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THESIS

BEYOND GUZMAN? THE FUTURE OF THE SHINING
PATH IN PERU

by

James C. Rix

December 1992

Thesis Advisor: Gordon H. McCormick

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BEYOND GUZMAN? THE FUTURE OF THE SHINING PATH IN PERU

by

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Captain, United States Air Force
B.A., Miami University, 1984

Submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

from the

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ABSTRACT

Peru's Shining Path revolutionary movement is at a crossroads. With the September 1992 capture of its founder Abimael Guzman and much of its Central Committee, the movement that appeared so strong has now been decapitated. Given this, it is tempting to dismiss the Shining Path as a significant threat to Peru's current order. This thesis contends that it is too early to close the book on the Shining Path as a long-term threat. While no one can as yet accurately assess the Shining Path's future, the most important determinant of the Shining Path's fate will be its ability to contain the damage of Guzman's capture by adapting to a new state of affairs. This thesis analyzes the organization's record of flexibility and appeal by examining the ideology, strategy, and tactics employed through the course of its 12 year war. The thesis concludes that the organization, while uncompromising at the ideological level, has demonstrated an exceptional degree of flexibility at the tactical level. This flexibility will be essential if the organization is to regroup and continue its assault. While the outcome is uncertain this soon after Guzman's capture, the Shining Path's demonstrated capacity to adapt to diverse circumstances suggests that the organization has the capability, after a period of reconsolidation, to renew itself and continue its revolutionary war.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In September 1992, in a stunning victory for the government of Peru, Shining Path founder Abimael Guzman was captured in Lima. This represents a severe setback for the guerrilla movement, for not only has it lost its ideological and spiritual leader, but the raid also captured several members of the organization's Central Committee as well. The Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso), in the face of these losses, will have to reconstitute its operations and leadership in Lima if it is to remain a force in Lima and a serious contender for power.

What is the future of the Shining Path? While no one can know the definitive answer, this thesis argues that Guzman's capture could result in any one of three scenarios. First, the capture could galvanize the movement into intense short-term violence as retribution for the capture, after which it would enter long-term decay and internal conflict, decapitated by the loss of its overall strategist and unifying force. Second, the Shining Path, being a cohesive, tightly organized, and strongly disciplined organization, may proceed as it had prior to Guzman's capture, only with greater caution and additional attention to security. Finally, Sendero could go into short-term hibernation as it regenerates its leadership, reorganizes its structure, and rethinks its security and other

arrangements in Lima, only to reemerge as a credible threat.

Which of these options proves correct is still unknown, but the Shining Path's ability to move forward will depend upon its ability to adapt to a post-Guzman era. If the organization is flexible and adaptable, it may be able to weather this crisis. If the organization proves unable to adapt it is unlikely to respond successfully.

The focus of this thesis, then, is an examination of the Shining Path's ideology, strategy, and tactics to determine if the organization has a record of flexibility in the conception and prosecution of its war on the State. This thesis contends that the Shining Path has demonstrated a high degree of flexibility in its campaign. Ideologically, the organization has proven intransigent, but its use of differing strategies and tactics in fulfilling the goals of that ideology have been quite flexible. At the strategic level the organization established an urban campaign in order to undermine and ultimately overthrow the current order. At the tactical level, the organization has employed a spectrum of inducements, both persuasive and coercive, to assert control or gain influence over targets. The employment of these inducements is dependent upon many factors, including the organization's objectives, its reception in the targeted community, and the exploitable conditions present in that community. In short, the movement does not approach targets with a rigid, preconceived, ideologically determined approach

to recruitment. The organization's recruitment strategies are determined by its assessment of the vulnerabilities of the community and often include tactics that conflict with its rigid ideology.

The thesis also examines the organization's appeal in Peruvian society, finding that it appeals to or has the potential to appeal to several constituencies that cross class lines. The organization's ability to appeal to women, youth, and university students demonstrates not only flexibility in its message, but that the movement is not just a campaign that appeals to the poor of society.

Finally, the thesis examines Peru's vulnerabilities to revolution and its vulnerabilities to the Shining Path in particular. The thesis concludes that the State has done little to address its own vulnerabilities to the Shining Path, thereby facilitating the group's regeneration. Until the State addresses fundamental issues about society and its own inability to assert authority in the countryside, it will remain vulnerable to the Shining Path.

The thesis concludes that given the group's capability to adapt its tactics and message to targeted communities, the most likely response to Guzman's capture will be to retract, regroup, and ultimately continue its guerrilla campaign. Further, the thesis determines that the State has done little to address its own vulnerabilities to the Shining Path.

I. INTRODUCTION

Peru's return to democracy in May 1980 was accompanied by the emergence of the Shining Path (Sendero Luminoso, or SL), which at the time appeared to be a fringe terrorist group in the Andean highlands. Despite an apparently anachronistic revolutionary ideology out of place both in Latin America and in a democratic state, the Shining Path's organizational skills, strategy, tactics, and message created an environment that compelled President Alberto Fujimori, on April 5, 1992, to suspend democracy to allow for a total campaign against the organization. This *autogolpe* was instituted despite the fact that, at the time, over two-thirds of Peru was already under an emergency rule that gave local army commanders authority over all government activities.¹ The Shining Path had grown in size, scope, and importance to such a point that no analyst of Peru or revolutionary movements could dismiss its chance for success in gaining control of the State. Indeed, some analysts had begun to warn of a Shining Path threat to Peru's neighbors.

¹See James Brooke, "Peru's Military Is Granted Broad Powers in Rebel War," *New York Times*, 3 Dec 91.

A. THE IMPLICATIONS OF GUZMAN'S CAPTURE

In mid-September 1992, in a stunning victory for the government, Shining Path founder and leader Abimael Guzman Reynoso was captured in Lima. This governmental victory represents a severe setback for the Shining Path, for not only has its undisputed leader been captured, but so has much of its Central Committee. The momentum of the conflict, for the first time, seems in the government's favor. Sendero will, in the face of this blow and the now-obvious skills of Peru's Counterterrorist Directorate (DINCOTE) in Lima, have to in some way reconstitute its operations and leadership in the city if it is to remain a force in Lima and a serious contender for power.

What is the future of the Shining Path? While no one can know the definitive answer, this thesis argues that Guzman's capture could result in any one of three scenarios. First, the capture could galvanize the movement into intense short-term violence as retribution for the capture, after which it would enter long-term decay and internal conflict, decapitated by the loss of its overall strategist and unifying force. Second, the Shining Path, being a cohesive, tightly organized, and strongly disciplined organization, may proceed as it had prior to Guzman's capture, only with greater caution and additional attention to security. Finally, Sendero could go into short-term hibernation as it regenerates its leadership,

reorganizes its structure, and rethinks its security and other arrangements in Lima, only to reemerge as a credible threat.

The first scenario (ultimate failure) is certainly a possibility, especially given that much of the Central Committee, including the leader of the Lima Metropolitan Committee, Laura Zambrano Padilla, was captured along with Guzman. Deprived of several strategic planners and leaders, but possessing considerable firepower, the Shining Path could still wreak much destruction on society. However, now robbed of its visionary leader, the organization could, while inflicting pain on Peru, persist without posing much danger to the State and the existing order. The situation in Peru could evolve and become similar to Colombia's relationship with its revolutionaries, where society lives with much violence but whose State is not seriously threatened.

One could posit several reasons why the above scenario is not likely to occur. The Shining Path has been, since its inception, a disciplined, patient movement that acts based on its own timetable. Sendero has consistently dictated the scope and pace of the war, forcing the government into a reactive posture. Despite the loss of Guzman and others, there is no reason to believe that the organization, at least at the militant or activist level, has lost its discipline.

The second option (no effect) is highly unlikely, for it is difficult to believe that any revolutionary organization could sustain such a setback without effect on its strategy,

tactics, or operations. Guzman is much more than just SL's leader; he is also its spiritual sage. After years of cultivating an image of genius, his capture will have a psychological effect beyond decisions on strategy. Remaining Shining Path leaders are likely to either be in deep hiding or otherwise laying low; such a posture is even less conducive to aggressive guerrilla action than "normal" underground activities.² Further, uncertainty about the startling success of DINCOTE will probably, especially in Lima, keep SL leaders from exposing themselves unnecessarily.

However improbable this option, it should not be completely dismissed. The Shining Path is a formidable movement whose organizational strength greatly contributed to its almost uninterrupted rise in power from 1980 to mid-1992. Utilizing what most in Latin America would call an ideology alien to Latin America, and commencing its operations in concert with Peru's return to democratic rule, Sendero has long confounded the experts. The Shining Path has demonstrated, through its long string of successes, that to underestimate it is to grant openings which the organization all too often effectively exploits. Again, however, this scenario is unlikely, given the challenge now facing SL's organizational cohesion and operational flexibility.

²For an analysis of the difficulties inherent in normal underground activities, see J. Bowyer Bell, "Revolutionary Dynamics: The Inherent Inefficiency of the Underground," *Terrorism and Political Violence* Vol. 2, No. 2 (Summer 1990): 193-211.

In the third scenario, Sendero goes into hiding or a short-term standdown to regenerate itself. This does not mean that all operations will cease, as they are undertaken at low organizational levels. However, any significant shift in tactics, strategy, or direction would likely be postponed, as the organization has many challenges to face in light of Guzman's apprehension. Thus, at least in the short-term, the danger of a Sendero victory would be greatly diminished.

Sendero's first order of business would be to make Guzman's (and the captured Central Committee members') knowledge obsolete to prevent the government from capitalizing on any information derived from interrogation and to limit its own vulnerability. Given the level of the individuals involved, this could take considerable time and effort. Second, the organization would have to ensure that it has a chain-of-command that is understood and respected by all senior leaders. A power struggle would obviously be counterproductive to the movement, causing organizational paralysis and perhaps exposing itself further to DINCOTE.

OTHER ISSUES

Which of these scenarios unfolds will not be known for some time, but several factors will be influential in determining the final outcome. The Shining Path did not blossom suddenly, but slowly and methodically built its bases of support, its organizational structure, and its coercive capabilities. It is thus not likely to expire suddenly

either. Further, Sendero has in the past reduced or stabilized its profile, such as in 1984 and 1985, only to spark an upsurge of activity later, such as in 1988.³

SL has absorbed the loss of key leaders in the past without disintegrating. Guzman's capture is far more significant than the loss of other Sendero leaders such as Osman Morote Barrionuevo (captured in June 1988), Antonio Diaz Martinez (arrested in 1983 and killed in June 1986), and Luis Kawata (status unknown, but expelled from the organization), but the organization has lost leaders before only to regenerate and continue its campaign. Further, Guzman was aware of the government's intense manhunt, given previous close calls. This, when combined with his poor health, makes it likely that planning for his capture or death had occurred prior to September 1992.⁴ This resiliency when faced with high level losses indicates, as Gabriela Tarazona-Sevillano writes, that "... Sendero leadership is by no means limited to a few individuals, but is rather the concerted effort of a well-oiled organizational structure in which trained, capable individuals are continuously accessible."⁵

³See Gordon H. McCormick, *From the Sierra to the Cities: The Urban Campaign of the Shining Path*, R-4150 (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1992), chapter 3.

⁴Although the simultaneous capture of Zambrano and Elena Albertina Iparraguirre may have complicated those plans.

⁵Gabriela Tarazona-Sevillano, *Sendero Luminoso and the Threat of Narcoterrorism* (New York: Praeger and The Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1990), 74.

Another factor to consider is that little has changed in Peru proper. Clearly, the solid police work demonstrated by DINCOTE is evidence of a greater capacity to combat the insurgency, but that greater capacity has only been demonstrated in Lima, and Lima is but one of the insurgency's four distinct campaigns and one its of six regional committees.⁶ Losses or setbacks in the Lima Metropolitan Committee do not affect operations or leadership in the other regional committees. Until Peruvian forces can stop Sendero in the countryside, losses in Lima may not be debilitating.

As previously stated, Sendero normally dictates the pace of the war. The government's poor record of acting preemptively against the movement means that, regardless of the impact of Guzman's capture, the organization can take as much time as it deems necessary to heal itself. Unless DINCOTE and the military in the countryside can follow this success with aggressive pressure on the organization, Sendero will have the opportunity to, as it has in the past, choose the timing of its actions. The government, now holding the initiative, would not want not surrender it to Sendero, a likely event unless the government's intelligence capability is able to follow the organizational and operational changes likely to be made by the Shining Path.

Guzman's apprehension arguably puts as much pressure on

⁶McCormick, *From the Sierra to the Cities*, 14. Tarazona-Sevillano, 57.

President Fujimori and the military as it does on the Shining Path. The capture has, in the short-term, given the government a much needed boost; however, if unable to build on the capture and dramatically reduce the level of violence in Lima and the countryside, Fujimori risks falling into a deeper political and security crisis than before the capture. His own constituency will expect to see tangible results from the capture of Guzman. If unable to deliver a greater measure of security, Fujimori could fall into illegitimacy, unable to provide a marked improvement following a spectacular but thus far operationally limited success. If Sendero proves capable of absorbing this loss and continuing its campaign, Fujimori could well be left in a more untenable position than before the arrest.

Finally, Guzman's apprehension does nothing to address the conditions that spawned and supported the movement in the first place. Until long-standing social and economic conditions are addressed, the foundations from which the Shining Path emerged will remain for the organization, with or without Guzman, to employ to further its cause.

B. CAN SENDERO OVERCOME THE LOSS OF GUZMAN?

Regardless of one's speculation on the future of SL, it undeniably faces a very difficult path that will challenge the capabilities of the organization and remaining leaders. A

response to the current situation will demand an organization with an enormous capacity for adapting itself to new and different situations. Will Sendero be able to adapt? As stated above, no one can know for certain at this juncture, for, despite previous losses, none were as significant as Guzman's loss. SL's ability to adapt will determine its success or failure in surviving Guzman's apprehension. One way to assess Sendero's potential for recovery is through the analysis of Sendero's past. Does the Shining Path have a history of flexibility? An analysis of Sendero's past is not analogous to the current situation, but it is the only non-speculative option available.

This thesis will thus address the issue of Sendero's flexibility. Despite its initial depiction as an inflexible, dogmatic organization too closely wedded to an alien ideology not suited for Peru, this thesis will demonstrate that the Shining Path has proven, at the operational level, to be a remarkably flexible organization able to adapt and succeed in diverse settings. Chapter II examines the Shining Path at the ideological, strategic, and tactical levels to demonstrate that SL, while ideologically intractable, is quite versatile at the strategic and tactical levels, both in form and content. Sendero's flexibility is demonstrated by its ability to alter its strategic orientation and the tactical use of various persuasive and coercive instruments to convert a targeted audience to its cause. These instruments are used

differentially, with emphasis, mix, and type of instruments dependent upon the local context. Sendero has shown itself capable of making local concerns the focus of its recruitment tactics, while molding local needs to its own purpose. At the local level, SL deals with "bread and butter" issues, and such issues change, however subtly, at each village or shantytown. As Chapter II will show, the organization has demonstrated its skill at fitting its overall mission into the needs of a local populace, thus going beyond the infliction of pain and into building bases of support from which it contends for power.

Related to Sendero's capacity to gain support through various inducements is the ability to appeal to a variety of popular constituencies. If a revolutionary group is the equivalent of a single issue candidate, it can inflict pain, but is unlikely to become a credible threat to the established order. The Shining Path has been characterized, variously, as an Indian or, more recently, as a peasant movement. However, Chapter III will make the case that Sendero has shown the flexibility to appeal across classes, which, if true, is further evidence of a highly flexible organization, one with the potential to overcome the loss of its leader.

C. VULNERABILITY TO REVOLUTION

After establishing the Shining Path's adaptability and flexibility, this thesis will attempt to establish a framework

through which one can examine Peru's vulnerability to revolution, and more particularly, its vulnerability to a revolutionary movement such as the Shining Path. The framework established in Chapter IV will identify those aspects of Peruvian society exploited by the Shining Path, concentrating on three general themes: (1) the divided nature of Peruvian society; (2) the environment of economic crisis which has allowed the organization to flourish; and (3) the status (or lack thereof) of governmental institutions that could or should act either as a barrier to the rise of a revolutionary group or serve as a countervailing force to inhibit the growth of such an organization.

The above themes will be explored because they are the conditions that allowed the Shining Path to emerge initially, and are the conditions that allowed it to reach its recent level of strength. If these conditions are addressed and adequately rectified, the Shining Path will not succeed, with or without Guzman.

At this juncture it is simply too early to predict the impact of Guzman's seizure. However, the Shining Path has been underestimated too often in the past, and one would be more prudent to "hope for the best and prepare for the worst." Despite Guzman's capture, it is far too early to write Sendero's obituary.

II. RIGID IDEOLOGUES AND FLEXIBLE TACTICIANS

The Shining Path is normally portrayed as having a rigid, inflexible ideology, which, if true, should limit its ability to adapt to conditions in other countries. This chapter will demonstrate that Sendero ideology, while rigid in an overarching way, has not bound or restricted Sendero in its pursuit of seizing control of Peru. Despite its rigid ideology, Sendero has been extremely skillful in altering its strategies, tactics, and message to suit particular situations, playing upon the vulnerabilities, anger, or needs of its targeted audience, as well as its own larger strategic requirements. Thus this chapter's title-- the Shining Path is an organization with an unbending ideology, yet it has not allowed that ideology to limit its strategies or tactics in pursuit of its overall goal-- the overthrow of Peru's existing political, social, and economic system.

