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SURPRISE: GET USED TO IT

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Army.

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ABSTRACT

Strategic surprise is one of the most feared dilemmas that a country can suffer. United States Army doctrine, FM 100-5, Operations, says that strategic surprise is extremely difficult to achieve. Empirical historical evidence does not support this position. In fact, strategic surprise is frightfully easy to accomplish. U.S. Army doctrine should be changed to reflect this not so uncommon phenomenon. The revised doctrine should address both the positive and negative aspects of surprise. It should also provide for the planning considerations for exploitation of the surprised to maximize/capitalize upon the effects and benefits that accrue to the surpriser.

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SURPRISE - GET USED TO IT

...the universal desire to take the enemy by surprise. The desire is more or less basic to all operations, for without it superiority at the decisive point is hardly conceivable.¹ Clausewitz

Military surprise is generally accepted as one of the greatest dangers a country can face. Military surprise has been achieved when one antagonist initiates a sudden military action that was not anticipated or predicted by the recipient. If warnings were received, and they always are, they were not received in time to matter or they were not believed or acted upon by the recipient. Throughout history countries have gone to great lengths to preclude being surprised. Virtually every military theoretician since Sun Tsu has listed surprise as one of their Principles of War.² But being on the list has not insured its understanding nor has it taught many of its students to avoid its effects. On the contrary, even a very cursory investigation of military conflicts in history will illustrate that surprise is frightfully easy to achieve. But since surprise has been studied for so long and yet seems so difficult to avoid, why should it be investigated any further? Because, surprise is so important.

"From a military point of view, the advantages to be derived from achieving strategic surprise are invaluable."³

The intensity of surprise is proportional to the unreadiness of the victim. When one is surprised, defenses are not fully prepared, the collective psychic is shocked, confidence is damaged and precious lives are carelessly lost. Those are some of the negative effects visited upon the surprised. There is another aspect to surprise -- the positive side, those effects which accrue to the surpriser. The positive aspects of surprise include the initiative, a force multiplier, (little force, large gain), fewer friendly casualties, more cost effective efforts and a potentially

shorter conflict -- the historic quest for the one decisive battle. These two faces of surprise will be more fully developed shortly. Before the character of surprise is described it would prove illustrative to discuss the United States Army's approach to surprise in its capstone doctrinal publication.

Doctrine is the transition or bridge between theory and practice. It governs our actions and bounds our operational approach to warfare. The U.S. Army's capstone manual on doctrine is the 1986 FM 100-5, Operations. FM 100-5 describes surprise in this manner:

Strike the enemy at a time or place, or in a manner, for which he is unprepared.

To a large degree, the principle of surprise is the reciprocal of the principle of security. Concealing one's own capabilities and intentions creates the opportunity to strike the enemy unaware or unprepared. However, strategic surprise is difficult to achieve. Rapid advances in strategic surveillance technology make it increasingly more difficult to mask or to cloak the large scale marshaling or movement of manpower and equipment. This problem is compounded in an open society such as the United States, where freedom of press and information are highly valued. However, the United States can achieve a degree of psychological surprise due to its strategic deployment capability. The rapid deployment of U.S. combat forces into a crisis area can forestall or upset the plans and preparations of an enemy. This capability can give the United States the advantage in both a physical and psychological sense by denying the enemy the initiative.

Surprise is important at the operational and tactical levels for it can decisively affect the outcome of battles. With surprise, success out of proportion to the effort expended may be obtained. Surprise results from going against an enemy at a time and/or place or in a manner for which he is unprepared. It is not essential that the enemy be taken unaware, but only that he become aware too late to react effectively. Factors contributing to surprise include speed and alacrity, employment of unexpected factors, effective intelligence, deception operations of all kinds, variations of tactics and methods of operation, and operations security.⁴

Of particular note is the sentence -- "However, strategic surprise is difficult to achieve."⁵ History would disagree. Not only is strategic surprise not difficult to achieve, it is almost impossible to avoid. The U.S. Army should change its perspective on the discussion of surprise. FM 100-5 should expand its treatment of surprise to include a discussion of the positive and negative

aspects of surprise. It should also include a requirement for the planning criteria for the subsequent exploitation of the achieved surprise. To disregard the preponderance of historical evidence and professional literature on the subject showing that strategic surprise is commonplace would be an unjustifiable mistake. The U.S. Army's doctrine must prepare leaders for the reality of future battlefields. That reality includes the inevitability of strategic surprise.

