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PART 3

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THE PATTERN OF SOVIET CONDUCT IN THE THIRD WORLD

Review and preview.

by

WALTER LAQUEUR AND OTHERS

FOR

OSD/NET ASSESSMENT

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
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THE PATTERN OF SOVIET CONDUCT IN THE THIRD WORLD:

Review and Preview

by

Walter Laqueur and others

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SOVIET INFLUENCE IN TURKEY

Jennifer Noyon

Soviet Influence in Turkey

Few states in the world have had as long and complex a relationship as Russia and Turkey. Their long common border, unpleasant experiences with Russian ambitions, and Turkey's relative weakness in the face of its large and powerful neighbor have led Ankara to tread warily in its dealings with the USSR. Soviet initiatives to improve relations have always been welcomed but have never resulted in lasting Soviet influence in Turkey.

If Turkey cannot afford to offend the USSR, however, the Soviets have learned that the Turks cannot be softened up by threats. In 1945-46, Stalin tried to cow his southern neighbor with ferocious propaganda and territorial demands. Turkey's response was to join NATO and to ally itself closely with the United States. It took the Soviets 15 years to work their way back to a situation of detente. Since then, Moscow has only tried occasionally and cautiously to use pressure. Instead, a variety of methods -- aid, trade, political concessions, and cultural offensiveness -- have been employed to ease relations.

None of these efforts have erased Turkish suspicions of the Soviets. Despite Moscow's overt friendliness, the Turkish belief in Soviet support covertly for left-wing terrorist groups in the 1970s and the obvious analogy for Turkey posed by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan have maintained a high degree of mistrust.

Moscow would ideally like to detach Turkey from the West and join it to the Soviet sphere of influence. Yet shorter-term considerations often are at cross-purposes with such an objective. Soviet interests toward Turkey can be roughly divided

into "defensive" and "offensive" considerations. The former concerns the fact that Turkey, in conjunction with the West, could form a threat to the USSR's weak southern flank and could close or restrict Soviet traffic through the vital straits leading from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean.

Conversely, the "offensive" issue is that Turkey forms a barrier to Soviet expansion southward, toward the strategically and economically important Middle East. In the 1940s and early 1950s, the latter aspect seemed uppermost in Moscow's thinking. In trying to open the door at which Turkey stood guard, the Soviets tried hostile methods.

Yet, without weakening Turkey or changing bilateral relations, the Soviets were able to leap the northern tier into the Arab world. Turkey ceased to be an active barrier for Soviet policy in the Middle East, "defensive" considerations gained the upper hand, and Moscow sought to defuse Turkish enmity in order to keep the straits open, avoid any inconvenient problems on that secondary front, and -- at best -- to dilute Turkish-Western solidarity.

There are some signs in the last few years that Soviet policy might be swinging back toward a harder-line. The invasion of Afghanistan, the use of Soviet troops in Africa, and the emphasis on ideologically Marxist regimes in the region, coincided with the upsurge of Turkish terrorism. At least some effort to destabilize Turkey may again be on the Soviet agenda.

Soviet influence has increased in proportion to Turkey's rejection by the West. This is true on both the government-to-

government and on the ideological levels. There should be no doubt that another arms embargo or similar U.S. rejection could completely undermine Turkey's relations with the West. Soviet interests are served by the continuing attacks of Armenian terrorists on Turkish diplomats when these strain Turkey's Western relations. Conflicts over Cyprus have increased the Soviet Union's influence in both Turkey and Greece. Likewise, Western European criticism of Turkey's current military government has been to Soviet advantage by delaying or threatening to sever Turkey's Western aid.

Cooperation and Conflict

In the early 1920s the new Soviet Republic, weak, beleaguered by the West, and in the throes of civil war needed quiet on its frontiers. It set out to cultivate the emerging Turkish Republic with logistic and moral support for its war of independence. Turkey's conflicts with the West, and need for peace and economic support led Mustafa Kemal Ataturk to warily accept Soviet offers for good relations. The two nations signed a series of treaties symbolizing their new-found friendship and restoring the disputed provinces of Kars and Ardahan to Turkey. These were capped in 1925 by the Bilateral Treaty of Friendship and Non-Aggression signed in Paris.

The Soviets used economic ties to strengthen the diplomatic agreement. Economic cooperation in aid and trade flourished. A Soviet foreign trade bank opened a branch in 1925: economic cooperation agreements were signed in 1927, 1931 and 1937. In a

precedent setting move in 1932 Moscow extended credits to Ankara for the purchase of industrial machinery.

Communist ideology made some inroads during the Turkish Republic's formative period, but ultimately could not compete with Kemal's pragmatic nationalism. Although Communist groups such as the Green Army helped in Turkey's war of independence and several Communist parties were established, Kemal coopted them in a series of clever moves and ultimately outlawed these movements in 1925. The Soviets could not have been pleased by the elimination of these forces, but Moscow did not allow this to damage bilateral ties. The Soviets may have been somewhat mollified by Kemal's equally forceful repudiation of rightist pan-Turkism, which potentially threatened to mobilize the Soviet Union's large Turkish population.

World War Two brought an end to over 20 years of Turkish-Soviet friendship by resurrecting old suspicions. Stalin's negotiations with the Germans showed him interested in gaining power over Turkey. Turkey responded first with a June 1939 non-aggression pact with France and then, after the shock of the Nazi-Soviet accord two months later, another agreement with both France and Britain. Throughout the war, Turkey's main foreign policy objective was to avoid attack or occupation by either Germany or Russia. Remaining neutral, Turkey closed the Straits to foreign warships in 1939 in accordance with the 1936 Montreux convention.

By the time Turkey entered the war on the side of the allies in February 1945 Turkish-Soviet relations had already soured. Despite Turkey's moves to open the Straits to Russian supplies

and its severance of Japanese relations, Moscow denounced the Turkish-Soviet Pact of Friendship and Non-Aggression of 1925.

From June 1945 Moscow made open territorial demands on Turkey, including the return of Kars and Ardahan, the granting of military bases in the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, and revisions of the Montreux Convention and boundary of Thrace. These ended the friendly Turkish-Soviet relations of the Bolshevik and Kemalist revolutionary era. Turkey swung sharply away from its foreign policy of neutrality, sent troops to Korea and joined NATO, realizing its vulnerability as a weak nation in the shadow of an aggressive giant. Yet the aggressive Soviet demands ultimately proved far more expensive to Moscow than to Ankara. The Soviets made none of the gains they sought and Turkish resistance to them represented the USSR's first post-war setback.

Largely out of antipathy toward Moscow the Turks began to identify closely with U.S. foreign policy interests in the Middle East and the world. The years between 1950 and 1960, which coincided with rule by the pro-American Democrats, represent the nadir of Turkish-Soviet relations.

In the UN Turkey consistently voted against the Soviets. It became a leader in the controversial Baghdad Pact; supported the landing in Egypt of French and British forces in the 1956 Suez Crisis; mobilized troops on its Syrian border against a possible stationing of Soviet troops in Syria in 1956 and 1957; allowed the movement of U.S. forces through Adana for the intervention in

Lebanon in 1958; and diplomatically supported the pro-Western Iraqi monarchy during the Iraqi revolution in 1958.

Moscow protested all these actions though it had already taken a step back from the antagonistic policies of the Stalinist era. In May 1953 -- just two months after Stalin's death -- the Soviets withdrew all territorial demands and accepted the status quo of the Straits. Subsequently, Moscow made a number of offers of good will. Today the Soviets appear to regret the Stalinist demands and sometimes omit them from histories of Turkish-Soviet relations.

Despite their offers to improve relations the Soviets had little success in shaking Turkey's pro-American or NATO policies. Throughout 1957 Moscow directed a major effort against the deployment of short-range nuclear missiles, the Honest Johns, in Turkey. But the Turks wanted the weapons and announced that they would obtain both Honest Johns and Nike anti-aircraft missiles. The Soviets protested more vigorously as NATO began to consider deployment of intermediate range Thor and Jupiter missiles, but these were also welcomed by Ankara.

Detente

Moves toward detente resulted more from a change in Turkey's policies than the Soviets, for Moscow had sought persistently to improve relations with Ankara since 1953. The Soviets took advantage of the improved atmosphere of the mid-1960s with a series of high-level visits, joint communiques, trade and cultural agreements. Military aid was not a factor in Soviet-Turkish relations.

Despite its broadly pro-American stance, the first steps toward detente were taken by the Democratic Party government of Adnan Menderes. The need for economic aid, general East-West detente and consistent requests by the Kremlin were the main motives. The Soviets meanwhile claimed to accept Turkey's status as a NATO and CENTO member. Announcement of an exchange of visits between Premiers Menderes and Khrushchev typified this change in attitude. Even the downing of an Adana-based American U-2 reconnaissance aircraft over the USSR in May 1960 did not set back these plans, but they were effectively cancelled with Menderes' ouster by Turkey's first military takeover on May 27. On the other hand, the suggestion that military leaders took over in part because of Menderes' new foreign policy directions is improbable since the centrist takeover resulted in the liberal constitution of 1960 and continued Soviet-Turkish rapprochement.

No major re-examination of foreign policy was undertaken during the military interlude. Like the intervention of 1971 and 1980 it was motivated ostensibly by internal domestic concerns. Yet since Menderes' policies were so extremely supportive of the United States his overthrow inevitably signalled some shift. Significantly, Menderes' American-style economics had led to unacceptably high inflation and unequal development, and thus, a setback for pro-Americanism.

Soviet analysts persistently identified the Turkish military with the "forces of progress", and the USSR welcomed the 1960 intervention, even suggesting the generals retain power indefinitely. There was some increase in cultural and commercial

exchange with the USSR, but Ankara rejected Soviet aid offers and shelved plans for visits.

In 1961 democracy was restored with the election of the Republican People's Party, led by Ismet Inonu. Inonu had also been premier for much of the Soviet-Turkish cooperation period from 1923 to 1937. Ankara and Moscow signed agreements on railways, communications and trade under Inonu's leadership in the early 1960s. In 1961 Moscow provided 4.5 million dollars worth of equipment for building a glass factory.

Turkish-U.S. ties remained strong, but some re-evaluation of Turkey's foreign policy had begun in the press and public opinion aimed at directing the country toward a more independent and multidimensional path. Leftist intellectuals wanted to broaden Turkey's foreign policy base by expanding relations with the Soviet Union and Turkey's East European neighbors, especially Rumania and Bulgaria.

In 1962 the Soviet ambassador renewed the USSR's invitations to Russia and reportedly promised 500 million dollars in economic aid if Turkey would alter some of its NATO relations. Instead, Ankara reaffirmed its solidarity with the West and, complying with a U.S. request, was the first nation to embargo its ships carrying cargo to Cuba.

The Cuban crisis and the subsequent removal of Honest Johns from Turkey provided the first test of U.S.-Turkish relations and gave the Soviets their first real opportunity to expand relations with Ankara. During the crisis Moscow requested the withdrawal of Jupiter missiles from Turkey as a quid pro quo for Cuban missile removal. President Kennedy's decision to chase them out

without consulting Ankara opened up a host of questions for Turkish military strategists. The Turks complained it had taken away Turkey's shelter under the nuclear umbrella and began to doubt the steadfastness of the U.S. commitment to defend Turkey.

Removal of the Juciters eliminated a source of Turkish-Soviet friction. One sign of the change was the June 1963 visit of the Senate president and a parliamentary delegation to Moscow.

A more important Soviet opportunity came with the cooling of U.S. relations over Cyprus in 1964. Just as Soviet post-war threats had driven Turkey toward the U.S. a perceived lack of U.S. support led to stronger Soviet ties in the mid-1960s.

As a status quo nation since 1923 the aim of Turkish foreign policy had been to insure the security of its existing territory. Its extraterritorial interests centered mainly on concern for the Turkish Cypriot minority, as partner with Greece and Great Britain in guaranteeing the island's independent status. Thus Ankara protested in late 1963 when Greek Cypriots abrogated political guarantees of the Turkish Cypriots. In June 1964, after fruitless appeals to the UN and NATO, to Greece, Britain and the U.S., Ankara was preparing to intervene militarily. The Johnson letter however, categorically warned Turkey not to intervene in Cyprus and also called into question NATO support of Turkey against a possible Soviet attack if the Turks did so.

Premier Inonu replied that the letter had been the "source of sorrow and grave concern":

If NATO members should start discussing the right or wrong of the situation of their fellow-member victim of a Soviet aggression whether this aggression was

provoked or not...the very foundations of the Alliance would be shaken and it would lose its meaning.

The letter marks a watershed in Turkish foreign policy and the beginning of serious doubts about U.S. guarantees of Turkish security. If the United States could not be depended on in the event of Soviet hostility then Turkey would have to defuse potential conflict through its own bilateral detente with Moscow.

The USSR was slow to react over the Cyprus problem and unaware that it had removed some of the barriers to improved relations. At first Moscow was anxious to maintain the Cypriot status quo and supported Makarios, especially since he advocated non-alignment. The Soviets may have hoped he would eventually seek removal of the island's three sovereign British bases. Clandestine radio termed the Johnson letter a "smokescreen" and called Turkey's strafing of the island in August the "handiwork of NATO."

Gradually the Soviets changed their position, perhaps seeing a chance to drive a wedge in U.S.-Turkish relations. During the November visit of Turkey's Foreign Minister Feridun Erkin to Moscow -- once postponed on account of the Cyprus issue -- the Soviets recognized the Turkish community's legal existence. Ankara interpreted this as support for Turkey's demand that Cyprus be an independent federated state. The Foreign Minister's visit ended with a joint communique calling for the strengthening of good neighborly relations, plans for greater trade, and a cultural exchange agreement.

Turkey's opening up to the Soviet Union was a bipartisan development. The government of the conservative Justice Party.

successor to the defunct Democrat Party, expanded relations more broadly than had its liberal Republican People's Party predecessors. A series of high-level visits succeeded one another, culminating in Premier Alexei Kosygin's trip to Ankara in December 1966 and Justice Party Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel's trip to the Soviet Union in December 1967. The Prime Minister toured the USSR for ten days, including Central Asia and the Caucasus, and exchanged promises with the Soviet to make the Middle East a zone of peace.

As in the past Moscow offered developmental and industrial aid; these were finally accepted on a large scale in 1967. Joint industrial projects, such as the Iskenderun iron and steel facilities, the Aliaga oil refinery and the Seydisenir aluminum complex were begun. Moscow provided \$200 million credit at 2.5 percent interest with a fifteen-year maturity, payable in goods. Turkish-Soviet trade between 1966 and 1969 rose from \$55.5 million to \$105.3.

Shortcomings in Menderes' liberal economic development policies were a factor in Turkey's interest in alternative economic strategies. Ataturk's policies had given the state a respected role in promoting the Turkish economy-many wanted to broaden this. Turkish social analyses criticized U.S. military and economic assistance for leading to Turkey's overdependence. Hence, Soviet aid projects focusing on heavy industry and development of the public sector, and providing low-interest terms payable in goods, were cited as possible alternatives. To many the relative development of Turkey's socialist Balkan neighbors appeared attractive.

Of potentially greater significance than the exchange of diplomatic visits, aid and trade was the intellectual and ideological opening up to the Soviet Union that became a feature of Turkish intellectual life. Even before the Cyprus crisis of 1964 a re-evaluation of Turkish foreign and economic policy had begun in the press and public opinion. The founding of leftist periodicals such as Yon (Direction) in 1960 and the formation of the Turkish Labor Party (TLP) in 1961 are indications of this trend.

The liberal 1961 Constitution gave free rein to the pursuit of socialist thought. Titles such as The Paths to Socialism and Turkish Realities (Cemal Barlas -- 1962), Principles of Turkish Socialism (Hilmi Ozgen -- 1962), and Socialist Turkey (Ali Faik Cihan -- 1965) were widely read; translations of Marxist classics and Western socialist thought proliferated. Social themes in Turkish fiction underscored such concerns as writers such as Mahmut Makal, Yasar Kemal and Fakir Baykurt painted troubling scenes of continuing feudalism and poverty.

The Turkish Labor Party gave political voice to this intellectual stirring. Founded by a dozen trade unionists, the party in its early days was far more nationalist than internationalist in orientation. Its first leader was the intellectual Mehmet Ali Aybar, who urged Turkey to develop its own brand of socialism. Aybar advocated nationalization of mineral rights and foreign capital, economic independence and an expanded role for state economic enterprises. The TLP opposed minority discrimination of Lazes, Circassians and Kurds. The

party never came close to parliamentary dominance. Despite its important ideological impact, the socialist left was a small group, at its height able to elect only 15 members to a 450-seat parliament. The TLP also attracted less independent and more doctrinaire thinkers such as Benice Boran, Mihri Belli and Sadun Aren, all of whom have been linked with the pro-Moscow clandestine Turkish Communist Party (TCP).

The outlaw status of the TCP leads it to seek outlets in legitimate organizations. In recent years these are said to have included front organizations for peace, professional organizations (e.g., teachers and engineers unions), and labor unions. Since Communism was forbidden in 1925 the TCP has closely followed the Soviet lead ideologically, and is said to owe its continued existence almost entirely to Soviet support. Prominent Communists such as Nazim Hikmet, one of Turkey's leading poets, have sought refuge in the Soviet Union; central committee members generally receive training there. Party heads live in East Berlin.

The USSR's allied position in World War II lent Communist ideology a limited legitimacy, and front organizations proliferated. Soviet post-war demands on Turkey weakened this status though some front groups continued to form, such as the Turkish Association of Peace Lovers. Attempts to form legitimate political parties such as the Turkish Socialist Workers and Peasants Party were set back by the crackdown against Communists in 1951.

The Turkish governments unyielding opposition to the TCP has meant that all its overt activities have been undertaken abroad.

Moscow supports the clandestine radio stations Dizin Radyo (Our Radio) and the Voice of the Turkish Communist Party from East Europe. The TCP's party pronouncements appear in special supplements to the Turkish-language edition of The World Marxist Review, Yeni Çağ (New Age), published in Prague. Party strength is estimated at about 3000 members, but there is uncertainty about this figure.

Domestically, the TCP reportedly infiltrated and influenced trade union and teachers organizations in the 1960s. The trade union federation DISK (The Revolutionary Workers Confederation) included the principle of political strikes in its charter. Its militancy and support for the Moscow line led to allegations of TCP influence. DISK, formed by a breakaway group from the political trade union Turk-Is eventually attracted up to 900,000 members, and is widely suspected of Soviet influence via East Berlin. Radical policies of the Turkish Teachers Union (TUS), representing some 120,000 rural teachers have also led to charges of TCP influence. TUS was ultimately closed but replaced by the equally militant TOB-DER.

The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 set Moscow back among Turkey's legitimate left. It led to a deep split in the TLP as pro-and anti-Moscow factions quarrelled over the invasion. The dispute ended with Ayar's resignation, leaving the party in control of those who supported Moscow. Leadership passed to Behice Boran, a steady pro-Moscow ideologue. It began to appeal directly to a potentially revolutionary urban proletariat and to Kurdish activists.

Czechoslovakia did not stem the tide of leftism itself or stop official Turkish-Soviet rapprochement. Student demonstrations in Paris in 1968 and anti-Vietnam demonstration in the United States, both critical of the West, had more impact on Turkish politics among the left, which became increasingly radical and violent. After 1968 the militant left turned away from electoral politics to armed struggle as a means of effecting change. Leftist publications such as Ant (Vow -- 1967), Devrim (Revolution -- 1969) Turk Solu (Turkish Left -- 1970) vied with one another in efforts to radicalize the left, and leaders called for guerrilla war. In the mid-1960s these became the more radical Dev-Genc (Revolutionary Youth Federation), whose stated purpose was: "the struggle against imperialism and feudalism...and the diffusion of socialist ideas among youth.

On the eve of Turkey's second military intervention, the so-called coup by memorandum of March 12, 1971, the left comprised several groups that sprang up following the fragmentation of the TLP. Several were terrorist and the extent of Soviet influence on them is not known. The groups included Trotskyites, Guevarists, Maoists and leftist fringe ideologies of all kinds. Most saw the TCP as reactionary and were not well-inclined toward Moscow.

One such anti-Moscow faction was the Revolutionary Workers and Peasants Party of Turkey (RWPPT), formed by Dogu Perincek, a teaching assistant at the Middle East Technical University. This Turkish Maoist group was sharply anti-Soviet, accusing Moscow of reaction and imperialism. Clandestine radio in turn accused the RWPPT of deviationism and CIA collaboration. In part because of

Turkey's historical anti-Russian bias and their organizational talents, the Maoists found widespread support among the radical left.

The March 12 intervention came down hard on leftist extremism. Yet leftists at first hailed the takeover; they hoped it would mean a turn to the left. Nor did the Soviet Union object, seeing the military as a "progressive force" (as they had in 1960), and not wanting to upset government level detente.

Relations with the USSR remained good. In 1972 during Nihat Erim's caretaker government Soviet President Podgorniy visited Turkey. The two countries signed a Declaration of Principles of Good Neighborly Relations, in which Turkey and the USSR pledged respect for each others' sovereignty and territorial integrity and the peaceful settlement of disputes. They also promised not to let their territories be used "for staging aggression and subversion against other states."

The Soviets kept their options open. On the one hand, provocative broadcasts by the Voice of the Turkish Communist Party and TDP efforts continued in Europe. The TDP reportedly supported and infiltrated the Federation of Turkish Socialists, the Association for Vigilant Turks, and the Front for a Democratic and Free Turkey. On the other hand clandestine Bizim Radyo in Leipzig backed the RPP in the 1973 elections.

The Arms Embargo and After

Between 1974 and 1979 official Soviet-Turkish relations continued to improve. By 1979 Turkey had become the Soviet

Union's largest economic aid recipient outside the Communist bloc, and the U.S. arms embargo against Turkey had seriously raised the possibility of Soviet provision of military aid. Despite strained U.S. relations in the mid-1970s, traditional Turkish caution militated against a basic change in Turkish-Soviet relations -- for the most part Ankara explained its closer Soviet ties in the context of general East-West detente. A series of weak and fractious Turkish governments avoided foreign policy changes, since there was a lack of general agreement on the form these should take. By the late 1970s three factors had set the potential limits of further Soviet influence in Turkey: the growing suspicion of Soviet backing for leftist terror in the increasingly bitter leftist-rightist civil strife, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the return of better U.S.-Turkish relations.

The Cyprus issue was responsible for the second major blow to U.S.-Turkish relations and led to another upsurge of Soviet influence in Turkey. In July 1974 an Athens -- sponsored coup overthrew President Makarios' independent regime and attempted to install a well-known terrorist as president of Cyprus. When Ankara's request for joint inter-cession with Great Britain failed, Ankara intervened unilaterally.

The move caused confusion in Soviet-Turkish relations, but the Soviets at last backed the action because they did not want the island's independent -- and non-aligned -- status altered. Nonetheless, the USSR asked for an international conference on Cyprus, insisted on Turkey's withdrawal from Cyprus, and their clandestine radio continued to attack Turkey as a NATO tool.

The Johnson letter of 1964 had warned Turkey against using American weapons for action on Cyprus. On this basis at the instigation of Congressional friends of Greece an inquiry was made. Turkey was then embargoed for using U.S. arms in an aggressive action in violation of arms provision terms. The embargo shook what had been the pillars of Turkish foreign policy since the 1950s. It reinforced the idea that the United States was an unpredictable and therefore unreliable ally, while the Soviets, even if not trusted, were at least predictable.

Turkey felt itself badly treated, as if it were not a strategic ally, but a nation whose security was negotiable. This analysis saw the embargo as the culmination of a series of events -- the removal of Jupiter weapons in 1962, which removed Turkey from the "nuclear umbrella": the Johnson letter threat that NATO might not come to Turkey's assistance under certain conditions; and finally the embargo.

In June 1975 Ankara threatened the United States with a status change for its bases in Turkey. Just a few days later Secretary of State Kissinger said that nations should not "feel they were doing the U.S. a favor" by remaining in NATO. A little over two weeks later Turkey and the USSR signed a \$700 million industrial aid agreement. Turkey's NATO representative said for the first time that Turkey could turn to other sources for military aid.

In late December Soviet Premier Kosygin and forty financial experts visited Turkey for the opening of the Iskenderun steel

mill. Kosygin and Demirel signed a communique which promised to exert "efforts to further expand and strengthen relations."

The Soviets urged caution to both Greece and Turkey over Cyprus and restraint in Aegean disputes. Moscow's policy, echoed in its clandestine radio broadcasts, was to avoid offending either Greece or Turkey while capitalizing on disillusionment with the United States. For this reason it advocated the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Cyprus and bilateral negotiations. Urging the withdrawal of Turkey's forces did not of course win Moscow any friends among Turkish nationalists, and illustrates to some degree Moscow's own heavy-handedness in dealing with these delicate disputes.

The embargo and general East-West detente offered the Soviet Union opportunity to improve its military relations with Turkey, and it hastened to the initiative. In the context of general NATO and Warsaw Pact exchanges, Moscow invited Turkish observers to the January 1976 military maneuvers in the Georgian and Armenian Republics and concluded their visit in Moscow with talks with Defense Minister Grechko. Three months later the then Deputy Chief of Staff Keran Evren led a second delegation to Moscow. Press reports talked of negotiations with the Soviets for SAM-6 and SAM-7 missiles.

