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A MODEL OF DEFENSE FOR RUSSIA

By

David B. Hanson

JUNE 1993

Thesis Advisor:

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A MODEL OF DEFENSE FOR RUSSIA

by

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Lieutenant, United States Navy
B.A., Augustana College, 1980
Submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL


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


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
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ABSTRACT

This thesis constructs an original model of defense for Russia. This model is developed in the context of Russia's current military situation, but can easily be adapted to other nations. It examines the geographic extent that a nation will defend through the interplay of two factors: the cost of defense and the propensity to defend.

The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the collapse of the Soviet Union have left Russian forces based in potentially hostile territory which is logistically insupportable in the event of hostilities. To support its troops, Moscow must re-deploy them and prepare new theaters of military operations. The requirement for prepared theaters was discussed by the Russian military strategist, A. A. Svechin. However, first Moscow must determine where wars are likely, and what territory it will defend.

The model draws upon the work of Halford Mackinder, Johann von Thünen, Yi-Fu Tuan, and Walter Christaller. The model addresses the complexity of the elements which compose the cost of defense and the propensity to defend. These elements can come into conflict with each other over specific geographic areas. Three regions of conflict are addressed: the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Ukraine. The thesis concludes with some policy implications.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This thesis constructs an original model of defense for Russia. This model is developed in the context of Russia's current military situation, but can easily be adapted to other nations. It explains the geographic extent that a nation will defend through the interplay of two factors: the cost of defense and the propensity to defend.

The thesis begins with the thought of the Russian military strategist of the 1920's and 1930's, General-Major A. A. Svechin. Svechin and his thought have undergone a remarkable rehabilitation in recent years due to his intellectual objectivity, his application of historical principles, and his discussion of operational art. The latter is a term he coined to refer to that portion of military art lying between tactics and strategy. Operational art requires the management of large assets over a broad geographic area. To be most effective, it requires the preparation of a theater of military operations, including identifying potential enemies, the strategic axes to be used, development of highways and railroads, the construction of logistics bases, and even the equipping and training of troops for a particular theater.

Due to the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia no longer has a prepared theater of military operations along its southern and western borders. Before these theaters can be prepared, the question "What will Moscow defend?" must be answered. The model constructed in this thesis is an attempt to answer this question.

The model draws upon the work of Halford Mackinder, Johann von Thünen, Yi-Fu Tuan, and Walter Christaller. Mackinder developed the "Heartland" thesis which stated that control of central Eurasia would allow a nation to control the world. Mackinder is important for the author's model of defense because he saw geo-strategy in terms of expansion from a secure core area to a more vulnerable periphery.

Johann von Thünen created a model to explain differences in agricultural land use based upon the costs of sending goods to market. The author has adapted this to explain defense behavior. With increasing distance from the core area, the cost of defense increases. In the case of an expeditionary force sent its base, the size and complexity of the logistics train increases with distance. In the case of a static defense, such as a net of air defense sites, the cost similarly increases with an increase in the radius of the area defended. This half of the model of defense, the cost of defense, concerns what a nation can afford to defend.

The second half of the model is what a nation will *want* to defend, termed the propensity to defend. Here the work of the humanistic geographer Yi-Fu Tuan is helpful. He has coined the term *topophilia*, to refer to the affective bond between people and place. Some elements of the propensity to defend are ethnicity, cultural ties, economic value, historic ties, political integrity, the need for collective defense, and even a people's psychology and their vision of the world and their place in it.

When the cost of defense and the propensity to defend are combined, the model can be analyzed abstractly. At the core, the value placed on the land is high and costs to defend it are low. The nation will therefore defend this area. With increasing distance from the core, costs rise and the value placed on the territory decreases. This progresses to an equilibrium point which is the furthest point a nation will militarily defend. Beyond this point, costs are too high, and the national interest is too low. The equilibrium point may change over time due to technological, economic, or political changes. This is the first stage of the model.

The model of defense then adds additional actors, and progresses by applying the work of Walter Christaller. Christaller developed "Central Place Theory" which explains the settlement pattern of small villages, medium-sized towns, and large cities. An economic system is made up of many different goods and services. To acquire certain goods, a person is willing to travel only a short distance. These are called "low-order" goods. Other goods attract customers from a wider geographic extent, or "tributary area." These are "high-order goods." For Christaller, the pattern of settlements is caused by the overlap of the tributary areas of economic goods of various orders. Villages offer only low-order goods; medium-sized towns offer low- and medium-order goods, and large cities offer goods of all orders.

Central Place theory is applied to the model of defense by treating the elements of the propensity to defend as analogs of economic goods of various orders. Ethnicity in Armenia is a low-order good: it is satisfied in a relatively

compact area. Other goods, such as collective defense are high-order: they can only be satisfied over a larger geographic extent. When the various elements of the propensity to defend overlap, they become the sources of conflict along the periphery of Russia because they assert competing claims over the same territory.

The model is given application in three areas around Russia's periphery: the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Ukraine. Ethnicity as an element of the propensity to defend is applied to the Caucasus, the element of collective security to Central Asia, and the element of historical ties as expressed in the Russian-Ukrainian relationship is applied to Ukraine. These applications illustrate and serve to temper the model.

The thesis concludes with a discussion of the need for area specialists. The various elements of the propensity to defend are very complex. They require a thorough knowledge of the culture and history of the people. Without analysts with such detailed knowledge, the United States will be surprised by unanticipated and misunderstood conflicts throughout the world.

I. INTRODUCTION

We must be able to get a grasp of war as it is perceived by the opposing side and clarify the other side's desires and goals. (Svechin, 1992, p.62)

The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the collapse of the Soviet Union have caused profound changes in the political, economic, and social life of Central and Eastern Europe. The armed forces of the Russian Federation have by no means been immune to these changes. The change in collective security status and the creation of new, independent states has meant that a large portion of the armed forces of the former Soviet Union have suddenly found themselves logistically stranded, cut off from any hope of re-supply in the event hostilities break out. Their positions are largely indefensible. Until they are re-positioned and new logistics lines and bases are constructed to support them in these new locations, the situation will not improve.

The solution to this current dilemma of the Russian armed forces raises a larger issue. Russia cannot re-deploy its divisions until it first defines its security interests. In the political circles of Moscow today, there is much debate over this issue.

This thesis is "A Model of Defense for Russia," and the central question of this model is "what will Moscow defend?" Until this question is determined, the Russian Federation will be unable to begin reconstruction of its armed forces. The

manner in which it is answered will largely determine the future size and structure of these forces. The thesis will begin with the work of the Russian military strategist, General-Major Aleksandr Andreevich Svechin (1878-1938). The strategic theories of General-Major Svechin are particularly pertinent to this issue. He developed the term "operational art" to refer to that level of military art lying between strategy and tactics. Operational art requires the coordination of large-scale military actions over a wide geographic extent, called the theater of military operations. For Svechin, the preparation of the theater of military operations requires identifying potential enemies, the locations of likely conflicts, the strategic axes to be used, and the overall strategy being pursued. Only when these are determined can the logistics and mobilization infrastructure be developed which can support an operational victory.

The thesis will develop an original model of defense to theoretically answer the question, "what will Moscow defend?" This model will draw on the works of four geographers, Halford Mackinder, Johann Heinrich von Thünen, Yi-Fu Tuan, and Walter Christaller. With the exception of Mackinder, these geographers did not address issues of military geography or geo-strategy. However, their theories and insights can be modified to create a model of defense. This model, while developed in a Russian context, can easily be adapted as a model for other states.

The model contains two factors: the cost of defense and the propensity to defend. The former accounts for the economic, political, and social costs associated with the decision to defend a given territory. The propensity to defend

accounts for the motivations and national interests which lead a nation to *want* to defend a given area. The propensity to defend is an extremely complex factor. It is made up of various elements such as ethnic, linguistic, and religious ties to the residents; historic ties to, and claims on, a particular territory; economic interests; political ties; the desire for collective security; and the manner in which national myths and psychology find their expression in claims over territory. When these elements are treated separately and overlain on geographic space, it becomes obvious that in many cases they make competing demands on the same territory. This forms the basis for violent confrontation. Since these demands are of different natures, it is necessary to understand their origins, their geographic extent, and which policy actions may resolve the issues, and which will not.

The model will then be applied to Russia. The thesis will examine the way these factors of the cost of defense and the propensity to defend are finding their expression in the current debate of military doctrine. It will then adopt a regional approach and examine three regions in detail, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Ukraine. The thesis concludes with some implications for U.S. policy.

II. THE REDISCOVERY OF SVECHIN

During the Gorbachev years, profound changes swept the political and economic thinking of the Soviet Union. The terms *glasnost'* and *perestroika* entered the lexicon of even Western nations. As part of this "new thinking," the role of the armed forces was undergoing the most significant examination in forty years. Terms like "defensive sufficiency" began to be discussed in Soviet military thinking.

Coincident with this discussion, a curious citation appeared in an article by Dr. Andrei Kokoshin and Prof. Valentin Larionov (1987). The significance of a citation by authors of such prominence could not be ignored. Kokoshin was then the Deputy Director of the Institute of the USA and Canada, and is today the First Deputy Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation; Larionov is a retired General-Major, a primary author of Sokolovskii's *Military Strategy* (1963), and is one of the most prominent Russian strategic thinkers in his own right. The citation was of the work of a largely forgotten Russian military strategist, Professor Aleksandr Andreevich Svechin. From this oblique reference to the work of Svechin, interest has steadily grown in both the Russian language press, and in the West. Kokoshin wrote a full-length article on Svechin and his thought (1988), and was joined for a second article by none other than General V. N. Lobov, who became Chief of the General Staff (1990). Kokoshin and Larionov co-wrote an

article on military doctrine for *Kommunist* (1990) in which Svechin and his approach were featured prominently. Other articles in the Russian press (Geller; Gaydukov) have made specific reference to the value of Svechin to his own time, as well as to the present.

The attention being paid to Svechin has not been limited to the Soviet Union and its successor states. The circle of readers interested in Svechin was widened with the publication of an English translation of the second edition of the *magnum opus* of Svechin, *Strategy* (1992). This latter work contains new essays by Kokoshin and Larionov (1992), Lobov (1992), and Dr. Jacob W. Kipp of the U.S. Army's Foreign Military Studies Office (1992). On a research trip to Russia and Ukraine in the summer of 1992, the author noted this English language translation on the shelves in the offices of several senior military officers and national security analysts. A copy of the translation may be easier to obtain in Russia than an original edition. The sudden interest has sparked further analyses of Svechin's work (Stoeker; Waters; Blank). Who was this figure who had languished so long in relative obscurity? Why was his work significant? Do these ideas apply today?

A. BIOGRAPHY OF SVECHIN

Svechin was born in Yekaterinoslav (Dnepropetrovsk) in August 1878. His father was the Chief of Staff of the 34th Infantry Division. Aleksandr and his older brother Mikhail were tutored privately, and then sent to military school. Aleksandr graduated from the Mikhailovsk Artillery School in 1897 and from the Nikolaevsk

Academy of the General Staff in 1903. He became a company commander and then a staff officer of the 16th Army Corps of the 3rd Manchurian Army taking part in the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905). Following the war, he began a study of the conduct of the Russo-Japanese war and of Russian military thought in general, which resulted in numerous articles and monographs. For a time during 1913, he was stationed in France.

With the outbreak of the First World War, he was sent to the German-Russian front. Later, he was an officer of the Chief of Staff of the Russian High Command. From July 1915 to January 1917 he commanded the 6th Finnish Rifle Regiment. In July 1917 he became the Chief of Staff of the 5th Army, and in September, the Chief of Staff of the Northern Front. Of this period, his official biography simply says that Aleksandr Svechin subsequently "was demobilized with the rank of General-Major." (Ageev, p. 126)

At the time of the Bolshevik Revolution, Aleksandr's brother Mikhail was the commander of the 1st Cavalry Corps on the Northern Front with rank of General-Lieutenant. Mikhail was embittered with the performance of the Provisional Government, and following the seizure of power by the Bolsheviks, fearing things were going to become even worse, he resolved to take action. Mikhail received approval from his new semi-literate Bolshevik commissar, Seaman Second-class Simachev to be "sent on vacation" for two months. He took his leave papers and headed south to the Don, where had heard that a "volunteer army" was forming. Curiously, Mikhail never mentioned in his memoirs whether he had been in

communication, or received help from, his brother Aleksandr at the Front headquarters. Mikhail subsequently served the White armies as an emissary to the Ukrainian *Hetmanate* until being forced to flee Russia forever (Svechin, M. A., 1964).

Aleksandr Svechin remained in Russia and joined the Red Army in March 1918. He served as a Military Commissar in the Smolensk region, and from August 1918 he worked for the Chief of the All-Russian Main Staff (Ageev, p. 126). In October (Geller) or November (Ageev) of 1918 he became a professor at the Academy of the General Staff, which from 1921 on was known as the Military Academy of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army (RKKA). He was in charge of a commission to study the lessons of the First World War.

This study ushered in the most fruitful period in the life of Svechin. He wrote a three-volume study *Istoriia Voennogo Iskusstva* (History of Military Art, 1922, 1923) in which he followed the intellectual lead of the German historian and military theorist Hans Delbrück. The first edition of *Strategy* (1926) was followed by a second (1927). He expanded his earlier three volume work and it was published as *Evoliutsiia Voennogo Iskusstva* (Evolution of Military Art, 1927, 1928). During this time he also translated works of Ludendorf (1923, 1924), Von Schlieffen (1923), and Clausewitz (1924). This does not include additional dozens of articles.

This period of the flowering of Svechin's thought coincided with the New Economic Policy and the years immediately following. But the steady flow from

Svechin's pen was cut short. From 1930 to 1934 Svechin published nothing. The official Soviet biographies of Svechin give no explanation, nor does any English language source.