There are many excellent works which have analyzed modern conflicts and articulated those campaigns which had achieved strategic surprise. Most agree that modern warfare began with the Japanese surprise attack on the Russian fleet at Port Arthur in 1904 without the benefit of a declaration of war. Barton Whaley, most noted for his work on deception, has generated the most comprehensive analysis of every conflict between 1914 and 1968. In his Stratagem, Deception and Surprise in War he analyzes sixty-seven instances of strategic surprise. In this exhaustive study, Whaley discusses the methods used to achieve surprise, its intensity and consequences in terms of both friendly and enemy casualties.⁶ Whaley's research differentiates between strategic, operational and tactical surprise. The sixty-seven instances cited here deal only with strategic surprise. The obvious fact remains; strategic surprise occurs often.

Dr. Michael I. Handel is the leading United States expert on surprise, deception and intelligence. He is also the most prolific, providing abundant evidence of his exhaustive research. His studies have lead him to proclaim that strategic surprise is inevitable.⁷ In his many books, articles and lectures he usually cites the more demonstrative surprises in modern warfare. A brief listing follows:

11 November 1940	Tranto; British attack of the Italian Fleet
9 September 1940	Germans attack Norway
10 September 1940	Germans attack France through the Ardennes
20 June 1941	Germans attack Russia

7 December 1941	Japanese attack Pearl Harbor
31 January 1942	Japanese attack Singapore
6 June 1944	U.S. invades Normandy
6 May 1945	U.S. bombs Japan
25 June 1950	North Koreans invade South Korea
15 September 1950	U.S. lands at Inchon ⁸

A favorite set of examples, replete with many instances of surprise are the Israeli conflicts: 29 October 1956 Sinai Campaign, 5 June 1967 Six Day War and 6 October 1973 October War. These situations are cited by Dr. Richard K. Betts, who was a senior fellow at the Brookings Foreign Policy Studies program in 1982.⁹ Betts used these cases to substantiate his thesis that the reality of strategic surprise is critical to the appreciation of the international environment and the subsequent impact these occurrences ought to have on defense planning.

One need not depend solely upon history for examples of strategic surprise. Some very recent occurrences ought to illustrate the currency of the surprise phenomenon. Panama, Just Cause in 1989, the Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent U.S. invasion of Iraq in 1991 are just three of the most current instances. Empirical evidence overwhelmingly substantiates the statement that strategic surprise is not difficult to achieve. Furthermore, with one possible exception, no one has shown that such a surprise attack has ever been prevented or warned against in time.

As doctrine drives our thinking about the *how* of warfare, the theory explaining the inevitability of surprise will help to understand the *why*. One of the reasons that surprise is so easy to obtain is that it can be accomplished in a multitude of ways and as a consequence of a number of situations. There is no hard and fast rule or step by step menu to follow to achieve surprise. The two best, modern day, theoreticians studying surprise are Dr. Michael Handel and

Mr. Richard K. Betts. Understanding their theories will generate an appreciation for the inevitability and consequences of surprise.

Dr. Michael I. Handel concludes that strategic surprise is inevitable.¹⁰ He comes to this conclusion after carefully comparing a large number of cases of strategic surprise. Through a systematic and methodologically innovative analysis of the particular circumstances, personalities, and intelligence reports available for each case, he draws some comparisons based on the large number of similar occurrences.

