces in reaction. Once a crisis has begun, the ideal posture allows a rapid and credible response to be tailored to the situation. At least six criteria must be met for forces to approach the ideal. They should:

- be in the crisis area or quickly deployable to it;
- provide the U.S. President readily usable military power;
- be sustainable once in place;
- minimize the prospect that Americans will become casualties or prisoners;
- not be tied to a basing structure which places them at high risk physically; and,
- not be dependent for basing access or overflight rights which may be difficult or impossible to obtain.

Concentrating on those activities each service performs best and convincing them to trust other services to provide necessary support will result in the closest possible approach to the ideal. Comparing U.S. conventional air, ground, and naval forces is the only way of identifying areas of mutual support, unnecessary redundancies, and comparative advantages.

Land-based Air Forces. Land-based air forces played a role in half of the documented instances of U.S. crisis response during the 40 year period following World War II.⁶⁹ Except in areas where naval (including Marine) forces are already operating, land-based air forces generally have the edge in providing quick response because of the speed at which they can bring considerable power to bear over long distances. Reminiscent of John Lehman's activism, Donald Rice, the Air Force Secretary under Bush, vigorously emphasized the "unique capabilities" of his service.⁷⁰ He argued how "with one refueling and a large conventional payload, land-based bombers can cover the entire globe from as few as three secure bases," Barksdale, Louisiana; Diego Garcia; and Guam.⁷¹ Such bombers are not only long-legged, they are also highly efficient and lethal. As Rice put it:

Six B-2s operating from the United States with the support of six tankers, could conduct an operation like the 1986 Libya raid—which utilized two aircraft carrier battle groups, an Air Force F-111 squadron, and numerous supporting assets.... The 1986 operation involved 119 aircraft and 20 ships.⁷²

On another occasion, he focused specifically on the trade-off between carriers and land-based aircraft. "Not many realize," he stated, "that one squadron of F-15Es [24 aircraft] or just 8 B-2s can match the daily ordnance capability of a carrier."⁷³ His argument is consistent with that of William Kaufmann and others that, assuming proper bases and support are available, land-based air forces can deliver ordnance to target more cheaply than their sea-based counterparts.⁷⁴

If proper basing is (made) available, the Air Force can also rapidly station surveillance, transport, electronic warfare, fighter, or ground attack aircraft in the crisis region. Rice referred to "AWACS diplomacy" as constituting "a show of force in itself. Shooting electrons rather than bullets, AWACS can quell potential trouble by its mere presence."⁷⁵ He also points out that an "F-15E squadron can both provide presence and deliver over 400,000 pounds of ordnance per day," and without divulging either the point of origin of the aircraft or their exact destination, he offered the example of how in August

1983 "an F-15 fighter force package deployed to Africa. . .in less than 24 hours. . .in response to the unsettled political situation."⁷⁶

Unfortunately, he did not specify whether the F-15s would have been immediately ready for extensive or sustained combat operations. This would depend on the level of upkeep support specifically available for that type of aircraft as well as whether or not a regular supply of ordnance could be maintained. If they were expending anywhere near the 400,000 pounds per day to which he refers, where would that ordnance come from, when would it arrive, and at what rate? Undoubtedly, maintenance infrastructure and resupply problems would only be temporary. The Air Force has ammunition ships prepositioned around the world and numerous transport aircraft for delivery of personnel and logistics, but the point is that while combat aircraft can very quickly provide a presence, they may not in all circumstances be ready for sustained operations until their maintenance and resupply needs are resolved.

As part of the DESERT STORM buildup, for example, two squadrons of F-16 aircraft [24 aircraft per squadron] deployed from their base in Utah to "an allied base in the Middle East."⁷⁷ They were the first American aircraft ever to utilize that base, and although the "hosts were well-prepared" and "bent over backwards for us, . . .the base required weeks of work before the wing was bedded down adequately." The main problem was that the existing facilities could not support the level of activity, personnel, and equipment which the Air Force brought with it. The American wing commander described his situation: "So you essentially are starting out at scratch," he said.

You have to come in and assess what's here and really sit down and think everything through in terms of how are you going to bed down this force and how are you going to operate, what kinds of adjustments are you going to make, what are your shortfalls, what...work arounds do you need to develop, how are you going to integrate with the hosts, how do we establish communications with higher headquarters and other agencies we've got to work with, where can we train, how are we going to feed our people, where

are we going to sustain our supplies in terms of fuel, all this kind of stuff. My head was spinning for about the first three to four weeks.⁷⁸

A highly important consideration when military force is contemplated is the number of potential casualties and the prospect of whether Americans would become prisoners of war. Rice notes that had Air Force B-2s conducted the Libya raid exclusively, "only a few [i.e., six] highly survivable aircraft" would have been placed at risk vice the 119 which were actually used.⁷⁹ This is a powerful argument.

Policymakers also resort to air power specifically because they do not wish to enter into a ground campaign with all its attendant costs and risks. Aviators may become casualties or prisoners, but generally in far fewer numbers than personnel involved in a ground war. Of course, any forces based on the ground in a crisis area must contend with threats to their bases. Air forces would not seem to be any more at risk here compared with other ground-based elements.

A major disadvantage associated with forward deploying air forces to a crisis region is that they usually require a relatively benign environment for insertion.⁸⁰ Otherwise, deployment would probably have to be put off until the environment is made secure and air assets would have to operate from outside the region. In light of what has been presented above, operating from a distance may not be a problem if there is a need to drop bombs, but it does not make for presence or for quick tactical response in the way that having forces in the area does. In addition, because bases would be necessary if air forces are to have a presence in a crisis region, foreign leaders may hesitate requesting land-based air support. The long-term trend in general base availability has been negative, and in the last few years the United States has, for various reasons including the request of host governments, either left or agreed to leave Torrejon Air Base outside of Madrid, Hellenikon Air Base outside of Athens, and Clark Air Base in the Philippines. Reflecting the political sensitivities associated with having foreign forces stationed in his homeland, a Philippine spokesman commented that the withdrawal actually "strengthens the U.S. position" among his countrymen.⁸¹ He further downplayed the loss of Clark by

adding "it is the U.S. Navy carriers that will make the difference."

