The Gettysburg Campaign - Lee's Failure to Define Intent

Abstract

This paper examines the extent to which General Robert E. Lee adequately delineated and conveyed his intent for the campaign into Pennsylvania in the Summer of 1863. The argument is made and defended that General Lee did not have the overall intent of the campaign firmly defined in his own mind. Failure to convey commander's intent caused his subordinates to operate without unity of effort. This led to confusion throughout the campaign and ultimately disaster at the Battle of Gettysburg. The paper discusses General Lee's correspondence and conversations which provide contradictory views of his intent for the campaign. The paper then reviews the execution of the march into Pennsylvania and demonstrates various instances in which Lee's Corps Commanders were confused by the lack of well defined commander's intent. The actual battle at Gettysburg is discussed only briefly and is used only to demonstrate the end result of the confusion which is evident throughout the operation. The paper concludes by discussing the applicability of the lessons learned to a modem day joint commander.

Open PDF

Document Details

Document Type
Technical Report
Publication Date
May 17, 1993
Accession Number
ADA266793

Entities

People

  • Steven S. Funck

Organizations

  • Naval War College

Tags

Communities of Interest

  • C4I
  • Weapons Technologies

DTIC Thesaurus Topics

  • Bridges
  • Classification
  • Command And Control
  • Geography
  • Identification
  • Lessons Learned
  • Military Operations
  • Mountains
  • Navy
  • New York
  • Pennsylvania
  • Potomac River
  • Recognition
  • Security
  • United States
  • Virginia
  • War Colleges

Readers

  • Military History of the United States in the 20th Century.
  • Systems Analysis and Design