In January 1977 Prime Minister Demirel responded to the question of future Soviet arms provisions by saying that if the NATO path were closed to Turkey, Ankara would "naturally" take steps necessary for its national defense. By March 1977, NATO Forces Commander Alexander Haig urged Congress to lift the

embargo, just two weeks before talks between Turkey's Justice Party Foreign Minister and the Soviets.

Turkey and the USSR signed agreements to build a \$28 million hydrogen peroxide plant, a heavy electro-mechanical factory, a plastics plant, a catalyzer system for the Aliaga oil refinery plant, and expansions of existing Soviet built iron and steel facilities. The Soviets said they would provide credit for construction of two thermo nuclear power plants, and for another oil refinery.

The return of RPP leader Bulent Ecevit to power in January of 1978 brought a further shift in Turkish foreign policy orientation as Ecevit began to implement his promised "new security concept." Still under the U.S. arms embargo Ankara appeared determined to redefine its foreign policy position in the world.

In April General Nikolai Ogarkov, Soviet First Deputy Defense Minister and Chief of Staff visited Turkey. The press reported that the USSR would provide whatever the Turkish armed forces needed, including financial aid for defense industry development.

Ecevit claimed that Ankara had no intention of withdrawing from NATO. But he informed the United States that Turkey would not sign a joint declaration on NATO's future. Then he shocked many observers by declaring on the eve of the Washington-based NATO summit (of which he was head) that Turkey felt no threat from the Soviet Union. Ecevit claimed general East-West detente as the basis for Turkey's new orientation. But he also criticized the United States for the dangers that its ethnic politics posed for other countries, and for its own interests.

Immediately after the NATO meeting Ecevit traveled to Moscow and signed a reiteration of the 1972 agreement. In addition the two nations signed cultural and scientific, trade, fishing and oil agreements. The Turkish press reported that Moscow had acted to reduce border tensions by a transfer of troops toward central Europe.

The embargo was finally lifted in September 1978, but U.S.-Turkish relations underwent no sudden change. Ankara's statement that it would re-open four U.S. bases was somewhat overshadowed by Ecevit's visit to Romania, the visit of two Soviet warships to Turkey -- the first in 40 years -- and a three year commerce accord with the Soviet Union, all in the following month. The USSR offered Turkey a huge amount of financial assistance on easy terms (figures as high as \$10 billion have been quoted) as the West seemed to stall loans.

Trade was expanding to record levels. In 1980, at a time when Turkey's economy was otherwise troubled it reached \$364 million. In June 1979 Moscow and Ankara signed an agreement to enlarge oil refining facilities and other heavy industries and to conduct surveys for petroleum deposits in Turkey. A bizarre atmosphere prevailed as Turkey's leaders continued to hope for world detente as ideological warfare raged fiercely in their own country and Turkey's economy continued to deteriorate. Turkey's growth rate went from a high of 8 percent in 1975 to -0.5 percent in 1979. By the end of 1979 terrorism was claiming more than 2000 victims per year.

Ankara was increasingly careful not to offend its northern neighbor and sought to scrupulously follow provisions of the 1972 and 1978 agreements proscribing aggressive or subversive acts on its territory. In order to spare a possible repetition of the 1960 U-2 incident, Ankara sought to have terms of Turkey's role of SALT II verification discussed by the United States with the Soviet Union. In May 1979 Ecevit said that permission to use Turkish territory for U-2 flights would depend on Soviet approval. Two weeks later the Soviets announced their pleasure at this stance, while to western circles this appeared to indicate Turkey's increased vulnerability to Soviet pressure.

Between 1970 and 1980 Turkey witnessed twelve governments. When Demirel's sixth government replaced Ecevit's third in November 1979, there was little indication that it would end the parliamentary squabbles which had come to characterize politics.

Political polarization had infested the educational system, the state bureaucracy, and even the police. Terrorists were sometimes arrested, tried and imprisoned only to arrange mass escapes. The prisons themselves became radical proving grounds.

Ideological differences began to follow religious and ethnic lines. The largest segment of the Kurdish separatist movement -- KAWA and the Apocular -- were strongly leftist. The Kahramanmaraş riots of January 1978 that resulted in over one hundred deaths followed Sunni-Alevi sectarian cleavages -- the Sunnis were rightist, the Alevis leftist. The Soviets doubtless followed these developments with interest but the extent of their possible involvement in them remains unknown. The success of the

Islamic revolution in Iran increased the strength and prestige of pro-Islamic groups.

By 1978 legal leftist organizations included seventy Revolutionary Youth Associations and a number of shortlived legal leftist parties which vied to replace the outlawed TLP. These included the Revolutionary Socialist Party of Turkey (1975); the Socialist Workers Party (1974), the Workers Party (1975), the Turkish Workers and Peasants Party (reformed, 1978), and the Fatherland Party (1975). Founded by former LPT members such as Behice Boran, all were thought to have been subject to TLP influence. None gained seats in parliamentary elections.

Over 34 clandestine organizations were counted in 1978. They included the Maoist Liberation Army of Workers and Peasants and non-Maoist groups such as the Turkish People's Liberation Party which supported its army the Turkish People's Liberation Army, the Turkish Peoples' Liberation Party/Front, and the Marxist-Leninist Armed Propaganda Unit. At one time or another each of these three has been mentioned as "pro-Moscow". Yet each group took different positions on different issues -- China, Chile, Russia, Iran, Albania, the Middle East, etc., and these positions shifted quickly making exact analysis difficult.

The shock of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan profoundly played an important role in precipitating the Turkish general staff's January 1979 warning to the politicians to put Turkey's house in order. It was the beginning of a pronounced check in the slide toward detente. For Turkey the invasion marked an ominous departure from what they had viewed as a comfortable

consistency in Soviet foreign policy, for it was the Soviets' first use of troops outside Eastern Europe.

Turkish officials claim that Ankara was the first government to condemn the Soviet invasion -- even before the United States. But in addition Turkey continued to underline the importance of good neighborly relations. Turkey continued to underline the importance of good neighborly relations. Turkey did not initially support President Carter's call for an Olympic boycott, for example, citing previous promises to keep sports and politics separate.

The United States hastened to repair ties with Turkey. On January 10, the United States and Turkey initiated a new defense and economic cooperation agreement, and the United States promised \$450 million in aid.

The new agreement proved to be a source of apprehension and disappointment to Moscow, which warned in Pravda that Turkey was following a perilous path between strategies of crisis and detente. In late February Pravda wrote that abandoning detente could lead to Turkey's end as a nuclear cemetery. This heavy-handed remark was greeted with repugnance by the Turkish press and government officials. Relations cooled noticeably as Turkish diplomats failed to attend a party to celebrate Soviet Army Day.

Throughout the summer, deaths from terrorism mounted, reaching about 25 per day. Terrorists were especially active in the southeast. Whole towns, like Fatsa on the Black Sea, were "liberated." Even in Ankara entire shanty-town neighborhoods were effectively controlled by terrorist groups, who had constructed quasi-government structures.

In addition, prolonged crisis paralyzed the parliament, which was unable to elect a president after over 100 ballots. After an Islamic fundamentalist rally in Konya -- in 1977 the seat of the TCP's clandestine conference -- attracted thousands calling for an Islamic state, the military intervened for the third time.

Turkish-Soviet Relations After September 12, 1980

The Soviet Union sent a message of good will to Ankara within ten days of the military intervention. As after previous military interventions Turkish-Soviet relations remained essentially unchanged. Indirect evidence of a Soviet role in spreading leftist terrorism was uncovered after the intervention -- the vast amounts of arms captured (now said to total over 800,000); the suspected complicity of the Bulgarian government in arms smuggling; the training of certain leftist groups in Palestinian or Syrian camps; and the influence of the East Berlin-based TCP. Some analysts believe that Soviet support was an instrumental if not a primary cause of leftist (and even rightist) terror in Turkey.

Thousands of leftist and rightist terrorists were arrested. Three months after assuming control, the military government moved against hitherto legal organizations, such as the leftist trade union DISK, for alleged support of terrorism. The state prosecutor asked the death penalty for 52 DISK leaders. Former RPP notables, such as an Istanbul mayor and Kurdish parliamentarians, were also arrested. In early 1981 Benice

Boran, former head of the TLP, was sentenced in absentia for making Communist propaganda and attempting to establish the domination of one social class over another. In December, arrests were made of 44 prominent members of the Peace Association, a suspected Communist front.

In March 1981 Head of State Kenan Evren announced that about 25 billion Turkish liras worth of arms and ammunition had been seized. Police discovered that the terrorists had developed whole subterranean cultures, and run front organizations from kindergartens to beauty salons to finance terrorism.

In addition to Turkey's problems with domestic terror and Kurdish separatist movements, many Turkish officials suspected a possible Soviet role in support of Armenian terrorist campaigns directed against Turkish officials abroad. Its two main terrorist groups, ASALA (The Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia) and The Justice Commandos for Armenian Genocide often cooperate. Pro-Soviet ASALA claims that its goal is to "liberate" Eastern Turkey and join it to the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic.

As the United States increased its financial aid and political support, Ankara appeared to draw closer to the United States. The visits of Secretary of State Alexander Haig and Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger to Turkey in December 1981 were a source of concern to the Kremlin. At the same time Moscow appeared to tilt toward Greece on the Cyprus issue, in part to curry favor with Greece's new socialist government. In May reports surfaced of a "warning" given to Ankara by Moscow on the

Cyprus issue, though this was probably taken out of context by the source.

The Soviet press complained about the arrests of DISK officials, RPP members and the sentencing of Boran. HAYGA gradually adopted a more critical tone toward the Turkish regime, closer to the position of Moscow's trade union paper Irug.

Some Turks have faulted the military government for not directly accusing Moscow of destabilizing Turkey. But Turkish officials shy away from such a step on the grounds that it serves no useful purpose. The Turks' long experience with the Russians leaves them with few illusions about Soviet intentions. They believe that Moscow inevitably exploits internal weaknesses, and that a strong government and society offer Turkey's best protection against subversion. Furthermore, cooler Turkish-Soviet trade continues to grow. Between 1977 and 1981 it more than doubled, from 162.4 million to 357.2 million dollars. In 1981 alone exports rose 14.6 percent and imports, 9.5 percent.

Conclusions

Turkish-Soviet official relations have been conducted independently of the Soviet Union's relations with the local left. Ankara's crackdowns on Communism have not affected Turkey's relations with the USSR: nor have good relations with Moscow limited Soviet support for Turkey's destabilization. This dual level of relations has existed since the early republic, when Mustafa Kemal crushed the Moscow-supported Communist party while maintaining ties of friendship with the USSR. In the future Moscow will endorse all practical policies which improve its state-to-state relations with Turkey in the same vein, for

example, as it concurrently exploits Turkey's internal weaknesses.

The Soviet Union has five basic options for increasing its influence in Turkey, ranging from working within the existing system to overthrowing it. These are: 1) to work to increase aid, trade and good official relations with any Turkish government, conservative or liberal; 2) to exploit rifts between Turkey and its allies over divisive issues; 3) to work for the election of "progressive" parties such as the RPP, and to support legal pro-Moscow groups such as trade unions, professional and student organizations; 4) to threaten Turkey with the use of force or sanctions; 5) to ferment civil war by means of terrorism or military coup, and install a pro-Moscow regime.

I. Since the Bolshevik revolution Moscow has relied most on the first option. Soviet assistance to the Kemalists during Turkey's war of independence set the pattern of aid, trade and friendly relations that characterized Turkish-Soviet relations from 1920-1939 and from 1960 through the present, making Turkey by 1979 the Soviet Union's largest non-Communist aid recipient. Neither the Soviets nor the Turks have let ideology stand in the way of this development. The first post-war steps in this direction were taken by pro-American leader Ismet Inönü: many of Turkey's most important political documents and trade agreements were signed under conservative governments led by Justice Party leader Süleyman Demirel.

Most Soviet aid has been state sector project aid -- low costs long term credit and technical assistance to build massive

power plants, steel factories and other industries. Such aid has been successful in winning Turkish support because of Turkey's long-term pre-occupation with economic development and its existing state enterprise infrastructure for disbursement.

In trade, too, neither the Soviet Union nor Turkey has shown ideological prejudice since the Soviet Trade Bank opened in the twenties; and apart from the Cold War period, trade has shown steady growth. The implementation of the export-oriented economic stabilization program in January 1979 has meant increased interest in Turkish-Soviet trade from the private sector. In August 1982 a high level delegation of Turkish businessmen visited the USSR. In June 1983 a hard currency agreement replaces the barter terms of previous trade.

Improving state-to-state relations has led to some Soviet influence at the official level. When Soviet-Turkish relations have been good Turkey has shown consideration for the Soviets on sensitive issues, such as Moscow's reaction to U-2 overflights and the passage of certain Soviet vessels through the straits. However, this policy's maximum yield is not a pro-Soviet stance but a neutralist one at best. Nonetheless, since Turkey is a valuable NATO member guarding the Soviet Union's only Black Sea outlet and possessing western Europe's largest standing army, Moscow will continue to give high priority to good relations with Ankara.

II. The Soviet Union has gained most influence in Turkey during periods of Turkish estrangement from the west. Turkish-Soviet cooperation during the early stages of Turkey's revolution ended centuries of conflict, and was the result of Turkey's

diplomatic isolation from Europe. Conflict with the United States over Cyprus and the arms embargo led to Moscow's biggest gains in Turkey. At the height of rapprochement, this included talk of supplying Ankara with arms and providing credits for developing a domestic arms industry.

Moscow has tried to maintain the kind of even-handed stance on Cyprus that will win approval of Turkey as well as Greece, with whom the Soviet Union has important interests. At present Moscow is benefitting from Western European rejection of Turkey, from its aid suspension and threatened expulsion from the Council of Europe. Ankara announced the important business delegations travel to the USSR immediately following Turkey's censure by five European nations over human rights issues. Although it strongly suspected Soviet influence in Turkey's destabilization, Ankara maintained a high level of correctness with Moscow in large part as a counterbalance to Western criticism of the military regime and possible snags in U.S. support.

Moscow has supported Communism among Turkish students and workers in Western Europe, and a number of pro-Soviet exile groups have campaigned against Turkey's military takeover, further straining Turkey's relations with the West. Moscow benefits from the continuing Armenian terrorist campaign directed against Turkish officials; Turkey's diplomatic relations with France have come close to rupture over the issue, which has also strained ties with other allies.

In the future the Soviet Union will probably continue to seize opportunities to exploit difficulties with Turkey's allies

as an important part of long-term strategy. Turkey's detachment from NATO would be a Soviet triumph, although it is unlikely in the foreseeable future.

III. Support for "progressive" forces such as the RPP has been standard for clandestine radio, which urged listeners to vote RPP in 1977 and continually calls for a common front of progressive labor unions, students, professional organizations and the military. During the late 1970's the RPP under Ecevit took important steps to further Turkish-Soviet relations. The former prime minister was slow to condemn the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. In general, however, the election of an RPP government has been felt not so much in changes in Turkish foreign policy, as in increased influence for the left domestically. Direct Soviet support for the RPP does not necessarily help the party, because it distracts from its independent image.

Soviet influence on other legal "progressive" groups has ranged from clandestine broadcast support for trade union strikes to suspected infiltration or even control by KGB members or Soviet agents. Forms of support range from propaganda to financial aid.

Priority to the 1980 intervention. Soviet help for such groups bordered on subversion, since group aims were at odds with those of the state. Hierarchical, disciplined organizations are good instruments for Soviet interests; through them coordinated campaigns for state disruption were made possible and carried out. In the later 1970's for example clandestine broadcasts calls for extensive strikes were followed by bloody strikes and

clashes. A number of influential groups took pro-Moscow positions on many issues. In fact the Soviet Union probably exercised its primary influence in Turkey through the vehicle of such pro-Moscow organizations, rather than through the more anarchic terrorist groups. Thus, Turkey's new constitutional draft severely curtails the right to organize among professional, student and trade union groups.

IV. Moscow has resorted to greater or lesser threats against Turkey on several occasions, without achieving the desired result. Moscow's greatest threat, the territorial demands of the post-war era, pushed Turkey to join NATO and produced the Soviet Union's first major post-war diplomatic failure. It took Moscow fifteen years to heal the ensuing rift with Ankara. During the 1950's the Soviet Union sent Turkey stiff warnings on Middle East issues. More recently Moscow hinted darkly that Turkey's abandoning detente could lead to its end as a "nuclear cemetery": this led to an immediate cooling of relations.

Under present conditions the Soviet Union stands to gain much more from positive inducements than from threats. Its most constant threat is the unspoken but unforgettable one of its own looming presence just north of Turkish territory. For this reason the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan put a check on the Turkish moves toward detente. The USSR is likely to turn to threats only intermittently as a reminder of Soviet clout.

V. For at least fifteen years the extreme left in Turkey has been fragmented into pro-and anti-Moscow groups. The latter

include Maoists, Guevarrists, Trotskyites and splinter groups of all kinds. Leftist antagonism toward Moscow stems from traditions of Turkish-Russian conflict stressed to Turks since childhood, from ideological differences and from the increasingly anarchic quality of the Turkish left which often views the Soviets as reactionary. Under such conditions Soviet control of the entire Turkish left is all but impossible.

A major exception to deep anti-Moscow sentiment is found among factions of Kurdish and Armenian separatist groups. Here traditional anti-Russian feeling is weaker, and some might see the Soviets as potential benefactors. A large proportion of Turkish terrorism originated in Turkey's southeast where Kurds in some areas comprise the majority of the population (throughout Turkey they represent about fifteen percent of Turkey's 45 million population). Arabs, a substantially smaller proportion of the population concentrated in Turkey's southeast, would also be liable to Soviet influence through links with the Moscow-backed Syrians and PLO. There have been some reports of cooperation in Turkey between Kurds and Armenian extremists (perhaps not indigenous to Turkey's own Armenian population of 60,000, concentrated in Istanbul).

In August 1982 there were some 77,254 persons under detention or serving sentences in Turkey, as compared to about 4,000 after the 1971 military intervention. About 80 to 90 percent of the prisoners in 1982 were leftists. A number of terrorist leaders were still at large, having fled to western Europe and the Middle East. Turkish society faces a great challenge to reintegrate these tens of thousands.

Leftist ideologies -- Moscow-inspired or supported or otherwise -- will continue to attract adherents in the 1960's, and the greatest danger lies in eastern Turkey. Social dislocation, rapid urbanization, persistent unequal development among regions and classes, and the proximity of socialist regimes are some of the reasons. Major social and economic reforms are not visible on the political horizon. Turkey's economic austerity program has not eased high unemployment or helped income redistribution.

Turkey's generals hope that a return to Kemalist values can halt this trend, and that a new constitution will cure structural weaknesses. Turkish society is resilient and may have just passed a critical point in its development. To date almost no evidence of possible Soviet influence on military officers has been uncovered, except for a few individuals at the non-commissioned officer level. A cautious reading of Turkey's future is, however, bound to give considerable weight to regional and international developments, and these cannot be read with certainty at this point. Whatever that future may hold, it is certain that the Soviet Union's abiding interest in its southern neighbor will continue.

SOVIET RELATIONS IN THE GULF

DAVID L. PRICE

Soviet-Iraqi Relations

Despite the formality of the Iraqi-Soviet Friendship Treaty (1972), bilateral relations have been difficult, mutually suspicious and more directly affected by events in Baghdad than in Moscow.

Indirect Soviet-Iraqi links began in 1934 with the creation of the Communist Party of Iraq (CPI) but its existence has been precarious and violent and there is no evidence to show that the CPI has had any influence on Iraqi policy. Formal relations were established in August 1944, broken off in January 1955, then resumed in March 1959. In the last 30 years there have been four major bilateral agreements; a trade agreement (Oct. 1958); an agreement on technical and economic cooperation (March 1959); the creation of an Iraqi-Soviet Friendship Society (1959-63 and then 1969 to the present) and a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation (April 1972). Since 1959 and under the wide umbrella of these agreements the Soviet Union has assisted about 40 major projects in Iraq.

The turbulent progress of bilateral relations has presented analysts with a reasonably clear picture of the main agents of Soviet influence in Iraq-military aid, economic assistance and Moscow's opportunism towards the CPI.

Military Aid

The Soviet Union has made its greatest impact on Iraq with military aid and sales programs which provided a direct and fast route to influence. Before 1974 Moscow's arms sales to Iraq totalled about \$2 billion. But after the 1973 Middle East war, the oil price rise, a shift in Soviet strategy and the rising cost of modern weaponry, Iraq was one of four clients (the others were Syria, Algeria and Libya) that accounted for 70 percent of total estimated Soviet sales of \$34 billion in the period 1974-79. It was also attractive to Moscow to be able to demand payment in hard currency from oil-rich Iraq. For example, in 1976, Moscow signed a \$1 billion arms deal with Iraq making it the Soviet Union's top arms recipient. Since that time, Moscow has delivered arms according to the terms of that agreement including MiG-23s and T-62 tanks. The following year, Iraq received one fifth of total Soviet arms deliveries to the Third World.

This massive increase in the sale and delivery of military equipment to Iraq was accompanied by significant numbers of Soviet military technicians and instructors. In 1978 it was estimated that there were 1,100 such technicians in Iraq.⁴ But the training is in two parts because it also includes the instruction of Iraqi personnel in the Soviet Union. It is extremely difficult to calculate the number of Iraqis that have received or are still on training in the Soviet Union; a Western ambassador in the Gulf suggested to the writer that it could be about 600. That seems low.

The quality of Soviet training is a matter for conjecture; the performance of Iraqi forces against the Iranians in the Shatt-al-Arab war suggests that it may not be very good. Soviet instructors in Iraq assist in the assembly and maintenance of military equipment and they groom the officer corps for staff and operational duties. Training courses have been established for an entire range of weaponry -- from small arms to advanced fighter aircraft and air defense systems. Soviet instructors also serve in Iraqi's staff schools and military academy. In their capacity as advisors, Soviet officers have sometimes played key roles in modernizing and reorganizing the Iraqi military establishment. In exceptional cases Soviet officers have been actively involved in combat operations; in the 1974/75 campaign against Kurdish insurgents, Soviet officers directed several tank and artillery attacks. It is conceivable that some Soviet officers were involved in the recent Iraqi offensive against the Iranians but they are obviously well back from the combat zone as none has been captured or become a casualty.

Since the late 1970s, Iraq has diversified its arms supplies by buying French equipment but still remains heavily dependent on Soviet military hardware. Despite its arms sales to Iraq the Soviet Union has not made ideological converts of the Iraqi Baathist leadership. Nevertheless, as a vehicle, the transfer of arms enabled Moscow to neutralize the Baghdad Pact (later CENTO) and it has helped to weaken Western influence in the region. A less tangible consequence of the military relationship is that the Soviet Union has established important contacts with Iraqi military leaders as well as with junior officers who may

eventually hold key positions in the Iraqi power structure. But as the Soviet Union has learned from two Middle East wars, a special relationship with its client could bring it into unwelcome military confrontation with the U.S.

But severe strains have entered the Soviet-Iraqi military relationship partly because of Iraq's persecution of the CPI but mainly because Iraq has condemned the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Soviet neutrality in the Iraq-Iran war, and Soviet reluctance to provide arms for the Iraqi war effort. Two Iraqi military missions visited Moscow in 1981 but both were unsuccessful. In addition, Iraq, in common with some Arab states has been diversifying its sources of military equipment, a move that could weaken the effectiveness of Soviet arms sales as a political lever. It seems ironic that Iraq, which has received about \$10 billion (about 20 percent of total Soviet arms commitment), has moved the furthest among Moscow's major arms clients in seeking other suppliers. In January 1981, the delivery of the first Mirage F-1 fighters -- of 60 ordered in 1977 -- was reported in the Washington Post (2 Feb. 1981), which contrasted markedly to the embargo on major arms shipments imposed by Moscow since the start of the Iraq-Iran war in September 1980.

These strains in the Soviet-Iraqi military relationship serve to underline one of the fundamental weaknesses in that relationship, which is Baathist chronic suspicion of Moscow. It is highly probable that whatever the result of the Iraq-Iran war, the Soviet Union will continue to supply arms to Iraq and that

those arms will be regularly upgraded. Soviet prestige is heavily involved in Iraq and there is a political forfeit to be paid if Iraq were let down by Moscow. Yet, despite Moscow's nearly 30-year military relationship with Iraq, at no point have the Soviets it been able to convert it into effective political leverage within the Iraqi leadership. No one in Baghdad can be called Moscow's man.

Economic Assistance and Trade

The principal channel of Soviet economic assistance to Iraq has been the oil industry. In December 1967, a letter of intent was signed by the Committee for Foreign Economic Relations of the Soviet Council of Ministers and the Iraq National Oil Company (INOC).

The agreement covered exploratory drilling, supply of equipment by the Soviet Union all of which would be paid for by Iraq in crude oil deliveries. Thus a framework was established for a series of agreements and contracts to be made between Iraqi and Soviet agencies not only in oil but in many other fields.

In June 1969 a general agreement was signed between INOC and the Soviet agency Machinexport providing for a loan of \$72 million under which contracts would be negotiated for the provision of drilling rigs, survey teams, oilfield equipment, the services of Soviet experts to assist in preparing designs and specifications and training facilities of all kinds. By 1971 three further agreements in the oil sector had been signed for a total of \$285 million -- all to be paid for in crude oil. Should

crude oil not be available, payment would be made in convertible currency.

