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**CHINA AT THE TURN OF THE CENTURY:
A HANDBOOK FOR OPERATIONAL PLANNERS**

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
Frederick H. Grant
Major, U.S. Marine Corps

March 1993

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93-18285



REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

1a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED			1b. RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS N/A	
2a. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY			3. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY OF REPORT UNLIMITED	
2b. DECLASSIFICATION / DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE				
4. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)			5. MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)	
6a. NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION ADVANCED RESEARCH DEPARTMENT		6b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable) 35		7a. NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION
6c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE 686 CUSHING ROAD NEWPORT, RI 02841-1207			7b. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)	
8a. NAME OF FUNDING / SPONSORING ORGANIZATION		8b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable)		9. PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER
8c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code)			10. SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERS	
			PROGRAM ELEMENT NO.	PROJECT NO.
11. TITLE (Include Security Classification) CHINA AT THE TURN OF THE CENTURY: A HANDBOOK FOR OPERATIONAL PLANNERS				
12. PERSONAL AUTHOR(S) GRANT, FREDERICK H., MAJOR, UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS				
13a. TYPE OF REPORT FINAL		13b. TIME COVERED FROM 18 NOV 92 TO 3 MAR 93		14. DATE OF REPORT (Year, Month, Day) 3 MAR 93
15. PAGE COUNT 132				
16. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION				
17. COSATI CODES			18. SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number) CHINA, THREAT, PACIFIC, STRATEGY, MILITARY, PACOM	
FIELD	GROUP	SUB-GROUP		
19. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number) (U) Current internal events in China are analyzed to determine their effects of international relations and on formulation of PACOM strategy. The legacy of a four thousand year Chinese civilization is clashing with a revolutionary communist society. Economic modernization is occurring at a rapid pace, without any corresponding political and ideological reforms, further exacerbating an already volatile situation. PACOM strategy cannot influence internal events in China. PACOM planners must, therefore, formulate strategy designed to contain spill-over. This spill-over may occur as a result of four distinct scenarios: a civil war in China; Chinese maritime aggression; a PRC conflict with Taiwan; or a dispute between China and her continental neighbors. Internal instability in China makes these scenarios near-term possibilities, and will drive continuous reassessment of PACOM strategy.				
20. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT ☒ UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED ☐ SAME AS RPT. ☐ DTIC USERS			21. ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED	
22a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL CDR J.W. KENNEDY, ASST DIR, ARP			22b. TELEPHONE (Include Area Code) (401) 841-3304	22c. OFFICE SYMBOL 35A

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, R.I.

**CHINA AT THE TURN OF THE CENTURY:
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by


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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Advanced Research Program.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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3 March 1993

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Approved by:


Faculty Research Advisor

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Date

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Abstract of
**CHINA AT THE TURN OF THE CENTURY:
A HANDBOOK FOR OPERATIONAL PLANNERS**

Current internal events in China are analyzed to determine their effects on international relations and on formulation of PACOM strategy. The legacy of a four thousand year Chinese civilization is clashing with a revolutionary communist society. Economic modernization is occurring at a rapid pace, without any corresponding political and ideological reforms, further exacerbating an already volatile situation. PACOM strategy cannot influence internal events in China. PACOM planners must, therefore, formulate strategy designed to contain spill-over. This spill-over may occur as a result of four distinct scenarios: a civil war in China; Chinese maritime aggression; a PRC conflict with Taiwan; or a dispute between China and her continental neighbors. Internal instability in China makes these scenarios near-term possibilities, and will drive continuous reassessment of PACOM strategy.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This study explores recent events in the People's Republic of China (PRC) to determine their effect on the United States Pacific Command (PACOM) strategy in the near-term. Near-term is defined here as within the next five years. Since the demise of the Soviet Union, United States policy has mandated military force reductions with a corresponding strategy shift toward regional threats. China has the potential to be, at a minimum, a dominant regional threat. Frightening to the imagination, she also has the long-term potential to be a super power adversary of the magnitude of the former Soviet Union.

This paper also provides evidence to support the contention that event-driven changes will cause China to become the primary regional focus in the near-term around which all PACOM strategy and reassessment will revolve. While the findings of fact and the conclusions set forth are important from a historical perspective, this study's primary message is directed toward those military planners charged with developing strategy in the vast PACOM area of responsibility that includes the PRC. As such, the purpose of this paper is to provide the PACOM planner with a single China handbook that covers requisite historical background,

delineates internal issues currently driving Chinese domestic politics and international affairs, examines potential Chinese scenarios that could involve U.S. forces, and suggests some approaches to the development of PACOM strategy for China.

This study, then, seeks to answer several questions in support of the PACOM planner. What are the key internal issues affecting China today? What kind of new China will emerge as a result of these ongoing internal issues? Will there be a succession struggle for power after Deng Xiaoping's death, and, if so, what impact will it have on Chinese international relations? What hegemonic aspirations does China have in Asia? Finally, and most importantly of all, what are the potential scenarios in which PACOM military force may come in contact against Chinese military force?

Key points and broad conclusions of this study are listed below.

Internal Events and Historical Lessons

* The observation and study of internal events in China today is the true barometer for measuring potential Chinese actions and intentions toward the international community. The task of the observer becomes one of separating those events which result from carefully orchestrated party propaganda from those which are spontaneous and reactionary in nature. Once this determination is made, the event can then

be properly interpreted to determine the effect it will have on the way the Chinese conduct affairs with the outside world. It is only then that appropriate PACOM strategy can be developed.

* The key to understanding internal events in China is to attempt to comprehend the magnitude of uncertainty instilled in a populace suddenly informed by the new PRC leadership that the legacy of four thousand years of culture was now obsolete. The reform and revolutionary periods of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries clashed abrasively with the previous dynastic rules, creating a highly combustible and reactionary society under the communists. This produced a present-day Chinese society that is indeterminate in its actions at best, and chaotic at its worse.

* Several relevant lessons for the operational planner can be gleaned from a review of China's history. They are:

- China will always perceive herself as the leader of Asia and will strive to achieve her stated goal of regaining her historical position as suzerain of the Asian continent

- The Confucian teachings of family fidelity and the quest for harmony espoused by the philosophy of Daoism will always permeate Chinese thinking. The populace continues unsuccessfully to adjust to the contrast of today's

revolutionary society with four thousand years of legacy, the importance and validity of which are constantly being altered and questioned.

- The period of the communist regime has been characterized by a party leadership and a people that desperately sought to come to grips with how to erase the past while continuing to modernize their vast country. This dilemma is never-ending, since the cleansing of the past in China usually equates to the destruction of the educated elite and the most capable and able institutions.

* Reactionary and destructive policies, personified by misguided programs such as The Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, have raised questions among the populace regarding the communist party's prestige and ability to govern. The Chinese people have learned that the "emperor has no clothes." The leadership of China has evolved to one that has taken crisis management to its zenith. Failed attempts to bring some cohesion between the past and present is causing the reactionary and indeterminate policies of today's China.

* Internal events currently driving Chinese actions include, but are not limited to: the legacy of the Tienanmen Square massacre; the People's Liberation Army (PLA) modernization program; corruption and graft in party politics; posturing for a potential succession struggle after the death

of Deng Xiaoping; economic reforms without corresponding ideological and political reforms; and, most important of all, the awareness by the populace of reforms in the former Soviet Union and attempts by Chinese leaders to prevent a corresponding occurrence in China.

Current Military Issues

* The PRC has now reorganized its ground forces into army groups, with an emphasis on combining infantry, armor, electronic warfare, anti-air capabilities, and supporting fighter aircraft under one commander. People's Liberation Army (PLA) doctrine now calls for self-contained highly trained forces to be deployed to a specified area and fight a high-intensity war under low-intensity conditions. This local war concept is limited in time, space and objectives, using as one of its models the Falklands War. Beijing now wants its military forces refurbished for rapid deployment and intensive response.

* The PLA Navy, or PLAN, adopted a new forward naval defense. It is characterized as an active green water defense strategy in place of its previous coastal brown water emphasis, and is ultimately aimed at obtaining a blue water power status. Under this new strategy, the PLAN will confront

the enemy at long range and stop any advance before the enemy reaches coastal waters.

* China considers it vital to increase presence in the Indian Ocean to counter growing Indian naval power. The Chinese are negotiating arms sales with Burma for the right to establish naval facilities and listening posts on islands off the Burmese coast.

* Deng Xiaoping is moving rapidly to reshuffle the military leadership to ensure that the communist party retains control of the armed forces. Recent purges resulted in the replacement of senior officers and commissars in almost every major central headquarters and regional military command. General Yang Baibing was removed from his post as General Secretary of the Central Military Commission for allegedly attempting to place close supporters in key positions. Posturing for positions of power in the event of a power struggle after Deng Xiaoping's death remains a key issue in political and military circles.

PACOM Strategy Issues

* The critical problem for the U.S. is that internal events shaping China are not incidental to the future of China, but are key to China's future and should therefore

drive U.S. strategy. Although many of these internal events are random and indeterminate in nature, they can be predicted within certain scenarios. Since the U.S. has little control over events in China, the challenge is determining how to influence to any degree internal Chinese events, while containing the potential spill-over.

* Ironically, Americans in general do not understand revolution, and suffer from arrogance when dealing with foreign nations, particularly with Asian peoples. The keys for the military planner are: to understand the transient nature of internal Chinese activities; to understand their impact on international issues; to understand the near-term impact of the results of these issues; and to prepare for various scenarios that could evolve as a result of these indeterminate occurrences.

* PACOM strategy must be structured around the 1993 national security strategy, which encourages democratic reform in China. It also sets a five-fold agenda for Asia.

- The U.S. must maintain a strategic framework reflecting its status as a Pacific power.

- The U.S. must continue to expand markets.

- The U.S. must carefully watch the emergence of China and support, contain or balance this emergence as necessary to protect U.S. interests.

- The U.S. must continue to play a role in the peaceful unification process on the Korean peninsula.

- The U.S. will encourage the normalization of Indochina.

* Since the U.S. cannot greatly influence Chinese internal events, PACOM strategy must be aimed in two directions.

- The first is to support U.S. national security strategy of free-flow of information regarding the democratic societies of the world into China, and to monitor closely the emergence of China as a regional, and potentially, global power. This task can be achieved in two ways. First, the U.S. should remain physically engaged and use theater informational resources to shape regional opinions. PACOM personnel and units must participate in bilateral operations, exchange programs, mobile training teams, and the like. Second, an ambitious theater intelligence collection plan should be followed. This plan must make innovative use of overt human intelligence, to include inter-governmental information exchanges, the defense attache reporting system, and debriefing of all PACOM personnel that come in contact with citizens of the PRC.

- The second direction of strategy must be aimed toward containing the possible spill-over from reactionary internal events in China. This spill-over may occur because

of four distinct scenarios: a civil war in China; Chinese maritime aggression in the Pacific or Indian Oceans; a PRC conflict with Taiwan; or, a dispute between China and her continental neighbors. In order to meet the demands of these diversified scenarios, strategies must be developed to support: humanitarian missions; non-combatant evacuation missions; flexible deterrent options that include forward naval presence and aircraft beddown locations; freedom of the seas; and, power projection missions on the mainland of Asia.

Conclusions

Strategic and operational planners are taught to base assessments on threat capabilities and intentions. The scope of planning in the Pacific theater, however, must be broadened to also include the event-driven threat posed by China, due to the indeterminate nature of internal Chinese politics. **This indeterminate factor always overrides logic. Strategists must recognize that wars may rise by inadvertence as well as aggression.** PACOM strategy must be flexible and reversible to counter this threat. It must recognize that the Chinese are currently restructuring ground forces for quick reaction missions. The extensive merchant fleet and the continued development of a blue water navy give China the capability to project forces immediately, although on a small scale, and on a limited basis. The PLA, and particularly the PLAN, is

embarked on a rapid modernization program. The PLAN's aim is to become a major maritime power in the Indian and Pacific Oceans. These intentions and capabilities, however, are not as likely to influence the stability of the Pacific theater as much as current internal Chinese uncertainties and resulting reactionary Chinese policies. This underscores China's potential for bizarre military behavior abroad. It also makes China a near-term threat, around which all PACOM military strategy must evolve.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT	iii
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	v
LIST OF MAPS	xvii
NOTE	xviii
CHAPTER	
ONE. INTRODUCTION	1
TWO. A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE	7
Background	7
Early History: From Daoism to the Taiping Revolution	8
The Revolutionary Era: From the End of the Qing to the PRC	15
Modern China: The PRC	18
Summary	27
THREE. INTERNAL EVENTS IN CHINA	33
The Focus for Planners	33
The Legacy of Tienanmen	33
The PLA Factor: Still a People's Army?	37
The PLA Modernization Program	39
Corruption and Graft in Party Politics	44
Succession Struggle After Deng?	49
Economic Reforms	52
The Enemy is Information!	55
Impact of Internal Events on International Relations	58
FOUR. THE INDETERMINATE FACTOR AND WESTERN MISINTERPRETATIONS	65
The Task	65
The Clash Between the Old and the New	65
The Historical Precedence of Western Misinterpretation	67
Lessons For the PACOM Planner	71

FIVE.	DEFINING A PACOM STRATEGY	74
	The Challenges	74
	The U.S. National Asian Strategy	75
	PACOM Theater Strategy	76
	Containing Spill-over Through Scenario	
	Contingency Planning	80
	Civil War in China	80
	Chinese Maritime Aggression: The Spratlys	
	and Beyond?	84
	Taiwan Conflict	94
	Neighborhood Dispute	95
	Summary	98
SIX.	CONCLUSIONS	101
		
	SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY	107

LIST OF MAPS

Map


1. China and the Western Pacific	xix
2. China	xx
3. PLAN Maritime Area of Interest	41
4. Disputed Islands	85
5. Proposed Naval Bases	87
6. Layered Defense Strategy	89
7. Chinese Inroads in the Indian Ocean	96

NOTE

This paper uses the pinyin method for English spelling of Chinese characters, with some exceptions. Pinyin is the official system for the People's Republic of China, and has been adopted by the United Nations and other world organizations. It is also the system most commonly used by today's scholars and journalists.


The exceptions are proper nouns, which are extremely familiar to the western reader. Some examples of personal names are Sun Yat-sen, Chiang Kai-shek, Henry Pu-yi, and Yuan Shih-kai. Examples of place names are Hong Kong and Taiwan. The pinyin spelling "Beijing" is used in all references to the capital city after the proclamation of the Peoples Republic of China in 1949. The familiar "Peking" is used for references to this city before 1949. Additionally, the term "Kuomintang" is used throughout when discussing the Nationalist Party founded by Sun Yat-sen.

Map 1
China and the Western Pacific



Source: 93-ADVR112 (Newport: Naval War College, 1993).

Map 2
China



Source: 93-ADVR113 (Newport: Naval War College, 1993).

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**CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION**

As national and theater military strategists of the United States grapple with current force reductions and regional threats, internal events are occurring in China that will drive continuous reassessment of U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) strategy over the next five years. These spontaneous internal events are significant to western strategic planners in two areas. First, current Chinese internal events are causing a significant impact on China's international relations with the west and the other Pacific nations. Important issues, such as the 1997 Hong Kong reversion plan and Chinese-Japanese relations, are greatly influenced by what is happening today within China. Second, and most important of all to PACOM planners, China has a historically prominent role as the major force in Asia. In spite of concentrated attempts by the communist regime to sever all links to the past, the Chinese leadership will continue to strive to regain that dominant Asian position in the future. These issues and events are particularly relevant today, as China is slowly

opening her doors to the west after operating for the last forty years in an extremely closed communist society. The route she takes to regain a position of prominence will result from current internal events and historical precedence, and will directly impact on PACOM strategy for dealing with regional threats in the Pacific theater.

The National Military Strategy of the United States for 1992 emphasized that, ". . . the real threat we now face is the threat of the unknown, the uncertain. The threat is instability and being unprepared to handle a crisis or war that no one predicted or expected."¹ U.S. military experiences in Korea in the summer of 1950 taught the valuable, but costly, lesson of unpreparedness. In discussing the poor performance of the U.S. military in the face of the initial onslaught of the North Korean invaders, T.R. Fehrenbach wrote, ". . . they represented exactly the kind of pampered, undisciplined, egalitarian army their society had long desired and had at last achieved. They had been raised to believe the world was without tigers, then sent to face those tigers with a stick."²

Nowhere is the National Military Strategy's concept of uncertainty or unpredictability more applicable than when dealing with China. Unlike North Korea in 1950, China is not an immediate military threat to world peace. She does, however, have the potential to be either an important ally or a significant adversary of the United States in the near term.