Dr. Handel's theory can best be explained by looking at three complementary factors.¹¹ But first, the three phases of all intelligence work are discussed as a background to discuss the others. Acquisition, Analysis and Acceptance, AAA, begin the process. Each of these three phases are dissected to show where and how intelligence failures occur. The first factor in the problem is the paradoxical nature of intelligence estimates. A discussion of the inherent difficulty in risk assessments, the effects of self-fulfilling or self-negating prophecies, the dilemma of too much intelligence (data overload) and alert fatigue reactions provide a basis to appreciate the ambiguities involved in the process. The second factor is the subjective nature of intelligence. This factor encompasses perceptions and misperceptions. Problems such as preconceived notions, ethnocentrism, and wishful thinking are illustrative of the very pervasive human dimensions in surprise. The third factor is the politicization of the intelligence machine. This factor studies the impact of organizations, elected officials and government employees who can color intelligence and massage the information to gain or control the power it generates. When these three complementary factors are combined and each is used to feed each other a very confusing picture begins to emerge. It is this confusion, compounded by human subjectivity and

the crisis of time that high threat situations generate, that the breeding ground for mistakes are fermented with the subsequent product -- surprise. Dr. Handel contends that this situation can occur without any overt participation of the enemy. If the enemy employs deception, the chances of achieving surprise are increased considerably. It is because of these ambiguous, and contradictory inputs into the intelligence system and the effects that humans have upon the system that Dr. Handel says surprise is inevitable.

Dr. Richard K. Betts approaches surprise from a more parochial perspective than Dr. Handel. His overall thesis can be summarized as follows:

"In the best known cases of intelligence failure, the most crucial mistakes have seldom been made by collectors of raw information, occasionally by professionals who produce finished analyses, but most often by the decision makers who consume the products of intelligence services. Policy premises constrict perception, and administrative workloads constrain reflection. Intelligence failure is political and psychological more often than organizational.¹²

Betts focuses primarily on the consumer of intelligence, the decision maker. It is this decision makers' intellect and perspective that are the target of Mr. Betts' theory. Because he argues that changing the human psychology of the decision maker or the process that produced this consumer are so difficult, he -- like Dr. Handel -- concludes that strategic surprise is not only inevitable but natural.¹³ The framework for Mr. Betts' theory focuses on three primary factors. The first factor is failure in perspective. Due to the classified nature of intelligence it is difficult to determine the relative rate of successes. It is likewise difficult to differentiate between those actions that caused failure and those which supported adequate warning. The ambiguity here is obvious. In the historical study of strategic surprise we only study our failures. Betts says this negative outlook generates an unrealistic focus on those specifics that we can prove caused the failure for that singular event. This methodology cannot determine for certain if this same

specific action was a positive aspect in a difficult event. The second factor are the pathologies of communication. Within this factor, Betts includes the timeliness of the information, the methodology of transmitting that information to the decision maker and the ability to articulate the validity and relevance of the intelligence to the decision maker. The third and final factor in Betts' theory are the paradoxes of perception. It is in this area that Betts' theory is most evident. It is here that he discusses the tradeoffs and relationships between a specific actions' cause and effect as sometimes unresolvable. He argues that solving one problem can create many others. The dilemma is how to determine what to change and what not to change. For example:

"... perfecting intelligence production does not necessarily lead to perfecting intelligence consumption; making warning systems more sensitive reduces the risk of surprise, but increases the number of false alarms, which in turn reduces sensitivity; the principles of optimal analytic procedure and in many respects incompatible with the imperatives of the decision process; avoiding intelligence failure requires the elimination of strategic preconceptions, but leaders cannot operate purposefully without some preconceptions. In devising measure to improve the intelligence process, policy makers are damned if they do and damned if they don't."¹⁴

These three factors form the basic framework of Betts' theory of surprise. The decision maker is the focal point. Uncertainty and ambiguity surround the processes that generate the input to this consumer. Betts uses this premise as an introduction to defense planning considerations in light of the subjectivity of the decision process. Even from this circuitous route the conclusion remains the same. Strategic surprise is a common condition of modern conflicts. Military leaders and planners must learn to deal with its consequences. To appreciate the basis for these two theoreticians conclusions it would prove useful to expand upon some of the basic factors that affect the intelligence process.