There is no doubt that between 1971-1975 Soviet technical assistance to INOC was competent and the Iraqis admitted that their own efficiency had improved. By 1974 Iraq had begun to express its dissatisfaction with the slowness of Soviet equipment delivery and several protocols were signed committing the Soviet Union to expedite the supply of equipment. The Soviet Union also undertook to supply tankers to export Iraqi crude and to construct the projected pipeline from Rumailah to the Mediterranean. In early 1972, a Soviet tanker under charter to INOC left with 21,000 tons of crude oil for the Soviet Union. In the second quarter of 1972 INOC exported 388,183 tons, half of which went to the Soviet Union and another quarter to East Germany. Soon after Alexei Kosygin headed a Soviet delegation to the inaugural ceremonies in Baghdad, a 15-year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was signed on April 9. The Middle East Economic Survey (14 April 1972) stated "...the treaty's significance lies in the fact that it consecrates the economic and political presence of the Soviet Union in the Gulf area". After 1974 the rapid increase in crude oil prices brought home to the Iraqis the liabilities of barter trade. For example, in a 1971 agreement, the Soviet Union fixed the price of barter crude 30 percent below the posted price. Since then the crude oil barter trade between both countries has been slowly but not completely dropped. Moreover INOC has become dissatisfied with Soviet oil industry expertise. In 1979 the U.S. company Halliburton was invited by Iraq to conduct a study of the north

Rumailah field in an attempt to improve production and to introduce enhanced recovery techniques.

Like other countries, Iraq has found that Soviet economic assistance brings with it several disadvantages which a developing country in a hurry -- like Iraq -- simply does not need. By 1978, as a trading partner, the Soviet Union had dropped from fourth to sixth as a supplier and was seventh as a customer (non-oil). The main constraints of Soviet economic aid, as seen by the Iraqis, are that it is tied to equipment purchases in the Soviet Union. At least 95 percent of Soviet economic aid interest must be pre-paid -- traditionally over 12 years -- at a rate of two and a half or three percent. In the Soviet view, economic assistance seems productive and inexpensive especially as the Iraqis had paid in crude oil; in 1978 the Soviet Union received nearly 7 million tons of crude from Iraq. Because the oil market has changed so dramatically in the last few years, Iraq like Libya, has started selling -- not trading its oil to the Soviet Union. The manpower in the Iraqi oil industry is now mainly Iraqi, Brazilian, Indian and French. One interesting area that might be developed is the possibility of the Soviet Union becoming a major commercial importer of Arab and Iraqi oil. If all that were involved were Soviet domestic requirements, Soviet reserves are more than adequate for the foreseeable future. But the Soviet Union has commitments to other Communist states. By 1990 the energy requirements of COMECON members are expected to grow by 250 percent. At the same time the main centers of extraction and production in the Soviet Union

are moving more and more to eastern regions which involves a significant rise in costs. So at this rate more Arabian oil -- especially Iraqi -- is a very attractive proposition. But, given their present problems, the Iraqis are not interested in selling oil for non-convertible currencies.

The Soviet Union faces another obstacle in negotiating Iraqi oil imports: the competition it presents to the petrochemical industries of the Arab oil states. All of them have petrochemical plants in operation which are meant to provide an alternative source of income for those states which will enable them to reduce their dependence on oil exports. But competitive Soviet ammonia sales could average 3 million tons in 1987 and it is unlikely that this quantity can be absorbed by world markets. So if the Soviet Union seeks to import Iraqi oil, Iraq -- and its neighbors -- are justified in asking for a reduction in Soviet petrochemical production. Iraq's honeymoon with Soviet economic aid cooled in the mid-seventies. Visitors to the annual Baghdad Trade Fair have remarked on the predominance of American, French, Japanese, British, German and Italian companies, all of which are doing business in Iraq. Soviet technical assistance was crucial in 1970-1971 in accelerating the development of Iraqi oil industry, but since then, Iraqi economic development has been progressing steadily under the advice and direction of Western consultants and companies. Even the centralized economic plans -- based on the Soviet model and adopted by Iraq -- are being loosened to a point where 30 percent of the Iraqi economy is now run by the private

sector. An Arab diplomat commented that "Soviet aid helped Iraq to move from a crawl to a walk. Iraq can now run unaided".

The Communist Party of Iraq (CPI)

For nearly 50 years, the relationship between the CPI and the Iraqi regime has been disfigured by blood and vengeance. Even when the CPI -- at its most successful point -- was represented in government, it was subsequently persecuted, its leadership hounded into exile and other leading figures hanged or shot. One of the principal sources of tension between the CPI and the ruling Baath party is that they are competitors for power. This was not apparent in July 1968 when a Baathist junta came to power and quickly took control of the Baath party, the state and the military machinery. During 1968-73, Iraqi-Soviet relations peaked and the CPI came closest to sharing power with the Baathists. The Treaty of Friendship was signed and an internal power struggle within the CPI between Soviet and Chinese factions was resolved in the Moscow group's favor. In 1973, the CPI, after some Soviet pressure, agreed to form a progressive National Front with the Baathists and the main Kurdish ethnic party, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP).

But almost immediately the CPI found itself vulnerable to the mercurial spasms of Iraqi-Soviet relations. In the 1973 Middle East war, the Soviet Union supported Egyptian and Syrian efforts to negotiate a settlement with Israel. Iraq was opposed to any negotiations. Moscow also failed to support Iraq in its long-running dispute with Iran over the Shatt al Arab, and disagreed with Baghdad on how to end the Kurdish conflict. It

certainly did not help the CPI's position that many of its leaders were Kurds -- at a time when Iraq tried to destroy the Kurdish insurgency at any cost. In March 1975 Iraq signed an agreement with Iran that ended Iranian support for the Kurds. Moscow complained that it should have been informed about the agreement according to the terms of the 1972 treaty.

Animosity between the CPI and the Baath sharpened in 1978. Its first sign was the Iraqi request to the Soviet embassy to move. The embassy was close to the presidential palace from which it could electronically eavesdrop on discussions in the palace. The embassy refused, then the Iraqis cut off electricity and water supplies to the building until the Soviets complied. In May 1978, 21 Iraqi officers were executed for trying to organize Communist cells inside the army. They had been arrested three years previously. On July 17, 1978, Saddam Hussein declared that the executions had been a political act and that they had been⁸ carried out despite an appeal by the Soviet ambassador. At the time of the executions the CPI lost its only cabinet post and in December 1978, 18 other Communist officers and soldiers were executed. The Baath party's sensitivity to leftist intrigue in the military had some point because clandestine military subversion had given the Baathists power a decade earlier.

This purge of the CPI forced the leadership into exile in Bulgaria and the PDRY where some of them were pursued by agents of the Baathist government. Some Communists left Baghdad to join the Kurdish resistance under Jalal Talabani. There was no formal public comment by the Soviet Union about the persecution of the

CPI. In fact the episode underlined once again Moscow's willingness to sacrifice local Communists in the interests of state-to-state relations. But the purge of the CPI affected these relations and Iraq began to criticize harshly the Soviet Union. Iraq differed with Moscow over Ethiopia -- Baghdad supported the Eritrean separatists while Moscow provided massive military aid to Ethiopia. Iraq also recorded its divergence from the Soviet Union over a Middle East settlement. From the winter of 1978 events in Iraq began to be dominated by the revolution in Iran and by 1980, open warfare between the two countries brought a further deterioration in Soviet-Iraqi relations. Moscow refused to provide Iraq with the military equipment it asked for and Baghdad correctly interpreted Soviet behavior at this stage as another signal of Soviet imperialism and opportunism.

Prospects for the CPI

In Iraq, the CPI is dominated by the Baathist security machinery and is regarded with suspicion and distrust. It is identified solely with the Soviet Union which puts it at a great disadvantage against the Baathist claim to be socialist, Arab and secular. In short it is at the mercy of a violent and vengeful regime. Moreover, the example of the Iranian revolution has flushed out another major threat to the CPI-Islamic fundamentalism. The Communists compete for essentially the same public as the fundamentalists and in the industrial areas of Baghdad and southern Iraq, the Shia fundamentalists have cut a broad swathe through the CPI's potential supporters. The only common factor between them is that, in essence, they are both

anti-regime. But that is not much of a bond because the Baathists will probably intrigue amongst the movements so as to set them at each other's throats. The CPI's only hope is that if it can maintain its organization, and should the present Baathist regime fall, it might be able to do a deal with the incoming junta. Yet in traditional Iraqi fashion, that junta could be even more violent than its predecessor. And if the Shia Islamic fundamentalists participate in political change in Baghdad, they will be as hostile to the CPI as are the Baathists.

Soviet-Kuwait Relations

The historical record of Soviet policy towards the Persian Gulf between 1917 and 1955 reveals that priority was given to the non-Arab regional actors, Turkey and Iran. It is probable that this priority is still high in Moscow's southern policy because these two countries share borders with the Soviet Union. Soviet concern for the security of its southern borders has been especially acute when Turkey and Iran were firmly pro-Western.

Although Soviet interest in the Persian Gulf has been well documented in Soviet-Nazi relations in the 1940s, there was no direct manifestation of it until the early 1970s. At that time British military withdrawal from the Gulf, the emergence of the Indian Ocean as a strategic region, the Shah of Iran's imperial ambitions, the Arab-Israeli dispute, and the scramble for oil supplies were some of the main factors that drew the Soviet Union into the region. In the Arab Gulf, Moscow's position was weak; it had diplomatic relations with Kuwait and Iraq but in neither

case has it been able to convert those links into decisive regional political and military advantage.

Diplomatic relations with Kuwait were established in March 1963 and they were followed by an agreement on economic and technical cooperation (Feb. 1965) and a cultural agreement (March 1967). The first and only arms deal was the sale of a battery of SAM 6/7 missiles for \$50 million in 1979. (A trespassing Iranian Phantom was shot down by a Kuwaiti manned SAM 6 in November 1980). On the face of it the links are modest and do not appear to loom large in the foreign policies of either country. In material terms Kuwait does not receive many benefits from its Soviet links. Moscow supplies lumber, cement, building materials and machinery to Kuwait but this constitutes less than 5 percent of Kuwait's foreign trade. Similar products of better quality and lower prices are available from Asian and Western suppliers.

The cultural and technical links are slightly more visible in the form of ballet troupes, news agency cooperation, fisheries and medical experts and the rare visits of Soviet orientologists. Kuwait's arms inventory is almost exclusively American, British and French. But if neither side gets much in the way of material benefits and concessions, the political value of the link is high. The main justification for the investment from the Soviet side is that (a) the Soviet embassy in Kuwait is the only one in the lower Gulf and it is backed by seven other East European embassies (GDR, Poland, Yugoslavia, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Hungary) all of which combine to form a highly efficient listening post; (b) for the Soviet Union, Kuwait is a channel to Saudi Arabia which Moscow energetically and

assiduously cultivates; (c) the importance to the Soviet Union of earning the goodwill of the six-nation fledgling Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) formed in May 1981 and largely a Saudi creation.

For Kuwait, diplomatic relations with Moscow allows the emirate to play a convincing role as non-aligned nation between the superpowers. This role is played skillfully and gives Kuwait exceptional influence in the region and in the Middle East conflict. Its Foreign Minister can talk to Washington and Riyadh, and also to Moscow and Aden. But this link also brings with it pressures in the form of persistent lobbying by the diplomats of eight Communist nations and the stream of visitors they inspire. In mid-1982 there were about 217 Soviet and East European diplomats in Kuwait, and in six months, major delegations from Hungary, Bulgaria and the Soviet Union visited the emirate. In contrast, non-Communist diplomats in Kuwait were nine times greater in number and there were 37 ministerial visits to Kuwait from Asia, Africa, the Middle East, Europe and North America. But the point about emphasizing the contrast is that the East European and Soviet diplomats and visitors spoke with one voice, and presented a united front. East European diplomats have told the writer on several occasions that each Communist embassy or delegation in its turn raises the question with Kuwaiti officials of Soviet-Saudi relations. The Eastern bloc has tried to organize two freelance operations like a Bulgarian trade fair in the UAE and an East German cultural week in Bahrain. Both were courteously blocked by the host governments. Most of the Communist diplomats in Kuwait are allowed to visit

some of the lower Gulf states like Bahrain, Qatar and the UAE, but none, with the exception of the Romanians and Yugoslavs, are allowed to visit Saudi Arabia and Oman.

In many respects, East European links with Kuwait allow these countries to earn much-needed hard currency. When the Bulgarian president, Todor Zhivkov visited Kuwait in March 1982, the joint communique mentioned that Bulgaria was seeking "...economic cooperation particularly in industrial and touristic fields in addition to sources of finance" (Kuwait News Agency, 13 March 1982). Kuwaiti officials and ministers have visited every East European state and the Emir of Kuwait visited Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Romania in 1981.

Kuwait and Soviet-Saudi Links

Since early 1979, in a move related to the Iranian revolution, the Soviet media has maintained a steady and cordial attitude towards Saudi Arabia. But it was not until November 1981, following the Emir's visit to the Balkans, that the Soviet press singled out Kuwait. The Soviet newspaper, Sovietskaya Rossiya (12 November 1981) praised the role that Kuwait played in the affairs of the Middle East and the world. "The government of Kuwait" it said, "firmly adheres to the principle of positive neutrality. It consistently stands for the consolidation of peaceful security, for reducing international tension, for the termination of the arms race, for the elimination of all seats (sic) of crises and for the eradication of the remnants of colonialism". The article noted that the Kuwaiti leaders have repeatedly made a "...high appraisal of the stand maintained by

the U.S.S.R. which speaks up firmly in support of the right of the Arab Gulf states to use their national wealth at their own discretion. Kuwait was one of the first states in the region to back up the well-known proposals by Leonid Brezhnev on ensuring peace and security in the Gulf". This last statement is a total falsification of the record. When Kuwait's Foreign Minister visited the Soviet Union in April 1981 the joint communique was vague on the Brezhnev proposals and when the Kuwaiti minister returned to Kuwait he stated candidly that Kuwait and the Soviet Union held different views on Gulf security.

Subsequently, the London-based Financial Times (16 November 1981) ran a story about imminent Soviet-Saudi links. The story alleged that Saudi Arabia promised its oil-producing neighbors that it would "... urgently review the question of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. The pledge is understood to have come after strong pressure from Kuwait which has had an ambassador in Moscow since 1962. The other members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) are believed to have indicated they were prepared to exchange ambassadors with Moscow". But, consistent with tradition, Saudi Arabia officially denied the reports. Yet the pattern is set; the Soviet Union is in no hurry to clinch it with Saudi Arabia. After all, it has time and has been pursuing the same general trends of its foreign policy since 1917 -- some Soviet watchers argue that parts of that policy are of even greater vintage. At the moment, Kuwait's close association with Saudi Arabia is convenient for the Soviet Union; it

might just serve Soviet purposes, something might just come of it.

Kuwaiti-Soviet Links and the GCC

The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), formed in May 1981, is a political association of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the UAE and Oman. Its Secretary General is the former Kuwaiti ambassador to Washington, Abdulla Bishara. Although the GCC is a Saudi creation, its public image is Kuwaiti. Not surprisingly, the Soviet Union took an interest in its formation. Initially, that interest was in the form of spoiling tactics, especially when Kuwait was, momentarily, at the center of the Arab-Soviet relationship. The Soviet ambassador to Kuwait, Nikolai Sikachev was interviewed by a local Arabic daily, Al Seyassah (14 March 1981) and the GCC -- the hottest topic around at the time -- was not mentioned. Through their South Arabian clients, the PDRY, the Russians tried to persuade the GCC conference in Muscat (March 1981) to address the issue of U.S. facilities in the Gulf and the Horn of Africa. A Saudi diplomat pointed out that the PDRY message did not mention the Soviet military presence in Aden.

A year later the Soviet attitude may have changed but it has yet to be officially recorded. The Soviet Union may be playing the waiting game until the GCC's policy towards Moscow is defined. In fact, the issue of Soviet-GCC relations has presented Bishara with a few problems. At the second GCC summit in Qatar (Oct. 1981) he discounted speculation that the GCC would discuss diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. He stressed

that member states of the GCC, "...not even Kuwait, have requested the inclusion of the diplomatic ties with Moscow on the agenda" (Qatar News Agency, 28 Oct. 1981). Five months later, Bishara was again on the defensive: "Gulf countries are maintaining a dialogue with Eastern Europe directly and through embassies in Kuwait. The GCC has no East European embassies but that will not affect the dialogue. Embassies are not important to make contact with these countries" (Emirates News Agency, February 3, 1982).

A month later, interviewed on Kuwait television, Bishara spoke with more candor. "The Gulf countries are reluctant to exchange diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries because they have no initiative in world affairs. But the absence of relations with them does not mean that the Gulf states are aligned against them". Bishara added that "...the Soviet Union is involved in problems directly affecting the GCC member countries. Oman had complained that the Soviet Union is playing a role in the Sultanate's dispute with South Yemen". He disclosed that the question of exchanging diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union had been under discussion for nearly a year within the GCC. "Kuwait and the PLO have been trying to talk Saudi Arabia and other GCC members to balance their relations with the West by exchanging diplomatic ties with Moscow and East European countries" (Kuwait News Agency, 21 March 1982).

A month later Bishara's premonitions were fulfilled when the GCC suspended the dialogue with the Eastern bloc countries soon after the Soviet Union refused to guarantee it would not meddle

in the domestic affairs of the region. To quote a Kuwaiti official, "we were convinced we stood to gain nothing from a dialogue and diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries".

Conclusion

Soviet-Kuwaiti diplomatic relations have produced insignificant material benefits in the last 20 years. But for both parties, those links have political and symbolic significance that greatly exceeds bilateral trade and cultural relations. The Communist presence in Kuwait provides a long-term listening post for petro-political events in the Persian Gulf, a conduit for Soviet-Saudi relations and a diplomatic antenna to monitor and react to (and possibly influence) the emergence of a regional, political strategic alliance.

Nevertheless, despite the tenacity and opportunism of Soviet policy towards Kuwait, there is no sign that Kuwait's national interest or political behavior has been affected by that policy. The emirate's material interests are served by the West, it is unlikely to be invaded by Soviet forces, pro-Soviet subversives have no prospects in the state, and the pressures that bear most heavily on Kuwait are those exerted by Saudi Arabia, Iraq, more recently Iran, Islamic fundamentalism and the Palestinians.

THE U.S.S.R. AND EGYPT

by Alvin Rubinstein

When the post-Stalin Soviet leadership embarked on its forward policy in the Third World in the mid-1950s, relations with Egypt figured prominently in the Kremlin's thinking. Egypt (with India) was the centerpiece of Soviet attention and expectations. Over the years, the Soviet Union invested enormous economic, military, and political capital in pioneering undertakings, ranging from construction of major projects to restoration of the fighting capability of a client defeated in war to deployment of combat forces on behalf of a client faced with defeat at the hands of a U.S.-backed regional rival.

During almost three decades of sustained and intense interaction, the Soviet quest for influence in Egypt was marked by frustrations and stunning setbacks, greater than those experienced by the U.S.S.R. in any other courted Third World country -- and all of them despite commendable Soviet behavior as a patron and protector. A verdict of "failure" would seem warranted, and even in Soviet circles there are probably those who would agree. However, in assessing Soviet policy in a Third World country, it is important not to impute to Soviet leaders criteria of success and failure that appear reasonable or compelling to us, and not to overlook the broader context within which that policy evolved. The Soviet Union pursues a number of simultaneous objectives in the Third World: to support governments whose regional policies oppose those of the United States and its clients; to acquire military facilities; to

undermine Western influence; to encourage reliance on the Soviet Union; to enhance the position of local Communist parties; and to promote the establishment of Soviet-type vanguard parties. Such a full plate complicates the process of determining the hierarchy of Soviet preferences, which is a necessary step if we are to ascribe success or failure to a particular policy.

A key to the enigma of Soviet policy is the notion of strategic context. The priorities that impel Soviet leaders and explain why they persist in believing the game is worth the candle inheres in the quest for local and regional advantages conducive to the advancement of Soviet imperial aims. Criteria for evaluating Soviet policy may be identified in order of importance: first, the changed configuration of regional alignments that emerge as a consequence of Soviet behavior; second, the extent to which U.S. policy or interests are undermined; and third, the increase in Soviet influence in specific countries or movements.

Soviet-Egyptian relations are analyzable in terms of discrete periods during which certain priorities and characteristics predominated. This periodization -- 1955 to 1967, 1967 to 1973, and 1974 to the present -- highlights the continuities and changes in Soviet policy, the means used to implement that policy, and the principal accomplishments and disappointments. It allows for evaluating past Soviet influence and speculating about future Soviet prospects. Moreover, such an approach could facilitate comparison with Soviet efforts toward other Third World countries, and it suggests that the quest for

influence is a cyclical, on-going process rather than a zero-sum game.

From 1917 to 1945 the U.S.S.R.'s policy in the Middle East focused on geographically contiguous Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan. After World War II, despite new opportunities, Soviet prospects in the Arab East were bleak. Stalin's attempted blackmail of Turkey and Iran and his support in the United Nations General Assembly for the partition of Palestine and the creation of the State of Israel intensified the Arab world's deeply ingrained suspicions of Communism, whose philosophy of materialism was diametrically opposed to the tenets of Islam. Arab Communists, drawn primarily from ethnic and religious minorities, were weak, generally of low status, and isolated from mainstream nationalist movements.

The Soviet Union and Egypt discovered one another in the changed domestic, regional, and international circumstances that followed the death of Stalin in March 1953 and the emergence of Gamal Abdel Nasser after the toppling of the monarchy in July 1952. On the one hand, Soviet leaders aimed to undermine the interlocking system of alliances that the United States was trying to extend to the Middle East. On the other, Nasser, opposed to the establishment of Western-sponsored military pacts in the region, resented the flow of British arms to Iraq, Egypt's main rival in the Arab world, and felt frustrated by his inability to purchase weapons for strengthening his army against Israel. This convergence of interest paved the way for expansion of Soviet-Egyptian relations. On September 27, 1955, after a number of visits by Soviet officials and a flurry of secret

negotiations, Nasser announced a major arms agreement between Egypt and Czechoslovakia (the U.S.S.R.'s temporary surrogate). Arms became the key to Moscow's entry into Egypt and its subsequent campaign for influence.

Soviet aims were to undermine the Western (particularly American) political-military presence in the Arab world, establish a Soviet presence there, and encourage a pro-Soviet orientation among Arab nationalist movements. The outlines of a far ranging Soviet strategy for attaining these objectives emerged during the mid-1950s: to support those Arab regimes that opposed Western military groupings in the Middle East; to encourage regimes that opted for nonalignment politically and the non-capitalist path of development economically; to exploit the Arab-Israel dispute; to use political rivalries in the Arab world for improving its position with anti-Western regimes; to expand economic and military ties in order to acquire political influence; and to encourage, where feasible, the legitimization of Communist participation in Arab nationalist movements.

The changes in Soviet policy preceded a doctrinal revisionism whose impetus came from a more sophisticated appreciation of the possibilities that existed for penetrating the Third World. This "forward policy" received ideological sanction at the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in February 1956, when Nikita S. Khrushchev stressed the political-strategic importance of the Afro-Asian world and the uses that the emerging "zone of peace" could have

for the promotion of Soviet interests; but it was driven by the urge for strategic advantage.

From 1955 on, Soviet-Egyptian relations became a function of U.S.-Egyptian relations: deterioration in the latter led to improvement in the former. During the 1954 to 1957 period, when Moscow's role was still minimal, Washington exaggerated the extent to which Moscow could exploit Nasser for its own purposes and underestimated Nasser's capacity for unpredictable initiatives. The 1955 Soviet-Egyptian arms deal proved fateful, because it alienated the United States and Britain, as well as heightened Israel's fears; and because it emboldened Nasser, leading both to his recognition of the People's Republic of China in May 1956, a move that, in turn, impelled Secretary of State John Foster Dulles to withdraw support for America's financing of the Aswan High Dam, and to his nationalization of the Suez Canal Company in July 1956, thus triggering the chain of events that prompted Israel, Britain, and France to attack Egypt at the end of October 1956.

Though it was American, not Soviet, pressure on Britain, France, and Israel that forced their withdrawal and saved Nasser, the Soviet Union's prestige nonetheless rose spectacularly in the Arab world as it replaced Egyptian arms lost to the Israelis in Sinai, lent Egypt several hundred million dollars for economic development, and upheld Cairo's position in United Nations discussions. Khrushchev spoke out strongly on Egypt's behalf, but he carefully avoided any military actions that might elicit a forceful response from the United States, still the preeminent military power in the region. He did, however, further expand

Soviet assistance to Egypt: in October 1958, Moscow agreed to finance the construction of the Aswan Dam; trade increased, as did interaction in the political and cultural spheres.