Because of the indeterminate nature of internal events, however, it is uncertain which direction she will move and what kind of relationship she will seek with the West. In addition, United States' policy makers are currently going through a post-Soviet Union euphoria reminiscent of events at the end of the second World War as they simultaneously address military force reductions. It is the combination of the uncertainties in China coupled with world-wide U. S. military drawdowns that makes the job of developing strategy to meet regional threats in Asia so difficult for the PACOM planner.

Internal events currently driving Chinese actions include, but are not limited to: the legacy of the Tienanmen Square massacre; the People's Liberation Army (PLA) modernization program; corruption and graft in party politics; posturing for a potential succession struggle after the death of Deng Xiaoping; economic reforms without corresponding ideological and political reforms; and, most important of all, the awareness by the populace of reforms in the former Soviet Union and attempts by Chinese leaders to prevent a corresponding occurrence in China. The latter event is critical, for the Chinese leadership is acutely aware of what happened in the Soviet Union and is taking steps to ensure it doesn't happen in China. Nevertheless, as Professor William Fuller stated in his lecture to the Naval War College in November of 1992 concerning the collapse of the Soviet Union:

But it is important to remember . . . that the Soviets themselves did not perceive the rapid demise of their

system either. Certainly the conspirators of August 1991 did not perceive the demise of communism. In fact, ironically, what they were trying to do was to avert the destruction of the union. The real irony of course is that [the actions they took] to avert the destruction of the union actually accelerated that very destruction.³

The inevitable changes in China could result from actions similar to those of East Germany in 1989 or those of the Soviet Union in 1991, in which relatively peaceful events culminated in free and open societies. Conversely, changes may also occur as a result of armed rebellious activity that could cause reverberations throughout Asia. The fact remains that internal events will drive changes in China in the near-term, and the activity during this transitory period will be unpredictable and indeterminate. Deng Xiaoping will ensure that China continues a modernization program that will allow this largest of Asian countries to take what she perceives to be her rightful place as an Asian leader, but the question remains as to how far he will go to achieve this goal. Additionally, what will happen when Deng finally succumbs to old age? Will there be peaceful transition to new leadership? Will China become a state with free and democratic principles waging economic war against Japan and the United States for supremacy in the Pacific, or will she be a communist adversary determined to spread her decaying ideology to other nations of the East? The possibility exists that a violent succession struggle could occur after the death of Deng Xiaoping that could result in a more aggressive communist regime dedicated to preservation of the last bastion of communism. Whatever

the scenario, evidence clearly suggests that, regardless of the type of China that emerges, it will be one dedicated to modernization and the advancement of China toward a dominant leadership role in Asia. This fact alone should drive strategic planners in Washington and Hawaii as they grapple with emerging regional threats in a vast PACOM area of responsibility during an era of diminished forces.

The next chapter presents a concise Sino history with the sole intent of providing the PACOM planner with the relevant lessons that are most applicable today in assessing internal Chinese activity and future intentions. Chapter Three provides a detailed and interpretative analysis of current internal events and issues that affect most heavily the reassessment requirements of PACOM strategy makers. International events are addressed only in the sense that they are acted upon by internal events. Chapter Four further analyzes those lessons of history and internal events, and places them in the perspective of today's modern Chinese state. Chapter Five suggests some of the potential scenarios of importance to PACOM that could result from this indeterminate internal activity, identifies problems for the military planners, and offers possible strategy options. The emphasis throughout is on how the reactionary and spontaneous nature of internal Chinese politics and activities necessitates varied and flexible strategy response options. The final chapter provides conclusions.

The current China can be compared to the phoenix, who consumed itself in the fire and then rose from the ashes. Like the phoenix in the fire, China will emerge with a new shape and form as a product of this series of indeterminate and unrelated internal events. Her resulting actions will drive continuous reassessment of PACOM China strategy in the near-term.

Footnotes for Chapter One

¹U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy Of The United States January 1992 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1992), p 4.

²T. R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1963), p. 123.

³William Fuller, "The Soviet Union," Lecture, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI: 5 November 1992.

CHAPTER TWO

A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

Background

China has a recorded history of nearly four thousand years.¹ Although the magnitude of the task of reviewing this long and varied history appears intimidating at first, China's past can easily be divided into three different and very distinct periods. The legacy of these three periods all have a lingering impact on Chinese actions and psychology in the nineties, and will continue to do so into the twenty-first century.

The first period is the longest, and covers Chinese civilization from the beginning of time to the late nineteenth century, when the last Chinese dynastic rule began to crumble. This period is important to the military planner in several ways. For example, it was during this the beginning phase of this interval that the philosophies of Daoism and Confucianism evolved. These two philosophies are the cornerstones for modern Chinese thought in the same manner that Judeo-Christian ethics influenced Western thought. This early historical period also established the acceptance by other Asian nations of Chinese suzerainty, as well as China's status as cultural leader of Asia. Lastly, and most significantly, the

subjugation of the Chinese empire by western and Japanese occupying powers occurred toward the end of this period, a humbling fact that was never far from the thoughts of modern-day Chinese leaders as they formulate policy.

The second period spans from the aftermath of the Taiping Rebellion in the late nineteenth century to the proclamation of the People's Republic of China (PRC) on October 1, 1949. This was a period that brought about the collapse of dynastic rule, and was characterized by continuous revolutionary activity. Nationalism was the call to action. Chinese patriots, such as Sun Yat-sen, Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Zedong, jockeyed for leadership of the new order in China and the right to lead China back to her high pedestal in Asia.

The third period covers the reign of the Chinese communists and demonstrates the conflicts that occur when a four thousand year legacy steeped in tradition clashes with a modern communist state. The lessons from these three periods have relevance for today's planners in formulating Chinese strategy, and can provide valuable insights on the current volatile situation in China.

Early History: From Daoism to the Taiping Revolution

The roots of Chinese civilization are embedded in the philosophies of Daoism and Confucianism. Lao Tzu, believed to be an older contemporary of Confucius (551-479 B.C.), is credited as the founder of the school of thought that is

called Daoism, or "School of the Way." The entity called Dao, or "Way," existed before the universe came into being. There are no words to describe the Dao, because languages are totally inadequate for this purpose. A person discovers the "Way" when he or she becomes one with nature and the universe. The "Way" is something that is discovered or obtained, but cannot be explained. In fact, the way that can be described, cited as authority, or praised is not the "Way." One of Daoism's main tenets is the concept of the Yin and the Yang, which is based on the premise that opposites attract and therefore create harmony. For every plus, there is a minus. For every life, there is a death. For every bird in the air, there is a fish in the sea. When the sun is setting, there is a rising somewhere else. For every Yin, there is a Yang, which attract each other like magnets by virtue of their own opposite characteristics.² Daoism can be likened to a circle, where the end is also the beginning. In essence, Daoism may be summed up as a philosophy of essential unity of the universe, of polarization, of harmony with nature, and the leveling of all differences, from which ". . . naturally arises the absence of desire for strife and contention and fighting for advantage. . . . In his emphasis on non-resistance to evil, Laotse [Lao Tzu] became the precursor to a long line of thinkers and moralists culminating in Tolstoy as the greatest modern disciple of Christian humility and forbearance."³

Confucianism was also much influenced by Daoism, and historians believe Confucius met Lao Tzu on at least one occasion. Confucius taught a way of life in which morality occupies a supreme position. Confucianism is a system of ethics, education, and statesmanship for regulating the relations of men according to certain beliefs. It stresses love for humanity, ancestor worship, reverence for parents, and harmony in thought and conduct. Like Daoism, it emphasizes the special relationships between the Gods, the emperor, and the people. The emperor was an extension of the family, creating the foundation for the Chinese reverence of the ancestral hierarchy. As long as the emperor ruled rightfully, his nation-family was happy and the Gods smiled favorably on his regime. If the emperor deviated from a rightful regime, he would gain the disfavor of the Gods, who in turn would express their disfavor in varied ways. These expressions included earthquakes, famine, floods, and draught. When this occurred, the emperor had lost the "Mandate of Heaven" and the results sometimes included the overthrow of his regime. It was this special connecting relationship between nature and the Chinese peasant, and the peasant with his father, his governmental leaders and his emperor, that was the basis for the harmony that was so important in both Daoism and Confucianism.⁴

Confucius also placed a premium on education and effectively established the forerunner to the civil service

system and written examinations for job placements. The result was the elevation of the Mandarin class of educated and elite advisors to every level of government from the lowest villages and provinces to the court of the emperor.⁵ It was this privileged class that was revered as the personification of what could be achieved through dedication, hard work, and education. Most importantly, this status was obtainable by all Chinese through preparation, study and a series of successful examinations. The Mandarins became the personification of the Confucian ethic, and provided the vanguard of Confucius' belief that if everyone lived up to his station in life, then harmony would prevail and order would exist.

China has one of the oldest civilizations in the world, and her name, Zhongguo, means middle kingdom or central country, suggesting she is the center of the world. Her legacy was one in which neighboring Asian countries paying homage to the Chinese emperor. Emissaries from places such as Korea, Japan, Annam (northern Vietnam), Burma and Siam travelled for miles and days to kowtow to the emperor and to offer gifts from their respective rulers. Chinese cultural and scholarly traits permeated the upper echelons of the societies of neighboring countries. The ability to read and write Chinese was a sign of knowledge and literary accomplishment in both Korea and Japan. "One dominant culture led the Chinese to think of themselves as the men of Han,

members of one country and of the leading race within the world."⁶ The kowtowing to the emperor by representatives from other countries symbolized their recognition of China as the legitimate ruler of the Asian people and of Chinese suzerainty.

China is credited with the early inventions of the compass, gunpowder, and paper, to name a few.⁷ This is all the more significant when one realizes that, during the same era, European civilization experienced the dark and middle ages, in which survival was the primary goal of the day. When Marco Polo visited China in 1275, some of his first observations were about the advanced Chinese civilization and the contrast between the modern cities of the Han empire and the living conditions of Europe.⁸

Even with the Mongol invasion of China in the thirteenth century, and the subsequent establishment of the 1644 Qing or Manchu dynasty, the Chinese were able to maintain their superior position in Asia.⁹ They simply assimilated the Mongol and Manchu ruling classes into their culture, many of whom became more Chinese than the actual Chinese themselves. When the western nations of the world began to occupy China in the nineteenth century, the Chinese aptly developed an intermediary class of licensed merchants, called Hong, that conducted all dealings with the foreigners. The Mandarin ruling classes and the Hong diplomatically interpreted the harsh demands made by both the Emperor and the western

nations. The Mandarins and Chinese merchants would then jointly seek a compromising solution. In this manner, the Chinese continued to maintain internally the pretense of the supreme power of the emperor. As the opium trade flourished, China was exploited by the colonial merchants, who were backed by their countries' powerful and technologically superior military forces. As disputes arose and were settled by force, more and more Chinese territory was acceded to the western nations.

Even while dominated by foreign powers, China never lost the perception of her rightful high-standing in Asia. Her nineteenth century history is characterized by obstinate and arrogant demands on behalf of her rulers to the occupying nations. This occurred despite the overwhelming odds against her due to the advanced technology and the modern armies and navies of the western world and Japan. Nowhere is this Chinese sense of superiority, particularly in things Asian, more evident than in the writings of Lin Zexu to Queen Victoria in 1839 to protest English opium trade practices in China. Lin, the Imperial Commissioner at Canton and a member of the educated elite of China, wrote to Queen Victoria on behalf of the Emperor, delineating the evils of the opium trade. In the condescending manner of a parent to a child, he quickly established the relationship of the celestial emperor to his subjects which, from the Chinese viewpoint, included the Queen of England (who he referred to as King). He then

carefully outlined the steps the Chinese would take to reform the British merchants and what was required of the English leadership to stop the trade. He wrote:

The barbarian merchants of your country, if they wish to do business for a prolonged period, are required to obey our statutes respectfully and to cut off permanently the source of opium. They must by no means try to test the effectiveness of the law with their lives. May you, O King, check your wicked and sift out your vicious people before they come to China, in order to guarantee the peace of your nation, to show further the sincerity of your politeness and submissiveness, and to let the two countries enjoy together the blessings of peace. How fortunate, how fortunate indeed! After receiving this dispatch will you immediately give us a prompt reply regarding the details and circumstances of your cutting off the opium traffic. Be sure not to put this off.¹⁰

The ignominy of the occupation of China by foreign nations in the nineteenth century weighs heavily on the thinking of Chinese communist leaders today, whose writings are permeated with references to not allowing a situation such as this to develop again.¹¹

The Taiping Rebellion (1860 - 1864) was the beginning of the end for the Qing Dynasty, as the uprising nearly toppled the Manchu rule. It was a rebellion of Christian zealots who managed to establish a foothold in Nanjing and attempted to initiate utopian reforms. The Taiping goals were the destruction of the invading Manchu ruling class and the revamping of the Chinese historical value system. The rebellion failed because it could not attract support from either the Chinese Mandarins, who perceived the rebellion as a threat to their Confucian sense of values, or the Christian nations of the west, who were more concerned about the

negative effects of the rebellion on their lucrative commercial exploitation of China. The rebellion is important because its ability to attract such a large following for so many years served notice of the social discontent which brewed within the corrupt Qing regime.¹² The worse, however, was yet to come.

The Revolutionary Era: From the End of the Qing to the PRC

The Taiping Rebellion was not the only problem that sent warning signals to the leadership of the Qing dynasty. The high degree of humiliation suffered by the Chinese nation at the hands of the western powers during the 19th century convinced many Chinese leaders that, only through modernization, would China take its rightful place in Asia and regain the respect of other nations. This line of thinking was reinforced by the defeats that the Chinese suffered at the hands of the Japanese in 1894 and 1895 when Chinese ground forces were soundly beaten in Korea and Lushan, and China's northern naval fleet was practically destroyed. The fact that a small country like Japan, who had been in virtual isolation prior to 1854, could now defeat the armies and navy of imperial China drove home the necessity for technological improvements and a revision of thinking.¹³

The Boxer Rebellion of 1900 further exacerbated the growing discontent in China. Encouraged by the reigning dowager Cixi, the Boxers attacked members of the occupying

western nations and Japan, whose combined forces retaliated in turn against both the Boxers and the armies of the Qing. Cixi even had to temporarily evacuate the palace in Peking in the face of the advancing foreign military forces, further signifying the hollowness of her decaying rule.¹⁴

With the death of the emperor and empress dowager in 1908, the political scene changed radically, culminating with a national assembly in October of 1910. Riots and strikes occurred throughout the country, and fighting broke out between the forces of the imperial army and provincial governments. By the end of 1911, the revolutionists established a provisional government at Nanking, with Sun Yat-sen as president. The new infant emperor Henry Pu-yi still held court in Beijing with Yuan Shih-Kai in command of his imperial army and navy. Neither Sun Yat-sen or Yuan Shih-kai had the will to fight, nor the money to conduct war, so they negotiated. Sun offered to resign as provisional president and support Yuan Shih-Kai as head of a new republican form of government if Yuan would force the six-year old emperor to abdicate. As a result, on March 10, 1912, Yuan was inaugurated in Peking as the first president of the Chinese Republic.¹⁵

The new Chinese Republic was never an effective governing body, as warlord armies continued to vie for control of various sections of the vast country. When the terms of the World War I Versailles Peace Conference were announced in

1919, about five thousand students in Peking took to the streets on May fourth in protest against awarding German rights and colonial claims to Shandong to the Japanese. Widely recognized as the first actual mass movement in modern Chinese history,¹⁶ this demonstration came to be known as the May Fourth Movement.

Furthermore, communist cells were soon established in major Chinese cities, such as Peking, Shanghai, and Canton. In 1920, Sun Yat-sen formally resurrected the Kuomintang, or Nationalist Party, and gave it a new constitution.¹⁷ By 1924, the Communist Party and the Kuomintang had found temporary common ground for a united front. They both stood for national independence.

This peaceful coexistence was short-lived, however, as distrust and suspicion eventually led to armed conflict between the two factions. Gradually, the communists transformed wandering bands of troops and peasants into a disciplined army, as they progressed from hit and run tactics into systematic guerilla warfare. Even though they continually outmaneuvered the Kuomintang army, now headed by Chiang Kai-shek, communist forces eventually succumbed in the early thirties to a combination of superior military force and economic blockade. The communists were forced to leave southern China, and, in 1934, began what was later to known as the "Long March". One year and six thousand miles later, and after fighting against half the armies of Chiang Kai-shek and

the local warlords of provinces along the way, the communists reached Yen-an in northern China in October, 1935. There they established their base in the part of China closest to the Soviet Union. The communists remained in Yen-an until the end of World War II. The "Long March" became a moral victory for the communist forces and catapulted Mao Zedong to a position of undisputed command within the communist party.¹⁸

At the end of the Second World War, communist forces in Yen-an controlled a regular army of a million troops, two million militiamen, and had pacified eighteen liberated areas in north, south and central China.¹⁹ Subsequent fighting between these forces and the armies of Chiang Kai-shek demonstrated the contrast between the well-disciplined and highly motivated communist forces and the corrupt, ragtag armies of the Nationalist Government. By 1949, Chiang had to evacuate the mainland and move his government to Taiwan. In Beijing²⁰ on October 1, 1949, Mao Zedong proclaimed the People's Republic of China (PRC).