To make this point, this thesis will review the foundations of the Shining Path's ideology, focusing on the marriage of Mao Zedong, Jose Carlos Mariategui, and Abimael Guzman that makes SL unique. Then the paper will examine how the Shining Path operationalizes its ideology, studying the messages and tactics used for gaining support. This will be done by documenting and analyzing the inducements, both persuasive and coercive, used to mobilize a targeted

population. In particular, this chapter will, using case studies, analyze how SL differentially applies these inducements in Peru's two distinct cultures to gain support and to otherwise advance its own strategic agenda. First, I will focus on the message and tactics used in the interior, examining two distinctly different highland cultures. Within this section the essay will address Sendero methods used with the peasants of the southern highlands, and then its methods with the coca farmers in the Upper Huallaga Valley. Secondly, the Shining Path's methods in urban areas and the surrounding shantytowns will be analyzed. This chapter will demonstrate that despite its seemingly rigid ideology, Sendero has been flexible enough to sell itself to a diverse spectrum of Peruvian society, adapting its approach and mix of inducements to each situation, showing an operational flexibility that will be demanded if the organization is to survive Guzman's capture.

A. SHINING PATH IDEOLOGY AND STRATEGY

Jose Carlos Mariategui and Mao Zedong are the ideological foundations of the Shining Path.⁷ While Mariategui and Mao are from opposite sides of the world, they share many common

⁷Clearly, Marx and Lenin are also foundations of Sendero's ideological thought, as evidenced in Guzman's claim to be the "Fourth Sword." Guzman stated that "We would never be able to understand Maoism without understanding Marxism-Leninism." Guzman interview, 4-5. However, Guzman views Mao as the most applicable to Peru; thus, only Mao's ideology will be reviewed in this paper.

characteristics, both in background, ideology, and methods espoused to implement their preferred solutions. Each was the first to carry out a Marxist study of their respective countries, and each was important in the founding of his country's Communist Party. Each saw land tenure inequities as a fundamental detriment to progress, and each looked to peasant-based revolution as the solution.⁸

Mariategui's Marxist interpretation of Peru, written in his *Seven Essays*, was an attempt to develop a revolutionary program for Peru.⁹ The kind of society Mariategui envisioned was one founded on the values and institutions of the Incan civilization of the 1500s and would, by extension, be dominated by the indigenous population.¹⁰ Mariategui's ideal would be "Inca Communism," a system based on the Incan societal structure with a modern socialist economic system.¹¹ In his essays, Mariategui illustrates a Peru dominated by the conquering whites of Europe, exploiting the Indian from their

⁸Andrew Wheat, "Shining Path's Fourth Sword Ideology," *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* Vol. 18 (Summer 1990): 45.

⁹Jose Carlos Mariategui, *Seven Interpretive Essays on Peruvian Reality* (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1971).

¹⁰John M. Baines, *Revolution in Peru: Mariategui and the Myth* (University of Alabama Press, 1972), 80.

¹¹Tarazona-Sevillano, *Sendero Luminoso and the Threat of Narcoterrorism*, 15 and 17.

artificial capital of Lima. This world view, written in 1928, is essentially the same one used by Sendero today.¹²

While Mariategui provides the rationale and Peruvian version of communism, Mao provides the method, through his concept of a protracted, rural, peasant-based revolutionary struggle. As Wheat writes, Sendero rarely deviates from the Maoist line. For instance, Wheat quotes Mao's proposal for a "new democratic state," ruled by the four revolutionary classes (peasants, proletariats, and the petty and nationalist bourgeoisie).¹³ Although many writers have called Sendero an Indian movement, or, more recently, a peasant movement, Guzman states that the masses he serves are much broader:

It is the masses of our people, the proletariat, ... to which we owe our existence and which we serve; our peasantry, mainly the poor peasants; the intellectuals; the petty bourgeoisie; the advanced; the revolutionaries, those who want a radical transformation, in a word, a revolution- that's who sustains the Party.¹⁴

Later, when questioned of his views on property rights, Guzman states that

Mao stressed this slogan again and again, which for us means the destruction of semifeudal property and the distribution of the land as property to the peasantry,

¹²Wheat writes that the Shining Path "applies Maoism to a memory of Peru - one analyzed by Mariategui 60 years ago. It has not updated Mariategui to the present day..." Wheat, 48.

¹³Wheat, 43.

¹⁴Interview with Chairman Gonzalo, conducted by Luis Arce Borja and Janet Talavera, *El Diario*, 24 Jul 88, translated by the Committee to Support the Revolution in Peru (hereafter, CSRP) (Berkeley: CSRP, 1991), 29. Hereafter, Guzman interview.

mainly the poor peasantry... As for the national, or middle bourgeoisie, the policy is to respect their rights...¹⁵

These are not isolated examples of Sendero following the Maoist line; the Guzman interview reads like a primer not only for Mao's strategy of revolutionary peasant warfare, but also of Mao's plans for Chinese society. Even Sendero's five revolutionary phases are modeled on Mao's three-phased theory of protracted revolutionary warfare.¹⁶

The Shining Path's revolutionary ideology, although based on Maoism, is in reality much harsher than the revolutionary ideology pursued by Mao in the 1940s. Mao appealed to a wider spectrum of Chinese society, and tried to build as broad a popular base as possible. Sendero, on the other hand, has been far more exclusive in reaching out to society, having been deeply affected by the reforms initiated by Deng-Xiaoping following Mao's death. Thus, as Wheat writes, Sendero is much closer to the Mao of the Cultural Revolution and the Gang of Four than the Mao that came to power in 1949.¹⁷

Mao is clearly the dominant influence of Sendero ideology and tactics, but Mao's dictums are not followed blindly and verbatim; this is where the Guiding Thought, or Gonzalo Thought becomes important. Gonzalo Thought is the synthesis

¹⁵Guzman interview, 75.

¹⁶Gordon H. McCormick, *The Shining Path and the Future of Peru* R-3781 (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, Mar 1990), 15.

¹⁷Wheat, 47 and 50.

of Mariategui and Mao into an ideology and plan of action applicable to present day Peru. Tarazona-Sevillano writes that the major philosophical contributions of Guzman are the synthesis of the laws of dialectics, and the formulation of the five phases of armed struggle.¹⁸

Guzman has altered Sendero's plans more significantly than Tarazona-Sevillano has suggested. For example, the Shining Path formulated a revolutionary plan to confront a predominantly urban society by taking the battle into the cities, a factor that Mao did not have to face.¹⁹ Additionally, as a part of the urban campaign, SL has attempted to infiltrate established and legitimate groups such as unions and trade groups, and established front organizations ("generated organizations" in Sendero parlance) such as the Association of Democratic Lawyers, which had previously been despised and condemned.²⁰ As Guzman states,

¹⁸Tarazona-Sevillano, 20. The five phases are: (1) Agitation and propaganda; (2) Sabotage; (3) Generalization of the struggle; (4) Conquest and expansion of the support base and the strengthening of the guerrilla army; (5) General civil war, siege of the cities, and collapse of the state. McCormick, *The Shining Path and the Future of Peru*, 15.

¹⁹For a discussion of the ideological shift that took place within the Shining Path as it developed its urban strategy, see McCormick, "Sendero's Approach to the Cities: From the Sierra to the Cities," 5-19.

²⁰FBIS-LAT-91-178, 13 Sep 1991, 35, citing *La Republica*, 1 Sep 1991. The article's specific example is of Sendero's growing influence in SUTEP, the Trade Union of Education Workers. McCormick writes of Sendero's disinterest in front organizations prior to 1985 or 1986 and subsequent change of policy in *The Shining Path*, 27-28.

"The first thing that we established was the need to avoid a mechanical application of people's war..."²¹ Guzman and the Shining Path, while firmly following the path blazed by Mao, have not been afraid to deviate from Mao's programs when necessary. Close observation of Sendero's ideology and strategy shows that although they are generally rigid in following established doctrine, the Shining Path has clearly demonstrated the strategic flexibility to adjust to changing conditions, and dispels the notion of an unbending Sendero unable to adapt.

B. OPERATIONALIZING IDEOLOGY

As the case studies of Sendero recruitment will show, SL uses a wide variety of methods of gaining influence and support from targeted populations. These methods vary depending upon the needs and vulnerabilities of the community, as well as the organization's requirements, and can encompass a myriad of approaches. Sendero's approach to recruitment can be best understood by categorizing the particular aspects of recruitment under the general heading of inducements. That is to say, SL chooses its methods, messages, and tactics from an

²¹Guzman interview, 42.

arsenal of what this paper will call persuasive and coercive inducements.²²

By persuasive inducements this paper means providing (or promising) goods, or what Wickham-Crowley calls collective benefits, to a targeted population, whether they be tangible or psychological. This can encompass benefits provided in a positive sense, such as something provided to the targeted populace, or benefits provided in a negative sense, which provide the targeted audience the capacity to strike out or gain retribution or revenge against a perceived enemy. Coercive inducements, or what Stephen Walt calls negative sanctions, are the repercussions a target may incur by not supporting the revolution, or more seriously, by actively supporting the State.²³ This paper will now address each of these categories of inducements in turn.

²²The concept of inducements is not new in addressing guerrilla or revolutionary methods of recruitment, as it is drawn in part from the collective-goods theory, and is similar in approach to Parsons' four types of social control. See Talcott Parsons, "Reflections on the Place of Force in Social Process," in Harry Eckstein, ed., *Internal War: Problems and Approaches* (New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964). Also see Nathan Leites and Charles Wolf, Jr., *Rebellion and Authority: An Analytic Essay on Insurgent Conflicts* (Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1970), 33 and Chapters 4 and 6. More recent theory by Timothy P. Wickham-Crowley has yielded what he calls "macrosocial exchange processes." Timothy P. Wickham-Crowley, *Exploring Revolution* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1991), 17.

²³Stephen M. Walt, "Revolution and War," *World Politics* Vol. 44, No. 3 (April 1992): 335.

1. Persuasive Inducements

a. Social Contract

A persuasive issue exploited by the Shining Path is what Barrington Moore, expanding on Rousseau's concept, termed the social contract, or mutual obligations that link rulers to the ruled. According to Moore, the authorities are obligated to: (1) provide for the defense of the populace from foreign enemies; (2) maintain internal peace and order; and (3) contribute to the material security of the populace. In return, the populace is expected to: obey orders that contribute to the ruler's fulfillment of his end of the social contract; contribute toward the common defense; surrender a portion of its excess to the State; and arrange its own social relations in such a way as to maintain the internal peace.²⁴ If the State fails to fulfill its obligations within the contract, it loses legitimacy in the eyes of its subjects, and, if that loss of legitimacy is extreme, the region ultimately becomes "virgin soil" for those striving to establish a counter-state.²⁵ Chalmers Johnson makes a

²⁴Barrington Moore, Jr., *Injustice: The Social Bases of Obedience and Revolt* (White Plains, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1978), 20-22. Moore and Rousseau are only two of many social theorists who have written about some form of a social contract. Thomas Hobbes, for instance, wrote of covenants, and John Locke wrote of authority as a complementary relationship that incurred rights and obligations on both the ruled and the rulers.

²⁵Wickham-Crowley, *Exploring Revolution*, 34-35. By virgin soil Wickham-Crowley means that a political actor does not have to "reeducate" a person or region in revolutionary ideology, but only

related point when he asserts that a State loses legitimacy when its only claim to authority rests on the monopoly of force, meaning, by extension, that the State has mortgaged its legitimacy by not fulfilling its responsibilities under the social contract:

When confidence has evaporated to the extent that the exercise of power is futile, when the authority of the status holders entrusted with supervision and command rests *only* on their monopoly of force, and when there is no foreseeable prospect of a processual change in this situation, revolution is at hand.²⁶

As if confirming Johnson's point, the Peruvian government is viewed in much of the country as more of an abuser of power than as a party under contract. Peru's human rights violations are legendary, and the army's counterinsurgency campaign tends to be indiscriminate in its violence.²⁷ This delegitimizes the coercive arms, and by extension, the State as a whole, resulting in the fear and

to educate them; essentially, the revolution only needs to write on a blank slate, not first erase that slate.

²⁶Chalmers Johnson, *Revolutionary Change*, 2nd ed. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1982), 33. Rather than speak of a social contract, Johnson would say that societal values and the division of labor are in disequilibrium, and the ruling elite is not enacting policies to bring society back into equilibrium.

²⁷Mauceri writes that the army's approach to the insurgency closely resembles the national security doctrines followed by Southern Cone militaries in the post-World War II era. He further reports that the number of civilian casualties increased almost 10 times in the year after the military assumed control of the counterinsurgency campaign. Philip Mauceri, "Military Politics and Counter-Insurgency in Peru," *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* Vol. 33, No. 4 (Winter 1991): 91-92.

suspicion with which much of Peruvian society views the State, a suspicion used by the Shining Path to their advantage.

The government, further, is not fulfilling its end of the social contract. It has been unable to protect its citizens from Shining Path violence, thus failing the second of its obligations under the social contract. Furthermore, the government has not been able to contribute to the material security of the populace either, as crushing inflation, job and income losses, and negative economic growth have been constant since the early 1980s.²⁸

The Shining Path, on the other hand, has been able to fulfill aspects of the social contract in certain limited situations. In the Upper Huallaga Valley, Sendero provides protection from government troops and the Colombian cartels, and negotiates prices for coca leaf, fulfilling all of the requirements of the basic social contract. "Sendero law," known as "people's justice" and administered by "people's committees," satisfies the need for civil order in areas controlled by the organization.²⁹ Finally, Sendero-mandated

²⁸As Bernard Aronson stated, "When President Fujimori took office, Peru's 1990 GDP was down 22 percent from only two years before. It would take Peru 12 straight years of five percent growth to get per capita income back to 1987 levels." Assistant Secretary of State for Interamerican Affairs Bernard W. Aronson, testimony before the House Western Hemisphere Subcommittee, March 12, 1992. Peru's economic condition will be addressed in greater detail in a later chapter.

²⁹See, for instance, James Brooke, "Marxist Revolt Grows Strong In the Shantytowns of Peru," *New York Times*, 11 Nov 91.

price controls and killings of merchants believed by peasants to be engaged in price gouging constitute a blunt and crude form of combatting monopoly power and inflation, and is seen in the highlands as enhancing material well-being.

With respect to the social contract, the Shining Path, as an outside organization contesting for power, has an advantage over the government in that the government, as the central authority, is expected to uphold its obligations, while Sendero, as a nongovernmental challenger, is not generally held to the same standards. The Shining Path, as a group not in power, can always claim that it will better fulfill the needs of the people, even in cases where it is unable to do so now. In this respect, the government as the incumbent is forced to contest for people's support on the basis of its record, a record that is, for most Peruvians, a dismal failure. As in any political contest, the incumbent, if running with a record of failure, is at a certain disadvantage. The challenger, on the other hand, can contest the race based on the hope and promise for a different and better future.

b. Socioeconomic Issues

Socioeconomic conditions provide Sendero with a variety of messages with which it can appeal to a large segment of the Peruvian population. An important element of the Shining Path's message that carries a powerful appeal in

Peru is the promise of land. The Shining Path has long understood its importance, and regularly appeals to the peasant desire for land. Despite the success of the land reform programs of the Velasco years (Peru's reformist military president from 1968-1972), land tenure in Peru remains highly unequal, as the vast majority of the population did not benefit from his land reform programs.³⁰ Much of the expropriated land was not redistributed to the local Indian communities, but rather to the former tenants of the seized haciendas, which were later turned into cooperatives.³¹ Thus, land tenure remains highly skewed.³² In *Bases for Discussion*, the Shining Path speaks of "The peasants being the primary force, especially the poor peasants, struggle for the armed conquest of land under the leadership of the Communist

³⁰356,276 families, or 24 percent of rural families benefitted from land reform programs. Cynthia McClintock, *Peasant Cooperatives and Political Change in Peru* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), 61.

³¹Daniel M. Masterson, *Militarism and Politics in Latin America: Peru from Sanchez Cerro to Sendero Luminoso* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), 254.

³²76.3 percent of all landowners (1,084,364 total owners) own 6.6 percent of total agricultural land, while .1 percent of the landowners (2,187 total owners) own 61.7 percent of the agricultural land. James W. Wilkie, Enrique C. Ochoa, and David E. Lorey, eds. *Statistical Abstract of Latin America* (hereafter, *SALA*), Volume 28 (Los Angeles: UCLA Latin American Center Publications, 1990), table 302, p. 44-45. Further, in 1961, prior to Velasco's land reforms, the average farm size was 1.3 hectares; in 1972, the average was 1.4. *SALA* Vol. 28, table 304, p. 49.

Party." ³³ Additionally, to remind of its long history of fighting for land rights for peasants, *Bases for Discussion* alludes to Guzman's support of the poor peasants in Ayacucho before the beginning of Sendero's war against the State in 1980. "He (Guzman) supported the land invasions, held peasant events..."³⁴ Guzman was more specific in his appeal to land, stating "... which for us means the destruction of semifeudal property and the distribution of the land as property to the peasantry, mainly the poor peasantry...."³⁵

The Shining Path's also utilizes the hopelessness of its target's current situation, in conjunction with the offer of material security inherent in the basic social contract. Perhaps Sendero's best recruiting tool has been the extreme and prolonged economic downturn that has plagued Peru since at least 1987. Since that time, real wages and employment have fallen precipitously, and economic growth has been negative.³⁶ Such hardships play into SL's hands, as it

³³Central Committee, Communist Party of Peru (CC/PCP), "Bases for Discussion. The PCP Calls on the Masses to Struggle for Power. The Thinking of Gonzalo and the Workers," (hereafter, *Bases for Discussion*) Sept 1987, Reprinted in *Latin America and Caribbean Contemporary Record* (hereafter, *LACCR*), Vol. VII 1987-88 (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1990), C322.