Secretary Rice correctly pointed out that "when the interests of allies are threatened, basing will normally be made available," but when specifically? Air forces can speedily rush to a crisis area, but a President may hesitate calling on them early, when deterrence remains most viable, if the basing issue is unresolved. Even when the United States was protecting reflagged Kuwaiti vessels, the Kuwaitis sharply limited the extent to which U.S. forces could operate from their territory. It took the loss of Kuwait and the prospect of invasion of Saudi Arabia for the Saudis and others to make bases available. Even then, speaking of the DESERT STORM operation, a USAF lieutenant colonel with responsibilities for planning stated, "There are no established refueling areas, so we're starting from ground zero. A lot will depend on what Arab countries will allow. Our fear is that if a shooting war starts, we'll lose their support."⁸² If aerial bombardment is all that is desired, even without basing, Rice's call for strikes from U.S. bases remains an option. Such an option, however, supports only limited objectives. In comparison to the Navy's ability to provide **months** of presence in a crisis region, B-2s could provide only **minutes** of presence.

Ground Troops. Foreign sensitivities to having U.S. forces on their soil applies, of course, to ground troops as well. The historical record shows they were used in approximately 30 percent of the documented cases from the end of World War II through the mid-1980s. When they were used, however, it was often in considerable numbers, and they represented an especially strong signal of American commitment. As Colin Powell put it, "It's a lot different to have a guy on the ground with a rifle who can't fly away, can't sail away. He is the surest embodiment of the will of the American people."⁸³ As demonstrated in DESERT STORM, ground units can reassure a friend who wishes to buttress his defense, and, when massed, they can provide the wherewithal for ambitious campaigns to retake lost territory.

The Army is strongly committed to making its forces as mobile as possible so that they can respond to contingencies

worldwide. This has meant keeping a considerable portion of the force as light as possible so as to be air transportable. A former commander of the U.S. Central Command commented that the "Army and the Air Force practice these combined operations on a continuing basis and do so proficiently, much as the Navy and Marines constantly hone their amphibious skills."⁸⁴ The first ground troops flown to Saudi Arabia, the lead elements of an airborne brigade, arrived 6 days after the invasion. Relatively "heavier" light infantry divisions (about 10,000 people, 6 helicopters, 20 anti-air guns, 50 howitzers, and other weapons) can be flown to a secure forward assembly area and fully formed up in about 2 weeks.

For opposed entry, the Army has both the 82nd Airborne Division, stationed at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, and the 101st Air Assault Division, from Fort Campbell, Kentucky. The 82nd could, if necessary, fly directly from the United States for insertion at a point of crisis. If necessary, a small contingent of Rangers would go in first and the Air Force would conduct preparatory strikes. The airborne troops might attempt to seize an airhead to allow the insertion of air assault forces with their helicopters. These would arrive on C5 or C141 transport aircraft or, if an intermediate staging base were available within helicopter range, the air assault troops would come in on their own lift helicopters accompanied by their own attack helicopters. One brigade (1500 to 1700 combat personnel with 20 anti-tank weapons and 18 105mm artillery pieces) at a time could be lifted in this way on the helicopters attached to the 101st.

Both airborne and air assault forces would strongly prefer operating from an intermediate staging base prior to conducting an opposed entry. The level of opposition they would face, furthermore, would have to be fairly limited if they were to be used at all, for, as Jeffrey Record has argued, the factors which make light units air transportable become a problem when they arrive on scene. Specifically,

their lack of armored fighting vehicles and artillery. . . places them at risk, once on the ground. Getting there "fastest with the leastest" invites a larger enemy to crush U.S. light forces before they can be

resupplied or reinforced from the United States by heavier units compelled to travel by sea.⁸⁵

Except for the air assault contingent, the forces are also limited in their own abilities, once on the ground, to move large segments quickly or to engage in extensive offensive operations.⁸⁶ They also organically carry only enough of their own logistics to last a few days. All of these considerations caused concern when the United States first put troops in Saudi Arabia to help defend the kingdom against a powerful Iraqi army. As in the Saudi case, these problems are eventually resolved as airlift and, especially, sealift fill in behind air-landed units to provide them with necessary logistics and, if necessary, heavy tanks and mechanized equipment. But for some time after initial arrival, the forces remain limited as to what they can do and may be exposed to excessive risk. An Army spokesman put it this way when commenting on the DESERT STORM buildup in September 1990: "I think the public's got the idea we're fully deployed in Saudi Arabia, but you've got to realize we'll be unloading equipment and putting troops on the ground throughout the month."⁸⁷

The DESERT STORM, Panama, and Granada operations also show, however, that only the Army and the Air Force can ultimately provide the President with the necessary weight and type of force to deal with large-scale contingencies. As a recent Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Central Command put it, "The U.S. Army and the U.S. Air Force are the historical keepers of the heavy divisions and long-range tactical air forces. They are practitioners of the high-intensity air-land battle. It makes sense that they retain their preeminence."⁸⁸ In such circumstances, the Navy and Marines play enabling and supporting roles.

Naval Forces. The historical record shows that naval forces have been the forces of choice in about four-fifths of U.S. crisis responses even though they have the comparative disadvantage that maximum ship speeds are in the low tens of knots. Thus, if not already in the area, ships may take days or, if transiting from the United States, as much as two to three weeks to arrive at a contingency halfway around the world. Except for aircraft, including air-transported Marines, and

land-attack cruise missiles, naval forces are also generally limited to projecting power over coastal regions. Those points aside, they are obviously well-suited for traditional missions such as convoying, establishing protected lanes, clearing mines, blockading coasts, and attacking unfriendly ships. Also their normal peacetime deployments have generally been more widespread than those for air and ground forces and, often as not, have placed them in areas of potential or expected contingencies, a factor which helps offset, to some degree, their relative slowness in arriving at the scene of a crisis. Indeed, decisions about where to deploy naval forces have generally been linked to expectations about where undesired and destabilizing activities may occur.⁸⁹

Once there, they can project power against land targets in a variety of ways. Amphibious units and/or Marines were used in half the cases where naval forces played a role since World War II. Amphibious ready groups (ARGs) are normally forward deployed for quick response. Each ARG embarks a Marine Expeditionary Unit of about 1900 men, 16 helicopters, and 6 AV-8B Harrier jump jet aircraft. The Marines can move from ship to shore and establish themselves within a day. They land with 15 days' worth of supplies drawn from amphibious ships and Maritime Prepositioning Ships forward stationed around the world. A brigade-size force (about 15,000 to 18,000 Marines, including a fly-in echelon) could be landed and mated to equipment in 2 weeks or less.⁹⁰ Included in this force package are about 88 helicopters and 40 AV-8Bs, and 30 to 60 days of supplies. The Marines have spent considerable effort ensuring that support packages are quickly deployable. This means they are generally faster in assembling a force ready to conduct sustained operations once in-country than Army light divisions.

