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Religious Support to Corps Nondivisional Units

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REVISED EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

AR 5-5 Study Religious Support To Corps Non-Divisional Units

The AR 5-5 study, Religious Support to Corps Non-Divisional Units by Chaplain (LTC) Larry Walker, formerly of DCD, USACHCS, is a monumental study requiring over two and one half professional staff years to complete. It represents the most comprehensive examination to date of the unique features of ministry to non-divisional units.

The original study contained ten recommendations as to ways to improve religious support (RS) doctrine to facilitate better ministry to soldiers at echelons above division (EAD). It also contained six organizational recommendations to correct RS shortfalls to non-divisional soldiers. The most significant of these recommendations was to add ministry team (MT) spaces to the force structure based on revised manpower requirements criteria (MARC).

When the study was briefed to the Commanding General, CASCOM only the organizational solutions were highlighted. The MARC solution was rejected by the CG as being out of step with the current emphasis on force structure reductions. The study was then returned to DCD, USACHCS with instructions to revise the study to "remove all out dated references to the MARC."

After lengthy review, the DCD staff came to two conclusions:

First, contained within the study is a doctrinal solution to providing improved RS to EAD without adding new MTs. This solution, plus the other doctrinal recommendations, are fundamentally sound and do not require revision.

Second, to remove all references to the MARC is virtually impossible since these references are woven throughout the study.

Therefore, the DCD, USACHCS is resubmitting for approval the study in its original form with a brief overview which highlights the doctrinal solution to RS shortfalls and disclaims the MARC solution and any references to MT additions based on the MARC.

It is recommended that the study, with its disclaimer, be approved by the Commandant, USACHCS.

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RELIGIOUS SUPPORT TO CORPS NON-DIVISIONAL UNITS

BACKGROUND

The AR 5-5 study Religious Support to Corps Non-Divisional Units is the latest of six studies on religious support (RS) to corps units. The first study was conducted in 1945 and the continuing interest in this area is a clear indication that RS issues for corps units have, to date, never been satisfactorily resolved.

The key similarity in each of these studies is an analysis of the RS shortfalls which occur in corps units owing to such factors as the lack of assigned chaplaincy personnel (i.e. ministry teams composed of chaplains and chaplain assistants), the continuous task organizing of company-sized units and the increasingly wide dispersion of these units on the battlefield.

A second similarity in these studies is that, with the exception of the present study, the proposed solution to the RS shortfall is to increase chaplaincy personnel either through the creation of chaplaincy "pools" or "teams" (now termed Chaplaincy Support Teams, TOE 16-500LA/B) or through the addition of ministry teams (MTs) by the application of revised manpower requirements criteria (MARC).

The present study departs from this exclusive emphasis on additional chaplaincy personnel by also proposing a doctrinal solution which will increase the level of RS without additional MTs.

When the present study was briefed to the Commanding General, CASCOM, for approval in August 1992, the MARC solution to the RS shortfall rather than the doctrinal solution was emphasized. The CG did not accept the MARC criteria for MTs and the study was therefore returned without approval to USACHCS for revision.

DISCLAIMER

It is fully recognized that manpower constraints prevent further MT additions to the current force structure. Therefore, the revised study disavows that portion of the study which recommends additions to the force structure based on revised MARC criteria. Only those portions of the study which present doctrinal solutions to RS shortfalls are highlighted.

STUDY REEXAMINATION

During the past nine months the AR 5-5 study on RS to Corps Non-Divisional Units has been carefully reexamined for its doctrinal solution to RS shortfalls. This solution and the accompanying research has been found to be sound and this solution is currently being validated in the USACHCS version of "battle labs" known

as the Religious Support Concepts Task Force (RSCTF) and in chaplaincy involvement in the Force Projection Logistics Exercise (FPLEX) in June 1993.

The study's doctrinal solution to RS shortfalls in EAD and the study's other doctrinal recommendations are based on one primary finding: RS doctrine for Echelons above Division (EAD) must be distinctive from RS doctrine for divisional units. This finding is, in turn, based on one major fact disclosed by the study:

Current RS doctrine, which emphasizes the concept of Forward Thrust, generally works better for divisional rather than non-divisional units. However, 57% of all MTs are in non-divisional units.

The main feature of Forward Thrust which creates problems for RS to EAD is the emphasis of this concept on "organic" (i.e. unit) rather than "area" RS. The Forward Thrust concept describes MTs as moving "forward" to provide RS to "integral elements" of their assigned battalions such as companies, detachments and sections (see FM 16-1, Religious Support Doctrine, page 1-8). When this same RS principle is applied to corps units, difficulties arise from the fact that numerous units have no assigned MT and must rely on "area" rather than "organic" RS (Note: in the original study, the writer pointed to 34 battalion-sized and 3 brigade-sized units, mostly at corps level, who have no assigned MT. This equates to over 20,000 soldiers, mainly at EAD, which are in units with no assigned MT).

CURRENT DOCTRINE

Current RS doctrine is based on the concept of "Forward Thrust" which dictates that RS should be directed to the most forward deployed units and the priority of assignment for MTs must be to battalion-sized units.