Modern China: The PRC

During the period 1949 to 1970, China concentrated on consolidating her power and taking solace in the fact that she was now a world power with which to be reckoned. Although the Chinese committed troops against western forces in Korea from 1950 to 1953 and supported Ho Chi Minh's regime from behind the scenes in the sixties, China operated mainly as a closed

society to the outside world. The first five year plan, 1953 to 1957, initiated a period of industrial growth as Mao began his quest to eliminate poverty.²¹ The modest success of this initial plan resulted in two items of significance. First, a more ambitious second five year plan, known as the Great Leap Forward, was implemented based on the first plan but failed miserably. Second, Mao became concerned that, with industrial success, the peasant would be forgotten. In 1966, Mao countered the latter by unleashing the Red Guard and the Cultural Revolution. As youth took to the streets in violent demonstrations and recriminations against many established authority figures, the idea of change brought about by massive public demonstration was born in the PRC. This was the forerunner of the Tienanmen Square demonstrations in 1989. Whereas these later students of 1989 simply wanted to be heard in a democratic manner, the Red Guard of the sixties wrecked havoc on a land that was already suffering from famine and poor economic growth. "By the end of [the] Maoist Cultural Revolution in 1976, the then-existing Communist system was despised by almost all the people. . . . including Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yun, the two most powerful Communists in the reform era. The last thing the Communist authorities wanted was for China's people to recognize their failures."²²

Understanding the Cultural Revolution is extremely important because it showcased the personality-driven, power-politics nature of the Chinese communist government. More

importantly, it demonstrated the rapidity of the up and down mobility of various factions within the hierarchy and the resulting impact on Chinese relations with her neighbors and the international community. Unleashed when Mao perceived a threat to his legacy and his way of thinking, the Red Guard revolution led to the downfall of projected Mao successors, such as Liu Shaoqi and Lin Biao, and the rise to power of Mao's wife, Jiang Qing, and Kang Sheng, the notorious security manager of the PRC.²³ Deng Xiaoping, known for his pragmatic approach for solving the country's ills, went into disfavor as a "capitalist-roader."²⁴ Simultaneously, relations with the West, and particularly with the United States, reached another low ebb.

The Nixon visit to Beijing in February of 1972 revitalized Chinese and American relations and ushered in a new era of cooperation between China and the west.²⁵ Zhou Enlai, one of the premier party founders along with Mao Zedong, survived the delicate tightrope of cultural revolution politics, in which he was the bridge between the Maoist zealots and the pragmatic reformists. Zhou was the consummate diplomat, and the delicate negotiations that resulted in the historic meeting between Mao and President Nixon was one of the crowning achievements in his long career. It also solidified his position as the heir apparent to Mao. True to its communist dogma of distorting the truth to gain political ends, the party presented President Nixon's visit to the

people as one in which Nixon was coming to pay respects to Mao as The Great Leader. The party propaganda apparatus announced, "The forthcoming visit of the president of the United States is a great victory for the Chinese proletarian class. It's a reflection of the great achievement made by the Cultural Revolution."²⁶ The rapprochement with the United States did signal an end to many of the excesses brought about by the cultural revolution and also brought a rise to power of Zhou Enlai. Zhou represented stability in what was otherwise a chaotic and reactionary regime. He also was a proponent of modernization to achieve China's "rightful position" in the world. Most importantly, he represented a link to the past for the Chinese people.

After Zhou Enlai's death of cancer on January 8, 1976, "millions of people with no organization behind them and no newspaper to call their own went out into the streets [the following April] to demonstrate . . ."²⁷ in his honor. Many believe these demonstrations were responsible for the eventual fall of Jiang Qing, her close associates (later collectively called the "Gang of Four"), and the Maoist extremists. At the time, Mao was bed-ridden and Jiang Qing and her cohorts were intent on destroying the moderates, as personified by Zhou Enlai.

The problem began when students conducted a show of demonstrative respect for Zhou in Tienanmen Square during the annual April tomb-sweeping festival. They placed thousands of

flowers and placards in Tienanmen dedicated to Zhou's memory, but the government removed them that night. The irritated demonstrators replaced them the next day and wrote slogans in favor of Zhou and Deng Xiaoping, suggesting an anti-Maoist theme. Poems were circulated that made derogatory references to Jiang Qing. The mayor of Beijing, a friend of Jiang Qing, ordered the police and militia to disperse the demonstrators. Hundreds of unarmed demonstrators were killed, as once again the reactionary and spontaneous nature of the people had put them at the mercy of an equally reactionary government. The demonstrations signaled, ". . . the awakening of the Chinese people. . . . This was a significant turning point . . . no longer would the Chinese people be at the beck and call of the authorities."²⁸

When Mao died five months later on September 9, 1976, Hua Guofeng was his successor. Mao, in an attempt to ensure his memory would not suffer the same fate as Stalin's, groomed Hua for the leadership position. Hua Guofeng proved ineffective, however, in attempting to carry on Maoist policies, and eventually relinquished power to Deng Xiaoping and Chen Yun. The latter two could never agree on what direction China should take. It was Deng, the innovator, who had bounced back to power after being purged by the cultural revolution for being too liberal, and who felt that the key to economic success was through a market economy and decentralized control. Chen Yun, like most of the remaining aging leaders,

did not want to pursue Mao's outdated economic plans, but was opposed to Deng's idea of giving more power to the provincial and local bureaucrats. It is interesting to note that at this time Deng listened "...to the people crying for more power sharing. It was natural for Deng to choose a policy of decentralization in order to gain wide support."²⁹ It is to Deng's discredit, however, that in handling the 1989 Tienanmen incident with a closed mind, he forgot the lessons learned from the aftermath of the cultural revolution, in which he listened to the people and implemented their desires.

As a result of his reform policies, Deng received a lot of popular support in 1980 from local, provincial party bureaucrats. His open door policy brought in new ideas from the west. He also developed a reform-minded cabinet by bringing in people such as Zhao Ziyang of Sichuan Province. Deng's private enterprise policies payed dividends, especially in Shanghai, which was quickly gaining vitality as an international economic city. Chen Yun continued to hold support in the capital for his central planning policies, but Deng was successful in gaining the popular support of the population. He became the "campaigner for the cause of free markets -- the great reformer for a brave new world."³⁰ He even began to groom his heir apparent, Hu Yaobang. Hu did become Party general secretary in 1982, and proved to be as reform minded as Deng. Unfortunately, he was later removed by Deng in 1987 after being blamed for more student unrest, and

replaced by Zhao Ziyang. "The positive results of the reform in the initial years (1979 - 1984) had been gradually overtaken by negative effects in the later years. As inflation accelerated and official corruption and speculation ran rampant, social discontent was brewing."³¹ The removal of Hu by Deng over student unrest was significant in that Deng began to take a more hard line approach toward liberalization. Deng also began to exhibit the hard line characteristics which would allow him to unleash the PLA on the demonstrators in Tienanmen Square in June of 1989.

The era of continuing growth of freedoms still flourished under Zhao, who even went so far as to have some of his economists present proposals in early 1989 that advocated the end of public ownership and pushed for social issues such as equality of opportunity. As the May Fourth Movement anniversary of the student demonstrations of 1919 approached, it was only natural for the students to develop plans for the use of Tienanmer Square to celebrate. This was the square where Mao had unleashed the Red Guards, and where, on April 5, 1976, the people mourned the death of Zhou Enlai. "Plans to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the May Fourth Movement were short-circuited by the unexpected death of former Chinese Communist Party (CCP) general secretary Hu Yaobang on April 15th."³² Hu was a symbol of freedom to the students. At Beijing University, posters began to appear exhorting Ku. These posters and their slogans criticized those established

leaders who had opposed Hu's democratic reforms.

Spontaneously, numbers of demonstrators in Tienanmen square began to grow, reaching 150,000 by late April. As the demonstrators gathered, the square became a forum for discussions. Not only did students praise Hu for his democratic reforms, they also attacked issues such as inflation and governmental corruption. These students were part of a new breed of young Chinese who were beginning to learn about the west. Significantly, they were also learning about the social and economic advances in Taiwan and Hong Kong. At the same time, these students were faced with limited job opportunities in a declining economy, and even less opportunity to use their education. It should be noted, however, that these students did not seek the overthrow of the Communist Party. They were not anti-establishment as much as they simply wanted to be heard.

As the numbers of demonstrators continued to grow, there were some meetings between demonstrators and government officials. Zhao was the unwilling pawn, for even though his regime was somewhat progressive, the reverence for the deposed Hu had placed the students in an adversarial relationship with the Deng-backed leadership responsible for Hu's fall in 1987. While Beijing students boycotted classes, university students in Shanghai also began to demonstrate. On May 3rd, Zhao Ziyang made a speech commemorating the May Fourth movement in 1919, and asked for stability. Simultaneously, government

wall posters and articles in the "People's Daily" began to appear criticizing the students, and hinting at pending crackdowns on disorder.

In spite of Zhao's appeal, the demonstrators marched on May fourth, and about 100,000 of them congregated in and around Tienanmen Square. The students were joined by workers and even some journalists who protested against biased reporting on the demonstrations. A petition was circulated signed by many journalists asking for more freedom of the press. Zhao Ziyang, in what was to prove his downfall in party circles, continued to insist that the solution to the protests lay in using democratic and legal means. By May 15th, student hunger strikes were in progress, further embarrassing the Chinese leadership as they simultaneously hosted a short visit by Mikhail Gorbachev.

By the eighteenth of May, millions of people had taken to the streets in support of the hunger strikes and the students. Premier Li Peng, more of a hard liner than Zhao, had a nationally televised meeting with pro-democracy leaders in which he appeared to lecture the students on the troubles they were causing. The hunger strikes ended on May 19, but the gap between the demonstrators and the party leadership widened.

Li Peng announced that martial law in Beijing was effective at 1000 on the 20th. Zhao Ziyang was stripped of many of his duties, reportedly for not being hard enough with the students. He was not heard from again during the

demonstrations. PLA units began to converge on Tienanmen Square. Deng Xiaoping was conspicuously absent during all of these events. The party hard liner, Premier Li Peng, along with the president of China, Yang Shangkun, now emerged as central figures, although there seemed to be no doubt that Deng was firmly in control.

During the last days of May, the army was unsuccessful in imposing martial law. In almost all confrontations, the troops backed down. Tanks were turned away from the approaches to Tienanmen square by determined citizens who blocked their way. Rumors circulated that many army units refused to follow orders to dispel the demonstrators. These heightened tensions culminated when loyal (to the leadership) PLA troops arrived in Beijing from outside the capital and opened fire on the demonstrators in Tienanmen during the early morning hours of June fourth. The results in terms of dead and wounded may never be known.

Summary

Several lessons and constants can be gleaned from a review of these three connecting, but very different and distinct periods of Chinese history. First, China perceives herself as the cultural leader of Asia and always will. In many minds, Chinese culture and Asian culture is synonymous. The word Kanji in the Japanese writing style literally means

"Chinese character." The cultures of Japan, Korea and Vietnam are permeated with Chinese influences.

Second, regardless of the world situation and the status of Japan and Russia, China will always perceive herself as the leader of Asia. Although she may manifest this by aligning herself with third world countries of the world against economic imperialism by the super powers and other industrialized countries, she will still strive to take the position which has historically been her right. Chinese will always be proud to be Chinese, and will continue to take pride in their legacy. Even the Chinese entrepreneur who escaped communism to establish a profitable business in San Francisco and the Chinese political refugee who fled persecution from the cultural revolution are still intensely proud of the success of the People's Republic of China. Chinese everywhere are particularly gratified by the manner in which China threw off the yoke of colonial imperialism.

Third, the Confucian teachings of family fidelity and the quest for harmony espoused by Daoism will always permeate Chinese thinking. In fact, it is this subconscious holdover from the teachings of Confucianism and Daoism that contribute to the reactionary nature of Chinese policies today. The populace continues unsuccessfully to adjust to the contrast of today's revolutionary society with four thousand years of legacy, the importance and validity of which are constantly being altered and questioned. The Yin and the Yang of the

Confucian era have never been in harmony during the tumultuous revolutionary periods in the twentieth century.

Last, the period of the communist regime has been characterized by a party leadership and a people that desperately sought to come to grips with how to erase the past while continuing to modernize their vast country. This dilemma is never-ending, since the cleansing of the past in China usually equates to the destruction of the educated elite and the most capable and able institutions. Additionally, the continuous fear of being associated with the past has destroyed initiative and innovation. The governmental apparatus has become one of stagnation and petty bureaucracy at all levels. The constant and drastic changing of successive five-year economic plans, the extremes of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, and the constant denunciations of one leader after another, have raised questions among the populace regarding the communist party's prestige and ability to govern. As Nien Cheng, who suffered firsthand the persecutions of the Red Guard, wrote after her escape to the United States, this has ". . . enabled the Chinese people to stumble upon the truth that the emperor had no clothes."³³ The leadership of China has evolved to one that took crisis management to its zenith. Failed attempts to bring some cohesion between the past and present is causing the reactionary and indeterminate policies of today's China. The Yin and the Yang of the old and the new China is not in

harmony and PACOM planners have the unenviable task of dealing with resulting uncertainties.

Footnotes for Chapter Two

¹Immanuel C.Y. Hsu, The Rise of Modern China, 4th ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 3.

²D. C. Lau, Introduction to Lau Tzu Tao Te Ching, trans. D. C. Lau (Baltimore: Penguin Books Inc., 1963), pp. 8 - 15.

³Lin Yutang, Introduction to The Wisdom of Laotse, trans. Lin Yutang (Taipei, Republic of China: Youth Book Store, no date), pp. 13 - 14.

⁴D. C. Lau, Lau Tzu Tao Te Ching, pp. 13 - 14.

⁵K. M. Tong, Educational Ideas of Confucius (Taipei, Republic of China: Youth Book Store, Ltd., 1970), pp. 90 - 98.

⁶*Ibid.*, p. 303.

⁷Will Durant, The Store of Civilization, vol. 1: Our Oriental Heritage (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1954), p. 780.

⁸Woodbridge Bingham, Hilary Conroy, and Frank W. Ikle, A History of Asia, vol. I: Formation of Civilization, From Antiquity to 1600 (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc., 1974), p. 444.

⁹Durant, Our Oriental Heritage, p. 637.

¹⁰Wm Theodore de Bary et al., eds., Sources of Chinese Tradition, Vol. II (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1964), p. 9.

¹¹One example is cited in Julian Baum, Tai Ming Cheung and Lincoln Kaye, "Ancient Fears," Far Eastern Economic Review, 3 December 1992, pp. 8 - 10. China, in response to a reported sale of French Mirage 2000-5 fighters to Taiwan, warned the west not to copy the behavior of the eight-nation expeditionary force that attacked China in the late 19th century.

¹²Jonathan D. Spence, The Search for Modern China (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1990), pp. 170 - 177.

¹³Ibid., pp. 222 - 223.

¹⁴Ibid., pp. 232 - 235.

¹⁵Claude A. Buss, Asia in the Modern World (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1964), pp. 238 - 240.

¹⁶Hsu, The Rise of Modern China, p. 502.

¹⁷Spence, The Search For Modern China, p. 297.

¹⁸Buss, Asia in the Modern World, p. 390.

¹⁹Mao Tse-tung Hsuan-chi [Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung] (Peking, 1963), IV, 1157, cited by Immanuel C. Y. Hsu, The Rise of Modern China (New York: Oxford university Press, 1990), p. 619.

²⁰Mao changed the name of the name of the city from Peiping, which means northern peace, to Beijing, which means northern capital, and established it as the capital of the PRC.

²¹Joel Colton and R. R. Palmer, A History of the Modern World (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1978), p. 860.

²²Gu Zhibin, China Beyond Deng (Jefferson, North Carolina: McFarland and Company, Inc., 1991), p. 18.

²³Kang Shang is infamous as the evil genius who operated behind the scenes during Mao Zedong's rule. He held almost unlimited power as head of Mao's security apparatus. Aligned with Jiang Qing for much of his life, he managed to survive fifty years of political intrigue while living a life of opulence and debauchery. For more about Kang Shang, read John Byron and Robert Pack, The Claws of the Dragon (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992).

²⁴The term "capitalist-roader" was introduced during the Cultural Revolution and was used in a derogatory manner against those who were believed to be anti-Maoist and/or had western connections.

²⁵Hsu, The Rise of Modern China, p. 727.