Although the Army also has prepositioning ships to support light division deployments, the DESERT STORM experience demonstrated they are not as well-suited nor as well-integrated as those of the Marines to provide immediate support to forces ashore.⁹¹ During DESERT SHIELD, Army General Norman Schwarzkopf found himself having to rely heavily on the Marines during the buildup phase:

The general knows that there's more than war taking place in the desert. Besides Iraq, there's the old struggle between the Army and the Marines. The service that shines stands to get the edge on appropriations and staffing into the next century. . . . Boosters like Schwarzkopf have been eyeing new roles, such as a shift toward swift "expeditionary" forces—the Marines' traditional bailiwick. Yet so far in Saudi Arabia, the Marines have looked more battle ready—with more equipment set up in the region. . . . Schwarzkopf has been forced to give them the primary role in a buildup he wanted to make a showcase for the Army.⁹²

Another Army officer, General Colin Powell, has spoke . . . of the link or synergy between Marines and naval ships as a definite plus in many crisis-management situations compared with air-delivered ground forces:

The "amphibious capability of the Marines in tandem with the Navy," he said, "gives us a capability to have a potential ground-force presence whenever we have Navy presence. And that is a great deterrent. Lying offshore, ready to act, the presence of ships and Marines sometimes means much more than just having air power or ship's fire, when it comes to deterring a crisis. And the ships and Marines do not have to do anything but lie offshore. It is hard to lie offshore with a C-141 or C-130 [aircraft] full of airborne troops."⁹³

In short, the utility of various forces is all a matter of circumstance. There are times when the speed of airborne delivery is all that matters, but there are other times when what is prized most is both arrival and an ability to loiter without impinging on any nation's sovereignty.

In an opposed entry situation along a coast, the Marines are the obvious force of choice, either alone or in conjunction with Army airborne or air assault troops.⁹⁴ Ships, carrier aircraft, and the Harriers attached to the amphibious group can provide gunfire, air defense, and bombing support.

The historical record indicates that the most often used naval unit for crisis response was the aircraft carrier. Former Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney noted that when he sat down with President Bush to deal with a crisis, "literally the first thing he always [said was], 'How are we fixed for carriers?'"⁹⁵ Reflecting their power projection potential, aircraft carriers

were employed in two-thirds of the cases where naval forces played a role in the post-World War II era. The Kuwaiti Crisis well illustrates this potential. Because both *Independence* and *Eisenhower* were close by at its onset, they were "the most visible U.S. forces" for signalling initial American resolve, and they provided the President with 130 or so fighter and ground attack aircraft for use within a few days of the invasion.⁹⁶ In slightly over 2 weeks, by virtue of *Saratoga's* arrival in the Eastern Mediterranean, the United States had, on carriers alone, as many combat aircraft as in the entire Saudi Air Force and one-third as many as in the Iraqi air force. The United States also had several land-attack Tomahawk cruise missile ships operating either independently or with the carriers. These ships were available for selective strikes without risking manned aircraft or as front-end support for aircraft strikes by suppressing enemy air defenses.

Though used extensively in peacetime crises, it is undoubtedly the case that U.S. forces at sea have experienced far fewer casualties in crisis response than U.S. forces on land (including, of course, Marines placed ashore) regardless of service. Nevertheless, the record of the 1980s, in particular, is not a happy one. The experience of both the British and Argentines in the Falklands war, and the American experience in the Gulf (i.e., the Iraqi Exocet missile attack against *Stark* and the Iranian mine which nearly sank *Samuel B. Roberts*) graphically showed that naval ships are not immune to attack. Indeed, the situation may get worse as more nations develop a capacity to build and sell sophisticated weapons and more nations buy them. The Director of Naval Intelligence stated in 1990, for example, that, other than the United States and Russia, 68 countries had anti-ship cruise missiles and 41 had submarines.⁹⁷ In the DESERT STORM operation, the targets to which U.S. planners gave first priority were those Iraqi gun and missile batteries which could damage American and allied ships.⁹⁸ Nevertheless, notwithstanding the *Pueblo* incident of 1969, when North Korea seized an unarmed U.S. intelligence collection ship, naval personnel serving at sea will probably be far less prone to becoming prisoners of war than their compatriots serving ashore.

Finally, some of the factors which helped account for the frequent use of naval forces in crisis management since World War II would seem even more relevant in the future. Paradoxically, as the world has become more interdependent, many states have become more sensitive to perceived infringements on their sovereignty. This sensitivity places a premium both on the legally guaranteed right of naval ships to range the high seas and on their related ability to hover indefinitely out of sight but not mind off a nation's coast beyond the usual 12-mile territorial sea. The EARNEST WILL operation, which began with protecting reflagged Kuwaiti tankers, illustrated as well both the staying power of naval forces and their relative autonomy from extensive foreign land bases (compared to the Army and Air Force). One commentator went to the heart of the matter when he noted that "even those nations welcoming an American naval presence did not want Americans on their soil because of domestic political considerations."⁹⁹ The Navy resorted extensively to afloat bases much as it had done in the Pacific in World War II. The situation was not optimum and it was an extremely expensive way to do business, but business carried on.

From the Saudi perspective, it may well be the primary mode of business for presence forces in the aftermath of the Kuwaiti crisis as well; the Saudis sought reassurances that former Secretary of State James Baker's references to a "regional security structure" did not imply that the United States was seeking a long-term ground presence in their country.¹⁰⁰ After floating that idea, Baker "hastily retreated." Subsequent comments focused on maintaining an "increased" and "lasting" U.S. naval presence in the area complemented by prepositioned ground forces equipment should future crises require troops to return.¹⁰¹

Building From Comparative Advantage. Senator Nunn has called for a complete review of the roles and missions of all the services to ensure they remain relevant and to eliminate unnecessary duplication. As noted earlier, President Clinton has agreed. We have neither the time nor the expertise to deal

with all the issues Senator Nunn raised, but we do have views on some issues as they concern naval forces.