In the main, the Forward Thrust doctrine works well for divisional units. MTs are assigned to divisional combat, combat support and combat service support units and are closely identified with and responsive to these units. Area RS to units without organic MTs is demanding but generally not as difficult as area RS for corps units since the distances separating divisional units are ordinarily not as great as the distances separating corps units. Even denominational or distinctive faith group RS, such as Roman Catholic RS, is manageable as long as there are at least some distinctive faith group assets such as Roman Catholic chaplains within the division (Note: the desired minimum for combat is four Roman Catholic chaplains per division). In addition, divisional MTs train together regularly and these MTs are familiar with "Forward Thrust" doctrine.

When "Forward Thrust" doctrine is applied to non-divisional units, however, RS becomes more difficult. The constant task organizing of company-sized detachments, the vast distances which may separate these detachments from their parent units,

and the fact that many battalion-sized corps units are not authorized MTs means that "area" RS rather than "organic" RS is the rule for non-divisional units. Given the shortage of Roman Catholic chaplains and Jewish chaplains, denominational or distinctive faith group RS is virtually unworkable on any basis other than area RS. However, if MTs and their commanders are not familiar with or supportive of area RS due to lack of training or understanding, large gaps in denominational/faith group RS may occur.

DOCTRINAL RECOMMENDATIONS

The original study lists eight aspects of RS doctrine which need clarification. However, some of these concerns have been resolved in recent revisions of non-chaplaincy doctrinal literature (indicated by an asterisk).

First, revise RS doctrine to reflect the distinctive nature of ministry to corps units with its requirement for emphasis on "area" rather than "organic" RS.

Second, increase the integration of RC MTs with AC MTs through shared training, policy and practice to facilitate better coordination of area RS to corps units (Note: of the 200 RC MTs which deployed to Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, all but one were assigned to non-divisional units. However, of these, only 16% had trained with their AC counterparts).

Third, clarify doctrine involving the cross-leveling of MTs at the MOB station to underscore the role of the installation chaplain in cross-leveling to meet anticipated theater MT requirements.

Fourth, revise "Forward Thrust" doctrine and terminology to better reflect corps RS requirements and the non-linear battlefield.

Fifth, standardize reports among corps MTs and coordinate them with existing staff reports to facilitate better management of RS.

Sixth, revise doctrine on MT leadership and supervision to better reflect Army doctrine and real-world requirements for MT supervision at EAD.

Seventh, fully describe corps MT missions in doctrine in the areas of reconstitution, ministry to Enemy Prisoners of War/Civilian Internees and Mortuary Affairs personnel (*).

Eighth, clarify doctrine to delineate the missions of the Civil Affairs chaplain and the unit chaplain to advise the commander on indigenous religions (*).

METHODOLOGY

The study writer used several methods of gathering data for this study.

The first and most important of these methods was an in depth analysis of the 1988 Logistics Center's laydown of a notional five division corps. This analysis revealed, among other things, both the necessity for revising RS doctrine for corps units and the mechanism for facilitating this new doctrine.

Second, the study writer examined current doctrinal literature concerning operations at EAD and compared the doctrines contained in that literature with doctrines which were emerging as the result of recent conflicts such as Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm (ODS).

Finally, the writer gathered data on RS during ODS itself by reviewing ODS after action reviews (AARs) prepared by MTs, conducting interviews with MTs who are ODS veterans and analyzing the results of questionnaires sent to chaplaincy personnel who have served at EAD.

PROPOSED DOCTRINAL SOLUTION

The proposed doctrinal solution is, at best, an "80% solution" since changes in doctrine alone will not off-set significant shortfalls in chaplaincy personnel at EAD. None the less, significant improvements in RS at EAD can be accomplished by establishing, by doctrine, the following responsibilities:

1. The Corps Support Group commander is responsible for RS to all elements within the CSG boundary.
2. The Corps Support Group (CSG) Headquarters MT is responsible for coordinating RS within the CSG boundary.
3. Commanders of units within the CSG boundary are responsible for the RS mission within their areas of responsibility (AOR).
4. MTs assigned to units within the CSG boundary are responsible for assisting their commanders in providing RS within their AORs.

Note: the above doctrinal solution assumes that the rear operations commander is the COSCOM commander and the COSCOM staff chaplain has responsibility for coordinating RS in the corps rear. However, if another commander is designated to coordinate rear operations, this commander's staff chaplain could coordinate with the CSG MTs to provide RS. In addition, the same RS principle could be implemented at theater level utilizing Area Support Groups (ASGs) rather than CSGs.

OPERATING PRINCIPLE

The CSG Hqs MT will utilize, to the greatest extent possible,

the established rear area operations system consisting of Rear Area Operations Centers (RAOCs), Base Cluster Operations Centers (BCOCs) and Base Defense Operations Centers (BDOCs) to facilitate RS coordination. Utilizing this system will enable the CSG MT on a 24 hour basis to:

1. Communicate with all units and MTs within the CSG boundary as well as other CSG MTs and the COSCOM and Corps Chaplain MTs (if the latter are colocated with the rear CSG).