²⁶Nien Cheng, Life and Death in Shanghai (New York: Grove Press, 1986), p. 338.

²⁷Liu Binyan, China's Crisis, China's Hope, trans. Howard Goldblatt (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990), p. 25.

²⁸Ibid.

²⁹Gu Zhibin, China Beyond Deng, p. 25.

³⁰Ibid., p. 26.

³¹Chu-yuan Cheng, Behind the Tiananmen Massacre (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), p 32.

³²Anthony J. Kane, "Introduction: Reunderstanding China" in China Briefing, 1990, ed. Anthony J. Kane (Boulder: Westview Press, Inc. 1990), p. 2.

³³Nien Cheng, Life and Death in Shanghai, p. 539.

CHAPTER THREE

INTERNAL EVENTS IN CHINA

The Focus for Planners

Internal events are driving the shaping of the new China today as well as the manner in which the Chinese leadership conducts international affairs. For instance, Chinese intentions in the Spratlys demand the attention of U.S. military planners at all levels, but the results of domestic issues such as the PLA modernization program and the current reshuffling of the military leadership will drive what actually happens in the South China Sea. The planned Hong Kong reversion in 1997 is at the forefront of Sino-Western relations, but posturing for position within the party hierarchy as Deng Xiaoping grows older will determine how peaceful this reversion will be. The pivot points around which all Chinese international events revolve are internal events in China and the uncertainties of the daily changes that are occurring. It is upon this fulcrum that PACOM planners must focus.

The Legacy of Tienanmen

More than any one other event, the Tienanmen Square incident of the spring of 1989 personifies the spontaneity and

reactionary nature of Chinese internal strife. The legacy of the Tienanmen massacre haunts Chinese leaders today, and its continuing impact on internal events make uncertainty in China the single key issue. Tienanmen Square was unique. The vast cultural strength of the Chinese people, that was militarily harnessed so effectively by Mao against the Japanese and the Kuomintang, and later molded as the Red Guard, was directed peacefully against the party. Interestingly, it was spontaneous student leadership that provided direction at Tienanmen. The party, led by Deng, forgot the lesson of Mao that the people are the revolution, and turned against the demonstrators. "To the people of Beijing it is apparent that the mantle of heaven, which slipped from the death grasp of Mao Zedong to the agile hands of Deng Xiaoping, has slipped once again."¹

The initial Tienanmen Square demonstrations began with the sudden death of Hu Yaobang on April 15, and provided world news reporters and agencies with a plethora of stories and copy. Less and less information became available to the outside world, however, as the leadership slowly tightened its controls and established martial law. Even though more information was available than had traditionally been released under the communist regime in the past, the fact remained that it was much later before other nations of the world learned the full extent of discontent in China. Internally, news about the demonstrations was passed surreptitiously from

Beijing via the student "grapevine" to all parts of the nation. Students travelled by trains and other means to disseminate information about the Beijing demonstrations and to coordinate activities throughout all of China. Student demonstrations occurred in Hangzhou and Shenyang on 14 May, in Changchun on 16 May, and in Chongqing on 17 May.² Shanghai had multiple demonstrations that in many cases coincided with the ones occurring in Beijing.³ Although initially mesmerized by television footage of the events unfolding in Beijing, the western world did not fully comprehend the magnitude of these demonstrations until much later. East Germany certainly took a cue from Tienanmen Square, and staged her own successful revolution in the fall of the same year.

The Tienanman Square incident of 1989, therefore, was one in a series of spontaneous outbreaks of dissatisfaction that got its start from the May Fourth Movement of 1919. The spectra of this latest demonstration by the people, and the harsh reaction on the part of the government and military, hangs over the party as it attempts to continue its economic modernization program, while maintaining tight controls to prevent political and ideological reforms. The people, however, exhibit a sense of betrayal. After the excesses of the cultural revolution, the modernization period ushered in the opportunity to speak more freely. The Tienanmen Square massacre of June of 1989 reversed this course once again, and

contributed to uncertainty on the part of the people as to how they should act.

Not only are the people uncertain, but the leadership as well. For instance, Ding Guangen, head of the United Front Work Department, took over the communist party's ideological work from Li Ruihuan in November of 1992. Informed sources in Beijing, as reported by the Hong Kong Ming Pao [newspaper], say that this appointment is to free Li for more meaningful roles while relegating ideological work to a less important level. The reason given was that much of the internal strife in China since the formation of the PRC was caused by ideological work. The party will now focus on economic, scientific and technological work, while attempting to prevent ideological contradictions and disputes from interfering with this progress.⁴ The analogy to relegating ideological work to a lesser position is that of the ostrich putting his head in the sand when threatened. The fact is that ideological differences contributed to internal strife, such as the demonstrations in Tienanmen, and will continue to do so.

It is a formidable task, if not impossible, to continue with economic advances without ideological reforms in China. Stanley Karnow wrote that Deng could not bring himself to negotiate with the young demonstrators in Tienanmen Square because he knew that the party was too feeble to face reforms. Because the party was largely demolished during the Cultural Revolution, it could not withstand a confrontation with the

multitudes over human rights.⁵ The party solution at that time was a near-term one. Deng unleashed the PLA on the demonstrators. Deng's solution today is to hide, by downgrading the status of those charged with ideological works in the hopes the problem will go away. The fact is that many people feel betrayed by the Tienanmen Square incident and the legacy of this massacre continues to cause repercussions throughout the party apparatus.

The PLA Factor: Still a People's Army?

Other fallout from the Tienanmen Square massacre includes the impact on the PLA both from within the military and from the attitude of the people of China toward the PLA. Many military leaders remain upset over their misuse during the Tienanmen Square event. Unlike the events of the late sixties and seventies, in which the PLA was aligned with the "revolutionaries" against the anti-Maoists and party revisionists, the PLA was committed in the streets of Beijing against the people themselves. There was plenty of opposition in the PLA to the intervention. "According to an unconfirmed report, 110 officers, including division commanders, and 1,400 soldiers had refused to follow orders or had left their posts during the operation. Some 3,500 officers were reportedly under scrutiny for violation of orders."⁶ The news broadcasts of the people of Beijing standing in front of tanks was a

clear demonstration of at least some of the PLA soldiers' unwillingness to fire on the people.

Regardless of the numbers of military personnel who balked at participating in Tienanmen, the results of the massacre drove a rift between the PLA and the people. Where Mao worked so diligently to use the peasant rural base to develop an army which was one with the party, people were aghast when the "people's army" eventually turned and fired on the people themselves. It did not matter that the leadership had to search for just the right military unit to conduct this action. Many officers "are furious today at the leadership for ordering them to do the shooting."⁷ This split between the people and the army, coupled with distrust between the army and the political leadership, came at a time when events in Europe and the Soviet Union resulted in a people's revolution supported by the military.

The party and the current leadership are aware that two extremes of diversified thought exist within the military today. One extreme is a military that distrusts its leaders and will side with the people in future demonstrations. The other is a military of hardliners, who will take any actions necessary to ensure that no more incidents such as the Tienanmen Square demonstrations will occur again. Accordingly, this is a significant period in the brief history of the PLA, as its future role becomes a key factor in determining the shape of the new China in the near-term.

The PLA Modernization Program

The current modernization program in the PLA is also causing significant changes. Lessons learned from participation in the Korean War in 1950 and later in the 1979 border war against the Vietnamese drove home the importance of modernization to the Chinese. A people's revolutionary army organized to fight guerrilla warfare against an invading army simply will not win on a modern battlefield against a technologically advanced foe. China toyed with solutions like "people's war under modern conditions" and "guerrilla nuclear war,"⁸ but the current leadership under Deng remains convinced that, if China is to take her rightful place as a leader of Asia, she must modernize her armed forces.

The emphasis is now on a smaller, better trained force with technological improvements corresponding to the nation's economic reform program. The intent is to improve the quality of the individual soldier rather than to rely on the revolutionary zeal of a communist indoctrinated peasant as in the past. Recruitment is now focused on the cities and on a more educated or intelligent recruit, as opposed to past practices in which a premium was placed on political indoctrination of the peasant.

The PRC has reorganized its ground forces into army groups, with an emphasis on combining infantry, armor, electronic warfare, anti-air capabilities, and supporting fighter aircraft under one commander. The PLA's war doctrine

now calls for self-contained, highly trained forces to be deployed to a specified area and fight a high-intensity war under low-intensity conditions. This local war concept is limited in time, space and objectives, using as one of its models the Falklands War.⁹ This is a significant change from the previous configuration as a large standing army constituted to fight a general, defensive land war. Beijing now wants its military forces refurbished for rapid deployment and intensive response.¹⁰


Simultaneous with this new direction, the PLA Navy, or PLAN, adopted a new forward naval defense. This new maritime strategy began at least as early as 1985. It is characterized as an active green water defense strategy in place of the previous coastal brown water emphasis, and is ultimately aimed at obtaining a blue water power status.¹¹ Under this new strategy, the PLAN will confront the enemy at long range and stop any advance before the enemy reaches coastal waters.¹² Long range to the Chinese probably means the Central and Northern Pacific, Sea of Japan, and even the Indian Ocean. Coastal waters include the East and South China Seas and the Yellow Sea. The PLAN maritime area of interest is shown in Map 3 on page 41.

China's extensive, but aging, submarine fleet is well suited to a new active defense role in the East and South China Seas. Construction of new destroyers, frigates and intelligence gathering ships,¹³ and indications of their

intentions to purchase an aircraft carrier, possibly the Varyag from the former Soviet Union,¹⁴ all support the new maritime strategy.

This new power projection focus of the PLAN, including continued improvements in amphibious capability and restructured ground forces, gives them a

much improved quick-strike capability. The fact that they are quickly gaining the capability to deploy rapidly to adjoining Asian nations as well as to internal locations adds to the difficulties of the PACOM strategist. Unfortunately, the uncertainties of the internal situation within China and the political manipulations of both the party and the military hierarchy simply increases the volatile nature of the situation.



Source: Harvard Graphics, 1990.

Currently, a reshuffling of the PLA high command is on-going. General Yang Baibing was removed from his post as General Secretary of the Central Military Commission in late October of 1992 and investigations are still underway. Rumors of coup-plotting by Yang emanate from China. Observers say Chinese leaders are wary of his attempts to place his supporters in key military posts, and considered this a threat to Deng's plans to reduce the military's political role. Furthermore, beginning with the 14th Party Congress in October, 1992, Deng's purges resulted in the replacement of senior officers and commissars in almost every major central headquarters and regional military command. Nearly 300 generals have now been affected. General Liu Huaqing, a close supporter of Deng, is the only military figure promoted to membership of the Politburo Standing Committee. He is credited as being the architect of the build-up of the PLA navy, as well as a significant figure in the warming relations with the Russians.¹⁵

The PLA modernization program continues, but not without problems. Steeped in a tradition of a people's army, many of the leadership achieved their position based on revolutionary zeal and their dedication to the party. Now the emphasis is on modernization, with a quick-reaction army and a forward-capable deploying navy. Recruitment is now primarily centered on educated and urban-rooted sources, which is eventually bound to cause internal animosity between the peasant-based

career man and the new innovative thinker. Just recently in 1989, against the wishes of much of the PLA leadership, the army was called in to fire on the people, who are the foundation of the PLA. This type of order was unheard of in the recent past. The party is now concerned that the military remains under political control since events in Europe have shown how quickly revolutions occur in this day of far-reaching communications.

Deng, as previously mentioned, is moving rapidly to reshuffle the military leadership to ensure that the communist party retains control of the army. Mao Zedong advocated that all political power comes from the barrel of a gun, which must never be allowed to point at the party.¹⁶ Mao recognized that he was involved in a war of ideologies, and to be successful in the long-term, he would need a strong communist party with dedicated military force to survive. This lesson is not lost on Deng Xiaoping today. The party was shaken by the Tienanmen demonstrations, and even more so by PLA units that failed to respond. Lieutenant General Zhang Wannian surprisingly emerged as the new Chief of the General Staff in the November reshuffling. Zhang was head of the Guangzhou Military Region during the Tienanmen Square demonstrations, and he is one of the generals who was rumored to be against the use of force at that time.¹⁷ While Deng and his entourage of aging communist leaders must ensure the placement of loyal and dedicated officers that will support the current leadership, they also

must promote capable officers to ensure the success of their modernization program. No doubt the military will play a key role in any internal shakeup in China.

Corruption and Graft in Party Politics

The Chinese imperial court was filled with tales of intrigue and graft and maneuvering for power. Interestingly, the PRC, which tried so hard to eliminate the remnants of dynastic rule, took on many of its characteristics. In fact, many of the current party leaders live a life of luxury and privileged excesses that far exceed those exhibited in the past by the most excessive of the Mandarin classes. As Harrison Salisbury so aptly named his new book, The New Emperors, nowhere is the picture of what it was like in the past so clear as when observing present-day communist leaders vying for position as the old leadership of Deng Xiaoping is reaching the twilight of his career.¹⁸

Figures released in 1988 showed that 150,000 communist party members had been punished for corruption or abuse of authority in 1987. Over 25,000 of them had been dismissed from the party. Eighty percent of the new entrepreneurs had dodged taxes.¹⁹ These figures only scratch the surface of the problem. Fang Lizhi, the widely known Chinese dissident who hid in the American Embassy during the Tienanmen massacre, reports that corruption is so obvious now it can be seen every day in every factory and office. An attitude survey conducted

in Beijing indicated the respondents viewed anti-corruption as the most important issue, and also thought it the most likely precipitant of future unrest in China.²⁰ Nien Cheng, after escaping persecution in China, reported that "Communist officials always rewarded a person for his usefulness to them, not for his virtue."²¹

Even with punishment for corruption, the problem is too widespread for a quick and lasting solution. The up and down chaos of revolutionary politics has left the populace with a pragmatic approach to survival that has no place for ideological fervor. The people learned to work within the system and obtain goods through black markets, back doors, and contacts within the bureaucracy. A petty bureaucrat who is responsible for issuing visa forms to be submitted at a later date holds immense power over people desiring to leave the country. Vivienne Shue, Professor and Chair of the Department of Government at Cornell University and author of several books on China, writes:

. . . widespread government corruption plus painful policy drift, make it easy enough to understand why social life in China is so riddled with resentment, mistrust and apprehension. The great gloating mega-buck winners in the roulette game of reform are also plainly visible to all. They are the high-ranking military and civilian officials who early on sent their children and grandchildren abroad for study, and who now keep Swiss bank accounts and ride around in chauffeured Mercedes-Benz. . . These crafty old communist regulars flagrantly utilized their privileged access to information, contacts and resources to play all the crooked angles in the partially reformed economy. They and their children now enjoy fabulous wealth and personal pampering by Chinese standards. The nepotism and corruption of these

high-ranking families have earned them the contempt they deserve from ordinary people. . .²²

Zhongnanhai is the centerpiece of power for the communist regime, as well as the center of corruption, graft and vice. Zhongnanhai lies within the inner walls of the imperial palace in Beijing and became Mao's home in 1950. It is within these walls that Mao ruled supreme, surrounded by a flow of power-seekers, manipulators and schemers who set the standard for corruption. These included Mao, his wife Jiang Qing, and the notorious Kang Sheng. Contrary to the picture painted by Edgar Snow²³ of the idealistic communist guerrilla leader who shared in the hardships of the peasantry, Mao's life in Zhongnanhai became one of luxury and vice equal to the most excessive of the previous dynastic rulers. Reports slowly emanating from China today depict Mao in his later years as an aging patriarch trying to hold on to youth with a steady flow of young girls and the use of narcotics. He became deeply concerned about his own legacy and highly suspicious of anyone with new and innovative ideas. His suspicions, distrust and fear of losing his own honored place in Chinese history led to disastrous policies such as the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution.

Kang Sheng was equally infamous for his use of position and power for personal gain and for settling scores with old enemies. A friend of Jiang Qing from the pre-communist days in Shanghai, Kang Sheng used blackmail, extortion, torture and intrigue to rise to the pinnacles of power behind the scenes

in Zhongnanhai. In a review of Harrison Salisbury's book The New Emperors, Professor Arthur Waldron wrote the following description of Kang Sheng:

As a man, he seems the oriental villain direct from central casting: an opium addict whose menage a trois included his wife and sister-in-law (who eventually either committed suicide or was killed by Kang); a debased connoisseur of Chinese culture whose tastes ran to porcelain, calligraphy, and pornography; and above all, a consummate courtier and political intriguer whose devious manipulations of Mao Tse-tung brought Kang close to supreme power and China to the brink of disaster.²⁴

Kang Sheng held enormous power as the chief of China's secret police and as confidant to Mao Zedong in foreign and domestic affairs. Aligned with Jiang Qing and her Gang of Four, they became the personification of corrupt and power-hungry politics that are endemic to a modern communist state.

