


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THE UNITED NATIONS STANDING FORCE
A QUALITATIVE ANALYSIS OF STRATEGIC
AND
OPERATIONAL OPTIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES

by

Michael A. Brooks
Lieutenant Colonel, U.S. Marine Corps

June 1993

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The paper recommends that the United States participate in the force to enhance its political credibility, encourage burden sharing by other nations, and to actively manage the chaotic change happening in the world.

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NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, R.I.

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A qualitative analysis of strategic
and
operational options for the United States.

by

Michael A. Brooks
Lieutenant Colonel, United States Marine Corps

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The contents of this paper reflect by own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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18 June 1993

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Approved by:

Larry J. Bockman 27 May 93
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Executive Summary of
THE UNITED NATIONS STANDING FORCE

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THE UNITED NATIONS STANDING FORCE

PART ONE: THE U. N.

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

On 17 June 1992, the Secretary General of the United Nations put forth to the General Assembly a report that he entitled "AN AGENDA FOR PEACE." Among the many proposals addressing peacekeeping and peace-making by the U.N., Mr. Boutros-Ghali called for member nations to form a standing force, (he has subsequently modified his proposal, and has asked for a standby force). The idea was to have on-hand or on-call, certain forces that the Security Council could deploy early and rapidly in an effort to intervene in unstable situations, with greater effect than in the past, and with less overall cost.

This paper analyzes the proposal for the nations of the General Assembly to create a standby force-referred to here after as the United Nations Force in Readiness (UNFR)-relative to the United States' strategic and operational prerogatives. The analysis is based upon the qualitative analysis strategy outlined by Glaser and Strauss in their The Discovery of Grounded Theory,¹ certain elements from Churchman's A Systems Approach,² and McBrien and Ensminger's An Introduction to Rational Decision Processes.³ The objective is to answer the following fundamental questions:

1. Is the UNFR a good idea?
2. Is the U.N. in a position to effectively utilize a UNFR?
3. If the U.N. isn't capable/prepared for a UNFR, why not, and what changes would have to be made?
4. Could/should the United States participate?
5. Could the U.S. still protect/pursue its national interests?
6. How would the U.S. participate?
7. What might the U.S. force contribution look like?
8. What are the strategic and operational costs and benefits to the U.S. if it participates?

The intended audience for this paper includes those naval officers who are interested in the U.N., may be grappling with roles, missions, and structure issues, and are concerned about U.S. force options, particularly naval, in the changing world.

CHAPTER II

THE UNFR IN CONCEPT

Purpose of the U.N.

Chapter I, Article 1 of the Charter of the United Nations sets forth that the number one purpose of the United Nations is:

To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace;⁴

Even a cursory glance at the Charter of the United Nations shows that its beginnings lay deeply rooted in the "...untold sorrow of mankind," twice brought about by the "scourge of world war during the first half of the twentieth century."⁵ However, from 1945 until the very recent past, the fulfillment of the main purpose of the Charter was made all but impossible by the adversarial relationships forged between the Super Powers during the Cold War.⁶

Natural Change

The world is evolving into one that more closely approximates the conditions before the Cold War. As international businesses, world-wide communications and supranational nongovernmental agencies spread their influence, more countries are being intertwined on multilevels, for example, in commerce, environmental issues, entertainment, news, culture,

and human rights. Intuitively, it would seem that as interdependence grows, world stability would grow in direct proportion. However, just as medical doctors have discovered that homeostasis is not the natural order of the body, it is becoming more evident that the dynamics of chaos is the regular and healthy state of the world.⁷ According to Gleick,

No matter what the medium, the behavior obeys the same newly discovered laws. That realization has begun to change...the way political theorists talk about the stresses leading to armed conflict.⁸

As relevance of the science of chaos is becoming recognized, there seems to be concurrence that countries may have the opportunity to engage each other in ways that counter intuition and contribute substantially to the promotion of peace and security. By trying to stabilize conditions in the past, the Theory of Chaos would seem to say that those situations were actually exacerbated. As Michael Howard points out,

...the U.N. Charter contained no hint of supranationalism. The sovereign state was still the building-block of international order. Additionally, a general and equal interest was assumed in the preservation of the status quo. Change would be possible, but only by general consent. The post-war world was conceived, in fact, in somewhat static terms.⁹

In the long term, strife between peoples and states grew worse because pressures and antagonisms weren't allowed to pursue their natural processes in order to arrive at some sort of dynamic equilibrium. Perhaps the Secretary General is right; what the U.N. has to find are constructive ways to help manage the inevitable change. Managing change, instead of fighting for the status quo, would more often than not promote peace and security

as well as the principles of democracy. At the same time, the U.N. must do so in a way that promotes mutual respect between nations, encourages constructive solutions to age old problems, and shares the burden of promoting these conditions among the benefactors.

In 1978, the General Assembly finally acknowledged that the continuing reverberation and change from the colonialism of the immediate post-World War II era was inevitable when it issued the statement that all members of the world community should "refrain from the threat or the use of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or against peoples under colonial or foreign domination seeking to exercise their right to self-determination and to achieve independence."¹⁰

We see here the codification of humankind's right to seek self-determination and democracy. Those same principles and rights to change are at this moment being exercised by many of the peoples that were formally under the domination of the Soviet Union, while the Russian people themselves are struggling to achieve their own emancipation.

Concept of the UNER

The concept of a U.N. standby force is embedded in the Charter.¹¹ Because of the essentially bipolar orientation of the permanent members of the Security Council, the Military Staff Committee, made up of the Chiefs of Staff or their representatives, of the permanent members of the Security

Council, quickly disagreed about the type of force required and whether each member should provide the same size contingent.¹² The Soviet Union was dominant in objecting to the earlier proposals because it feared Western domination of a U.N. army. Additionally,

Other arguments against a UN force are that it might infringe on sovereignty or that it might be used by a UN majority against a minority. This position has often been voiced by small nations, and particularly by nations until recently under colonial domination, who are apprehensive that big powers, in control of UN (sic), might use an international police force to their own advantage and to the detriment of weaker countries.¹³

At different times, however, all five permanent members of the Security Council have agreed that such a force would be desirable; it was implicitly decided, however, that the force should be comprised of the military from countries other than the permanent members. The United States made such a proposal as early as 1958, essentially endorsing and perpetuating General Assembly Resolution 1000 (ES-I) of November 5, 1956.¹⁴ That resolution, in response to the invasion of Egypt in the area of the Suez Canal by the United Kingdom and France, authorized a U.N. Emergency Force (UNEF) "to secure and supervise the cessation of hostilities".¹⁵ In the formulation of the UNEF, we see the permanent members of the Security Council barred from participating with manpower.¹⁶ The Military Staff Committee's earlier agreements to disagree about the details of creating and maintaining a standby U.N. force were reasons in part; though more accurately, in the case of the Suez Canal, two of the antagonists were permanent members of the Security Council.