2. Monitor all units/MTs and unit/MT locations within the CSG boundary (See Note below).

3. Ascertain the RS assets (MTs) and RS requirements of all units within the CSG boundary (See Note below).

4. Coordinate area RS within the CSG boundary by identifying MT assets available to meet RS requests by units and assisting these units, as required, in obtaining RS for their soldiers.

* Note: This information could be placed on a matrix or in a data base and updated daily. This information could then be transmitted electronically or by courier to requesting MTs or units.

CONCLUSIONS:

In a time of diminishing human resources, doctrinal solutions to personnel shortages within the Army must be exploited. The AR 5-5 study Religious Support to Corps Non-Divisional Units offers a plausible doctrinal solution to RS shortfalls in EAD and recommends other important doctrinal changes to facilitate this solution. If approved, the doctrinal changes recommended by this study could form the basis for more appropriate and comprehensive RS doctrine.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

1. Approval of the study by the Commandant, USACHCS.

2. Incorporation of the study's findings into RS doctrine and training.

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Religious Support to Corps Nondivisional Units

FINAL REPORT

**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
UNITED STATES ARMY CHAPLAIN CENTER AND SCHOOL
FORT MONMOUTH, NEW JERSEY 07703-5612**

DIRECTORATE OF COMBAT DEVELOPMENTS

**DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT
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Security Checklist

1. Title of Study: Religious Support to Corps Nondivisional Units
2. Classification: This report is unclassified.
3. Dissemination: There is no limitation on the dissemination of this report.

Executive Summary

1. This study is dedicated to an enlarged understanding of religious support requirements for corps nondivisional units (hereafter called corps units). According to an analysis of the Logistics Center (LOGCEN) Notional Corps, Laydown (hereafter called the Laydown), 57 percent of all chaplaincy personnel in a deployed five-division corps are assigned to corps non-divisional units. Of these, 75 percent are in the U.S. Army National Guard or Reserve. Yet little doctrine exists in FM 16-1, Religious Support, to describe the religious support mission to corps units. MTs receive little training in understanding the nature of the religious support challenges in corps units which may be different or more extensive than in divisional units.

2. The first, and one of the primary elements of research which I completed for this study, was an analysis of the Laydown. It was developed in 1988 to provide a doctrinally accurate picture of deployed corps units. The Laydown depicts a five-division corps which I analyzed for religious support shortfalls and implications. This analysis provided me a base knowledge of units and their possible deployment locations on the battlefield (Appendix A).

a. In order to test my analysis and literary research, I developed a questionnaire for each of the three primary corps chaplain leadership positions: corps, corps support command (COSCOM) corps major subordinate command staff chaplains. The corps Sergeants Major and COSCOM NCOICs were also included. These surveys were sent to those occupying the positions either presently or formerly, from both the Active and Reserve Components. I concluded:

(1) Corps units and their MTs are dispersed over the entire corps area.

(2) Any corps unit may have numerous missions involving uninterrupted and continual hard work, especially before and after engagement.

(3) Constant task organizing of units results in difficulties of MTs to monitor their units' needs and ensure religious support.

(4) Some special missions are unique to the corps rear area.

b. Management issues caused by an extensive GRS mission in corps rear led me into a careful analysis of Army doctrine to help describe Technical Control and Coordination (TECHCON) (Appendix B).

c. Since corps combat service support (CSS) units provide support not only forward, but laterally and rearward, I questioned the utility of Forward Thrust as an operational principle for corps MTs. I found that MT assignment to battalion level and "being where the soldiers are" (ministry of presence) are valid principles of Forward Thrust. However, the directional emphasis ("Forward") does not apply well to these units. The term Battalion-Based Religious Support, more accurately describes the organizational concept (Appendix J).

3. Extensive task organizing, large expansive areas, and constantly moving MTs focused the need for a well managed GRS mission in corps rear. How then could supervisory MTs monitor unit and MT locations to provide the most comprehensive area coverage in the corps rear? This is also a problem in division rear where over 3,000 corps soldiers may be located.

a. Whenever possible, I used Army systems, terms, and definitions to describe ministry. Using an in-place Army system to analyze the GRS problem was helpful.

b. The Army's doctrine for terrain management and unit security in the corps rear area provides an excellent means for the supervisory MT to monitor religious support needs. Through the Army's system of clustering its units and providing Rear Area Operations Centers (RAOC) for control, the supervisory MT may have immediate information on unit locations, and communications capability as well (Appendix C). Since the RAOCs are usually collocated with the Corps Support Group (CSG) headquarters, the CSG staff chaplain is in a superb position to monitor GRS needs for the entire group area.