Intelligence is labor intensive and based upon the human factor, despite its reliance on new age technology, access to satellite capabilities and super-sleuth electronic maintaining

devices.¹⁵ It is still humans who analyze and validate the output of all of these high speed systems. It is at this point the theories of Dr. Handel and Dr. Betts again coincide.

"The quality of results achieved in the world of intelligence and strategic warning in particular depends upon finding solutions to human problems which sometimes defy technological (or for that matter, any other) solutions... As long as men interact with machines in the decision making process, the quality of the decisions made will be most heavily influenced by the human factor, the complexities of which can be explained but not done away with."¹⁶

With the uncertainty that human nature generates as a baseline, let us look at six of the many aspects of intelligence that can cause problems. The first is perception, wishful thinking and ethnocentrism -- all are methods or ways to approach a problem using conceptual thinking. If the premise is correct the product that was based upon the concept will also be correct. But will the premise work correctly in all situations, is it true for all cases -- probably not! All three of these approaches involve the attempt to superimpose or project ones own thoughts of how someone else would act. In many cases the question is asked -- how would I act or what would I do if I were them? The question ought to be -- how would they act or what will they do? -- but the answers must be addressed using the others' value system and cultural reasoning process -- not ours. The answers to both sets of questions are seldom the same. In any case, attempts to oversimplify our adversaries response or potential reaction usually leads to a very general, non-specific answer at best.¹⁷ The less time available or more inexperienced the analyst, the more subjective the answer will be. Already the product is being clouded.

The second area fraught with uncertainty is signals and noise. In the intelligence community there are two types of information, correct and incorrect; or signals and noise. In the final result, they end up being the same. Deception will only exacerbate the dilemma causing each of the many signals to be questioned again. Any bit of information collected must be

corroborated against other bits of information. Each bit has a reliability factor to judge its worth. Humans judge each bit of information. Humans decide what to forward and what to kill. Humans focus the collectors, gather the bits, collate the bits, judge the bits and ultimately determine the reliability of each bit. Again, the problem of time becomes a factor; the more information you collect, the more noise is added, the more time is needed for analysis. Because of the challenge humans have with perception, wishful thinking and ethnocentrism bias, this signals and noise situation adds more fuzz to the already cloudy picture.¹⁸

The third problematic factor is the overall quality of intelligence. The influences upon this factor are very large. They encompass the relative experience of the analyst, their educational level, length of time in the organization and political affiliation. It also includes the number and type of organizations providing information, organizational bias if any, and type and frequency of access the organization has to the decision maker. Other factors include the amount of time available to prepare the intelligence, the period of previous focus on this threat, the percentage of available resources that have been targeted on the threat, and the past history of the threat in relation to the U.S. These are just a few of the influences upon the quality of intelligence. The uncertainty grows.

The fourth factor, deception, will increase the probability of failure exponentially. Deceptions is "defined as a purposeful attempt by the deceiver to manipulate the perceptions of the targets' decision makers in order to gain a competitive advantage."¹⁹ All the factors discussed thus far have taken for granted that the threat was real. Deception calls that premise into doubt. Deception is aimed at making us believe what we want to believe. That should be easy; it is.

Deception increases the success of strategic surprise significantly. Deception makes everything much more difficult.²⁰

The fifth set of factors are time and warning. These two are more obvious. If you are warned of an impending attack, and there is always some type of warning, and there is no time to generate a response -- was there a warning? If there was sufficient time to respond, did the decision maker believe the warning? If there was not sufficient time to analyze the information in a crisis, would a warning be recognized as a warning -- would it make any difference? The intelligence process takes time. Especially in today's world, the great proliferation of threats is inversely proportional to our shrinking assets. It will take time to focus and reorient the assets on any particular threat. Decision makers are impatient, they want answers quickly but it takes time. The other aspect of time is in relation to the threat or reaction time. Are the threat indicators really showing a preparation for attack? If the threat has decided to attack, you are already late. You may have warning but be unable to alleviate the consequence of the preparation time gap. You are behind. You are unprepared. You are *surprised*.²¹