Svechin was apparently in jail:

The fate of Aleksandr Andreevich took shape, as is usual with us, sadly. In 1930 he was arrested. However, knowledge and talent were still required, and in 1933 he was set free. Moreover, maintaining his official category, he was assigned to the Chief Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff (GRU). In 1935 he received the general's military rank of *komdiv*. Knowing about the colossal achievements of Svechin in the creation of the Armed Forces of the country, Stalin and Voroshilov, in mockery, gave to the recalcitrant military leader, the rank won by him on the fields of battle twenty years previously. In 1936 Svechin resumed the teaching work begun eighteen years previously at the Academy of the General Staff of the RKKA. (Geller, 1991, p. 10) (translated by the author)

It is not known what the charge against Svechin was, nor under what conditions he was held. During this period, Svechin and his professional ideas were denounced. Tukhachevskii wrote "Against Reactionary Theories on the Military-Scientific Front (A Critique of the Military-Historical Views of Prof. Svechin)" (1931). Tukhachevskii's book of the same title was published in 1931. The number of copies printed of this denunciation (10,000), was double that of the second edition of *Strategy*. Another article, "The Problem of Wars and the Vain Dialectical Attempts of Prof Svechin," appeared in *Bolshevik* (Bukhartsev, 1931).

Svechin resumed writing following his release. First, a few of his articles appeared in this era, and his significant book on Clausewitz (1935). As part of

Stalin's purge of the Red Army, Svechin was removed from the army, and on 26 February 1938, he was again arrested, this time without reprieve.

B. SVECHIN'S THOUGHT

What makes Svechin's thought significant? How is it being utilized today in Russia? What can Westerners learn from Svechin? First, Svechin was committed to an objective analysis of facts. He courageously ignored pressure to conform analysis to ideology. Second, he was an ardent student of military history. This study led him to conclude that there were two ideal types of war: those pursuing a victory through destruction, and those pursuing a victory through attrition. Thirdly, he concluded that the modern theater of military operations was more complex than previously seen, and it required a new type of thinking to manage. His term, "operational art" refers to this management.

1. Svechin's Objectivity

Svechin was not dogmatic. His Commission for the Study of the First World War made a sincere attempt to analyze the facts of the conduct of the war, unclouded by ideology.

At the same time Svechin promised an objectivity which transcended even that of Moltke the Elder's injunction to his General Staff in writing up the history of the Franco-Prussian War: "The truth, only the truth, but not all the truth." Instead, Svechin said the Commission's motto would be Clausewitz's: "The truth, only the truth, the whole truth." (Kipp, 1992, p. 33)

In one sense this was made easier because many of the czarist officers who had held command position in the First World War were not in the Red Army, and the revolutionary government could blame most deficiencies on them. However, it was harder to maintain objectivity under a regime like the Bolshevik's which was so ideologically oriented. Marxism-Leninism was essentially applied deductively, that is, from a general theory toward particular applications of the theory, from dogma to practice, from the Party hierarchy down to the local activist. This does not lend itself to objectivity. Inconvenient facts that do not fit the theory are ignored or explained away. The refusal to compromise his principles would create increasing troubles for Svechin with the authorities. Tukhachevskii's military thought was more in line with Lenin's theory, and Stalin's temperament, and in the politically charged atmosphere of the day ideology won out over scholarship and objective thinking.

Svechin was not a Communist Party member, nor was he a Marxist. This fact alone is remarkable: that a Bolshevik government would entrust the instruction of strategy at its most important military academy to a non-Marxist. Svechin's writings do not contain the slavish references to Marx and Lenin which characterize much of later military thought. This makes them more palatable in Russia today: the ideological gilding does not have to be stripped away. Svechin remains largely uncontaminated by Marxist theory, and he therefore is acceptable to a wide spectrum of political thought, from neo-imperialist nationalists to liberals.

Not only did Svechin reject ideological cant, he also insisted on an openness of thought. His choice of words in the title *The Evolution of Military Thought* is no accident. The art of war constantly changes, and therefore to rely on school solutions would only lead a nation to prepare for the last war (Svechin 1992, p. 61). Chief among the causes for this evolution in the art of war is technological change. The importance of railroads, communications, aviation, and new weapons significantly change the military-technical aspects of war, and therefore the appropriate military art to be applied (Svechin, 1927-1928, vol. II, pp. 537-567).

2. The Role of History

Svechin was primarily a student of military history. He saw history as the basis for any strategic enterprise. Only by grounding himself in historical research, and drawing upon the lessons of history, could a military leader hope to understand strategy.

Issues of military history are particularly pertinent to persons involved in the study of strategy, because by its very methods strategy is merely a systematic contemplation of military history. (Svechin, 1992, p. 77)

The works *The History of Military Art* and *The Evolution of Military Art* were the first comprehensive works on military history to appear in Russian. Aside from adapting Delbrück's broadly historical approach, Svechin also accepted his classification of wars into two types. Svechin called Delbrück's

Niederwerfungsstrategie as a strategy of *sokrushenie* (destruction). Delbrück's *Ermattungsstrategie* became Svechin's *izmor* (attrition, or literally, "starvation").

What do these two ideal categories of victory through destruction and victory through attrition mean? A war of destruction is preferably fought on the strategic offensive, while a war of attrition makes use the strategic defensive, at least during the early phases of a war. Because a strategy of destruction relies on the offensive it assumes maximum intensity at the beginning of hostilities. To achieve this, it must rely on large standing forces and stockpiled materiel. A strategy of attrition, in contrast, does not achieve its maximum intensity until several months, or even years, after the initiation of hostilities. It relies on small covering operations to avoid having its forces overrun while the population and industry are mobilized. As the name implies, a strategy of destruction requires the total destruction of the enemy, while a strategy of attrition may, although not always, be mandated by political goals and objectives which are more modest (Svechin, 1992, p. 97).

Svechin thought both forms of strategy were viable, but the most appropriate form should be dictated by the particular political and economic factors at play in a given conflict.

When a state is poorly prepared for land war (Great Britain, the United States), its peak of strategic intensity obviously could not coincide with the first weeks of the war but would rather be postponed one, two, or three years. States which have weak armies in peacetime wage long wars. Shifting the center of gravity to mobilizing military industry leads to the same situation (Svechin, 1992, p. 98).

Svechin also identified strong geographic factors as favoring victory through one strategy or the other.

(T)he distance between two states which may enter into conflict only in a remote theater of war separated by seas or distance from the most important centers of the hostile states (Japan and Russia) would obviously prevent a war of destruction. Military parity also leads to the renunciation of a destructive strike. Military preparations made for the purpose of maximizing strategic intensity as quickly as possible and extensive land boundaries crossed by good lines of communication, a significant superiority in forces and a hostile state whose political structure resembles a giant with feet of clay are conditions which favor a destructive strike (Svechin, 1992, p. 98).

He concludes that these factors favored long wars of attrition, especially for Moscow.

His thought directly challenged the "young Turks" at the academy, who, fresh from their Civil War experience, saw a war of destruction against the capitalist states as fulfilling the historical destiny of Marxism-Leninism. Svechin's position was further compromised with the launching of the First Five-Year Plan. Not only did this coincide with the beginning of the political purges, but the rapid industrialization program would, it was thought, produce enough material in a crash program to allow a war of destruction. To oppose a strategy of destruction carried the implied criticism of the economic program of the nation, which was launched to allow the strategy of destruction to be followed. Svechin unguardedly criticized this economic program.

Operational art lost touch with its material basis, and this inflicted double damage. The strategy of the Russian army received a sharply scholastic

coloring, but fundamental questions of the rear had the possibility to develop only spontaneously, without the influence of any rational ideas. The theory gives full freedom to the suppliers and the "redskins;" the result is that the theater of military operations turns out to be organized without a well thought out plan, like our type of disorderly domestic economy of gigantic measures. (Svechin, 1928, p. 96) (translated by the author)

A strategy of destruction is more expensive to pursue than a strategy of attrition. Large armies and stocks are maintained during peacetime. Not only this, but by preparing for a war of destruction, a state may also make itself vulnerable. The industry is not oriented to begin large-scale production of war-goods. Interior lines of communication are not maintained, since the war is planned to be fought on opposing territory, and is intended to be over quickly. Industries are located in the vulnerable periphery, as are the armies themselves, and these then become vulnerable to enveloping operations.

[Svechin] considered that it was necessary to prepare most seriously for a long period of defensive actions and correspondingly prepare rear defensive lines. Svechin cautioned against placing all new large industrial objectives in the vicinity of the USSR's western border, considering that they could be lost as a result of defensive engagements in the initial period of war. In this connection he came out against "superconcentration" of industry and population in Leningrad, calling this 'the Sevastopol of a future war.'" (Kokoshin and Larionov, 1992, p. 10)

For Svechin, the error of a nation preparing for a victory through destruction only to be forced to later adopt a strategy of attrition was one which had been repeated throughout history.

By the end of the thirties, the debate over the appropriate strategic posture had been won by those, like Tukhachevskii, who favored a war of destruction. However, the initial period of the war found the Soviet Union unable to pursue victory through destruction, and unprepared for a war of attrition.

By that time, however, Svechin was dead, a victim, along with his rival, M. N. Tukhachevskii, of Stalin's blood purge of the Soviet military. Tukhachevskii did not live to see the fate of his mass mechanized army during the initial period of war, when it was all but annihilated. Following those initial defeats, another Soviet army, as was befitting Svechin's "second act," arose. This people's army lost battle after battle, was surrounded, smashed, and phoenix-like arose from its own ashes to confound the architects of blitzkrieg. With its blood, the blood of millions, it bought time for a new generation of military leaders to master operational art and for the nation to forge the new weapons of war. This was the army of attrition, the army of *izmor*, the army of people's war, the army of Russia, the army of Svechin. Moscow and Stalingrad were its victories. (Kipp, 1992, p. 55)

3. The Development of Operational Art

The third contribution of Aleksandr Svechin was the development of "operational art," a term he first coined. This term refers to the level of military art between strategy and tactics. As such, the form of operational art employed in a given conflict is derived from the strategy and finds its expression in the tactics. It ties together tactical engagements in a logical manner to support strategic victory. Svechin developed his ideas about operational art by drawing upon his experiences in the Russo-Japanese War. In that war, large armies met on a theater whose breadth and depth exceeded those previously faced by Russian commanders. The complexity of the new theater required a new thinking about

how to manage forces, space, and time, to achieve victory. This was a type of military thinking for which the Russian commanders were unprepared. He defined an operation as "an act of war if the efforts of troops are directed toward the achievement of a certain intermediate goal in a certain theater of military operations without any interruptions" (Svechin, 1992, p. 69).

Svechin drew a distinction between strategy and operational art.

Strategy is the art of combining preparations for war and the grouping of operations for achieving the goal set by the war for the armed forces. Strategy decides issues associated with the employment of the armed forces and all the resources of a country for achieving ultimate war aims. While operational art must take into account the possibilities presented by the immediate rear (front logistics), the strategist must take into account the entire rear, both his own and the enemy's, represented by the state with all its economic and political capabilities. A strategist will be successful if he correctly evaluates the nature of a war, which depends on different economic, social, geographic, administrative and technical factors. (Svechin, 1992, p. 69)

The geographic extent of operational art therefore is that of the theater of military operations. It can also exist for a particular service. For example, one may speak of a naval operational art or an air force operational art, but only if the service is given separate operational goals. Strategy, on the other hand, is necessarily a combined arms concept and may function beyond the geographic extent of the theater. Therefore, it is not possible to speak of an "air force strategy," but only of an air force operational art (Svechin, 1992, p. 70).

C. IMPORTANCE OF SVECHIN TODAY

What is the importance of Svechin today, and why have his works undergone such a renaissance? The reasons follow the content of Svechin's thought.

First, the undogmatic nature of Svechin's thought finds a resonant chord in the current Russian debates about military policy and strategy. The example of Svechin who boldly spoke the truth as he saw it in spite of the consequences has given inspiration to a new generation of strategic thinkers. Svechin saw a strategy of destruction as costly to the national economy. His assertions about the viability, and even of advisability of a strategy of attrition as both less costly and still providing for adequate security are very similar to the position of many reform-minded thinkers in Russia today such as Kokoshin and Larionov.

Second, Svechin's historical approach gives additional weight to his prediction in the 1920's and 1930's. The Soviet Union began with a strategy of victory through destruction, but as Kipp so eloquently said, it was only through "the blood of millions" (p. 55) and the shifting to a strategy of attrition that the Soviet Union was able to achieve victory in World War Two. Quite simply, the history of that war validates Svechin and his thought. At the same time, Svechin warned against any rigidity of thought. He specifically identified the role of changes in the military-technical realm which will necessitate changes in military art, and even in strategic thinking. Svechin can therefore be used by those who argue that a major change in technology has occurred, and that strategic and operational thinking has not kept pace.

Thirdly, Svechin is important because of his thinking on operational art. The concept, and the term itself, have certainly been re-validated by military experience from the First World War through the Gulf War. It is the ability to tie together numerous engagements across a wide geographic area that has been the difference between victory and defeat. The trend, in fact, has been for the theater to become more complex, and the task of managing assets has become more difficult over time.

For Svechin, the management of assets required a secure rear area. This was especially true when following a strategy of victory through attrition. Forces must be mobilized, and this can only take place in a secure geographic rear. Svechin identified two rear areas: the "front" rear which served the operational needs of the theater, and the "state" rear, which served strategic needs. Svechin insisted that as strategy is superior to operations, the needs of the state rear must take precedence over the front rear (Svechin, 1928).