4. The chaplaincy Manpower Requirements Criteria (MARC) study, which was approved for application to the FY 91 force, had a remarkable effect on religious support at EAD (Appendix E). When the MARC is applied uniformly to the Laydown units, the religious support shortfall for soldiers without chaplains was reduced from 20,125 to 807 soldiers.

a. Whereas the MARC application would greatly reduce the number of soldiers without religious support, the overall problems of the management of GRS and denominational coverage remain.

b. The application of the new MARC would greatly reduce the need for TOE 16-500 Chaplain Support Teams (CST) which had been approved for activation in the U.S. Army Reserve in FY 93 (Appendix F).

c. Future warfighting concepts show a battlefield quite different from the Laydown. Some of the differences from the previous warfighting concept include:

- (1) nonlinearity,
- (2) some corps units located forward of divisions,
- (3) an unweighed division base, and
- (4) an enlarged battlefield, twice the size formerly conceived.

a. I evaluated the impact of these changes and determined that though some new stresses will be placed on MTs, the religious support mission will remain the same.

b. Whereas the requirements for religious support in future operations remain the same, some are especially imperative. Corps MTs must:

- (1) know their unit's missions and how they deploy,
- (2) plan GRS,
- (3) include in their Religious Support Plan (RSP) how they will move with their unit and communicate on the battlefield, and
- (4) know their role and where to locate in each operational phase of the battle (Appendix H).

6. Operation Desert Storm MT interviews and after action reports provided invaluable lessons learned for this study. I weighed this data with previous research and the questionnaire analyses to draw final conclusions (Appendix H and Chapter 6 of the main report).

7. I evaluated special missions and issues for religious support at corps level including reconstitution (Appendix K), civil affairs (Appendix K), enemy prisoners of war, personnel, and resupply issues.

8. Final recommendations may be seen in Chapter 7 of the main report.

Acknowledgements

The U.S. Army Chaplain Center and School initiated this study. Chaplain (LTC) Larry A. Walker, Chief of Concepts and Studies Division of Combat Developments Directorate was author of the study.

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NOTICES

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Definitions

Nonlinear Operations: A concept of warfare which minimizes traditional divisions of the battlefield. This concept is the evolution of the AirLand Battle to accommodate modern warfare technology, equipment, and a new world situation.

Corps Units: In this paper, these are corps nondivisional units.

Direct Religious Support (DRS): DRS is religious support that a Ministry Team (MT) provides to soldiers, their family members, and other authorized personnel in the unit to which the MT is assigned.

General Religious Support (GRS): GRS is the religious support provided by the MT to soldiers, their family members, and other authorized personnel belonging to units other than the one to which the MT is assigned or attached.

The Laydown: The five-division notional corps laydown completed by the Logistics Center in 1988. This battlefield laydown of corps units provided the basis for extensive analysis by CSS proponent schools.

Linear: With respect to a battlefield, conditions where the method of operations is largely oriented toward terrain features and characterized by high attrition of massed forces against massed forces.

Ministry Team: Normally one chaplain and one assistant when assigned at battalion and brigade. At higher echelons, more than a single pair may be included.

Nonlinear: With respect to a battlefield, conditions where less density on the battlefield allows us to capitalize on the advantages of operational fires and maneuver to select those enemy forces to be defeated (not resulting in mutual attrition).

Operational Cycle: The sequence of the stages of activities designed to focus the efforts of all elements on the intent of each operation.

Power Projection: The capability to deploy and sustain combat power to any region. It requires an Army organized, trained, and equipped for flexible and tailored employment and naval and air capabilities (including lift).

Staff Chaplain: "Staff" chaplain refers to the senior position in a given chaplain section.

Tailorability: The design and organization of units to allow selection of only required capabilities for deployability, flexibility and structure.

Unweight: The removal of certain logistical responsibilities from a unit or echelon (while retaining command functions) to unburden it so that it is more agile, deployable, and tailorable. It reduces redundancies and focuses activities at echelons that allow efficiencies of organization and operation.

List of Acronyms

AAR	After Action Review
ACR	Armor Cavalry Regiment
ADA	Air Defense Artillery
AG	Adjutant General
ALB	AirLand Battle
ALO	AirLand Operations
AO	Area of Operations
AR	Army Regulation
ARCOM	Army Reserve Command
ARNG	Army National Guard
ASL	Authorized Stockage List
ASP	Ammunition Supply Point
AV	Aviation
AVIM	Aviation Intermediate Maintenance
AVUM	Aviation Unit Maintenance
AAR	After Action Review
BCOC	Base Cluster Operations Center
BDOC	Base Defense Operations Center
BOS	Battlefield Operating System
C2	Command and Control
CAC	Combined Arms Center
CASCOM	Combined Arms Support Command
CCRK	Chaplain Consumable Resupply Kit
CEWI	Combat Electronic Warfare Intelligence
COMPO	Component
CONUS	Continental United States
COSCOM	Corps Support Command
CI	Civilian Internee
CINC	Commander-in-Chief
CMO	Civil Military Operations
CP	Command Post
CS	Combat Support
CSB	Corp Support Battalion
CSC	Combat Stress Control
CSG	Corps Support Group
CSH	Combat Support Hospital
CSS	Combat Service Support
CST	Chaplain Support Team
DCD	Directorate of Combat Developments
DCPC	Direct Combat Probability Code
DISCOM	Division Support Command
DR	Direct Support
DRS	Direct Religious Support
EAC	Echelons Above Corps