³⁴Ibid., C324 and C325.

³⁵Guzman interview, 75.

³⁶Real wages fell 15.8 percent in 1988 and 46.3 percent in 1989. GDP fell 7.9 percent in 1988 and 11.3 percent in 1989. Carlos E. Paredes and Jeffrey D. Sachs, eds., *Peru's Path to Recovery* (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1991), table 2-1, p. 85.

can promise a better life-- without having to offer much proof.

The inequalities that pervade Peru offer another avenue of persuasion through which it can recruit. These inequalities can be along racial lines, where the disparities between the Indian, mestizo, and white sectors are stark; class lines, with Peru's highly unequal distribution of income;³⁷ or gender lines, where women face discrimination and exploitation. Sendero offers a means for each of these groups to lash out and take back from a society which has, in their view, treated them unfairly.

c. Psychological Needs

Although not as concrete as the above-mentioned inducements, psychological needs such as a sense of belonging, self-esteem, personal importance, and an explanation and solution to problems are important goods SL delivers to its followers, particularly the poor, landless, and dispossessed. These are the very groups that, until the rise of the Shining Path, did not have a voice in society. The Shining Path preaches that their lives have worth, something they may not have previously felt. Sendero writes, quoting Guzman,

³⁷In 1986 the top 10 percent of Peru's population controlled 35.4 percent of total income, while the bottom 70 percent controlled 36.9 percent. Paul Glewwe, "The Distribution of Welfare in Peru in 1985-1986," *Living Standards Measurement Study working paper 42* (Washington, DC: The World Bank), cited by A. Javier Hamann and Carlos E. Paredes, "Economic Characteristics and Trends," in Paredes and Sachs, eds., 54.

Poverty is a driving force in the revolution. The poor are the most revolutionary, poverty is the most beautiful song... *Poverty is not a blemish, it is an honor.*³⁸

El Diario echoes a similar theme as it plays up the sense of equality in the People's Guerrilla Army (PGA). In *El Diario*, Sendero writes that

Among the soldiers of the PGA, neither physical traits nor skin color count. There are mestizos, whites, blacks, Asians, men and women of all ages, ... Everybody looks after one another.³⁹

This concept is significant given the degree of prejudice and discrimination prevalent in Peru. Sendero provides an atmosphere of belonging, a sense of purpose and worth that is not conveyed to or felt by the marginalized of Peruvian political or civil society.

Finally, the Shining Path, through its ideology and message, provides the certainty of a "scientific" understanding of society, what is wrong with that society, and how to fix it. Carlos Degregori writes that Andean people have long been deceived by rulers who maintained a monopoly over education. Thus, the people, the "children of the deceived," are searching for, among other things, the truth. In the universities (and primary and secondary schools as well) Guzman and the Shining Path provide a simplified and

³⁸"Bases for Discussion," C320.

³⁹*El Diario Internacional*, Aug-Sep 1991, 10.

accessible version of the only "scientific truth."⁴⁰ As Chalmers Johnson writes,

When an ideology is developed enough to be a full-blown revolutionary ideology, it will combine the ideas of "goal," "instrument," and "value." It will supply intellectually and emotionally satisfying explanations of what is wrong with the old order and who is preventing its change, how to remove the obstacles to change, and what to replace the old order with.⁴¹

This relieves the stresses of everyday life, such as racism, sexism, poverty, and joblessness, because the Fourth Sword has given them the answers to their situation-- and promises to change that situation.

d. Conflictive Situations

Sendero's most basic and all encompassing method of persuading targeted audiences into supporting the revolution is through its exploitation of the particular conflictive situations that exist in targeted regions or villages.⁴² Sendero's method is to gather intelligence on its target and determine its conflictive situations, or those aspects of life that most anger or bother the targeted audience. These situations can run the gamut of corrupt public officials, hoarding by the local agricultural cooperative managers, price

⁴⁰Carlos Ivan Degregori, "A Dwarf Star," *NACLA Report on the Americas* Vol. 24, No. 4 (December/January 1990/1991): 15-16.

⁴¹Johnson, 86-87.

⁴²The term "conflictive situations" is taken from a Francisco Reyes report printed in *La Republica*, 31 Jul and 1 Aug 1991, cited in FBIS-LAT-91-156, 13 Aug 1991, 42.

gouging by local merchants, misconduct by the local priest, and so on. With this information in hand, Sendero "resolves" the conflict by punishing or killing offenders or offering them up for public trials, while extolling the virtues of Sendero. Thus by dealing with the village's local concerns and allowing them to gain some measure of revenge or "justice" from those who have "wronged" the community, Sendero offers a vehicle for addressing problems. Simultaneously, the Shining Path channels public discontent into its revolutionary program by linking the goals or demands (the conflictive situations) of the targeted group with the party's objectives.⁴³ This linkage, entirely dependent upon the local situation, can range from demands for land to revenge against a neighboring village to demands for food or electricity. Addressing these situations, in each case unique to its targeted region, allows the audience to vent its anger and frustration, while allowing the Shining Path to further recruit for its cause.

2. Coercive Inducements

These inducements are used if persuasion fails to convince a targeted audience to join the Sendero cause. This is not to say that just because they are inducements of last resort that they are used infrequently; clearly the brutality of Sendero's revolutionary warfare and the flight from the countryside by highland peasants reflects that persuasion is

⁴³McCormick, *From the Sierra to the Cities*, 11.

not always successful. But it is important to recognize that coercion is but one weapon in SL's arsenal of tactics, and in fact is just another option along the spectrum of available tactics. As Thomas Perry Thornton writes, the use of terror on the part of revolutionary groups aspiring to power is but a different expression of persuasion, with the same ultimate goal-- to influence political behavior.⁴⁴ Leites and Wolf echo the linkage (and often the mixing) between persuasion and coercion, writing

In practice, both persuasion and coercion are important as well as intimately linked. Severe coercion is often combined with a considerable and effective persuasive effort by Rebellions.⁴⁵

a. Violence and the Threat of Violence

Thornton writes that terror, in the context of an internal war, is a method used by insurgents to break or disrupt the "inertial relationship" between the existing State and the masses.

In order to do this (break or disrupt the inertial relationship), the insurgents must break the tie that binds the mass to the incumbents within the society, and they must remove the structural supports that give the society its strength... This process is one of

⁴⁴Thomas Perry Thornton, "Terror as a Weapon of Political Agitation," in Harry Eckstein, ed., *Internal War: Problems and Approaches*, 72-73.

⁴⁵Leites and Wolf, 33.

disorientation, the most characteristic use of terror...⁴⁶

Thornton's description of the use of revolutionary terror closely mirrors Sendero's use of terror. Sendero attempts to break a targeted community's ties to the government; then, if persuasion of local power brokers is unsuccessful, terror is used to disorient a society and bring it into Sendero's sphere. Examples of this abound, from the intimidation or killing of government officials to the attacks on prominent individuals that resist recruitment. Once it succeeds in inducing disorientation, SL can then begin to create the community it wants, to oppose the government and support the war against the State.⁴⁷

Shining Path violence, as all revolutionary violence, is aimed at several audiences. The first audience is the unfortunate individual or individuals who, by virtue of position or action, incur Sendero's wrath. That, however, is the least of any revolution's objective; the real audience is the living. Sendero's use of terror against the living is intended to have one or more effects, including: (1) to break the relationship with the State by demonstrating the State's

⁴⁶Ibid., 74.

⁴⁷Thornton writes that "... to the extent that terror destroys only the keystone-symbol, the individual components of the structure remain intact and available for restructuring along lines desired by the insurgents." Thornton, 77.

inability to fulfill the social contract; (2) set an example for others so that they do not cross the organization; (3) immobilize an audience so that they cease to act as supporters or agents of the government; this includes, as Wickham-Crowley writes, an attempt to stop "information leakage;"⁴⁸ (4) disorientation, to isolate the audience from its normal support structures;⁴⁹ and (5) the advertisement of the group's presence, strength, or ideals.⁵⁰ Sendero's use of violence, as we will see in the case studies, closely resembles this set of objectives.

Although Sendero is an unusually violent organization, its use of terror, whether by threat or violence, tends to be highly discriminating, unlike that of the State.⁵¹ This has been noted in numerous accounts of the war in Peru. While Sendero defines its enemies broadly, violence is used against someone; a group of individuals; or a village that has in some way violated Sendero rules, is unpopular with the local community, or is in some way a

⁴⁸Wickham-Crowley, *Exploring Revolution*, 75.

⁴⁹Thornton, 83-84.

⁵⁰*Ibid.*, 82.

⁵¹See Wickham-Crowley, *Exporting Revolution*, 75-80 for his explanation of discrimination and guerrilla terror.

supporter of the State.⁵² Terror is not used as a means in and of itself, but as a means to an end.

This is not to say that Sendero's use of violence is always successful, for that clearly is not the case. Violence can also work against a revolutionary movement. For example, when used in traditional societies that still maintain extensive familial ties, each killing or act of violence affects a large number of people, and, due to the personal nature of the act, does not always have the effect of neutralizing the populace. Nelson Manrique writes of specific instances where the use of violence moved wide circles of people to seek revenge. These revenge seekers were soon employed by the army into civil patrols, a move that broadened the war and ignited communal rivalries that had existed in some cases from pre-colonial times.⁵³ In this case, as in others, excessive violence caused a backlash against the revolutionary group, creating problems for the organization. The use of violence, to be successful, must be carefully

⁵²See, for instance, Carol Graham, "Sendero's Law in Peru's Shantytowns," *Wall Street Journal*, 7 Jun 1991. Tom Mark's interviews in Lima expand on Sendero's use of terror. He quotes an unnamed embassy official, "Sendero is brutal but not indiscriminate... We are not witnessing pent-up rage exploding. Rather we are seeing carefully designed and calculated terror...." Tom Marks, "Making Revolution with Shining Path," in David Scott Palmer, ed., *Shining Path of Peru* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), 196.

⁵³Nelson Manrique, "Time of Fear," *NACLA Report on the Americas* Vol. 24, No. 4 (December/January 1990/1991): 36.

calibrated to achieve the desired effect, for to exceed a certain level can be detrimental to the cause.

Violence is the ultimate coercive inducement, and is one that the Shining Path is not loathe to use. Terror, however, does not always mean the killing or physical harm of individuals. The threat of terror, if considered by the audience to be credible, can be an equally effective coercive tool. That is to say that an organization with coercive capability, if it has demonstrated its willingness to follow through on its threats, is more likely to have its warnings heeded. While threats are often effective in reaching a desired objective, they are not adequate by themselves to achieve several of the objectives outlined above. Threats are unlikely to allow an organization to advertise itself or achieve the shock effect necessary to disorient a targeted audience. Thus, threats are most likely to be effective if either preceded or accompanied by actual violence.

How does the Shining Path get away with such actions? In Peru the answer is twofold, and relatively simple. First, Sendero is able to use terror and violence because of the lack of a state coercive counterforce in much of the country. If no credible counter-coercive force is available, the Shining Path essentially has free rein. Secondly, government forces often are not seen as a legitimate alternative to the Shining Path. Peruvian security forces, with their record of indiscriminate action, do not serve, for

a large portion of the population, as a force to which a threatened individual, village, or region can turn.⁵⁴ Thus, the mass populace either must face SL alone or they must worry about receiving similar abuse from government forces. Given that, in general, Sendero intelligence is much better than the government's, the squeezed masses may find a way to accommodate the Shining Path; if they oppose SL, invariably the organization will find out and take appropriate steps. On the other hand, if one accommodates SL, government forces are less likely to recognize one's role; if caught by government forces one is more likely to be picked at random or indiscriminately than based on hard evidence or good intelligence. Thus, accommodation of the Shining Path, even in government patrolled areas, is often the safest choice one can make. Such are the harsh realities of being stuck, in the eyes of many, between two bad alternatives.

Sendero's use of terror provides it with many positive returns. First, it can be used to force acquiescence of a relatively large group of people.⁵⁵ But terror can also work against a revolutionary group just as it works against the State. Sendero's use of coercion to gain control of a

⁵⁴For an illustration of this dilemma, see Jo-Marie Burt, "Counterinsurgency = Impunity," *NACLA Report on the Americas* Vol. 24, No. 4 (December/January 1990/1991): 30-31. Also, Mauceri, "Military Politics and Counter-Insurgency in Peru," 91-92.

⁵⁵Thornton quotes Trotsky, who said that "the revolution... kills individuals and intimidates thousands." Thornton, 88.

region often elicits a positive response in the community, as targets are normally those disliked or feared. However, once in control of a region, Sendero is held to the same standards as an established government, and coercion that is seen as excessive or unwarranted breeds resentment, and the organization may lose support.⁵⁶

This illustrates two points. First, contenders for power are not held to the same standards as the incumbent. Should Sendero gain power it is likely to be judged on the same scale as the government, which is to say a more critical scale. Second, Sendero's vision of "the enemy" may, and often does, differ from that of a targeted population. That is to say, each may agree on the use of force against criminals or corrupt officials; however, in the eyes of the targeted audience, merely being in a position of authority is not reason enough to kill local authorities. While this is clearly not indiscriminate violence from SL's perspective, it is in conflict with the peasant's vision of propriety. This does not mean that Sendero will lose influence or support in a region, but it does make the mission more difficult.

⁵⁶This illustrates how the use of violence can work against a revolutionary movement. See, for example, Isbell's depiction of Sendero's campaign in the Rio Pampas Valley in the early and mid 1980s. Billie Jean Isbell, "Shining Path and Peasant Responses in Rural Ayacucho," in Palmer, ed., *Shining Path of Peru*, 61-78.

b. "Sendero Law"

The impact of "Sendero law" in a region controlled by the Shining Path was previously mentioned as an example of a situation in which SL meets one of the pillars of the social contract. This law, however, also has a clearly implied coercive element, for the punishment for violation of the newly imposed law is often harsh. "Sendero law" often goes beyond mere punitive action against child molesters, wife beaters, homosexuals, or common criminals; Sendero also imposes rules that allow it to better prosecute its campaign against the State. This can include, for instance, forbidding peasants from planting or harvesting crops that exceed their own subsistence needs, in an attempt to reduce or prevent the flow of food into cities. In effect, those living under "Sendero law" in SL controlled regions must deal with a whole new administrative order that includes living under the threat of SL retribution. When faced with this situation, individuals have but two choices; either accommodate SL and become, at a minimum, a passive supporter, or flee one's home and village and join the migration to the cities-- a dislocation that obviously does not guarantee escape from the Shining Path.

Chalmers Johnson writes of the importance of equilibrium between "values and division of labor." Peru, by most standards, is a society in disequilibrium. Sendero uses coercion to further that disequilibrium and induce local

disorientation. If successful, "Sendero law" can create a new equilibrium-- in other words, a new set of values and a new division of labor. Attempting this in an equilibrated society would be inordinately difficult. But in Peru's fractured state, people need something to hold onto, a moral anchor. Sendero provides that anchor. The implications for the State are enormous, for if Sendero is successful in creating a "new equilibrium," the State would have to do much more than defeat SL militarily-- it would then have to reassert or create its own equilibrium. While this may sound extreme, recall the above discussion of the social contract, and the fact that in many cases the Shining Path is the element best equipped to fulfill the State's obligations. Thus, the longer the war with Sendero goes on, the more difficult becomes the mission of the State; the mission becomes more than just defeating a revolutionary group; it becomes the recreation of society.

3. Case Studies

Thus far this chapter has documented the abstract methods that Sendero uses to gain support by classifying their methods into the broad categories of positive, negative, and coercive inducements. The following case studies will show how the Shining Path uses these inducements to attract support, be it in the poverty-stricken southern highlands, the relatively affluent profit-motivated cultivators of the Upper Huallaga Valley, or the slums that surround the cities. These

cases will demonstrate the tactical flexibility of the Shining Path and how it takes local, "bread and butter" issues and makes them its own, rarely even mentioning the relatively rigid ideology detailed above. James Scott writes of the difficulty revolutionary movements can encounter in reconciling their objectives for society with the often very different desires of the peasants on whom they rely.⁵⁷ Sendero, at least during the recruitment phase, has thus far skillfully and successfully negotiated that difficult obstacle.

a. *SL in the Interior: The Battle for the Southern Highlands*

The first campaign this thesis will examine is the Shining Path's attempts to build support in its home region of the southern highlands. The nature of the southern highlands is such that Sendero is able to operate largely free from extensive government interference; often when government interference was present, it is ineffectual in preventing the insurgency's expansion.