Operational art, as Svechin understood it, requires the development of a theater of military operations. It is imperative that a state determine the nature of the military threat, the location of a likely theater of military operations, and how a future war will be conducted. Then, and only then, can a theater be prepared. This preparation is necessary regardless of the strategic paradigm employed. This takes on a critical nature when the potential theater is underdeveloped (*malokul'turniy*). Without the establishment of proper logistics lines, bases, communications links, without adequate reconnaissance and mapping, engineering

surveys and construction, the war can only be conducted successfully at enormous additional costs. A small investment before war yields much greater savings when the battle is joined.

Each country may be a base only in the existence of well-known prerequisites--of the development of a theater of war, of the existence of local means, of the sufficient development of the railroad network. In an underdeveloped theater, the thesis of a state rear is naturally no longer relevant. The characteristic features of the conduct of war in an underdeveloped theater are enormous overhead costs--for the establishment of a vast basis for the conduct of operations, in building necessary roads, in the building of storehouses, of rear towns, of strong points, in the concentration of vast supplies, even in the building of forest paths and the draining of swamps; only by enormous additional efforts to surmount the underdevelopment does a theater of military operations adjust to the conditions of the operations of European forces, the center of gravity of the operations shifts to preparatory and administrative work, and only then uses the superiority of European equipment and training of forces. (Svechin, 1928, p. 98) (translation by the author)

In the discussions of Svechin, the relationship between operational art and the preparation of a theater of war is one which has received too little attention. This thesis is a attempt to draw attention to this aspect of Svechin's thought.

The necessity to prepare the theater and determine the appropriate strategic paradigm is acutely felt in Russia today. For four decades following the Second World War, these question had clear answers. The strategic axis ran east-west across Central Europe, and the Red Army would pursue a strategy of destruction. Elaborate preparations were made in stationing Soviet forces on the territory of the Warsaw Pact. These nations' armies became fully integrated with the Red Army, rates of advance were calculated, and logistics lines and bases were established

to support this rate of advance. Equipment and training requirements were determined by the operational concept.

As Stalin's and Tukhachevskii's army, oriented for a war of destruction, was destroyed by the *Wehrmacht blitzkrieg* in the early days of the Second World War, the political changes of 1989-1991 have done almost as much harm to the fighting ability of the armed forces of the former Soviet Union. The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact meant that logistics bases, and lines of communication, thoroughly prepared for an echeloned offense, were now on neutral, and potentially hostile, territory. The Soviet Groups of Forces in Germany, the cream of the Red Army, suddenly found itself on NATO territory without ever leaving the confines of the garrison. This force could not hope for re-supply or re-enforcement, and therefore was rendered inert.

This situation was exacerbated by the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. The military districts which had been in the deep rear, and organized for the purpose of mobilizing forces, suddenly found themselves bordering on newly sovereign states. This area, once in the rear, and now potentially on the front, must be considered to be an underdeveloped theater of military operations. The requirements set forth by Svechin to develop this zone therefore apply. Russia in 1993 finds itself in a situation analogous to the Soviet Union of 1941. It is unable to conduct a strategy of destruction, and it is unprepared for a strategy of attrition.

Just as operations are subordinate to strategy, and strategy subordinate to politics, the development of the theater will have to await the determination of what

Moscow will consider to be its "defensive space," that is, what Moscow will defend. This is the central question of this thesis. It is only when politics has determined what Moscow will defend will the military be able to begin the development of the theater, and organize, equip, and train its forces to defend the Russian Motherland.

III. WHAT MOSCOW WILL DEFEND

A. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

This chapter will be addressing the problem, "What will Moscow defend?" It will be assumed from the outset that Moscow is primarily interested in the defense of Russia. However, it would be too simplistic to draw a line coincident with the boundaries of the current Russian Federation, and proclaim that this is where Russia will define its security frontier. It is necessary to account for the bi-lateral and multi-lateral security arrangements with other republics, for example, with the Central Asian republics of the former Soviet Union, which Russia may feel obliged to uphold. But extending the outer boundary to include those states which have a formal security arrangement with Moscow is also too simplistic. The issue would be a very complex one for any state, and due to the current political flux, this is doubly so today in Russia. Therefore, one must not be doctrinaire in analyzing how Russia will define its security frontier. I want to examine the problem in a deeper, more lasting way, rather than drawing a line on a map. To do so would be to risk having the entire problem swept aside with the morning papers. Aspects of defense policy may change with the government, but the factors which drive the problem should continue in spite of policy perturbations.

When the discussion concerns other states, either within the structure of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) or in some other security

arrangement, the perspective will normally be from Moscow, rather than from, Dushanbe or Tallinn. I will do this for three reasons. First, Russia holds a unique geographic position at the core, with respect to the non-Russian republics lying along the periphery. This will be important for the model. Second, Russia is by far the largest republic, and has the greatest number of nuclear weapons, the bulk of the navy, etc. Russia is the most important nation in her own right, and therefore, what Moscow will defend is an important question in itself. Thirdly, in some important ways, Russia functions as the successor to the Soviet Union. It has been Russian and Soviet imperialism that has historically dominated the non-Russian republics. Therefore, the historical, cultural, political, and economic ties between many of the former Soviet states tend to be weaker than their relationship with Russia. The links, both logical and logistical, between Dushanbe and Kiev tend to run via Moscow. It is difficult to imagine a defense alliance between, say, Belarus and Kazakhstan, that did not include Russian participation. The republics would be physically isolated from each other, making a workable alliance virtually impossible. Russia has a long history as a major international actor. It can be expected to make an attempt to continue this role, as much as internal politics and economics allow. So the Russian perspective is most important because it holds the geographic center, it is the most powerful in itself, as well as having the most important ties with the peripheral republics and important international relations.

Moscow may be defending something other than the outer borders of the Russian Federation, as currently constituted. This may include the defense of the outer borders of the former Soviet peripheral states against external enemies. It may include internal security operations within those republics against threats to domestic peace and security. This takes on an added dimension when one considers that ethnonationalism and domestic politics in Russia may fuel revanchism for the "near abroad" (i.e. former Soviet republics). Intervention may be rationalized on the premise of protecting the human rights of Russians in those republics. In the long-term at least, we should include the possibility that the Russian definition of territory that will be defended may include areas, such as Afghanistan in 1979, which fell outside the borders of the Soviet Union.

There are two purposes to the following sections. The first is to acquaint the reader to a few classic geographic models. This should serve to show how the author's model fits into the body of geographic theories. The second is to build, step by step, the model itself. In doing so, I will be drawing upon these same classic models, in effect, altering their context for application to a model of defense.

B. MACKINDER

The most obvious example in the history of geography of a model relating to Russia and defense is the "Heartland" theory of the Scottish geographer Halford Mackinder (1861-1947). This model was first developed in a lecture before the

Royal Geographic Society, "The Geographic Pivot of History" (Mackinder, 1904). In this lecture he discussed his proposition that the "pivot" of history was the control of an area in central Eurasia. In later discussions he changed the awkward term of "pivot" to the "Heartland" (Mackinder, 1919).

His thesis was that this "pivot" area or "Heartland" had exerted controlling influence for many centuries upon the rest of the Eurasian land mass. The period of this controlling influence had been interrupted by the "Columbian Epoch." By this he meant that period from the 15th century until his time. During the Columbian Epoch, the primacy of Europe had been based on a mercantile exploitation of the Americas and Asia. This exploitation had been made possible due to the improvements in navigation and ship-building. This change in technology made long-range sea travel easier, and therefore, favored sea lanes of communication at the expense of overland commerce. However, Mackinder claimed that the age of this primacy of naval power was coming to a close. The new age would not be based on sea power. The "World-Island" (Eurasia plus Africa) would once again resume its natural role and be the focus of economic and political activity. The control of the "Heartland" of this land mass would control the whole of this "World-Island" and therefore, ultimately, the entire world.

Who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island. Who rules the World-Island commands the world. (Mackinder, 1919, p. 186)

In essence, he was arguing for the primacy of land power in geo-strategy.

Mackinder identified the changing technology as key in determining the geo-strategic equation. The new technological change, for Mackinder, was the development of rail links in Central Eurasia. Eurasia would be able to overcome the vast distances necessary to link east and west, north and south. While the area had been relatively disadvantaged for internal and external commerce in the era of water transport, the development of rail links favored a land power. The timing of his theory in 1904 is coincident with the completion of the Trans-Siberian Railroad, and the challenge to Japanese power which resulted in the attack on Port Arthur and the Russo-Japanese War.

Aside from the linking of east and west, the new railroads would allow the exploitation of the vast mineral and timber resources of Central Asia and Siberia. It is interesting to compare the world-wide rail links envisioned by Mackinder with those that have been actually constructed. Although not all of the railroads in Africa and Asia that he predicted were ever completed, his predictions for those in Central Asia, the Russian Far East, and China are remarkably accurate (Hauner, 1990, pp. 142-3).

For Mackinder, another factor favoring the Heartland was the particular geographic features of topography of the Heartland itself. Among these are the drainage patterns of Russia. Major rivers such as the Yenesei, Ob', and Lena flow northward, greatly reducing their utility for navigation. In the United States, by contrast, the mouth and entire lower reaches of the Mississippi remain open year-round, even when the source in Minnesota is frozen. Other major Russian rivers

such as the Volga have no outlet to the ocean at all. Other geographic features such as the mountains to the south, and the arctic cold to the north, decreased the relative vulnerability of the Heartland from challenges from the periphery.

It is also interesting to note that Mackinder's theory received virtually no comment by the tsarist government or scholars, or even later by the Soviets (Hauner, 1990, pp. 147-9). We might speculate what the reasons could be for this. Mackinder, as a Briton, was warning the rest of the world of the potential threat of domination by Russia. It was not in the interests of either Russia or the Soviet Union to underscore this geographic advantage. It was in their interests to quietly exploit this advantage without provoking a response.

Mackinder asserted that it was not necessary to *occupy* the Heartland, only to *control* it. This could be accomplished from Moscow, Berlin, or Tokyo. He saw the struggle for control of the Heartland as having been largely one of Russo-German competition. In light of this, he modified his definition of the boundaries of the Heartland twice. Following the First World War, he expanded the boundaries. This increased the relative importance of Central Europe. This had been the main theater of war, and international boundaries had recently been redrawn. To a lesser extent it also emphasized the role of China (Figure 1). During the midst of World War Two, he withdrew the eastern boundary. Perhaps unconsciously, this had the effect of minimizing the impact of Japanese occupation of Manchuria and the Pacific Theater as a whole, while emphasizing the geo-strategic importance of the European Theater (Hauner, 1990, p. 138).




Figure 1 The Changing Boundaries of Mackinder's Heartland
 Source: (Hauner, 1990, p. 138)

The Mackinder thesis was, in large part, a critique of the naval theories of Alfred Thayer Mahan. Mahan, of course, argued forcefully for the decisive role of naval forces in determining the relative strength of nations. In Mahan's view, a control of the sea (and a few critical coaling stations) allowed a nation to control the coastlands. Control of the coasts might then allow a nation to control interior territory, such as Mackinder's Heartland. However, even Mahan recognized the natural advantages of defense from attack from the sea that Russia enjoyed. The remote interior lines of communication in Russia protected it, "for the Russian center cannot be broken" (Mahan, 1900, p. 27).

Later Nicholas Spykman (1944) argued that the critical territory was the "rimlands" (that area of the periphery of Eurasia that Mackinder had called the "interior crescent"). Control of the periphery would ensure control of the Heartland, agreeing largely with Mahan.

My purpose is not to try to determine who was "right" in this debate. It is better to think of the writers as complementary. All identified Heartlands, rimlands, and ocean territories, although their terms for these varied. These would be the stages upon which the national actors would play their geo-strategic roles. For Mahan, it is the projection of power from the sea onto the coastlands, and eventually into the geographic core. For Mackinder, the projection of power was from the core to the periphery. Both Mahan and Mackinder identified naval power as playing a key role in national dominance, at least during a certain historical period.

So what is the value of Mackinder? Mackinder argued that the value of a certain part of Central Eurasia had dramatically increased due to a technological change, the maturation of the railroad as a means of commerce. He did correctly foresee that the influence of Russia and its successor, the Soviet Union, would greatly increase. Certainly Mackinder was too deterministic. The Soviet Union never *controlled* the world. Perhaps this was in part due to subsequent technological developments such as the wide use of air transport, the invention of radio telecommunication, etc. These have all tended to reduce the importance of railroads as land links.

A second lesson from Mackinder is the importance of core-periphery relations, and the essential role of maintaining control of the interior lines of communication. Aside from the Central Eurasian issue, he cited the importance of control of the Mediterranean for the Greeks and the Roman Empire. He also discussed the necessity of control of the desert oases for the Babylonian, Syrian, and Egyptian empires (Mackinder, 1904, pp. 430-2). It is the requirement of maintaining a central geographic core with secure interior lines that is the *sine qua non* which permits the centrifugal expansion of power. The value of linking east and west, and having an interior heartland from which to draw reserves was dramatically borne out for the Soviet Union during the Second World War. These are the enduring legacies of Mackinder.

My model of what Moscow will defend is one which deals with the core-periphery issue that interested Mackinder. It depends on two issues. The first is the ability of Moscow to control a core territory. The second is whether Russia will be able to advance forces beyond this core to the periphery.

C. VON THÜNEN

A second classic geographic model is that of Johann Heinrich von Thünen (1783-1850), which was published as *Der Isolierte Staat* in 1826 (von Thünen, 1966). This model attempts to explain the geographic differentiation of economic activity, even when there are no differences in topography, soils, climate, etc. He described how agricultural specialization would occur in the zone around an

isolated market center. Once again, this was an issue of a center, surrounded by a peripheral, or tributary, area.