The revolution that overthrew Nuri Said's pro-Western regime in Baghdad in July 1958 and that had been hailed by Moscow and Cairo, paradoxically, caused their first serious disagreements. During the 1959-1961 period, the Soviet Union found itself increasingly supportive of Iraq, at a time when relations between Egypt and Iraq turned sour because of contentiousness over how best to advance Arab unity. For Moscow, Iraq took a correct position on key issues. For example, whereas Nasser was trying to balance good relations with the U.S.S.R. with an improvement in ties to the Western countries, Iraq was militantly hostile to the West; whereas Egypt suppressed local Communists, Iraq tolerated them; and whereas Nasser engaged in bitter public exchanges with Khrushchev over the merits of Arab socialism versus the Soviet variant (scientific socialism), Iraq posed no such ideological challenge.

Shrewdly, Khrushchev kept Moscow's mini-Cold War with Cairo over outlook, strategy, and issues from interfering with the steady expansion of economic and military ties. He did not wish to alienate Nasser, who was enormously popular in the Arab world. Moreover, by mid-1961-1962, disenchantment with Iraq's strongman, Abd al-Karim Qasim, had set in because he turned against local Communists. However, it was military considerations that loomed most prominently in Khrushchev's decision to tone down his disagreement with Nasser. The May 1961 Albanian eviction of the

Soviets from the naval base they had enjoyed at Valone since the end of World War II and the imminent U.S. deployment of Polaris submarines in the Mediterranean whetted Moscow's strategic interest in Egypt and prompted intensification of its courtship of Cairo.

Moscow increased the size of its aid programs and backed Nasser's intervention in Yemen from 1962 to 1967: the 60,000 to 80,000 troops were Egyptian; the weapons, supplies, and logistical support were Soviet. By subsidizing Nasser, the Kremlin sought to advance several objectives: above all, to deepen Nasser's dependency, in order to obtain naval facilities for the Soviet Mediterranean fleet; to intensify pressure on the British in Aden, and on Saudi Arabia; to establish close ties with a new "progressive" force and prevent its being overthrown by "reactionary," Western-supported leaders. Throughout, it played up the threat from imperialism. Ideological and political dilemmas were subordinated to the pursuit of strategic and military objectives. While aid to Egypt did not bring Moscow a privileged position until after the June War, it did induce Nasser to persist in a policy that narrowed his options and heightened his dependence on the U.S.S.R.

For reasons of his own, Nasser muted his disagreements with Khrushchev. On the eve of the Soviet leader's visit in May 1964, he amnestied imprisoned Communists in a gesture of political reconciliation. He also permitted Soviet naval ships to make visits, but refused to negotiate any permanent arrangements. Indeed, notwithstanding four official visits (in 1961, 1965, 1966, and 1967) by Soviet Admiral Sergei G. Gorshkov and

extensive Soviet military assistance, Moscow had very little to show for its courtship; "Egypt itself was taking more than it was giving.

After Khrushchev was deposed in October 1964, his successors, urged on by the Soviet military, worked hard to strength Soviet-Egyptian ties. Economic aid was increased; high-ranking officials exchanged visits more frequently; and major arms agreements were concluded in November 1964 and again a year later. But none of this brought tangible military benefits or political influence over Egyptian policy.

In broad strategic terms, however, the Soviet Union's support for Nasser had helped to nurture a diplomatic environment in the Arab world that was conducive to development of a substantial Soviet presence in this heretofore uncongenial region and that positioned Moscow in the spring of 1967 to take advantage of unanticipated events. Relations between Moscow and Cairo were good, but far from intimate. It took a catastrophe to bring the Soviets the military privileges they coveted.

II

Egypt's defeat in June 1967 proved a boon for the Soviet Union. It paved the way for a massive infusion of Soviet military and economic aid and, more importantly, of Soviet advisers and military personnel: some 2,000 advisers, including about 800 attached to the air force, arrived very quickly to help in the retraining. Cairo's dependence was total: the army and air force had to be re-equipped and retrained to handle advanced

aircraft and surface-to-air missile systems; Soviet advisers operated at all levels of the army; the economy required imports of food, industrial materials, and machinery, much of which Moscow financed on favorable terms with little prospect of repayment. Nasser's vulnerability and need for Soviet protection led him to grant the military privileges that the Soviet military had sought since 1961 -- naval facilities at Alexandria and Port Said and airfields for the use of Soviet aircraft, which could engage in ASW operations and reconnoiter the movements of the U.S. Sixth Fleet. Between 1967 and 1969 alone, the U.S.S.R.'s input into Egypt was in the range of three to four billion dollars, though rough approximations of the actual cost fail to convey the central position that Moscow acquired in Egypt.

Soviet leaders handled Nasser skillfully. They made no demands, exerted no pressure. True, there was no need: Nasser acted admirably from their perspective. He had provided military facilities; championed an anti-U.S. coalition in the Arab world; brought the Soviet Union into intimate contact with Arab nationalist movements; pruned the military of social "reactionaries," and encouraged an enormously expanded Soviet role in Egypt's economy and armed forces. Yet Moscow was to discover that while a commanding position could bring many concrete advantages, exercising political influence and institutionalizing Egypt's dependency were highly improbable without imposing onerous controls that jeopardized the very influence it had seemingly acquired.

Nasser's strategy after June 1967, deliberate or intuitive, was to enmesh the U.S.S.R. increasingly in the defense and

promotion Egyptian interests without surrendering ultimate authority or sovereignty. Though heavily dependent on Soviet aid, Nasser was not a satrap. He neither introduced the extensive socio-economic changes counselled by Soviet advisers nor legalized the Communist party. As Egypt recovered, he strove not only to allay domestic restiveness and restore his prestige in the Arab world, but also to put the Israelis on the defensive. Shows of military assertiveness in late Summer 1968, initially with sniper fire across the Suez Canal and the laying of mines on the Israeli-held eastern bank of the waterway, and followed by sporadic artillery and air duels in the canal area during September and October, intensified, without consulting Moscow, creating a crisis atmosphere that would force the United Nations and particularly the great powers to require an Israeli withdrawal. When months of inconclusive diplomatic maneuvering passed, he decided to launch, over Soviet opposition, the "war of attrition" -- his interim answer to an unacceptable stalemate. Moscow was anxious to prevent the situation from escalating further. Between its post-August 1968 military occupation of Czechoslovakia and clashes with the Chinese along the Ussuri River in March 1969, the Kremlin had its hands full. But Nasser went his own way and carried the reluctant Soviets along with him.

Despite Nasser's total military dependence on the Soviet Union, two issues cramped the Soviet-Egyptian relationship in the summer and fall of 1969: Moscow's inability to dissuade Nasser from escalating the fighting and its unwillingness to exert the

kinds of pressure that might have given him pause. For example, judging by the lavish expenditure of artillery shells, it did not restrict supplies, for fear that such blatant pressure would undermine its position in Egypt.

Nasser's war of attrition backfired, however. Far from forcing Israel to reconsider the price of occupying Egyptian land, it resulted instead in heavy Egyptian losses along the canal from the Israeli air force's as well as relentless pounding in Israeli deep penetration raids, which by mid-January 1970 had extended to the outskirts of Cairo itself. Nasser's plight -- indeed, his very political future -- impelled him to fly secretly to Moscow on January 22 for four days of talks with Soviet leaders.

Unwilling to abandon the man who had brought them into the mainstream of the Arab world and in whom they had already invested considerable resources and prestige, Soviet leaders sharply raised their ante to the point of committing 20,000 combat troops to man missile sites and the air defense of Egypt's heartland. For the first time in its history, the Soviet Union assumed an operational responsibility for the active defense of a non-Communist country. The decision was leavened by Nasser's offer of unhindered Soviet military access to Alexandria, Port Said, and Sollum, as well as unrestricted use of six major airfields, and freedom to deploy Soviet ground air defense personnel and combat pilots -- all of this in studied contrast to June 1967, when Moscow's request for exclusive control over areas quartering Soviet advisers had been rejected. Moscow saved Nasser and further secured its military-strategic foothold. By

the time of the cease-fire of August 7, 1970, and until July 1972, Soviet privileges in Egypt were at a record high; and Moscow thought it had a dependent client capable of resisting but not defeating Israel and therefore sensitive to its wishes and goodwill.

When Nasser died on September 28, 1970, Moscow expected continuity in leadership but instead watched a succession struggle that resulted in the virtual elimination in May 1971 of Nasser's entire entourage, on which it had predicated further cultivation of the privileged Soviet position in Egypt. Concerned over the unexpected turn of events and the durability of its strategic assets in Egypt, Moscow pressed for a formalization of the Soviet-Egyptian relationship. An unprecedented pledge of soviet support for a non-Communist Third World country, the resulting treaty of friendship and cooperation, signed on May 27, 1971, explicitly committed the Soviet Union to the defense of Egypt suggesting that Moscow believed it would obtain an important return in influence over Egyptian policy. Soviet leaders felt obliged to expand their commitments merely to preserve their existing position. But the treaty did not improve that position in any sphere of Egyptian life; on the contrary, the Soviets were constrained to be silent while Sadat suppressed "progressive" elements and took such "bourgeois" steps as increasing the permissible size of private landholdings.

On the eve of Nasser's death, the U.S.S.R's military position in Egypt was at its apogee: the elaborate and thickened

air defense system, which was one of the strongest in the World, was Soviet-operated; the advanced MiG-21s were Soviet-piloted and only Soviet personnel handled the new MiG-23s and the deployed Su-11 fighter-bombers; Moscow enjoyed extensive air and naval privileges; and Soviet advisers functioned from the battalion level to the highest echelons of the Egyptian High Command. Yet, despite the impressive Soviet military presence, and Egypt's heavy dependence, Moscow's political influence was more apparent than real. As Nasser had demonstrated when he ignored Soviet advice and launched the war of attrition, Egypt's dependency did not give the patron-protector automatic control over its policy. The reasons go to the heart of superpower-Third World relationships, namely, that they are asymmetrical both as to aims and accomplishments, and involve an active give-and-take. The donor is not a free agent unaffected by the courtship. In its quest for advantages, the U.S.S.R. had to accept restraints on its use of power and assets that are systemically derived. In sum, it had to tolerate irritating, frustrating local fractiousness, and unpredictability on the part of the courted country's leadership. This is the price that a superpower must pay to stay in the influence game in the Third World, and Third World countries have learned to exploit this phenomenon to their advantage. They undoubtedly hoped that the treaty would frustrate Washington's attempt to work out an Egyptian-Israeli settlement without Soviet participation and weaken the position of those in Sadat's circle who favored increased contacts with the United States.

Despite the treaty, Moscow found Anwar Sadat -- the new Pharaoh -- difficult. He wanted more weaponry than it was willing to supply; the Egyptian military was restive over the brusque and patronizing attitude of Soviet advisers; and the completion of the Aswan Dam in January 1971 brought new high-priced requests for economic assistance. Also, Sadat helped to suppress a Communist-inspired coup in the Sudan in July 1971, cracked down on Egyptian Communists, and flirted with ways of improving relations with the United States. On July 8, 1972, a little more than a year after the signing of a treaty that Moscow thought a guarantee of its presence in Egypt, Sadat informed the Soviet ambassador that the services of Soviet military advisers would no longer be required, part July 17. Frustrated by his inability to augment the flow of arms and increasingly convinced that Moscow and Washington, in the interest of promoting detente, had agreed to freeze the condition of "no war, no peace" in the Middle East, Sadat decided that an "electric shock" was needed to straighten out the Soviet-Egyptian relationship.

On July 19, 1972, Sadat publicly announced the termination of the mission of Soviet military personnel (between 15,000 and 20,000), including all Soviet pilots. Of the once extensive Soviet military presence in Egypt, only the naval privileges were allowed to remain more or less as before. By the summer of 1973, three years after the Soviet Union had shielded the Egyptians from certain defeat, the Soviet position in Egypt had slipped considerably, but still retained some advantages. In the economic sphere, Soviet involvement in the industrial sector was important. In the military sphere, though deprived of the use of

Egyptian airfields, the Soviet Union was permitted the continued use of ports and anchorages. (By 1976, the once prominent Soviet military presence was a thing of the past.) This stunning turn of events demonstrated that neither a major presence nor heavy dependency would necessarily assure influence for the patron, and that a superpower unable or unwilling to impose its military power directly on the domestic system of a client state was vulnerable to the vagaries of a client's change of attitude or policy.

A limited reconciliation preserved the Soviet-Egyptian relationship intact until the Arab-Israeli war of October 1973. By early 1973, Moscow had resumed arms deliveries to Egypt at pre-July 1972 levels, mostly thanks to Sadat's newfound Saudi Arabian bankroller, ready and willing to provide hard currency for Soviet arms purchases: what the Soviet Union was reluctant to supply gratis in large quantities, it happily (and quietly) sold for much-needed hard cash. The flow of weaponry into Egypt had proceeded apace, notwithstanding Moscow's ire at Sadat's abrupt curtailment of military privileges and its criticisms of his rebourgeoisization of Egypt's economy and deviation from socialism.

The decision to go to war on October 6, 1973, was made in Cairo and Damascus. The conflict was one Moscow did not want but did nothing to prevent. Once the fighting began, the Soviet Union showed itself more protective of its Arab clients (especially Syria) than of detente with the United States. Within 72 hours it mounted a major effort to resupply them with

critical items such as surface-to-air missiles and equipment, antitank ammunition, tanks, and assorted light weapons. Again, as in 1970, the Kremlin acted very much the generous and protective patron, shielding Egypt and Syria from defeat and enabling both countries to emerge from the war with significant political gains. It stymied U.S. attempts to arrange for cease-fire resolutions at the United Nations until the tide turned against the Arabs militarily; used the Soviet navy provocatively for the first time in a Middle East crisis; and signalled a readiness, if need be, to risk confrontation with the United States in order to keep Israeli forces from destroying the Egyptian Third Army on the eastern side of the canal and moving on Cairo.

Yet, hardly had the cease-fire taken hold on October 25 than Sadat jolted Moscow by sending his Foreign Minister to Washington to negotiate, among other things, a restoration of diplomatic relations (which was effected on February 28, 1974). After having forcefully demonstrated its credibility as a patron, Moscow found itself, paradoxically, odd capital out in Cairo, as Sadat proceeded to plump all his eggs ostentatiously in Washington's lap. The Soviets had provisioned Egypt, saving it again from certain defeat, and imperiled their detente with the United States, only to find their relations with Sadat worse than ever, and the Soviet Union relegated to the sidelines in the negotiations to bring an end to the cycle of Arab-Israeli wars.

Sadat's mercurial turn to Washington and open alienation of Moscow was prompted by a combination of personal, political, and economic reasons. In July 1972 and again in October 1973, he

took momentous steps in foreign policy without apparent regard for Soviet interests or preferences and despite Egypt's complete dependence on Soviet arms and its heavy reliance on Soviet economic aid and foreign trade.

III

For the next two-and-a-half years, acrimony and increasing friction characterized Soviet-Egyptian relations. Sadat's contemptuous treatment of the Russians was evident even in the disparaging way in which Cairo dragged its feet on the routine matter of gratifying the Soviet desire to participate in the clearing of the Suez Canal in the spring of 1974. But it was his decision to go public in criticizing Moscow that most directly poisoned the relationship. By impugning Soviet good faith and support for the Arab cause, he raised a critical finger at its presence in the Arab world. Whatever the astute and cogent arguments for his disaffection with Moscow, intense and long-standing animosity underlay his aversion to the Russians. Sadat's anti-Sovietism and his conviction that only Washington could deliver a return of Egyptian territory meshed, so that one consideration was indistinguishable from the other.

Sadat frequently criticized the Soviets for their failure to provide him with arms, but the nub of the quarrel was his interest in a new superpower patron. Brezhnev, annoyed with the public bickering and innuendo about Soviet reliability, saw no reason to make new deliveries, certainly not without payment. Moscow also distrusted his policy of deNasserization, seeing in

it a design to diminish economic and political ties to the U.S.S.R.

On March 14, 1976, Sadat dealt Moscow another blow, calling for termination of the 1971 treaty. Less than twenty-four hours later, Egypt's People's Assembly approved his request and Soviet-Egyptian relations plummeted to a new low. The move caught the Kremlin by surprise. Only several weeks earlier, at the Twenty-fifth Congress of the CPSU, Brezhnev had declared that the Soviet Union regarded the treaty "as a long-term basis of relations meeting both the interest of our countries and the entire world." In July 1972, when Sadat had expelled the Soviet military, the Soviet government had been forewarned; but not in March 1976. A month later, he announced cancellation of facilities for the Soviet navy. In less than five years, the formerly impressive Soviet military position in Egypt had turned to sand.

During the next five years, Moscow's relations with Sadat further deteriorated. Moscow refused to reschedule Egypt's debts, prompting Sadat in October 1977 to declare a moratorium on repayment of the military debt, while continuing payments on the commercial debt. Likewise, it balked at supplying more than a trickle of spare parts for Egypt's Soviet weapons, stressing that the Egyptian leadership itself had spurned the services of the Soviet military and turned instead to the West. As things went from bad to worse, it increasingly engaged in bitter exchanges over foreign policy issues. The Soviet Union called Sadat's visit to Jerusalem on November 19, 1977 a "betrayal" of the Arab cause, and roundly denounced the subsequent diplomacy that culminated in the Camp David Accords and the Egyptian-Israeli

Peace Treaty of March 26, 1979. It upheld the Arab confrontation states' position and encouraged the anti-Sadat coalition in the Arab world. Everywhere, from the Maghreb to Afghanistan, from Lebanon to the Horn of Africa, Moscow and Cairo found themselves on opposing sides.

In mid-September 1981, Sadat slashed even the thin diplomatic, economic, and cultural strands that remained of the once extensive and significant relationship: he expelled Ambassador Vladimir Poliakov and a number of embassy personnel, allegedly because of their complicity in sectarian unrest, and reduced the Soviet embassy staff to the size of Egypt's mission in Moscow; closed the U.S.S.R.'s military bureau in Cairo; ordered the termination of contracts for the more than 1,000 Soviet technicians working on various industrial projects with which the Soviet Union had long been associated, notably the Aswan Dam and the Helwan Iron and Steel Works; and dissolved the Egyptian-Soviet Friendship Society, founded in 1968, during the halcyon period of the relationship.

IV

When Sadat was assassinated on October 6, 1981, Soviet-Egyptian relations were at their lowest ebb since the days of Stalin and King Farouk. Nothing remained of the once vaunted Soviet influence in Egypt. Before speculating on the prospects for Soviet-Egyptian relations and the conditions under which a major Soviet presence might again be established, an appraisal of why the U.S.S.R.'s influence proved so short-lived. is

warranted. There are a few policy-relevant generalizations to be gleaned from this analysis of the Soviet-Egyptian experience between 1955 and 1981.

First, Soviet inputs in the form of military and economic assistance, technicians, and diplomatic support, and even the deployment of combat forces in defense of Egypt, did not automatically translate into stable and usable influence over Egyptian policy. They were essential for establishing a presence and acquiring privileges after 1967, but were not enough for institutionalizing influence. Lacking a compliant indigenous leadership that would willingly subordinate its desires to Moscow's preferences or a Soviet readiness to compel obedience through the direct intrusion of military power, a privileged position for the U.S.S.R. depended more on Cairo's dire need and calculated goodwill than on continued generous Soviet infusions of aid. Until now, only in Afghanistan has Moscow found the mix of cadres and circumstances promising enough for it to use force to retain an entrenched position in a Third World country.

Second, the amount and kind of Soviet aid do not appear to have made much difference when it came to exercising influence on Egypt's internal system. The importance of this observation cannot be overemphasized. Donors have a habitual tendency to assume a casual connection between aid and influence, expecting the flow of aid through the donee's institutions to leave a heavy residue of influence. There is no evidence, however, that aid enabled Moscow to mobilize or strengthen the position of those Egyptian officials or bureaucratic-interest groups that were disposed to accommodate to Soviet desires. The situation of the

Egyptian Communists did not improve much, nor was Moscow disposed to lobby on their behalf after it had obtained extensive military privileges. Nor were Egyptian military or political elites ever purged out of deference to its wishes. (The upheaval in the Egyptian air force after the June War was dictated strictly by military, not social or political considerations.) Soviet propaganda and cultural activities operated under very close scrutiny, and from every indication had no impact on Egyptian life or the attitude of the elite. Indeed, even in the heyday of the Soviet presence, anti-Soviet currents prevailed throughout the leadership. Egypt did not restructure any of its institutions to Soviet equivalents: the one party system in Egypt is a very different organization from the CPSU. Despite much fanfare in the press, neither Nasser nor Sadat really shook up their ministries, practices, or priorities in line with Soviet suggestions, leading one Soviet journalist to observe that "dealing with Egyptians is like swimming in glue."

In the military sphere, Cairo accepted Soviet advice on how best to use the weaponry it received, but it did not look to Moscow to develop a foreign policy or mount an initiative.

Third, strategic and military considerations, not ideology or economics, guided Soviet diplomacy. Moscow sought to develop as close a relationship with the Egyptian leaders as they were prepared to accept. It gave extensive aid as long as they pursued policies ultimately congenial to the U.S.S.R.'s interests. Thus, the U.S.S.R. saw benefit in encouraging Cairo's opposition to Western-sponsored alliance systems, its efforts to

overthrow Western-oriented Arab governments, and its willingness to provide military facilities. Moscow exploited Egypt's desire for arms and the regional conflict in which Cairo was imbroiled. It persisted in the face of periodic frustrations because its long-term and overriding purpose was to undermine the U.S. position in the region.

Fourth, the relationship revolved around the recognition by both parties of its asymmetrical character, both as to aims and advantages. What mattered most to Moscow was of little importance to Cairo, and vice versa. Stripped of illusions and devoid of trust, the Soviet-Egyptian relationship fed on tactical necessities. Moscow's leverage on issues of importance to Egyptian leaders was at best marginal once Cairo resolved upon a course of action. Gratitude for Soviet support did not carry with it any willingness to tolerate Soviet interference in Egyptian decision-making on key issues.

Over the years, Cairo sought from Moscow the military, economic, and diplomatic support that would facilitate Egyptian ambitions in the Arab world and provide advantages in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Moscow, on the other hand, sought to establish a major presence in Egypt, not principally with the expectation of turning it onto a "socialist" or incipiently Communist path, but in order to acquire strategic advantages relative to its perceived geopolitical rivalry with the United States. Thus, it was willing to accelerate the Middle East arms race and raise the level of tension, albeit within bounds that it hoped to be able to control.

Fifth, that the Soviet-Egyptian relationship degenerated, was not due to any change in the U.S.S.R.'s commitments or credibility; it was a function of Sadat's personality and shift in policy orientation. Time and again, Moscow proved a reliable patron-protector. From the beginning of its courtship of Egypt in 1955, and especially from 1967 to 1973, there was not one instance in which it sought to whittle away or renege on a basic commitment. At times, this required that it yield to Egypt's preferences, as it did in 1968-1970 during Nasser's war of attrition and in October 1973, for reasons that may be applicable to patrons in general in Third World settings: A donor derives more benefit from the broad consequences of a donee's policy that it favors than from the immediate and tangible advantages of its inputs. In brief, the Soviet Union courted Egypt in order to improve the strategic context within which it pursued its principal objectives in the region, notably, the erosion of the American position. The rebuff it experienced was unanticipated and, viewed in terms of the quantity and significance of the assistance it rendered, deserved.

V

In the years ahead, Soviet prospects in Egypt look bleak. Moscow is unlikely to reestablish a major presence or enjoy the extensive military privileges that it had in the late 1960s-1970s. This assessment rests on the following assumptions: that Hosni Mubarak, Sadat's successor, will not succumb to the incubus of unifying the Arab world but will rather concentrate on the consolidation of his power and on Egypt's serious internal

problems; that once having regained all its territory from Israel, Egypt will not resort to war to advance Palestinian claims or its own ambitions in the Arab world; that the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty assures no war between the two former regional enemies, as long as the United States is prepared to shoulder a hefty part of their military and economic burden; that the United States will accept this role for the foreseeable future; that the Egyptian military favors closer ties with the United States; and that as long as U.S.-Egyptian relations remain good, Soviet-Egyptian relations will be insignificant.

At the heart of the above set of assumptions is the hypothesis that any future restoration of Soviet privileges in Egypt would be contingent upon a deterioration in U.S.-Egyptian relations and a return by Egypt to confrontation with Israel. Both of these circumstances, aggravated by Nasser's hostility not only toward the West's military presence in the region but also toward pro-Western, monarchical Arab regimes, were preconditions for Moscow's entry into Egypt. In the absence of this specific constellation of circumstances, the Soviet Union finds an environment that offers few prospects for acquiring influence. It was the quest for weapons that led Egypt to look to the Soviet Union, whose principal attractions were as a supplier of arms a protector against defeat. As one looks ahead, neither seems likely to loom large in Egyptian thinking. Unlike Nasser, and Sadat from 1970 to 1973, Mubarak has no real need for Soviet military assistance and political guarantees. He seeks basically to preserve not overturn the territorial and political status quo

in the region (excepting, notably, the knotty, vexing Palestinian question), and thus views the Soviet Union warily.

THE SOVIET UNION IN AFRICA:

AN ASSESSMENT

by

RAYMOND W. COPSON

Introduction

The Soviet Union has made significant gains in Africa in the past decade. Four African countries -- Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, and the Peoples Republic of the Congo are signatories¹ to treaties of friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union. Soviet military advisors and Cuban troops are apparently well-entrenched in Ethiopia, strategically located on the Red Sea opposite Saudi Arabia and along the approach touez. Cuban troops and Soviet advisors are also in Angola, a country in mineral-rich southern Africa and one which has considerable economic potential in itself. A number of other countries have regimes that follow domestic and foreign policies that are broadly approved in Moscow. The dean of Soviet Africanists,² Anatoly Gromyko, counts "over a dozen" "socialist-oriented"³ countries on the continent.