Perhaps the best single illustration of Sendero's flexibility and recruitment pattern in the southern highlands is Ronald Berg's analysis of Sendero operations in Andahuaylas. Andahuaylas province of Apurimac department,

⁵⁷James C. Scott, "Revolution in the Revolution: Peasants and Commissars," *Theory and Society* Vol. 7 (1979): 97-134.

located approximately 50 miles southeast of Ayacucho. Andahuaylas is a region similar to Ayacucho, with a poor populace that has historically fared poorly, from the *haciendas* through the Velasco-inspired cooperatives.⁵⁸ Velasco's land reforms and the demise of the *haciendas* created an economic vacuum which was filled by entrepreneurs, who were resented by many of the peasants that did not prosper or better themselves during the changes of the 1970s. This created a small number of successful peasants in the midst of the majority, economically polarizing the peasant community. Thus, when the Shining Path began its campaign in Andahuaylas in 1981, it faced three conflictive situations in society. First was peasant resentment of the cooperatives, which had in some ways taken on a similar role as the detested *haciendas*; second, resentment toward the State for its role in establishing the cooperatives and its long standing association with the old exploitive elite; and finally, local entrepreneurs for alleged excesses, corruption, and excessive profiteering.

Sendero's conduct of the campaign indicated an understanding of these conflicts. Their first action in Andahuaylas was to attack one of the conflictive symbols by destroying machinery at one of the local farm cooperatives.

⁵⁸Following case study derived from Ronald H. Berg, Sendero Luminoso and the Peasantry of Andahuaylas," *Journal of Inter-american Studies and World Affairs* Vol. 28, No. 4 (Winter 1986-87): 165-193.

The region's two cooperatives became SL's primary targets, and within a year both had been ruined by Sendero attacks. Sendero destroyed the farm equipment, and, in an example of the use of positive inducements, contributed to material security by either distributing the cooperative's remaining produce among neighboring peasants or expropriating it themselves. They also assassinated former leaders of the cooperatives that had been accused of corruption.

Sendero exploited the second conflictive situation by attacking state agencies associated with the cooperatives or with commercial agriculture, which evidently had a marked effect on other local government officials. All, including judges, resigned from their positions.⁵⁹ Several local officials were killed, including a judge who had been involved in the agrarian reform movement that resulted in the cooperatives. Additionally, in one instance Sendero beat a judge accused of passing tips to the police, but allowed him to live after what appears to be a "people's trial" rendered its verdict.

Sendero exploited the third conflictive situation with a combination of positive and negative inducements. In some cases they robbed stores and gave away the goods, and in one case, redistributed cattle owned by wealthier land owners. On another occasion, SL attacked a town, killed three major

⁵⁹Ibid., 180.

merchants, and either confiscated or distributed their goods. All three merchants were unpopular, primarily due to their wealth and exploitation of the peasants. Thus, Sendero appealed to the peasant resentment of those better off than themselves by use of negative inducements that address their desire for revenge or punishment against those who have bettered themselves at the expense of their villagers. The positive inducement comes from the satisfaction, however short term it may be, of the peasant desire or need of the goods confiscated from local merchants.

The above description is but a very broad brush of Sendero's actions in Andahuaylas, but several important conclusions can be drawn from the characterization. First, the level of precision with which the Shining Path guerrillas dissected the Andahuaylan social and economic concerns indicates that the *senderistas* either conducted much research on the targeted province or had covert sympathizers in place. This is in line with past SL practice and analysis that concluded that Sendero rarely shows its hand before it is ready to act.⁶⁰ Second, those conflictive segments of society were heavily targeted; each was attacked in brutal fashion, and perhaps received great publicity at the time for their brutality. Yet each target was attacked and dealt with to serve as a negative inducement for the local populace.

⁶⁰McCormick, *From the Sierra to the Cities*, 12.

Further, Sendero did not demonstrate a propensity to attack elements of society indiscriminately. This conforms with observations made throughout Peru, where targets or personnel are attacked either because of their position in society (government association, wealth, etc.), opposition to the Shining Path, or disfavor in a Sendero-targeted region. We again see confirmation of the now generally held view that while its list of enemies may be long and broad, Sendero rarely attacks randomly.⁶¹

Berg, in fact, found that the Shining Path's campaign was indeed successful in gaining a measure of peasant support. Perhaps the best example cited is the ways the Andahuaylan peasants referred to members of SL. In 1982 senderistas were known as "terrorists." By 1985, they were often called "comrades."⁶²

Sendero's brutal but relatively precise targeting of specific issues in Andahuaylas is marked in contrast to police methods, which typically consisted of random violence. With their characteristically weak intelligence, the police forces typically searched houses, rounded up suspected

⁶¹One finds much evidence to support this proposition. For instance, a human rights worker from Ayacucho reported, "Sendero investigate and decide who to kill-- they may be common criminals, rapists, or informers, but there is always a reason. But when teachers or women disappear, then it's the army." Reported in Sally Bowen, "Peru Harnesses Peasant Power to Combat Guerrillas," *Financial Times*, 31 May 91.

⁶²Berg, 189.

senderistas and sympathizers, conducted interrogations and torture. Other police actions included indiscriminate beatings, and on at least one occasion, the rape of two women. This was part of a general pattern of police and paramilitary behavior towards the peasantry which cannot help but further discredit the government in the minds of the peasant populace by contributing to what Chalmers Johnson calls power deflation,⁶³ and by contrast boost the appeal of Sendero.

This case is representative of Sendero forays in the sierra. While the basic tactics may be similar, the actual issues addressed vary with the targeted locale. The mission is the same: break the region's ties to the central government, break down local elite objection to the organization, and, most importantly, address issues important to the target. Once that is done and the group has gained a degree of authority in the region, Sendero will work to address its own concerns, and, if successful, impose "Sendero law."

b. SL in the Interior: The Battle for the Upper Huallaga Valley

The situation in the Upper Huallaga Valley (UHV) in the early 1980s was far different from that of Andahuaylas. In contrast to Andahuaylas, the UHV had several additional actors, both internal and external, with which to contend.

⁶³Johnson, 93.

First was the presence of representatives of the various Colombian drug cartels, thoroughly capitalist external actors who acted as the market for peasant-grown coca paste. Second was the presence of the Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement (MRTA), Peru's other revolutionary group, which was looking to gain power and political support in the valley. Thirdly, the Peruvian police and military forces were present in the UHV on a more sustained basis, propelled by the intensive attention given to the coca crop by the United States. A final difference was that while the peasants of Andahuaylas were generally subsistence farmers, the average coca-growing peasant in the UHV is a participant in Peru's export market and thus, realized or not, a capitalist. Thus, Sendero clearly faced a different environment in which it would have to operate to expand its influence and improve its overall position. This essay will address Sendero's response to each factor in succession.

Prior to the Shining Path's military appearance in the UHV, drug traffickers ran roughshod over the growers. The traffickers refused to negotiate over the price of coca, and enforced informal "death sentences" on growers unable to deliver the proper amount of coca. Additionally, cartel-financed gangs prevented any peasant move toward organizing themselves, breaking up meetings and killing the leaders.⁶⁴

⁶⁴Tarazona-Sevillano, 117.

Sendero's response to this situation was to move into an area, arrange meetings for ideological speeches, and then question the townspeople about the gangs and other problems. Once the gang members were known, Sendero either banished or executed them.⁶⁵ Thus Sendero used a positive inducement by fulfilling the first requirement of the social contract, acting as the guarantor of security from an external power by serving as a buffer between the Colombians and the peasants. Additionally, Sendero, in exchange for taxing the growers five percent of the value of their product, has worked to raise the price of the coca, in effect lining their own pockets while also increasing the grower's profit-- again contributing to the social contract by guaranteeing material security.⁶⁶ These are not isolated cases, as Sendero often acts in ways that appeal to the local peasant population. However, this is a case of the organization operating successfully in an environment radically different from its home bases in southern Peru.

This is not to say that Sendero has completely alienated the Colombians. Despite the obvious contradiction with Sendero ideology, SL has thus far worked out a *modus vivendi* with the traffickers whereby each benefits. In return for charging the cartels periodically for access to the coca,

⁶⁵Ibid.

⁶⁶McClintock, "Peru," LACCR, B162.

Sendero provides the traffickers three benefits: discipline among the peasants, protection from state interference, and the promise of further destabilization of the Peruvian government, a situation which can only increase the availability of coca.⁶⁷

Sendero and the MRTA had been competing for power in the UHV since the early 1980s. Although Sendero was the more powerful of the groups, both militarily and socially, they nevertheless formed an alliance with the cartel, and together they forced the MRTA out of the regions in the UHV where the MRTA maintained a power base.⁶⁸ Thus, after first confronting the cartel's hegemony over the peasant growers, Sendero then was able to use or work with the Colombians to further consolidate its political hold over the valley.

While Sendero's actions against the traffickers enhanced its appeal to the peasant growers, nothing has benefitted the Shining Path politically as much as its response to governmental actions in the UHV. In this instance, the Shining Path was fortunate that the government delivered two important issues to exploit, which Sendero handled successfully.

The first issue was the economic issue. In the early 1980s the government initiated two programs to limit the

⁶⁷McCormick, *The Shining Path and the Future of Peru*, 22, and Tarazona-Sevillano, 118.

⁶⁸Tarazona-Sevillano, 126.

growth of coca. One, the Special Project for the Upper Huallaga (PEAH), was designed as a crop substitution program, which has thus far failed. The second, the Agreement for the Control and Reduction of Coca in the Upper Huallaga (CORAH) was a coca eradication program, and the program that most agitated the local populace. To the farmers, these programs were seen as threats to their only means of survival. The State became an "element of alienation"⁶⁹ to the peasants of the UHV as it acted, in the eyes of the farmers, to consciously break the social contract and actively deprive its citizens of material security, and drove the growers into the arms of SL.

The second issue handed to Sendero was not only the US support and backing of these programs, but the actual presence of US agents in the valley. This led to fear and distrust of the United States, opening up the issue of interventionism, nationalism, and US imperialism for Sendero to use to gain peasant support.

Sendero was able to use each of these governmental gifts skillfully. Sendero responded to the first by protecting the growers from the government eradication teams and by attacking personnel associated with the military,

⁶⁹Tarazona-Sevillano, 111.

police, and workers from CORAH.⁷⁰ Sendero used the presence of US agents primarily for ideological purposes, by denouncing the US imperialists as the primary cause of the grower's problems. Tarazona-Sevillano quotes a US Drug Enforcement Agency agent who sums up the rhetorical bonanza handed to SL by stating, "You'll have imperialists cutting down coca trees in front of a crying peasant woman. Mao could not have thought of anything better."⁷¹

Although the Colombian cartels have benefitted somewhat from the agreement forged with Sendero, the clear winners are the peasants and Sendero itself. While Sendero has not spared the peasantry from its wrath on certain occasions, the order Sendero imposed in the valley has worked to the growers' advantage, as they are now protected from the intimidation of the traffickers, and protected to a degree from government forces. While Sendero has imposed conditions on the peasantry for their protection, overall the costs are low. The five percent tax on coca leaf is seen as a cost of doing business, but one whose benefits far outweigh the

⁷⁰The military cooperated with Sendero, as their policy of changing military emergency zone commanders every year resulted in ever-changing counterinsurgency strategies that never had the time to succeed or fail, and prevented the zone commanders (typically white generals from the coast) from ever developing an understanding of their task and the situation. See Mauceri, "Military Politics and Counter-Insurgency in Peru," 98-99.

⁷¹Alan Riding, "Rebels Disrupting Coca Eradication in Peru," *New York Times*, 26 Jan 89, quoted by Tarazona-Sevillano, 111.

disadvantages.⁷² Most growers are better off under Sendero than they were when they were subject to the wrath and whims of the cartels.⁷³

An additional economic benefit the growers have gained from Sendero is a measure of protection from price gouging. Because coca is so nutrient demanding, much of the soil in the UHV is in poor condition, thus making it difficult to grow food. Sendero has responded by limiting the price of fertilizer, which, according to Sendero sources, had been marked up extraordinarily high. While Sendero does not state whether the growth of food is of the growers' volition or in response to a Sendero order, nevertheless the organization has limited price gouging in the fertilizer market.⁷⁴ And even if the growth of food is mandated by SL, the average grower's family earnings far exceed that of the average Peruvian.⁷⁵ Needless to say, support for the Shining Path has grown substantially, and Sendero is the dominant political actor in

⁷²And, according to Moore's social contract, taxation is within the bounds of acceptability-- if the government or authority is fulfilling its obligations, as the Shining Path is doing.

⁷³McCormick, *The Shining Path and the Future of Peru*, 23.

⁷⁴*El Diario Internacional*, Aug-Sep 91, 8-9.

⁷⁵Even with a poor yield, Tarazona-Sevillano reports that the average annual earnings comes to approximately \$3636 before expenses, compared to Peru's per capita income of \$1,000. Coca yields a price about 10 times higher than food crops, and often the *narcotraficantes* (drug cartels from Colombia) pay in advance. Tarazona-Sevillano, 116.

the region.⁷⁶ The UHV has become one of Sendero's greatest successes, and is now probably its strongest support base.⁷⁷

Sendero's collaboration with the peasant growers does not come without a substantial compromise on its part, as the tolerance of such a capitalist society dependent upon a decadent product contradicts SL's socialist vision. Sendero's distaste for drug trafficking is evident in internal writings. For instance, *El Diario* writes, "In the Open People's Committees one can sense the determination of the people led by the PCP to develop a self-sufficient economic system that no longer depends on dollars from the sale of coca leaves."⁷⁸ Additionally, when pressed on the issue of Sendero support of the drug trade, Sendero's representative in Europe, publisher of *El Diario*, and Guzman interviewer, Luis Arce Borja stated

The Shining Path organization supports the people, the exploited peasant... Drug trafficking is not a problem that the armed struggle wants to resolve for the time being. This is a more serious problem that the revolution will resolve in due time. The problem of drug trafficking and coca growing will be definitely solved as soon as the PCP takes power, and not before then.⁷⁹

Sendero's drive to control the UHV represents another clear example of an organization flexible enough to

⁷⁶McCormick, *The Shining Path and the Future of Peru*, 22.

⁷⁷Although this base of support was at first based solely on economic considerations, Sendero is now winning "hearts and minds" as well. Tarazona-Sevillano, 116 and 120.

⁷⁸*El Diario Internacional*, August-September 1991, 9.

⁷⁹FBIS-LAT-91-226, 22 Nov 91, 39, quoting an interview in *Expreso*, 10 Nov 91.

adapt to local conditions. Sendero gained the support of the peasant through the provision of positive inducements by protecting him from the government and the cartels, yet was still able to reach tactical compromises with the cartels on coca prices, access to the valley, and order in the peasant communities. Sendero even forged alliances with the traffickers to fight the government and the MRTA-- despite the fact that Sendero scorns much of what the Colombians represent.⁸⁰ Additionally, in return for the support of the peasant, Sendero has tolerated trade that is contrary to the values of the organization. While Sendero's long-term support for these activities is suspect, Sendero has shown that it can compromise its puritanical side to gain a tactical advantage that benefits its overall strategic goals.

c. SL in the Cities: The Battle for Urban Support

Before proceeding with this section, several factors must be noted. First, the urban campaign is more recent and less developed than that in rural areas, as Sendero did not start to see the cities as an important part of its campaign for victory until 1985.⁸¹ Secondly, the Shining Path faces obstacles in the urban campaign not present in the

⁸⁰The Colombians are seen by the puritanical Shining Path as excessive drinkers, overbearingly loud in their parties, and extravagant in their dress.

⁸¹McCormick, *From the Sierra to the Cities*, 6. Although Sendero's actual rural campaign began in 1980, it had spent the greater part of the 1970s laying the groundwork.

countryside. First, unlike much of the countryside, the cities are not "virgin soil," devoid of governmental influence. To gain influence in these urban settings the Shining Path must recruit within a far more diverse social, economic and political setting.⁸² Urban occupations are more diverse, and political competition from incumbent and parties of the legal left is more prevalent. Second, many of the inhabitants of the cities, particularly the shantytowns, are former rural peasants who fled Sendero violence; these people should be, by definition, less receptive to the Shining Path's overtures. Finally, the State's coercive arms are deployed far more densely in the cities, making attacks more complicated and dangerous.⁸³ With these factors in mind, one still sees evidence of SL's flexibility in its urban conduct.

While data on Sendero's local-level actions in the cities are sketchy, the pattern of its flexibility and use of local issues, although less sophisticated than in rural cases, is still apparent. For example, *La Republica* reports that when Sendero attempts to compete with the legal left, it employs the same basic promises as the legal left, such as shortages of food and electricity. For instance, SL graffiti

⁸²McCormick, *From the Sierra to the Cities*, 58.

⁸³For a more thorough discussion of the difficulties inherent in the urban campaign, see McCormick, "Problems of the Urban Underground," in *From the Sierra to the Cities*, 55-73.

in the Campo Grade *pueblo jovenes* reads "For water and light, fight and resist."⁸⁴

Additionally, Sendero learned from its mistakes in attempting to win over individual shantytowns. In 1983, SL attempted to infiltrate and control a shantytown in Huancayan, but was soon overrun by traditional political parties and interest groups, attracted to Huancayan's large and expanding population. From this experience, Sendero learned to target smaller, poorer, and less politicized shantytowns, where it would face less political competition.

Sendero also created its own shantytown, Raucana, which it hoped to use as a model community to lure a larger following in other shantytowns. Under Sendero control, the shantytown residents dug their own wells, raised lampposts for electricity, and laid out streets, and generally created a *pueblo* whose order contrasts favorably to the chaos seen in most shantytowns.⁸⁵ This is an attempt to begin to address the largest issue in the shantytowns, which is the basic services not provided by the government, such as sanitation, potable water, basic health care, electricity, and other quality of life issues. Granted, this is very difficult, as

⁸⁴FBIS-LAT-91-178, 13 Sep 91, 34, quoting *La Republica*, 1 Sep 91.