Now, in the post-Cold War world, the bipolarity of the Security Council has faded and there exists an opportunity to aggressively pursue the principles envisioned when the United Nations was chartered. Ironically, Russia is the most enthusiastic about the "Agenda for Peace," because many of the proposals were first put forth by Mikhail S. Gorbachev's Deputy Foreign Minister, Vladimir Petrovski.¹⁷

Initiatives For Peace

In "AN AGENDA FOR PEACE," Secretary General Boutros-Ghali addresses a spectrum of initiatives that are designed to better manage the inevitable dynamic tension in the world. His remedy is the relatively inexpensive preventive medicine of diplomacy and early preemptive deployment of peacekeeping forces, rather than the expensive cure of full-blown military combat action.¹⁸ Therefore, the Secretary General called for the members of that world body to extend even beyond the precepts of the Charter and assign permanent forces to the U.N.¹⁹ He subsequently modified his proposal by saying that a U.N. standing force would be "impractical and inappropriate." Instead, he requested the member nations contribute specially trained peacekeeping units that would be ready to deploy on short notice.²⁰

Recognizing that the U.N. had been largely impotent in the past due to the Superpower struggle, Boutros-Ghali has taken the opportunity to propose an approach to world conflict that essentially embodies our national strategy and applies it to the larger realm of the world.²¹ His proposal is particularly

impressive in the context that Boutros-Ghali was Anwar Sadat's Minister of State for Foreign Affairs at the talks that led to the Camp David Accords.²² He has, therefore, experienced first hand the length and breadth of his proposal from preventive diplomacy, to peace-making and peacekeeping. The Secretary General proposes that, failing preventive diplomacy, the U.N. should be prepared and willing to use preventive deployment.²³ For example, in a bilateral dispute, the United Nations, in response to a request from one or more of the antagonists, would deploy a U.N. force along the border in order to discourage hostilities. This is a change from the past, where a U.N. force was usually deployed only after a shooting war had developed and the antagonists found their way to an uneasy truce, usually with one side at a marked disadvantage in relative terms of pre-hostilities. This situation tended to exacerbate already intense animosities and contributed to the intractability of the players. The most recent definitive example seemingly headed that way would be the Muslim situation in regard to the Serbians in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Additionally, some other immediate examples of "after-the-fact actions" are the "temporary" U.N. organizations that are still deployed: the U.N. Truce Supervision Organization between the Arabs and Israelis since 1948; the U.N. Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan since 1948; and the U.N. Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus since 1964.²⁴ We can only wonder if the proposal by the Secretary General for the family of nations to exercise preventive

measures, given the environment we have today, would have established lasting harmony in the above instances.

In any case, by quickly adding up the cost of any armed conflict in monetary and human terms, it seems clear that the preventive measures called for by the Secretary General, including having a force that is in readiness and can deploy on very short notice, make sense. The concept is fitting for the times.

CHAPTER III

USING THE UNFR EFFECTIVELY

Operational Tempo: A Crisis

The United Nations is a busy organization, and it's getting busier. The activity can be most dramatically characterized by a look at the recent growth in peacekeeping operations. During the past five years, the United Nations Security Council authorized twelve new operations, seven in 1992 alone.²⁵ The Secretary General has stated that the United Nations' reputation is starting to suffer because there are so many expectations of the organization. Late in 1992, he opined that during the Cold War, the United Nations lacked credibility because of the gridlock caused by the antagonism between various factions in the Security Council and the General Assembly.²⁶ Conversely, because of the end of Cold War, the U.N. is suffering from a crisis of too much credibility. Boutros-Ghali said:

So, by definition, because of this excessive credibility, whatever is done by the U.N. can hurt the U.N. people—especially in the new member states—are under the impression that the U.N. can do everything.²⁷

President Bush, in his address to the General Assembly acknowledged the growing clamor for U.N. assistance in promoting peace. Although saying that the United Nations could do much more, he followed with:

Peacekeepers are stretched to the limit while demands for their services increase by the day. The need for monitoring and preventive peacekeeping, putting people on the ground before the fighting starts, may become especially critical in volatile regions.²⁸

Criteria For Intervention

One of the reasons that the Secretary General called for the formation of the UNFR, is that three or four months can elapse between the time when the Security Council authorizes a peacekeeping mission and when the force becomes operational in the field.²⁹ While that may be true, there has been no documented study made available that examines the implications in those situations, therefore, we just don't know if those crises were exacerbated by the delay. Although a delay in identifying and deploying the requisite forces may happen on occasion, perhaps a more fruitful area to explore would be the delays caused by the sometimes interminable debate within the Security Council and the General Assembly.

The economic realities of the post Cold War era dictate that the availability of military forces is a diminishing commodity around the world. The scarcity of military resources when coupled with the myriad of security concerns, combine to make the identification and deployment of forces a more difficult and time consuming process. Therefore, especially when pertaining to rapidly deployable forces, it would seem wise for the United Nations to formulate guidelines that would outline the criteria for establishing priorities of available force allocation. The fact is, as the Secretary General and President Bush identified, there aren't enough forces or capabilities available to assist in every situation that needs intervention. Mr. Les Gelb, of the New York Times, put it succinctly when he called for a "Doctrine

of Limited Tears" to reflect that the United States and the other countries of the world just don't have the capability to help everyone at the same time.³⁰

Therefore, there is an argument that the U.N. should go through the same type of rigorous analysis that the United States has practiced in the recent past vis-a-vis the Weinberger Doctrine.³¹ A possible adaptation of that doctrine by the U.N. might look like the following:

- ♦ Deploy/employ peacekeeping forces only when the vital interests of regional or world peace and security may be reasonably threatened.
- ♦ Sufficient force to win must be rapidly concentrated.
- ♦ Clearly define political and military objectives.
- ♦ Continuously reassess U.N. involvement.
- ♦ Don't go to war without the consensus of world opinion.
- ♦ War should be a last resort.

Another set of criteria was suggested by LtGen Trainor:³²

- ♦ Start by examining the situation: Understand the conflict.

Does it call for unilateral action?

multilateral ad hoc action?

United Nations action?

- ♦ Are the circumstances so gross as to demand redress by some or all of the world community?
- ♦ Have all other means been exhausted?

Diplomatic, economic, cultural pressure psychological

campaign, etc.

- ♦ Will resorting to military force change the situation?
- ♦ Will the problems extant in the end state be less severe than the ones at present.