Despite these gains in Africa, however, the Soviet Union continued to suffer -- as it had in earlier years -- serious setbacks in its African policy. It lost its position in Sudan and Somalia, and saw its role in several other countries significantly reduced. Perhaps as a result of such setbacks, Soviet observers of Africa appear to have adopted a decidedly guarded view of the prospects for Soviet influence and Marxist socialism on the continent. This view is accompanied by a realistic assessment of Africa's grave economic, political, and social problems.

Soviet policy toward Africa at the present time is heavily concentrated on the Horn of Africa and the southern part of the continent. The strategic location of these areas, as well as the

mineral wealth of southern Africa, are no doubt major factors attracting Soviet interest. Further Soviet gains in these areas in the short term are conceivable. A government favorable to the Soviet Union could come to power in Namibia at some point -- although this is by no means certain. Coups might occur in the Horn, as elsewhere in Africa, that would bring pro-Soviet regimes into office.

Whether such gains would prove to be lasting gains, however, must be of concern to Soviet analysts. Soviet experience in Africa has demonstrated that friendly regimes can be overturned in countercoups. They can also undergo changes of heart that suddenly draw them to the West. Moreover, Soviet analysts, like their Western counterparts, must grapple with Africa's highly uncertain economic prospects in looking toward the future. Serious agricultural problems, burgeoning populations, and a host of other problems confront the majority of African countries with a future in which political instability and social turmoil loom as distinct possibilities.

Perhaps the Soviet Union can profit from instability and turmoil in Africa. But doing so would appear to require major economic and possibly military commitments that would compete with high-priority demands on Soviet resources elsewhere in the world. To date, Soviet capabilities for dealing with Africa have proven to be quite limited, and not always implemented with skill. Thus, the Soviet ability to achieve dominance in Africa or to exclude Western influence, even in the long term, is very much open to question.

Current Soviet attitudes toward Africa

Despite its gains, the Soviet Union today is by no means jubilant over the situation in Africa. Soviet officials and analysts are able to muster only guarded optimism when contemplating the prospects for Marxist socialism on the continent. President Brezhnev, speaking of the "newly free" nations to the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in 1981, said

These countries are very different. After liberation, some of them have been following the revolutionary-democratic path. In others, capitalist relations have taken root. Some of them are following a truly independent policy, while others are today taking their lead from imperialist policy.³ In a nutshell, the picture is a fairly motley one.

Professor Gromyko is concerned about the fate of even the socialist-oriented states in Africa. Taking note of "economic disproportions, numerous social problems still unresolved, and scientific and technological backwardness" in Africa, Gromyko has written recently that "the position of the countries that are⁴ aiming to improve their people's welfare is not an easy one."

Ideology no doubt compels the Soviets to continue to expect the eventual victory of Marxism in Africa, but they are making no predictions about when this victory will occur. Brezhnev issued no clarion call to revolution at the 26th Party Congress. But he made it clear that the Soviet Union would remain active in the Third World:

The CPSU will consistently continue the policy of promoting cooperation between the U.S.S.R. and the newly-free countries and consolidating the alliance of world socialism and the national liberation movement.

Modest Soviet expectations for Africa are firmly rooted in hard experience. While there have been, on balance, a number of gains for socialist and Marxist forces on the continent in recent years, there have also been serious setbacks. Soviet influence in Sudan was virtually eliminated after a leftist coup against President Numeiry failed in 1971. In November 1977, Somalia, which had been the first African country to sign a treaty of friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Union, expelled all Soviet advisors and broke relations with Cuba. In August 1979, the regime in Equatorial Guinea, which had allowed the Soviet Union to use facilities on its territory as a jumping-off place for operations in Angola, was overthrown in a coup. The new government refused to renew a Soviet lease on a fishing depot used by Soviet trawlers apparently equipped with advanced electronic gear.

Even the victory of Robert Mugabe, a self-declared Marxist, in the April 1980 elections in Zimbabwe was something of a setback for the Soviet Union. During the long guerrilla war in Zimbabwe, Soviet aid had gone primarily to Joshua Nkomo, Mugabe's non-Marxist rival. Soviet tacticians had evidently judged Nkomo to be the likely victor in any post-war leadership contest. Mugabe was understandably disappointed by his treatment at Soviet hands, and he waited 6 months after taking office before inviting

the Soviets to open an embassy. U.S. and British embassies had been permitted from the beginning.

The history of Soviet setbacks in Africa extends back to the earliest days of Soviet involvement in independent Africa.⁷ Soviet assistance to Prime Minister Lumumba in the Congo (Leopoldville), now Zaire, in 1960-1961, helped to precipitate Lumumba's overthrow by pro-Western forces. Moreover, the Soviets were strongly criticized by many African leaders for unilateral interference in Africa and for sabotaging the United Nations peacekeeping operation in the Congo. Guinea, one of the first countries to receive Soviet assistance after independence, denied landing rights to Soviet planes during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962.⁸ Governments that had been friendly to Moscow were overthrown in Ghana in 1966 and in Mali in 1968.

These experiences, together with other, lesser setbacks in bilateral Soviet relations with African states, have forced the Soviets to adjust to certain realities of the African situation. Two adjustments seem critical.

(1) Coming to a realistic estimate of Africa's political and economic problems. Soviet writers in the Khrushchev era were known for their optimistic assessments, from the Soviet perspective, of the prospects for economic and political development along socialist lines in Africa.⁹ Experience tempered this enthusiasm. Soviet writings on Africa today are more likely to stress the obstacles to economic growth, political stability, and socialist development in Africa. Larded with condemnations of "international imperialism," "neocolonialism,"

and "provincial dependent capitalism" as the root causes of
Africa's difficulties,¹⁰ these writings also acknowledge hunger,
disease, poverty, and adverse natural conditions as significant
limiting factors on Africa's potential. The increase in
petroleum prices during the 1970s is also recognized as a major
economic problem, although (perhaps for diplomatic reasons) this
increase is attributed to "transnational corporations" rather
than to Middle Eastern and African oil producers.¹¹ Assessing
such factors, one Soviet analyst has concluded,

All this, in combination with the unfavorable forecasts for
the trends in world capitalist production in the current
decade, gives no grounds to hope for radical positive
changes in the developing world.¹²

This vision of Africa must restrict Soviet expectations of
what can be accomplished on the continent in the years ahead.
Clearly there is a possibility of economic disintegration and
political instability in Africa in the future which would make it
difficult for any outside power to exercise influence. A country
which wishes to retain even marginal influence is going to have
to respond Africa's economic difficulties with large amounts of
economic assistance. But the Soviet Union has not been a
generous aid donor in the past (see below), and its ability to
become more generous is in question.

(2) Appreciating the strength and appeal of the Western
economies in Africa. As much as some Africans themselves may
denounce "economic imperialism" and "neocolonialism," the fact is
that Western consumer goods, industrial and agricultural

equipment, technology, and skills are widely recognized on the continent as superior to the Soviet equivalents. Western banks, Western corporations and businessmen, and Western technical personnel are widely dispersed around the continent. Countries that have undergone a reduction in the Western presence, such as Guinea and Angola, have suffered for it. Typically, they have sought at least a partial return of the Western presence. Angola, indeed, recently welcomed a visit from David Rockefeller, retired chairman of Chase Manhattan Bank, for two days to talks on increased U.S. private investment in the country. ¹³

Soviet observers acknowledge the appeal of the Western economies in Africa, and indeed accept that even the socialist-oriented governments must continue to operate in an economic environment strongly influenced by the West. According to Gromyko,

Suffice it to say that the socialist orientation in Africa has come about and is developing with these countries still living within the framework of the world capitalist economy. ¹⁴

This remark could, in addition, be interpreted to imply that a Western economic role in the socialist oriented countries is necessary to the growth and development of those countries.

This is not to say that the Soviets are pleased by continued strength of the Western economies in Africa. One writer has complained that Africa is "encountering fierce resistance on the part of the neocolonialists and their allies and their local ¹⁵ herichmen." ¹⁶ But this and other, similar comments only

underline the Soviet acknowledgement of the economic influence of the West in Africa.

Behind the vehemence of Soviet denunciations of "neocolonialists" in Africa there lies a recognition of the limited Soviet ability to compete. Faced with serious economic problems at home, the Soviet Union has been able to contribute to Africa's economic development in only a modest way. Substantial efforts have been made in a few countries, but from 1954-1979, the U.S.S.R. has provided only \$1.2 billion in aid to sub-Saharan Africa.¹⁷ The United States, which has historically been outpaced by some other Western donors in Africa, gave \$5.7 billion over a comparable period,¹⁸ while the Western nations and Japan together provided the same amount -- \$5.7 billion -- in 1979 alone.¹⁹ The Soviets gave \$1.7 billion in economic aid in 1979 worldwide,²⁰ so it is clear that they would be hard-pressed to compete with the West in aid to Africa. Reliable data on Soviet trade with Africa are not available,²¹ but clearly the U.S.S.R. is in no position to compete with the tens of billions that flow between the West and the African nations each year.

Soviet Strategy in Africa

An element of uncertainty must exist in any analysis of Soviet strategy. In the absence of an open policy discussion in the Soviet Union, or of an investigative press, the possibility of hidden plans and goals can never be dismissed. The analyst is left to examine official statements and authorized academic publications, both of which are usually couched in heavily propagandistic terms, and to draw inferences from Soviet actions.

This kind of analysis suggests that one goal of the Soviet Union on the continent is to weaken the West in a region in which it is acknowledged to be quite strong. According to Brezhnev, "In a thousand ways, the imperialists are trying to bind themselves to these countries in order to deal more freely with their natural riches and to use their territory for strategic designs."²² From this perception, it naturally follows for the Soviets, that steps should be taken to counter the Western role in Africa, even if the Soviet Union and its friends on the continent are not yet in a position to terminate that role.

Soviet planners evidently hope that with time, a large bloc of anti-Western, Marxist states with close ties to the U.S.S.R. can be created. Angola, Ethiopia, and Mozambique -- states which are perceived as being on the "left flank" of socialist orientation in Africa²³ -- are expected to lead in this movement. One Soviet analyst has written of their role:

These states may come close to direct integration with the world socialist system, which in its turn will be a fresh factor in a further deepening of the crisis of present-day capitalism.²⁴

Countering Chinese influence in Africa may still be a factor in Moscow's thinking, although China is only a marginal influence on the continent today. Anatoly Gromyko is still able to bluster against China's "aspiration for hegemonism and anti-Sovietism,"²⁵ and for allegedly "aiding the neocolonialists" in Africa.²⁶ Soviet observers recognize, nonetheless, that the principal

Chinese threat to their interests today is in Asia, not in
27
Africa. It may be, however, that one part of Africa - the Horn
- is strategically significant to the Soviet Union partly because
of the rivalry with China in Asia. According to one analyst, the
Horn has served as a way-station and strongpoint on a key
shipping-route to southeast Asia, where that rivalry is
28
keenest.

The Horn is probably more significant to the Soviets,
however, because of its strategic location on the southern flank
of the Middle East. Soviet interest in the Horn first became
apparent in the mid-1950s, when Somalia was provided with the
Soviet arms that made it a regional military power. In the
1970s, the region probably became more important to the Soviets
because of their loss of influence Middle East itself. Thousands
of Soviet advisors and military personnel were expelled from
Egypt in 1976, and by the end of the decade, Egypt and Israel
were implementing a peace settlement arranged entirely under
American auspices. Losses at the center of the Middle East,
however, seem to have increased Soviet interest in the flanks of
the region. The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, Soviet
attempts to gain influence in Iran after the collapse of U.S.
influence there, and the Soviet role in Ethiopia may thus form a
pattern reflecting Soviet strategic concerns over the oil-rich
region on its southern border.

Long-term Soviet plans for the Horn are not clear, and may
not have crystallized even in Soviet minds. Soviet planners may
envisage a linked system of socialist-oriented states in the
region, perhaps including Somalia after a coup or a second

realignment and -- across the Red Sea -- South Yemen. There may also be some hope that Sudan could eventually be included in such a system.

Bringing Ethiopia, long wary of encirclement by Islam, into a system of cooperation with Moslem nations would be a test for Soviet diplomacy and pressure tactics. But Ethiopia did enter into a cooperation agreement with Libya and South Yemen in August 1981, suggesting that idea may have some potential. A belt of friendly nations extending across the Horn and into Arabia would, it need hardly be pointed out, provide the Soviet Union with opportunities for extending its influence deeper into the Middle East. It could also offer significant military benefits in the event of a superpower confrontation in the Middle East or the Persian Gulf.

Southern Africa is the other region of Africa that is clearly of special interest to the Soviet Union. With Portugal's withdrawal from Angola and Mozambique, and the victories of Marxist, Soviet supported revolutionary movements in those countries, Moscow scored two of its signal foreign policy successes of the 1970s. The prospect of a South African withdrawal from Namibia, a mineral-rich territory with a population of less than 1 million, holds out the possibility of another gain in the region in the near future. Informed analysts, however, are not yet ready to predict the future behavior of an independent Namibian government headed by Sam Nujoma, the leader of the guerrilla opposition. Nujoma has received Soviet support (as well as support from African and

other sources), but he is widely regarded as enigmatic and unpredictable. In any event, the Namibian peace process is being sponsored by five Western nations led by the United States, so that the final settlement may contain provisions that will limit Soviet opportunities. At the present moment, it should be noted, a South African withdrawal from Namibia is far from certain.

Meanwhile, there is a palpable Soviet fascination with the future of South Africa itself, where an alleged Soviet KGB major was recently expelled after what was reported to be his fourth mission to the country. Soviet analysts are well aware of the mineral wealth and strategic location of this country. Moreover, because of what they see as "deepening class contradiction," a growing "African proletariat," and the inevitable failure of reform efforts directed by the "local big bourgeoisie," Soviet observers evidently believe that the country has revolutionary potential.

Just how strong this belief may be is difficult to assess. Soviet analysts also recognize the strength and effectiveness of the South African government. According to one Soviet writer,

The Pretoria regime still possesses considerable economic and military potential and powerful repressive machinery. It is doing all it can to stem the tide of the revolutionary movement.

But even if, as seems likely, the U.S.S.R. is not expecting early revolutionary change in South Africa, it now has a foothold in the region from which it will undoubtedly seek to influence the direction of any such change, whether in the long or the short term. Soviet military advisors in Angola and possibly

Mozambique, close Soviet ties to the governments of these countries, and Soviet aid to the African National Congress as well as the Mozambique-based South African Communist Party, have provided the Soviet Union with a position from which it can try to exploit developments in South Africa as they occur.

Elsewhere in Africa, it is difficult to discern clear military/strategic ambitions behind Soviet conduct. If such ambitions are present they probably take the form of a desire for military access for use in the event of as yet undefined contingencies. Some observers, for example, believe that the Soviet Union may itself hope to use an 1,800 meter runway it is helping to build as an aid project in Mali. This facility does not tie with any immediate known Soviet objectives, but it would be useful in dispatching transport planes to a variety of African destinations.

In general, the Soviets seem concerned to maintain ties with a variety of regimes -- ties which can have diplomatic, economic, and intelligence benefits -- and to take advantage of opportunities for increased influence as they present themselves. In Ghana, the Soviets swiftly befriended the new regime of Flight Lieutenant Rawlings, which took power in a New Year's (1982) coup. Rawlings is popular among African youth, who see in him a zealous, pure-in-heart challenge to corrupt politicians. Backing Rawlings is good public relations for the Soviets, who probably have little expectation of long-lasting gain in a country as stricken with economic difficulties and political instability as in Ghana.

Meanwhile, the Soviets are careful to keep on the good side of the very different government in Nigeria. Nigeria's civiliair regime is at the apex of a boisterous political system indeed, where charges of corruption often fill the air, and it oversees an active capitalist economy. Nigeria, in short, is far from a socialist orientation. But Nigeria is also Africa's most populous nation, its economy is the largest on continent, and its army -- at 132,000 men -- is second in size only to Ethiopia's on the African continent. In short, this is not a country from which the Soviet Union can afford to be excluded if it is to play a major role in African affairs. Thus, Soviet publications are full of praise for Nigeria as, in the words of one writer, a country that "pursues both a realistic foreign and a national domestic policy." ³⁴ Nigeria is singled out for its efforts to ³⁵ restrict the activities of "transnational corporations;" ³⁶ academic exchanges are carried on; and substantial economic assistance is sent in Nigeria's direction (see below).

Soviet Tactics in Africa. Ambitions alone cannot assure a successful foreign policy. The fact that the Soviet Union has ambitions in the Horn, in southern Africa, and elsewhere by no means guarantees that it will realize these ambitions. Estimating the prospects for Soviet success requires an assessment of Soviet Union's tactics on the African continent and of its capabilities for successfully implementing those tactics in the future.

With tactics as with strategy, an element of uncertainty must hang over the discussion. To some degree, Soviet tactics in

Africa remain hidden. The outside observer may never learn what is said in private meetings when the leaders of "socialist oriented" states visit Moscow. Are strongarm techniques employed? Are threats made? How often? Nor is it easy to discover how Soviet advisors in Africa carry out their activities on a day to day basis.

Questions linger over the possibility of Soviet involvement in a number of specific events in Africa. Were the Soviets, through their Cuban allies, involved in the 1978 uprising in Zaire's Shaba province, or did the Carter Administration badly misread this crisis in implicating Cuba in this incident? Did the Soviet Union have foreknowledge of the 1977 Angolan coup attempt launched by a faction thought by some to be more pro-Soviet than President Neto? Was any encouragement provided to Rawlings, who visited Libya prior to his second takeover in Ghana? These are fascinating questions, but the answers may never be known.

In Liberia, there has been some recent suspicion of the Soviet Union. The new government in Liberia, which seized power in April 1980, flirted a briefly with the Libya and the Soviet Union, but in May 1981, for unexplained reasons, it ordered a reduction in the size of the Soviet embassy. In June, Liberian authorities seized a cargo of electronic equipment being offloaded from a Soviet ship directly into a Soviet embassy car.³⁷ But again, the details of Soviet covert activity, if any, remain shrouded.

Economic Assistance

Soviet economic assistance to African countries is an important instrument of policy, even if it is a limited instrument. While only a few countries are likely to receive Soviet aid in a given year, more than 25 countries have benefitted from U.S.S.R. assistance since their independence.

The impact of Soviet assistance may be magnified by the way it is channeled into large-scale infrastructure projects. The U.S. assistance program is focused on directly aiding the poorest of the poor in Africa, and it goes primarily toward the rural areas. The future may judge that this approach has made the greater contribution to African development, but the Soviet approach, some argue, enhances the usefulness of aid for political and propaganda purposes. Much Soviet aid is devoted to

³⁸
industrial projects, such as a major pipeline project in Nigeria and the Ajaokuta steel project in that same country.

³⁹
Some 6,000 Soviet personnel are expected to come to Ajaokuta -- located in a country that does not receive U.S. economic assistance because of its oil wealth. In Mozambique, Soviet personnel are reported to be engaged in the development of coal

⁴⁰
mining and in oil exploration, and the Soviets have supported ⁴¹
railway and road construction in Angola. In so far as

agriculture is supported, the Soviets concentrate on assisting large-scale farming and on providing farm machinery.

Economic assistance as an instrument of Soviet policy is largely constrained by the limits -- noted above -- on the Soviet

economy. The Soviet Union, given its other priorities at home and in the defense field, is simply not in a position to provide aid to Africa on a vast scale.

Another difficulty for the U.S.S.R. in the field of economic aid is that the Soviet economic experience may be of only limited relevance in Africa. Food and agriculture are critical problems on a continent where per capita food production is falling at a rate of 1.4 per cent annually.⁴² But the Soviet Union, facing a food crisis of its own, can hardly become a major supplier of food aid in Africa. Its background in collective agriculture and state farms restricts its ability to contribute to increasing agricultural output in Africa, where rapid production increases on the part of individual small farmers are widely seen as the only road to early food sufficiency.

When Soviet aid for infrastructure projects brings in large numbers of Soviet technicians, the opportunities for friction with Africans increase. Reports suggest that Soviet personnel show a tendency toward clannishness in Africa, forming tightly-knit communities that disdain social interaction with Africans. Soviets are also reputed to be condescending and impatient in dealing with their African counterparts. In August 1979, Nigeria expelled a number of Soviet air-force instructors, and offensive⁴³ behavior might have contributed to the decision to do so. Certainly the expulsion raises questions about the possibility of significant frictions when large numbers of Soviets arrive at Agadeuta.

The Soviet Union, moreover, has acquired a name for sharp-dealing and attempts to exploit its economic relationships with

African countries. According to one report, Angola "provides the rent and utilities for the Soviet's housing, pay \$620 a month for every Cuban school teacher, allows the Soviet Union to keep 75 percent of the fish caught off the Angolan coast, and repays its debts for weapons with most of its income from oil and coffee."⁴⁴

Reports that Ethiopian coffee sent to Eastern Europe in repayment of debts has been resold on world markets in competition with exchange-earning Ethiopian export coffee are not likely to have been well-received in Addis Ababa. The Soviet negotiations with Nigeria over the Ajakuta project were extremely prolonged,⁴⁵ lasting from 1967 until 1976. This may have indicated Nigerian wariness over the terms of the deal -- and perhaps also over possible Soviet political intentions toward Nigeria.

Nor are African recipients satisfied with the quantity and quality of Soviet aid. President Sekou Toure of Guinea, once the foremost Soviet ally on the African continent, has complained openly about the Soviet failure to develop his country's bauxite industry. Colonel Mengistu, the Ethiopian Head of State, actively seeks increased Western assistance and is making some effort to rebuild his country's tourist industry -- suggesting dissatisfaction with the volume of Soviet assistance flowing into his country. Angola and Ethiopia also encourage aid from a variety of sources, and apparently do not regard Soviet aid alone as adequate. Soviet economic assistance in Africa, in short, is a foreign policy instrument of decided limits.

Security Assistance

The Soviet Union far outstrips the United States as an arms supplier to the African continent, and its role has been expanding in recent years (Table 1). Soviet security aid, however, has been geographically concentrated. In terms of dollar value for the period 1975-1979 (the most recent period for which unclassified data are available), 44 percent of Soviet security assistance went to Ethiopia.⁴⁶ Angola, at 15 percent (Table 1) for the same period, has been the second-ranking recipient, and lesser amounts of military aid have been spread to at least 17 other countries.

Soviet military advisors have assumed increasing importance in Africa in recent years. They are thought to have directed the Ethiopian offensive against the Somali invasion of 1977-1978 and are probably playing a role in the current Ethiopian offensive against Eritrean guerrillas. A few have been killed or captured in southern Angola. It is estimated that there are 4,000 Soviet military advisors on the African continent at present, heavily concentrated in these two countries and in Mozambique.⁴⁷ Approximately 11,000 military personnel from these countries and from several others have received training in the Soviet Union.⁴⁸

Cuban troops in Africa also serve as an instrument of Soviet policy. Cuba no doubt has its own leadership ambitions among the Third World nations. In pursuing these ambitions, it is more than a "surrogate" for the Soviet Union. But without Soviet financial and logistical support, the presence of these troops in

Table 1 1/Weapons Delivered by Major Suppliers to Africa (Sub-Saharan) 2/

<u>Weapons Category</u>	<u>United States</u>	<u>U.S.S.R.</u>	<u>Major Western European 3/</u>
<u>1973-1976</u>			
Tanks and Self-Propelled Guns	10	460	60
Artillery	20	940	230
APCs and Armored Cars	30	850	240
Major Surface Combatants	0	1	2
Minor Surface Combatants	0	16	37
Submarines	0	0	0
Supersonic Combat Aircraft	0	120	50
Subsonic Combat Aircraft	0	50	10
Other Aircraft	10	10	200
Helicopters	10	30	80
Guided Missile Boats	0	2	0
Surface-To-Air Missiles (SAMS)	0	600	190
<u>1977-1980</u>			
Tanks and Self-Propelled Guns	20	1 060	20
Artillery	200	2 150	170
APCs and Armored Cars	10	1 520	520
Major Surface Combatants	0	4	9
Minor Surface Combatants	0	44	30
Submarines	0	0	0
Supersonic Combat Aircraft	20	210	20
Subsonic Combat Aircraft	0	90	10
Other Aircraft	10	60	80
Helicopters	0	100	110
Guided Missile Boats	0	2	1
Surface-To-Air Missiles (SAMS)	0	1 360	10

1/ Reprinted in part from U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs. Changing Perspectives on U.S. Arms Transfer Policy. Report prepared by the Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office (September 25, 1981), p. 21.

2/ U.S. data are for fiscal years (and cover the period from July 1, 1972 through September 30, 1980). Foreign data are for calendar years given.

3/ Major Western European includes France, United Kingdom, West Germany, and Italy totals as an aggregate figure.

Africa would be impossible. While providing such support, the Soviets are using the Cuban troops for their own purposes.