Von Thünen made several assumptions in his model:

1. There is a single urban market located on a plain with uniform characteristics of topography, climate, soil, etc., and that the market and the hinterland are solely dependent upon each other.
2. The economic system is free and competitive with each farmer trying to maximize personal profits.
3. For each agricultural commodity, all land is equal in terms of on-site production and productivity.
4. There is one mode of transportation through the plain, the ox cart.

The determining factor for land use differentiation in the hinterlands is the difference in the cost required to send each commodity to market. This, in turn, determines the rent on land in each zone, and which commodity is produced there.

Von Thünen concluded that there would emerge a system of six concentric zones around the market center.

1. Horticulture and milk production
2. Silviculture
3. Intensive arable land
4. Crop rotation with fallow
5. Three-field crop rotation
6. Livestock




Figure 2 Von Thunen's Model
Source: Kendall, and others, 1976, p. 503.

These zones would then be surrounded by a wilderness in which the costs of bringing any commodity to market would exceed the value of that commodity at the marketplace, Figure 2.

Like Mackinder, Von Thünen was interested in core-periphery questions. He was interested in the theoretical expression of economic forces in a two-dimensional geographic space. Due to its simplicity, his model remains a classic.

D. APPLICATION OF MACKINDER AND VON THÜNEN

Can a geographic theory such as von Thünen's be adapted to explain what a state will defend? There are similarities between this issue and the problem which interested von Thünen. He observed a differentiation of land-use in two-

dimensional space, and attempted to explain it. It is reasonable to assume that there is an analogous differentiation of defense interests in two-dimensional space. In von Thünen's model, the costs of transportation were the key to differentiation.

Let us look at the economic costs of sending a military expeditionary force from the core to the periphery. Let us say this is the cost of moving an army division of personnel, with its equipment, from its home base. As the distance traversed increases, so does the amount of fuel used, and the size and complexity of the logistics train. The cost is therefore positively correlated with the distance from the base. This is an example of the costs of a dynamic military operation.

What are the economic costs of a static military operation? Let us look at the example of an air defense net. Imagine the net is composed of a series of surface-to-air missiles and associated radars located around the border of a circular state. They are spaced in such a way that the outer edge of one battery is tangent with the envelope of the adjoining battery, covering the entire frontier. If we increase the size of the circle, the number of batteries must increase, in direct proportion to the increase in the radius. This same principle would apply for border troops, air defense interceptors, etc. Therefore, both for a static and a dynamic defense, the economic costs will increase with a larger size defended, graphically depicted in Figure 3, where "s" is the cost of defense curve.




Figure 3 Cost of Defense

E. TUAN

The theories of von Thünen deal with the differentiation of geographic space driven by market forces. However, it is quite clear that decision making with respect to land occupancy, use, and defense, are not driven solely by economics. This has been demonstrated in research dealing with perceptions of the environment. One example is the settling of the North American continent. The central grasslands, labeled as the Great American Desert, tended to be bypassed in favor of Oregon. In the minds of the settlers, rich farmland was associated with forested areas. The result was that the prairie schooners rolled over the rich chernozem soil, and the interior tended to be settled relatively late (Bowden, 1976,

pp. 119-147). This "environmental perception" factor exerted a strong influence on behavior.

Environmental perception has been developed further in the writings of the geographer Yi-Fu Tuan. He is not only interested in geographic behavior caused by lack of accurate information as in the case above, but also in the cultural, demographic, and psychological factors which cause this behavior. He is especially interested in the ties that people feel to land. Professor Tuan has coined the term *topophilia* to refer to "the affective bond between people and place or setting" (Tuan, 1974, p.4). To understand this, he has argued for a humanistic geography which takes its insights and methods from the humanities (Tuan, 1976). Recounting the work of another humanistic geographer who described this feeling which transcends economics, he wrote:

When Saarinen, in his study on the Great Plains, showed some wheat growers a picture of a farm besieged by wind and dust, their characteristic response was that the dust-bowl farmer knows he can do better elsewhere, but remains because he loves the soil and the challenge of making a go of it. (Tuan, 1974, p. 96)

Tuan is interested in the maps that we all carry around inside our heads, our psychological cartography. He is further interested in how this space is organized, and what values we ascribe to the places in our mental maps, and why. This bond affects what we see when we look at the world.

Our view of the world is influenced first by our common tools of perception, the five senses. As primates, for example, we have the ability to discern color

which is unmatched by other mammals, while our sense of smell is relatively undeveloped. Other physiological effects, or the factors of age, sex, occupation, etc., can be shown to affect our personal view of the world (Tuan, 1974, pp. 45-74).

The aggregation of personal views toward land strongly influence culture and group psychology. These cultural attitudes are then transmitted down through the generations by means of art, literature, religion, myth, and symbol. As culture, these attitudes can be studied, and their impact better understood.

One trait that appears to be nearly universal is the belief in the centrality and importance of one's own territory. One example shows that eskimo men, when asked to draw a map of their island, overestimate the size of the side of the island on which they reside (Carpenter, 1955). Another surprising example is from Mackinder. Two years prior to his "Heartland" article, he tried to show that England lay in the center of the "land hemisphere" of the globe, as seen in Figure 4.

On a national level, these two ideas of centrality and the importance of home territory constitute ethnocentrism.

Civilized cultures often have a highly developed cosmology, either secular or religious. This cosmology segments space and reinforces ethnocentrism. The classic example of this is the Mediterranean, whose very name denotes centrality. The maps of medieval Europe showing the known world had common characteristics which gave them name of "T-O" maps. The maps are "oriented,"




Figure 4 Mackinder's View of the World
Source: Tuan, 1976, p. 43.

that is, with the east at the top. East was considered the most important cardinal direction, as the place of the rising sun, and of the risen Christ. The "O" is formed by the world ocean which surrounds the land mass. Within the O, the "T" is formed. The downstroke of the T is the Mediterranean Sea, and the cross strokes are the Nile and Don rivers. Jerusalem is at the juncture of the three bodies of water, with Asia above the T, Africa to the right, and Europe to the left, asserting

a geographic symmetry, and emphasizing the Mediterranean as the pathway to the center of the world, see Figure 5 for a schematic form of these maps.




Figure 5 Schematic of a Medieval T-O Map
Source: Tuan, 1976, p. 40.

A related idea is the concept of one's homeland as a middle zone lying between lands and peoples who exhibit extreme characteristics. The history of this idea of a middle zone goes back to antiquity. Within the Hellenist tradition, physical locality was thought to determine the forms of political and economic systems observed throughout the world. This was done either directly, or indirectly through the effect of climate, soil, and water, which were thought to determine the physiological health (generally through the balancing of humors) and the mental development of various peoples (Glacken, 1967, pp. 80-115).

Virtually all the familiar assertions of modern times...are found in a cruder form in antiquity; warm climates produce passionate natures; cold, bodily strength and endurance; temperate climate intellectual superiority; and

among the non-physiological theories, a fertile soil produces soft people, a barren one makes them brave (Glacken, 1967, p. 81).

Hippocrates expounds one early form of this theory, but it is also to be found in Plato, Aristotle, Ptolemy, and others, and even carried down, as Glacken noted, to our day. This idea is not limited to the Western tradition. See Figure 6.

China did not see itself as a nation among other nations of comparable stature. It stood at the center of the world; it was the Middle Kingdom. It was even more grandly known as *t'ien hsia* (under heaven) or *chung yuan* (center and source. . . . The idea of successive rectangular domains centered on imperial China is traditional. The earliest expression of this idea appears in the *Shu Ching* and possibly dates back to the fifth century B.C. The earth was conceived as a succession of zones of decreasing culture away from the imperial capital... This schema was popular with the Chinese but the Romans could easily have adapted it to their own use (Tuan, 1974, pp. 37-38).




Figure 6 Traditional Chinese View of the World

Source: Tuan, 1976, p. 38.

An obvious question is the extent to which Moscow leaders see themselves as literally at the center of the world: at the juncture of Europe and Asia, between the arctic wastes to the north, and the torrid, over-populated sub-continent to the south. If that is the case, then there is a psychological and cosmological core, and a periphery, and behavior depends in part on the structure of this cosmology.

But why this hatred against us? Why can't they all, once and for all, start trusting us and become convinced of our harmlessness? Why can't they believe that we are their friends and good servants, and that our whole European mission is to serve Europe and her welfare?... Nay, they cannot place trust in us. The main reason is that they are altogether unable to recognize us as *theirs*.... In Europe we were hangers-on and slaves, whereas we shall go to Asia as masters. In Europe we were Asiatics, whereas in Asia we, too, are Europeans. (Dostoyevsky, 1954, pp. 1046, 1048)

Establishing that a core-periphery attitude exists is not sufficient. One must also have some sense for the question of scale. That is, how quickly in spatial terms does the center fade into the border lands, the wilderness? The intensity of emotion that an individual feels for place tends to operate on the personal scale. One has the maximum intensity of feeling for the territory of one's domicile, neighborhood, or city. This strong attachment to place can vary in scale and intensity.

In ancient times it was a local sentiment. The Greeks did not apply patriotism indiscriminately to all Greek-speaking lands, but to small fragments such as Athens, Sparta, Corinth, and Smyrna. The Phoenicians were patriotic to Tyre, Sidon, or Carthage; not to Phoenicia generally. The city aroused profound emotions, especially when it came under attack. When the Romans sought to punish the Carthaginian for disobedience by razing the

city to the ground, citizens of Carthage begged their masters to spare the physical city, its stones and temples, to which no possible guilt could be attached, and instead, if necessary, exterminate the entire population. (Tuan, 1974, p. 100)

The converse process of ethnonationalism can be seen today in any number of places, such as Bosnia. There, the physical destruction of villages and towns which have been occupied for centuries by mixed ethnic groups is the price that is gladly paid to force one of those groups, the muslims, to leave from territory the Serbs (and Croats) view as inside their own legitimate boundaries. The ties may be toward place, or ethnic group, or both.

The core-periphery is a useful image. It implies a radial differentiation of space which echoes the structure of political boundaries. Political boundaries have only two territories, the "inside" and the "outside." However, this may be misleading in some instances. There are other ways to divide space, such as cardinal directions: north, south, east and west. Are there other images or myths which exist on the psychological level of the national elites of Russia?

A house is a structure whose physical boundaries are segmented. It has a "front" and a "rear." The front is the carefully contrived facade that is presented to the world. It is designed for the reception and entertaining of guests. The central hearth area is the location of the kitchen and family activities. The "rear" is space occupied by servants, tradesmen, etc. The front is sacred space, while the rear is the realm of the profane, the garbage heap, the outhouse (Tuan, 1982, pp. 52-85).

A similar orientation can also apply to a city or even a nation.

The course of the Nile exerted a powerful influence on the Egyptian's sense of direction. The word "to go north" meant also "to go downstream," and the word "to go south" meant "to go upstream" or against the current. When the Egyptian visited the Euphrates he would have had to describe its course in some circumlocution as "that circling water which goes downstream in going upstream." At the time the Egyptian language was forming, the direction south dominated the Nile dweller's world. He faced south, the source of rising flood waters and of life. The word for south was also that for face, and the usual word for north was related to one which meant "back of the head." Facing southward, east came to be identified with left, and west with right. (Frankfort, et al., 1951, pp. 45-46)

The model can now be revisited. What has been added is that there is a strong topophilic aspect to behavior that this is not based on rationality, but on deeply held values which form a particular world view, and are expressed through culture. The previous discussion was of the economic costs of defense. It tried to show what a nation will be able to *afford* to defend. When considering ethnicity or ties to a homeland, the equation must be one of what a nation such as Russia will *want* to defend. This is not normally a matter of economics, but rather of human values.

The obvious example of what Moscow will want to defend is ethnic Russians. In order to bring the discussion to two dimensional geographic space, let us define the "core" of ethnicity as the area where the population of ethnic Russians is highest. The desire to defend the population would be highest there, at least when considering only the factor of ethnicity. The interest in defending a territory in which the percentage of ethnic Russians is low would similarly be low. Portrayed

graphically, what might be termed the "propensity to defend" appears as a negatively sloped line. The value placed on a given plot of land will be highest at the core, and declines with increasing distance. Note that "distance" should not be considered a strict linear distance, but rather to zones with decreasing density of ethnic Russians. This curve is graphically depicted in Figure 7, with "d" as the propensity to defend.




Figure 7 Propensity to Defend

What other factors might be elements of the propensity to defend? Language plays an important factor. While overlapping heavily with ethnicity, it should be

considered a separate phenomenon due to the large number of Russified minorities who have tended to drop their native culture in favor of Russian.

There is also a strong historic factor on human territoriality. The ties are stronger to territory which has a long history of ties with Moscow, while the desire will be weaker to defend territory over which the ties are not as long, or as strong.

The relative ease with which Moscow was willing to allow the Baltic republics to withdraw from the Soviet Union and achieve their own independence is an example of Moscow acknowledging that the legitimacy of their incorporation in the Soviet Union was weaker than other republics.

Another element of the propensity to defend is of a very practical nature. It is the desire to defend militarily significant regions. Here one should not only consider the abstract regions, such as Mackinder's Heartland, but also smaller, more specific territories, such as the Kola Peninsula. Loss of the Kola would be devastating to Russia because of the loss of access to the open Atlantic, as well as a loss of a large number of military bases. Should Karelia secede from the Russian Federation, the land links to the Kola Peninsula would be lost. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Moscow lost many valuable military bases. The ones remaining, especially those of front-line forces, are therefore of increased importance.

Economic interests, broadly defined, is an element in the propensity to defend. Interest is high in valuable territory and low in wastelands. Oil was one factor in the decision to launch Operation Desert Shield.

A factor related to economic interest and military value is the desire to keep the defensive zone contiguous. Today the Russian Federation includes the exclave of the Kaliningrad *Oblast* on the Baltic Sea. This region has no direct land connections with other areas of Russia. The ability to defend this isolated area, and its economic viability are thereby threatened.

