The Contribution of Intelligence to the Battles of Alam Halfa and El Alamein: August-November 1942
Abstract
The natural interchange between morale, leadership and creativity, to name a few, and intelligence during a military conflict makes the task of evaluating the impact of just one of those factors, in isolation from the others, difficult. Despite the fact that the precise impact of intelligence on military operations may be difficult to determine, the need for commanders and their intelligence staffs to understand how intelligence resources can best support the planning and conduct of military operations demands that historical case studies be undertaken within the modern framework of intelligence support to the operational level of war. The intelligence sources and methods used by the British against the Afrika Korps during the battles of Alam Halfa and El Alamein are now largely declassified, including the signals intelligence source, Ultra. The transformation of intelligence during the Second World War and Montgomery's use of it at the operational level was fundamental to surprising and deceiving Rommel in the Western Desert, and, in turn, avoiding surprise and deception of the Eighth Army. The British victories in the defensive battle of Alam Halfa and the offensive assault at El Alamein were in a large part due to the effective use of intelligence at the strategic and operational levels of war. Intelligence, Operational intelligence, Alam Halfa, El Alamein, Ultra, Second World War
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jun 18, 1993
- Accession Number
- ADA266874
Entities
People
- Eugene R. Arbogast
Organizations
- Naval War College