The Cuban forces were particularly useful to the Soviet Union in 1975 through 1978, when they played a crucial role in consolidating the power of the Marxist MPLA party in Angola and in beating back the Somalis in the Ogaden. Their attraction for the Soviet Union probably lies in their ability to engage in combat in Africa without sowing the sort of alarm that Soviet forces themselves would create. The Cubans, in African eyes, can appear to represent a minor power, far away, that is little threat to African independence. Moreover, the Cuban troops -- themselves culturally influenced by long ties between their island and the African continent -- are more accepting of Africa than Soviet troops could ever be. Racial frictions are evidently not a problem.

Today there remain an estimated 15,000 to 19,000 Cuban troops in Angola, 12,000 to 17,000 in Ethiopia, and small contingents in a few other countries. For the present, they are quiescent. They have avoided engaging South African forces during their incursions into Angola. Cuban troops in Ethiopia as far as is known, are not taking part in the current fighting in Eritrea, but are positioned to resist a new Somali attack (which is not regarded as likely). The reasons for this quiescence are not known. It may be that the Cuban government has grown wary of the domestic impact that deaths in foreign wars can have; that, in Angola, Cuban troops are reluctant to go up South African forces; and that in Ethiopia, Cuba is reluctant to fight Marxist

Extract groups it once supported. Some combination of these and other factors may be at work.

On rare occasions, the Soviets have undertaken overt naval movements in order to bolster their African allies and intimidate opponents. Soviet naval vessels appeared off Angola in 1976,⁴⁹ and South Africa charged that a Soviet naval task force was moving along its coast following the South African incursion into Angola in August and September 1981. In February 1981, Soviet ships were sent to ports in Mozambique following a South African raid against opposition movements based in that country. The Soviet Ambassador to Mozambique said that the vessels had come under the 1977 Soviet-Mozambique Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation, and warned, "if anyone attacks us or our friends, we will give a suitable response."⁵⁰

Security assistance can be a powerful instrument of foreign policy on a continent where so many regimes are threatened by internal and external enemies. The Soviets made their greatest gains in Nigeria when they provided weapons during the 1967-1970 civil war. Somalia's attack on Ethiopia, itself carried out with Soviet-supplied arms, initiated Ethiopia's dependence on the U.S.S.R. Arms aid, however, is also a limited instrument.

Too prominent a role as a supplier of weapons on the African continent can be damaging to a superpower's reputation. The Soviet role as an arms-provider to Idi Amin's Uganda, which continued ever as evidence of Amin's bizarre behavior in domestic and foreign policy accumulated, damaged the Soviet Union in African opinion. The same is true of Soviet aid to Equatorial Guinea's repressive Macias Nguema, overthrown in 1979.

Most African governments regard requests by other governments for assistance from outside powers as a legitimate exercise of sovereignty and do not openly object when even large-scale arms shipments or Cuban troops arrive by request. But all are highly sensitive on the issue of maintaining Africa's independence, and many are worried that the Soviet role in supplying arms could one day threaten that independence. General Olusegun Obasanjo, then the Nigerian Head of State, warned the Soviets in 1978 that they should not "overstay their welcome," and added, "Africa is not about to throw off one colonial yoke for another."⁵¹ Too many reactions of this sort could lead to a reduction of Soviet influence on the continent.

Africans are not always pleased with the Soviet arms that are delivered, and this can lead to frictions. Nigeria was reportedly dissatisfied with both the quality and the rate of delivery of Soviet weapons during the civil war.⁵² Moreover, in the arms field, as in economic aid, the Soviets are known for their parsimony. Zambia, with a deeply troubled economy but facing repeated raids from Rhodesian armed forces, signed an arms deal with the Soviets in 1979 that cost it \$100 million.⁵³ Ethiopia's coffee crop appears to be heavily mortgaged to pay for Soviet military aid.

Propaganda

The Soviet Union carries out a major propaganda campaign in Africa. Radio Moscow beams 273 hours of broadcasting in 10 languages toward Africa each week, compared with 219 hours for

the 230 and 125 hours for the Voice of America. In addition, the Soviets circulate numerous press reports aimed at the continent and sponsor the publication of journalistic and academic articles with the African audience in mind.

Soviet propaganda directed toward Africa often stresses ideological themes which have a sympathetic audience there. A favorite claim is that "transnational corporations" driven by the quest for scarce raw materials and "superprofits" are ruthlessly exploiting Africa and its people. Meanwhile, it is argued, the United States, in the search for strategic facilities, is accelerating the arms race in Africa and sowing the seeds of international discord. Such ideas, which attribute Africa's problems to non-African forces, inevitably have a certain appeal.

Misinformation is frequently provided in Soviet propaganda. In recent months, for example, Soviet sources have alleged that the United States is cooperating with South Africa in order to produce chemical and biological weapons for use against South Africa's black population. They have also charged that the U.S. has conspired with Britain to overthrow the new Ghana government; plotted to overthrow President Kaunda of Zambia; and attempted the ouster of Zimbabwe's Prime Minister Mugabe. The United States is repeatedly portrayed as engaged in intensive military cooperation with South Africa and as aiding Jonas Savimbi's UNITA opposition in Angola. U.S. "military penetration" of an impoverished Somalia is another frequent complaint.

The effect of this propaganda in Africa is difficult to assess but appears limited. The few listener surveys that exist,

as well as unscientific observation, indicate that African audiences are far more likely to listen to the BBC and the Voice of America (or Radio France in the Francophone nations) than to Radio Moscow. The clear bias and heavy-handedness of Moscow's broadcasts apparently deter listeners, who seek objectivity elsewhere. Nor does Soviet propaganda in the print media seem to have a significant African audience. Nonetheless, it is striking that the charges made against the United States in Soviet propaganda sometimes recur when the United States is criticized in the African media or on African campuses. This could be entirely coincidental, but it may also be that the Soviet propaganda effort does have some influence.

Soviet tactics in Africa have their mundane side as well. A steady stream of visitors between Africa and the Soviet Union is apparently intended to cement relationships. "Uzbek peoples' representatives,"⁵¹ Lithuanian officials, and a host of other Soviet delegates have made the journey to Africa, while officials of African labor unions, political parties, and governments travel in the opposite direction. Medical care is available in the Soviet Union for the leaders of friendly countries. These things are also done by the Western nations, and at least as far as medical care is concerned it seems likely that the Western version is better appreciated in Africa.

The Future

Speculation on the future of the Soviet Union in Africa centers around two issues -- whether the Soviets will be able to

retain the gains they have already made; and whether they can achieve additional gains. Reports in the press suggest from time to time that the Soviets are losing influence in Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia -- the countries where their effort has been concentrated in recent years -- or are on the verge of being expelled. A break or a major reduction in Soviet relations with any of these countries would indeed be a major setback for the U.S.S.R.

In none of these countries has Soviet involvement been an unequivocal success. To Angolan, Ethiopian, and Mozambican observers the contribution of the Soviet Union to solving national problems must still be open to questions. The military contribution is certainly of value but clearly has its limits. South African forces are able to move into southern Angola at will, meeting no counterattacks from Cuban troops. Perhaps these troops would join battle if South Africa penetrated into central Angola or threatened major towns, but South Africa encounters only local resistance as it ranges over southern Angola. Meanwhile, UNITA guerrillas can also mount attacks over a wide part of Angola. They have apparently kept the Benguela railway, once an important link to the Atlantic for Zaire, virtually closed. Mozambique was unable, despite the Soviet security assistance it has received, to prevent the January 1981 South African raid, and it faces a small but possibly growing resistance movement, which it alleges is backed by South Africa. Nor, despite an offensive in the first months of 1982, has Ethiopia been able to defeat the Eritrean guerrilla movement.

All three countries face serious economic problems. These problems are by no means entirely the fault of the Soviet Union, which cannot be blamed for drought in Ethiopia or for declining world commodity prices. But the Soviet Union's inability to respond fully to the economic needs of Angola, Ethiopia, and Mozambique means that all three remain interested in increased Western aid. Angola's avid interest in attracting private Western capital is particularly evident. The West remains culturally attractive in Angola, Ethiopia, and Mozambique. A revival of a bourgeois lifestyle has been reported in the Ethiopian capital,⁶² where Western shortwave newscasts and newsmagazines are popular.

The Soviet Union itself seems to be wary of a possibly breakway, particularly on the part of Angola and Ethiopia. Should the Western peace initiative in Namibia succeed and the UNITA rebellion somehow end, Angola's need for Cuban troops would probably be at an end. A withdrawal of these troops, in turn, would open the way for a dramatic improvement in relations with Washington and a possible influx of U.S. investment. This prospect probably explains Soviet Prime Minister Nikolai Tikhonov's warning that the Namibia initiative is a "broad plot of international imperialism" intended to "intimidate" Angola and return it to the Western "sphere of influence."⁶³ Tikhonov made this warning to an Angolan delegation visiting Moscow in January 1982. In Ethiopia, meanwhile, the Soviet Union continues to press Colonel Mengistu for the establishment of a civilian Marxist party. Such a party would become the base for a

permanent Marxist-socialist government, removing affairs of state from the hands of a single, rather unpredictable individual.

Will any of the three most closely allied states break away from the Soviet Union? Much counterevidence could be cited to suggest that they are solidifying, rather than reducing, their relations with the U.S.S.R. The Angolan delegation that visited Moscow in January pledged to strengthen relations with Moscow and entered into a new 10-year cooperation agreement. Mozambique's March 1981 expulsion of U.S. Embassy personnel as alleged "spies" abruptly ended progress that had been made in improving relations with the United States. Mengistu's August 1981 decision to enter into a treaty linking his country's foreign and defense policies with those of Libya and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen cut off speculation at the time on an Ethiopian turn to the West. In any event, as long as the Angolan, Mozambican, and Ethiopian regimes are threatened by internal and external enemies, they are likely to remain dependent on Soviet security assistance.

Would the Soviets leave these countries if asked? They have, in the past, packed up and departed from Egypt, Sudan, Somalia, and other countries.

But if the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan marks a new era of intensified Soviet strategic concern over the Middle East, the U.S.S.R. might well be highly reluctant to leave Ethiopia. A variety of covert and overt techniques might be used to assure that an Ethiopian regime favorable to Moscow's remaining came into office. Angola and Mozambique are farther from the Middle East and perhaps less important to the realization of the Soviet

Union's major immediate foreign policy goals. Perhaps these countries would be easier to leave. But southern Africa is strategically and economically important to the West and therefore, inevitably, of keen interest to the Soviet Union. Thus, here too the Soviets could well resist a forced departure.

The strategic significance of the Soviet presence in Angola, Ethiopia, and Mozambique for neighboring states is inevitably a source of concern. The Soviet-advised offensive in Ethiopia's Ogaden halted at the Somali border in 1978. But Somalia is understandably concerned that a Soviet-armed Ethiopia will look its way if the rebellion in Eritrea is brought to an end. Kenya and Sudan maintain cordial relations with Ethiopia at present, and Colonel Mengistu himself appears convinced that peace with these pro-Western neighbors is an essential condition for defeating the Eritrean insurgents and for deterring Somalia from any new attacks. But Sudanese and Kenyan leaders, one suspects, must have occasional pangs of doubt about the prospects for long-term friendship with a Marxist Ethiopia.

South Africa, of course, is highly sensitive on the issue of Soviet involvement in southern Africa. Clearly, Soviet-supplied opposition forces based in Angola and Mozambique are in no position to engage in regular war with South African forces and could not do so for many years to come. But guerrillas infiltrating from those countries can cause damage that would encourage black opposition within South Africa, lead to dissension among white political forces on the best means of countering the threat, and perhaps precipitate white emigration.

Such developments could eventually result in major political change in South Africa, although in directions that can hardly be predicted today.

Whether such developments occur, however, is a highly contingent matter. They would depend, among other factors, on whether political reform in South South Africa moves forward or stagnates; on whether there is a Cuban withdrawal from Angola, leading to a U.S./Angola rapprochement; on whether there is a settlement in Namibia; and on the nature of any new Namibian regime. These interacting contingencies could work themselves out in ways that would reduce Soviet influence in the region. Certainly an expansion of Soviet influence is by no means a foregone conclusion. Similarly, in the Horn, an expansion of Soviet influence to other countries will be affected by the ability of those countries to resolve their economic problems, to cope with religious and ethnic conflicts, and on a host of other factors. Permanent Soviet gains in other countries in the Horn are not inevitable.

Elsewhere in Africa, the Soviets can reasonably expect occasional coups that will bring friendly governments to power. Socialism is a political philosophy that enjoys wide appeal in Africa, and new (often young) military leaders quite often proclaim their allegiance to socialist development. This gives the Soviet Union, which proclaims itself as the champion of socialism in the world, a ready entree. Elected governments too may at times warm to the Soviet Union, particularly as a way of increasing the military and economic assistance they receive. For the Soviet Union to consolidate gains such as these,

however, would require major commitments of resources. Even then, as the Soviets have learned, recipient governments may be overthrown or grow dissatisfied with Soviet assistance and look to the West for aid.

Consolidating gains, to summarize, requires the use of tactics which are flawed and, at least as applied by the Soviets to date, of limited effect. Improvements in these tactics are likely to require substantial changes in Soviet attitudes, and perhaps even in the Soviet system. If the Soviet Union is to give greater economic aid in Africa, it will have to become more generous and possibly wealthier. If its way of life is to be made more appealing to Africans, it will have to become a more open and more tolerant society. Soviet broadcasts to Africa will have to be made more objective if they are to attract a wider audience. The long-term expansion of Soviet influence to encompass a large part of the African continent, in short, would require changes in Soviet society and politics that are difficult to imagine.

FOOTNOTES

1. The Soviet-Angolan treaty, signed on October 8, 1976, appears in Legum, Colin (ed.). African Contemporary Record, 1976-1977. London and New York, Africana Publishers, p. C151-C153. The Mozambique treaty, of March 1977 is in *ibid.*, 1977-1978, p. C17-C19; and the treaty with Ethiopia, of November 20, 1978, is also in *ibid.*, 1978-1979, p. C84-C86. The treaty with Congo was signed on May 13, 1981 and ratified on March 23, 1982. For text, see U.S. Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), Soviet Union Daily Report, May 9, 1981. p. J1-J3. FBIS relayed the text from Pravda.

2. Gromyko, Anatoly. Socialist Orientation in Africa. International Affairs (Moscow), September 1979, p. 96. Gromyko who was probably including North Africa's Libya and Algeria in his count, is Director of the Institute of Africa, U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences.

3. Report of the Central Committee of the CPSU to the XXVI Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the Immediate Tasks of the Party in Home and Foreign Policy. Delivered by L. I. Brezhnev, February 23, 1981. Information Department, U.S.S.R. Embassy (Washington, 1981).

4. Gromyko, Anatoly. The Imperialist Threat to Africa. International Affairs (Moscow), July 1981. p. 47-48.

5. Report of the Central Committee (*op.cit.*), p. 14. Emphasis in the original.

6. Washington Post, December 19, 1979; Los Angeles Times, January 28, 1982.

7. Albright, David E. Moscow's Africa Policy in the 1970s in Albright (ed.) Communism in Africa. Bloomington, Indiana University Press (1980) p. 38-40.

8. Legvold, Robert. Soviet Policy in West Africa. Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press (1970), p. 157.

9. This was particularly true in the early years of African independence. See *ibid.*, p. 60-98; 209-213.

10. See Roschin, G. Africa Battling for Economic Liberation. International Affairs (Moscow), March 1981. p. 107-117; Tarabrin, Y. Problems of Africa in the 1980s. International Affairs (Moscow), June 1981. p. 47-57.

11. Gromyko, Anatoly. The Imperialist Threat to Africa (*op.cit.*), p. 47.

12. Dinkevich, A., Commenting in Round Table, The Strategy of Economic Development in the Young States. Asia and Africa Today (Moscow), January-February, 1982. p. 19.

13. Washington Post, March 3, 1982.

14. Gromyko, Anatoly. The Imperialist Threat to Africa (*op.cit.*), p. 48.

15. Tarabrin, Y. Problems of Africa in the 1980s (*op.cit.*), p. 54.

16. Gromyko has quoted Lenin on the alleged tendency of "imperialism" to put up "an increasingly furious resistance the closer death approaches." Socialist Orientation in Africa (*op.cit.*), p. 99.

17. U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. National Foreign Assessments Center. Communist Aid Activities in Non-Communist Less Developed Countries, 1979 and 1956-1979. Washington (October 1980), p. 18.

18. Calculated on the basis of data appearing in U.S. Agency for International Development. U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants and Assistance from International Organizations, July 1, 1945-September 30, 1980. Washington (1981). Data are for fiscal years 1953-1979.

19. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Developing Countries, 1976-1979. Paris (1980), p. 2.

20. U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. Communist Aid Activities (op.cit.), p. 18.

21. Roschin places Soviet trade with Africa at 1.3 billion rubles in 1978. Africa Battling for Economic Liberation (op.cit.), p. 116. Setting a figure for this amount in dollars is problematic because the ruble is not a convertible currency and because much of the trade probably took the form of commodity exchanges. The value set on commodities is open to question.

22. Report of the Central Committee (op.cit.), p. 12.

23. Kim, Georgy. Deepening Socio-Class Differentiation. Asia and Africa Today (Moscow), January-February, 1982. p. 5

24. Ibid. Kim is a Corresponding Member of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences.

25. Gromyko, Anatoly. Soviet Foreign Policy and Africa. Asia and Africa Today (Moscow), January-February 1982. p. 48.

26. Ibid.

27. "Asia remains the main objective in Peking's expansionist plans. Karinin, Nikolai and Boris Pavlov. On the Road of Expansion. Asia and Africa Today, September-October 1981. p. 48.

28. Payton, Gary D. The Somali Coup of 1969: The Case for Soviet Complicity. Journal of Modern African Studies, September 1980, p. 495-498.

29. The published terms of this treaty call for economic, political, and security cooperation. FBIS, Middle East and Africa Daily Report, September 2, 1981. p. R1-R3.

30. According to South African Prime Minister Botha, the officer was exchanged for 8 high-ranking western agents and a South African soldier captured in Angola. Washington Post, May 12, 1982.

31. Makarov, A. South Africa - Mainstay of Racism and Apartheid. International Affairs (Moscow), January-February 1981. p. 61, 62, 64.

32. Ibid., p. 67.

33. Gudel, Christoph. Mali - Potential and Problems. Swiss Review of World Affairs, September 1981. p. 9.

34. Tarabrin, Y. Problems of Africa in the 1980s (op.cit.), p. 49.

35. Roschin, G. African Battling for Economic Liberation (op.cit.), p. 112.

36. See, for example, transcripts of speeches given at the Second Soviet-Nigerian Round-Table Scientific Conference. Asia and Africa Today, November-December 1981. p. 44-45.

37. FBIS, Middle East and Africa Daily Report, June 25, 1981. p. T1. FBIS cited a Liberian report.

38. For a recent Soviet summary, see Kapranov, Ivan. Cooperation between the U.S.S.R. and the Developing Countries. Asia and Africa Today, January-February, 1982. p. 31-34.

39. FBIS Middle East and Africa Daily Report, June 5, 1981. p. T1. FBIS cited a Lagos Domestic Service broadcast.

40. Ibid., February 9, 1982, p. J4.

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43. New York Times, August 22, 1982.

44. Report by David Lamb of the Los Angeles Times, appearing in the Washington Post on June 5, 1981.

45. Ogunbadejo, Oye. Ideology and Pragmatism: the Soviet Role in Nigeria. Orbis, v. 21, Winter 1978. p. 821-822.

46. U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1970-1979. Washington (1982), p. 127.

47. U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. Communist Aid Activities (op.cit.). p. 15.

48. Estimate is for 1954-1979. Ibid., p. 16.

49. Papp, Daniel S. The Soviet Union and Southern Africa, in Donaldson, Robert H. The Soviet Union in the Third World, Successes and Failures. Boulder, Westview Press (1981) p. 74

50. Africa Research Bulletin (London), February 1981. p. 5957.

51. Africa Research Bulletin (London), June 1978. p. 4023.

52. Ogunbadega, Oye. Ideology and Pragmatism: the Soviet Role in Nigeria. Orbis, v. 21, Winter 1978: 813-819.

53. Africa Research Bulletin (London), December 1980. p. 5911.

54. Data are for 1981. U.S. International Communications Agency. Voice of America Handbook (Washington, February 1982).

55. Many are found in the bimonthly publication, Asia and Africa Today (Moscow).

56. Roschin, Africa Battling for Economic Liberation (op.cit.).

56. FBIS, monitoring Radio Moscow broadcasts. Soviet Union Daily Report, March 19, 1982, p. J2; March 25, 1982, p. J2.

57. FBIS relaying TASS reports. Soviet Union Daily Report, February 1, 1982. p. J2; March 22, 1982, p. J3.

58. Khzanov, Anatoli. The White House and the "Black Continent." Asia and Africa Today (Moscow), January-February 1982, p. 8.

59. FBIS, relaying a TASS report. Soviet Union Daily Report, March 12, 1982, p. J1.

60. FBIS, relaying Soviet commentaries. Soviet Union Daily Report, March 12, 1982, p. J1-J2; March 22, 1982, p. J4-J5.

61. FBIS, relaying a Tashkent report. Soviet Union Daily Report, April 7, 1982, p. J3.

62. Ottaway, David. Coptic Church, Home Restaurants Thrive in Marxist Ethiopia. Washington Post, December 12, 1980.

63. Washington Post, January 22, 1982.

SOVIET ARMS TRANSFERS

By Roger F. Fajak

GENESIS OF THE SOVIET ARMS TRANSFER PROGRAMS

The peoples of the developing "Third World" countries have traditionally been regarded by Soviet theoreticians as potential allies of the Communist world. In the immediate post-World War II period, the Soviet leadership, largely preoccupied with problems of internal reconstruction and with developments in Europe, devoted only superficial attention to the governments of newly emerging states, the Soviets did little beyond formally expressing opposition to Western influence in these areas.

Following the death of Stalin in 1953, Soviet policy toward the developing countries underwent a dramatic change. The new Soviet leadership, acknowledging the lack of success of the former tactics, became increasingly cognizant of the potential of non-Communist nationalist movements in the emerging countries. Instead of the hitherto traditional Soviet policy of fostering militant local Communist agitation and subversion, Moscow began to emphasize support of nationalist movements and to develop a variety of state-to-state contacts through a three-pronged strategy comprising: (1) the provision of arms aid to sever the newly-developing state's dependence on the West; (2) the establishment of a bilateral politico-economic relationship with such countries, grounded in the self-interest of each side; and (3) a modicum of ideological solidarity rooted in anti-colonialism, anti-Zionism, revolutionary change, and

¹
"socialism." This tactical shift apparently reflected Moscow's assessment that the most effective strategy for establishing its influence lay in associating itself with the strong nationalist and anti-Western sentiment in many Third World states.

One of the most consequential instruments in the transformed Soviet approach was a newly-conceived program of foreign assistance, patterned somewhat after that of the West. The Soviet decision in 1955 to offer military assistance, in particular, was probably stimulated by at least three factors: (1) the general success of the Soviet postwar recovery effort, (2) the availability of surplus stocks of military equipment as a consequence of military manpower reductions and changes in military doctrine, and (3) the conspicuous lack of success of indigenous Communist elements in the developing countries.

The USSR's respect and authority as a superpower emanated disproportionately from its military strength. Soviet economic achievements and standard of living were not valued very highly in many quarters of the globe. The Soviets had relatively little to offer in trade and technology transfer. Soviet society was not admired and was viewed as intolerant of religion and race. But the military prowess of the USSR was nearly universally regarded as the prime achievement of the modern Soviet state.

Military assistance consequently became an important policy tool in Third World areas. Transfers of weapons were readily acceptable to many fledgling regimes because of their immediately usable utility. An entire matrix of material and technical dependence usually followed. The U.S.S.R.'s multi-faceted arms

transfer program consequently enabled Moscow to dramatically assist its clients and thus establish itself politically, much more facilely than it otherwise could.

The Program in Microcosm

Magnitude and Pattern of Distribution

It is difficult to ascertain the magnitude of the Soviet arms transfer program with precision, since many facets of the program are shrouded in secrecy. Western reports vary widely as to the value and types of equipment provided, so that available data must be scrutinized carefully in terms of reliability of sources, consistency with other reporting, and reasonableness.

From 1954 through 1979 (the latest year for which comprehensive unclassified data are available), the Soviet Union extended about \$18.2 billion worth of economic assistance to developing, nonaligned countries. Of this amount, approximately \$8.2 billion has been drawn (or utilized) by these countries, for an implementation rate of 45 percent. In contrast, the Soviets in the same period contracted with developing countries for an estimated \$47.3 billion has been delivered, for a substantially higher implementation rate of 75 percent.

Because the Soviet program has been partly a response to available opportunities and because it has been influenced by the absorptive capacity of recipients, the annual magnitude of sales commitments has been highly variable, as shown in Table 1. Beginning in 1955-56, Czechoslovakia, serving as an intermediary for the U.S.S.R., extended an estimated \$200 million worth of

TABLE 1

Value of Soviet Arms Transfers to
Non-Communist Developing Countries

(Million US \$)

	<u>Agreements</u>	<u>Deliveries</u>
Cumulative		
1955-69	5,875	5,060
1970	1,150	995
1971	1,590	865
1972	1,690	1,215
1973	2,890	3,135
1974	5,735	2,225
1975	3,325	2,040
1976	5,550	3,085
1977	8,715	4,705
1978	2,465	5,400
1979	<u>8,335</u>	<u>6,615</u>
TOTAL	47,310	35,340

Source: CIA, Communist Aid Activities in Non-Communist Less Developed Countries, 1979 (Washington, D.C., October 1980), p. 13.