Another element is political status. There is a strong tendency to defend political boundaries once they are defined. Clashes between India and Pakistan over glaciers, and the recent firmness of Russian (and Japanese) policy toward the southern Kuril Islands are two examples.

The concept of legal principle must be accounted for. By this I mean designating space according to juridical claims. Two nations may disagree over the legal claims to territory. They may also disagree over the principles themselves which should apply in a specific case. Argentina saw its right to the Malvinas as derived from historic land claims, while the United Kingdom saw the appropriate principle to be the right of the residents of the Falklands for self-determination. The result of the inability to agree on which principle to apply was the Falklands War.

It should be acknowledged that the elements of the propensity to defend may not always follow a smooth curve from the core to the periphery. Political status, for example, changes quite sharply with respect to two-dimensional space because political boundaries are sharply defined. For simplicity's sake, however, it can be

assumed that when the factors are aggregated, the curve tends to smooth out, see "d" in Figure 7.

If we superimpose the propensity to defend curve, d, on the defense cost curve, s, we get equilibrium values for distance and cost (q and p, respectively), see Figure 8.




Figure 8 Defense Equilibrium

At a distance from the core beyond q, the desire to defend is overcome by prohibitive costs, and therefore this territory will not be defended. At a distance to the left of q, the value placed on the territory is high, and the costs to defend it are low, and therefore the decision will be made to defend it.

This is a good point to add other elements to the defense cost curve. "Costs," like "values" may be interpreted broadly. These may be political costs, rather than pure economic costs. Therefore, a military adventure away from the homeland becomes more politically costly in the international community. The domestic political cost may also be high. While George Bush received the political benefits of a military victory in Desert Storm, he became vulnerable to the charge of not attending to domestic problems, and subsequently lost the election.

Let us see how these curves could have functioned for Russia in the recent past, to account for the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the contraction of the defensive borders, which precipitated the current dilemma of having no prepared theater of military operations for Russia. There are two possible explanations for this collapse. The first is that the defense build-up during the Reagan administration forced the Soviet Union to increase defense spending. The second theory is that the policy of the Communist Party changed under Gorbachev. The Soviet Union implicitly rejected the Brezhnev Doctrine of keeping satellite nations in the bloc, by force, if necessary.

If the first explanation is correct, this implies a change in the cost of defense curve from s to s' . See Figure 9. That is, the costs of defending a given geographic area rose. It should be noted here that costs may not be simple ruble values, but percentages of Gross Domestic Product that must be allocated for military spending. If the second explanation is correct, this implies a shift of the propensity to defend curve from d to d' . See Figure 9. That is, an ideological shift




Figure 9 Changes in Cost of Defense and Propensity to Defend

caused the desire to defend a given territory to be reduced.

Could similar shifts occur in the future? The answer is obviously, yes. For example, if Yeltsin is politically defeated by factions which have the stated political goals of defending ethnic Russians (or other Slavs) more aggressively, this will indicate a shift of the propensity to defend curve, d , to the right.

The model of what Moscow will defend is still incomplete. The model has not progressed beyond the basic von Thünen paradigm. Von Thünen described a single market in isolation. To this point defense has been treated as if also existed in isolation. However, military force is always used *against* something else. We

must add additional actors to the model, and for this it will be necessary to turn to the work of another geographer.

F. CHRISTALLER

Von Thünen's work was with an isolated state. Only island states exist in some form of isolation. To account for the existence of other actors, it will be helpful to turn briefly to a related model known as central-place theory. Its most important theorist was Walther Christaller, who wrote *The Central Places of Southern Germany* in 1933 (Christaller, 1966). He examined spatial differentiation when markets were in proximity to each other. In the region between the two market centers, goods may be shipped to either market, or "central place," and the residents of the hinterland can receive finished goods such as processed food, clothing, education, medical care, etc., from either central place. However, the most economic means is to supply raw materials and food to, and receive finished products from, the closest center which handles that good. Christaller theorized that the circular pattern would be replaced by a hexagonal pattern of evenly distributed economic zones. This would most efficiently exhaust all the geographic territory. These economic zones are known as the "tributary areas" of the central places located at their centers. See Figure 10.

Christaller went beyond a simple pattern of equally sized and spaced hexagons. The tributary area for each particular good will be of a different size. For example, if one considers the distance people are willing to travel to see a




Figure 10 Tributary Areas of Central Places
Source: de Blij, 1971, p. 82.

doctor when they have a cold, it will be quite small, generally within the local area, but general practitioners are common, and can generally be found even in small towns. So the "tributary area" for general practitioners is small. Their services are therefore called "low-order" goods. In contrast, the services of a brain surgeon are rare and people will travel a great distance for them. The large tributary area for a brain surgeon shows that it is a "high-order" good. So for each good or service, the tributary area is of a differing size. "Low-order" goods have a short range, while "higher-order" goods have a longer range. When these goods are

aggregated, this leads to a system of central places of different sizes. Small central places offer only low-order goods, such as the services of a general practitioner, groceries, gasoline, etc. and have small tributary areas. Medium central places offer all the "low-order" goods of small central places as well as "medium-order" goods such as wholesalers, specialized stores, etc. Large central places offer all of the goods of small and medium central places, and also have "high-order" goods such as brain surgeons, large manufacturing plants, symphony orchestras, etc. When these central places are overlain upon each other, this leads to a hierarchical pattern of hexagons within other hexagons; see Figure 11.

What might happen to the defense model by applying Christaller? First, each one of the elements in the propensity to defend (ethnicity, language, historic ties, political ties, etc.) should be treated as if it had a different "tributary area." Then it is necessary to determine whether this element operates as a high-order or a low-order good. This assignment should be done with caution, as it is easy to make mistakes in assigning these labels. Specifically, what determines whether an element is high-order or low-order is not strength of feeling, but the size of the tributary area. For example, for an Armenian, ethnicity is a low-order good because the geographic size of the Armenian homeland is a relatively compact area even though his ties to Armenians are strong. For a Russian, ethnicity is higher-order, because the area which is inhabited by ethnic Russians is large.

The factor of ethnicity is interesting because it may be treated two ways. In the first, Great Russians would constitute the lower-order good for Moscow, and




Figure 11 Christaller's Hierarchy of Central Places
Source: de Blij, 1971, p. 83.

related Slavs would be progressively higher-order. Therefore, Byelorussians and Ukrainians would be middle-order, and Poles and South Slavs would be high-order. In the second scheme, territory which contains a majority of ethnic Russians would be a good of a low order. The protection of ethnic rights in regions where Russians are a minority would be a good of a higher order. Both schemes should be considered.

Some factors seem to exist only at the higher-order. Among these would be collective defense, especially a collective nuclear defense. It is only by subordinating themselves to Moscow that small, non-nuclear republics can achieve this high-order good. This would help explain the formation of the CIS. At the time of the collapse of the Soviet Union, each successor republic (including Russia) was striving for increased independence from the others. In spite of this strong centrifugal force, the limits of this policy were reached when the issue was nuclear weapons. At least a nominal structure was necessary to ensure collective responsibility and collective security. Political arrangements had to be made in order to ensure that the demands for the high-order good of collective nuclear security were met.

What occurs when the boundaries of higher-order factors such as collective security change? The medium sized central places (B in Figure 11) have the opportunity to *exchange higher-order goods with either large central place (G)*. Said another way, they can choose to subordinate themselves to the market area of either large central place. In the realm of national security, the subordination

of a small state to a larger state or defense alliance is a political decision. Such associations can change with time. The changing of defense blocs increases the tributary area for one large nation (or central place) at the expense of the other.

The geographic concept of a "shatterbelt" is useful here. A shatterbelt is

a region whose internal geographical, cultural, religious, and political fragmentation is compounded by pressures from external major powers attracted by the region's strategic location and economic resources. (Cohen, 1982, p. 226)

A shatterbelt is formed in the territory along the boundary of two larger nations or empires. As the political, economic, and military fortunes of either large nation wax or wane, the territory along the periphery is exchanged. The result over time is a line of small, distinctive nations, which are never totally absorbed into either large nation. The classic example of a shatterbelt zone is East Central Europe.

Shatterbelts tend to become the source of conflicts due to the overlapping nature of loyalties and aspirations, of low- and high-order elements of the propensity to defend. Seventy-nine percent of major power wars have been fought in shatterbelt regions (Kelly, 1986). The key to understanding the potential for war along the periphery of Russia is a recognition of the geographic overlap of these conflicting claims over territory. This can only be accomplished by a thorough understanding of the cultural, historical, economic, and military geography of a region.

IV. APPLICATION OF THE MODEL

A. INTRODUCTION

Theoretical models have the power to help explain complex processes. A geographic model should always be able to be applied to the physical world. Matters of defense and war fighting are necessarily practical, and large numbers of lives are at stake with the application of theory. In this chapter, the model of defense will be applied to specific regions bordering on Russia. This will begin with a discussion of Russian military doctrine. It is important to understand Russian attitudes toward defense. Do they currently favor an offensive or defensive posture? From whence do they see the threat? What does the military hierarchy see as the role of the armed forces?

The chapter will continue with short analyses of two regions: the Caucasus and Central Asia. Two elements of the propensity to defend, ethnicity, and collective security, will likewise be discussed. One element will be discussed in each geographic area. The assignment of an element to a geographic area is somewhat arbitrary, but the discussion of a particular element should illustrate the model in action.

B. MILITARY DOCTRINE

Military doctrine is a viewpoint under which military history is understood. (Svechin, quoted in Proektor, 1993, p. 41)

General military doctrine is understood to mean a set of officially accepted views expressing the attitude toward war and the determining nature of the state's military tasks, and methods of achieving them and the main direction of military force generation. ("General Provisions," p. 1)

The content of Moscow's military doctrine has undergone rapid changes in the past several years. In May 1987, a military doctrine was announced which declared a "defensive sufficiency" for the Soviet Union. The doctrine assumed the continuation of the Warsaw Pact. However, not only has the Warsaw Pact been dissolved, but the Soviet Union has collapsed. This was the first cause which forced a major re-evaluation of Russian military doctrine.

The second force dictating a change in Russian military doctrine was the Gulf War. In that war, "the Soviet Armed Forces have seen the future--and it works" (FitzGerald, 1991, p. 1). The Gulf War demonstrated the effectiveness of modern weaponry when combined with effective command, control, communications, and intelligence.

Russian military doctrine is generally divided into two realms which exert a strong influence upon each other: the political and the military-technical. The bases of both realms of Russian doctrine have been changed. The political realm changed with the collapse of communism in Central and Eastern Europe. The

dissolution of the Warsaw Pact radically altered the mutual defense obligations of the Soviet Union. The subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union similarly changed the defensive boundaries of Russia. With respect to the model of defense, this was equivalent to a shift to the left of the propensity to defend curve, or d.

The military-technical realm of doctrine corresponds to issues affecting the cost of defense curve. New innovations, such as reconnaissance-strike complexes, change the costs of defeating an enemy army. When one nation or coalition is armed with advanced conventional munitions, and the other is not, as in the Gulf War, the side equipped with these weapons can prevail with a smaller fighting force, and simultaneously minimize its own casualties, thereby also reducing its domestic political costs.

The dilemma of Russian military doctrine is that it faces major challenges from both halves, and must attempt to make appropriate adjustments more or less simultaneously. It should be no surprise, then, that there is no unanimity to the provisions of the draft doctrine. On the contrary, a vigorous debate has raged in the Russian press about the content of military doctrine, especially since the publication of a draft military doctrine in a special issue of *Voyennaya Mysl* in May 1992.

The changes in the political realm will be dealt with in this chapter, and Chapter V.

C. DRAFT MILITARY DOCTRINE OF 1992

The draft military doctrine of May 1992 will be the basis of analysis of the defense model. It was published as a transition document, and a new version will not be released until approved by the Defense Ministry Collegium, Russian Security Council, and the Russian Parliament (Lepingwell, 1993). The 1992 draft contains several sections which are applicable to the model of defense.

1. No Enemies

The draft doctrine states, "Russian does not consider a single state or coalition of states to be its enemy ("Fundamentals," p. 4)." Aside from the international good will engendered by such a statement, it obviates the need to define a strategic axis for defense. If Russia has no enemies, it no longer requires the preparation of a theater, at least for large-scale operations. The military-geographic problem of having no prepared theater, in which Russia currently finds itself, is thereby defined away. That is not to say that the issue is totally ignored.

Strategic groupings of the Russian Armed Forces are established and stationed with consideration for ensuring the capability of repelling aggression on a *local scale* on any axis ("defense of all azimuths"). (emphasis added) ("Fundamentals," p. 4)

Valentin Larionov, the retired General-Major and military academic, who co-wrote the preface to the English edition to Svechin's *Strategy* has commented on this notion of having no defined axes.

Can we be indifferent to the crescent of instability that has taken shape to the south and southwest, in near and distant countries?...I cannot agree with the formula of "defense in all directions." "In all directions" means nowhere in particular. (Larionov, 1992, p. 86)

Russia today is unprepared for large-scale war, but local wars which require a lower level of commitment can be foreseen on any axis.

2. Cooperation of Commonwealth Member-States

(The doctrine) assumes cooperation with member-states of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in accomplishing joint defense tasks based on bi-lateral and multi-lateral intergovernmental treaties and agreements. (emphasis in original) ("Fundamentals," p. 1)

This concept will be critical to the "near abroad" states of the former Soviet Union. Russia assumes a high degree of integration with the armed forces of these republics. Should the republics resist integration, the doctrine becomes invalid. Not only are forces seen to be integrated, but national interests are assumed to be equivalent between Russia and the "near abroad." The draft doctrine repeatedly equates the concepts of "national" security or "national" interests with "general national" (*obshchenatsionalnyy*) security or interests. What is meant by the term "general national?"