With the above criteria, or something like them, the U.N. can better form an action plan to include a more efficient use of its military resources.

CHAPTER IV

SOME REQUIRED CHANGES

The Need for Reform

The United Nations has been the obliging target of critics almost since its beginning. Volumes have been written specifically devoted to proposing reforms and changes to the U.N. Although there is much fertile ground in which to find areas needing attention, it seems for the purpose of this analysis that there are three areas on which to concentrate: Finances; bureaucracy; and command, control, and information.

Finances

The United States pays 25% of the regular U.N. budget. Additionally, it pays over 30% of the peacekeeping costs.³³ The problem is that as more peacekeeping operations are approved, the United States is placed under an increasingly difficult financial burden. The GAO report on U.S. participation in peacekeeping operations suggests that some relief could be generated if the method of assessment were changed. Certainly, there is a case for other countries paying more of the burden according to their ability. Japan, for example, pays only 12% of the regular budget and 12% of the peacekeeping costs. Germany pays less than 9% of each. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait pay almost infinitesimal amounts relative to their Gross National Product.³⁴

Even if the method of assessment were changed, an equally serious problem is the question of U.N inefficiencies and

largesse. As an example, when its mission was over, the U.N. Transition Assistance Group, set up in Namibia to keep the peace, observe a cease fire, and supervise an election, gave away U.N. equipment worth nearly \$26 million. U.S. diplomats who were on the scene, verified that as many as 1,400 vehicles were given to local government officials.³⁵ The United States has protested such tremendous waste by both withholding and delaying assessment payments to the U.N.

Bureaucracy

The structure of the U.N. has become increasingly burdened by the tendency to expand its bureaucracy. The former U.N. Under Secretary General for Administration and Management, Dick Thornburgh was especially critical of the bloated organization. He called for the institution of regular outside management reviews in addition to the establishment of an Inspector General office. Additionally, he claims that the personnel system is riddled with defects that encourages retention of "deadwood," much to the frustration of the few staff members that are dedicated and professionally competent.³⁶

To its critics, the U.N. has been on a self indulgent expansion binge that has led to many of its functions, programs, and activities becoming redundant or irrelevant. "Their main beneficiaries often are the bureaucrats they employ."³⁷

Command and Control

Article 47 of the Charter establishes the Military Staff

Committee (MSC). It is charged with advising the Security Council on all questions relating to the Council's military requirements. Additionally, it is responsible for the "strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council." The fact is, because of the gridlock caused by the Cold War, the MSC has been inactive since 1948.³⁸ Consequently, in a primarily political organization, the politicians have had no consistent source of advice on military matters. Even the most rudimentary functions have been left wanting. For example, until recently, the U.N. had no means for field commanders to reach the Secretariat at any time other than business hours in New York. In response to the Secretary General's request, the United States has committed the resources and helped establish a U.N. command and information center.³⁹

Additional improvements are possible. If the United States provided the leadership, the Military Staff Committee could be invigorated and given the responsibility for identifying the military needs of the U.N. Much as our Joint Chiefs of Staff are responsible for giving advice to the President, plus the management of U.S. forces, the MSC could carry out similar functions for the U.N. Thus, the Security Council, the Secretary General, and the General Assembly would have a source that could help translate the military implications of their political intent.

PART TWO: THE U. S.

CHAPTER V

UNITED STATES PARTICIPATION

Economics

The end of the Cold War and the tremendously large national deficit of the United States presents us with a situation that requires the nation look at alternative courses of action that address the strategic and operational realities of the changing world in which we now find ourselves.

On July 2, 1992, Senator Sam Nunn delivered a speech on the floor of the U.S. Senate that was born of the growing recognition that in the wake of the end of the Cold War, it was time to start dealing with the severe fiscal constraints imposed upon us as a by-product of the cost of waging and winning that war. Senator Nunn addressed restructuring the armed services and the requirement to review the roles and missions of each of the forces.⁴⁰ Ostensibly the review was dictated by the need to further the reform started by the Goldwater-Nichols Act and by the change in the threat as redefined by the collapse of the Warsaw Pact. A further review of the speech, however, reflects an even more stringent imperative when he states,

Mr. President, this redundancy and duplication is costing billions of dollars every year."⁴¹

Concurrently, the economic realities of the changing world were not lost on the two men running for President. Governor

Clinton, echoing the congressional call for a "peace dividend" formulated his campaign strategy to address what the majority of Americans were concerned about; the economy. In fact, a major poll taken soon after the election found that 62% of those asked thought the new President's number one priority should be to quickly address the problems causing the recession.⁴² He proposed a defense reduction plan that would expend \$1.36 trillion for defense through 1997. President Bush, while slow to respond to the shifting focus of domestic concern, conceived a plan that called for an expenditure of \$1.42 trillion, a difference of only 4% from the Clinton plan. Extrapolating the defense budget plan that existed in 1990, the nearly \$2 trillion defense expenditure target would take dramatic cuts by the candidates approaching 30%, with the effective yearly variance between the plans averaging only about \$12 billion.⁴³

Burden Sharing

First as a candidate and now as the President, Clinton has repeatedly expressed his "vision for security in the new era." That vision was perhaps best expressed on December 12, 1991, in a campaign speech when he called for "A New Covenant for American Security." This, Clinton's first important foreign policy speech, addressed his views on burden sharing and collective security. He said, "America needs to reach a new agreement with our allies for sharing the costs and risks of maintaining peace;" and, "it is time for our friends to bear more of the burden."⁴⁴ Additionally, Candidate Clinton expressed the view that the U.N.

should be given a wider role in maintaining the stability and peace called for by the U.N. Charter by saying, "multilateral action holds promise as never before."⁴⁵

Meanwhile, then President Bush, on September 21, 1992, addressed the United Nations General Assembly. He said that he also supported a reinvigorated U.N. as a means to help ensure peace and stability through collective security. In setting forth his vision of the "New World Order," to the members of the General Assembly, he said,

With the Cold War's end, I believe we have a unique opportunity to go beyond artificial divisions of a first, second and third world, to forge instead a genuine global community of free and sovereign nations, a community built on respect for principle, of peaceful settlements of disputes, fundamental human rights, and the twin pillars of freedom, democracy and free markets. Already the United Nations, especially the Security Council, has done much to fulfill its original mission and to build this global community...But, as much as the United Nations has done, it can do much more.⁴⁶

Changing Times

As the Bob Dylan song goes, "The times, they are a changin'," The times, indeed, have changed to such an extent, that many, to include our present Secretary of Defense, have concluded that we must look for new and innovative ways to utilize our nation's declining military power in pursuit of our national security objectives.⁴⁷ In that light, it has been officially proposed that it is now in our best national interest to designate certain elements of our armed services as the United States' contribution to the United Nations Standing Force.