The sixth and final factor discussed here is the politics of intelligence. Politicization of information will always be a factor as long as information is viewed as power. As long as fractional interests are served prior to the truth, as long as agencies and services vie for an ever decreasing portion of the resource dollar and as long as the two party system continues to attempt to catch each other short -- there will be politics involved in the intelligence process. Politicians are humans, and so can fall victim to many of the challenges already discussed. They were elected on a particular platform and are loathe to admit any semblance of a mistake. With competitive allegiances, political cronyism and frequent administration changes, it is inevitable

that some people in the decision making process would/could be influenced politically to view information in a biased way.²²

These six factors are only some of the criteria that are used when theoreticians like Handel and Betts analyze case studies to describe the phenomenon of strategic surprise. Their approach reinforces each other and their conclusions are supportive. Strategic surprise is unavoidable. Since surprise is a fact, how should the U.S. Army approach this problem? Surprise has both a negative and a positive aspect. They are two sides of the same coin. There are consequences of action which apply to both the surprised and the surpriser. Understanding the two sides of surprise will assist the future leader in assessing its probability and how to either exploit its consequences or mitigate its effects.

The negative consequences of surprise are inflicted upon the surprised. As discussed earlier there is a great amount of shock and disorientation involved in being the surprised. Defenses are not fully alerted, forces are not fully mobilized or positioned for maximum benefit. It is a crisis situation. The surprised is already on the psychological defensive as well as the strategic defensive.²³ The first recourse to mitigate the impact of the surprise could be to ascertain the duration and intensity of the attack. To accomplish this would require a robust intelligence system. But that has already proved to be inadequate or focused on the wrong threat. Consequently the first requirement to mitigate the negative consequences of surprise would be to invest in a survivable, redundant and prolific intelligence warning system. But there will never be enough money to target every threat. We should develop a methodology in which the most dangerous threats are identified and categorized by the effects their surprise would have upon the U.S. and then target their assets to determine intent.²⁴

In the absence of a reliable, perfect warning system the defensive forces must be able to survive the initial attack with sufficient force left to influence the final outcome. This position offers some competing options. One option would be to have so many forces that you could lose large numbers and still have a conventional retaliation capability. In light of the shrinking budget, this is not a viable alternative. Another option is strategic depth. This alternative is present within the Forward Presence pillar of the National Security Strategy, but there are degrees. Consider a small force forward -- would the U.S. be able to respond quickly enough to save the forward deployed force? As the budget grows smaller the Forward Presence option decreases the response time available because the forces are not robust enough to hold for long. Strategic depth is not the complete answer. Suffice it to say that in order to be able to absorb the effects of surprise the mental and physical flexibility of the forces must be paramount. The doctrine that guides our actions must preach flexibility and ensure that freedom of action at the subordinate commander level is understood, taught and practiced.

Another option to mitigate the negative effects of surprise is the technique of dispersing the force to advantage the survival benefits that separation provides. This proposal is extremely difficult to execute. Command and control are certainly more difficult the greater the distance of the elements of the force are from each other. The resultant time it would take to concentrate the force to achieve mass at the critical point is also a function of the distance between the elements of the force. The dilemma is obvious. Something must give. A partial solution would be to increase the emphasis on the hardening of defensive sites and the use and practice of advance camouflage techniques.

A fifth area where the negative aspects of surprise could be mitigated is in generating redundancy in those key areas or functions that would enable the survival of the capability to resist after the first blow. The choice of key functions and missions becomes more difficult as funds decrease. One could not afford to clone everything, and anything you have two of would preclude having one of something else. Critical models of C² and intelligence producing or processing centers would be certain choices. Redundant capabilities will probably be the decision. This will undoubtedly drive specific areas to become multifunctional, increasing their requirements and training needs. Another doctrinal challenge to prepare the force for the challenge of the future battlefield.