This term relates to the totality of Commonwealth states regardless of the ethnic makeup of their population. ("Content of Selected Terms," pp. 6-7)

This is a clear assertion that the national interests of Russia and the "near abroad" Commonwealth are identical.

In fact, Russia is not necessarily staking its entire policy on the Commonwealth. Russia is demonstrating a preference for accomplishing military cooperation and mutual defense through a series of bi-lateral agreements, rather than rely on the structure of the Commonwealth (Lepingwell, 1993).

3. Many Contradictions

The doctrine identifies what some of the sources of conflict might be:

Political, economic, territorial, religious, ethnic and other contradictions...may lead to armed conflicts and wars (including civil wars). ("Fundamentals," p.1)

These contradictions are not explained further, with one exception, ethnic Russians in the "near abroad."

A violation of the rights of Russian citizens and of persons who identify themselves with Russia ethnically and culturally in former USSR republics can be a serious source of conflicts. ("Fundamentals," p. 2)

It implies an extension of Russian "common defense space" over those nations with Russian ethnic and cultural minorities and the implication of a right to intervene on behalf of those minorities. For the model of defense, this would be an area over which the high-order good of Russian ethnicity and the low-order good of ethnicity of the national republic overlap. Should a republic of the "near abroad" seek foreign help to resist Russia, there could be direct consequences.

Russia will view the introduction of foreign troops on the territory of contiguous states as well as a buildup of army and navy groupings at its borders as a *direct military threat*. In this case it reserves to itself to take

steps necessary to guarantee its own security." (emphasis in original)
("Fundamentals," p. 2)

Note that in the Russian view, the presence of its troops in Lithuania would not constitute a threat for example, to Poland, but the converse does not apply. In the Russian view, the presence of foreign troops in Lithuania would constitute a direct military threat to Russia. Russia therefore sees itself playing a special role in the shatterbelt republics of the "near abroad." The high-order good of collective defense can only be satisfied by subordination to Moscow, not some other state.

4. Structure of Russian Armed Forces

The draft doctrine foresees three types of armed forces for Russia:

1. Permanent readiness forces in theaters of military operations (or on axes)
2. Mobile, rapid reaction forces, capable of deploying to a theater of military operations for the repelling of medium-scale aggression
3. Strategic reserves formed during a threat period or war to conduct large-scale operations. ("Fundamentals," p. 5)

The permanent readiness forces would essentially be static, garrison units in the periphery. It has been proposed to use Cossack units in this, their traditional role of border defense (Shlyk, 1993). In times of crisis, the mobile forces would then deploy to assist the permanent forces.

Military doctrine, as Svechin said, must be subordinate to politics. In order to coincide with political goals and economic realities, some compromise of doctrine may be necessary.

There appears to be a unanimously held view on the part of Russian's military leadership that the course of partnership with the western world is not congruent with Russia's interests and that Russian's security requirements would be better served by a more assertive policy toward the "near abroad", leading perhaps to the re-forging of some sort of Russian-led alliance of former Soviet republics. However, the on-going withdrawal of the Northwestern Groups of Forces from the Baltic States suggest that some senior generals accept the need for the temporary surrender of military influence in the "near abroad" as the price for rebuilding Russia's military machine. (Lough, 1993, p. 27)

D. ETHNICITY AND THE REPUBLICS OF THE CAUCASUS

The mountain region of the Caucasus republics illustrates several important factors relating to defense and ethnicity. The physical setting of a mountain region, with its isolated valleys and limited lines of communication, tends to encourage the development of small cultural, linguistic, and ethnic minorities who may have little in common with neighboring peoples in adjacent valleys, or in the lowlands.

In mountain areas around the world, the inhabitants tend to be culturally distinct, independent, insular, and clannish. Examples of such groups are the Berbers in North Africa, the Swiss, Nepalese, Druze and other groups in Lebanon, Serbs, Croats, and Muslims in the former Yugoslavia. The factors of ethnicity and language which tend to be lower-order goods in most areas, are even more so in mountain areas.

This takes place for various reasons. The first is cultural isolation. The relative difficulty of travel in mountain areas ensures that the inhabitants have minimal contact with outsiders. The diffusion of technological innovations and

cultural influences is thereby slowed. The second reason is that inhabitants of lowlands tend to ignore the isolated pockets of minorities who inhabit the mountain areas. As long as the mountain people remain in their homeland, they are not a political or military threat. Another reason is that mountainous areas are more easily defended. The inhabitants can sustain themselves, and their culture, within their homeland. Some of the most ancient cultures survive in mountain valleys. Mountain people make use of natural defenses and can withstand invasions which tend to sweep away peoples who inhabit the plains.

The Caucasus region contains a large number of relatively small native ethnic groups. These include Azeris, Armenians, Georgians, Abkhaz, Lezgins, Chechens, Ingush, Kurds, Ossetians and others. The groups have varying levels of national consciousness and cultural development. The multitude of ethnic groups is complicated by the fact that they do not necessarily live in compact, contiguous national homelands. One group may be spatially interspersed within other groups. This affects the political stability of the regions since it is not possible to create political entities which reflect the composition of all the people living in a region. According to the model of defense, the element of ethnicity may not be satisfied locally at all, but only through extension to the ethnic homeland, which may be located two valleys over.

During the Soviet period, the "nationalities question" was considered to have been solved, and all people theoretically had the same cultural rights. Large linguistic minorities were accorded status as constituent republics of the Soviet

Union. These republics were granted a certain status which included some rights of cultural development and expression which varied with the changing policies of Moscow. Smaller minority groups, either within Russia or in one of the other fourteen constituent republics, were analogously accorded minority rights and accorded political status through the establishment of Autonomous Republics, *Oblasts*, or *Krays*. The boundaries (and even the existence) of these regions changed over time with Moscow's policy.

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, all constituent republics of the former Soviet Union were accorded international recognition as independent states. The same principle did not hold for the second-order Autonomous Republics or *Oblasts*. They may be as culturally distinct, as nationally conscious, and with a culture that is as highly developed as a constituent republic, but today they have no independence.

The problem is illustrated by the conflict in South Ossetia. South Ossetia is a region located in the Republic of Georgia. The goal of the South Ossetians is to unite with North Ossetia, which is across the frontier as part of the Russian Federation. If the Ossetian goal is realized, it would entail a change in political boundaries, that is, a transfer of territory from Georgia to Russia.

Political boundaries exist primarily as *ideas*. The boundary may coincide with a river or mountain ridge for simplicity of identification, but there need be no physical manifestation of a boundary. A political boundary is a thing of delicacy. The strength of a political boundary is similar to an egg shell. As long as the

integrity of the boundary is maintained, the shell is surprisingly strong. It is mutually reinforcing, and can withstand large external pressures. However, if the shell is broken at any point, it loses its integral strength, and the contents are lost.

In Ossetia, both Russia and Georgia want to maintain their own political integrity. They are incidentally bound by the UN charter, the Council for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), and (on the Russian side) the CIS charter, all of which oblige the members to maintain territorial integrity. Ossetia, divided between the two, finds its aspirations in conflict with the higher-order requirements to maintain political integrity. This is of vital interest to Russia, which is itself a federation that faces strong centrifugal forces. A change in the external boundaries of the Federation, like the cracking of an egg, will immediately call into question the existence of the Russian state itself.

Nagorno-Karabakh provides another example of a nation divided. One portion of the Armenian people live in Armenia proper, and achieved full independence with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. The irredenta, living in Nagorno-Karabakh, did not. This was due to the fact that Nagorno-Karabakh was only afforded the status of an Autonomous *Oblast* within the constituent republic of Azerbaijan during the Soviet period. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, it remained within the boundaries of a newly independent Azerbaijan. This exclave of ethnic Armenians declared its independence in January 1992 as the self-styled "Nagorno-Karabakh Republic," which does not have international recognition (Fuller, 1993). Moscow's involvement in Nagorno-Karabakh has been

much less than in South Ossetia. This is due, at least in part, to the fact that the political integrity of Russia's borders are not at stake. When Armenia tried to invoke the CIS Mutual Defense Agreement, Moscow rejected it out of hand (Fuller, 1993, pp. 20-22).

The Lezgin people face a similar situation to the Ossetians. The Lezgins inhabit a territory in northeastern Azerbaijan, and in southern Dagestan, which is part of the Russian Federation. Estimates of the size of this ethnic group range from over 450,000 (Sheehy, 1990) to as many as one million (*Rossiiskaya Gazeta*, 1992). Since 1991 they have made demands for an independent state carved from Dagestan and Azerbaijan. The growing unrest of the Lezgins was expressed by protests in both Dagestan and Azerbaijan in June 1992. The proximate cause of this unrest was Yeltsin's announcement that new frontier regulations would be instituted between Russia and Azerbaijan. These restrictions, including visa requirements, would have divided the population and hindered contacts. To defuse this potentially violent situation, Russia subsequently announced that an effort would be made to deter smuggling, but that there would be no frontier controls (Fuller, 1992). The two halves of the Lezgin people have been pacified by Russian and Azerbaijan, at least temporarily, by granting modest concessions. These concessions fulfill the low-order aspirations of cultural contacts between Lezgin while simultaneously maintaining the high-order political boundaries. This technique holds potential for future application elsewhere along Russia's periphery.

E. COLLECTIVE SECURITY AND CENTRAL ASIA

In the preceding section ethnicity as an element of the propensity to defend was examined. In this section one element which is often in conflict with ethnicity, that of collective security, will be examined. The desire for collective security is a complex one. It is not visceral like ethnonationalism, its motivations are more intellectual. Typically, nations band together due to a perceived weakness. This may be caused by a poor economy, weak armed forces, competing border claims, and the proximity of strong neighbors. All of these elements are found in Central Asia today.

The Central Asian republics have the lowest per-capita income in the former Soviet Union. The strategic situation of the five republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Tadjikistan is complicated by the fact that they have a relatively large territory, but a low population density. The border between China and Tadjikistan is in dispute. There are other border anomalies: within Kyrgyzstan there are two enclaves belonging to Uzbekistan (Iskandari and Soch), and one belonging to Tadjikistan (Voruch). Besides China, the region also borders Iran and Afghanistan, in which a civil war is still continuing.

The five republics have the potential for cooperation on many levels: they have linguistic similarities and are at least nominally Islamic.

The idea of a Central Asian Commonwealth is not new. The concept of a "Turkestan" encompassing the entire region predated Russian domination by many centuries (Critchlow, 1992). It existed in concrete form as a political entity during

the last half of the nineteenth century, and through the Soviet period until 1925 when the division into individual constituent republics began (Marnie and Whitlock, 1993, p. 39).

There are, however, strong factors acting against a tight integration. First, the republics desire their own political independence after the long domination of Moscow. Second, due to the legacy of central planning during the Soviet period, the economies tend to be integrated with *Russia*, rather than with each other (Marnie and Whitlock). Lastly, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tadjikistan are all members of the CIS. Therefore, they acquire their high-level good of common defense through its structure. The fifth republic, Turkmenistan has a bi-lateral defense agreement with Russia (Zhurvenko, 1993). However, the main threat to the region has proved to be internal, rather than external.

1. Tadjik Civil War

A civil war began in Tadjikistan in May 1992. It continued through the summer and autumn until the opposition was apparently crushed near year's end. However, the seeds for future conflict still exist. Tadjik government officials have estimated that between 20,000 and 70,000 lives have been lost, and hundreds of thousands have fled as refugees (Brown, 1993a, p. 9).

The proximate cause of the civil war was the growing influence of political parties opposed to the neo-communist government led by President Rakhmon Nabiev. These parties included the Tadjik nationalist movement, *Rastokhez*, the Western-oriented Democratic Party of Tadjikistan, and Islamic

fundamentalists. There was a strong geographic element to the opposition. It was centered in Garm and in Kurgan-Tyube to which many people migrated from Garm (Brown, 1993a, p. 10). The nationalist agenda of the opposition provoked a violent response from the communists, and fighting raged throughout the summer (Brown, 1993b, p. 10). By September, the President was forced to resign, and the opposition groups took effective control of power in Dushanbe. This power was short-lived, however, as Islamic forces could not resist the pro-communists, and the opposition-led government was forced to resign on 10 November 1992 (Brown, 1993a, pp. 10-11). The return of communist forces were marked by brutal repression against the opposition. (Brown, 1993b).

2. Threat of Contagion

What turned the tide for the pro-communist forces? It was largely the result of active intervention by Russia (which it has denied) and Uzbekistan. This took the form of humanitarian aid and the direct combat support of the Uzbek Air Force and ground troops (Panico, 1993, pp. 40-41).

What was the motivation for such intervention? The president of Uzbekistan, Islam Karimov, has claimed that Uzbek involvement was motivated by the threat of Islamic fundamentalism being exported across the Afghan-Tadjik border. In reality, it was as much in response to his own domestic political situation.

Karimov faces a domestic situation similar to Tadjikistan. The democratic opposition movement, known as *Birlik* (Unity) has been joined by a

small Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP) which has been officially outlawed since a 1991 law banning political parties with a religious platform (Cavanaugh, 1992).

Karimov has sought to maintain his own authoritarian control of Uzbekistan. His assumption of power in 1989 coincided with the riots in the Fergana Valley of Uzbekistan. Since then he has feared that an outbreak of violence would be caused by any liberalization or loss of government control. Karimov appealed to the CIS and even the UN for help during the civil war to stop the contagion of Islamic fundamentalism (Brown, 1993c).

What the Uzbek president understood intuitively is borne out by empirical research. This shows that wars tend to spread from one state to another, especially when they have similar circumstances (Starr and Most, 1983, 1985, Houweling and Siccama, 1985).