⁸⁵FBIS-LAT-91-178, 13 Sep 91, 36-37, citing *La Republica*, 1 Sep 91.

Sendero is faced with a conservative population,⁸⁶ and is operating under close supervision of the armed forces or police. But the attempt is being made. The creation of its own shantytowns gives the Shining Path an additional advantage, as it allows the organization to influence all aspects of daily life from the outset, without having to compete with other, established organizations.⁸⁷ Thus, to further its influence in this manner, the Shining Path is apparently organizing land seizures to increase the number of shantytowns under its control.⁸⁸

In the shantytown of Huascar, Sendero found and successfully exploited a negative inducement by seizing the issue of official corruption, and has thus targeted government officials for elimination.⁸⁹ In this case, two purposes are served. First, Sendero is able to address a local area of concern for the residents, one for which they hope to be rewarded with support. Secondly, Sendero is given the opportunity to reduce or eliminate the government's reach into Huascar, providing Sendero additional space from which it can

⁸⁶See Susan C. Stokes, "Politics and Latin America's Urban Poor: Reflections from a Lima Shantytown," *Latin American Research Review* Vol. 26, No. 2 (1991): 75-99.

⁸⁷Michael L. Smith, "Shining Path's Urban Strategy: Ate Vitarte," in Palmer, ed., *Shining Path of Peru*, 143.

⁸⁸*Ibid.*

⁸⁹Carol Graham, "Sendero's Law in Peru's Shantytowns," *Wall Street Journal*, 7 Jun 91.

use political mobilization, terror, or the threat of terror to enforce its will, and to address other conflictive situations in the community to build real political support.

On a more general level, the Shining Path continues to work to infiltrate local organizations, which gives it two alternatives, both in its interests, with which to exploit. First, Sendero would like to be able to take control of the organization, as it was able to do with the primary teachers union, SUTEP, and the newspaper *El Diario*. If unable to actually gain control of the organization, penetration allows it to gather intelligence on organizational actions, and either influence actions or intimidate to serve SL's purposes.⁹⁰

Although the above examples are less clear than the cases from the interior, the evidence from the cities demonstrates several samples of Sendero modifying its methods to suit local conditions. First, Sendero has been flexible enough to slowly exert its influence within organizations it does not completely control. Second, the evidence shows that Sendero can in fact operate in a more crowded arena and in an arena in which it is neither the first political actor nor the most powerful. Thus, one should not be surprised that the Shining Path has been less successful or slower in selling

⁹⁰Smith, 137-140. Smith writes that a grass-roots tradition of democratic tolerance of radicals has allowed the Shining Path to gain such footholds.

itself in the cities. Regardless, the available evidence clearly demonstrates that the Shining Path is a tactically flexible organization able to alter its methods and message to suit local needs, yet still keep itself focused on the overall goal.

C. CONCLUSION

This chapter has examined the Shining Path's ideological foundations and found that in fact the conventional wisdom that depicts the organization as a dogmatic, ideologically rigid organization is generally accurate. However, once SL moves beyond its ideology into the realm of strategy and tactics, a completely different picture emerges, as it has been able to subordinate its ideological beliefs to further long range goals. The Shining Path significantly altered its strategy in the mid-1980s to better address the urban component of the war. At the operational level of prosecuting the revolution, Sendero, using the framework of inducements, is remarkably flexible in addressing local issues and using them in the context of its overall goals. The above review of three very different scenarios draws a picture of an organization that is as adept at operating with subsistence peasants as it is at crafting a foreign policy that limits yet also harnesses the power of a foreign actor in serving its interests.

The implications of this flexibility is disturbing for Peru. Initially portrayed as an Indian and then as a peasant group, the Shining Path has shown the capacity to expand beyond those bounds to enlist the support of a larger spectrum of supporters. This does not in any way diminish the role of coercion or violence in the expansion of the revolution, but it does demonstrate that Sendero is capable of expanding its influence beyond expected boundaries. It makes the underestimation of Sendero's abilities to move into and organize new regions a highly risky assumption.

Further, the Shining Path's demonstrated flexibility indicates that the organization may have the institutional capability to adapt and proceed despite Guzman's capture. Were the Shining Path slavishly devoted to its ideology at the strategic and tactical level, unable to adapt to changing conditions, Peru's would have little to fear, for the organization, not having been adaptable during its campaign, would be unlikely to be able to adapt to this situation either. If SL were rigid and ideologically bound at all echelons of operation it could perhaps continue to create problems, but these problems would likely remain local and, while perhaps violent, would not pose a threat to the State's stability and overall national economic and political order. The Shining Path, though, has already demonstrated its ability to adapt to local conditions both in its tactics and its recruitment message. This obviously does not mean that

Sendero will successfully recover from Guzman's capture, but it does make the potential for success greater.

III. SHINING PATH'S APPEAL

The above chapter addressed the ideology, strategy, and tactics used by the Shining Path to gain support among targeted audiences around the Peru. These audiences are made up of a number of constituencies, or relatively independent interest groups, that form any gathering of people, whether it be a highland village or a shantytown near Lima. This chapter will address the organization's appeal from a lower level of analysis, focusing on the appeal to the specific targeted constituencies that make up the highland villages and urban shantytowns. This section will examine which issues and types of issues Sendero employs, and which sectors of society are targeted or attracted by the message.

Again, despite its depiction as a rigid organization, the Shining Path demonstrates its flexibility by appealing to a number of segments of people in Peruvian society. Much of this appeal is based on the economic problems that grip Peru, but nevertheless, many different bases of support are targeted, and often reached, belying the notion of an inflexible organization inherently limited to a small constituency.

A. URBAN POOR

One group that is a natural Sendero target is the poor of Lima. This group, with the lowest capacity to accept further economic hardship, has suffered the most under the hyperinflation and economic contraction of Alan Garcia's final two years in office, and has borne the brunt of Fujimori's economic program. Fujimori's program has had the short-term effect of increasing poverty and unemployment, even though Peru had already seen its poverty rate almost double in the last three years.⁹¹ When dealing with the poor sectors, Sendero can gain the loyalty of people by just the **promise** of a better life. As a report in *La Republica* stated,

It is well known that the SL seeks to settle in the poorest sectors to garner their support... Anyone who is able to organize them under the promise of giving them a house and some kind of order in which to exist will receive some obedience and sympathy from them.⁹²

Why do they believe the Shining Path? Because the current regime is unable to deliver a measure of good to the poor. Juan J. Linz writes that a legitimate regime that has been effective and efficacious can build a reservoir of goodwill that can be drawn upon during harsh times.⁹³ However, the

⁹¹James Brooke, "Marxist Revolt Grows Strong In the Shantytowns of Peru," *New York Times*, 11 Nov 91.

⁹²FBIS-LAT-91-178, 13 Sep 91, 37, quoting from *La Republica*, 1 Sep 91.

⁹³Juan J. Linz, *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown, & Reequilibration* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), 21.

Peruvian government does not have a reservoir of trust or goodwill, as it is not seen as efficient or efficacious by the poor. The government, when present at all in the *pueblos juvenes*, is not seen as a legitimate actor.⁹⁴

A further rationale for the poor's support for the Shining Path is given by the moral economist's explanation of revolution. If one extrapolates James C. Scott's subsistence crisis into the notion of a moral economy,⁹⁵ one can argue that government policies have had the effect of threatening the very existence of the poor, leaving them in the position of "that of a man standing permanently up to the neck in water, so that even a ripple may drown him."⁹⁶ From this perspective, the poor's support is not so much an indication of a vote "for" the Shining Path but a vote "against" current leaders.

⁹⁴Carol Graham, "Sendero's Law in Peru's Shantytowns," *Wall Street Journal*, 7 Jun 91. Graham writes that (in Huascar, a Lima shantytown), "Where state officials are present, they are known for their corruption and inefficiency rather than anything else.... 'The only good thing about Sendero is that they kill the corrupt state officials' one Huascar women told me." Further, the *pueblos juvenes* are not new to Lima, as they have existed since at least 1980. See Kenneth Freed, "Death Scene: Outrageous Peru Slums," *Los Angeles Times*, 21 Oct 80.

⁹⁵James C. Scott, *The Moral Economy of the Peasant* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976).

⁹⁶Scott, quoting Tawney, vii.

B. LANDLESS OR LAND DEFICIENT PEASANT

In the countryside, the Shining Path is able to appeal to an analogous group, the landless peasant, and official Sendero writings recognize their standing as a natural ally. In the 1987 *Bases of Discussion*, Sendero states that "The peasants, being the primary force, especially the poor peasants, struggle for the armed conquest of land under the leadership of the Communist Party..."⁹⁷ Additionally, in the 1988 interview Guzman speaks of the importance of land distribution in such a way as to appeal to those neglected by Peru's land tenure system. When questioned about whether Sendero would confiscate all kinds of property, Guzman responded with

We are for the destruction of semifeudalism, implementing the great slogan that is still valid: 'land to the tiller.' It is good to emphasize this, because many things are said about it. Mao stressed this slogan again and again, which for us means the destruction of semi-feudal property and the distribution of the land as property to the peasantry, mainly the poor peasantry.⁹⁸

Clearly, the statements made above regarding efficiency, efficacy, and the threat to moral economy apply equally in the interior. Indeed, they are likely to apply more in the interior, as the State's historic inattention and neglect is a major reason that Sendero was able to form and expand in the 1970s and early 1980s.

⁹⁷PCP, *Bases for Discussion*, C322.

⁹⁸Guzman interview, 74-75.

C. UNIVERSITY STUDENTS/GRADUATES

Again in the cities, the Shining Path holds an appeal to university students and graduates. Marxism holds a certain appeal in universities worldwide, and Peru is no different. However, for Sendero's purposes, Peru has the added dimension of economic catastrophe, as students do not see any hope of using their skills or knowledge under such conditions. Only nine percent of Lima's economically active population is "adequately employed."⁹⁹

An example of this phenomenon is Teresa Angelica Cardenas Lopez, now a Sendero leader. Educated as an anthropologist, she was not able to find work after graduation. Frustrated and in poverty, she joined Sendero.¹⁰⁰ According to Tarazona-Sevillano, this is a typical scenario; university graduates, unable to find employment, become disillusioned and decide to change the existing system.¹⁰¹ Sendero's strength in the universities is seen by reporting from Lima in which in a roundup of Sendero members, where most were "... students from the University of San Marcos, the Catholic University, and the Engineering University, as well as lawyers and high

⁹⁹Graham, in *Wall Street Journal*, 7 Jun 91.

¹⁰⁰Tarazona-Sevillano, 73.

¹⁰¹Ibid.

school teachers."¹⁰² Further, an October 1991 report from Lima reported that Guzman had lived at the Enrique Guzman Valle National University in La Cantuta in early 1991.¹⁰³ To counter Sendero's influence on college campuses, the military in early 1992 occupied five campuses. This was done, according to Defense Minister Malca Villanueva, to "restore authority," citing evidence that the Shining Path was proselytizing in the dining halls and residences.¹⁰⁴

Wickham-Crowley points out that Latin American universities, despite the fact that they are inclined to perpetuate the elite rather than offering opportunity across society, tend to be further to the left than the national populace.¹⁰⁵ Further, he notes a correlation between large increases in university enrollment and revolutionary activity.¹⁰⁶ Between 1965 and 1975, university enrollment in Peru rose by 189 percent, the 14th fastest increase in Latin America.¹⁰⁷ While Wickham-Crowley does not view Peru as

¹⁰²FBIS-LAT-91-240, 13 Dec 91, 55, quoting Lima Global de Television Network, 4 Dec 91.

¹⁰³FBIS-LAT-91-204, 22 Oct 91, 43, quoting *Expreso*, 15 Oct 91.

¹⁰⁴FBIS-LAT-92-051, 16 Mar 92, 38-39, referencing *El Comercio*, 13 Feb 92.

¹⁰⁵Timothy P. Wickham-Crowley, *Guerrillas and Revolution in Latin America* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 34-36.

¹⁰⁶*Ibid.*, 46-47.

¹⁰⁷*Ibid.*, 220-221.

demonstrating a positive correlation with his hypothesis, I would content that a 189 percent increase is substantial, even if it is not one of the highest growth rates in the region, and supports the hypothesis that correlates university enrollment increases with revolutionary activity.

D. WOMEN

Sendero's appeal to women has been particularly noteworthy. Both Mao and Mariategui noted the discrimination and exploitation faced by women. According to Mao, women in semifeudal/semicolonial societies suffer from four categories of oppression: political, societal, marital, and religious. Guzman continues this line of thinking, and teaches that women must be aware of their double exploitation - class and sex - and that they must fight both. And in fact both are correct. Rape goes virtually unpunished in Peru, and literacy laws prevented uneducated women from voting until 1980.¹⁰⁸

SL's outreach towards women is not a new phenomena, as in the 1970s the organization's *Movimiento Femenino Popular* published feminist booklets and its own magazine, *Women Speak*

¹⁰⁸Robin Kirk, "The Deadly Women of the Shining Path," *San Francisco Examiner*, Image section, 22 Mar 92, 16. Kirk writes that the saying "*Mas me pega, mas te quiero*" ("The more you hit me, the more I'll love you") is still common in Peru.

Out.¹⁰⁹ Further, Sendero has backed its message with action; although no one is sure of the representation of women in the Shining Path, estimates range as high as 50 percent.¹¹⁰ Numbers, however, do not tell the complete story, as women are often assigned the psychologically important role of delivering the lethal shot during most major assassinations.¹¹¹ This indicates a willingness to entrust difficult and challenging responsibilities to women.

Additionally, women have been given positions of leadership in the organization. Tarazona-Sevillano mentions two women by name believed to sit on Sendero's Central Committee,¹¹² and Kirk writes that police intelligence documents list eight women on the 19 member Central Committee and two of the five members of the political bureau.¹¹³ The best evidence of Sendero's trust of women's leadership ability was demonstrated in Guzman's 12 Sep 92 capture. During that

¹⁰⁹Carol Andreas, "Women at War," *NACLA Report on the Americas* Vol. 24, No. 4 (December-January 1990-1991): 22.

¹¹⁰Wickham-Crowley, *Guerrillas and Revolution in Latin America*, 215. Kirk uses similarly imprecise but more current figures, and writes, "Members of The Shining Path claim that 40 percent of their militants are female. A third of the approximately 1,000 people who are currently held on terrorism charges related to the Shining Path are women." Kirk, 16. Andreas traces the large numbers of women in the Shining Path to social independence of women in the sierra. Andreas, 24.

¹¹¹Tarazona-Sevillano, 77.

¹¹²Ibid., 72-73.

¹¹³Kirk, 16.

operation, four Sendero Politburo members were also captured, including three women. These women are Elena Albertina Iparraguirre, Maria Pantoja Sanchez, and Laura Zambrano Padilla. Albertina Iparraguirre was Guzman's companion and an influential member of the Central Committee, and Zambrano Padilla, as mentioned earlier, was commander of the Lima Metropolitan Committee and believed to be Guzman's second in command.¹¹⁴ Finally, one of the best known *senderistas* after Guzman is Edith Lagos, known for masterminding a spectacular prison escape in 1982. Her funeral (later in 1982) was attended by a reported 30,000 people, and she became a martyr of the revolution.¹¹⁵

E. YOUTH

A fifth group that the Shining Path sees as a natural support base and one which it expends much energy recruiting is the country's youth. The appeal here is also tied to the economic despair felt by Peru's youth, who see no opportunity for advancement. *Bases for Discussion* states "We must mobilize youths to participate directly ... They must develop

¹¹⁴"Politburo Members Arrested with Guzman Viewed," *El Comercio*, 16 Sep 92; also, "Shining Path Leader Zambrano's Arrest Detailed," *La Republica*, 16 Sep 92, both cited in FBIS-LAT-92-186, 24 Sep 92, 22-23.

¹¹⁵*Ibid.*, 17.

their struggles for a new world, their right to an education, and freedom from unemployment and other ills."¹¹⁶

A primary mechanism for gaining the loyalty of the young is through school education. Guzman realized the importance of youth early in his career at the University of Huamanga, and assiduously recruited teachers to go into the countryside to teach the young peasants at both the primary and secondary school level.¹¹⁷ Again we come to the "virgin soil" theory, as Sendero believes that the youth have no political "bad habits" to unlearn. Additionally, many youth became members of the organization, routinely taking up arms in their early teens. Sendero's recruitment of the youth is not limited to schools in the highlands, as Army intelligence has found that the Shining Path conducts schools in Lima shantytowns. These "popular schools" have taken hold and Sendero's mission made easier, according to *Expreso*, by the "state of abandonment in which the children and their parents find themselves in recently occupied plots which still lack public schools services."¹¹⁸ Thus, in dealing with Peru's youth, Sendero has been exploiting virgin soil with political indoctrination in both the interior and in Lima's slums.

¹¹⁶PCP, *Bases for Discussion*, C323.

¹¹⁷McCormick, *The Shining Path and the Future of Peru*, 13.

¹¹⁸FBIS-LAT-91-214, 5 Nov 91, 39, quoting *Expreso*, 25 Oct 91.

F. SURVEY DATA

Given these group appeals, how much of Peruvian society actually supports the Shining Path? Accurate information on Sendero's base of support is difficult or impossible to obtain. Many supporters, given a traditional distrust of the central authorities (especially after the 5 April 92 coup), would likely not report their sentiments accurately. Additionally, given Sendero's strength in the interior, and its policy of targeting those perceived of as supporting the government, it is understandable that researchers would be loathe to gather data on Sendero's support in the highlands. However, an Apoyo poll conducted in Lima in June 1991 offers some indication.¹¹⁹ The poll found that, as one would expect, the bulk of Sendero's support lies in the lower two strata of Peruvian society.