The last and probably most important factor in mitigating the negative effects of surprise is to be prepared for it. Our doctrine must address the eventuality of U.S. forces being surprised. We must train under the conditions of surprise. It must address ways/methodologies or concepts that will assist the force in mitigating these harmful effects. It must provide for the thought process that will enable the leader to transition from that surprised and disoriented defensive state to the more independent, offensive posture that can generate the combat power to fight and win.

U. S. Army doctrine should also address the positive benefits of surprise. The positive aspects of surprise are those operational advantages which accrue to the surpriser. The psychological effects and the subsequent disorientation that befall the surprised have already been discussed. While these effects are superb additions to any campaign plan they achieve only half of the available benefits.

"Thus, accomplishment of the surprise itself is only the first phase of the planning; the second must consist of detailed preparations for the best possible exploitation of the projected surprise attack."²⁵

This point cannot be overemphasized. First, we must overtly plan to achieve surprise; second, a detailed, coordinated and fully supported exploitation plan must be constructed that is complementary to the campaign objectives and political goals. It is more cost effective to exploit a surprise won than to initiate another battle. Branches and sequels in the commanders concept are not enough to accomplish this requirement. Clausewitz agreed by stating "...no victory will be effective without pursuit; and no matter how brief the exploitation of victory, it must always go further than an immediate follow up."²⁶ Since surprise is so easy to achieve, why do we express disbelief when it is not exploited? The reason is simple -- surprise and its positive aspects are not planned for.

"... the attacker is often so amazed by the effectiveness of his own attack that he is caught unprepared to exploit fully the opportunities it presents."²⁷

This would not happen if the doctrinal sources admitted the probabilistic nature of surprise and required planning for it in detail.

"...the Japanese did not follow up their successes at Pearl Harbor with repeated attacks on U.S. oil depots and other naval and air installations in Hawaii, nor did the allies take advantage of the opportunities produced by their surprise landing at Anzio. The same holds true for the Egyptian and Syrian armies in their 1973 attack on Israel."²⁸

We ought to learn from mistakes. The U.S. Army doctrine ought to prepare leaders to maximize their resources. Surprise is a viable force multiplier, and in this age of decreasing budgets the services ought to adopt those practices which maximize their dwindling capabilities. As a force multiplier, surprise can facilitate inflicting an inordinate amount of casualties upon the unsuspecting enemy with a smaller friendly force than without surprise.²⁹ Studies have also shown that the attackers who have achieved surprise suffer less casualties as a result of the surprised victims' disorientation and the other negative aspects described earlier.³⁰ This fact

alone ought to generate more professional interest in surprise because of the preoccupation our civilian leadership places upon limiting friendly casualties.

Other endeavors can be generated to support the effectiveness of the positive aspects of surprise. The study and employment of the operational art with all of its focus on intent, endstate, and protecting and supporting the initiative of the subordinate commander is a very positive direction. Flexible planning and fully implementing the robust capabilities of our intelligence systems provides additional versatility and agility to the commander and his forces. Understanding and accepting risk is a crucial aspect of creating the positive climate conducive to searching for opportunities to achieve and exploit surprise. Improving and proliferating a robust C² capability will enable more decentralized execution of operations and will improve the reaction time to exploit windows of vulnerabilities. Improved mobility factors for all types of forces is a very positive step. Especially critical are the mobility factors of support forces. Exploitation is only a concept if it cannot be supported and sustained. The positive aspects of surprise are many and we will never appreciate them all if we do not begin to address the concepts now. To disregard the inherent advantages achieved by planning for surprise would be a mistake -- it would also forfeit one of the most productive combat multipliers known. But the criticality of this argument is only important if the perceived risk of surprise is high.