EAD	Echelons Above Division
EEA	Essential Elements of Analysis
EN	Engineer
EPW	Enemy Prisoners of War
EVAC	Evacuation
FA	Field Artillery
FEBA	Forward Edge of Battle Area
FSB	Forward Support Battalion
FSOP	Field Standard Operating Procedure
GRREG	Graves Registration
GRS	General Religious Support
GS	General Support
HSN	Host Nation
IN	Infantry
LIC	Low Intensity Conflict
LID	Light Infantry Division
LOC	Lines of Communication
LOGCEN	Logistics Center (Now CASCOM)
MCC	Movement Control Center
MARC	Manpower Authorization Requirements Criteria
MASH	Mobile Army Surgical Hospital
MBA	Major Battle Area
MEDCOM	Medical Command
MF2K	Medical Force 2000
MI	Military Intelligence
MOB	Mobilization
MOPP	Mission Oriented Protective Posture
MP	Military Police
MSC	Major Subordinate Command
MSE	Mobile Subscriber Equipment
MTOE	Modified Table of Organization and Equipment
NAF	Nonappropriated Fund
OPCON	Operational Control
POD	Port of Debarkation
PSS	Personnel Service Support
RAOC	Rear Area Operations Center
RSP	Religious Support Plan
RTF	Reconstitution Task Force
SAG	Study Advisory Group
SC	Signal Corps
SIB	Separate Infantry Brigade

SRC	Standard Requirements Code
SME	Subject Matter Expert
TA	Theater Army
TAA	Tactical Assembly Area
TAACOM	Theater Army Area Command
TAC	Tactical
TACCP	Tactical Command Post
TDA	Table of Distribution and Allowances
TECHCON	Technical Control and Coordination
TO	Theater of Operations
TOE	Table of Organization and Equipment
TRAC	TRADOC Analysis Command
UMT	Unit Ministry Team
USACHCS	United States Army Chaplain Center and School
USAR	United States Army Reserve

STUDY ABSTRACT

1. The purpose of this study was to analyze and describe religious support to corps nondivisional units. The objectives of the study were: to determine manpower, supervision, organization, leadership and training issues for Ministry Teams (MT) corps level. (MINISTRY TEAM: Normally one chaplain and one assistant when assigned at battalion and brigade. At higher echelons, more than a single pair may be included.) Survey instruments were developed to collect data on key MT positions at corps level. Lessons Learned from recent conflicts including Desert Shield/Desert Storm were highlighted in study.

2. Study results revealed that religious support doctrine focuses primarily on maneuver units rather than corps support units where 57 percent of the MTs are assigned. Significant coverage gaps in corps rear will have been eliminated if the Manpower Requirements Criteria Study (MARC), which was approved in January 1990, is applied uniformly to military units. This would eliminate the need for the Chaplain Support Teams (TOE 16-500 A/B). However, some Modified Table of Organization and Equipment (MTOE) units will have MT requirements and no authorization due to DA resource constraints. Nonlinear operations and other emerging doctrines affect religious support in the specific unit but does not define the overall chaplaincy mission. Lessons Learned from MTs experienced in recent conflicts confirm that many chaplaincy problems are leadership problems.

3. The recommendations of the study have most impact on the Reserve Component during hostile operations and will have little impact on either personnel or dollar cost during normal peacetime. The recommendation to move the TOE 16-500LA/B chaplain support teams, which are planned to be activated to COMPO 3 in FY 93, back into COMPO 4 (unfinanced and unresourced), is the billpayer for the other recommendations.

Chapter 1

Introduction

1. Study Background.

a. Since WW II, the role of the corps has expanded from a merely tactical headquarters to the largest tactical unit in the U.S. Army. The Corps is responsible for necessary administrative and logistic support for subordinate divisions. Chaplains and chaplain assistants assigned to these units struggled to meet the needs of the soldiers in conflicts including: WW II, Korea, Vietnam, Just Cause, and Operation Desert Storm. The corps commander and corps nondivisional units (hereafter referred to as corps units) have been given an even more predominant role in the future warfighting concept developments (see in Appendix H).

b. U.S. Army chaplaincy combat developments agencies or directorates completed four studies from 1962-1976 which dealt with some aspects of the shortfall of chaplains in the corps rear areas (see Appendix F). The 1945 report by the General Board of U.S. Forces on the Army Chaplain in the European Theater discussed some of the same religious support issues highlighted in this study.

c. Former studies focused on coverage shortfalls and approved chaplain-to-soldier ratios during the periods. The approved ratio for corps units varied from 1:700 to 1:1350 at different times since WW II. Generally, the ratio was always greater for corps units (1:850-1:1350) than for divisional units (1:700). This disparity resulted in a greater shortfall of religious support in corps rear than in divisional areas. Study writers proposed chaplain pools or augmentation teams assigned to theater, corps, or even division, as solutions to the shortfall. These solutions gave senior supervisory chaplains the flexibility to "fill holes" and provide more comprehensive denominational coverage.