- There is, first of all, no one right answer to the roles and missions question. As we argued in Part Three, establishing military requirements and then allocating responsibilities across the services are extremely difficult for a nation such as the United States, which accepts global obligations. Other countries have different roles and missions breakdowns for their forces that seem to work and reflect their circumstances. There is nothing sacrosanct about how responsibilities are apportioned today, but the apportionment should not change for change's sake.¹⁰²
- Our primary rule for joint operations and force structure development is: use the comparative advantages of the services as they now exist. Across the range of the six criteria, the relative advantages of naval forces includes their largely unencumbered deployments to ocean or coastal areas where crises are anticipated or feared; their versatility or ability to conduct significant air and ground as well as traditional maritime operations; their potential for maintaining a low profile presence; their organic sustainability; the relatively lower prospects of at-sea personnel becoming casualties or prisoners; a legally guaranteed right to transit the oceans and to hover off a nation's territorial seas; and an ability to rely on afloat basing if necessary. These qualities help explain why naval forces were featured so often in post-World War II crises. They also provide the rationale for naval forces in the 1990s—the first decade in the post-World War II era where the prospect of regional contingencies completely overshadow the prospect of large-scale wars and where low-profile operations with minimal access to land-basing may occur frequently.¹⁰³
- Ground and land-based air forces possess their own unique and highly valued capabilities. They can be

used in or against landlocked states; are the forces of choice for large-scale, long-term, or "heavy" ground contingencies; and where, basing is available, can establish a presence at the scene that demonstrates the strongest possible U.S. resolve. In addition, land-based air forces can most quickly put considerable ordnance on targets worldwide and probably do so with relatively few casualties.

- The issue of having four air forces has raised the most public comment. Naval operations—especially carrier and ARG operations—are distinctive enough to justify a separate naval air force. As the integration of Navy and Marine Corps aviation and doctrine proceeds, it will become increasingly more accurate to speak of naval, rather than Navy and Marine Corps, aviation and only three vice four air forces. Because of the unique relationship between the Navy and Marine Corps, they should provide for their own close-air support as well as maintain the capability to operate from expeditionary airfields.¹⁰⁴
- As noted above, long-range and heavy sustained bombing should remain with the Air Force with naval aviation playing both complementary and supplementary roles. Whether the cut-off for long-range begins at 500, 700 or more miles from a target is a devilish detail. We rather suspect that aircraft endurance, rather than range, will ultimately be used as the yardstick.¹⁰⁵
- There is a *de facto* division of labor in ground expeditionary forces which ought to be made *de jure*. Spending funds, especially in the current fiscal environment, to give one service capabilities already possessed by another flies in the face of logic. Specifically,
- *Light forces.* Quick reaction, air-transportable, firepower-light, logistically-sparse ground forces are in the Army and should remain.

- *Medium forces.* Marine infantry provides mid-range capability vis-à-vis firepower and sustainability and, because of prepositioning ships, response time.
- *Heavy forces.* The Army has the capability to conduct long-term, sustained combat with heavy forces.

We should keep things that way.¹⁰⁶ We should avoid making the Marines a heavy force and avoid large-scale afloat prepositioning for the Army. Procuring surge sealift for the Army makes better sense. We should also avoid having too much of the Army be light.

As to specific force numbers, weighing both fiscal reality and changes in the security environment, we believe Aspin's Option "C" provides the proper mix of naval forces (by stressing carrier and amphibious capabilities while deemphasizing submarines) in about the right numbers. To estimate the adequacy of this force, some standard measure must be applied. The one we apply is that there should be at least one carrier battle group (CVBG) continuously in the Mediterranean, Western Pacific and Northern Arabian Sea.¹⁰⁷ Because 17.5 percent of the carrier force is usually in long-term overhaul, an inventory of 12 carriers means that 9.9 would be available for deployment. When transit times, personnel and operation tempo guidelines are added to the calculus, 2.5 to 2.67 could actually be on station providing coverage about 85 percent of the time.¹⁰⁸ We would prefer closer to 100 percent coverage but we accept that 12 carriers are the most that can be realistically expected.

The case for amphibious ships follows a slightly different path of argument. We believe that each coast ought to maintain the capability to transport a Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) which consists of 10,000 to 15,000 personnel and their equipment. Each MEB requires approximately 20 amphibious ships. Since overhauls for nuclear-powered carriers are lengthier than those for conventional powered ships,¹⁰⁹ a conservative estimate is that 15 percent of the amphibious force will be in long-term overhaul. Assuming Aspin's 50-ship inventory, approximately 42 ships (21 per coast) should be available to meet our standard of measure.

PART FIVE: OBSERVATIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

Though mindful of the need to avoid being captured by today's news in a paper which is supposed to look 10-years ahead, we are nevertheless impressed by two contrasting sets of headlines. One set speaks to the need to reduce and restructure the military and to cut defense spending. The realities underlying those headlines may indeed have a marked impact on naval roles, missions and forces far into the future. Another set speaks to circumstances where American military personnel are now actively engaged (Somalia, in and around Iraq, Caribbean drug operations, etc.); where they may be engaged (Yugoslavia); or where they should, according to some foreign leaders, remain engaged so as to contribute to stability (Western Europe and Western Pacific). The contra-position of these two sets of headlines can be worrisome. American history is replete with instances where military capabilities remained ill-suited to national commitments and even to announced defense policy, the promulgation of which had been intended to bring capabilities in line with perceived changes in requirements.¹¹⁰

There are numerous reasons for believing that "getting it right" is as much a function of luck as it is of wise planning. In his post-World War II historical analysis, James Lacy concluded:

Military intellectuals, policy analysts, and military scientists were simply not capable—certainly not after the late 1950s [as the United States was moving beyond the policy of massive retaliation]—of generating the "one right grand strategy" from which derivative policies could be deduced with confidence and against which competing contentions about functions and missions could be weighed and determined. Strategy was more a series of issues than a set of cogent answers.¹¹¹

In short, to our view the historical record should not engender optimism that we will get it right in the 1990s; nevertheless, we are not pessimistic. The cold war has been won and the specter of massive nuclear conflict has practically vanished. The time has come to reconsider the purposes of

the military and to restructure and reduce forces. To our minds, the Clinton foreign policy "pillars" provide an excellent foundation for doing so, and we particularly applaud his willingness—initiated in the Bush administration—to consider how U.S. forces, when appropriate, can work within a U.N. context.