"The only thing less probable than war itself is that it would start in the way we expect."³¹

The probability of the United States being involved in a surprise attack in the near future is very great. Gone are the forty years of comfort, knowing your enemy, bipolar power bases and détente. Today's world order has only one super power. The U.S. role has expanded significantly to even include security discussions with former Warsaw Pact Nations. The U.S.

influence and interest have increased to degrees that were heretofore never imagined. Some have even gone so far as to say our role is that of a globo-cop. As we increase our area of interest and influence, we strain our scarce intelligence assets and levels of historical expertise. The further we extend, the greater the vulnerability we experience. A paradox is produced; as the U.S. expands its role in providing global security, it increases the probability for insecurity through overextension and increased vulnerability.

Proliferation of technology like that of weapons of mass destruction increases the probability of surprise. Technology generates capabilities and capabilities sometimes generate intentions.³² In Whaley's definitive study of the aspects of surprise between 1914 and 1968 he found that the probability of surprise increased as the number of environments available were exploited.³³ Technology provides the vehicle to execute action in expanding environments, air space, sea, land and now stealth. So where and when you least expect it, you will need it most. Surprise is a probabilistic, interactive process. If you perceive no threat, you allocate no resources; if you do not focus, you do not see; if you do not see -- you can be surprised.

With the demise of the Soviet Union there emerged the uncertainty of unfamiliar, unconstrained international actors. No longer were some of the more individualistic leaders controlled by the FSU purse strings and strong leadership. Now into this new world, more uncertain than ever before, emerges a whole new set of inexperienced participants. Some are not accustomed to their new-found untethered independence. Most are vying for recognition and respect. These circumstances are a fertile breeding ground for risk. As the rationality of the actors decreases, the probability for an independent, unwarranted, unprovoked action increases - *- surprise happens.*

Any one of these destabilizing factors would be a challenge to guard against. Add them all together and the synergy of uncertainty surpasses our current capabilities. Exacerbating the situation are the military cutbacks which are bound to decrease some capabilities. With scarce resources and increasing restraints the process of focusing or targeting becomes much more important. As U.S. military priorities are directed by civilian policy makers, there is always a chance our focus will not be where we need it. Another complementary factor is that as the U.S. downsizes its forces, the subsequent correlation of forces with any adversary more closely approaches parity. As this happens the "superior force" attitude and reluctance to resort to deceptive measures like surprise would hopefully also decrease. The U.S. now wants quick, decisive, low casualty wars -- we must plan to avail ourselves of the positive benefits of surprise and mitigate the negative aspects.³⁴ In fact, Secretary of Defense Casper Weinberger in the 1983 Annual Report to the Congress stated that there are four tasks which must be undertaken with urgency:

- 1) make more realistic the manner in which our forces respond to warning
- 2) we ought to expect a massive and skillful effort at deception
- 3) it is likely that skillful deception could deprive us of clear warning
- 4) there are few jobs more important to our country than to recognize the earliest indicators of future international problems and to alert our national leaders quickly.³⁵

In the ten years since this statement was made only one situational factor in the U.S. has changed. Our capabilities have shrunk. The requirements have increased, the resources have decreased. We must do better with less. We must expand our perspective and follow those

precepts which maximize our capabilities while minimizing our casualties. The force multiplier capability of surprise must be doctrinally explored for implementation.

In conclusion, it seems evident that surprise is not only probable but unavoidable. There are too many opportunities to make mistakes throughout the process to argue differently. Even if it were not for the paucity of resources, the human factor would be enough. As the U.S. has assumed a global security role it has unwillingly increased the instability in the international environment. As this potential overextension has increased risk, the proliferation of threats, technology and weapons of mass destruction only increase the probability that someone, someplace will decide to attack. As a WWII German General postulated "...for it is enough if a surprise play works only once."³⁶ One theoretician postulates that the U.S. has historically demonstrated an aversion to using deceptive methods, but he states "my survey of the interactability of the inadequacy of intelligence, and its inseparability from mistakes in decision, suggests one final conclusion that is perhaps the most outrageously fatalistic of all: tolerance for disaster."³⁷ If the U.S. is not prepared to accept this position, and yet we agree that "the failure to understand that in a future war the enemy was virtually certain to throw the first punch had many implications for operational planning, we must plan this inevitable surprise."³⁸ Those implications for operational planning mean doctrine. In 1934, under the direction of Colonel George C. Marshall, the book Infantry in Battle was produced. It was generated by officers' combat experience in WWI but still holds true today:

"Surprise is usually decisive; therefore much may be sacrificed to achieve it. It should be striven for by all units, regardless of size, and in all engagements, regardless of importance. When the squad opens fire it should do so suddenly and simultaneously. When an Army attacks it should strive for an unexpected direction, at an unexpected time, with unexpected violence."³⁹

This doctrinal attempt to prepare the leaders for the upcoming conflict of WWII by explaining the historical experiences of those who had already learned the lessons should not be overlooked today. Our doctrinal publications must focus the leader's intellectual energy and our forces capabilities toward the threats of tomorrow. FM 100-5, with its definition of surprise does not fulfill that role today. The explanation of surprise should state its probability, discuss its positive and negative aspects and challenge the leaders to plan for its success and exploitation. One recommended alternative way to articulate surprise would be:

SURPRISE

STRIKE THE ENEMY AT A TIME OR PLACE OR IN A MANNER FOR WHICH IT IS UNPREPARED.

SURPRISE CAN DECISIVELY SHIFT THE BALANCE OF POWER. BY ACHIEVING SURPRISE FORCES CAN SUCCEED WELL OUT OF PROPORTION TO THE EFFORT EXPENDED. ON THE POSITIVE SIDE WE CAN EASILY ACHIEVE SURPRISE BECAUSE OF A SUPERIORITY OF INTELLIGENCE, SPEED, TECHNOLOGY AND WEAPONRY. ON THE NEGATIVE SIDE WE CANNOT GUARANTEE WE WILL NOT BE SURPRISED DESPITE OUR HIGHLY SOPHISTICATED INTELLIGENCE SYSTEMS. EMPIRICAL HISTORICAL EVIDENCE IS OVERWHELMING -- SURPRISE IS A CRITICAL CONDITION OF THE BATTLEFIELD. SURPRISE IS RELATIVE, IT WILL VARY IN DEGREE, INTENSITY AND DURATION. SURPRISE EXPLOITS HUMAN NATURE, BUT ABOVE ALL IT IS THE MANIPULATION OF THE EXPLOITATION OF THE ENEMY'S PERCEPTIONS WHICH ALLOWS SURPRISE TO BE ACHIEVED.

FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO SURPRISE INCLUDE TIMING, SPEED, EFFECTIVE INTELLIGENCE, DECEPTION, WARNING TIME, EVENT, APPLICATION OF UNEXPECTED COMBAT POWER, OPERATIONS SECURITY AND VARIATION IN TACTICS AND METHODS OF OPERATIONS. SINCE SURPRISE CAN ALWAYS BE ACHIEVED, DELIBERATE PLANNING MUST INCLUDE THE EXPLOITATION OF THE INITIAL SUCCESSES. EXPLOITATION CAN BE ENHANCED WITH MANEUVERABILITY, SPEED, DECEPTION AND ROBUST C² BUT TO BE EFFECTIVE IT MUST BE ENHANCED WITH FIRE SUPPORT AND LOGISTIC SUSTAINABILITY.

If doctrine is to fulfill its role by leading us to practice the right things then we must admit to the obvious -- surprise in war will remain an integral part of all future conflicts. We must prepare our leaders to deal with its consequences and its impacts! To do less would be an injustice to history and a violation of our vow to protect our nation.

NOTES

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4. U.S. Army, FM 100-5, Operations (Washington, DC, 1986), pp. 176-177.
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7. Handel, p. 7.
8. Michael I. Handel, "Intelligence and the Problem of Strategic Surprise," Lecture, U. S. Naval War College, Newport, RI: 31 March 1993.
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16. Ibid.
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19. Ibid., p. 310.
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28. Ibid.
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