7
military assistance to Afghanistan, Egypt, Syria, and Yemen.

The Soviet military aid program began in its own right in 1956, when Moscow concluded arms deals directly with Afghanistan,⁸ Syria, and subsequently, with Egypt. By the end of 1957, about \$400 million worth of Soviet arms aid was established to have⁹ been extended to Middle Eastern countries. A subsequent dearth of reports for the next few years probably indicates that new extensions of Soviet military aid temporarily fell off, perhaps to allow time for assimilation of previous arms deliveries.

As the trade and aid offensive matured and the Soviets became embroiled in the complexities and slow fruition of economic development, the military aid program undoubtedly appeared even more attractive to supplier and recipients alike. With the open eruption of the Sino-Soviet conflict in 1960, the Soviet Union embarked on a vastly expanded wave of military aid activity, apparently designed to demonstrate militant Soviet support for the "national liberation movement" in the nonaligned¹⁰ countries. The momentum of the arms program carried over into 1961, as Moscow signed additional large agreements, highlighted by one with Indonesia, as the latter's dispute with the Netherlands¹¹ intensified. The incidence of new arms aid commitments decreased over the next several years, perhaps to¹² allow time for assimilation of equipment previously ordered.

Then, due to heavy demands for equipment resupply resulting from the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 and the Arab-Israeli war of 1967, Soviet arms exports increased dramatically in the late¹³ 1960s. Arms transfer activity during the early 1970's was highlighted by the continuing military buildup in India after its

December 1971 conflict with Pakistan and in the Arab countries following the October 1973 war.

From 1974-79, Soviet weapons sales to the Arab countries, as well as to Ethiopia, Iran, and India, surged to unprecedented highs. The increasing prices of modern weaponry, combined with Arab oil wealth, resulted in total Soviet military equipment transfers estimated at \$34 billion during that six-year period with the Soviet Union accounting for about a quarter of the world arms market, ranking second to the U.S. as a weapons supplier.¹⁴ Moscow's policy of requiring hard currency payments for arms from nearly all customers in recent years evidently applied even to politically--prized customers, such as Ethiopia.¹⁵ Four major Arab clients -- Iraq, Syria, and Libya--accounted for some 70 percent of total estimated Soviet sales in 1974-79, with transfers to India and Ethiopia together accounting for another 15 percent of the total.¹⁶

Table 2 indicates a regional distribution of Soviet arms transfers over the course of the program.

TABLE 2

Regional Distribution of Soviet Arms Transfer to
Non-Communist Developing Countries,
Cumulative 1955-79
(Million US \$)

	<u>Agreements</u>	<u>Deliveries</u>
North Africa	10,960	7,165
Sub-Saharan Africa	4,635	3,530
East Asia	890	885
Latin America	970	675
Middle East	24,465	18,675
South Asia	<u>5,410</u>	<u>4,410</u>
TOTAL	47,310	35,340

Source: CIA, Communist Aid Activities in Non-Communist Less Developed Countries, 1979 (Washington, D.C., October 1980), p. 14.

Prices and Terms

Much of the attractiveness of Soviet aid to Third World countries has been due to the comparatively low prices and favorable terms offered by Moscow. The prices charged to developing countries have varied with the type and condition of the equipment, but on the whole Soviet prices have been substantially below Western prices for comparable equipment. For example, the price of the new U.S. F-15 fighter charged Israel averaged about \$12 million per aircraft, while the price of a Soviet MIG-23 fighter approximately \$6.7 million. The price for a U.S. F-4 fighter was \$5.7 million, while a Soviet MIG-21 fighter reportedly listed at \$2 million.¹⁷ While the types of aircraft cited are not fully comparable in terms of performance capabilities, the wide variation in reported prices serves to illustrate the point.

Besides low prices, the Soviets have offered attractive financial terms to recipients. Credits generally have been made available at two percent interest, with repayment periods averaging ten years, following a grace period of one to three years. Moreover, to clients hard-pressed for foreign exchange, Moscow frequently has permitted repayment in local currency or commodities. In addition, Moscow often has postponed payment when recipients have been unable to meet their scheduled obligations.¹⁸

Discounts from list prices also have been an intrinsic feature of Soviet military assistance, particularly in the early years of the program. Such discounts reportedly have averaged about 40 percent of the value of Soviet contracts. Discounting

probably was partly premised on Moscow's assessment of a recipient's ability to pay, as well as on political favoritism. 19

Organization

Overall responsibility for implementing the arms transfer program is assigned to the Chief Engineering Directorate (GIU), a component of the Soviet State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations. The GIU, which acts as the "supplier" in military sales contracts, handles the negotiations with recipient governments. In addition, the GIU coordinates with the Ministry of Defense on the types and quantities of equipment and with the External Relations Directorate of the General Staff on training and technical assistance to be provided. Subsequent requests for modification of an arms agreement must be approved by the GIU. If any changes requested by a client exceed the value specified in an agreement or if they entail advanced weapon systems, the GIU apparently forwards the request to the Minister of Defense or to the Politburo. Finally, the GIU arranges for shipment of military equipment with the Ministry of Foreign Trade and the Ministry of Maritime Fleet. 20

Assessing Soviet Arms Transfer Policy

Of the various foreign policy instruments employed by the Soviets, the arms transfer program has proven to be the most dramatic and consequential. Besides directly contributing to the emergency and survival of nonaligned regimes, arms transfers have served as the primary Soviet vehicle for establishing a presence

in regions important to Western interests, often providing the Soviets with political entree into countries where their role had hitherto been limited or nonexistent. Furthermore, arms transfers often provided the opening wedge for a variety of diplomatic, trade, and other contacts which would have been difficult to achieve otherwise, such as in the Arab countries in the 1950's, India and Indonesia in the 1960's and Ethiopia more recently.

In any analysis of Soviet arms transfer policy, as for Soviet foreign policy in general, the criteria for evaluation of success can vary widely. Some observers view the growth or expansion of Soviet presence as a basic criterion of Moscow's success, while others maintain that presence in itself does not equate with influence and that any effort to assess Soviet gains or setbacks should focus on influence.²¹

In any case, in approaching an assessment of Moscow's foreign policy achievements and shortcomings, it is crucial to recognize that the key to the Soviet leadership's criteria for policy success or failure centers on the degree to which Moscow has achieved its objectives. Since the Soviets seldom, if ever, delineate their specific objectives openly, their purposes in general must be inferred from their actions.²²

Arms transfers have proven to be Moscow's most effective, flexible, and durable instrument for establishing a presence in nonaligned countries. By furnishing such assistance, Moscow became an advocate of a recipient's national aspirations and was able to adroitly exploit this position to the detriment of Western interests. Arab-Israeli tensions, the Yemen-UK conflict

over Aden, the Indo-Pakistani dispute, and Indonesia's territorial conflicts were ready-made opportunities to be exploited by Moscow.

In addition to the broader objective of undermining Western influence in recipient countries, Soviet policy makers have used arms transfers to eliminate Western military facilities and alliances adjacent to Soviet borders. Moscow sought to neutralize the Baghdad Pact (which subsequently evolved into CENTO) and SEATO so as to disrupt the West's "northern tier" defenses against the Soviet Union. Moscow early on provided military equipment to Afghanistan to ensure that Kabul remained neutral and well-disposed toward its Soviet neighbor. Soviet aid to India was intended to diminish India's reliance on the West and to extend the Soviet presence into the subcontinent. Soviet arms aid to Southeast Asia and African countries was designed to strengthen Soviet influence at the expense of Western, as well as Chinese, interests.

While the West has viewed its own military assistance to developing countries as an influence for regional stability, Moscow has regarded arms aid, inter alia, as an instrument for creating international instability and frequently has channeled arms to areas where the West has sought to limit military build-ups. Arms shipments to rival Arab countries, for example, have been partially intended to keep the area divided--and in ferment. Soviet sensitivity toward inter-Arab rivalries has been demonstrated by the care with which advanced weapons have been introduced to different recipients at about the same time.

A Soviet Balance Sheet

As Soviet policy makers assess the returns from a quarter-century of arms transfers, they must conclude that, on balance, the program has served Soviet interests reasonably well. In comparison with the state of international political alignments that existed in the 1960's, and increased again in the 1970's.

A useful set of criteria for assessing Soviet policy effectiveness could include the following factors:

- 1) the impact on regional alignments caused by Soviet behavior;
- 2) the degree to which U.S. and Western interests have been undermined; and
- 3) gains in Soviet influence in specific countries.

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Although Moscow has acquired no ideological converts as a direct result of its arms transfer program, it has acquired a widely accepted presence and a substantial, though unquantifiable, degree of influence in the Third World. An arms agreement with a developing country has been the point of departure for nearly every major Soviet advance in the Third World, beginning with the first Egyptian accord in 1955. Soviet support for nationalistic governments has contributed substantially to the weakening or elimination of Western influence in many countries and has facilitated establishment of a Soviet presence in a number of strategic areas. Moreover, through the acquisition of Soviet arms, a number of developing countries--notably Afghanistan, Algeria, Ethiopia, Iraq, Libya, and Syria--now are largely equipped with Soviet military

equipment and are heavily dependent on Moscow for logistical and technical support.

Through its military training and technical assistance program, the Soviet Union has exposed many Third World nationals to a Communist orientation. Moreover, the Soviets have established important relationships with military leaders, as well as with junior officers who may eventually hold key positions in their countries' armed forces.

On the other hand, the Soviets have discovered, after some particularly bitter experiences with certain client states, that the donor state in providing arms and material assistance is far from being a free agent unaffected by the relationship. In the present international system, even the U.S.S.R. as a superpower has had to accept irritating and sometimes insulting behavior, local fractiousness, and unpredictability on the part of courted client states. Moscow has had little choice but to pay such a price to remain in the superpower game in developing areas, and Third World regimes have learned to exploit this factor to their advantage.
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Moscow, for a variety of military, political, and psychological reasons, has been unwilling to attempt to compel a client state to act in accordance with Soviet designs if the latter chooses not to. This is due partly to superpower considerations and partly to a concern of jeopardizing Moscow's
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overall position in the Third World.

A sampling of policy results in various of Moscow's Third World client states may usefully illustrate the effectiveness and shortcomings of arms transfers as a policy instrument.

Angola

With the advent of nationhood for many sub-Saharan African states in the 1950's Moscow had precious few ties to the continent to show for its ideological efforts. Consequently, the U.S.S.R. in the middle of the decade began a program of assistance to the continent, concentrating on economic assistance, with military aid playing a relatively minor role.

While the Soviets initially registered some success in Ghana, Guinea, Mali, and Nigeria by the mid-1960's, local conservative trends, nationalism, and Soviet diplomatic boorishness negated more widespread gains. The lacklustre Soviet economy also failed to provide an alluring economic development model for the African states. The Soviet leadership thereupon came to place increasing reliance on arms transfers to advance their ends, particularly in view of the heightening levels of conflict and the search for military support in many quarters of the continent.²⁹ Although the Soviets stressed arms transfers rather than direct military involvement, they were not averse to the latter means, as witnessed in the Angolan civil war.

As Moscow witnessed the possibilities for a pro-Communist MPLA political victory in Angola dissipate in 1975, the Soviets shifted their emphasis to supporting the MPLA on the battlefield. They expedited large-scale military assistance and advisers and arranged for the introduction of Cuban troops, keeping the Soviet

profile low enough to avoid triggering a U.S. military response. This strategy proved successful for Moscow. By 1976, Soviet arms support and the use of Cuban army troops were instrumental in ensuring the victory of the MPLA.

Basic Soviet foreign policy objectives in Angola--to reinforce ties to African liberation movements, to establish a logistics base in Angola to support future operations in the region, and to acquire access to military facilities in the country -- were served to some extent by Soviet military support to the regime. By these tokens, Soviet policy in Angola can be viewed on balance as successful. The Soviets have gained a political ally, and Soviet contacts with southern African states, while never intimate, have been strengthened. At the same time, Angola has not chosen to move too closely to the U.S.S.R. economically. Neither has Moscow evinced a strong interest in Angolan resources since the civil war or exhibited a serious objection to the Western economic presence in the former Portuguese colony. The Soviets may simply wish to avoid subsidizing the Angolan economy as the country rebuilds.

The Angolan experience, at the same time, likely emboldened Moscow in its Third World military policy, as witnessed in its subsequent involvement with Ethiopia. While by no means foreshadowing a pattern of similar operations because, inter alia, of the possibility of active Western opposition, the effectiveness of Soviet arms supply operations in Angola, combined with the successful collaboration with Cuban military forces, may have induced Moscow to place more stock in activist

military operations in future carefully selected areas of Soviet
32
choosing.

Egypt

Moscow has experienced its most salient successes among the Middle East countries. For over a quarter of a century, the Soviet Union has taken advantage of the Arab-Israeli conflict to the point of largely displacing Western political influence among its major Arab clients. In this respect, Soviet involvement owes much to the desperate need of the Arab states for military support against Israel, as well as Moscow's desire to acquire a forward defense against Western military power in the area. In no other Third World region has this situation been duplicated.

The former Soviet-Egyptian relationship demonstrates how Soviet arms transfers, accompanied by powerful common interests, could develop into a significant Soviet military presence for a time, and then be quickly dissipated in the vagaries of international politics. The Soviet military presence in Egypt -- the leading recipient of Soviet arms aid for nearly two decades -- was, until 1972, the largest such presence outside the Warsaw Pact. At the zenith of their influence, roughly from 1969-72, the Soviets, with some 20,000 military personnel in the country, had access to half a dozen airbases, several ports and anchorages, and excellent maintenance and support facilities in Alexandria and Port Said. These facilities, some of which also were used as bases for Soviet reconnaissance aircraft operating in the Mediterranean, enhanced the Soviets' overall strategic position in the area. The Soviet position in Egypt, the most

populous and influential Arab state, accordingly served as the
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chpin of Soviet policy in the Arab world.

It is now known that the relationship between the U.S.S.R. and Egypt was saturated with strains and vituperation. At the core of Soviet-Egyptian disagreements was Cairo's dissatisfaction with the Soviet arms transfer program, with the Egyptians complaining continually over the slowness of deliveries, the lack of spares, the quality of training, and the continued Soviet denial of offensive weapons demanded by Egypt. The widespread Soviet presence in the country, which led to Soviet attempts to penetrate Egyptian political, security, and military organizations was another major irritant for Cairo, as were the heavyhanded and arrogant attitudes displayed by Soviet advisors.

When such irritants and tensions reached the breaking point, President Sadat in 1976 abrogated the 1971 friendship treaty with the U.S.S.R. and denied Soviet access to Egyptian naval facilities, again catching Moscow by surprise. In view of the tremendous economic cost to the Soviet Union of its investment in Egypt and the accompanying commitment of Soviet prestige, the influence and gains realized by Moscow turned out to be
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ephemeral.

Ethiopia-Somalia

Following the overthrow of Haile Selassie in Ethiopia in 1974, the Soviets were provided with a challenge and an opportunity. The efforts of the new Ethiopian military government, the Derg, to eradicate the old order had created a backlash of resistance, and the Arab-supported Eritrean rebels

were seriously sapping the strength of the Ethiopian army, the bulwark of the regime. Most importantly, by late 1976, when Moscow was establishing an arms supply relationship with the Derg, tensions were increasing on the Somali-Ethiopian border, and Somali support for guerrillas in the Ogden region of Ethiopia was well advanced.³⁶ Although the Soviet presence at the time in Somalia and to a lesser degree in Southern Yemen was still formidable, Moscow apparently was concerned that its regional position would be seriously affected by the collapse of Ethiopia.

In addition to these negative consequences of inaction, Moscow had positive inducements to support Ethiopia. Soviet support for the Marxist regime in Addis Ababa could provide a timely demonstration of Soviet defense of the world revolutionary movement. Moreover, Ethiopia, with the second largest population in Black Africa and as headquarters of the OAU, was a key nation in the Horn of Africa, and thus offered Moscow a promising opportunity to expand its presence and influence on the African continent.³⁷

As a result of these calculations, Moscow in early 1977 decided to commence a military equipment and technical advisory buildup and to replace the U.S. as Ethiopia's principal arms supplier. Furthermore, when Somalia employed Soviet-supplied weapons to invade the Ogaden in July 1977, Moscow decided to respond by expediting arms deliveries and expanding training activities for the Ethiopian armed forces.³⁸

While aware of the Somalis' proclivities to support the Ogaden rebels, Moscow probably overestimated its influence over the Siad Barre regime in Somalia and miscalculated the latter's

vehement nationalistic response to Soviet support for Ethiopia. The Soviets, at the same time, may have rightly calculated that no Western state would support Somalia's efforts to achieve territorial ambitions by force of arms. Consequently, Moscow may have felt that Somalia, with no place else to turn for material support, would have no choice but to acquiesce in the Soviet decision to support Ethiopia.

As weeks of Soviet diplomatic efforts to ameliorate the conflict slipped by and as their dilemma deepened, the Soviets in October 1977 announced the suspension of all arms deliveries to Somalia. Mogadishu retorted shortly thereafter by abrogating the Soviet friendship treaty and by evicting the Soviets from all Somali military facilities, including the important naval base at Berbera. Moscow, in turn intensified its massive military airlift of equipment to Ethiopia, and as in its experience in Angola, arranged for the significant involvement of Cuban armed forces in the fighting which definitively turned in favor of Ethiopia.
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Some interesting factors seem to emerge from a post-mortem analysis of Soviet experience in the Horn of Africa. Inasmuch as the Western powers were opposed to providing material support to Somalia, the Soviets could quite confidently assume--as they did in Angola -- that there was practically no possibility of a military confrontation with the West, as long as no Soviet combat forces were directly involved. The presence of 15,000 Cuban troops in the Ogaden on the other hand guaranteed Moscow considerable future leverage in dealings in the region. The

timing of the Soviet involvement -- shortly after Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in November 1977 which ostensibly removed the U.S.S.R. from a direct role in the Middle East peace process -- furthermore prominently underscored Soviet capabilities for distant power projection and Moscow's determination not to be ignored in a peace settlement.

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While Soviet successes in Ethiopia may not appear grandiose, neither may their setbacks in Somalia be utterly irretrievable. As far as bases are concerned, for example, the U.S.S.R. seems to have acquired at least limited access to naval base facilities in Ethiopia and South Yemen that partially make up for the loss of Berbera. Moreover, an eventual accommodation with Mogadishu cannot be ruled out.

The question whether Moscow would have acted differently had it foreseen the outcome of the situation in the Horn remains moot, but at the outset the U.S.S.R. may have thought it could have it both ways. The policy goals at stake in Ethiopia evidently were sufficiently important for Moscow to risk alienating Somalia, even with its desirable base facilities. The Soviets may have recognized that giving in to Somali demands at the time would have established an undesirable precedent, involving more significant dilemmas in the long term for Soviet interests than losing access to facilities in Somalia.

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Libya

Generally speaking, arms transfers to Libya have been as useful for Soviet purposes as elsewhere in the Third World. An additional important economic benefit is the fact of repayment in

hard currency for equipment supplies. The staggering amounts of modern Soviet weapons and other equipment delivered to Libya have resulted in that country's 55,000-man armed forces having the highest equipment to manpower ratio of any developing nation.⁴² In fact, Libya's equipment inventories now vastly exceed the armed forces' capabilities to absorb and maintain them. While the provision of this equipment has resulted in a substantial Soviet military presence in the country, the Egyptian experience is clear testimony to the fact that presence does not necessarily equate to influence or control. Concomitantly, the Soviets may have some limited access to ports in Libya, but they have not acquired base rights there.⁴³

While the Soviet arms transfer program has burgeoned in Libya, other aspects of the Soviet-Libyan relationship have lagged. With its oil revenues, Libya has not been in need of economic assistance, and with the exception of the nuclear program, Moscow has not been able to interest the Libyans in any technology of use to their development program. The lack of any ideological affinity between the two countries also has retarded the development of a political relationship. While the Soviet position on the PLO remains in congruence with that of Libya, important policy differences persist over a number of issues, including the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and an appropriate level of Soviet support for the radical Arab "Steadfastness Front." While some elements of Libyan policy coincide with Soviet interests, there is no evidence to suggest that Libyan policies are influenced by Moscow.⁴⁴

South Yemen

After taking power in the former British Crown Colony of Aden in 1970, the Marxist-oriented National Liberation Front in the renamed People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) proclaimed a revolutionary policy in the Arabian Peninsula and accordingly attracted substantial Soviet military support. Indeed, Moscow's policy in PDRY, with which a friendship treaty was signed in 1979, has been highly cost-effective with small outlays and low risk, but with potentially rewarding returns in upsetting the regional status quo in the Arabian Peninsula and southern Red Sea areas.

Moreover, Moscow has already accrued dividends from its material investment in PDRY: limited access to Aden, the best naval anchorage in the area, and basing privileges for long-range reconnaissance aircraft in the country. A Soviet presence in PDRY also offers opportunities for Moscow to increase political pressure inter alia on Saudi Arabia to make it more tractable to Soviet "good offices" and to possible normalized relations with the U.S.S.R. -- another key policy objective geared toward
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undermining the U.S. position in the area.

Syria

Moscow, relations with Syria have had a checkered history. Serving as Syria's nearly exclusive source of arms since the late 1950's, the U.S.S.R. after the 1967 and 1973 conflicts strived to cement its ties with the Baathist regime in Damascus by providing expanding quantities of increasingly sophisticated arms,

including MIG-23 and MIG-25 fighters, SCUD ballistic missiles, and T-72 tanks. By the end of 1974, the supply of Soviet equipment delivered had reached staggering proportions.

The reasoning behind the high level of arms deliveries to Syria was complex. A prime Soviet consideration was two the arms supply relationship could be utilized to optimally serve Soviet political or military objectives, without allowing Syria to become sufficiently powerful to be tempted to initiate hostilities with Israel, at least in the hope of inducing a chain effect of Arab and possibly Soviet involvement. Other Soviet interests included some cash returns for weapons sales and limited access to port facilities.

Syrian President Assad visited Moscow in October 1978, reportedly to discuss the Middle East military balance which Syria felt was further shifting in Israel's favor. The Soviets, however, because of what Syria regarded were Moscow's concerns over its superpower interests, were reluctant to meet Syrian requests for the types of weaponry then requested, probably including longrange missiles. Soviet-Syrian relations then plunged to a new low when Assad recalled his ambassador from Moscow and cancelled a newly-scheduled trip to the U.S.S.R.

Moscow's reluctance to satisfy Syria's new tranche of arms aid requests in late 1978 evidently reflected a shift in Soviet strategy. Detente was then at a crossroad, and Moscow chose to move carefully in the Middle East. Again, Moscow was in a dilemma because it regarded Syria as an important client state

and in a position to exercise a crucial role in any political settlement in Lebanon.⁴⁹

Before providing additional sophisticated equipment, the Soviets reportedly argued for the establishment of an alliance among Syria, Iraq, and Jordan. Soviet strategists feared that the introduction of late model weaponry into Syria could provoke an Israeli preemptive strike and a possible military disaster for Syria, as well as the possibility of a Soviet confrontation with the U.S.