The white paper appeared before President Clinton's formulation of his pillars, but it is consistent with them. Because the white paper's introduction ties it directly to President Bush's National Security Strategy and Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney's "Base Force" concept, the temptation may be to discard it as a political document.¹¹² Before doing so, it should be pointed out that the main concepts in the paper were developed by Navy and Marine Corps officers based on their experience and independent assessment of future security challenges. The basic concepts which emerged for meeting these challenges have enduring value and should survive the change in administrations.

With its emphasis on jointness, it constitutes a major change in the perspectives of the Naval Service—a change for which it is deserving of great credit. The focus on jointness is significant not only vis-à-vis the Army and Air Force but also, and no less importantly, vis-à-vis the two naval forces themselves. It was long overdue that the Navy and Marine Corps should again become the Naval Service (in the singular)—as highlighted by the cover page of the white paper.

The trend toward littoral operations is also, to our minds, highly welcome, and it has already, as former Secretary O'Keefe stated, resulted in adjustments to roles and missions. Those adjustments must continue in all the services and with minimum rancor lest the President or Congress impose solutions which may or may not be best for all involved.¹¹³ Recapping our recommendations, we suggest light forces remain with the Army and Air Force, medium forces remain with the Marine Corps, and heavy forces remain with the Army. We recommend the Air Force continue its deep strike mission and that the Navy concentrate on close air support and medium strike missions. We believe strategic warhead reductions should continue; eventually placing all warheads on strategic

nuclear submarines which will remain the most survivable basing scheme in the future. Finally, we recommend the Air Force assume sole responsibility for tactical nuclear weapons. What we do not recommend is changing for the sake of change. We find sufficient uniqueness in the support provided by the specialized air branches of the ground and naval services to justify their continuance. Although there may be some redundancies, when lives are at stake a little redundancy is a good thing.

Where we differ most significantly with Clinton-Aspin policies—and with some authors of the white paper—is on the question of forward presence. The United States should maintain more than token forces overseas, and outside of Western Europe, the forces of choice should be naval and air. From our perspective, however, the Naval Service ought to continue its historical role as the service of choice for responding to limited crises along coasts, up to and including medium-sized contingencies, regardless of today's stress on jointness.

This leads to a second difference of opinion with many of today's defense leadership. Our belief is that the rhetoric of jointness has surpassed its reality. By that we mean that many service members needed, and to some extent still need, to be sold on the value of joint operations. Thus, those making the case for jointness, including the authors of the white paper, had to "oversell" the concept.¹¹⁴ As we noted earlier, which and how forces are used in specific circumstances ought to depend on their comparative advantages. There will be times when only the Navy and/or the Marine Corps are relevant; other times when neither are relevant; and times when they complement the other services.

Newspaper reports that the Navy is considering major changes in its force makeup suggest, if accurate, that naval leaders have taken seriously the need to both restructure and reduce. When asked to write this paper, we fully intended to discuss alternative force structures and conclude with our personal force structure recommendations. However, the leaked Navy plan, entitled "Recapitalizing the Navy," is so close to Aspin's Option "C," which we support, and

"emphasizes a goal to preserve carriers and Marine Corps amphibious vessels," that arguing in the margins seemed unproductive to us.¹¹⁵ If the Congress and the White House accept the reported naval force structure plan as simply a ceiling from which to reduce further, they will, we believe, be making a great mistake. It is rare for service chiefs to put forward a plan calling for such drastic reductions (approximately 30 percent).¹¹⁶ That naval leadership has done so reflects its determination to reshape its forces in the manner which it believes is most consistent with the white paper rather than allow others to make the choices.

We began by referencing Public Law and suggested it should be amended to reflect a wider role for naval forces consistent with projected capabilities and doctrine. We do so, not to usurp roles and missions of other services, but to ensure the Naval Service will, by law, be able to enhance its enabling role and complement the other services. Our recommended changes are noted below.

The Navy shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations at sea *and in the littoral*. It is responsible for the preparation of naval forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war except as otherwise assigned and, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of the peacetime components of the Navy to meet the needs of war. (10 U.S.C. 5062)

The Marine Corps shall be organized, trained, and equipped to provide fleet marine forces of combined arms, together with supporting air components, for service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval *or joint* campaign. (10 U.S.C. 5063).

ENDNOTES

1. Robert Seager II and Doris D. Maguire, eds., *Letters and Papers of Alfred Thayer Mahan*, Volume II, Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1975, p. 494.

2. Sean O'Keefe, Frank B. Kelso II, and C.E. Mundy, Jr., ... *From the Sea: Preparing the Naval Service for the 21st Century*, Washington D.C.: Department of the Navy, 1992.

3. The Marine Corps was established under Title 10 U.S. Code which also details its roles and missions along with those of the Navy. What the U.S. Code describes as functions are referred to as missions in U.S. Navy Regulations.

4. A **function** is a specific responsibility assigned to a service through executive action which permits it to successfully fulfill its legally established role. **Primary functions** are those principal responsibilities assigned to a service within its role and for which it may allocate fiscal resources and generate force structure. **Collateral functions** are those responsibilities assigned to a service to support another service's primary functions. A service may not generate force structure based solely upon a collateral function. **Missions** are those tasks assigned to a Unified or Specified Command by the President or the Secretary of Defense.

5. Department of the Navy, *Naval Force Capabilities Planning Effort, Phase I Report*, Washington, DC: 1991, Appendix B.

6. Anthony Harrigan, "Comment and Discussion," *Proceedings*, January 1993, p. 20.

7. Colin S. Gray and Roger W. Barnett, eds., *Seapower and Strategy*, Annapolis: Naval Institute Press, 1989, p. x.

8. O'Keefe, *et. al.*, p. 2.

9. During the cold war as the Navy prepared to fight the Soviets on the high seas, they adopted a strong "go it alone" attitude. "When you are in trouble, fighting hundreds (perhaps, thousands) of miles from shore, with battles also raging on land," the Navy asked, "Who ya gonna call?" As one admiral recently wrote, "This is why you never hear of the cavalry riding up and rescuing a ship in trouble at sea. The men on board the sinking ship either solve the problem, abandon the ship for the cold sea, or die in their iron mortuary." David R. Oliver, "Persona," *Proceedings*, January 1993, p. 55.