2. Recent Developments.

a. Since this study began, five major events transpired which drastically altered the course of the study: DA approval of the chaplaincy MARC study, the inclusion of the TOE 16-500 chaplain support teams into the Reserve Component, Operation Just Cause, Operation Desert Shield/Storm, and the approval of the AirLand Operations concept, TRADOC PAM 525.5, 1 August 1991.

b. The approval of the chaplaincy MARC study IAW AR 570-2 (see Appendix E) for application to the FY 91 force, answered many of the issues raised by senior chaplains. When applied uniformly to units throughout a five-division corps (see Laydown,

Appendix A) the MARC standards reduce the religious support coverage shortfall for soldiers without chaplains was reduced from 20,125 to 801 soldiers. This reduction applies only to go-to-war requirements. The chaplaincy MARC provides a benchmark for commanders which suggests that for a MT to do an adequate job, the former ratio of 1:700 is too high. Under the new MARC, some large units now require two MTs.

c. The approval of the MARC greatly reduced the validity of the rationale for augmentation teams to "fill holes" in units without chaplains in corps rear (see in Ch. 5).

d. Operation Just Cause was the first major military action in many years involving corps units. However, its brevity and limited corps units' involvement provided less data for this study than Operation Desert Storm.

e. Operation Desert Shield/Storm was the first deployment of a full corps since WW II. Preceding the ground war in February 1991, corps MT requirements were filled at 100 percent. The valuable experiences of the deployed MTs obtained in After Action Reports (AAR) and personal interviews provided invaluable direction for this study.

f. New warfighting concepts threatened to make obsolete much of my early research into the linear battlefield depicted in the Laydown (see Appendix A). However, this analysis provides historical and mission information for units, much of which is still current. Though force structure will change in the future, other changes will include methods and deployment variations. Additionally, force structure proposals and final approval for doctrine have not been completed at this date.

3. Problem.

a. Based on the Laydown analysis of a corps of five divisions, 57 percent of assigned MTs are in corps units. Corps units vary widely in mission, organization, deployment, and tactics, and provide a broad field for the application of the religious support mission on the battlefield.

b. Chaplaincy doctrine in FM 16-1 contains little specifically for these units.

4. Objectives. The objectives of this study were to identify chaplaincy manpower, deployment, and religious support issues of corps units on the battlefield. Comparisons and contrasts of the linear with the nonlinear battlefield were also reviewed. Special missions in the corps rear, such as religious support in reconstitution, supply, and ministry in cluster groups, formed a predominant part of the study. Four questionnaires submitted to

the field provided realistic balance (see Appendixes AC and G). Lessons learned from major conflicts, including most recently, Operation Desert Shield/Storm, provided first-hand experience.

5. Scope. The study evaluated corps unit missions, structure, and deployment and their implications for religious support. Aspects of religious support were considered wherever these units were assigned on the battlefield, from positions forward of divisions to the corps rear boundary.

6. Limitations. None.

7. Methodology.

a. The sheer size and diversity of a corps increase the difficulty of analysis. Until the Laydown was developed in 1988, studies of corps units and elements were piecemeal or confined to classified scenario development. The analysis of the Laydown provided extensive information on the mission and structure of corps units current at the date of its development. It provided a background for the appendices of this study which delineate current Army thinking, emerging doctrines, and warfighting concepts.

b. Data obtained from four questionnaires submitted to the senior chaplaincy leadership in corps units provided balanced research. In addition, AARs, historical documents, and interviews with MT participants from Operation Desert Shield/Storm were particularly valuable for a comprehensive treatment of the subject.

8. Essential Elements of Analysis (EEA). Military developments and world events led to a modification of the EEAs over the period. The following are the final EEAs.

a. EEA (1) How does the threat affect religious support to corps units?

b. EEA (2) What units meeting current MARC criteria have no authorized MT?

c. EEA (3) What does the analysis of the Laydown reveal about religious support to corps units?

d. EEA (4) What are the implications of the new MARC on religious support to corps units?

e. EEA (5) How was religious support provided to corps units since 1940?

f. EEA (6) What is the impact of combat duration on religious support to corps units?

g. EEA (7) How do coverage shortfalls affect the adequacy of religious support to corps units?

h. EEA (8) What are the unit attachment, command, and technical control and supervision issues for TOE 16500LA00 and 16500LB00 chaplain support teams (CST)?

i. EEA (9) Does Forward Thrust doctrine apply to corps units?

j. EEA (10) How do the outcomes of this study relate to the Battlefield Operating System (BOS)?

k. EEA (11) How will emerging doctrines affect the religious support mission at corps units?

l. EEA (12) What are the implications of the outcome of this study for changes in doctrine, organization, training, operational concepts and leader development?

Chapter 2

The Threat to Corps Units

1. The Threat Continuum.

a. The types or degrees of threat have been categorized as: peacetime competition, conflict, and war (see Appendix D). Corps units and their MTs may have limited participation in peacetime competition (normal competition between nations) and conflicts which may include protracted U.S. military involvement and consequent religious support needs.

b. Low Intensity Conflicts (LIC) will likely be the primary focus for the U.S. military for the future. Direct action will be confined to short, focused, and direct application of forces. MTs may be involved in these power projections as their units are deployed.