The military is not exempt from the corruption and graft that permeates the communist bureaucracy in China. The official Chinese press published a directive in November of 1992 that placed emphasis on the need to develop traditions and to eliminate corruption. It specifically directed that the exchange of power for money and other personal gain must be stopped. Part of the reasons given for the recent purging of General Yang Baibing was his fondness for holding dance parties that "were well attended by young women."²⁵

The PRC system does not breed a lot of altruistic leaders. Their politics are a function of personalities, with manipulation, corruption and graft the norm. Position is everything. Mobility, both up and down, is fluid and rapid.

Deng's unleashing of the PLA on Tienanmen Square demonstrators in 1989 seemed somewhat out of character for the leader who had initiated moderation within the apparatus. After review, however, it appears evident that Deng possesses the same knack for survival exhibited by Mao and Kang Sheng, and the ruthlessness to use his power when threatened. He was a skillful military general and political commissar during the thirties and forties whose military record against the Nationalists was superb. He proved to be a master at motivating and harnessing his armies to successfully control his assigned area. Most importantly of all, he proved to be a survivor, a characteristic most essential to the present-day Chinese leadership. His track record is one of up and down politics, while always maintaining enough support to rebound at a later time. A master at manipulation, he called his reform policies socialism with Chinese characteristics when he anticipated opposition from the pro-Maoists factions. Deng's reaction to the Tienanmen Square demonstrations was not out of character for an adaptable politician who typifies a frightened leadership fighting to hold on to what they have in an era of changing times. It is one more example of the extent to which all party members will go to hold onto power in a decaying regime when communist nations are falling all over the world.

Succession Struggle After Deng?

In 1976, immediately following the death of Mao on September ninth, China was very close to the outbreak of civil war as the government arrested Jiang Qing and her Gang of Four on October sixth. Local militia in cities such as Shanghai made plans to march to Beijing to rescue her, but government forces quickly surrounded them and prevented any such action.²⁶ It is not out of the realm of possibility for similar events to occur after the death of Deng.

Deng Xiaoping is eighty-nine years old. Although the western world is aware of the purging of PLA General Yang Baibing, rumors abound as to why it occurred. Initially, there were suspicions of coup plotting, but most sources attribute his downfall to posturing for position in the event of Deng's death. His elder brother Yang Shangkun has also given up his military titles, and is expected to retire from a largely ceremonial role as President early this year. Yang Shangkun played a key role in the Tienanmen Square massacre, and he and his brother are accused of politicizing the military at the expense of the modernization program.²⁷ It is safe to assume that Yang Baibing's posturing was not an isolated incident, nor will it be the last.

Nowhere are uncertainties more obvious than in assessing who is in power in China and who will succeed to power. The Great Cultural Revolution was launched when Mao was threatened by new leadership. Liu Shaoqi was the first identified

successor after Mao, but he was purged as a capitalist-roader when Mao began to fear for his own legacy. Peng Dehuai, the leader of the Chinese "Volunteers" in the Korean War, was purged for offering constructive criticism of Great Leap Forward policies and for questioning the inflated figures of production, all construed to be a criticism of Mao Zedong.²⁸ Lin Biao was next. He died while trying to escape after an alleged coup plot was discovered. Zhou Enlai walked a political tightrope throughout his reign within the inner circle of the PRC politics, and died as the number two man in the country. Much to the disdain of Mao Zedong, many would say Zhou was the most revered. Hua Guofeng was a virtual unknown when Mao, on his deathbed, designated Hua as his successor. No doubt Hua's lack of notoriety contributed to this selection.

Even when Hua assumed power, most outside observers thought the strong-willed Jiang Qing would quickly usurp Hua Guofeng's position upon Mao's death. Jiang Qing and her Gang of Four were notorious in their manipulation and maneuvering to achieve supremacy in the party. They were at the height of their power during the cultural revolution, and wielded enormous influence prior to Mao's death in 1976. It came as a complete surprise to the western world when they were arrested shortly after Mao's death. In fact, the rapidity and thoroughness of the arresting action was a testimonial to the dissatisfaction of the leadership with the unpredictable

nature of cultural revolution politics. Knowing that Jiang Qing would not let Deng Xiaoping live long after Mao's death, Marshall Ye Jianying moved quickly. Marshall Ye was the senior army General, had been extremely close to Zhou Enlai, was a proponent of Deng Xiaoping as a stabilizing influence, and hated the cult-like factions that had grown around Mao. Gaining the support of Mao's long time security chief Wang Dongxing and reluctant backing from Hua Guofeng, Marshall Ye planned and executed an elaborate operation that culminated in the arrest of all the Gang of Four members on October fourth, 1976.²⁹ As previously mentioned, PLA military units moved rapidly to forestall any police and militia action in defense of Jiang Qing and prevented any massive bloodshed. The succession struggle was over in 1976, as Jiang Qing was behind bars and Hua Guofeng remained temporarily in power.

The career of Deng Xiaoping is the embodiment of the difficulty in predicting a successor in Chinese politics. Deng suffered his first party censure in the early thirties when he refused to lead his military forces to fight urban battles in Shanghai. He viewed these missions as suicidal. As a result, he was relieved of his political and military responsibilities and subjected to a party inquiry.³⁰ His participation in the Long March and subsequent military prowess as a General in the revolutionary army fighting against the Japanese and Chiang Kai-shek's armies brought him back to prominence. He proved to be extremely resilient as he

was purged during the Cultural Revolution, and became a target of the Gang of Four as Mao lay on his death bed. Deng certainly did his share of maneuvering, and he skillfully worked within the party apparatus to achieve the position he holds today.

Posturing is evident as everyone waits for the death of Deng with no clear successor identified. There is no "Chinese Gorbachev" or "Chinese Yeltsin" on the scene. The military leadership was recently purged, but an attempted strong-armed military coup is always possible. Given the turmoil caused by a multitude of internal events that include public awareness of continued graft and corruption, the legacy of the Tienanmen Square incident, the modernization of the PLA and the reshuffling of its leadership, the PACOM military planner must develop strategy that is flexible and reversible to meet the broad span of possibilities that could result from these uncertainties. The advanced age of Deng Xiaoping makes this a near-term issue.

Economic Reforms

Nothing is more unpredictable than economics. In China, where reactionary politics and indeterminate actions are the norm, economic reform programs are fraught with uncertainties not experienced in other countries. The PRC, beginning with the first five-year plan in 1953, used the Soviet model of five-year plans. China just completed the sixth and seventh

five-year plans, which covered the eighties (1981 to 1985 and 1986 to 1990, respectively).³¹ The inconsistencies of these economic plans, formulated by self-serving autocrats, contributed more to internal tensions in China than to its progress.

The Great Leap Forward of 1958, an adjunct to the first five year plan, is perhaps more misunderstood than any single event in Chinese history. The picture painted for the outside world, and for the Chinese populace as well, was one of a historically poverty-stricken country advancing to new heights under a communist regime. In reality, events were totally out of control during the Great Leap Forward. Ridiculous stories abound of peasants smelting their farm implements to forward the communist cause, yet having no tools to harvest crops when they were starving. There are also stories of peasants mobilizing to drive away sparrows from their crops, but later finding themselves overrun by insects that were previously eaten by the birds. During this period, China was on the brink of total collapse with people starving everywhere, yet the west did not comprehend the seriousness of the situation until many years later.

It was the catastrophic problems caused by these plans and the uncertainties of the cultural revolution that led to the rise of a moderate faction in the PRC. Headed by Deng Xiaoping, this faction instituted the "four modernizations" in 1977. The goal was to turn China into a leading modern state

by the year 2000 through commitment to modernization of agriculture, industry, science and technology, and national defense.³² Continued difficulties in modernizing such a backward and vast country led to various reforms, culminating in Deng's theory of building socialism with Chinese characteristics. Deng recognized that China would have to adopt international economic practices and gain membership in world economic organizations for China to achieve parity with other nations of the world. He emphasized economic construction as the center of mass during the initial stage of socialism. As reported by the 14th National Congress report in October of 1992, his current three goals (or "three criteria") are developing the productive forces of socialist society, boosting the national strength, and improving the people's standards of living. Always a pragmatist, Deng's policies cautioned against an abstract debate over whether current reform policies are socialist or capitalist in nature.³³ It is Deng who is infamous for the statement that it doesn't matter what color the cat is as long as it catches mice.

As a result of these modernization programs, China's GNP has risen by about ten percent a year over the last fifteen years. In 1992 China achieved a twelve percent annual economic growth rate, five percentage points higher than the originally planned target.³⁴ Problems still abound, however, and Chinese leaders face a number of potentially explosive

economic issues. The plight of the unemployed urban exiles is aggravating the housing shortages in cities like Beijing. These are the disenfranchised youth who relocated to the countryside from the cities during the heyday of the cultural revolution to spread revolutionary fervor, only to return to face the realities of housing shortages and a paucity of job opportunities. The intelligentsia are still faced with a system of who you know, rather than occupational skills, as a prerequisite for finding the best jobs. Regardless of the economic improvement under Deng's modernization programs, dissatisfaction remains over the disparity between the standard of living in China with that of other countries.

The Enemy is Information!

Economic reforms continue in China, but the leadership is faced with the dilemma of how to continue economic progress in support of modernization without making the ideological and political reforms of which they are deathly afraid. China is acutely aware of the deterioration of communist states, in both the former Soviet Union and East Germany, and is committed to preventing a similar occurrence in China. But as Professor William Fuller stated in his 5 November 1992 lecture at the Naval War College:

. . . as East Germany collapsed, the domino theory, which had been ridiculed in the United States in the 1970s by opponents of the Vietnam war, tended to acquire new and explanatory power, not to explain how countries fell to communism, but to explain how countries rid themselves of communism. . . . clearly, the collapse of communism in

East Germany hastened its demise in other eastern and central European countries as well."³⁵

China understands the domino effect that occurred in Eastern Europe could happen in Asia as well. As she wrestles with economic reforms, however, more and more information about reformation in Europe and about the contrasting life styles in Hong Kong, Taiwan, Japan, Korea and the western world become available to the local Chinese populace. The prevention of the spread of information throughout China, as the economic modernization program continues, is proving to be a formidable task.

For instance, China announced on 2 December 1992 the purchase of a telecommunication satellite from a U.S. company, which will boost China's capability for television broadcasting, telephone service, and data transmission. China has already built two satellite communications earth stations in Beijing and Shanghai. Using the newly purchased satellite, China's central television station is expected to reach ninety percent of the country by April of 1993.³⁶ The New York Times also announced on December 17, 1992 that A.T. & T. and Northern Telecom had concluded deals to provide telephone switches and equipment, respectively, to the Chinese.³⁷ Additionally, the Chinese increased the capacity of telephone exchanges in Shanghai to one million lines in November 1992. By 1995, it is estimated that the capacity of telephone exchanges will reach 2.5 million in Shanghai, and one in five people will have a phone. In comparison, there were only 57,000 lines in

1972 during the aftermath of the cultural revolution,³⁸ when information flow was tightly controlled. Although Shanghai is certainly in the economic lead, the fact remains that more and more information is available to people throughout China via a rapidly improving communications network.

Additionally, the PRC Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and Trade announced that in January through October 1992, China dispatched 128,000 workers overseas, an increase of forty percent over a corresponding period in 1991. These workers were going to countries such as South Korea, Singapore, Malaysia, Spain, Guam, Hong Kong, and the Commonwealth of Independent States. The Ministry also announced that 12,000 mariners and 8,000 Chinese fisherman were working overseas, including Taiwan.³⁹ These people will all return with eye-witness accounts of how people live in other countries and will develop a firsthand comparison of their own way of life under a communist regime.

No matter how hard the party leadership attempts to use an expanding internal communications network to disseminate the party line, a plethora of information from the outside world will be available to the people via their overseas workers and the gradually expanding communications network. Perhaps the most damaging to party credibility are the growing contacts across the Taiwan Strait. More and more mainlanders are becoming ". . . aware that their cousins on Taiwan are able to curse their leaders, cast votes and engage in other

mind-boggling activities." The fact remains that, ". . . Taiwan's growing democratization is an important subversive force on mainland China."⁴⁰

Additionally, the people will certainly be using many of the same mediums to gather information about what is transpiring in other parts of the world beyond that already discussed. There is certainly no better weapon against a closed communist society than the free flow of information. As economic reforms continue, and modernization progresses within China, more and more people will become glued to pirated television and radio broadcasts, and, therefore, much more aware of contrasting life styles and world political events such as the fall of communism in eastern Europe. Unfortunately for the PACOM planner, as more and more information becomes available to the Chinese, the more internal instability will increase.

Impact of Internal Events on International Relations

The internal events driving China today have a double significance. Not only are they important in assessing what the new China will look like, but they are also crucial in the way China views international issues. These issues are many and varied and include: the planned 1997 Hong Kong reversion; determination of future Chinese-Japanese relations; international concerns over the sale of Chinese arms to third world countries; conflict with the Vietnamese in the Spratlys;

minority rebellions in Tibet and Xinjiang; border disputes with India; and the continuous, festering issue over the status of Taiwan.

The most important issue, however, concerns China's relationship with the new Russia. In the past, the Soviet military threat on the northern Chinese border drove practically all Chinese international relations, even so far as to cause them to seek rapprochement with the Nixon administration in the early seventies. With the dissipation of the Soviet threat, China no longer has a compelling reason to seek friendship or alliances with the United States. She is also free to flex her international muscle and pursue her own regional aspirations, if she so chooses.

China is, therefore, in the throes of change in relations with the international community at a time when the United States is facing force reductions overall, with commensurate drawdowns in each theater. Unfortunately, these external issues, which normally are carefully orchestrated by the Chinese, are acted upon today by volatile internal events, resulting in uncertainty regarding the direction the Chinese will take in dealing with other Asian countries and the international community.

Deng Xiaoping stated in October of 1981 that, ". . . we will radically transform the backward aspects of our country so that, with an entirely new look, it will take its place in the front ranks of the nations of the world."⁴¹ He is also

attributed with saying that, "the Cold War between the East and West may have ended, but the Cold War waged by Western countries against the Third World has begun."⁴² The last quote was in November 1992, and was in response to the proposed sale of Mirage jets by the French to Taiwan. In the same article, China's party newspaper referred to the economic strangulation of China, and mentioned the "spectra of a new concerted Western aggression similar to that which followed the Boxer rebellion of 1898 to 1902".⁴³

Deng Xiaoping recognizes that, even though relations are cordial between the east and west, lines are also being drawn between the free countries of the world and China, the last large bastion of Communist ideology. It is a battle that he and his surrounding entourage are determined to win. Unfortunately for all concerned, the route China takes to maintain this bastion is not one of a carefully orchestrated plan of action and milestones. Random internal events that remain reactionary in nature drive Chinese actions. As national and military strategists plan toward the twenty-first century with central themes in mind of reducing forces and the absence of the Soviet global threat, they must never lose sight of China's perception of her rightful standing in Asia, her dedication to maintaining the revolutionary theme of a communist society, and her lack of control of the reactionary nature of her society.

Footnotes for Chapter Three

¹Harrison E. Salisbury, Tiananmen Diary (Boston: Little, Brown, and Company, 1989), p. 172.

²Jonathan Unger, "Introduction," in The Pro-Democracy Protests in China, ed. Jonathan Unger (New York: M. E. Sharpe, Inc., 1991), p. 3.

³While participating as part of a U.S. Navy ship visit to Shanghai on 19 - 21 May 1989, this writer viewed portions of the demonstrations that included paper or cardboard replicas of the Goddess of Liberty, which had very similar characteristics to the U.S. Statue of Liberty.

⁴"Ding Guangen and Li Ruihuan Are in Charge of Ideological and United Front Work," Hong Kong Ming Pao, 20 November 1992, p. 8, reported in Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report China, Monday, 23 November 1992, p. 28.

⁵Stanley Karnow, Mao and China, 3d ed. (New York: Penguin Books, 1990) p. xv.

⁶Ellis Joffe, "The Chinese Army: Coping With the Consequences of Tienanmen," in China Briefing, 1991, ed. William A. Joseph (Boulder: Westview Press, Inc. 1992), p. 43.

⁷*Ibid.*, p. 47.

⁸The term "people's war under modern conditions" was first introduced in the Korean War in 1950 when the Chinese had to adapt their guerrilla revolutionary army to different conditions against the Americans on a modern battlefield. The term "guerrilla nuclear war" refers to the use of Chinese nuclear weapons as a guerrilla weapon, since retaliatory strikes by super powers could not kill all of the Chinese in their vast homeland. For more detailed information, see Rosita Dellios, Modern Chinese Defense Strategy (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), p. 4 and p. 208.

⁹Paul Lewis, "At The Crossroads," Asian Defense Journal, November 1991, pp. 32 - 35.