10. O'Keefe, *et. al.*, p. 2.

11. *Ibid.*

12. As quoted in James Kitfield, "Deconstructing Defense," *Government Executive*, January 1993, p. 10.

13. O'Keefe, *et. al.*, pp. 1-2.

14. Anthony Harrigan laments that the white paper "represents a complete break with the historic [sea control] role of the Navy and Marine Corps," (Harrigan, p. 20); however, Secretary of the Navy Sean O'Keefe

asserts that sea control "is—in some ways—a given. . . .I think we have sea control covered at this point." ("Be Careful What You Ask for. . .," *Proceedings*, January 1993, p. 73.)

15. As quoted in Kitfield, p. 10.

16. O'Keefe, *et. al.*, p. 4.

17. Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, *On Active Service*, New York: Harper, 1948, p. 506.

18. Carl H. Builder, *The Masks of War*, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1989, p. 18.

19. Kenneth J. Hagen, *This People's Navy*, New York: The Free Press, 1991, p. 339.

20. Richard K. Betts, *Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977, p. 10.

21. David C. Jones, "What's Wrong with Our Defense Establishment," *New York Times Magazine*, November 7, 1982, p. 81.

22. Patrick E. Tyler, "Navy Urged to Bring Ships Home to Cut Costs," *The Washington Post*, March 28, 1990, p. A6.

23. A Center for Naval Analyses meeting with congressional staff members concluded "the Navy may be paying a price for its perceived attitude of aloofness during the 1980s. Although members [of Congress] are not really against the Navy, there is no real support for helping the Navy either by providing more dollars or cashing in political capital." Thomas P.M. Barnett and John D. Mayer, Center for Naval Analyses, memorandum for the record, December 9, 1991.

24. Bill Clinton, "A New Covenant for American Security," speech at Georgetown University, December 12, 1991. Quoted in Loren B. Thompson, "Bill Clinton's Views on National Security: An Assessment," Global Security Project, National Security Studies Program, Georgetown University, September 28, 1992, p. 13.

25. Les Aspin, "The Clinton Position," *San Diego Union-Tribune*, October 18, 1992, p. C1.

26. Bill Clinton, "In His Own Words," *The New York Times*, January 19, 1993, p. A14, address given to diplomats at Georgetown University on January 18.

27. Thompson, p. 10. Thompson says these capabilities, which were also contained in the Democratic Party's 1992 platform, "differ significantly

from the four "essential elements" that the Bush Administration [said] underpins its "Base Force" concept." (Ibid.)

28. George Bush, *National Security Strategy of the United States*, Washington DC: White House, January 1993, p. 14, and Thompson, p. 10.

29. Thompson, p. 10.

30. *Ibid.*

31. O'Keefe, *et. al.*, p. 12.

32. Thompson, p. 10. During a Veterans' Day speech in Arkansas, President-elect Clinton reiterated, "We need to invest more in airlift and sealift. We need to increase the facility and speed and competence with which we can move our people, because we never know where we might be needed." Thomas L. Friedman, "Clinton to Open Military's Ranks to Homosexuals," *The New York Times*, November 12, 1992, p. A25.

33. Les Aspin, "National Security in the 1990s: Defining a New Basis for U.S. Military Forces," speech before the Atlantic Council of the United States, January 6, 1992, p. 7.

34. Cited in Thompson, p. 14, from *Defense Week*, July 13, 1992.

35. Thompson, p. 14.

36. Les Aspin, "Aspin Shows Defense Alternatives," House Armed Services Committee press release, February 25, 1992, p. 2.

37. Colin L. Powell, *National Military Strategy*, Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 1992, p. 17.

38. During Aspin's confirmation hearings, it was asserted that DoD projections state "that current acquisition plans support only a 260 ship fleet." *Defense Daily*, "Aspin Dodges Clinton Pledge on Seawolf," January 19, 1993, p. 80.

39. See David C. Morrison, "Pentagon Pitfalls," *National Journal*, November 28, 1992, p. 2719.

40. When asked about the number of attack submarines the Navy requires, O'Keefe responded, "Probably close to 60 is what we need." That is 20 fewer attack submarines than the Base Force requirement. Peyton Fleming, "Acting Navy secretary sees little need soon for major submarine work," *Providence Journal-Bulletin*, October 27, 1992, p. D3.

41. Dick Cheney, *Annual Report to the President and the Congress*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 1992, p. 82.

42. Gregory Vistica, "Navy weighs major new cuts," *San Diego Union-Tribune*, February 1, 1993, p. 1.

43. Thompson, p. 10.

44. Aspin, "Aspin Shows Defense Alternatives. *op. cit.* During his confirmation hearings, Aspin said his alternative force options were simply illustrative of the methodology (i.e, threat-based approach) that needs to be refined and used to determine actual fleet size. "Aspin Dodges Clinton Pledge on Seawolf," *Defense Daily*, January 19, 1993, p. 80.

45. The Bush administration amended its original FYDP and the last plan called for spending \$1.42 trillion. The Clinton plan calls for spending \$1.36 trillion. There are serious concerns, however, that Bush defense program estimates are too conservative and that Bush cost savings estimates are too liberal. This dreadful combination seriously undermines force structure planning.

46. In Bush's final foreign policy speech delivered at West Point, the President said use of force is not symbolic of anything. He said, "The relative importance of an interest is not a guide. Military force may not be the best way of safeguarding something vital, while using force might be the best way to protect an interest that qualifies as important but less than vital." (As quoted in William Safire, "When to Use Force," *The New York Times*, January 7, 1993, p. A23.) The point of Bush's speech was that military power is a valuable policy option and should not necessarily be the last option considered. See also Robert J. Art, "A US military strategy for the 1990s: reassurance without dominance," *Survival*, Winter 1992-93, pp. 4-5, for additional discussion concerning the definition of vital interests.

47. Bill Clinton, "In His Own Words," *The New York Times*, January 19, 1993, p. A14, address given to diplomats at Georgetown University on January 18.