The poll indicates that the Shining Path has the overt support of or a favorable image among 7.14 percent of Lima's population. This number should be considered as an absolute minimum given the above mentioned reluctance of individuals to commit overtly to Sendero. Apoyo's director of public opinion believes that one can plausibly add 50 percent of those who did not specify an opinion to the ranks of Sendero supporters. If this is done, Sendero's support in Lima rises to 12 percent

¹¹⁹Following data from FBIS-LAT-91-202, 18 Oct 91, 33-38, citing Quehacer, Jul-Aug 91.

of the population. The study further found that 41 percent of the two lowest strata of society feel that subversion is justifiable; this 41 percent equates to 15 percent of Metropolitan Lima's population. The study indicates a growing class polarization in Lima, with the top echelon of society hardening in their opposition to the Shining Path while support for SL increases among the lower strata. This indicates that, if the government and Sendero are in a battle for the "hearts and minds" of Lima's citizens, the battlefield will become the second level of Peruvian society, nine percent of which considers subversion justified, and eight percent of which has a favorable opinion of Abimael Guzman.

G. CONCLUSION

Despite the traditional portrayal of a rigidly determined, ideological organization, Sendero has the capacity to appeal to a wide range of Peruvian society. Three of those appeal groups-- women, youth, and university students-- hold the potential for cross class appeal, giving Sendero the capacity to significantly expand its traditional base. Although much of Sendero's appeal stems from the dismal state of the Peruvian economy and from the lack of opportunity for university students and youth, the notion that Sendero appeals only to a narrow segment of Peru's population is outdated at best and dangerous at worst, for to underestimate Sendero is

to limit one's ability to respond to its political and military operations.

The Shining Path's potential appeal across society has further dangerous implications for the current order in Peru. Although its use of violence deters many from Sendero's cause, the government's absence as a legitimate countervailing force in much of the State leaves many Peruvians with no real choice but to accommodate the organization. If SL becomes more successful and increases its scope and intensity of attacks on the existing State, one must consider how many of the above-described groups will, using Samuel L. Popkin's model of the rational peasant, calculate that their own well being is more likely to be fulfilled by Sendero.¹²⁰ How many Peruvians will, should a Sendero victory appears more certain, decide to back the apparent winner to make the new order more hospitable to their interests? Should this occur, it would almost inevitably happen at the precise moment when the government's need for support is most crucial, as such shifts toward Sendero would likely occur as Sendero's strength was gathering momentum. While the capture of Guzman clearly lowers the short-term threat, this principle is still important. The importance of the Shining Path's potentially wide, cross-class appeal is that, should momentum toward victory accelerate,

¹²⁰Samuel L. Popkin, *The Rational Peasant* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), especially chapters 1, 2, and 6.

many groups of people would have not only the "rational peasant" reason to back SL but also those Sendero appeals that have preceded and would help legitimate their shift towards the Shining Path. These appeals would make their conversion to the cause appear less opportunistic, regardless of the motivation, and make their acceptance by SL more likely, circumstances that could make the shift from government supporter to Sendero supporter an easier one to make, particularly in a deteriorating environment.

The implications for Sendero's appeal toward the constituent groups identified above should make Peru's elite uncomfortable. While the immediate threat of Sendero appears to be diminished with Guzman's capture, little progress has been made to lure the above groups into the government's base of support. Until this is done, Peru will be, to a certain degree, a State awaiting Sendero's return, not a State actively attempting to address the insurgency. This, when combined with the Shining Path flexibility demonstrated in the previous chapter, should cause Peru's leadership to rethink the apparent stability of their societies and formulate plans to move during any SL retrenchment.

IV. PERU'S VULNERABILITIES

Scholars have analyzed many conditions that make Peru vulnerable to a revolutionary movement. David Scott Palmer points to several factors that led to extreme hardship in Peru, opening the door for Sendero. At the national level, he notes the severe economic decline that began in 1976 eroded both real wages and social living standards. At the local level Palmer points to the numerous changes that occurred in Ayacucho department that, reminiscent of Davies' "J-curve," raised and dashed expectations by not achieving rural development.¹²¹

On a more theoretical level, Wickham-Crowley applies four theories of revolution to present-day Peru, finding three that apply.¹²² Specifically, citing Cynthia McClintock's work, he posits a subsistence crisis in Ayacucho combined with discontent over social conditions to make Peru an example of Scott's "moral economy" theory of revolution.¹²³ Secondly,

¹²¹David Scott Palmer, "Rebellion in Rural Peru," *Comparative Politics* Vol. 18 (January 1986): 130-134. For the theoretical justification of the "J-curve," see James C. Davies, "Toward a Theory of Revolution," *American Sociological Review* Vol. 6, No. 1 (February 1962): 5-19.

¹²²Only Jeffery Paige's theory of agrarian structures and revolution did not apply.

¹²³Wickham-Crowley, *Guerrillas and Revolution in Latin America*, 245-246. Theory developed in James C. Scott, *The Moral Economy of the Peasant*. The application to Peru made in Cynthia McClintock,

Sendero illustrates the "tapping of rebellious cultures" theory, as Ayacucho was the home to Hector Bejar's ELN in 1965;¹²⁴ more ominously, and descriptive of Sendero's spread beyond Ayacucho, Wickham-Crowley observes that "A survey of peasant movements in Peru makes it quite clear that *virtually the entire Sierra* has been the site of scattered or intense peasant resistance and agitation for at least the last century."¹²⁵ (emphasis added) Finally, Wickham-Crowley applies the "resource mobilization theory" and found it applicable, noting that Sendero uses language, educational, family, religious, and political ties to mobilize the peasantry for insurgency.¹²⁶

These theories, while useful in explaining the rise of Sendero in specific circumstances and under narrow constraints, are of limited utility when applied to the Shining Path and Peru as a whole. First, other than the resource mobilization theories, they only explain Sendero's

"Why Peasants Rebel: The Case of Peru's Sendero Luminoso," *World Politics* Vol. 37, No. 1 (October 1984): 48-84.

¹²⁴The ELN, or the Army of National Liberation, was an offshoot of the Peruvian Communists whose *foco* in 1965 originated in Ayacucho. It was defeated by government forces within 6 months. Wickham-Crowley, *Guerrillas and Revolution in Latin America*, 18.

¹²⁵*Ibid.*, 136 and 248.

¹²⁶*Ibid.*, 250-258. These are but a few of the theories of revolution used to analyze Latin American insurgencies. For a review of these theories, see Susan Eckstein, "Power and Popular Protest in Latin America," in Susan Eckstein, ed., *Power and Popular Protest: Latin American Social Movements* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), 1-54.

success in Ayacucho or the southern highlands, thus failing to address the organization's success elsewhere in Peru. Further, I would contend that the above theories are but symptoms of a greater feature of Peruvian society which must be understood to appreciate why they apply to Peru, and to fully understand why Peru was and is vulnerable to insurgency.

One must first examine Peru from a higher level of analysis; one must understand the fundamentally divided nature of Peruvian society. This thesis will argue that this central social fabric of Peruvian society makes it highly vulnerable to the rise of revolution. Beyond that, this chapter will analyze two state-centered phenomena and a brief analysis of the impact of previous economic divisions related to Peru's divided nature that, I contend, made and continue to make Peru vulnerable to revolution. These phenomena are:

1. The lack of effectiveness and efficacy needed for a regime to gain the legitimacy necessary to preclude the spread of a revolutionary movement.
2. Within Peru there is an extraordinary amount of political space within which the Shining Path was conceived, its message proselytized and spread, and the initial phases of the revolution fought.

While Peru's divided nature is, in my view, its primary vulnerability to revolution, I would contend that the vast political space left unfilled by the government is the phenomenon that left Peru vulnerable to a highly structured and hierarchical revolutionary organization.

Clearly economic conditions, while arguably not a significant contributor to the creation of the Shining Path, are a powerful factor in influencing the organization's continued strength and breadth of support.¹²⁷ This thesis will not address the economic aspect except as it impacts or is influenced by Peru's divisions. This is for two basic reasons. To adequately address the economics that have assisted the Shining Path's growth would require an extensive historical and analytical examination of Peru's various economic programs, including their impact on the different economic and ethnic factions of society. That daunting task would best be attempted in an economically focused paper. Second, as I hope to demonstrate, the issue of economic development is only one aspect of and is subsumed within the divided nature of Peruvian society.

A. THE TWO NATIONS OF PERU

Peru has been a dualistic society since Lima served as the capital of the Spanish viceroyalty of Peru in the 16th and 17th centuries. In the colonial years, Spaniards used the indigenous Indians as slave labor in the mines and on the haciendas. This is the foundation of today's Peru, which still "... confronts the heritage of a conquest culture: an

¹²⁷For an overall sense of Peruvian economic performance as it relates to the rise of the Shining Path, see Palmer, 130, and McCormick, *The Shining Path and the Future of Peru*, 38-39.

ethnically diverse population stratified along lines of deep-seated inequality."¹²⁸ Despite the passage of over 400 years, Peru remains divided ethnically, linguistically, economically, and geographically, much as the Peru described by Mariategui in the 1920s.¹²⁹ Taken together, these interrelated divisions have worked to ensure that, on a general level, the largely white and mestizo elites of Lima have little to do with the mestizo and Indian of the sierra. This has left the typical resident of the sierra with few ties to either Lima or to the State of Peru, created deep resentments, and spawned a situation fertile for cultivation by a group such as the Shining Path. These divisions are closely linked. I will, however, attempt to illustrate each individually to highlight the scope of the chasm between the two Perus; their related properties should be evident.

1. Ethnic and Linguistic Divisions

Despite the passage of several centuries and Velasco's reforms, Peru remains largely divided along ethnic lines. After conquering the Incas in the 16th century, the Spanish remained in western South America in large part due to the

¹²⁸Patricia Kluck, "The Society and its Environment," in Richard F. Nyrop, ed., *Peru: A Country Study* (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981), 61.

¹²⁹See Jose Carlos Mariategui, *Seven Interpretive Essays on Peruvian Reality* (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 1971).

mineral resources and landholdings in the region. Those persons of European descent still dominate Peru today, politically, socially, and economically. On the political scene, Peru is dominated by whites and mestizos that were either born into or have been able to make the transition into Peru's elite class.¹³⁰ The military still plays a major role in Peruvian politics, and shares the racial bent of the upper and middle classes, as well as their ethnic biases.¹³¹

In contrast to the white and mestizo elites, the Peruvians of Indian descent are considered and treated as those lowest on the socioeconomic scale.¹³² According to Kluck, being Indian traditionally meant being controlled by whites or mestizos.¹³³ This ethnic divide has led to such racism that problems, such as the Shining Path, are not considered to be important until they affect the cities, and

¹³⁰See Kluck, p. 70-73. She points out that the lines between white, *mestizo*, and indian have blurred considerably; often the difference, especially between *mestizos* and indians, is based on class rather than a strict ethnic criteria. However, what is important for the purposes of this paper is how the individuals of each group perceive themselves, not necessarily the factual or nonfactual basis behind the perceptions. As Kluck writes, "To say someone is white is to attribute elite status to that person."

¹³¹McCormick, *The Shining Path and the Future of Peru*, 33. While the enlisted ranks include mestizos and Indians, the officer corps is predominantly white.

¹³²Kluck cites a sierra saying "The Indian is the animal closest to man." p. 73. SALA Volume 28, table 658, p. 144 estimates that approximately 36.8 percent of Peru's population is Indian.

¹³³Kluck, 71-72.

thus, the elites. This could in part explain the slow response of Fernando Belaunde's administration (1980-1985) to Sendero's rise in the early 1980s in the overwhelmingly Indian regions of the country.¹³⁴

Closely related to the ethnic divide is the division based on language. Spanish is the primary language, spoken by the whites and mestizos, while Quechua and Aymara are spoken by the indians. While Indians may be bilingual and speak Spanish, few whites or mestizos speak Quechua or Aymara.¹³⁵ This has left Peru with a linguistically fragmented social environment.

2. Economic Divisions

Economically, whites dominate the ranks of the upper class. A recent socioeconomic study divided Peru into four broad income groups (labeled from A to D, with A the highest income group and D the lowest), and found that the number of

¹³⁴Belaunde did not declare a state of emergency in certain provinces of Ayacucho department until late 1982, over two years after Sendero began the armed campaign. Palmer, 139. Henry Dietz describes Belaunde's ineffectual response to Sendero, particularly his lack of interest in addressing long-term social problems in Ayacucho. Henry Dietz, "Peru's Sendero Luminoso as a Revolutionary Movement," *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* Vol. 18 (Summer 1990): 138.

¹³⁵As with ethnicity, lines of distinction are complex. What distinguishes mestizo from Indian is the knowledge of Spanish/lack of knowledge of Quechua or Aymara. Once again, the perception is more powerful than reality. To be thought of as Indian is to be thought of as inferior.

people included in the top income group accounted for only 1.8 percent of Peru's population, and includes executives, businessmen, and independent professionals. The study states that "Those who are in this category are generally of the white race, born in Lima, and have attended university." Further, over 88 percent of the population belongs in the bottom two income groups; those in group C are typically mestizos and Indians, while those in the lowest income group are predominantly Indian. This report highlights two of the key divides in Peru: first, as previously shown, the status of Peruvian whites compared to other ethnic groups; secondly, the small size of the middle class. This study shows that in general, Peruvians are either very well off or poor, further illustrating the economic divisions of the State.¹³⁶ Other studies have confirmed the extreme concentration of wealth in Peru. According to one such study conducted in 1985, the top 10 percent of the population earned just slightly less than the bottom 70 percent of the population.¹³⁷

The economic division bleeds over into the land tenure question, an issue of great importance to the Andean peasant. The question of land tenure was important to General Juan

¹³⁶The study, conducted by APOYO, in *Peru Economico*, Feb 92, cited in FBIS-LAT-92-062, 31 March 92, p. 27.

¹³⁷In 1985-86, income distribution data in Peru showed that the top decile commanded 35.4 percent of the economic pie, while the bottom 70 percent controlled 36.9 percent. A. Javier Hamann and Carlos E. Paredes, "The Peruvian Economy: Characteristics and Trends," in Paredes and Sachs, eds., *Peru's Path to Recovery*, 54.

Velasco's reformist military regime (1968-1975), and his agenda to address the issue was vast. The objectives of his 1969 land reform included the replacement of the *latifundio* and *minifundio*¹³⁸, the creation of a new agrarian order, the guarantee of social justice, redistribution of income, and job security for the *campesino*. This was to be done through land expropriation and transfer.¹³⁹

Despite the noteworthy achievements of the Velasco administration, the vast majority of the population did not benefit from his land reform programs. Much of the land expropriated was not redistributed to the indian communities, but rather was given to the former tenants of the seized haciendas, which were later turned into cooperatives.¹⁴⁰ Less than one-third of the rural families benefitted from the agrarian reform programs.¹⁴¹ While this was the most

¹³⁸ The *Latifundia System* was a pattern of land ownership in which large-scale plantations were owned by local gentry, absentee landlords, and corporations. The *Minifundia System* was an agriculture system consisting of small farms. Ernest Rossi and Jack C. Plano, *The Latin American Political Dictionary* (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 1980), 12 and 15.

¹³⁹ Peter S. Cleaves and Martin J. Scurrah, *Agriculture, Bureaucracy, and Military Government in Peru* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1980), 261.

¹⁴⁰ Daniel M. Masterson, *Militarism and Politics in Latin America* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), 254.

¹⁴¹ The data on this issue are somewhat inconsistent. As previously noted, McClintock, *Peasant Cooperatives and Political Change in Peru*, p. 61 reports that 356,276 families, or 24 percent benefitted from land reform. SALA Vol. 28 table 309, p. 52 reports that 431,982 families, or 30.4 percent benefitted from land reform. Either way, well over two-thirds did not benefit.

successful and aggressive program in Latin America (save Cuba), it still excluded a large percentage of the population, especially the landless temporary workers.¹⁴² While land tenure may not be very important in a modern post-industrial society, its importance is still substantial in a society that, despite recent urbanization, remains heavily rural and thus tied to the land.¹⁴³

3. Geographic Divisions

Perhaps none of Peru's divisions is as important as the geographic one, as it helps maintain the other chasms in Peruvian society. The divide in Peru is primarily between the coastal plains and the interior. However, that divide has become symbolized as the divide between the capital city and the sierra. Lima is the center of Peru, and has in many ways become a city-state.¹⁴⁴ It now contains approximately one-third of the country's population, and is the center of political, economic, and social life, despite its small geographic size in comparison to the rest of the State.¹⁴⁵

¹⁴²McClintock, *Peasant Cooperatives*, 63.

¹⁴³Much of Peru's urbanization has taken place because of warfare and poverty in the highlands; such migration to the cities can hardly be considered voluntary

¹⁴⁴McCormick, *From the Sierra to the Cities*, 2.

¹⁴⁵The population of Lima is difficult to pinpoint, as it grows continuously due to the mass immigration from those fleeing violence in the highlands. Based on a the 1988 population estimate

Yet its location isolates it from most of the State's land mass, and the difficulty of movement into the interior has isolated Lima culturally and socially from a large portion of its indigenous population.¹⁴⁶ Mariategui's views of the chasm between Lima and the interior are that coastal Peru, while strong enough to maintain quasi control over the interior, cannot maintain true control. To Mariategui, Lima and the coast, while in Peru, are not of Peru.