¹⁰A. James Gregor, "The Spratlys and The Security Environment in The South China Sea," Unpublished Report from The 1992 Pacific Symposium "The New Pacific Environment: Challenges and Opportunities," February 27 - 28, Washington D.C. 1992, p. 3.

¹¹Brown water usually refers to coastal waters and inland riverways. Blue water refers to deep ocean. Green water is something in between.

¹²You Ji and You Xu, "In Search of Blue Water Power: The PLA Navy's Maritime Strategy in the 1990s," The Pacific Review Vol. 4, No. 2, (Oxford University Press, 1991) p. 137.

¹³"New Ships For the PLAN," Jane's Defense Weekly, 18 January 1992, p. 88.

¹⁴"China, India Eye New Carrier," Jane's Defence Weekly, 8 February 1992, p. 181 and "Aircraft Carrier Purchases From Russia Planned," Cheng Ming (Hong Kong), No 174, 1 April 1992, pp. 17 - 18, reported in Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report China, 26 February 1992, p. 29.

¹⁵Tai Ming Cheung, "General Offensive," Far Eastern Economic Review, 10 December 1992, pp. 14 - 15, and Tai Ming Cheung, "PLA Power Struggle Prompts High Command Shake-up," Jane's Defence Weekly, 2 January 1993, p. 11.

¹⁶Mao Tse-tung, Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung, Volume Two 1937-1938 (New York: International Publishers, 1954), p. 272.

¹⁷Tai Ming Cheng, "Lost In The Postings," Far Eastern Economic Review, 3 December 1992, p. 16.

¹⁸For a comparison of the rules of Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping with the imperial form of rule, see Harrison E. Salisbury, The New Emperor: China in the Era of Mao and Deng (Boston: Little, Brown, 1992).

¹⁹Jonathan D. Spence, The Search for Modern China (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1990), p. 736.

²⁰Vivienne Shue, "China: Transition Postponed?" Problems in Communism, January-April, 1992, p. 162 as cited in Elizabeth J. Perry, "Intellectuals and Tiananmen: Historical Perspective on an Aborted Revolution," in Chirot, op. cit., p. 135.

²¹Nien Cheng, Life and Death in Shanghai (New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1986), p. 50.

²²Shue, "China: Transition Postponed?" p. 162.

²³Edgar Snow is a renown author of books about China. He lived, studied and taught in China. He gained the confidence of Mao Zedong and visited with the communist "red bandits" for four months in 1936. Based on his notes from this visit, he

published his most famous book on Mao's revolution, titled Red Star Over China (New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1961).

²⁴Arthur Waldron, "Chinese Puzzles," The National Interest, No. 28, Summer 1992, p. 95.

²⁵Tai Ming Cheung, "General Offensive," Far Eastern Economic Review, 10 December 1992, p. 15.

²⁶Cheng, Life and Death in Shanghai, pp. 480 - 485.

²⁷Joyce Bernathor, "Does Deng's Army Shakeup Mean Reform is a Surer Thing?" Business Week, February 1, 1993, p. 43.

²⁸Spence, The Search For Modern China, p. 581.

²⁹Harrison E. Salisbury, The New Emperors: China in the Era of Mao and Deng (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1992), pp. 366 - 380.

³⁰Ibid., p. 39.

³¹"Beijing Steps Up Use of Foreign Funds," Beijing Review, November 16 - 22, 1992, pp. 38 - 39.

³²Immanuel C.Y. Hsu, The Rise of Modern China, 4th ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 803.

³³Yuan Mu, "Action Program for Marching Into the 21st Century," Beijing Renmin Ribao, 30 October 92, reported in Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report China, Monday, 23 November 1992, p. 25.

³⁴Nicholas D. Kristof, "China Builds Its Military Muscle, Making Some Neighbors Nervous," The New York Times, 11 January 1993, p. A3.

³⁵William Fuller, "The Soviet Union," Lecture, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, RI: 5 November 1992.

³⁶"Beijing Purchases U.S. Telecom Satellite," (Beijing) Xin Hua, 2 December 1992, reported in Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report China, Wednesday, 2 December 1992, pp. 4 - 5.

³⁷"U.S. Cabinet Aide Begins China Visit," New York Times, 17 December 1992, p. A20.

³⁸Jiang Zemin, Zhu Ronji Greet Telephone Milestone," (Beijing) Xin Hua, 22 November 1992, reported in Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report China, Monday, 23 November 1992.

³⁹"Beijing Purchases U.S. Telecom Satellite," pp. 4 - 5.

⁴⁰Nicholas D. Kristof, "Taiwan's Parties Test Limits of New Freedom," The New York Times, 17 December 1992, p. A19.

⁴¹Deng Xiaoping, quoted in "Foreword" to Robert Maxwell, ed., Deng Xiaoping Speeches and Writings (New York: Pergamon Press, 1984), p. xi.

⁴²Julian Baum, Tai Ming Cheung and Lincoln Kaye, "Ancient Fears," Far Eastern Economic Review, 3 December 1992, p. 8.

⁴³Ibid.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE INDETERMINATE FACTOR AND WESTERN MISINTERPRETATIONS

The Task

The observation and study of internal events in China today is the true barometer for measuring potential Chinese actions and intentions toward the international community. These internal actions are a function of the legacy of a four thousand year civilization coupled with the "scratching and clawing" politics of the last forty-four years of communist rule. The task of the observer becomes one of determining which events result from carefully orchestrated party propaganda, and those which are spontaneous and reactionary in nature. Once this determination is made, the event can then be properly interpreted to determine the effect it will have on the way the Chinese conduct affairs with the outside world. It is only then that appropriate PACOM strategy can be developed.

The Clash Between the Old and the New

The key to understanding internal events in China is to attempt to comprehend the magnitude of uncertainty instilled in a populace suddenly informed by the new PRC leadership that the legacy of four thousand years of culture was now obsolete.

Beginning in 1966, the Red Guard Great Cultural Revolution further aggravated this problem by random accusations against those suspected of having links with the past, and the infliction of severe penalties on the accused without any legal representation. A culture which had put a premium on education since the age of Confucius was now searching for books from the past in order to destroy them and to punish their owners.

In Shanghai, where the merchant classes had flourished, it became a mockery to acquire wealth. In other countries, Chinese people were pleased with the success of the PRC as a nation that had escaped the ignominy of western domination, yet were saddened at the loss of their culture and the communist route taken to achieve this success. One day Lin Biao was to be the successor to Mao, the next day he was purged as an anti-Maoist.

In a society in which the Confucian ethic of family fidelity was the foundation, children were now denouncing parents to gain favor with the establishment. Personal relationships were no longer sought, simply because no one could be trusted. This new social conflict between China's ancient values and the communist regime produced an era of uncertainty among the people, who had suddenly discovered that all was changed. This resulted in lack of harmony, and a pulling apart of the Yin and the Yang, instead of an attraction, which caused random and indeterminate actions.

The only thing predictable is unpredictability itself, since internal strife continues and the effects on domestic and international policy is reactive in nature rather than a product of carefully planned leadership. It is this resulting "indeterminate factor" that makes the job of the PACOM strategist so difficult.

The Historical Precedence of Western Misinterpretation

In the past, western China analysts had the common misconception that the communist party leadership was in control of these indeterminate domestic occurrences and their effects on international affairs. In reality, however, the preponderance of current evidence suggests that actions taken by the Chinese since 1949 were usually the result of uncontrollable events among the people, or were a function of personality clashes among the hierarchy. Additionally, as these various internal events occurred, party control was tenuous at best. The situation today is very similar, as a multitude of random and potentially volatile internal events are having great impact on the shaping of China and her near-term relations with the international community.

Beginning with the Chinese entry into the Korean War in November 1950, western analysts made a series of misinterpretations with regard to Chinese events that had profound effects on U.S. relations with China. Harrison Salisbury wrote that President Truman's surprise at the North

Korean attack on South Korea was equaled only by that of Mao. He stated that there was "massive evidence" that Mao had no specific advance warning at all.¹ For many years, however, westerners believed that Kim Il Sung's attack was carefully orchestrated with Mao, even to the point that some believed a corresponding attack by the Chinese on Taiwan was imminent. Conversely, it was precisely because of the Korean War that Mao had to give up his plan to attack Taiwan, deciding instead to divert forces earmarked for the invasion of Taiwan to North Korea.²

After the North Korean attack in June 1950, Mao and his top leadership agonized over what action to take. It was only after MacArthur's forces pushed toward the Yalu that he agreed to commit ground forces, and then only with Soviet air cover. Once Stalin determined not to commit his air forces, however, loss of face would not permit Mao to renege on his promise to support Kim Il Sung.

Lessons learned from these events for PACOM planners are twofold. First, misinterpretations of Chinese events occur when western planners apply western logic to assessments of oriental intentions. Second, operational level of war planning factors were not the driving forces behind the Chinese decision to enter the Korean War, nor will they be in any future Chinese conflicts.

Perhaps the best examples of both the spontaneous nature of internal events and their misinterpretations by the west

are internal demonstrations. Once the Chinese "iron curtain" fell over China's borders in 1949, outsiders were inclined to believe that the tyrannical party leadership had a firm control on all events within the country. The series of student demonstrations that began with the cultural revolution are testimonial to exactly the opposite conclusion. When the Red Guards were unleashed in 1966, it was initially assessed to be part of an overall cleansing plan to rid the country of those less-than-sincere communists who still had links to the past. This eventually became their true purpose, but substantial evidence suggests that the guards were initially operating on their own and out of control, before quick, decisive action on the part of Mao and some of his close henchmen brought them back to the fold.³

The demonstrations in Tienanmen in April of 1976 are another example in which western analysts misinterpreted the significance of an internal event in China. The wrath of the demonstrators was directed against the establishment, yet western analysts thought for the longest time that this was a leadership-directed tribute to Zhou Enlai, who had died the previous January. The demonstrations began by displaying wreaths of flowers in Zhou's honor. This quickly changed from a show of dissatisfaction into chaos and the reactionary policies that resulted from the government-sponsored cultural revolution. The posters, with their anti-establishment slogans, were directed against Jiang Qing, who was wielding

enormous power in the name of Mao Zedong at that time. Zhou represented stability to the students -- the direct opposite of the ruling factions. Yet an unsuspecting western world thought this was just one more emotional tribute to Zhou Enlai, and it was not until publication of the bits and pieces from the trial of the Gang of Four in 1981 that the west learned the real truth.

Lastly, in September of 1985, anti-Japanese demonstrations occurred in Beijing and other universities over Japanese text book issues and upon the occasion of then Japanese prime minister Nakasone's visit to a Japanese War Memorial. In 1982, China had reacted unfavorably to Japan's new history text book version of the 1937 to 1945 Sino-Japanese war. The China Youth Daily ran details of the war for over a month that included graphic pictures of the atrocities committed by the Japanese army. In 1985, when Prime Minister Nakasone announced a visit to a Japanese war memorial in commemoration of those Japanese who died in World War II, students from Beijing University and elsewhere conducted demonstrations in September that most outside analysts attributed to party leadership direction. Again, western analysts incorrectly assessed this to be a party-driven event. Subsequent information showed that the demonstrations were spontaneous, and that, in "actuality, the students were acting on their own deeply felt antagonism toward Japan."⁴

Lessons For the PACOM Planner

A review of Chinese history concludes that the reform and revolutionary periods of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries clashed abrasively with the previous dynastic rules, creating a highly combustible and reactionary society under the communists. After World War II, if left to nature's own devices, these different periods may possibly have evolved from the legacy of imperial rule to a socialist state with a minimum of disruption to the primarily peasant and rural society. Instead, these reformation periods, both prior to and after 1949, were acted upon by zealous communist revolutionaries determined to completely erase the past. This produced a present-day Chinese society that is indeterminate in its actions at best, and chaotic at its worse.

What does this mean to the PACOM planner? Heretofore, the most common western adjective to describe the Chinese has been inscrutable. The mysterious, the unfathomable -- that which cannot be understood. In the past, this inscrutability was based on a Chinese heritage of over four thousand years. Steeped in tradition, this legacy placed a premium on education, reverence for one's ancestors, and an ordered place in the world for each and every one. The Dao, or "Way," was obtainable by all Chinese and would provide guidance in living one's life as well as promote self-effacement. The combination of Daoism and Confucianism provided a moralistic framework for all daily actions.⁵ To the astute, outside

observer, there was an order to things, something tangible upon which to base estimates of intentions and predictions. The communist attempt, however, to either eliminate the past or to distort history to support their means disrupted the Dao of the present-day Chinese, replacing the inscrutable, mysterious image with one of confusion and random actions.

This has a profound effect on the way the strategic planner assesses China. No longer is there order, however mysterious and unfathomable, in the way internal events are played out within China. Accordingly, these internal events greatly affect the way the Chinese conduct international affairs. The tendency in the past has been for the western planner to view the Chinese as the patient, well-ordered oriental who is completely in charge of his destiny and is willing to bide his time in order to achieve his goals. Nothing could be further from the truth.

The greatest misconception by western analysts has been to assume the Chinese communist revolution ended in October 1949. The reality is that the revolution is occurring now, causing chaos, reactionary policies, "contentless politics,"⁶ and survival of the fittest.

Today's PACOM strategy cannot be based on the assumption of order in China. Strategists must view China as if she was a computer that spits out random numbers. The indeterminate nature of internal events in China today, and their effect on

the way China deals with the international community, must be taken into account by planners at all levels.

Footnotes for Chapter Four

¹Harrison E. Salisbury, The New Emperors: China in the Era of Mao and Deng (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1992), p. 106.

²Russell Spurr, Enter The Dragon (New York: Newmarket Press, 1988), p. 77 and p. 118.

³For more on the spontaneous and uncontrollable nature of the Red Guards during the initial stages of the Cultural Revolution, see Jonathan D. Spence, The Search for Modern China (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1990), pp. 604 - 609, and John Byron and Robert Pack, The Claws of the Dragon (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992), passim.

⁴Allen S. Whiting, China Eyes Japan (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1989), p. 5.

⁵D.C. Lau, Introduction to Lau Tzu Tao Te Ching, trans. D. C. Lau (Baltimore: Penguin Books Inc., 1963), pp. 8 - 14.

⁶Professor Arthur Waldron, author of The Great Wall of China From History to Myth (Boston: Cambridge University Press,, 1990), introduced this term in an interview conducted at the Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, 9 December 1992. Professor Waldron used the term "contentless" in describing the manner in which much of the Chinese leadership used politics for personal gain.

CHAPTER FIVE

DEFINING A PACOM STRATEGY

The Challenges

The PACOM planner must be sensitive to internal events within China when defining PACOM strategy. The planner must also understand the geopolitical parameters within which he or she is working and fully comprehend the misconceptions that exist regarding internal Chinese events.

The communist revolution was not over on October 1, 1949 with the declaration of the PRC. The Maoist revolution is incomplete and is ongoing right now. The Chinese are in the throes of a confrontational revolution trying to define themselves. The formula for how power is defined is non-existent, and succession to power is tenuous at best.

Americans in general do not understand revolution, and suffer from arrogance when dealing with foreign nations, particularly with Asian peoples. The U.S. cannot do much to shape internal events in China. The keys for the military planner are: to understand the transient nature of internal Chinese activities; to understand their impact on international issues; to understand the near-term impact of the results of these issues; and to prepare for various

scenarios that could evolve as a result of these indeterminate occurrences.

The U.S. National Asian Strategy

The President's National Security Strategy of the United States¹ and the JCS National Military Strategy for 1992² focused on regional threats, forward presence, crisis response and bilateral operations and coalition forces. The new National Security Strategy for 1993 reiterated the same focus, but also emphasized the need to encourage democratic reform in China. The 1993 strategy also set a five-fold agenda in Asia. First, the U.S. must maintain a strategic framework reflecting its status as a Pacific power. This framework is based on the alliance with Japan. Second, the U.S. must continue to expand markets. Third, the U.S. must carefully watch the emergence of China and support, contain or balance this emergence as necessary to protect U.S. interests. Fourth, the U.S. must continue to play a role in the peaceful unification process on the Korean peninsula. Last, the U.S. will encourage the normalization of Indochina.³

This five-fold agenda in Asia contains a number of implied tasks for PACOM planners that are often at odds with one another in this day of diminishing forces. To watch China and to be prepared to support, contain or balance her emergence as necessary from a military perspective requires careful thought and imaginative planning. More challenging,

however, is the potential that pursuit of the other four listed agenda items will cause friction with China. Alliances and bilateral operations with the Japanese and South Koreans will add to the encirclement phobia of China. Additionally, the Chinese may perceive U.S. military operations with India and members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as threatening to Asian stability. Normalization of relations with Vietnam, if it occurs, will likewise contribute to Chinese paranoia. As this paranoia increases, U.S. bilateral operations with other nations, which are a cornerstone of U.S. defense policy, could cause increased Chinese instability.