48. Anthony Lewis, "The Clinton Doctrine?," *The New York Times*, January 22, 1993, p. 23.

49. *Inside the Navy*, Volume 5, No. 50, December 14, 1992, p. 4. See also Paul Lewis, "U.N., Busier Than Ever Globally, Struggles With Peacekeeping Role," *The New York Times*, January 25, 1993, p. A1. A new 4-star staff may not be necessary if Chairman Powell's plans for reorienting the Atlantic Command are implemented. See Margo MacFarland, "Roles and Missions Review Recommends Major Expansion of Atlantic Command," *Inside the Navy*, January 4, 1993, p. 1.

50. We believe a fully ready division and sufficient personnel to maintain infrastructure capable of receiving reinforcements should be the minimum stationed forces in Europe.

51. Robert J. Art, "A Defensible Defense: America's Grand Strategy After the Cold War," *International Security*, Spring 1991, pp. 40.

52. *Ibid.*, pp. 41-42.

53. Too often the Third World has interpreted Western references to stability as meaning maintaining the status quo. By stability, we mean conditions which promote peaceful change.

54. Art arrived at the conclusion that U.S. forces are viewed as stabilizing influences after interviewing more than 110 governmental, defense, and foreign affairs officials and scholars from around the world. Art, "A US Military Strategy for the 1990s," n.15, p. 23.

55. To our knowledge, there is no technology on the horizon which will reduce strategic submarine survivability. See Donald C. Daniel, *Anti-Submarine Warfare and Superpower Strategic Stability*, Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1986, pp. 84-89.

56. James L. Lacy, *Within Bounds: The Navy in Postwar American Security Policy*, Alexandria: Center for Naval Analyses, 1983, p. 529. See also Builder, p. 147, with analogous statement about the Army.

57. Richard A. Stubbing notes, "Many defense issues are simply beyond the scope of our analytic capabilities—due to the vast uncertainty and complexity surrounding defense. In addition, the intense political atmosphere surrounding the defense budget and the limited time available for top civilian defense authorities further limits the extent to which ongoing defense programs can be objectively reevaluated." *The Defense Game*, New York: Harper & Row, 1986, p. 86.

58. *Ibid.*, Table 2, p. 44.

59. See Jessica Eve Budro, "Battle Brewing Over Army Attempts to Take Over Marine Corps' Mission," *Inside the Pentagon*, November 8, 1990, p. 1.

60. William W. Kaufmann, *The McNamara Strategy*, New York: Harper & Row, 1964, pp. 182-185; cite is from 182-183.

61. Cited in *Ibid.*, pp. 183-184.

62. Joseph A. Sestak, Jr., "Righting the Atlantic Tilt," *Proceedings*, January 1986, p. 68.

63. Interview with Admiral David L. McDonald and Dr. Alain Enthoven, quoted in Sestak, p. 68. The requirement for service life extension overhauls, particularly for nuclear carriers, coupled with the institution of

personnel and operational tempo limitations, changed the calculus of needing three carriers to keep one forward deployed. Recent analysis has shown the three-to-one ratio to be unrealistically optimistic. See Ronald O'Rourke, "Naval Forward Deployments and the Size of the Navy," *CRS Report for Congress*, November 13, 1992, pp. 15-22.

64. John Chipman, "Third World Politics and Security in the 1990s: 'The World Forgetting, By the World Forgot'?", *Washington Quarterly*, Winter 1991, p. 166.

65. Stansfield Turner, *New Times Magazine*, May 6, 1984, p. 38; see also *Builder*, p. 63.

66. Gray and Barnett, p. 377.

67. *Inside the Navy*, October 12, 1992, p. 9. An equally likely possibility is the fact that one purpose of the white paper was to convince naval leadership to support jointness. To achieve total conversion, the white paper didn't need to provide skeptics with ammunition supporting what has been labeled "old think."

68. Much of this section is contained in Donald C.F. Daniel, "Beyond the 600-Ship Navy," *Adelphi Paper 261*, London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Autumn 1991, pp. 24-36.

69. Includes land-based air forces from all services. Crisis response data throughout this paper is drawn from or based on data contained in Barry M. Blechman and Stephen S. Kaplan, *Force Without War*, Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1978; Philip Zelikow, *The United States and the Use of Force: A Historical Summary*, Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School, 1985; and Adam B. Siegel, *U.S. Navy Crisis Response Activity, 1946-1989: Preliminary Report*, Alexandria: Center for Naval Analyses, July 1989.

70. Donald B. Rice, *The Air Force and US National Security: Global Reach—Global Power, A White Paper*, Washington, DC: Department of the Air Force, June 1990.

71. *Ibid.*, p. 9.

72. *Ibid.*, p. 8. The Navy faults this comparison because it only discusses the raid on Libya itself and not the presence missions naval forces were simultaneously carrying out.

73. Donald B. Rice, Remarks to the Washington Chapter, National Security Industrial Association, March 1, 1990, p. 5. Such fallacious arguments muddy the waters since they ignore the comparative advantages of different aircraft basing schemes; nevertheless, the "tons on target"

argument is one of the reasons the Navy has decided to procure only multimission aircraft in the future.

74. William Kaufmann, *A Thoroughly Efficient Navy*, Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1987, p. 4.

75. Rice, "Remarks," p. 9.

76. Rice, *Global Reach*, p. 9.

77. Information in this paragraph is drawn from Lee Ewing, "Building an F-16 Team from Scratch," *Air Force Times*, December 24, 1990, pp. 14-15, 22; and Julie Bird, "Desert Shield Sends Ripples," *Ibid.*, p. 15.

78. Ewing, p. 15.

79. Rice, *Global Reach*, p. 8. On the other hand, on a purely monetary basis, the loss of a single B-2A bomber, at \$1.05 billion per aircraft, represents the comparable loss of 34 F/A-18A-D Hornets, at \$30.576 million per aircraft. Ted Nicholas and Rita Rossi, *U.S. Weapon System Costs*, Fountain Valley, CA: Data Research Associates, 1992.

80. James A. Winnefeld and David A. Shlapak, *The Challenge of Future Nonstandard Contingencies: Implications for Strategy, Planning, Crisis Management, and Forces*, Volume I, Santa Monica: RAND, October 1990, p. 34.

81. "U.S. Fighter Planes to Leave Philippine Base in '91," *The New York Times*, November 8, 1990, p. A6.