Our recent wars, humanitarian actions, and peacekeeping

experience serve as a series of models that we can expect to see repeated in the future.⁴⁸ Thus, we can look to this time of defense fiscal austerity as either a threat or a tremendous opportunity to redefine our basic approach to formulating our national security structure. Just as we have reached this urgent crossroads, the realities of the budget give critical impetus to drive us toward radical innovation. This innovation is required if we are to meaningfully contribute to our nation's defense well into the twenty-first century.

When Bob Dylan's song was popular, it was also relevant. At that time, the United States was involved in a virtually unilateral conflagration in Vietnam. Defeat was a change that ultimately shook our nation to its foundation and placed a stigma on our military for nearly a generation. However, it also served as the catalyst for the beginning of real reform within the military, and as an abject lesson to the political leaders of the country. Accordingly, as the nation moved further in time from Vietnam, the political, popular, and defense parts of Clausewitz's "amazing triangle" grew closer and stronger together. Among the more significant products of America's metamorphosis was the national security policy as defined by the Weinberger Doctrine.⁴⁹ The art of the practitioners and supporters of that policy finally reached a culmination point during Desert Shield and Desert Storm. The clarity of purpose and the unity of the nation had never been stronger since World War II.

The Search

Now, as then, Dylan's song is relevant. Change, this time in the form of the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact, has caused consternation with many, to include members of the executive branch, the congress, and the services. As we cast about for some solid ground, the burning questions that we all seem to be struggling with are: What is the threat, and what do we need to counter the threat? In the absence of a clearly defined adversary which threatens our survival, our destiny seems solely dictated by the search for dollars that can be sequestered from the "peace dividend." The Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Chiefs of Staff of the services have been put on notice by those in Congress that a smaller version of our Cold War defense apparatus is not the answer, arguing that it's too expensive and its utility has seen its day.⁵⁰ In today's more fiscally constrained environment we now find ourselves, the solution to the threat question must be addressed in the context of the times we live in now, not as we knew them.⁵¹

New Approaches

In terms of the number, frequency, and import of the developments within the last two years, we are living in the midst of a revolution...world revolution. The answers to questions about the services' roles, missions, and structure, plus how they equip, train, deploy and employ would seem, therefore, to call for revolutionary approaches.⁵²

Given the National Security Strategy, we know that forward (land) basing is being deemphasized.⁵³ However, since forward presence is one of the main pillars of that strategy, we will most probably see importance added to naval forces in carrying out that mission.⁵⁴ The State Department and Unified Commanders in Chief (CINCs) will demand that the Department of the Navy retain the capability to carry out the full spectrum of missions, from benign presence to power projection and war.⁵⁵

The world is inextricably involved and interdependent, therefore, a crisis springing up almost anywhere on the globe today is more rapidly recognized and felt by all of the international community.⁵⁶ Concurrently, an enormous uncertainty prevails as to the exact dynamics of these changes and the effect they will have on our national security objectives.⁵⁷

Opportunity

As more nations dedicate themselves to participating in an environment that is increasingly oriented towards free market-based economies, tremendous advances in availability and speed of access to information will facilitate their progress toward the relative power now monopolized by the United States. The influence and flexibility that the United States has enjoyed in the past will almost certainly be constrained. The stabilizing effect of the threat of mutual destruction by the erstwhile Superpower struggle can no longer be counted upon to provide the glue to hold allies together, while imposing caution upon most of

the nonaligned nations. Thus, in the more precipitous conditions of the future, we have some basic questions to answer: Is the United States going to choose to act as the world's policeman in order to impose the stability we think needed for continued prosperity?⁵⁸ Are we going to embrace the new isolationism, withdraw into the confines of Fortress America, stick our head in the sand and hope the world treats us with benevolence from across the seas?⁵⁹ Or, is there a way that we can address what some call the moral, political and economic responsibility to maintain our engagement with the world, yet not continually get stuck to the Tar Baby in the process?⁶⁰ There are those who would say that for the U.S. to remain competitive, we must be prepared to exercise our capability to lead the other nations of the world.⁶¹ Because of the narrowing power gap and the ever increasing quality of the competition, the United States may finally have to look at gaining advantages in the margin. The prevailing thought of the Clinton administration is that one of the ways we can clearly achieve this is to work through the U.N. in order to share the burden and promote conditions that, ultimately, are directly related to our national security interests.⁶²

The Threat: Old and New

In the past, the threat was defined as the U.S.S.R. and its surrogates, as they strove to create conditions that would favor the perpetuation of their totalitarian philosophy. Almost all of our attention was focused on our Cold War enemies. The natural

order (or more appropriately, disorder) of the world continued in its dynamic pursuit of equilibrium, usually affected, but not always determined by, the Superpower struggle. The emerging nations and lesser developed countries of the world sought, sometimes violently, their place in the grand scheme of things. Because of America's consuming focus on the Soviets, the U.S. was often caught behind the power curve and were forced to develop the definitive body of procedures known as Crisis Management. Our overall strategy of containment of the Soviets sometimes blinded us to the fact that the dynamics of a post-colonial world accounted for much of the turmoil during the period of the Cold War. We have seen in the General Assembly, for example, that the newly formed countries of the 50's, 60's, and 70's have, as a function of their growing maturation, moved from an almost universal and automatic anti-U.S. posture to one that more approximates balance if not outright favor.⁶³ This is not consistent with our natural suspicion that if something was not right in the world, it was because of the Soviets. Time has proven that sometimes it was, but, probably at least as often, it was the fermenting brew of self determination or other inward focused strife that caused much of the world's unrest. Our reactionary approach dictated that if the Soviets were interested, then we must be interested.

The threat of today and the foreseeable future remains the one defined by the interests of individual nation-states or nongovernmental actors within geopolitical regions worldwide.

Many of the same motivations that have driven regional conflict in the past remain like festering sores today. As we evolve from an essentially bipolar world, the window of opportunity to use our political, economic, and military to shape a world favorable to the development of universal democracy and free market economies is but a fleeting moment. As these players carry out their agendas for national or individual power, the natural tendency will be to focus on the power most easily attained: military. We all know what a threat nuclear proliferation presents and the United States is aggressively pursuing the means to curtail the spread of atomic weapons. It has been estimated that by the turn of the century, as many as 20 nations will possess ballistic missiles.⁶⁴ Additionally, the breakup of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact has flooded the market with untold masses of conventional arms at bargain basement prices. We can see the predetermining factors of armed conflict forming in many regions of the world that are of vital interest to the United States and, as importantly, to the rest of the world. Our threat, then, is unmanaged conflict throughout regions of the world.