China has already announced her alignment with third world nations against the economic superpowers. She has already made references to the drawing of lines for a new "cold war." Deng Xiaoping is committed to leading China into the twenty-first century with the stated goals of regaining her historical position as suzerain of the Asian continent. It remains to be seen if a moderate political regime will emerge that will pursue this goal through continued economic progress along the lines of the Japanese route to success, or if a more hardline approach will evolve.

PACOM Theater Strategy

The PACOM planner must, therefore, construct theater strategy around the guidance delineated in the National

Security Strategy for 1993, while monitoring closely internal events inside China. First, all strategy must support the national goal of the encouragement of democratic reform in China. Events in Europe that led to the downfall of East Germany and the demise of the Soviet Union were a windfall for the U.S. and free nations everywhere. Any theater strategy must support the contention that the best way to promote a democratic way of life is the continued flow of information into other countries. Information flow entails the use of the United States Information System (USIS), Voice of America broadcasts, and Most-Favored-Nation (MFN) clauses at the national level, to the judicial use of sailors, soldiers, airmen and marines at the theater level as emissaries of the U.S. way of life.

These informational resources must be used to not only influence China, but to shape regional opinion as well. PACOM strategy must ensure that U.S. military units remain engaged physically with all Asian nations, to include China. PACOM must pursue every opportunity to conduct exchange programs, bilateral operations, and mobile training teams, if asked. All opportunities to establish a forum with the Chinese for security dialogue must be exploited. The next generation of Chinese leaders must be cultivated.

Intelligence gathering becomes all-important in developing and reassessing PACOM strategy for China. China is not a target-rich technical environment for intelligence

collection. Human Intelligence, or Humint, must be the primary discipline focused on the effort. It was not that long ago in 1950 that China moved over 150,000 troops across the Korean border without detection. Granted, imagery and electronic surveillance methods have significantly improved since then, but it must be remembered that this was a Chinese army that swept its tracks in the snow with brooms and would remove entire sections of railroad in Korea to give the appearance the rail line was cut. At night, they simply replaced the tracks when a supply train approached and removed them once again after the train passed.

Humint should not be a replacement for other means of intelligence gathering, but rather developed as an adjunct to existing in-place systems and cultivated to a new high. Humint is critical in assessing internal events in China and their impact on international events. From a PACOM perspective, Humint does not involve the clandestine reporting of spies and double agents, but rather a judicious use of the Intelligence Information Reporting (IIR) system. Every effort must be made to ensure complete and thorough debriefings of those personnel within the chain of command who come in contact with mainland Chinese, or have the occasion to visit China. Liaison between PACOM military planners and Defense Attache Office (DAO) personnel is critical and should be pursued with vigor. Often overlooked, this includes DAOs from adjacent countries such as the Philippines, Singapore,

Thailand, and certainly Hong Kong. Taiwan is a special case, but every effort should be made to overtly exploit (within State Department guidelines) this country as a most valuable source of information about events in China.

Historically, the U.S. has not done a good job at efficient, inter-agency regional coordination and subsequent actions. A new emphasis must be placed on integrating the existing U.S. governmental representatives within PACOM in the overt collection efforts. Representatives of other governmental organizations such as Department of State, Drug Enforcement Agency, and the like have much peripheral information that can be of valuable information to the military planner.

Ironically, the dilemma for the planner in charge of developing PACOM strategy is that the more successful the influx of information is, the more aware the people of China will become, and the more internal instability will increase. As instability in China increases, more requirements will be placed on the theater collection program. Although this overall national and theater effort of providing information to the Chinese people supports the national goal of encouraging free and democratic societies, it also adds to the indeterminate factor within China and increases the likelihood of a PACOM regional conflict.

Containing Spill-over Through Scenario Contingency Planning

Developing a workable PACOM strategy oriented toward containing potential spill-over from internal events in China is key to the total success of the effort. Given the paucity of U.S. forces assigned to PACOM, this requires careful scenario contingency planning.

Accordingly, there are four major Chinese scenario groups that could cause concern to PACOM. The first one involves a civil war in China in which peacekeeping missions, humanitarian missions or evacuation missions are required. The second scenario group involves Chinese maritime aggression. The likely targets are the Spratly Islands and the closing of South China Sea SLOCs (Sea Lines of Communication), but this scenario could also involve Indian and western Pacific Ocean operations. A major conflict with Taiwan, either due to mainland aggression or the declaration of independence by Taiwan, is a third scenario. The fourth scenario group is a spill-over from a Chinese dispute with one of her many neighbors, or with one of her adversaries for hegemony in Asia. This last scenario also includes the proliferation of arms to other countries.

Civil War in China

A civil war in China is not the remote possibility that one may think at first glance. The Chinese population is homogeneous with a common culture and a common written

language. It is also very diversified in terms of regional dialects and life philosophies. The most extreme contrast is between the traditionally politically oriented north and the economically oriented southeastern sections. Today's issue of how far to take the economic modernization program at the expense of compromising revolutionary socialist ideas is divided along regional lines between north and south. The biggest contribution of the communist regime to date has been the unification of China and the halting of civil wars between warlording factions. Forty-four years of peace, however, is a mere drop in the bucket when compared to China's four thousand year legacy of civil wars.

As previously mentioned, there are many current events that possess the potential to cause an internal conflict. Lines were drawn in 1976 between local Beijing and Shanghai militias loyal to Mao's widow against the PLA-backed moderate factions. Bloodshed was averted at that time, but posturing remains evident today in anticipation of Deng's death. The PLA modernization program and the purging of military leadership continues. A common joke about loyalty in China is the leadership is reluctant to give any military general a force large enough to invade Taiwan in fear of it turning north instead and marching on Beijing.

Demonstrations remain the single most potential spark to ignite a civil conflict. Demonstrations could occur over issues that include, but are not limited to, human rights,

support of pro-democracy movements, graft and corruption, unemployment, and unfair economic practices. The reaction by the government to demonstrations will determine how far and to what extent civil unrest will spread.

A key near-term event that could cause internal disturbances is the reversion of Hong Kong, which occurs July 1, 1997. It remains to be seen how peaceful this reversion will be, and how strongly the PRC will react in the event of disturbances in this most modern of Asian cities. The Guangdong ren [Cantonese] of Guangdong Province have much in common, and close family ties, with the Chinese of Hong Kong. Military units from the Guangdong Military Region would face difficult decisions if ordered to take military action against the people of Hong Kong.

On September 26, 1984, the British and the Chinese signed the agreement to return Hong Kong to China. The agreement specified that Hong Kong would be a "special administrative region" for fifty years, during which time English would remain the official language and the current legal, social and economic systems would also remain unchanged. Jonathan Spence makes the point in his book The Search For Modern China that these are the ". . . same rights that the PRC government had guaranteed to its own subjects in various constitutions, and yet had constantly withheld."⁴ Tensions are evident between Governor Chris Patten of Hong Kong and Beijing as they begin to work details of the transition. China already stated its

refusal to honor contracts, leases or agreements undertaken by the colonial government after the Hong Kong reversion. This statement directly contradicts the agreement Beijing signed in 1984, and is causing much consternation in Hong Kong.⁵

This begs the question of U.S. military involvement if a civil war occurred in China, either in Hong Kong or on the mainland. No direct intervention is anticipated on the mainland. Intervention could occur in Hong Kong if the situation became such a travesty of the signed reversion agreement that all the nations of the world banded together in condemnation of PRC policies. Even then, the first steps would involve extensive diplomatic efforts.

In all cases, both on the mainland and in Hong Kong, the most likely missions for U.S. forces would involve either evacuation of American citizens or humanitarian actions. Non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) will most probably be permissive. The existing Chinese government will probably fully cooperate in the evacuation of foreigners. Animosity by any of the warring factions would not be directed at Americans. The primary threat to civilians in this scenario is the possibility of being inadvertently caught in a cross fire situation. The biggest planning problems center around the enormous numbers of evacuees, which of course will not be restricted to Americans alone, and around the vast area over which these evacuees will be located.

Any civil war in China can be expected to be extremely bloody. China lost around 450,000 dead in the Korean War.⁶ Soldiers and civilians alike are expendable in China. It is certainly within the realm of possibility that a Chinese civil war could evolve in which hardships and suffering on the order of that currently experienced in Bosnia is observed. The current National Security Strategy states, "longstanding missions, such as humanitarian assistance must now be undertaken in the midst of civil war and anarchy."⁷ The current proclivity of the United Nations to be involved in places like Bosnia, Somalia, and Cambodia make the introduction of U.S. NEO or peacekeeping forces in China during a civil war a viable possibility.

Chinese Maritime Aggression: The Spratlys and Beyond?


Chinese maritime aggression is the most likely scenario in which U.S. forces could come in direct contact with the Chinese military. Hostilities could result not only over occupation of territory, such as the Spratly Islands, but over control of the seas, rights of passage through both the seas and the corresponding airways, and free and unrestricted ocean trade routes for all nations of the world. Chinese action to seize additional islands in the Spratlys is a real, near-term possibility. The objective of such a maritime operation could be just the islands, both the islands and control of the South China Sea, or, worst case, the initiation of a blue water

aggressive strategy that could involve future operations in the western Pacific and Indian Oceans (see Map 4).

The reasons for recent Chinese aggressive actions in the Spratlys are speculative at best. They range from historical animosity between the Vietnamese and the Chinese to access to excellent fish harvests. More likely, it is a contest over future exploitation of rich oil deposits and natural gas, believed to be located there.

In February 1992, the Chinese announced the passage of a law immediately claiming the Spratly archipelago, and reserving the right

to use military force there. "This territorial water law claimed the Diaoyutai [Senkaku]⁸, Spratly and Paracel Islands as sovereign Chinese territory, and applies to the air space, sea bed and bottom soil of the areas."⁹ The report also mentioned that China reserves the right to use force to prevent violations of its waters by foreign naval warships or research vessels.



Source: Harvard Graphics, 1990.

The issue in the Spratlys thus becomes one of freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. China adheres to the twelve nautical mile limit for territorial seas, but has not made clear its position on exclusive economic zones (EEZs) or its interpretation of the archipelagic principle.¹⁰ One explanation is that China intends to surround closely joined groups of islands in the South China Sea with twelve mile territorial claims, but does not wish to commit until she is in a position to back her stance with force. If she chose to claim 200 nautical mile EEZs around each of the island groups, China would be effectively claiming the entire South China Sea.¹¹ This current posturing causes extremely serious repercussions for both the local Southeast Asian nations and the economically advanced nations of Taiwan, Korea and Japan. The latter three nations depend heavily on the flow of oil and products to and from Southeast Asia, the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf. The potential for Japan to react with a build-up of military forces to ensure open ocean transits would be significantly increased. Any sign of increased militarism by Japan would send reverberations throughout the world. U.S. interests remain heavily tied to ensuring the status quo in the Spratlys, and PACOM must possess the strategy to make this happen.

There are alarming peripheral issues over China's aggressive actions in the Spratlys. The PLA appears to be developing a modern naval force capable of being a blue water

power by 2020.¹² She recently announced in January 1993 plans to expand naval capabilities beyond coastal waters by building three large naval bases. The new facilities will be in Liaoning Province in northeast China, a site near Shanghai (probably Zhoushan) and Zhanjian in southern China's Guangdong

**Map 5
Proposed Naval Bases**



Source: Harvard Graphics 1990.

Province (see Map 5). The report also estimated completion by 1998.¹³ Of note, a study at the Australian National University on the PLAN maritime strategy for the nineties identified the lack of a Chinese strategic naval base as a neglected area. It discussed this requirement as an adjunct to the development of nuclear submarines and aircraft carriers, and mentioned Shanghai's adjacent Zhoushan Wupo area as a likely site. From Zhoushan, ". . . the aircraft carrier task force can enter the East China Sea as soon as it leaves the harbor. From there it can attack when progressing and defend when retreating to base. Only 500 nm [nautical miles] east to the Pacific, the task force could extend air cover over most of the area of the Yellow Sea, East and South China Seas. By doing so, it would enlarge China's ocean defence in length and breadth."¹⁴

China for years developed Chongqing as the center of China's contingency defense policy. Her national strategy was to fall back to the center of China in Chongqing and let her large country and continental army devour any invader. Since Deng's modernization program, however, emphasis was placed on developing the economically viable southeastern section that runs from Shanghai in the center to Hainan Island in the south. No longer will China concede her eastern seaboard. Her strategy now appears aimed at engaging the enemy at long range prior to arrival within her territorial waters.

Liu Huaqing, the architect of the PLAN strategy, was a student of Soviet naval tactics and most responsible for the current PLAN modernization program. He studied extensively in Russia in the mid-1950s at the Voroshilov Naval Academy. At the same time, Admiral Sergei Gorshkov was developing modern Soviet maritime strategy, and apparently made quite an impression on Liu.¹⁵ China's strategy for the defense of the rich and economically viable southeastern zone appears similar to the Soviet eighties strategy for layered defense of the approaches to Vladivostok and the Soviet homeland. The Soviets placed a ring running from Petropavlovsk through the Kurils and around Japan to the Tsushima straits, with a blocking force at Cam Ranh Bay cutting the South China Sea (see Map 6 on page 89).


The Chinese have already laid the groundwork for a ring from the Spratlys to the Bashi Channel and Taiwan Strait.

They have plans to develop a strategic naval base at Zoushang which gives them immediate access to defense of the East China and Yellow Seas (see Map 6).

The PLAN is developing a navy capable of employing Mao Tse-tung's warfare strategy under modern Chinese conditions. Where Mao said time is on the side of revolutionary forces committed to an

ideological cause, he was referring to communism as the cause. Today's ideological cause appears to be the reemergence of Chinese suzerainty in Asia.

This raises the question of Chinese long-term intentions toward the Philippines. The vacuum in the Philippines created by the departure of U.S. military forces has yet to be exploited by any nation. The decline of the Soviet Union and subsequent withdrawal from Cam Ranh Bay militates against the Russians as a viable force in Southeast Asia or the South



Source: Harvard Graphics, 1990.

China Sea. The resulting vacuum may prompt Chinese leaders to begin where the Soviets left off.

Furthermore, Mao Zedong's guerrilla and protracted warfare strategies, along with Sun Tzu's patient, flexible and common sense Art of War,¹⁶ remain as bibles for the Chinese strategic military planners. Sun Tzu's strategies are relevant today even after two thousand years. Mao's essays "On Guerrilla Warfare" (1937) and "On Protracted War" (1938) retain value also.¹⁷ Mao wrote, "energies must be directed toward the goal of protracted war"¹⁸ for time is on the side of revolutionary forces that are committed to an ideological cause. Mao saw guerrilla warfare as a fluid strategy, that could expand and contract through various stages, and could eventually evolve into conventional warfare for ultimate victory. It was Mao who believed that, "unlimited guerrilla warfare, with vast time and space factors, established a new military process."¹⁹

The Philippines was a hotbed of communist activity from 1946 to 1955 with the Hukbalahap Insurrection. The New People's Army (NPA) rose to its highest stage of power around 1986 and 1987, but have since fallen on hard times. The Philippines possess a number of current characteristics that make this country a prime target for enterprising PRC strategists. It is still threatened by an insurgency with a nucleus revolutionary army and an established Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP). The country is beset with political

unrest, poverty, corruption, and failed economic plans. There is a power vacuum since the closing of the U.S. bases. Lastly, there is a large overseas Chinese community. The expanding Chinese naval and merchant fleet could use the ship facilities at Subic City and the old Subic Naval Base for logistics purposes in support of both a local insurgency as well as an ambitious Chinese blue water Pacific presence. Eventual access to air bases in the Philippines would greatly extend the range of the PLAN air force and be consistent with their new maritime strategy. Time and opportunity is on the side of the Chinese, and PACOM planners must be alert and wary of any Chinese inroads in the beleaguered Philippines.

Chinese aggression in the Spratlys, however, remains the primary concern for PACOM planners. Historically, China has been a continental power with no apparant intention to be a major threat to countries not immediately adjacent to their land borders. At the height of the Cold War, China was never perceived as a threat to export communism on the magnitude of the Soviet Union. The Communist Party of China did support the Huk rebellion in the Philippines and the Chinese did make some inroads into Angola. For the most part, however, the Chinese remained very close to home.