The dilemma for Moscow once again, as so often with the Arab states, was the fact that Syria was not dependent on the U.S.S.R. for anything except military equipment. Finally, after Iraqi President Saddam Hussein's reported personal intervention on Syria's behalf (which Saddam no doubt profoundly regrets in retrospect), Syria in January 1979 received a Soviet pledge of new weaponry.⁵⁰

Relations between Syria and the U.S.S.R. thus have at times been anything but smooth. Not only has Assad been displeased or worse at Moscow's attempts to stall at providing equipment requested by Damascus, but he has rejected repeated requests by Moscow for expanded naval base rights. On the other hand, Soviet restraint in providing arms to Syria indicates Moscow's determination to closely calculate the costs and benefits of its transfers. Nevertheless, that the U.S.S.R.'s influence has not been as effective as it would have liked is reflected in the reported lament of the Soviet ambassador to Syria that the Syrians take everything from the U.S.S.R. except its advice.⁵¹

Despite the sporadic nature of Moscow's ties to Damascus, the Soviets still saw fit to conclude, after their repeated requests, a friendship treaty with Syria in October 1980. Even more extraordinary, while similar Soviet pacts refer only in general terms to mutual consultations in situations which "threaten peace," article six of the Syrian treaty calls on both parties to "enter into contact with each other with a view...to cooperating in order to remove the threat which has arisen and to restore peace." Although extremely unlikely that Moscow would commit itself militarily in any such treaty with a Third World state, the language of the Syrian pact does leave that possibility somewhat more open-ended than hitherto has been the case.
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Iraq

While the history of the Soviet arms transfer relationship with Iraq has been practically as uneven as with Syria, it may be useful to briefly examine the course of Soviet-Iraqi relations over the past several years. The Iraqi regime, especially for a variety of reasons since 1978, has been perturbed at the Soviet slowness in supplying newer types of military equipment already in other Arab countries' inventories, e.g. MIG-25 interceptors, MI-24 helicopter gunships, and SA-9 surface-to-air missiles.
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The editor of the Baath Party newspaper in Baghdad wrote in January 1980 that "the Soviet Union is neither capable nor ready to respond to the Arabs' needs, not even to those countries capable of paying in cash and hard currency."
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Finally, confirming publicly what had been Iraqi policy for some

time, Baghdad announced in June 1980 that it would seek arms from other countries. As a result, Iraq in the past few years has reportedly received at least one-third of its military equipment from France in contrast to its virtually exclusive arms reliance on Moscow for the previous two decades.⁵⁵

The increasingly cool state of relations with Iraq since 1978 certainly affected Soviet policy when the Gulf war between Iran-Iraq began in September 1980. Although Moscow declared its neutrality at the outbreak of the conflict, the Soviets had appeared to be tilting toward Iran in the months immediately prior to the Iraqi invasion.⁵⁶

When the war began, the Soviets were not long in realizing that in almost any scenario they postulated, Moscow had little to gain and much of its remaining influence to lose. Consequently, Moscow from the outset of the conflict has called for an end to the hostilities, with Brezhnev stating that "neither Iraq nor Iran will gain anything from mutual destruction, bloodshed, and the undermining of each other's economy."⁵⁷

The Soviet-Iraqi friendship treaty of 1972 notwithstanding, the Soviets embargoed the shipment of major new military equipment to Baghdad when hostilities erupted. Such deliveries of equipment that were reportedly being shipped through the Jordanian port of Aqaba in the early weeks of the war were apparently merely a trickle of items already in the pipeline. Successive visits to Moscow by ranking Iraqi officials failed to unblock the Soviet arms channel.⁵⁸

In the meantime, Western press reports indicated that the Soviets were selling at least limited amounts of military equipment to Iran. Such a development would have been consistent with newly revised Soviet ideological doctrine, in light of events in Iran, which now included a new category of Third World revolutions--the "neo-Islamic" type. The resulting line states that important traditionalist groups, even religious ones, may serve reactionary ends, but still be progressive, particularly in opposing imperialism and encouraging social reform. 59

By mid-1981, Soviet policymakers, presumably realizing that their arms embargo to Iraq was not producing any positive policy results, decided to resume military deliveries to Baghdad. The Soviet policy shift reportedly occurred when Taha Yassin Ramadan, the Iraqi Deputy Premier, visited Moscow in June, following the Israeli bombing raid on the nuclear reactor in Baghdad. 60

As the Gulf war dragged on, increasing Iranian military successes posed a dilemma for Moscow. The unexpected turn of events perhaps demonstrated that the risks of nurturing an alignment in the region may be more hazardous than any benefits to be realized. In this case, a victorious and rejuvenated Iranian regime would offer fewer opportunities for Communist penetration of the government and lessened prospects for a durable Soviet presence. Consequently, an emboldened Teheran would exacerbate security concerns among the Gulf counties, who might tend to seek an increased U.S. military presence in the Gulf, a development which Moscow assiduously wishes to avoid. Furthermore, a defeated Iraq, with the imprint of the Soviet arms embargo at a time of crisis vividly in mind, would be inclined to

turn even more toward the West for military support and economic assistance in rebuilding her damaged economy.

India

On the South Asian subcontinent, Soviet arms sales to India over the course of two decades have enhanced Moscow's stature in New Delhi and circumscribed that of the West, while helping to place the Soviets on India's side in the latter's dispute with Pakistan. Moscow's predominant position as an arms supplier, however, was set back in 1978 when New Delhi turned to the United Kingdom for a major purchase and coproduction arrangement for the Jaguar fighter bomber. By May 1980, following the return to office of Indira Gandhi as Prime Minister, the Soviets regained their preeminent military supplier position with the conclusion of a \$1.6 billion arms agreement on very favorable terms to India. Included in the accord were arrangements for coproduction of two sophisticated weapons systems -- the MIG-23 fighter and the T-72 tank -- in the first cooperative schemes for these systems granted by the Soviets to any country.⁶¹ Even so, and in the face of Soviet misgivings and counter-offers, India proceeded with plans to further diversify its sources of arms by concluding an agreement with France in April 1982 for the purchase of 40 late - model Mirage 2000 fighters, valued at an estimated \$1 billion, and possible follow-on coproduction for an additional 110 aircraft.⁶²

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Soviet Influence: How Durable

How much effective influence the Soviets have gained in any particular area is, of course, difficult to measure. Still more difficult to ascertain is how much of any such gain can be attributed directly to military assistance and how much to broader political considerations.

While arms transfers may have contributed to an accretion of potential Soviet leverage in some developing states, such a relationship has not enabled the Soviets to control the domestic or foreign policies of these countries. Realizing this, Moscow for the most part has tried not to abuse the influence it has gained, and only rarely have the Soviets attempted to directly use their aid to exact political concessions.

A number of examples may serve to illustrate the limited nature of Soviet influence. Despite receiving large amounts of modern weaponry and technical support, Iraq and Syria have not hesitated to antagonize Moscow when vital interests of these countries were at stake. Algeria has remained aloof from developing overly close ties with the Soviet Union, and Libya has not muted its suspicions of Soviet intentions in the Middle East.

Moreover, Arab moves to diversify sources of military equipment are challenging the effectiveness of the arms relationship as a policy lever. It is ironic that Iraq, perhaps the largest recipient of Soviet military equipment to date -- approximately \$10 billion worth, or about 20 percent of total Soviet arms commitments -- has moved the farthest among Moscow's major arms clients in diversifying its sources of military supplies. In fact, the delivery in January 1981 of the first

four French advanced Mirage F-1 fighters -- of 60 ordered in 1977 -- was highlighted in the press in vivid contrast to the major arms embargo imposed by Moscow at the start of the Iran-Iraq war in September 1980.⁶⁶ While the preponderance of Soviet-origin weaponry in Arab inventories will make diversification a slow process, even a moderate degree of success in the long run will erode potential Soviet influence. At the same time, the status of local Communist parties has not been enhanced by the Soviet presence. Many of Moscow's leading supporters in various client countries have been executed, purged, or forced into exile. No doubt particularly galling to the Politburo has been the inability of regimes which it particularly favored -- such as those of Qassem, Ben Bella, Nkrumah, and Sukarno -- to remain in power, despite large infusions of Soviet aid.

Base Rights

It is unclear to what extent the Soviets have directly used their arms transfer program to secure the establishment of military bases or to gain access to facilities. Until Egypt abrogated such arrangements in March 1976, the Soviets enjoyed the use of naval repair and fuel storage facilities at Alexandria and Port Said to support their Mediterranean Fleet operations. Similarly in 1977, as a consequence of strains resulting from the Soviet arms buildup in Ethiopia, Somalia evicted the Soviets from access to naval repair, missile-handling, communications, and other facilities at Berbera.⁶⁷ The Soviets apparently have sought similar support arrangements elsewhere in the area, but it

is doubtful that they will acquire the use of anything approaching their former facilities in Egypt and Somalia for the foreseeable future because of Arab and African sensitivities on this score. At the same time, it is doubtful that Soviet military planners, given their traditional operating procedures and their ultimate distrust of foreigners, contemplate extensive reliance on foreign facilities in their normal operations.

To the extent that the Soviets do require support facilities, however, the arms transfer program probably has some relationship to this requirement. In refining the program over the years, the Soviets obviously have learned when to press and when not to press their clients for the use of bases. In the cases of Syria and India, for example, the Soviets, while desiring some access over the years, have obviously decided not to make bases an overriding issue in their overall relationships with these countries.

Continuities in Soviet Policy

Examining the record of Soviet arms transfer policy in Third World regions over the past quarter-century leads to some impactful observations. First of all, substantial Soviet investment in arms transfers and technical assistance, combined with occasional willingness to assume high risks in crisis situations, has not automatically resulted in policy dividends for Moscow. Secondly, without the opportunity to inject its military power directly onto the scene, as in Afghanistan, Moscow has not been able to readily translate military assistance into usable political influence. The Soviets have found that even a

privileged position granted to them, as in Egypt or Somalia, could be revoked practically overnight, with little recourse for the Soviet leadership,⁶⁸

The Soviets have been able to attain some successes through a form of "coalition building". This criterion assumes (1) that there is rarely complete identity of interests between any two states and (2) that the fundamental requirement is to identify convergences of interests to further national ends.⁶⁹

Since the arms transfer program began in 1955, a number of continuities have characterized Soviet policy. Moscow, first of all, has remained acutely sensitive to opportunities and constraints. Soviet selection of targets, the overall composition of assistance packages, and a businesslike approach to concluding agreements reflect a carefully ordered perception of priorities. Moscow accordingly has managed to retain working relations with both sides in a number of contentious disputes, such as Iran and Iraq, Syria and Iraq, and North and South Yemen.⁷⁰

Secondly, political - strategic considerations, rather than ideological preferences, have determined Soviet policy. Sadat's de-Nasserization policies, Qaddafi's mercurial fundamentalism, and the former Shah's conservatism have all been taken in stride by Moscow at various times. As a least common denominator, local Communist parties have been expendable.⁷¹

The Soviets also have proven to be dependable protectors, helping to shield clients from total defeat by their opponents, even in the face of serious policy differences and potentially

dangerous confrontations with the U.S. Nor has Moscow been averse to fueling regional arms races, knowing that its increasingly sophisticated weaponry has been its primary attraction for many Third World regimes.
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The Soviets have been far from parsimonious arms suppliers. In most cases, Moscow has provided military equipment up to the absorptive capacity of the customer, although this is largely a judgmental factor on the part of supplier and recipient alike. An exception is Libya, where the Soviets have sold Qaddafi more military equipment than Libya can absorb. At the same time, there has been little danger of Qadhafi's initiating a war with Egypt. But by continuing to sell arms to Libya, Moscow has earned hard currency, encouraged Libyan dependence on Soviet technical support, and positioned itself for the future. The situation differs significantly from the Soviet arms supply relationship for example with Syria, where an overabundance of sophisticated weapons might have triggered another serious conflict with Israel which could have embroiled the U.S.S.R. Consequently, Moscow has been careful to calibrate military demands on the part of clients with political risks as it perceives them.
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Over the course of its arms transfer program, Moscow has found it ever more difficult to hold down the level of sophistication of its exported weaponry. In the Middle East in particular, the task became more complicated from each conflict to the next.

The Soviets nevertheless attempted to maintain a modicum of restraint, comprising several self-imposed restrictions on arms exports:

- (1) no provision of nuclear weapons;
- (2) no delivery of other advanced weapon systems which might tempt a recipient to launch a preemptive attack or an all-out war on its own against Israel; and
- (3) the maintenance of sufficient control on the types and quantities of arms exported to allow maximum Soviet leverage in bargaining with clients.

After the October war, with the Arabs heady with a sense of pride and accomplishment of arms, Moscow found it increasingly onerous to adhere to these guidelines.

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Another common thread in Soviet policy generally has been the consensus style of the Soviet leadership, characterized for the most part by a basically conservative approach and a low propensity for risk taking. A factor in this approach may be the Soviet belief that history is on their side, thus obviating the necessity of taking undue risks. The high cost of failure as perceived by the leadership no doubt also contributes to a cautious decisionmaking style by the current group of leaders.

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Partly in reaction to Krushchev's flamboyant style of leadership, the Brezhnev Politburo developed a consensus approach wherein major leadership members must essentially "sign off" prior to important policy decisions. This type of consensus maintenance, whereby differences relate more to nuances of emphasis and directions, rather than basic goals, has been conducive to "least common denominator" arms transfer policies

and has militated for the most part against high risk options. Moreover, the surest way for a member of the inner circle to be ousted from his position has been to have a clearly-delineated policy failure pinned on him -- another factor which contributed to middle of the road policies and an avoidance of risky initiatives, except for situations, such as Czechoslovakia or Afghanistan, where overriding security considerations were perceived to be at stake.⁷⁶

This is not to say that all Soviet arms transfer policy decisions in the Third World can be assumed to have been unanimous. Personality influences and organizational differences undoubtedly affect decisionmaking in Moscow as they do in any world capital. Indeed, indications have been noted of senior Soviet military and political leaders questioning the wisdom of large military assistance outlays to Middle East countries, generating considerable internal debate in Moscow on the topic.⁷⁷

Finally, Moscow has accepted the contradictions of Third World politics as a norm. Reconciled to dilemmas, accepting the continuation of local conflicts it cannot resolve, and prepared to commit substantial resources in situations where desired outcomes are far from certain, the Soviets have aspired to local gains, more to undermine the U.S. and the West, than to achieve local Communist influence. Moscow appears to have favored a tactical approach offering incremental gains in an area, rather than to have relied on a broad global policy to achieve regional goals.⁷⁸

New Departures in Soviet Policy

While some constraints in Soviet policy have persisted since the U.S.S.R. first became involved in the developing areas, a number of new departures and dimensions have emerged in recent years. Moscow, first of all, had displayed more of a tendency of late to project its military power and support to distant areas of opportunity. Highlighting this more pronounced predisposition for intervention -- other than in a situation such as Afghanistan -- have been Soviet long range military supply operations in Angola and Ethiopia, patterned somewhat on the Soviet resupply operations to the Arab countries during the October 1973 War.⁷⁹

In its arms transfer policymaking process, Moscow appears to have factored in a supposition that the U.S. will not directly interfere in a Soviet area of involvement, unless vital U.S. interests are at stake. The Soviet distant operations in Angola and Ethiopia appear to bear this out. The same operations also reflect another Soviet policy departure, i.e., the commitment of Cuban combat troops to insure military success for client states, which has added an additional dimension to the U.S.S.R.'s arms transfer program.⁸⁰

While the provision of arms to provide internal security for a client state is not a new motivation in Moscow's arms transfer policy, given such Soviet assistance to Yemen in 1967 and Iraq in 1973-74, this factor seems to have gained significantly in priority and importance since the Soviet involvement in Angola and Ethiopia. To be sure, the security threats to those two countries were not strictly internal, but were combined with

large-scale external attacks. Nevertheless, "counterinsurgency" as a factor in a decision to transfer arms evidently has become a more meaningful motivation in recent Soviet calculus.

While the underlying motivation of the Soviet arms transfer program remains essentially political, economic considerations and the "profit motive" have become substantial factors in Moscow's arms export considerations. With the U.S.S.R. increasingly in need of convertible currency to pay for imported Western technology, the Soviets have apparently instituted a substantial change in the sales terms for their military equipment. Moscow now reportedly requires payment in hard currency from most of its clients, particularly the oil exporters -- Algeria, Libya, and Iraq. The last publicly available estimate by the Central Intelligence Agency indicates that Moscow earned approximately \$1.5 billion in hard currency from arms sales in 1977 alone, but such earnings undoubtedly have⁸¹ increased several - fold over the past several years. Sales for hard currency reportedly have now practically supplanted the favorable terms and arms-for-commodities trade of earlier⁸² years.

As has always been the case, however, Moscow will make allowances for favored client states which cannot afford to pay cash. The 1980 Soviet \$1.6 billion arms agreement with India on terms very favorable to New Delhi appropriately demonstrates this point. Furthermore, existing indebtedness on the part of some clients has not thus far inhibited Moscow from concluding

additional arms agreements with them, and probably will not in the future, if other Soviet interests are at stake.

Another change factor in Soviet policy is a relatively recently-acquired, long-term interest in Middle East oil. With the CIA now estimating a Soviet petroleum shortfall by the mid-1980s, Moscow has become more interested in securing access to oil in the producing countries, with Iran perhaps at the top of the Soviet priority list. This more acute need for oil could induce greater activism in Moscow's policy toward securing sources of oil for itself and its allies, even at the risk of denying it to the West.

Overall Assessment

As the decade of the Seventies drew to an end, it became increasingly evident that Moscow had adopted a distinctly lower-key approach to the Third World than it initially did when entering that arena twenty-five years previously. The reverses suffered in Egypt, Indonesia, and some African states made it obvious to the Soviet leadership that expensive military and economic investments could be lost practically overnight. The disastrous policy reverses in those formerly close clients no doubt made clear to Moscow that its attempts to influence domestic policies through the arms transfer lever had generally come to naught. Moscow also came to realize that some of its most important Arab customers, as a result of their oil wealth, could now deal with alternative arms suppliers.

Given the new economic realities in the Middle East, Moscow responded to restricted opportunities with considerable caution.

Despite the Soviets' more acute need for hard currency, the U.S.S.R. did not saturate its Arab clients with all of the sophisticated weaponry they desired or could pay for. From the experience of the October War, the Soviets evidently learned that the optimal way to prevent their regional commitments from conflicting with detente and creating possible confrontations with the U.S. was to avoid crises in the first place.⁸⁵ For Moscow, this meant restraining its Arab clients by limiting their military capabilities and avoiding binding commitments with them.

The nature of Soviet involvement perceptively changed from offensive to defensive, from ideological to pragmatic, and from events at least partly within Moscow's control to ones beyond it. This shift did not so much result from Soviet policy failure, as much as it was a consequence of a changing phase in international relations, wherein the superpowers found themselves unable to control their client states.⁸⁶ Now cognizant of the instability of Third World regimes and the capriciousness of some national leaders, while remaining anxious to protect its perceived interests in these regions, Moscow has basically become more sober and careful in its policy calculations.

Several factors apply in the arms supply relationship between the Soviet Union and a recipient. Some attributes tend to enhance Moscow's leverage, while others constrain it. First among the former is the depth and quality of the overall relationship between the two states, including such facets as political affinity, trade patterns, and technical assistance. Also crucial are Moscow's objectives in the relationship.

The question also applies as to what types of counter leverage the client may possess. In cases where arms supplies are of no more than moderate importance to a client, the arms are generally insufficient to alter that country's position on matters it perceives to be of vital importance. Contrawise, the more weighty a recipient's stakes in an arms supply relationship, the more pronounced is Moscow's political leverage.

The perceived importance of a client's relationship to the U.S.S.R. is another crucial consideration. The more the Soviets rely on weapons transfers to maintain a relationship, the more constrained Moscow is likely to feel in applying pressure on that state. In terms of leverage, moreover, the promise of continuing arms shipments, as well as spare parts deliveries for weapons already on hand, may be at least as effective as a threatened suspension of shipments, and averts any negative residual impact on the relationship.

To the degree that the interests of Moscow and a client state converge, disagreements in general are less likely to arise. But should one occur, Moscow may discover that it has the least amount of leverage over clients with the closest ties, inasmuch as such recipients may be the ones whose interests are most congruent with Moscow's. For the client, heavy reliance on the U.S.S.R. for arms may make it difficult, expensive, and time-consuming to switch to another supplier, even if this is feasible politically. On the other hand, while a disruption in scheduled equipment production or deliveries may not be a critical factor for Moscow, the loss of a hard currency payment source and the possible suspension of debt payments may be constraints on the

Soviet and useful counter - levers on the part of a recipient.

The ultimate potential consequence of Moscow's manipulation of an arms flow would be a decision on the part of a client to reduce its dependence on Moscow for arms, either by developing an indigenous arms industry or by dealing with another supplier. The resulting loss of leverage for use in later situations -- for issues that may be even more important for Moscow then -- is a potential cost to be weighed against the gains in a current issue. Another serious cost would be the witnessing by other clients or would-be clients of any Soviet attempts at pressure and the possible determination not to be manipulated in similar fashion at some future time.

There is no doubt that the Soviet Union's presence and involvement in Third World regions has generally increased over the past few decades. One cannot, however, equate that presence with influence.

Influence is not something to be used by one state against another like a weapon. Rather it is something of an ongoing process by which one country attempts to persuade or coerce another country to act or not act in a particular fashion. It is thus far from true that a state with the most obvious political or military capabilities will automatically possess the most influence over another in a dynamic relationship.

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Soviet involvement in the Third World is replete with examples of Moscow's inability, in the wake of a substantial arms investment in a client state, to obviate actions which were counter to its interests. Suffice it only to mention the

Soviets' expulsions from a number of Third World countries, the Iraqi persecution of local Communists, and Syrian conflict with leftist Arabs as examples of Moscow's lack of influence over erstwhile clients.

On the other hand, some of the most significant Soviet policy successes have resulted from opportunities provided by Western mistakes or defeats or from events over which Moscow had no control. The fundamentalist revolution in Iran resulted in the downfall of the Shah, one of the staunchest U.S. supporters in the Middle East. The U.S. sponsored Camp David peace process led to Egypt's isolation from the Arab countries and other side effects beneficial to the Soviets. While there may be a tendency to view a setback for the U.S. in the developing world as a result of clever Soviet planning, Moscow at times emerges in a positive light in spite of what it did. 88

To sum up, while arms transfers have not provided Moscow with a guaranteed basis for influencing the behavior of its clients, the military supply connection has provided Moscow with the best, and sometimes only, means available for assuring a political presence in many countries. At the same time, it is clear that presence does not equate with influence. Nevertheless, Moscow's program of arms sales and military training provides a substantial security dimension which directly contributes to a durable Soviet bilateral relationship with numerous Third World states. Most importantly, Moscow continues to perceive net advantages in the arms transfer program. Without it, frequently no other basis would exist for a Soviet relationship with key developing states.

APPENDIX

TABLE 3

Major Nonaligned Recipients of Soviet Arms DeliveriesCumulative 1975-79

(Million U.S.\$)

<u>Rank</u>	<u>Country</u>	<u>Amount</u>	<u>Percent of Country Total Arms Imports During Period</u>
1	Libya	5,000	72
2	Iraq	4,900	72
	Syria	3,600	80
3	India	1,800	82
4	Algeria	1,500	79
5	Ethiopia	1,500	83
	Iran	650	7
6	Peru	650	59
7	Southern Yemen	575	96
8	Angola	500	59
9	Afghanistan	450	96
10	Tanzania	300	68
11	Egypt	250	17
12	Somalia	210	48
12	Yemen Arab Rep.	210	34

Source: ACDA, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1970-79,
(Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1982), pp. 127-30.

TABLE 4

Military Personnel from Nonaligned, Developing
Countries Trained in Communist Countries

Cumulative 1955-78¹

(Number of Persons)

	<u>Total</u>	<u>USSR</u>	<u>Eastern Europe</u>	<u>China</u>
Total	52,890	43,790	5,965	3,135
AFRICA	17,525	13,420	1,400	2,705
NORTH AFRICA:	3,735	3,385	335	15
Algeria	2,260	2,045	200	15
Libya	1,330	1,265	65	...
Other	145	75	70	...
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA:	13,790	10,035	1,065	2,690
Angola	60	55	5	...
Benin	20	20	...	...
Burundi	75	75	...	...
Cameroon	125	...	...	125
Congo	855	355	85	415
Equatorial Guinea	200	200	...	...
Ethiopia	1,640	1,190	450	...
Ghana	180	180	...	...
Guinea	1,290	870	60	330
Guinea-Bissau	100	100	...	...
Mali	415	355	10	50
Nigeria	730	695	35	...
Sierra Leone	150	...	...	150
Somalia	2,585	2,395	160	30
Sudan	550	330	20	200
Tanzania	2,855	1,820	10	1,025
Togo	55	...	...	55
Zaire	175	...	...	175
Zambia	130	85	...	45
Other	1,600	1,310	230	60

¹Data refer to the estimated number of persons departing for training. Numbers are rounded to the nearest five.

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Zaire	175	...	...	175
Zambia	130	85	...	45
Other	1,600	1,310	230	60

¹Data refer to the estimated number of persons departing for training. Numbers are rounded to the nearest five.

TABLE 5
Soviet and East European Military Technicians
in Nonaligned, Developing Countries, 1978
 (Number of Persons¹)

Total	12,070
AFRICA	6,575
NORTH AFRICA:	2,760
Algeria	1,000
Libya	1,750
Morocco	10
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA:	3,815
Angola	1,300
Equatorial Guinea	40
Ethiopia	1,400
Guinea	100
Guinea-Bissau	65
Mali	180
Mozambique	230
Other	500
LATIN AMERICA:	150
Guyana	...
Peru	150
MIDDLE EAST:	4,495
Iraq	1,200
North Yemen	155
South Yemen	550
Syria	2,580
Other	10
SOUTH ASIA:	850
Afghanistan	700
Bangladesh	...
India	150

Source: CIA, Communist Aid Activities in Non-Communist Less Developed Countries, 1978 (Washington, D.C., September 1979), p. 4.

¹Minimum estimates of the number of persons present for a period of one month or more. Numbers are rounded to the nearest five.

	<u>Total</u>	<u>USSR</u>	<u>Eastern Europe</u>	<u>China</u>
EAST ASIA:	9,300	7,590	1,710	...
INDONESIA	9,270	7,560	1,710	...
KAMPUCHEA	30	30	...	...
LATIN AMERICA:	725	725	...	...
Peru	725	725	...	...
MIDDLE EAST:	18,115	15,630	2,485	...
Egypt	6,250	5,665	585	...
Iran	315	315	...	...
Iraq	4,330	3,650	680	...
North Yemen	1,180	1,180	...	...
South Yemen	1,095	1,075	20	...
Syria	4,945	3,745	1,200	...
SOUTH ASIA:	7,225	6,425	370	430
Afghanistan	4,010	3,725	285	...
Bangladesh	485	445	...	40
India	2,285	2,200	85	...
Pakistan	430	45	NA	385
Sri Lanka	15	10	...	5

Source: CIA, Communist Aid Activities in Non-Communist Less Developed Countries, 1978 (Washington, D.C., September 1979), pp. 4, 5.

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