For the model of defense, this contagion should be expected when neighboring states have a similar pattern of unresolved low-order ethnic demands, overlapping claims to political boundaries, assertions of collective defense, etc. The element of collective security in the Tadjik civil war shows the peculiar way it can be expressed. In order to effect collective defense, it must be invoked along the periphery. Karimov was attempting to preclude domestic problems by joining battle when the threat was still beyond his borders.

The technique of preemptively intervening in the civil war should be expected to be applied elsewhere in the future at various points around the periphery of Russia. If the Russian leadership thinks that certain elements of its

national interest are threatened, and the costs of delaying military action will ultimately increase the cost of defense, they may decide to launch a preemptive operation.

V. RUSSIA AND UKRAINE: THE MAKING OF A "PET"

A. INTRODUCTION

Was it right for a lady of eighteenth-century England to keep a black boy as a pet? She thought so, for did she not dress the boy in finery and allow him special privileges? Of course, some of us are now inclined to disagree, arguing that the boy's dignity was compromised by his pet status and even by his mistress' acts of favor and indulgence. Affection mitigates domination, making it softer and more acceptable, but affection itself is possible only in relationships of inequality. It is the warm and superior feeling one has toward things that one can care for and patronize. The word *care* so exudes humaneness that we tend to forget its almost inevitable tainting by patronage and condescension in our imperfect world. (Tuan, 1984, p. 5)

In this paper I will be further discussing the model of defense developed earlier. In particular, I will be examining one element of the propensity to defend, that of historical ties. This element will be applied to the relationship between Russia and Ukraine.

The element of historical ties is necessarily an extremely complex one. Just as geography is the study of human and physical processes as expressed in two- (or three-) dimensional space, history includes all those processes through the fourth dimension, time. This adds a richness to the element of the propensity to defend which is not present in, for example, the element of economic relationships. Historical ties necessarily touch on each of the other elements. Such ties leave not only physical artifacts such as settlement patterns, transportation networks,

industrial and military centers, but also psychological artifacts such as the national myths of a people and what they say about this people's place in the world, with respect to surrounding peoples. Although it is exceedingly complex, it is within such a nexus of competing aims, aspirations, and myths, and their expression in two-dimensional space that Russia, Ukraine, or any nation must resolve the question of over what territory it will extend a claim, and how it will defend this claim.

The full scope of Ukrainian-Russian relations is beyond the reach of this chapter, and the abilities of the author. The author is neither Ukrainian nor Russian, and therefore does not have the benefit of learning, from childhood, the myths that express the national consciousness of these peoples. However there is hope in this richness of symbols for an outside observer. National myths exist in the plural: the symbols overlay one another like the leaves of a book. It may just be possible to examine one or two leaves, however crudely.

The Ukrainian-Russian relationship is also important to all of the other republics of the former Soviet Union. Besides Russia, Ukraine has the largest population, large agricultural and industrial resources, the strongest military force, including nuclear weapons, and therefore, the attention of the world community. If Ukraine is unable to maintain a separate existence from Moscow, it is doubtful that any of the other republics (with the possible exception of the Baltics) will be able to do so either.

To understand the Ukrainian-Russian relationship, it is necessary to delve into the historic roots of both the Russian and Ukrainian nations.

Without an adequate understanding of these premodern ethnic identities, we debar ourselves from coming to terms with the often deepseated conflicts between ethnic communities that continue to erupt.... Such conflicts and problems emerge primarily from rival, and sometimes incompatible, myths, symbols, and memories that define the traditions and value-systems of different ethnic communities when these are brought, usually by external agencies, into close proximity and often unequal relations.... Unequal relationships without the sense of ethnic difference founded on rival *mythomoteurs* and memories may encourage other forms of conflict, but not *ethnic* antagonisms. (Smith, 1992, p. 48)

The foundation of the ideas of both the Russian and Ukrainian nations lie with the history of Kievan Rus'. A short discussion of this history must therefore be the basis of any examination of Russian-Ukrainian relations.

The dynastic origins of Kievan Rus' are not found in Eastern Europe. During the 9th century Varangian, or Viking, tribes from Scandinavia penetrated Eastern Europe via the Gulf of Finland. Following their establishment in Novgorod, the Varangians extended their influence over the local Slavic peoples southward, following the Dnieper river. In 882, Oleh, the first historically verifiable ruler of Rus', conquered Kiev and established his authority over a wide area. At one point, this even included an attack on Constantinople. From that period until its zenith in the late 10th and early 11th centuries, Kievan Rus' covered the upper reaches of the Dnieper and Volga Rivers to Lake Ladoga, including the locations of modern Kiev, Moscow, and St. Petersburg (Subtelny, 1988, pp. 24-33).

An argument has raged among historians as to the extent of the Varangian's influence upon the native Slavic tribes. The earliest East Slavic chronicle, the "Chronicle of Bygone Years," underscores the role of the Varangians, even to the point of stating that the Slavs purposefully invited the Norsemen in as rulers, as they found themselves incapable of ordering their own affairs. This idea was taken up in the eighteenth century by German historians who founded the so-called "Normanist" school. According to this school, and the "Chronicle of Bygone Years," the name "Rus" was the name of that particular tribe of Varangians who became the rulers of Kievan Rus' (Subtelny, pp. 22-23). While this school was popular among Germans, it understandably has been less so among Slavs.

The Normanist explanation provoked its antithesis which emphasized the native Slavic elements of the culture and political organization. The anti-Normanist school included both Hrushevsky, and Russian historians. Some members of this school have sought to demonstrate that the word "Rus" originally came from the Rus and Rusna rivers in Ukraine, or alternatively, it was the name of another, non-Varangian, tribe (Subtelny, pp. 22-23).

The importance of Kievan Rus', and its origins is that it provides the basis for the historical myths of both Russia and Ukraine. Kievan Rus' was a large, politically powerful entity that could challenge the other great powers of the period. It established a tie between an ethnic group, the East Slavs, the land that they occupied, and a state which existed to govern them. These are the roots of modern ethnonationalism. Reinforcing these factors is the fact that it was during

the period of Kievan Rus', and through the conversion of Volodymyr (Vladimir) in 988 that Orthodoxy entered into Russian lands. Thus, the history of Kievan Rus' contains not only the political, but also the religious roots of the Russian state.

The other important aspect of the Kievan controversy is, "which people has the claim to the *inheritance of Rus'?*" Who can claim to be the direct political descendent of this polity? The political organization of Rus' degenerated over time, and each local prince maintained his own dynasty. This strengthened the regional principalities at the expense of Kiev. The larger fragments following the breakup of Kievan Rus' were sustained in Kiev, Galicia, Novgorod, and Vladimir (Pelenski, pp. 29-52). Within the Vladimir principality, the town of Moscow was established and eventually eclipsed Vladimir to become the center of the modern Russian state. It is through this line and the historic political continuity of this principality that Moscow claims to be the successor of Kievan Rus'. The Ukrainian claim is based not only on ethnicity and culture, but the physical location of Kiev as the center of Rus'.

The importance of Kievan Rus' for the Model of Defense is the role it plays in the national myths of Russia and Ukraine. By claiming the dynastic, and therefore political, inheritance of Rus', a state may assert a claim of historical legitimacy over this same territory. To the annoyance of Ukraine, this assertion by Moscow seems not only to usurp the historical legacy which rightly belongs to Kiev, but it also implies a contemporary claim to the territory of Ukraine as "Russian" as opposed to "Ukrainian." Russian and Ukrainian claims to the element

of historical legitimacy over the heart of Ukrainian territory are therefore superimposed. This forms the basis for future clashes between Russia and Ukraine.

B. UKRAINE: THE BORDERLAND

The word "Ukraine" means "borderland." This immediately raises the question, "bordering on what?" According to Subtelny, the word originally appeared in Chronicles in 1187, referring to the lands which surrounded Kiev (Subtelny, p.23). In later centuries, this term referred to those lands lying on the periphery of what was considered the civilized world, that is, the buffer zone between the Christian and Islamic nations (Subtelny, p. 105). This area could be seen as the "borderland" from the perspective of Russia, Lithuania, Poland, Bulgaria, the Mongol Khanate, or the Ottoman Turks. It denotes the partition of Ukrainian territory that existed until the re-uniting of Ukraine in a single polity in this century. By adopting the term "Ukrainian," the sundered peoples within the Hapsburg and Russian empires lost a concept of their own cultural *centrality*, but gained a concept of cultural *distinctiveness*.

In the late 19th and early 20th century, nationally conscious West Ukrainians began to call themselves "Ukrainians," a national theme that had been adopted by the Ukrainian intelligentsia in the east. There are two basic reasons for abandoning the traditional designation *Rusyn* (Ruthenian): it was felt that *Rusyn* was too similar to *Ruskyi* (Russian) and, by adopting the name used by their compatriots in the Russian empire, the West Ukrainians wished to stress their unity with them. (Subtelny, 1988, p. 307)

Due to the incorporation of the territory into Russia, and then the Soviet Union, the modern Russian usage of the term must connote the "borderlands" from the perspective of Moscow. This is reinforced in the consciousness through everyday usage of the term.

There are three possible ways to psychologically segment the space of a "borderland." First, it can connote the foreign land beyond the border. Second, it can connote the border itself and the lands on either side of it. Thirdly, it can be the domestic territory one crosses when approaching the line demarking what is "ours" from what is "theirs." An example of the latter would be to refer to Texas, Arizona, New Mexico, and California as "the border states." It denotes proximity to something foreign, without diminishing the psychological sense of US sovereignty over those states. This is the situation that Ukraine finds itself in today: it is still seen from the perspective of Moscow as located "inside" Russia, and the truly *foreign* lands do not begin until one has passed beyond the "borderlands." It is seen this way not only by many Russians, but by many in the West. It is *not* seen this way by Ukrainian nationalists.

While it may be seen as being "inside" Russia, the idea of a borderland has other implications. It can never be seen, from Moscow's perspective, as part of the national heartland, Kievan Rus' notwithstanding. Rather, the idea of a borderland implies a cultural hinterland. In this respect, the attitude of Russia toward the Ukrainian language takes on new meaning. For Russia, the Ukrainian language was a peasant dialect. For Ukrainians to fully participate as members

of the empire, it would be necessary to cleave to the superior culture and accept Russian. This denial of Ukrainian language took blatant forms, such as the *Ems Ukaz* of 1876 which forbade the use of Ukrainian in schools, in public life, and therefore sought to cripple a distinctive Ukrainian culture and encourage Russian culture. No doubt the tsar and Russian authorities thought they were doing Ukrainians a favor. It is this humaneness, this *caring*, as Tuan defined it in the quote on the first page of this chapter, which masks the domination of, and condescension toward, another. This will be explored next.

C. UKRAINE AS "PET"

As mentioned previously, the self-identity of a people is exceedingly complex, with an overlay of sometimes conflicting images and symbols. The interrelationship between Ukrainians and Russians, and their respective concepts of each other is very rich. The author will posit the existence of one such image: that of Ukraine as a "pet."

The term "pet" should be thought of abstractly. Yi-Fu Tuan goes beyond the category of domesticated animals to include such things as gardens, fountains, topiary, eunuchs, children, women, dwarfs, and fools (Tuan, 1984). To them the author will add "nations." What this wide variety of categories has in common is an unequal relationship, a relationship in which they are dominated by a stronger individual or group. However, they are protected, nurtured, and showered with affection by the dominator. In order to examine how this framework might

apply to Russia and Ukraine, it will be necessary to more fully explore the nature of the master-pet relationship.

1. Dominance and Affection

Power is a quality almost universally respected. It can be the blatant power of a thundering waterfall, or the latent power (and potential danger) of a lion lounging on the savanna. It can be expressed through gigantic industrial works, or the command of a language in poetry. Sexual potency is something eagerly sought, jealously guarded, and if lost, something on which millions are spent to retrieve.

Such power often times has a wild nature, something which is potentially out of control. Like sex, it must be contained within some sort of structure of accepted norms. Like the explosions within an internal combustion engine, power is something that is most useful when it is contained and directed. A nuclear weapon represents the most destructive power ever created by man. But the ability of nuclear weapons to deter is due to the fear that once released, such power cannot be contained. "Knowledge is power," and as such, intelligence is yet another form of power. In the information age, knowledge can be a very potent form of power.

It is in the comparison of one person or thing to another that power changes to dominance. Two people may be powerful, but for one to be considered *dominant*, he must be *more* powerful than the other. To say that the Japanese auto makers are becoming dominant is to speak of market share, rather

than absolute numbers of cars sold. With respect to Russians and Ukrainians, the terms used are interesting. The historic term used by Russians for Ukraine is not *Ukraina* but *Malorossia* ("Little Russia") a term which in Russian connotes not only diminutive size, but also a sense of insufficiency. The striving to create diminutive forms is a common characteristic of the master-pet relationship, as it increases one's relative power to the pet. It can be seen in the selective breeding of Shetland ponies, miniature canine breeds, "dwarf" varieties of fruits, and the art of bonsai.

For Tuan, the second element in the making of a pet is affection. This element is not the antithesis of dominance, which would be submissiveness. Affection, as he refers to it, is the anodyne of dominance. It is this ability to soothe, or palliate, the raw expression of power that justifies the making of a pet in the mind of the master. Pets are things that share an intimacy with the master, that are cared for, or even doted upon. Dogs and cats may be allowed free access to the living space in many families, in a sense become a *member* of the household, crossing not just familial lines, but species boundaries. They are sheltered, fed, played with, and "petted." Without intimacy and affection, dominance becomes a master-slave relationship.

2. Ukraine as Garden

For Tuan, a garden is the classic example of a botanical pet. It is an expression of the vitality and strength of nature, but is tamed and directed by a

gardener. The power of nature thereby is overwhelmed by the power of a human being, and serves as an expression of human dominance.