The Peru of the coast, heir of Spain and the conquest, controls the Peru of the sierra from Lima; but it is not demographically and spiritually strong enough to absorb it.... Lima, ... has had a somewhat arbitrary beginning. Founded by the conquistador, a foreigner, Lima appears to have originated as the military tent of a commander from some distant land... The creation of an aristocratic age, Lima was born into nobility and was baptized City of Kings. It was created by the colonizer, or rather, the conquistador, not by the native.¹⁴⁷

of 21.26 million people, Lima would contain roughly seven million inhabitants. The importance of Lima is illustrated when one compares its population to the next largest cities in Peru. Estimates from 1985 put the population of Lima at 5,008,400; the next largest cities were Arequipa with 545,165 and Callao with 515,200. Since Callao is virtually a geographic appendage of Lima, the importance of Lima is even further magnified. Figures taken from SALA 28, tables 618 and 635, pp. 118 and 131.

¹⁴⁶Lima was isolated culturally and socially at least until the recent forced exodus into the cities by those serranos fleeing the violence of the countryside. Still, most of the white elite of Lima remains separated from the indians of the *pueblos juvenes*. Even today, the road network from the coastal centers into the interior is very limited.

¹⁴⁷Mariategui, 164 and 176.

This isolation provided much "virgin soil" that Sendero was able to cultivate politically, without the countervailing forces of governmental political socialization.¹⁴⁸

4. Conclusion

Any one of the ethnic, linguistic, economic, or geographic divisions described above are counterproductive to the establishment of a nation. When all are added together, their synergistic effects exceed the sum of their individual parts. Comparing a Spanish-speaking white coastal elite with a poverty stricken Quechua-speaking Indian from the highlands is a comparison of two mutually exclusive groups. When one adds in the standard white disdain for Indians with that Indian's inherent distrust for outsiders one finds little to no commonality and an exceedingly difficult task in creating any common ground. Thus, one can view the rise of Sendero as a reflection of unresolved conflicts between Lima and the interior, with a significant ethnic component mixed with this regional conflict.¹⁴⁹ As Degregori noted,

¹⁴⁸See Wickham-Crowley, *Guerrillas and Revolution*, 151 and 251, and McCormick, *The Shining Path and the Future of Peru*, 18 for further discussion. Sendero's strategy has been to create a vacuum where necessary; Guzman speaks of this in Interview with Chairman Gonzalo, 34 and 36.

¹⁴⁹Susan C. Bourque and Kay B. Warren, "Democracy Without Peace: The Cultural Politics of Terror in Peru," *Latin American Research Review* Vol. 24, No. 1 (1989): 15.

It is clear that the spinal column of Sendero is drawn from one group. They are young men, from the provinces instead of the capital, from the mountains instead of the coast, mestizo or cholo, and more educated than the ordinary population. So, for the State, anyone who fits this description is a Senderista. Whites see indians from the provinces and they are afraid.¹⁵⁰

The Shining Path has worked hard to exploit these chasms and fears of Peruvians. In a recent interview, a leading Shining Path representative stated that "...I have perceived the need for a democratic revolution, an antifeudal revolution so Peru can stop being a colonial country, a country that is managed by persons of foreign descent-- in other words Spaniards...."¹⁵¹

The chasm is further accentuated when one combines the ethnic, geographic, and economic divides. Peru has long participated in the world economy through the export of its resources, from guano to copper to fish products. Probably because of this, Peru has invested primarily in sectors and projects that enhance the export market, meaning that Peru has invested heavily in the mineral economy and the coastal ports--and not in the subsistence agriculture of the sierra that would benefit the Andean peasant. This has furthered

¹⁵⁰Quoted by Eugene Robinson, "Racial Strife Fuels Peru's Rebel War," *Washington Post*, 4 March 90, cited in Dietz, 135.

¹⁵¹FBIS-LAT-91-203, 21 Oct 91, p. 42, referencing an *Expreso*, 13 Oct 91 interview with Adolfo Olaechea, Shining Path representative in London.

alienation due to the geographic divisions, and increased the disparity of income distribution. As Albert Berry writes,

The main implication of the last 100 years' experience is that a Peruvian-type primary export model is consistent with extreme levels of inequality, and thus such a strategy cannot be counted on to reduce significantly the income gap between rich and poor.¹⁵²

While the above-cited research specifically addresses the export sector of Peru's economy, other research has shown that regardless of the stated reason, Peru has invested the vast majority of its public investment in the coastal regions. Table 1 demonstrates the degree to which Peru has concentrated on the development of the coast, even during the Velasco administration, which is often lauded for its attempts to further the plight of the peasant.

¹⁵²Albert Berry, "International Trade, Government, and Income Distribution in Peru since 1870," *Latin American Research Review* Vol. 25, No. 2 (1990): 54.

TABLE 1, PERU, INVESTMENT BY GEOGRAPHIC REGION

Sector or Region	1968-75 (%)	1976-79 (%)	1968-80 (%)	1981-82 (%)
Productive Sector				
Coast	71.3	65.0	68.0	50.5
Sierra	1.5	4.8	3.0	34.8
Jungle	8.0	15.7	11.3	14.0
Multidepartmental	19.2	14.5	17.6	.6
%age of total	52.0	59.5	55.4	30.5
Economic Infrastructure				
Coast	46.4	35.3	41.9	51.4
Sierra	18.4	23.2	20.3	27.5
Jungle	16.5	18.3	17.1	11.4
Multidepartmental	18.6	23.2	20.7	9.7
%age of total	33.7	28.7	31.4	46.3
Social Infrastructure				
Coast	82.5	64.1	75.9	62.2
Sierra	13.0	14.9	13.3	20.0
Jungle	4.1	9.8	5.8	10.6
Multidepartmental	.4	11.2	5.0	7.2
%age of total	14.3	11.9	13.2	15.7
Other S ctors				7.5
Total	100.0	100.1	100.0	100.0
Source: Patricia A. Wilson and Carol Wise, "The Regional Implications of Public Investment in Peru, 1968-1983" <i>Latin American Research Review</i> Vol. 21 No. 2 (1986): 100. ¹⁵³				

¹⁵³By "productive sector" the authors refer to the major currency-producing industries such as oil, mining, and large-scale agriculture; "economic infrastructure," refers to transportation, communications, and electricity generation projects; "social infrastructure" refers to education, health, and housing. Ibid., 99.

Wilson and Wise write, "During the three major political phases since 1968, the national government has not used the public investment program as a means for correcting the vast interregional disparities in the distribution of national income."¹⁵⁴ The various administrations may have had legitimate reasons for such a public investment pattern; although one can perhaps understand the weightings in the "Productive Sector" and "Economic Infrastructure" sectors, it is more difficult to understand the vast spending on "Social Infrastructure" in the coastal regions relative to the interior. Nevertheless, the white, elite-dominated government enhanced the status and prosperity of the coastal regions relative to the sierra and the jungle, despite pressing needs in the interior, further adding to the disparities and thus the chasm between the two Peruvian nations.

Finally, reinforcing the data on investment patterns, the distribution of income follows the pattern of an economic and geographic divide within Peru. As previously mentioned, the top 10 percent of the population consumes over 35 percent of the State's total consumption.¹⁵⁵ This same study also cites a high correlation between income distribution and the geographic distribution of the population. In the mid-1980s, 70 percent of the poorest 20 percent of the population lived

¹⁵⁴Ibid., 111.

¹⁵⁵Hamann and Paredes, "The Peruvian Economy," in Paredes and Sachs, eds., 54.

in rural areas, five of those in the sierra. Only six percent of the poorest 20 percent lived in Lima.¹⁵⁶ The same pattern holds for the affluent sector, with only 18 percent of the top 20 percent living in rural areas, while almost half of the top 20 percent lived in Lima, with the rest in other urban areas.¹⁵⁷

B. ROLE OF POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS

While Peru's inability to function as a nation has been the primary cause of its susceptibility to revolution, State and political institutions have contributed to that susceptibility. As Theda Skocpol writes, state structures and political conditions, to include state relations with society, are important facets of susceptibility to revolution.¹⁵⁸ Although subsequent structuralist models do not predict success for Sendero's revolution,¹⁵⁹ conditions of State machinery and political circumstances contributed greatly to

¹⁵⁶This number has likely increased as peasants flee the violence in the countryside for the *pueblos juvenes* that ring Lima.

¹⁵⁷Hamann and Paredes, "The Peruvian Economy," in Paredes and Sachs, eds., 53.

¹⁵⁸See Theda Skocpol, *States and Social Revolutions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).

¹⁵⁹Jeff Goodwin and Theda Skocpol, "Explaining Revolutions in the Contemporary Third World," *Politics & Society* Vol. 17, No. 4 (1989): 489-509. According to the model argued in their article, neo-patrimonial dictatorships and directly ruled colonial regimes are most vulnerable to revolution.

the emergence and rise of the Shining Path. This thesis argues that two distinct but interrelated aspects of the State allowed and contributed to the rise of the Shining Path. First, the State has not been able to function as an efficient and efficacious regime, a condition which limits its legitimacy and makes segments of the populace receptive to alternative messages. That lack of legitimacy leaves those citizens unattracted to Sendero's message without a political alternative to which they can turn. Second, the State allowed a vast political space to exist that first allowed the movement to ferment, and then permitted the Shining Path to spread its message and build its organizational structure without a valid countervailing message from or suppression by the government.

1. Efficacy and Effectiveness

Juan J. Linz, theorizing about the breakdown of democratic regimes, writes that, over the course of time, efficacy and effectiveness can strengthen, reinforce, maintain, or weaken society's belief in regime legitimacy.¹⁶⁰ By efficacy Linz means the capacity of a regime to find solutions to problems; effectiveness refers to the capacity to actually implement the policies formulated, and with the

¹⁶⁰Juan J. Linz, *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown, & Reequilibration* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), 18.

desired results.¹⁶¹ If a regime has a record of efficacy and effectiveness it can build a reservoir of legitimacy with its people, from which it can draw in times of want or other problems.¹⁶²

The Peruvian government has not been an efficacious or an effective regime from the standpoint of the Peruvian people. Peruvians have had to tolerate, over the course of 12 years of democratic rule, three vastly different economic programs, two of which were abject failures (it is still too early to pass judgment on President Fujimori's economic plan).¹⁶³

The marginally orthodox plan of President Belaunde in the early 1980s left the economy in a state of negative economic growth. His privatization plan was too grandiose for the resources available, and trade liberalization was ultimately overturned. The public investment plan, in the absence of cuts in government spending, resulted in growing budget deficits and rising inflation.¹⁶⁴ Belaunde, despite

¹⁶¹Ibid., 20 and 22.

¹⁶²Ibid., 21.

¹⁶³For two reviews of Peru's economic programs under the Belaunde administration, see Catherine M. Conaghan, James M. Malloy, and Luis A. Abugattas, "Business and the 'Boys': The Politics of Neoliberalism in the Central Andes," *Latin American Research Review* Vol. 25, No. 2 (1990): 3-30. Also, Manuel Pastor, Jr. and Carol Wise, "Peruvian Economic Policy in the 1980s: From Orthodoxy to Heterodoxy and Back," *Latin American Research Review* Vol. 27, No. 2 (1992): 83-117.

¹⁶⁴Conaghan et. al., 16.

his professed dedication to economic orthodoxy, failed to follow the orthodox model when difficulties arose, and his backpedaling midway through the program led to disaster. Foreign reserves were dissipated, export prices fell, and domestic inflation rose rapidly as government spending continued to rise in the face of eroding governmental taxation.¹⁶⁵ Ultimately, Belaunde's "truncated liberalization" saw per capita GDP fall an average of 3.9 percent per year from 1980 to 1985.¹⁶⁶ Clearly, Belaunde's brand of limited dedication to orthodoxy was not the answer for Peru's economic ills, and constituted a major failure of the central government to establish legitimacy.

The economic programs of the Garcia administration, while very different from those of the Belaunde administration, also failed to establish the requisite efficacy and effectiveness of the government. After an initially encouraging beginning, Garcia's "heterodox" policies turned out to produce, in the end, a far worse economic situation than was inherited in 1985.¹⁶⁷

¹⁶⁵Ibid.

¹⁶⁶Hamann and Paredes, 71.

¹⁶⁷For a review of the economic goals, methods, and results achieved under the Garcia administration, see Pastor and Wise, and Arthur J. Mann and Manuel Pastor, Jr., "Orthodox and Heterodox Stabilization Policies in Bolivia and Peru: 1985-1988," *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* Vol. 31, No. 4 (Winter 1989): 163-191.

Initially, Garcia's populist economic program appeared to be successful. Peru ended 1986 with the highest growth rate in Latin America, made significant progress in calming inflation, and boosted real wages.¹⁶⁸ However, the government failed to confront the fiscal and balance of payments crises that created the above mentioned gains. Peru's heterodox system, in exchange for significant (and ultimately fleeting) benefits for its workers, bankrupted the treasury and set the stage for deep recession and hyperinflation later in Garcia's administration. Table 2 depicts some of the causes of Peru's precipitous economic decline, as well as the results of those policies.

¹⁶⁸GDP grew by 8.7 percent in 1986 and inflation fell from 158.3 percent in 1985 to 62.9 percent in 1986. Real wages, after falling by 15.2 percent in 1985, rose by 30.4 percent in 1986. United Nations, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, *Economic Survey of Latin America and the Caribbean 1989* (Santiago, Chile: United Nations, 1991), 581 and 583.

TABLE 2, PERU, ECONOMIC INDICATORS, 1985-1989
Percent unless otherwise specified

Indicator	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989
GDP (base year 1979)					
Change in real terms	2.3	9.2	8.5	-7.9	-11.3
Change in consumption	4.2	9.6	11.1	-6.2	-19.9
Change in investment	-15.0	31.4	15.6	-13.3	-19.4
Inflation	158.3	62.9	114.5	1722	2775
Current account	125	-1079	-1477	-1079	522
Nonfinancial public sector deficit (% GDP)	2.7	5.2	6.6	7.5	5.6
Tax collection (% GDP)	14.3	12.0	9.1	9.2	5.9
Changes in real wages	-16.3	23.5	9.6	-15.8	-46.3
Change in employment	-1.3	6.0	7.8	-1.5	-10.9
Source: Paredes and Sachs, eds., <i>Peru's Path to Recovery</i> , table 2-1, p. 85.					

Thus, on the economic front, Peru's reintroduction to democracy in the 1980s also initiated and demonstrated, at least with regards to the economy, two governments incapable of formulating sound economic policies. The Belaunde and Garcia administrations did not demonstrate the requisite economic efficacy or effectiveness needed to gain legitimacy, a failure that I would contend made and makes the Shining Path a more viable option to many Peruvians than it would be under legitimized government.

The inability to demonstrate efficacy and effectiveness does not end with economic policy and performance, and much evidence is seen in the regime's inability to competently prosecute a counterinsurgency

campaign against the Shining Path. At first, President Belaunde was reluctant to address the insurgency. SL's open campaign began in May 1980, but the government downplayed the threat, not responding with a major counterinsurgency campaign until December 1982-January 1983.¹⁶⁹ Belaunde's reluctance was crucial for what it allowed and what it demonstrated. It gave the Shining Path crucial breathing space within which to operate during the infancy of its campaign, precisely at the time when a revolutionary organization is most vulnerable to governmental counterinsurgency assaults. Further, Belaunde's slow response again demonstrated that, despite the passage of 400 years and the supposed advances gained by Indians and peasants during the Velasco years, the white, urban government of Lima was not attenuated to or even interested in conditions of the countryside. The initial lack of response to SL's rural campaign in Ayacucho again demonstrated both a lack of regime efficacy and effectiveness in addressing the concerns of the countryside.

When Belaunde finally reacted to the Shining Path, his counterinsurgency revolved around a military response, ignoring the conditions that gave Sendero the ability to operate. The military's response was, as mentioned in an earlier chapter, seen as indiscriminate, violating standards

¹⁶⁹Cynthia McClintock, "Peru: Precarious Regimes, Authoritarian and Democrat," in Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset, eds., *Democracy in Developing Areas: Latin America* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989): 366.

of human rights, and leaving the citizens caught between Sendero and government violence, giving them no legitimate alternative to SL.¹⁷⁰ Further, from a purely military standpoint, the counterinsurgency campaigns were poorly conceived, poorly executed, frustrated by an inferior intelligence capability, and cursed with inferior leadership that, at least in the initial stages, did not understand the nature of its foe.¹⁷¹

The Garcia response to the insurgency was not much better than Belaunde's. and in fact continued the previous administration's emphasis on military responses at the expense of long term civic actions. Human rights violations by the government continued, again denying the population a legitimate alternative to the Shining Path. Such actions, as evidenced by the lack of success in prosecuting the counterinsurgency and continued widespread peasant distrust of governmental authority, indicate a lack of efficacy in planning a counterinsurgency campaign, a lack of effectiveness in delivering goods to the interior, and an inability to act as a legitimate authority for the Indians of the interior.

¹⁷⁰For one view of human rights conditions in Peru, see Americas Watch, *Peru Under Fire* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992).

¹⁷¹For an assessment of the counterinsurgency campaign from a military perspective, see Mauceri, "Military Politics and Counterinsurgency in Peru," 83-109.