Recent developments since 1985 in the Spratlys, however, send new and entirely different signals. Continued Chinese aggression in the Spratlys would be a clear indication of Chinese intent to partially, and perhaps fully, fill the

vacuum left by the demise of the Soviet Union and a drawdown of American forces in the region. Seizure of additional islands in the Spratlys would signal the world that China is no longer content to be a continental power, and will henceforth seek her perceived rightful place in Asia and the world. Singapore's Defense Minister, Yeo Ning Hong, warned that China's assertiveness in the South China Sea has caused suspicion and distrust among Southeast Asian nations. Paul Beaver, publisher of Jane's Defense Weekly in London, was quoted by the New York Times as saying, "China is moving from a regional power to a regional superpower."²⁰ The threat of potential closing of South China Sea SLOCs is not acceptable to the free world. PACOM military strategy must be focused toward responses in the event of further aggressive action.

Takeover of additional islands in the Spratlys cannot be prevented by the U.S. military. Chinese forces can easily seize and occupy any number of these scattered islands before the U.S. could react. Instead, military flexible deterrent options (FDO) must be formulated which aim at either forcing the Chinese to withdraw or at least to stop any further actions. Coalition building and base utilization agreements in countries like Singapore and the Philippines must be pursued. FDOs that involve the Philippines must be developed and coordinated now, and approval through the proper U.S. and Philippine agencies sought immediately. The possibility of using bases in Vietnam must not be overlooked. The National

Security Strategy is dedicated to normalization with Indochina. A U.S. presence in Cam Ranh Bay would go a long way towards discouraging further Chinese aggressive in the Spratlys.

Lastly, just as U.S. strategy of the eighties advocated military action against the Soviets which included at least a raid on Russian soil, PACOM strategists must think in terms of some operation on Chinese soil to temporarily hold territory. Whether it is an amphibious raid on Hainan Island or special operations missions inland, no strategy will be complete without a plan to either gain the attention of the Chinese hierarchy or to gain territory as a bargaining chip. This plan must center on areas of economic or historical value to the Chinese that favor the use of U.S. maritime power, and which have terrain that militates against a counterattack by a large continental army. The Chinese are masters of Clausewitz's principle of integration of strategy and policy. U.S. military strategy must focus on creating situations in which Chinese loss of face in either the domestic or international arena becomes a factor. The preserving of face to Chinese leadership may well be the most significant center of gravity. Finding a suitable and defensible location on Chinese territory is a formidable challenge to the planner, but one that should be accorded the highest priority in theater planning.

Taiwan Conflict

The Taiwan problem remains the thorniest issue for U.S. national policy makers concerned with China. For years, the U.S. focused on an appropriate combined military response with Taiwan should the PRC attempt an invasion. U.S. recognition of China in 1979 ended the two-China policy, but affirmed a U.S. commitment to unification by peaceful means. Ironically for the U.S., Taiwan has evolved from an extremely autocratic regime under Chiang Kai-shek in the fifties and sixties to progressive democratic rule today, complete with open elections and multiple parties. There is an increasing demand for a declaration of independence by the autonomous Taiwanese. The threat of an invasion by the mainland becomes more and more remote, but China remains dedicated to bringing Taiwan back under the mainland fold. Deng Xiaoping stated that Taiwan is part of sacred Chinese territory and ". . . our policy in this regard will not change." ²¹ The PRC can be expected to take action if Taiwan declares independence. The PRC would be hard pressed to overturn a Taiwan independence declaration with military force, particularly when comparing the modern air force of the Taiwanese with the poorly trained and poorly equipped PLA air force. Even so, U.S. National policy makers would still probably direct at least a U.S. military demonstrative show of force action in support of the progressive Taiwanese regime against mainland aggression. As in the Spratly scenario, military FDO option packages such as

deployments of carrier battle groups and amphibious ready groups, and the forward staging of attack aircraft squadrons must be developed. Again, non-combatant evacuation operations must be planned.

Neighborhood Dispute


Spill-over from Chinese disputes with Asian neighbors that require military responses by PACOM forces run the gambit from the far-fetched to the more-likely. A confrontation over a revitalized Russian border or a military confrontation with the Japanese fit in the far-fetched category. Although these are highly unlikely scenarios, the Chinese and Japanese both claim the Senkaku Islands, and conflict could arise as the result of disputed claims. Chinese involvement on the Korean peninsula remains plausible, but only because of the irrational regime that is currently established in Pyongyang. The reactionary nature of the North Koreans, particularly with regard to use of nuclear weapons, makes them capable of drawing unwilling partners into another clash on the peninsula.

Of more relevance to PACOM planners are numerous flash points along the Chinese border that are more likely to result in armed conflict. Although the Chinese and Vietnamese have recently made overtures to each other, the potential still exists for another border conflict. Continued sparring in the South China Sea over the Spratlys adds to the volatile

situation on the border. The only U.S. involvement in a border war between Vietnam and China would be containing the spill-over in the South China Sea and keeping the sea lines open.

The India border area is a significantly different problem. The fact that both nations have a nuclear capability makes this a theater event. The ever-expanding Indian Navy and the

Map 7
Chinese Inroads in the Indian Ocean



Source: Harvard Graphics, 1990.

modernization of the PLAN place these two countries on a naval collision course. Both countries appear to be dedicated to developing a credible blue water navy. General Cho Namqi, director of the Chinese Academy of Military Sciences, recently announced it is vital [to Chinese interests] to increase Chinese presence in the Indian Ocean. He also said that India is "seeking to muscle in" the Spratly Islands by developing a navy to rival that of a global power. As a result, General Cho announced China will step up naval visits to the Indian Ocean and pay more calls on foreign ports in that region.²² Additionally, there are indications that China is negotiating

arms sales with Burma for the right to establish naval facilities and listening posts on islands off the Burmese coast.²³ Given present animosity along the Indian and Chinese border, a future war could easily spill-over into the South China Sea and the Malacca Straits once both powers have credible blue water navies (see Map 7 on page 96). PACOM strategy should be directed toward coalition building to act as a police force similar to the force in the Persian Gulf during the war with Iraq.

The arms proliferation issue creates a likely scenario for potential confrontation between U.S. and Chinese naval forces. U.S. National Security Strategy recognizes that, ". . . one of [the] most threatening national security challenges is the spread of weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver them." Among the principles of U.S. nonproliferation policy is the preservation of the right and capability for unilateral action to stop this flow.²⁴ China uses its arms proliferation to subsidize modernization of the military and to augment its economic modernization program. Major areas of concern mentioned in the National Security Strategy include South Asia and the Korean peninsula, two areas of the world where the Chinese deal heavily. The issue remains a national one for the U.S., with concentrated state department diplomatic and economic attacks the norm. PACOM planners, however, must develop a strategy capable of stopping this trade throughout the Pacific theater if necessary. This

includes plans for tracking Chinese arms carriers and adequate rules of engagements for stopping them. It also includes protective measures in the event of any Chinese reactions.

One additional category under this scenario is the narcotics trade. The graft and corruption endemic to Chinese bureaucracy portends that there must be high ranking officials from China involved in the trade of drugs through the Golden Triangle. There are no indications, however, that the Chinese government sanctions the drug trade. The U.S.'s "principal strategic goal is to identify, disrupt, dismantle, and ultimately destroy the trafficking organizations that produce or smuggle illicit drugs for the U.S. market."²⁵ PACOM military forces could become involved in stopping Chinese drug traffickers, but more likely U.S. military actions will be limited to tracking and observation of Chinese drug-trafficking merchant ships in the Pacific theater.

Summary

The PACOM planner must guard against becoming too involved with the fact that there are over a billion Chinese occupying a landmass in Asia. The U.S. is not going to fight a land war in China. The critical problem for the U.S. is that internal events shaping China are not incidental to the future of China, but are key to China's future and should therefore drive U.S. strategy. Internal events are random and indeterminate, but can be predictable within certain

scenarios. The U.S. has little control over events in China, so the challenges are how to influence to some degree internal Chinese events, and how to contain the spill-over from these events.

Footnotes for Chapter Five

¹George Bush, National Security Strategy of the United States 1991 - 1992 (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1991) pp. 1 - 127..

²U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy of The United States January 1992 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1992), p. 22.

³The White House, National Security Strategy of The United States January 1993 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1992), pp. 1 - 8.

⁴Jonathan D. Spence, The Search For Modern China, (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1990), pp. 710 - 711.

⁵Tai Ming Cheung, "Push Comes to Shove," Far Eastern Economic Review, 10 December 1992, pp. 8 - 9.

⁶Russell Spurr, Enter the Dragon (New York: Newmarket Press, 1988), p. 313.

⁷The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States January 1993, p. 1.

⁸Japan also claims sovereignty over the Diaoyutai Islands, known to Japan and the west as the Senkaku Islands.

⁹"Law Passed Claiming Spratly Islands," (Hong Kong) AFP, reported in Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report China, Wednesday, 26 February 1992, p. 19.

¹⁰The archipelagic principle states that only archipelagic nations such as the Philippines may declare an archipelagic maritime regime.

¹¹Brian J. O'Connell, "The Spratly Islands Issue: Strategic Interests and Options," Unpublished Research Paper, U.S. Naval War College, RI: 1992, pp. 8 - 10.

¹²Liao Xingun and Wu Xuansheng, "On the Priorities in the Military Budget Allocation," Military Economic Research, No. 7, 1989, pp. 4 - 7, cited by You Ji and You Xu, "In Search of Blue Water Power: The PLA Navy's Maritime Strategy in the 1990s," The Pacific Review, Vol 4, No. 2, 1991, p. 141.

¹³"Chinese Navy to Expand," Washington Times, 12 January 1993, p. 7.

¹⁴You Ji and You Xu, "In Search of Blue Water Power: The PLA Navy's Maritime Strategy in the 1990s," The Pacific Review Vol. 4 No. 2 1991, p. 147.

¹⁵You Ji and You Xu, "In Search of Blue Water Power: The PLA Navy's Maritime Strategy in the 1990s," p. 139.

¹⁶Samuel B. Griffith II, Sun Tzu The Art of War, trans. with introduction by Samuel B. Griffith II (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971).

¹⁷Samuel B. Griffith II, Mao Tse-tung on Guerrilla Warfare, trans. with Introduction by Samuel B. Griffith II. Introduction to Second Edition by Arthur Waldron and Edward O'Dowd (Baltimore: The Nautical and Aviation Publishing Company of America, Inc., 1992), p. 19.

¹⁸*Ibid.*, p. 93.

¹⁹*Ibid.*, p. 64.

²⁰Nicholas D. Kristof, "China Builds Its Military Muscle, Making Some Neighbors Nervous," New York Times, Monday, 11 January 1993, p. A1.

²¹Robert Maxwell, ed., Deng Xiaoping Speeches and Writings (New York: Pergamon Press, 1984), p. 90.

²²"Chinese Navy to Expand," Washington Times, 12 January 1993, p. 7.

²³Kristof, "China Builds Its Military Muscle, Making Some Neighbors Nervous," p. A1.

²⁴The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States January 1993, p. 16.

²⁵*Ibid.*, p. 19.

CHAPTER SIX

CONCLUSIONS

The evidence suggests that change will occur in China in the near-term. The Hong Kong issue will come to fruition in 1997. Deng Xiaoping is eighty-nine years old and there is no clear successor to his rule. The People's Liberation Army continues to modernize, and the Chinese are sending aggressive maritime signals in the South China Sea. Evidence also clearly suggests that, despite the type of China that emerges, it will be dedicated to modernization of the country and advancement of China toward dominant leadership in Asia and the world.

The culture of a four thousand-year civilization has been severely suppressed by the PRC government, which is dedicated to erasing the social evils of the dynastic past. This has enhanced the negative effects on the already tumultuous internal events that have occurred in communist China. China's history has been based on the philosophies of Daoism and Confucianism, which preach harmony and order. Instead of promoting cohesion, however, the communists have unleashed the disruptive influences of revolutionary politics. The resulting insecurity of the people, and lack of confidence in the communist leadership, has ensured that the PRC government

will never receive the mandate of heaven as the rightful ruler of China.

Western observers have continued to foster the misconception, however, that order prevails within this closed communist society. Since the beginning of Deng Xiaoping's modernization program, much new information about the early communist regime has become available to the international community. This new information clearly shows that Chinese actions are indeterminate at best, with party decisions based upon greed, corruption, personalities, petty jealousies, and personal gain. Misguided programs, such as the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, were reactionary rather than carefully planned events. Society, in general, has been insecure and irrational in its activities. The people, subjected to vacillatory politics that fluctuated between the extremes of Maoist zealots and pragmatic moderates, have developed wait-and-see attitudes and a complacency that stifled initiative. Forward and innovative thinkers have been faced with the dilemma of speaking out and being censured, or quietly accepting ruin.

Internal events remain uncontrollable in China today, and are influencing domestic and international affairs. Economic reforms continue without corresponding ideological and political change. As economic growth occurs, individual freedoms increase. As these individual freedoms reach an unacceptable level for the party hierarchy, government-

sanctioned oppression ensues. As human rights are further repressed, instability and uncertainty increases. Eventually, more economic reforms will occur and the vicious cycle will start again.

The current modernization program of the military is contributing to the explosive nature of the internal Chinese situation. Recent leadership purges have not prevented China from gradually building more modern and formidable military forces than the land-locked peasant army of the past.

The Chinese military area of interest is also much broader, and growing rapidly. In the past, the perception of a Soviet threat along the northern border greatly influenced Chinese strategy. With the decline of this threat, China is now free to turn in other directions, if she so chooses.

The Chinese are currently restructuring ground forces for quick reaction missions. The extensive merchant fleet and the continued development of a blue water navy give China the capability to project forces immediately, although on a small scale, and on a limited basis. The phased navy developmental plan calls for China to be a major sea power, and able to enter all the oceans of the world, by the year 2020. These intentions and capabilities, however, are not as likely to influence the stability of the Pacific theater as much as current internal Chinese uncertainties and resulting reactionary Chinese policies. This underscores China's potential for bizarre military behavior abroad. It also makes

China a near-term threat, around which all PACOM military strategy must evolve.

The formulation of an adequate PACOM strategy toward China is difficult due to the random and indeterminate nature of internal events in the PRC. The military planner must, therefore, begin by considering what is known and relevant to the task. The Pacific theater is vast in size and ethnic diversity. Today's U.S. political and economic climate portends an era of diminished forces. China is in the throes of a revolution, but the U.S. cannot influence internal events. China will be the dominant force on the mainland of Asia, and will continue to pursue an ambitious maritime strategy to achieve regional and global power status.

Since the U.S. cannot greatly influence Chinese internal events, PACOM strategy must be aimed in two directions. The first is to support U.S. national security strategy of free-flow of information regarding the democratic societies of the world into China, and to monitor closely the emergence of China as a regional, and potentially, global power. This task can be achieved in two ways. First, the U.S. should remain physically engaged and use theater informational resources to shape regional opinions. PACOM personnel and units must participate in bilateral operations, exchange programs, mobile training teams, and the like. Second, an ambitious theater intelligence collection plan should be followed. This plan must make innovative use of overt human intelligence, to

include inter-governmental information exchanges, the defense attache reporting system, and debriefing of all PACOM personnel that come in contact with citizens of the PRC.

The second direction of strategy must be aimed toward containing the spill-over from reactionary internal events in China. This spill-over may occur because of four distinct scenarios: a civil war in China; Chinese maritime aggression in the Pacific or Indian Oceans; a PRC conflict with Taiwan; or, a dispute between China and her continental neighbors. In order to meet the demands of these diversified scenarios, strategies must be developed to support: humanitarian missions; non-combatant evacuation (NEO) missions; flexible deterrent options (FDOs) that include forward naval presence and aircraft beddown locations; freedom of the seas; and, power projection missions on the mainland of Asia.

China should not be viewed as a threat to the United States in the same sense that the Soviet threat was the primary U.S. military focus for the last forty-five years. It would be a grave miscalculation, however, to base near-term assessments of the Chinese threat on aircraft production models, or on the ability of the Chinese to produce a specified number of ships in a certain number of years. China has the long-term potential to be a super power threat in Asia if she so chooses, but the PACOM planner must realize that this will not be a rational decision based on capabilities and force ratios. Rather, it will be the result of internal

events that become out of control, and which operate at their own pace. It could happen today or tomorrow.

Strategic and operational planners are taught to base assessments on threat capabilities and intentions. The scope of planning in the Pacific theater, however, must be broadened to also include the event-driven threat posed by China, due to the indeterminate nature of internal Chinese politics. This indeterminate factor always overrides logic. Strategists must recognize that in Asia, in general, and China, in particular, "wars may rise by inadvertence as well as aggression."¹ PACOM strategy must be flexible and reversible to counter this threat. It must recognize that the PLA, and particularly the PLAN, is embarked on a rapid modernization program. The PLAN's aim is to become a major maritime power in the Indian and Pacific Oceans. PACOM strategy must support national goals, while simultaneously recognizing that information flow into China will increase instability. Most importantly of all, a strategy must be developed for reacting to any scenario in China that could negatively affect the stability of Asia in both the near-term and the future.

Footnotes for Chapter Six

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