The garden may be divided into two basic forms, the formal garden, and the vegetable garden. In a formal garden, the expression of human dominance is taken to the extreme. Exotic species are introduced. These, or native species, are typically selectively bred so that they may display desired characteristics. Often times, it matters not what those characteristics are, so long as they are novel and distinctive. The custom of trimming of hedges allows the plant to display a mathematical precision that is impossible in the natural world. The use of topiary in a formal garden allows the gardener to transform a plant into shapes that even selective breeding cannot produce, for example, the shape of an animal. The essence of a formal garden is the capricious display of man's dominance over nature.

How does Ukraine resemble such a garden? To both Russians and Ukrainians, Ukraine is a more orderly republic than Russia. Flowers and lawns are in greater abundance. The natural disorder of Russia stands in contrast to the neat and tidy public and private spaces of Ukraine. This immediately struck the author upon arriving in Kiev from Moscow.

The second type of garden is the vegetable garden. This serves a more practical function, the feeding of the family, but is similar to a formal garden in that specific varieties are *planted*, rather than naturally arise, and it is tended by a gardener.

Ukraine also bears a resemblance to this type of garden. Its rich lands with chernozem soil have been known as the granary of Europe for centuries. Its association with agriculture and peasants is deep. If the thesis of Robert Conquest (1986) is true: that the famine of 1932-33 was a deliberate act aimed at crushing Ukrainian nationalism, the methods of de-kulakization and collectivization were well chosen. By destroying Ukrainian *agriculture*, the Ukrainian *nation* was dealt a heavy blow. But Conquest's task was difficult: the ideas of peasantry and the Ukrainian nation are so closely tied together that they are almost impossible to separate.

Another way that Ukraine is like a garden has already been touched upon: the ancient origins of the Russian and Ukrainian states. The original Kievan Rus' can be seen as a Garden of Eden, the place of origins. But, as in Eden, the time of blissful innocence was not to last. Corruption and fratricidal war shattered the state, and (at least from the Russian side) the survivors were forced to take refuge elsewhere.

How are gardens used? They may decorate the spaces around public buildings, they may be used as urban parks, they can be in or around homes, or especially in the Russian experience, around the country dacha. The gardens around a home may be differentiated: flowers, lawns, and hedges tend to be in front, in the public space of the home; vegetable gardens in the rear. In either case, these garden areas are immediately adjacent to the domicile, in a zone of great personal intimacy. While they are located outside of the home itself, they

are often contained within a fence or other symbolic border which delineates this personal property or space from the public space of strangers walking the streets. This resonates with the idea of Ukraine as not part of the Russian home *per se*, but still "belonging" to Russia, as Russian personal property.

There is one aspect of the making of a pet that has not been explored, that of the perspective of the pet. The experience of a pet is one of pampered attention, but also one of submissiveness and loss of independence. The pet has no independent power base from which to draw strength. The medieval eunuch may have been allowed to achieve high status even in the administrative structure of his lord, but this is only possible because it was obvious he had no independent source of strength, and therefore constituted no threat of usurpation.

The line between affection and cruelty is fine one, especially when dealing with intimate subordinates. It can easily go unnoticed in the master, confused with harmless amusement. The following story was told by an eleven-year-old Theodore Roosevelt, whose family came across a group of beggars in Italy:

We tossed the cakes to them and fed them like chickens with small pieces of cake and like chickens they ate it. Mr. Stevens (a traveling companion) kept guard with a whip with which he pretended to whip a small boy. We made them open their mouth and tossed cake into it. We made the crowds give us three cheers for U.S.A. before we gave them cakes. (McCullough, 1981, p. 15)

The awarding of the Crimea to Ukraine by Nikita Khrushchev, who had participated in the horrors of collectivization, can be seen as the capricious tossing of a tasty treat into the open mouths of the Ukrainians who managed to survive the first half of this century.

D. UKRAINIAN NATIONALISM

The Ukrainian nationalism of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries has left the current Ukrainian state in a delicate situation. The drive for a national consciousness has largely been one of resisting assimilation and claiming national distinctiveness from Russia.

The current Ukrainian government has stated that Ukraine will exist for all residents of Ukraine, rather than for just ethnic Ukrainians. This choice is an explicit statement that Ukraine will be a multi-national state, and does much to allay the fears of Russians and other minorities that their civil and cultural rights will not be infringed upon. But it also causes a bi-furcation of Ukrainian patriotism. For a Ukrainian, the three of elements of land, people, and state, all Ukrainian, are coincident and his patriotism can be a full nationalism. For a Russian in Ukraine, only two of these, land and state, are coincident, and therefore his patriotism must remain "statism." *Russian* culture and ethnicity are "high-order" goods which can only be satisfied in association with the larger Russian culture and with the Russian state.

Multi-national states can be successful. Switzerland is the best example, with Belgium as a generally successful example. However, there are several features in these two examples which do not apply to Ukraine. The cultural rights of each group in Switzerland and Belgium are rather explicitly protected. Also, there is no single dominant group. More importantly, there is a geographic division of the land into cultural territories. The new world has examples of successful multi-ethnic states such as the United States and Canada. But these two states are held together by an *idea*, rather than a blood bond. There is no group (with the exception of Native Americans) that can assert an historic claim to the land in the US and Canada.

The *idea* of the current division of Eastern Europe is that there should be three East Slavic states: Belarus, Ukraine, and Russia, in which the cultural rights of all citizens would be protected in each state. This immediately begs the question, "Why three states?" If each state is just like the next, with respect to cultural rights, why not one? Why not ten? The answer, of course, is that they are *not* just like one another: they represent three separate cultures. The strengthening of national consciousness and distinctiveness will necessarily highlight the differences between the predominant national culture in each of these states, and the cultural minorities living within their boundaries.

This bi-furcation of Ukrainian patriotism into nationalism on the one hand and statism on the other can be a source for future conflict between Russian and Ukraine. It can be expected that Russians will take a strong interest in ethnic

Russians living in Ukraine. Indeed, there are areas, such as Crimea, in which ethnic Russians constitute a majority of the population. Should conflicts develop between Ukraine and Russia there is the potential for them to take on a particularly malicious character. This is due to the intimacy and shared history between Russia and Ukraine. Ukrainian self-assertiveness can seem to Russians as insubordination: the little brother betraying the family. The pet deciding he wants to be master.

VI. SUMMARY AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

A. SUMMARY OF THE MODEL OF DEFENSE

As a practical matter, the Russian Federation will have to determine what territory it is prepared to defend. The Russian army cannot begin adequate preparations for the defense of this territory until its boundaries are determined by the political leadership.

This uncertain situation demands a fresh approach to an analysis of Russian defense policy. As part of this, a model of defense is necessary which will take into account both the intentions and capabilities of Russia. It must be sufficiently flexible to account for changes in government policy, and changes in technology.

The model of defense in this thesis adapts the ideas of two geographers, Halford Mackinder and Johann Heinrich von Thünen. Mackinder identified changing technology, specifically, the development of a railway network in Russia, as the agent which would allow the "Heartland" to resume its natural, historic role in world affairs. Inherent in the Mackinder model is the concept of an interior core which is easier for a land power such as Russia to control. However, defense of the territory beyond this interior zone becomes progressively more complicated and more costly.

Von Thünen's theory is a model of economic geography. He theorized that in the territory surrounding an isolated market center, a differentiation of agricultural land use would develop. Crops of lower value would be raised in concentric rings progressively further from the market center. At some distance from the center, a point is reached in which the cost of sending a good to market exceeds the value of that good. Beyond this point is wilderness.

Like Mackinder, the model of defense uses a concept of a core area. This is the area that it is easiest to defend. Like von Thünen's agricultural products, the costs of defense rise with increasing distance from this core. This defense can be either static or dynamic. Examples of a static defense would be fixed surface-to-air missile sites, air defense bases, border troops, prepared fortifications, coastal defense batteries, etc. As the radius of the area defended increases, so do the number of these batteries, fortifications, troops, etc., therefore increasing the costs. For a dynamic defense, one which includes expeditionary forces extending power abroad, the costs also grow in proportion to increasing distance from the core. This is due to fuel costs and the increasing size and complexity of the logistics lines. It also includes the political costs of projecting power beyond one's own borders.

The model of defense also accounts for the national interests of a nation: what it will *want* to defend. The model theorizes that there are certain territories which are more valuable than others for a nation. Defense of the core area is

vital, with a decrease in national interest with increasing distance from the core. This is called the propensity to defend.

The propensity to defend is a complex factor of the model of defense. It is made up of many elements including ethnicity, cultural ties, economic value, historic ties, political integrity, the need for collective defense, and even a people's psychology and their vision of the world and their place and role in it. To account for the propensity to defend, it is necessary to consider all of these elements which determine the value a nation such as Russia places upon a given geographic space.

When one combines the cost of defense with the propensity to defend, the model can be analyzed abstractly. At the core, costs to defend this area are low. The value placed on this area is high. Therefore, the decision will be made to defend it. With increasing distance from the core, the value placed on the land decreases while the costs to defend it simultaneously increase. This progresses to the equilibrium point. This is the furthest extent which a nation will militarily defend the territory. Beyond this point, national interest is too low and the costs too high. This is the first stage of the model.

The territory a nation will defend obviously changes over time. This may have either of two causes: in the first case, the cost of defense changes. This may be due to changes in technology, making weaponry more (or less) expensive. It may also vary due to a change in the economic situation of a country. If the

economy deteriorates, the cost of defense increases, and the equilibrium point moves inward toward the core of the nation, reducing the area defended.

The second possible cause of a change in the equilibrium point is a shift in the propensity to defend. This can be caused by a political change which alters the value placed on a given territory by a nation. One historical example would be the wariness of the US to become involved in a foreign land war following the Vietnam experience. This implies a lowering of the propensity of defend, also reducing the area defended.

The propensity to defend not only includes economic and political considerations, but also visceral motivations such as ethnonationalism or attachment to place. Here the work of geographer Yi-Fu Tuan is valuable. He has coined the term *topophilia* to refer to man's attachment to place. This often takes the form of a complex national myth or cosmology. The humanities are not a common field of study for military strategists and warfighters, but only by using the techniques of the humanities can such complex motivations be understood.

The notion of defense of a territory necessarily includes the concept of a foreign challenge to that territory. Defense is always *against* something else. The geographic model known as Central Place Theory as developed by Walter Christaller provides a useful analog for understanding the actions of two or more actors who have competing claims over territory. The propensity to defend is made up of many elements. An economic system is similarly made up of many different goods and services. Each of these goods has a "tributary area," that is,

the region in which people will travel to acquire that good. For each good, the size of the tributary area is different: people will travel only a short distance for a gallon of milk, but a long distance for high-fashion women's clothing. In Central Place Theory, the goods which have small geographic tributary areas are called "low-order" goods. Those which have large tributary area are termed "high-order" goods. In Central Place Theory, small towns or "central places" trade in only "low-order" goods, medium-sized towns trade in low- and medium-order goods. Large cities trade in goods of all sized orders. An economic system is thus made up of these competing tributary areas superimposed on one another.

The model of defense includes elements which are similarly superimposed in geographic space. In Central Asia, the claims of nationalism are analogous to an economic low-order good: they are confined to a limited area and generally do not extend beyond republic borders. But the element of collective defense is a relatively high-order good since it extends beyond national boundaries. Uzbek and Russian intervention in the Tadjikistan Civil War is an example of a clash in which the low-order good of ethnicity and the high-order good of collective defense come into conflict.

The national myths of Russia include Ukraine as historically lying "inside" of the Russian state. For a Ukrainian nationalist, the national myths see Ukraine as having a related, but distinctly separate existence.

By considering each element separately, and assessing the relative geographic extent of claims of all the actors, it is possible to better understand the motivations for defense, and where conflicts are likely to arise.

B. POLICY IMPLICATIONS

When the Soviet Union collapsed, it left in its wake a number of contradictions. Those republics which had the status of constituent republics achieved independence and international recognition. Those which had the status of Autonomous Republics or *Oblasts* did not. Just as the Soviet political hierarchy was relatively blind to the growing nationalities problem, the West does not fully recognize the problems inherent in these second-order nationalities in the newly independent republics. This is a problem that will not simply go away. We must better understand that there are competing claims for the same geographic space. This is our first error.

The second error is failing to recognize that the elements of the propensity to defend the same territory may be of a different *nature*. The Tadjik need for sovereignty over its own territory competes with the Uzbek and Russian needs for collective security. In Vietnam, the United States fought against communism. For many Vietnamese, the war was not about communism or capitalism, but about sovereignty. In the Falklands War, Argentina fought for the assertion of historic, legal claims. Britain fought for the right of self-determination. Unless we understand all sides' motivations, we will not understand the conflict. This will be

important as the regional actors around the periphery of Russia attempt to suppress disputes to avoid a contagion of violence from one republic to the next.

The third error is the overestimation of the importance of economics and politics. The model of defense forces us to confront other issues that drive a people to militarily defend a given territory. As the situation in the former Yugoslavian territory illustrates, other motivations can be much more important. To offer economic aid to the former Soviet republics when the potential conflicts have only a limited economic aspect is to ignorantly throw money at the issue: it will not alleviate the problem.

The solution is not an easy one. We must have more analysts and policy makers who understand foreign cultures. We must invest money in training people to speak, not only Russian, but Ukrainian, Uzbek, and Lezgin. These analysts must be able to understand the culture, history, religion, politics, and even the national myths of the people being studied. They must read the local literature to understand the aspirations of the people, and over what territory these aspirations extend. They must travel to these areas and speak to leaders and common people alike.

The shattering of the Soviet Union has left a legacy which is potentially extremely dangerous. Neither the United States nor Moscow can afford to ignore the complexity that exists around the periphery of Russia. The model of defense for Russia in this thesis is one attempt to deal with this issue.

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