82. Michele McCormick, "Tankers 'Bridge' World for F-117s," *Air Force Times*, September 3, 1990, p. 14.

83. Michael R. Gordon, "Army and Air Force Fix Sights on the Changing Face of War," *The New York Times*, May 21, 1990, p. B12.

84. George B. Crist, "A U.S. Military Strategy for a Changing World," *Strategic Review*, p. 20.

85. Jeffrey Record, "Strike from the Sea," *Baltimore Sun*, April 25, 1990, p. 17; cf. Carl E. Vuono, "The U.S. Army: Mobility and the Future of Deterrence," *NATO's Sixteen Nations*, February-March 1990, p. 75.

86. The air assault forces obtain mobility because of their helicopters, but that mobility depends on the availability of fuel and spare parts.

87. Richard H.P. Sia, "Problems Plague US Deployment to Saudi Arabia," *Baltimore Sun*, September 4, 1990, p. 1.

88. Crist, p. 20.
89. For example, the presence of carrier battle groups and amphibious ready groups in the Mediterranean, although part of the U.S. NATO commitment, reflects the fact that about $\frac{1}{3}$ of all crises to which naval forces have responded since World War II have occurred in the Mediterranean. Since 1980, the ratio is closer to $\frac{1}{2}$ of all crises. Bradford Dismukes and Bradd Hayes, "The Med Remains Vital," *Proceedings*, October 1991, p. 48.
90. Michael Gordon, "Power of Iraq and Distance Slow Reaction," *The New York Times*, August 3, 1990, p. A8.
91. Budro, p. 1.
92. "'Stormin' Norman Takes Command," *Newsweek*, September 10, 1990, p. 25.
93. Record, p. 17.
94. Theodore L. Gatchel, "Hang Together, or Hang Separately," *Proceedings*, November 1990, pp. 56-62.
95. Grant Willis, "Secretary Receives First-hand View of Carrier Operations," *Navy Times*, November 13, 1989, p. 4.
96. See Pat Towell, "Gulf Standoff Highlights Need for Speed as Well as Power," *Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report*, August 11, 1990, pp. 2597-2598; see also Michael R. Gordon, "Iraq's Advantage Limits U.S. Options," *The New York Times*, August 3, 1990, p. 1.
97. "Statement of Rear Admiral Thomas A. Brooks, U.S. Navy, Director of Naval Intelligence, before the Seapower, Strategic, and Critical Materials Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee on Intelligence Issues," March 14, 1990, pp. 55 and 57.
98. Douglas Jehl, "Shore Batteries in Kuwait High on Navy Target List," *Los Angeles Times*, October 13, 1990, p. 8.
99. Bernard Trainor, "Navy Sees Gulf Activity As Portent of New Era," *The New York Times*, November 25, 1988, p. B10.
100. David Hoffman, "Saudis Agree to Pay Billions for Defense," *The New York Times*, December 31, 1990, p. 92.
101. David Hoffman and Elizabeth Drew, "Letter from Washington," *The New Yorker*, December 31, 1990, p. 92.

102. General Powell's report on "Roles, Missions, and Functions of the Armed Forces of the United States," reportedly "calls for a reshuffling of service roles and missions" with the result being less autonomy for the services. Former Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and former Secretary of the Navy John Lehman believe that too much centralization can breed inefficiency; exactly the opposite of the desired effect. Robert Holzer and Neil Munro, "Powell Report Diminishes Services' Autonomy, Clout," *Defense News*, January 18-24, 1993, p. 4.

103. As naval forces did in DESERT STORM where they played an enabling role in helping secure the arrival of ground and air forces and in supplementing the coverage of sectors, targets, and axes of attack. They also constituted a significant portion of the residual forces left behind after the majority of the ground-based units were withdrawn at the end of the campaign.

104. The topic of separate "air forces" deserves a much fuller discussion than space here allows. Such a discussion would have to address close air support of amphibious operations when land-basing is not available; airframe differences required to land aboard ship as opposed to on land; currency requirements for carrier aviators; and, should critics go so far as to recommend Air Force squadrons aboard carriers, such things as cultural indoctrination (which includes more than aviation skills) and career paths for such officers since they would basically have to serve full time with another service. We are not talking about a simple exchange tour of duty.

105. The debate concerning deep strike is not simply between the Navy and Air Force but also between the Army and Air Force. See Neil Munro, Vago Muradian and Barbara Opall, "U.S. Air Force Vies to Dominate Deep-Strike Role," *Defense News*, January 18-24, 1993, p. 4.

106. Kitfield, noted the synergism this arrangement produced during DESERT STORM.

107. Critics of this standard argue that "the answer to every situation may not be a carrier battle group. ... The key is continuously tailoring our forces to anticipate and support national needs." (O'Keefe, p. 6). We are not arguing that every situation requires a carrier but that without a carrier the President's options are severely limited. In fact, the President's greatest range of crisis response options is provided when an amphibious ready group is also present.

108. Daniel, p. 32.

109. Ronald O'Rourke, "Naval Forward Deployments and the Size of the Navy, *CRS Report for Congress*, November 13, 1992, p. 14.

110. See, for example, Vincent Davis, *The Admirals' Lobby*, Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1967, p. 152; and Edward A. Kolodziej, *The Uncommon Defense and Congress, 1945-1963*, Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1966, p. 280.

111. Lacy, p. 556.

112. Inclusion of this introduction was resisted by the military fearing it would politicize the paper and limit its value, but Secretary O'Keefe, a strong Bush/Cheney supporter, insisted it be added.

113. Thus, recent reports that General Powell has been forced to back off in his roles and missions recommendations are worrisome in that such retrenchment invites extra-departmental intervention. See for example, Margo MacFarland, "Revised Roles and Missions Report Likely to be Even Less Bold than Draft," *Inside the Navy*, January 18, 1993.

114. Ultimately, the reaction to overselling jointness may be a rising hostility to the concept, just the opposite of what is desired.

115. Don Ward, "Thinking Small," *Navy Times*, February 15, 1993, p. 12.

116. One indication of how unusual the Navy's reduction proposals are is reflected in a statement by Senator Brien McMahon to his Senate colleagues: "What else would we expect to hear from admirals except demands for all the money they think Congress will appropriate? I don't blame them--that is their business...." Kolodziej, p. 56.

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