2. War.

a. War is conceived as an armed struggle or clash between organized parties within a nation or between nations in order to achieve limited political or military objectives. Soviet and Warsaw Pact dissolution has changed the focus of U.S. planners to areas other than Europe for the war of the future. Based on a comparison of official personnel records, Operation Desert Storm involved 31 percent more MTs than Vietnam. Saudi Arabia was the first theater since WW II where a full corps deployed. Consequently, the lessons learned there were critically important to this study.

b. Generally, corps units are "first in and last out" of a theater. They prepare sites, establish hospitals, move and station supplies, and ready equipment while preparing to defend if attacked. Some of these units were positioned forward of divisional units during Operation Desert Shield/Storm. The establishment of "log bases," both forward and rear, exposes corps units to threat attack as readily as combat units.

c. Enemy long range fires, deep strike aircraft, missiles, and specialized units make a potential attack on any portion of the battlefield a reality. Traditional battlefield lines differentiating forward and rear have become blurred due to weapons of mass destruction. No area of the battlefield is "safe." We can only guess at the destruction if modern missiles had been used against coalition forces in Saudi Arabia instead of the outdated SCUD missiles.

d. MTs are embedded in Army units throughout the battlefield. Generally, MTs experience the same threat as their units. The nonlinear battlefield will produce many casualties with intense destructive force projected by long range fires.

Chapter 3

Religious Support to Corps Soldiers in Divisional Areas

1. The Most Forward Units - Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR).

a. Corps unit/element involvement on the battlefield begins at the most forward units, usually the ACR. In addition to the five MTs assigned to the ACR, as many as three or more corps MTs may be in the area covering corps units supporting the ACR (see Appendix A).

b. Nonlinear operations increase the ACR mission of reconnaissance. ACR troops will be dispersed over as many as 300 kilometers on an extended battlefield. MTs will likely station themselves at casualty collection points or with support elements.

c. ACR MTs must be aware of battle plans, expect high unit casualties, and know the locations of secondary positions. Initial battles may be fierce and fought in an NBC environment. Pastoral care for casualties, battle fatigue ministry, and services to honor the dead may be predominant religious support missions.

d. In future operations, technical control and coordination of religious support will be difficult at best. In future operations, MTs must be ready to function alone during nonlinear operations (especially offensive operations) with little support from supervisory personnel.

e. In nonlinear operations, some corps units may be positioned forward of the divisions including: engineers (EN), field artillery (FA), aviation (AV), signal (SC), and military intelligence (MI). On the linear battlefield many of these units are normally positioned to the "rear." The forward positioning of units creates greater vulnerability. It is important to note that under current TOEs, many of these units do not have requirements for MTs. Some have MTs at brigade level only.

2. Corps Soldiers in Divisional Areas.

a. On the linear battlefield, an armored division rear may contain 3,812 or more corps support soldiers (see discussions on the Laydown, Appendix A). The FA brigade MT may be the only corps unit MT located there. The division chaplain is responsible for monitoring unit locations and for planning their religious support.

b. The General Religious Support (GRS) mission of the division must include these corps soldiers. As many as seven corps MTs located in areas rearward of the division may cross into divisional areas to provide religious support to their units. Supervisory corps chaplains expect their MTs entering a divisional area to advise senior divisional supervisory chaplains of their presence and coordinate their religious support plans with them (see Appendix G, Tab A, Q. 22).

c. In future warfighting concepts, responsibilities for divisional support functions transfer to corps or maneuver brigade levels to "unweight" the division commander so that he can focus on the tactical battle. Many corps support units have been organized into smaller elements attached to maneuver units and their support battalions. To provide comprehensive religious support, MTs must become more intentional in their GRS mission to these small units which are often located near each other (see Appendix H).

d. The maneuver brigade MT supervises not only brigade MTs, but also as many as two corps MTs (EN and FA) located in its area. The Forward Support Battalion (FSB) is configured in a "direct support-plus" relationship to the brigade. The brigade commander rates the FSB battalion commander. Accordingly, the maneuver brigade chaplain supervises the FSB MT, thus enlarging the brigade chaplain's responsibility.

e. Denominational support, particularly the assignment of Catholic chaplains in the brigade, is a critical resource. Often commanders are not understanding or supportive of the MT role to provide GRS (see Appendix L). The presence of corps units in the division area only increases the already nearly impossible mission of providing Catholic coverage to all divisional forces since most nondivisional Catholic chaplains are occupied in COSCOM or corps rear areas with coverage of hospitals and troops located there. To provide the most comprehensive Catholic coverage, the supervisory chaplains coordinate the requests for Catholic support. Current practice for most units is that MTs arrange their own coverage with the Catholic chaplain as best they can.

f. According to the Laydown, corps soldiers in the Light Infantry Division (LID) Rear total 3,198, a reduction of 164 from the heavy unit. However, the "slice" of corps support troops is similar to the heavy division. Each maneuver brigade MT has the same two corps MTs. Since the LID battalion MTs have no organic transportation assets, they may need to rely on corps MTs for assistance.