Environment and Constraints

The United States is following the national tradition of slashing the military after a war. As much as we talk of not repeating the errors of the past, the American core value of keeping its military as small as possible in light of the national historically inherent distrust of that institution, has

once again become the overall driver of the nation's future. The Administration and the Congress, in the face of a stagnant national economy and the perception that the threat has been eliminated, have understandably sought to redress the nation's woes by chasing after the ever more elusive "peace dividend."

Thus, one could argue that because of the economic imperative alone, the United States should participate in the UNFR. Participation would facilitate sharing the ever-increasing burden of promoting peace and security. Additionally, it would promote a system of collective security, while enabling the United States to continue the pursuit of its national security objectives, but with a much smaller force.

CHAPTER VI

ALTERNATIVE MODELS FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF U. S. FORCES

Context

It would be difficult to imagine a more complex issue than the UNFR. There are 179 countries in the General Assembly and each has its own agenda to put forth. However, as the Secretary General said,

In these past months a conviction has grown, among nations large and small, that an opportunity has been regained to achieve the great objectives of the Charter, a United Nations capable of maintaining international peace and security...⁶⁵

Alternatives and Operational Concepts

President Bush supported the Secretary General's proposals to strengthen the United Nations-for it to be more able to exercise preventive measures to keep the peace, and robust enough to make peace should it be required. In his speech to the General Assembly, President Bush emphasized American readiness to set the example to other nations.⁶⁶ Since taking office, President Clinton has, on more than one occasion, iterated his campaign stance that he fully supports the concept of collective security, and that nations should look to the U.N. as a means to address the strife in the world.⁶⁷ America's most recent Presidents have thus set the stage to solve several of our most perplexing problems.

The geopolitical model that Spykman calls the "Eurasian Rimland," focuses on the region of the world that contains the

majority of the areas of vital national interest to the United States. This region is where we are most likely to employ our military in pursuit of foreign policy objectives. The area is defined as the land that rings the former Soviet Union, and includes Europe in the west, Southwest and Southeast Asia, and Eastern Asia and Japan.⁶⁸ (Figure 1). It is in this region that we have fought two world wars, three mid-intensity regional wars, and have conducted numerous other military operations at the lower end of the spectrum of conflict. Our engagement and deep commitment in this area is not an accident of coincidence. We understand that our future, and that of the world, greatly depends upon the complex dynamics of potential friends and adversaries in this region.

Assumptions

By examining our history of involvement, we can see a very rational approach to how we have pursued our national interests in the past and why we must remain militarily engaged in the future. Presented here are three alternatives for continuing our forward presence. I use the naval subset of the nation's joint assets as representative of the total force available for the national security. The results of the analysis can be extrapolated to reflect the forces that would be provided by the Army and the Air Force. Each of the alternatives is based on two assumptions: 1) That the U.S. Navy is allowed to maintain the present amphibious ship retirement/buying schedule; 2) That the U.S. Marine Corps will execute its mandate of "Marine Corps

FIGURE 1

SPYKMAN'S VIEW OF THE RIMLAND



2001," but with the possibility of having to sustain further cuts. "Marine Corps 2001," is a manpower reduction and force restructuring plan that draws down the Marine Corps from 196,000 to 159,000 personnel. In the case of further cuts, the Marine Corps would probably have to reduce from three active duty Marine Expeditionary Forces to two. Although more difficult, the Marine Corps could still maintain Title 10 structure (3 divisions and 3 air wings), and the capability to simultaneously support two Amphibious Ready Groups (ARGs), an Air Contingency Force each for the Pacific and the Atlantic, and two Maritime Prepositioning Forces.

Alternative One: "From the Sea"--The Status Quo.

With this option, the focus of U.S. naval forces moves to the littorals and adds emphasis to the amphibious aspects of naval warfare. This is a continuation of how we have done business in the past. The Navy did indeed prepare itself to fight the blue water war, but every time it has actually been engaged in combat since World War II, it has been along the littorals, usually in support of the forces ashore. What we see in "From the Sea," is not so much a fundamental shift away from open water ocean fighting, but rather an acknowledgement of the way we've really been conducting business. While the U.S. Navy had to be prepared to fight in blue water, it never truly did.

In the status quo option, we shall continue to unilaterally deploy our naval forces in order to maintain a forward presence. The advantage to this approach is that the deployed naval forces

would continue to be the overt manifestation of U.S. strength and potential. Unfortunately, as the budget declines, America will see a commensurate reduction in the number and types of ships, their crews, and embarked Marines available to maintain the present operational commitments. If the U.S. continues to cut back on resources available, either operational tempo will run the ships and people into the ground or the nation will have to accept some sizeable gaps in forward presence. Since an inverse relationship exists between the deterrence that a level of forward presence brings and the propensity a rogue nation has for waging war, the latter could have the negative effect of adding encouragement to a belligerent state by giving the false impression that our power isn't to be feared.

Alternative Two: The Standing Naval Force, World.

History shows that the genius of the U.S. as a nation rests with its ability to form coalitions based upon consensus and compromise, and that unilateral intervention is not very profitable because it has had unusually high cost to benefit ratios. Additionally, the Soviet Union has dissolved and no longer has a credible conventional military or economic capability. Therefore, as many recent examples point out, conflict and strife are more regionally localized. Dr. Michael Vlahos agrees that we need to focus on regional conflict and opportunities. He says:

But one great military power remains in the world, and it is the United States. All other significant world economies are not simply on friendly terms with us, they

are allied to us, and we work together on economic as well as military issues. Those in the world who count, who actually have real power, are, in fact, our partners and the United States is their leader.⁶⁹

What he proposes is a standing world naval security force—a permanent Desert Storm coalition, consisting of two (Eastern and Western) naval forces. Each of these forces would be built around a U.S. Carrier Battle Group (BG), augmented with an ARG. Other nations, on a voluntary basis, would contribute assets to the coalition, with each nation's role determined by its contribution.⁷⁰ Dr. Vlahos addresses the critics of this idea by pointing out that the U.S. would avoid being sucked into every small crisis by looking to the U.N. for a resolution to commit armed forces. The U.S. would not use existing alliances, such as NATO because they tend to be area bound. Rather, a "consensual system of world security" would gain its power and credibility over time, and be formed as "simply a cooperative, voluntary association that works."⁷¹ He says that the U.N. should not control the force because it is too bureaucratic and would demand a sacrifice of national sovereignty. To support the "Standing Naval Force, World," the U.S. Navy would need about 350 ships. The world force would start "as a war coalition—without a war to fight and without warfighting pressures." The formal command and control would be worked out over time. Initially, operations would be handled as combined operations are now and would eventually lead to Task-Group flag officers who need not be from the United States.⁷²

Alternative Three: The UNFR, Naval Module (NM)

The Sea-Air-Land concept of America's forward presence-force projection works. A multitude of examples exist; i.e., Grenada, Panama, Korea, and the Persian Gulf. The concept is well founded in the proven application of the theories of naval, air and land power projection that had their beginning prior to World War II and have evolved to the sophisticated integration of joint employment concepts the Department of Defense embraces today. The CINCs have at their disposal the most impressive menu of flexible and powerful forces ever formed.⁷³ But, as Vlahos says, "we have a window in history to build a home for an idea: the evolution of a world security force, a true keeper of the peace."