2. Political Space and "Virgin Soil"

A second factor crucial to Sendero's rise was the existence, again linked to Peru's status as a divided entity, of an enormous amount of political space within which to organize, and, concurrently, the existence of much "virgin soil" open for SL recruitment. This thesis takes the concept of political space and applies it as a derivative of the concept of geopolitical vision. "Virgin soil" includes not only tangible geographic features, such as the Peruvian highlands, but more importantly, the virgin political consciousness of people's minds, uncultivated by the State.

a. The Internal Application of Geopolitics

One factor that has contributed to the rise and spread of the Shining Path that has not been adequately explored has been Peru's lack of an appropriate geopolitical vision. This deficiency would likely be considered a manifestation of the previously mentioned geographic divide, although because it also has roots in Peru's ethnic and linguistic split this lack of vision is in reality a concrete example of the occasionally abstract concept of a nation divided. In the context of this rural-based insurgency, Peru's deficiency is the failure to fully occupy its own national territory. Jack Child articulated this concept, writing

The first current concerns the purely internal aspects of geopolitical thinking, which stresses that a nation must fully and effectively occupy its own national territory in order to maximize the opportunities that its geographic position and resources permit... if carried out intelligently, it can make a contribution toward national development and general progress
...¹⁷²

While Child was writing of internal measures to provide security from threats beyond one's borders, I would alter this concept for application to internal security against internal threats. Thus, this concept would be modified to state that a nation must fully and effectively occupy its own territory to ensure its own security. This is necessary for a government to be aware of the political and social situation within its own borders, and to perform the task of political socialization (to till the "virgin soil") of its citizens. Note that military forces are not required to carry out these requirements; these are merely functions that most governments perform, and must perform in order to be an effective body.

In the case of Peru, the central authorities fulfilled neither of these conditions, a fact that has been recognized by other analysts as well.¹⁷³ First, as is now

¹⁷²Jack Child, *Geopolitics and Conflict in South America: Quarrels Among Neighbors* (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1985), 12.

¹⁷³Woy-Hazelton and Hazelton write, "Sendero's ability to expand geographically and numerically in 10 years is more a reflection of the failure to integrate vast areas of the Andean highlands than any real appeal of the Senderista message." Sandra Woy-Hazelton and William A. Hazelton, "Sendero Luminoso and the Future of Peruvian Democracy," *Third World Quarterly* Vol. 12 (April

well known, Abimael Guzman was able to use the University of Huamanga in Ayacucho as a base to proselytize, which he did until going underground in 1978.¹⁷⁴ The fact that such an ideology was spread openly for many years is testament to a lack of central authority. Secondly, the government failed to perform the task of political socialization, of tilling the "virgin soil" of its people, as is in part demonstrated by the receptivity of the students to Guzman's message.¹⁷⁵ While poverty enhanced the message's appeal, the fact that it was conveyed without an effective countervailing message contributed to Guzman's ability to recruit into his movement. In fact, Guzman's disciples fulfilled the role normally reserved for the State, as they fanned out into the highlands and provided those services neglected by the State.¹⁷⁶

Why was this allowed to occur? The answer goes back to the divide within Peru. Events in the Indian-dominated highlands were of little concern to the elites of Lima. Due to governmental neglect, Ayacucho and other highland departments were "virgin soil" for Guzman and his

1990): 33.

¹⁷⁴Cynthia McClintock, "Sendero Luminoso: Peru's Maoist Guerrillas," *Problems of Communism* Vol. 32 (Sep-Oct 1983): 20-21.

¹⁷⁵McCormick writes, "The young, according to Sendero, have little or no political past and are open to the wisdom of Comrade Gonzalo. They do not have to be reeducated, only educated." McCormick, *The Shining Path and the Future of Peru*, 13.

¹⁷⁶Woy-Hazelton and Hazelton, 22.

followers to harvest. This continued to present Sendero opportunities as it established rural base areas to facilitate expansion throughout Peru. As McCormick writes, "The establishment of such a basing structure, according to Guzman, has been made possible by 'a vacuum of power in the countryside,' a result of both the underdeveloped political infrastructure of the regime and the actions of the Shining Path."¹⁷⁷

The existence of political space is critical for the formation of a highly organized revolutionary organization such as the Shining Path. In his book *The Moral Economy of the Peasant*, James Scott writes of rebellion as a defensive, "last gasp" move by peasants confronted by threats to their subsistence. Actions like these, such as the bread line riots that preceeded the Russian Revolution in 1917, are less dependent upon political space due to their relative spontaneity. Revolutions such as Mao's in China, Vietnam of the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s, and Peru of the 1980s and early 1990s are more dependent upon space provided by the established authorities. That is because highly organized movements are dependent upon proselytization, recruitment, and organization building, actions that require time (the certainly are not spontaneous) and are difficult to conduct in complete secrecy.

¹⁷⁷McCormick, *From the Sierra to the Cities*, 17.

Guzman's activities at the University of Huamanga in the 1970s, his disciples' victories in student elections, and so forth were not carried out clandestinely, and were well known in the region. The government, while perhaps aware of Guzman's activities, did nothing to contain or mitigate the message, allowing it to build and grow without facing governmental repression. Such conditions inevitably helped Guzman and his deputies in designing and implementing a system that has proven, once constructed, highly resistant to governmental repression and suppression.

C. ECONOMIC IMPACT

Peru's economic performance has been well documented. It has been beset by high inflation, negative economic growth, and a growing sense of despair on the part of the poor segments of the population. However, several points need to be highlighted. An examination of overall economic growth is not an accurate measurement of whether the typical citizen's situation is improving, as evidenced by food riots and an aborted coup in Venezuela during a time of remarkably high economic growth.¹⁷⁸ As previously mentioned, Peru is dominated by Lima and the coastal industries that support the

¹⁷⁸Tim Golden, "Democracy Isn't Always Enough," *New York Times*, 9 Feb 92. Venezuela's economy was growing at a 9.2 percent annual rate prior to the coup attempt in February 1992.

export market; their success has little short-term effect on the peasants of the highlands.

A better measure of economic performance as it relates to the average citizen are measures that relate to sustenance. On those grounds, Peru is and has been slipping. Table 3 demonstrates by measures of food production and nutrition that Peru has not only failed to better the lot of its people, but that their situation has declined since the 1960s.

TABLE 3, PERU, NUTRITION AND FOOD PRODUCTION STATISTICS

	Daily Caloric Intake	Protein Consumption (grams)	Per Capita Food Prodn Index (1979-81=100)
1961-63	2227	60.9	
1969-71	2289	61.1	
1975-77	2209	56.7	118.3 (in 1976)
1979-81	2166	57.2	100
1980-82	2141	58.6	
1981-83	2150	58.2	
1983-85	2144	56.8	
1984-86	2192	58.3	96.3 (in 1987)
Source: SALA Vol. 28, tables 820, 821, and 827.			

Another issue is the means by which countries are now attempting to revive their economies. Most have embraced the harsh anti-inflation message of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which is likely a good prescription for long-term economic success. While growth may over time raise the standard of living for the average peasant, the economic programs imposed in countries such as Venezuela, Peru, and

Bolivia often hits hardest those least able to tolerate additional austerity. These measures, in Peru's case, while perhaps for the overall good of the economy as a whole, impacts heavily on the poor, and hands the Shining Path an issue around which to mobilize the populace. President Fujimori is thus confronted with a "Catch-22;" if he implements IMF-style austerity measures, he drives a segment of the populace towards Sendero. On the other hand, he can attempt to address the social and economic ills exploited by the Shining Path while his economy deteriorates from inflation, a lack of international financing, a bloated public sector, and other economic ills. Policies of past administrations presented President Fujimori with a situation in which he is "damned if he does, damned if he doesn't."

D. CONCLUSION

Peru still maintains much of the legacy of colonialism in the ways its people are divided by language, ethnicity, geography, and class. These chasms in society are, I contend, the primary vulnerability that the Shining Path exploits when waging war with the State, for all other vulnerabilities can be subsumed under this heading. These divides are obvious to the Peruvian citizenry, and the resentments of the disenfranchised play into the hands of the revolution. These divides should not be insurmountable, but the internal war

makes addressing such core, longstanding issues extremely difficult.

From the standpoint of the elite, the segment of the population that should be brought into the system is or could be seen as the enemy, due to their preponderance in the Shining Path, making their incorporation highly problematic. This perception is particularly troublesome if held by the military, as governmental repression based solely on race, language, age, and gender will drive the contested audience into the arms of the enemy. From the standpoint of the poor, elite unwillingness to share power or economic success, based on the above considerations, would validate the "unfairness" of society and conspire to drive that segment of the population toward Sendero. Even if they do not turn to the Shining Path, the dispossessed elements of the population would be even less likely to provide even passive support to the State as it attempts to conduct the counterinsurgency.¹⁷⁹

The State structures also addressed in this chapter, while evidence of the divides mentioned above, have contributed specifically to SL's rise. While I in no way contend that these structural deficiencies are the root cause of Sendero's campaign, I do contend that they were the springboard from which Sendero launched its campaign. A key lesson to be

¹⁷⁹For a theoretical analysis of the varying levels of support desired and required by a revolutionary movement, see Leites and Wolf, *Rebellion and Authority*, 8-16.

learned from this section is that a state, particularly one in a tenuous position, must occupy the political space and fill the "virgin soil" in its citizen's political experience. A government must be able to detect threats to the established order if it is to remain in power. This is not a profound discovery, for states throughout the world perform these functions regularly. A prime state function is to politically socialize its population, and if it fails to accomplish that task someone or something is likely to fill that void. Peru did not fulfill its governmental obligations, leaving space for an organization such as the Shining Path to do the job itself-- to the obvious detriment of the State.

The main question of this thesis regards the future of the Shining Path in the post-Guzman era, and whether the organization will be able to adapt to the loss of its leader. One step the government can take, as was mentioned in the previous chapter, is to alleviate the conditions that allowed for the rise of the Shining Path in the first place. If this is done, SL's future will be limited even if it is able to address the loss of its spiritual leader.

However, the Peruvian government does not seem to be pushing Peru from being a State towards becoming a nation-state in the true sense of the word. Ethnic, geographic, linguistic, and economic fragmentation is still the rule, not the exception. Further, the government does not seem interested in truly extending its control into the

countryside, as evidenced by the creation of the *rondas campesinas*, a tacit admittance of its incapacity to rule beyond Lima and perhaps the department capitals.

The government is aggressively addressing the economic troubles. Thus far, however, their responses, while perhaps sound from a strictly economic standpoint, are causing hardship precisely in the population to which Sendero is most popular. Guzman's capture will probably give the government a short-term respite whereby it can attempt to address the long-standing economic troubles facing Peru. However, the government's chosen economic recovery plan is fundamentally dependent upon containing and limiting the insurgency. A key aspect of Peru's orthodox plan is the need for foreign investment capital. Foreign investors are not likely to invest heavily in Peru unless they have confidence in the long-term stability of the country, something they are not likely to receive solely from the apprehension of Guzman.

The long term stability of Peru is dependent upon addressing the other vulnerabilities identified in this chapter, and the government is not moving to address the aspects of society that, I contend, makes Peru vulnerable to revolution in general and vulnerable to a group such as the Shining Path in particular. Addressing the structures of society are the type of aggressive steps that can, in a long-term sense, thwart the resurgence of the Shining Path. Thus far, the government is not taking those kinds of steps.

V. CONCLUSION

This thesis opened by offering three possible scenarios for the future of the Shining Path in a post-Guzman environment. Regardless of the outcome of the issue, clearly that outcome will be in large part predicated upon the organization's ability to adapt to Guzman's loss, particularly if the government proves unable to follow the Guzman capture with other counterinsurgency successes.

The thesis thus examined the Shining Path's campaign for evidence of flexibility at the ideological, strategic, and tactical levels in varying operational environments. The evidence demonstrates that the organization is highly flexible, adapting its message and tactics to suit the particular targeted community. Sendero does this by employing a flexible approach to inducements, employing various inducements and differential levels of persuasion and coercion that are dictated by the targeted community and its receptivity to SL. The thesis also examined how Sendero is able to establish bases of support through the framework of a social contract, including the provisal of security, economic necessities, and psychological needs. Following this analysis of Sendero methods, the thesis examined case studies from disparate regions of Peru to give concrete examples of how the Shining Path in fact uses inducements. The most impressive

example of SL flexibility is its campaign in the Upper Huallaga Valley where the organization uses coordinated strategies to thwart the government, the Colombian drug cartels, and the MRTA, often playing off one actor against the other.

The thesis then addressed the issue of how Sendero attempts to appeal to the many constituencies that make up any targeted community, finding that Sendero uses the contradictions inherent in society to appeal to several groups whose membership crosses class lines. Thus, to portray the Shining Path as a group that appeals only to the poor is incorrect, a portrayal that, if held by Peru's security forces, would inhibit its ability to prosecute a counter-Sendero campaign. This ability to appeal to several sectors of society again indicates that the Shining Path is a flexible group able to exploit any opening granted by the government and society.

Finally, the thesis proposed a method for examining Peru's vulnerability to revolution and its vulnerability to the Shining Path in particular. Examining the various fragmentations present in Peruvian society, the data indicate that Peru is a highly divided society, with those divisions encompassing class, race, geography, and language. When these divisions are combined, as they are in society, one finds that little bonds the white, urban, Spanish-speaking Peruvian with the Indian of the sierra who speaks Quechua, despite 400 years

of statehood and mixing. To be deemed an Indian or to be a Quechua speaker means to be categorized and, in effect, denied possibilities in society, this despite the fact that "pure" Indians and "pure" Europeans are far less common now than in the past. This in effect makes the division arbitrary, a situation perhaps even more repugnant to the excluded, further exposing conflictive situations to be exploited by revolutionaries.

The role and impact of Peru's economic collapse in the 1980s was examined briefly. This creates a vulnerability to revolution, but only if the citizens see no other alternative and if certain segments of society are bearing an unfair and disproportionate burden. I would argue, borrowing again from Chalmers Johnson, that economic disasters normally act as accelerators of revolution that require other significant dysfunctions in society to result in revolutionary activity.

Finally, the thesis analyzed the role of political institutions in Peru's vulnerability to revolution. This chapter's analysis found that the Peruvian State, as demonstrated by its handling of the economy and the insurgency, is not an efficacious or effective government, giving the population little reason to support the government through difficult circumstances. Further, the role of political space was analyzed and its importance found to be high. The Peruvian State does not effectively occupy its own territory, leaving it open for other political actors to

create their own political reality. Thus the State, by neglecting its proper role in political socialization and legitimate presence in its own land in effect cedes that mission to someone else, particularly in a society in transition. That role may be filled by trade or labor unions, other interest groups, or revolutionary movements. This is not to imply that a government should suppress avenues of socialization other than its own. However, the government, particularly an elected government, should have its voice heard, if for no other reason than to provide a countervailing or alternative message. Especially in the excluded segments of a divided society, people want an explanation for their situation and the world around them. In the absence of governmental presence, that role was filled by the Shining Path

The presence of political space has other ramifications as well. By not occupying its own territory, the Peruvian government evidently did not realize the threat posed by Abimael Guzman and the Shining Path until the insurgency was well established, delaying its response and giving SL valuable time to become established, to institutionalize, and to proselytize.

Peru's vulnerabilities to revolution are important when questioning whether the Shining Path will be able to overcome the loss of Guzman. If Peru does not act to mitigate the divides in society, the economic hardship that engulfs much of

its population, and the political space in the countryside, it leaves SL's ability to regenerate much easier.

The government has two venues within which to combat the Shining Path. One is in the military and police realm, whereby the regime's coercive elements either react defensively or act offensively against the movement. As was described earlier, Guzman's capture has thus far been a singular event, not followed by further aggressive action. Secondly, the coercive arms have not demonstrated any additional capability outside Lima. Thus, the government has not demonstrated the capacity to defeat Sendero solely in the military theater.

The other venue within which the government can combat SL is in the social, economic, and political realm. By addressing the conditions which allowed the Shining Path to rise and spread, the government takes away the conflictive issues which Sendero has exploited in the past. By addressing the societal divides, the government removes one of Sendero's key conflictive issues. By establishing itself in the countryside as a legitimate governor, the State can present itself as a alternative to the many communities not attracted to the Shining Path method and message yet also distrustful of the government. Finally, by establishing itself throughout the country and acting as a legitimate sovereign, the State creates for itself an alternative source of intelligence with which it can prosecute the armed realm of the conflict. Thus

far, other than in the economic arena, the government has not demonstrated a desire to tackle the factors that allowed the Shining Path to emerge.

In conclusion, given Sendero's demonstrated capacity to adapt to changing conditions, this thesis argues that the capture of Guzman presents the government with a short-term opportunity. The government can use that time to attack the organization militarily and by robbing it of its issues and cause. By alleviating the roots of the movement, the government can knock the foundation out from under the organization, decreasing the threat posed to the State itself. Until this is done, Peru will be a revolution waiting to happen, be it by Sendero or others.

Judging by the evidence presented in this thesis, Sendero is not dead. It has demonstrated a large degree of flexibility, a condition that allowed it to build its strength over the years and is now a precondition for its survival. Further, the government has not demonstrated the willingness to deprive Sendero of its bases of support by addressing the social tensions and contradictions in society highlighted above. Thus the Shining Path's ability to regenerate itself will be less difficult. Given the organization's ability to adapt and the government's apparent unwillingness or inability to address the conditions that support the movement, one should expect to see a rise of the Shining Path in the long term.

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