The future embraces the theory and practice of the Desert Storm model and formalizes it into a world strategy that has among its elements burden sharing, and interdependent multinational military and political cooperation. Lincoln Bloomfield called for the creation of a stand-by force that would be sized and trained for "the proper jobs," it is clearly the time to leave our past theories and press on with the future.⁷⁴ The charter would not have to be modified and the raising of a U.N. force to operate in readiness could be passed as a resolution under the auspices of Article 43, where it says, "...undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements, armed forces, assistance... for the purpose of maintaining

international peace and security."⁷⁵

The United Nations Force in Readiness, Naval Module would, as in Alternative Two, be formed around two core forces, each of which would have a U.S. CVBG as its nucleus. Utilizing the regional focus derived from Alternative One, the NM would concentrate on patrolling the littoral areas of the world. More often than not, this would be around the periphery of the Eurasian Rimland. Neither the UNFR in general nor the NM in particular would be exclusionary, and all member nations would be encouraged to participate. The UNFR, with its naval, air, and land forces would pursue the objective of the United Nations, that just happens to be coincident with United States National Strategy Objectives, namely: "a stable and secure world, where political and economic freedom, human rights, and democratic institutions flourish."

Every member country of the U.N. possessing naval forces would be asked and expected to participate. Using the best aspects of Total Quality Leadership on a grand scale, the United States would exercise its persuasive powers to get the members to enroll in the idea of participating in something that is larger than the noisy, petty forum that typified the U.N. in the 70s, and 80s, and to a large degree, continues today. Many nations would likely sign up for participating in the force, since it would be a direct function of national maturity, as well as subscription to the moral principles upon which the U.N. was founded. If that doesn't work, the combined economic, and

political powers of the United States, Japan, and the European Economic Community could be brought to bear in a more convincing way to persuade a reluctant nation to participate. By being an active contributor to world peace and stability, participating nations would begin a vestiture in the process and its goals. The more rich and powerful nations might contribute ships, aircraft, manpower and supplies, while lesser developed nations would contribute within their means, perhaps facilities at a port or airfield as elements of the UNFR (NM) passed through. Besides the U.S. core ships, other naval assets would be assigned to the task force by other participating members. Ostensibly, if enough nations contributed ships, each of the fleets could be further assigned multiple geographical areas, i.e., Eastern Fleets North and South. A typical operation, for example, might have the HMS Ark Royal, accompanied by two Brazilian missile destroyers and a South African refueler, form a carrier task group (CVG), and divert from the CVBG built around the USS Lincoln Task Force in the Mediterranean for a patrol through the Suez Canal and down the East coast of Africa. Meanwhile, the Admiral Kuznetsov might be participating in a large scale naval exercise in the Indian Ocean as part of the USS Nimitz Task Force. The message is that participating together in the pursuit of a common goal will create the synergism required to overcome instability and threats to regional peace. If you're part of the fire brigade, you're less likely to start fires.

Because of its emphasis on littoral security, the UNFR (NM)

would be expeditionary in nature and would have the same focus, skills, and capabilities as U.S. naval forces. At one end of the spectrum, as part of international power projection, the UNFR (NM) would provide, through their presence, confidence building and a general feeling of security throughout the region. With this unobtrusive, yet very capable force presence in the area, cheap dictators or even fanatics would tend to reconsider before adventuring across international boundaries. The show of force represented by the UNFR (NM) would certainly not encourage confidence in any despot bent on bothering his neighbors. The UNFR naval forces could also be used to protect ethnic groups who are rebelling against being brutally oppressed. A case in point is what we are doing for the Kurds in Northern Iraq, and are slowly approaching doing for the Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina. For those people seeking self determination, the U.N. could use its good offices and military power to interpose itself between warring factions to make/keep the peace until a political settlement could be reached.

Continuing along the spectrum, the expeditionary force package would also be capable of providing mobile training teams (MTTs) to various countries. The MTTs are a proven way to help build international understanding and cooperation between militaries. It would also help build the confidence of a country in its ability to better defend itself and nurture a general feeling of security. The UNFR (NM) would also be able to conduct humanitarian/disaster relief operations. In the wake of floods,

earthquakes, hurricanes and other disasters, the force would assist in the clean up, the preservation of lives and safety and temporary assistance to host country law enforcement/military forces in reestablishing order.

The UNFR (NM) would retain the ability for Non-combatant Evacuation Operations. If required, the UNFR (NM) would provide an air and ground screening force, riot control and security, medical support and protected transportation out of danger.

Still further along the spectrum of operations, the UNFR (NM) could conduct everything from maritime interdiction operations in support of a U.N. embargo; reinforcement operations in support of U.N. or member nation military; security operations to protect U.N. or member nation property and people (i.e., a nuclear reactor or non-combatants) and combat operations to include reconnaissance and surveillance, in-extremis hostage rescue, electronic warfare/signal intelligence, initial terminal guidance of assault forces, tactical deception operations, airfield seizure, amphibious raids, and limited objective attacks. If a regional crisis escalated out of control, the UNFR (NM) would act as the initial assault element and enable the introduction of heavier U.N. or coalition forces into the conflict.

Initially, each country would come to the UNFR (NM) with what it has. Through an evolutionary process, it would move towards some standard, probably using the NATO specifications as a start. The goal would be to facilitate joint and combined

operations with all the world's armed forces.

Since the core of each of the fleets would be U.S. naval forces, the UNFR (NM) could use U.S./NATO doctrine as a base line. However, that could be adjusted as needed just as the U.S. now does for combined naval exercises. Operations ashore would be handled in the same way as the U.S. we does presently. The value of the discussions and give-and-take in formulating UNFR (NM) task force specific doctrine would provide fertile ground for the growth of new ideas and the more rapid advancement of naval operational art.


There are many ways to peel the tactical and operational grapes. The "International Way" would tend to evolve over time as a function of familiarity and experience. The command, control and intelligence (C'I), of the UNFR (NM) would be handled much along the lines of the successful NATO model. The Security Council, based on their perception of the need and the resources available for military presence, would present the General Assembly with a plan, accompanied by a request for consignment of forces and/or support agreements. The United States, by virtue of its global interest and experience, would supply the infrastructure of the C'I system. By utilizing the CINCs and leavening them by integrating combined staffs, the chain of command would run from the unanimity of the Security Council, through the Military Staff Committee to the CINCs, and then on to the UNFR (NM) fleets. The UNFR (NM) Fleet Commander would be supported with a joint, combined staff. Thus, if a major combat

action happened, the critical structure for enabling the introduction of heavier follow-on forces from multiple countries would be in place. Should the United States be forced to take unilateral action, the joint staff would facilitate follow-on U.S. forces. The United Nations would have to form an all-source fusion center to handle intelligence matters. Here again, the NATO model is applicable. Each nation would utilize its own assets and intelligence network. After proper screening to protect systems capabilities and sources, the appropriate information would be disseminated to the UNFR (NM) via the intelligence chain that would parallel the command chain. The specific precedents for some of the suggestions above have been already been established in NATO, i.e., USCINCLANT and SACLANT are joint and combined headquarters (Figure 2.).⁷⁶

Finally, Vlahos says, "Americans are still committed. Fully 90% of Americans want to stop dictators who sponsor terrorism, get nuclear weapons, violate human rights, or invade a neighbor. But they want to stop them with the U.N. Answering the question, 'When faced with problems involving aggression, who should lead?'--80% of Americans want the U.N. to take the lead, and 97% of Americans think we should get involved only with U.N. approval."⁷⁷

FIGURE 2

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS: U.S. ATLANTIC COMMAND



CHAPTER VII

ANALYSIS OF STRATEGIC AND OPERATIONAL COSTS AND BENEFITS

The alternatives in the previous chapter are all feasible. The questions are, which one would best serve our national interests, and what are the measures of effectiveness upon which to judge? Here is presented a list of five areas that are important and representative enough to arrive at some reasonable conclusions.

Sovereignty

There is an important issue of sovereignty. A common misperception is that the U.N. was meant to be a world government. Close examination of the Charter, gives no hint of requiring that a nation subjugate itself to any "world government." In fact, Article 2 of the Charter says that the organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its members. It also says that nothing in the Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in a country's internal affairs.⁷⁸ Chapter VIII of the Charter further reinforces sovereignty by encouraging "regional arrangements" between nations.⁷⁹ Additionally, in "Agenda for Peace", Mr. Boutros-Ghali says:

The Charter deliberately provides no precise definition of regional arrangements and agencies, thus allowing useful flexibility for undertakings by a group of States to deal with a matter appropriate for regional action which also could contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security.⁸⁰

It is interesting to note that the U.S. seems to be less sensitive about sovereignty. Whereas in the past, America has been adamant that its forces in the field be commanded by an American. Recently, however, the U.S. has "crossed the Rubicon," and assigned 5,000 troops to UNISOM II, commanded by a Turkish General.⁸¹

Burden Sharing

As previously discussed, the United States has arrived victorious at the conclusion of the Cold War. However, it is now time to pay the piper. As the nation labors under the large deficit, the concerns about the stagnant economy and the possible dire consequences of continuing to owe staggering sums of interest, serve to reinforce the idea that we will have difficulty in carrying the load that we have in the past. It seems important to the Administration that the world accepts more of the burden of promoting peace and security.

Political Credibility

Whatever plan the Administration implements, it would seem extremely desirable for the plan to maintain or enhance the political stature of the nation. The fact is that American power to manage change in the world will be largely affected by how much political credibility it has.

Moral Credibility

If the U.S. is to continue to lead the world, it must persevere in its quest for the high moral ground. The foundation

of our National Security Strategy includes promoting the ideals of democracy, free trade, human rights, and the dignity of humankind. Should America choose a strategy that is inconsistent with those goals, its credibility will suffer commensurately. One could then expect that there would be a proportional decline in its ability to lead, and other's willingness to follow.

Freedom of Action

The overarching importance of the U.S. retaining freedom of action has been reiterated many times by politicians, diplomats, and members of the defense establishment. The fact remains that the world is essentially a hostile place where there is but one country interested in totally supporting the American national security objectives. While cooperation and collective security are important concepts, the most important principle of the country is national survival. In order to hedge against any possible situation that may threaten U.S. vital interests and by extension, U.S. survival, it has to retain the freedom to act in any manner it deems necessary to ensure that it is protected.

Relative Importance

If the most important goal of the United States is survival, both as a physical entity and as a way of life, then two things must be present. First, the U.S. must have a world environment in which it can thrive and grow. Second, to achieve that state, it must have the ability to use a spectrum of actions ranging from quietly setting the example, to all-out use of its

political, economic and military might to force conditions that are ultimately favorable.

The values of the criteria above, then, are relative to the contribution they make to creating conditions favorable to the United States primarily and then to the world. Therefore, it is reasonable to assign them the following priorities of importance: freedom of action, political credibility, burden sharing, sovereignty, and moral credibility.

Qualitative Model

The following is a brief description of a model which used priorities established above. The objective of the model was to select the best U.S. naval option for contributing to its security as well as world peace and security. The five criteria listed above were used in testing the strategic alternatives listed in Chapter VII. The operational considerations were again limited to a representative sample of important issues that would have an effect on the choices. The operational sample consisted of command, control, and intelligence; training; logistics; finances; and manpower. One might argue as to whether these should be strategic or operational in nature, but the conceptual basis of the analysis is that they may rest in the area of the Venn diagram as part of strategic and operational considerations.

FIGURE 3

THE GOAL

Select the best U.S. naval option for contributing to its security as well as world peace and security.




FIGURE 4

RESULTS

Priority	Alternative		Operational Impact
Freedom of Action Wt: 5	Unilateral	Wt: 3	C' I Training Logistics Finance Manpower
	Multilateral	Wt: 2	
	UNFR (NM)	Wt: 1	
Political Credibility Wt: 4	UNFR (NM)	Wt: 3	Finance Logistics C' I Manpower Training
	Multilateral	Wt: 2	
	Unilateral	Wt: 1	
Burden Sharing Wt: 3	UNFR (NM)	Wt: 3	Manpower Logistics C' I Training Finance
	Multilateral	Wt: 2	
	Unilateral	Wt: 1	
Sovereignty Wt: 2	Unilateral	Wt: 3	C' I Training Logistics Finance Manpower
	Multilateral	Wt: 2	
	UNFR (NM)	Wt: 1	
Moral Credibility Wt: 1	UNFR (NM)	Wt: 3	Finance Manpower Logistics C' I Training
	Multilateral	Wt: 2	
	Unilateral	Wt: 1	

Combined weights:

Unilateral = 29

Multilateral = 30

UNFR (NM) = 31

The table illustrates that the UNFR (NM) is the alternative that best supports three out of the five criteria that define goal achievement. In the other two criteria, freedom of action

and sovereignty, the unilateral option gives the best support. The criteria were assigned a weight consistent with their priority, i.e., freedom of action = 5, political credibility = 4, etc. Next, the alternatives within each criteria were assigned a weight according to their precedence, i.e., for freedom of action, unilateral was assigned 3, multilateral assigned 2, and UNFR assigned 1. The overall choice was derived by multiplying the weights of the criteria with weights of their respective alternatives. The results are that the UNFR (NM) appears the best alternative in support of the objective.

Alternative Service

An important ancillary issue is the special training required to prepare individuals and units to serve attached to the U.N. A program that uses the Canadian U.N. staff course and the force model exercised by the Scandinavian countries, is probably the best starting point. Both the Canadians and the Scandinavians have standing military formations that are made up entirely of volunteers for peacekeeping duty. They go through specialized training in self defense as well as the psychology of peacekeeping. The countries involved have garnered international respect and credibility through this approach of sending competent, trained volunteers on peacekeeping duty; however, their formations are relatively small. The Swedish force, for example, consists of only two battalion-sized units.⁸² A large peacekeeping effort would require a commensurately sized force. However, some would argue that it is unwise to expect peace-

makers to secure the peace and then be tasked with keeping it.⁸³ The U.S. Marine Corps' experience in Lebanon has been used to illustrate this point. Could the Marines have done better if, through prior training, vis-a-vis the Canadian and Swedish approach, they had been better prepared to walk the fine peacekeeping line? Perhaps then, their neutrality and objectivity could have been maintained and a terrible tragedy avoided.⁸⁴

In any case, there may be a way to keep the warrior and peacekeeping roles separated. President Clinton has proposed a domestic GI Bill that,

...will say to the middle class as well as low-income people: We want you to go to college, we'll pay for it, it will be the best money we ever spent, but you've got to give something back to your country in return.⁸⁵

Perhaps the Administration should examine the feasibility of forming a national peacekeeping force made up of a relatively small professional corps of experienced leaders and the bulk of the force made up of volunteers. Those who volunteer for the program would go to recruit training and then to the initial follow-on training in basic infantry type skills in self defense, weapons, and defensive tactics. They would then move on to more advanced training in skills more applicable to peacekeeping. Some important areas that would be covered are negotiation, peace psychology, respect for culture, etc. Additionally, as the military draws down, it will be particularly important not to spread the assets too thin. A volunteer peacekeeping branch of the military would take some of the burden off the heavily

committed traditional branches. Since the volunteers would be earning "national service wages," much the same as when the U.S had a draft, the cost of the force would be a bargain.

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions

We have looked at three naval options for our future. For only the third time in 75 years, we have a chance to help move the world more fully towards those principles this country (and thus, the United Nations) was founded on. By choosing to reach forth with our political, economic, and, finally, our military strength, we can contribute significantly to the world's peace and stability.

Alternative One is based upon unilateralism and leaves us vulnerable to international condemnation and isolationism if we take a course of action in our own short term self interests. If we choose that path, our position as a world leader, enhanced recently by how we chose to operate within coalitions, will erode. Our credibility will wane. Additionally, we will continue to bear the disproportionate burden of supplying a significant amount of world security without a commensurate compensation from the beneficiaries. We simply can't afford to continue business as usual.

Alternative Two is at first attractive. We would ply the oceans and littorals and have other nations drop in and out of the posse as they saw fit. But other than to come out and play once in a while, what is their incentive to form a "wartime coalition without the pressure of a war to fight?" Yes, if a

nation, Russia for example, decided to participate, it could save its "brace of carriers," but what's to guarantee that? I believe that the find itself out there alone, having slipped back into Alternative One by default of the other players.

Alternative Three takes the best of both worlds, and adds three very important ingredients. First, it gets every nation with naval forces actively involved. In fact, even if a country is land locked, they can supply small detachments to embark on participating ships. Further, they are involved not in making war, but in keeping the peace and contributing to stability. It lends legitimacy by using the same principles that led to the successful formation of the Desert Shield/Storm multinational coalition. Finally, it requires every nation to share the burden, not just with a checkbook, but with the commitment of its real treasure, people.

Much of the data indicates that the Administration, Secretary of Defense, certain members of Congress, and the Ambassador to the U.N. are in favor of assigning forces to the U.N. standby force. However, debate still continues. The JCS favor volunteering capabilities that are unique to the U.S. vice designating specific forces for standby assignment to the UNFR.

I believe that both sides are missing the mark. The data gathered during the research phase of this project seems to be dominated by the acceptance that the U.S. will somehow participate in the UNFR and the only question centers on whether it will be with specific forces or by capabilities. However, the

U.N. has no credible infrastructure in place to provide the essentials to a military force, be it assigned to them by unit or by capability. It would seem to make better sense to design the UNFR from the top down. As previously mentioned, there is no viable, clear command structure. The U.N. does not have standard procedures for training and operations. It lacks the facilities and assets to efficiently manage the logistical needs of a force. The dearth of a communications architecture makes it nearly impossible to command troops in the field let alone allow the commander to stay in constant touch with the Security Council or the Secretariat. And, most importantly, the General Assembly has yet to figure out how to pay for such a force. All of these problems can be worked out. There are already examples of successful international forces being extremely proficient at combined operations. The U.N. could model after one of them, probably NATO, and develop the where-with-all to raise, train, equip, operate, and sustain a UNFR. But, the problems should be solved first, the force should come later.

After the First World War, the idea of international peace and security burned briefly and then failed. The idea sprang forth again at the end of the Second World War. Despite the countervailing forces and financial crises, the idea has managed to survive. We are now two generations past World War II and have just seen the end of another great conflict.

While peaceful cooperation of the world's militaries is not new, formalizing that cooperation on a large scale is. For the

first time, on a global basis, the world community could conduct a unified mission in peace time, on a full time basis, to promote peace and security. Now is the time for commitment and change. The United States must continue its role as the world's leader. We should begin the new era by ensuring that the U.N. has the ability to effectively utilize a standby force. Then, when the infrastructure is in place, our naval forces and unique capabilities should form the nucleus of the United Nations Force in Readiness.

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