Chapter 4

Religious Support to Corps Soldiers in Rear Areas

1. The Corps Support Command (COSCOM)

a. The COSCOM is the primary unit for planning and providing CSS support in rear areas. The COSCOM staff chaplain section (3 chaplains/4 chaplain assistants) synchronizes and monitors COSCOM religious support assets to provide a denominationally balanced, comprehensive Religious Support Plan (RSP) for their soldiers in divisional areas.

b. In a five-division corps, the COSCOM chaplain supervises more MTs on the battlefield than any other Major Subordinate Command (MSC). In Operation Desert Storm there were over 60 MTs in each COSCOM with approximately half in the corps medical brigade. The COSCOM staff chaplain assists and relies upon the brigade level MTs for supervision of MTs in subordinate units.

c. The COSCOM supports the divisions through Corps Support Groups (CSG) which are composed of multifunctional battalions. Forward CSGs support the divisions and other units in their Area of Operations (AO) whereas the Rear CSG supports rear areas, units in reserve, separate brigades, and special missions. Operation Desert Storm experience showed that in the rear CSG, support centers or "log bases" contained as many as 19,000 soldiers. Senior chaplain leaders insisted that all CSGs needed 2 chaplains/2 chaplain assistants assigned to the CSG HQ, especially the rear CSG which needed one chaplain with the rank of lieutenant colonel.

d. The nature of the COSCOM ministry is significantly different from maneuver units. Support units provide continual, unending, unvarying, and often unappreciated hard work. They are first in and last to leave the battlefield, with maximum effort before and after engagement. The great diversity of unit missions (the MT must know every company's mission in the group) complicates religious support. MTs must plan well and communicate effectively with all levels.

e. Rapid Task Organizing. The CSGs are dynamic units, everchanging with almost daily attachments/detachments. In Operation Desert Storm, ad hoc battalions were developed "on the ground." None of these had MTs assigned. This provided a challenge for MTs to monitor their AO for GRS and to know where other MT resources were in the area.

f. Monitoring the Battlefield.

(1) Army doctrine requires base clustering of units in corps rear areas for support and security. Appendix C outlines one way for MTs to monitor rear areas and provides a plan for GRS using this Army doctrine. Contingencies may require other variations, but knowledge of this Army system should be understood and used by MTs, when available.

(2) By using the Rear Area Operations Centers (RAOC), the CSG MT will know what unit and MTs are in the base cluster(s). Because communication assets are always available in the RAOC, the MT may easily communicate with them (see Appendix C).

(3) Operation Desert Storm experience with clusters was mixed. RAOCs were ineffective due partially to their late deployment (most are in Reserves). Wide dispersion made it difficult to cluster effectively. To comprehend the religious support challenges in corps rear, the MT must be knowledgeable of Army systems for managing rear areas and use these systems to facilitate religious support. The S2-S3 sections remain the vital source for unit locations in lieu of an operative RAOC system.

2. The COSCOM Medical Units.

a. MTs assigned to the corps medical brigade respond to the COSCOM staff chaplain for technical supervision. Operation Desert Storm experience revealed that the hospital/medical MTs comprise a significant percentage of resources and a particular challenge for religious support personnel:

b. The supervision of MTs in many Combat Support Hospitals (CSH) and Mobile Army Surgical Hospitals (MASH) was the COSCOM staff MT's responsibility in Operation Desert Storm.

c. During Operation Desert Storm, the Chief of Chaplains mandated the denominational balance (Protestant and Catholic coverage) for each hospital. In-theater cross-leveling to accomplish this goal proved very difficult. Some mobilization (MOB) stations effectively cross-leveled soldiers before deployment.

d. The hospital MT must understand the nature of hospital ministry. The MT must integrate into the "family" atmosphere of the medical staff, become familiar with trauma and death, and be able to function in a confined area over a protracted time. Integration and acceptance are particularly important for effective ministry to the staff of a medical unit.

e. Returning MTs strongly recommended that a MT be required at the medical group headquarters where none exists presently. The mission of managing MT assets and covering medical units which do not have MTs assigned (i.e. medical support battalions, Evacuation (EVAC) battalions, group headquarters, dental, and combat stress control elements) remain largely unfulfilled without a MT assigned at group level. Hospital MTs are mostly confined to the hospital area.

3. The Corps Support Group.

a. The CSG staff MT may become the coordinator for GRS in the CSG for the following reasons:

(1) The CSG is generally a defined area for which support units have responsibility.

(2) Terrain management of the corps rear is generally divided within CSG areas and up-to-date information on units is immediately available at the RAOC or S-3.

b. The recommendation above contains the following difficulties:

(1) The rank of the CSG chaplain major would make extended management of the area difficult since other supervisory chaplains in the group area might be senior to him.

(2) Such an arrangement could only be made with the approval of the CSG commander. This could be coordinated with CSG commanders by the COSCOM chaplain during peacetime.

(3) MTs would need to be trained to understand and use this system of GRS in the corps rear.

3. The Corps Rear.

a. In the Laydown, the corps rear is the large CSG designated from the corps forward CSGs' rear boundaries to the corps rear boundary. It is usually the largest single corps rear area. In Operation Desert Storm, "log bases" including as many as 19,000 soldiers were established in this CSG. The Rear CSG provides general support (GS) transportation, aviation, maintenance, and supply for units forward and for those in its own area.

(1) The Corps and COSCOM headquarters sections are normally in this region and usually are in close proximity.

(2) Army doctrine calls for the corps staff chaplain to be at the corps rear Command Post (CP). However, Operation Desert Storm experience revealed that the two corps chaplain sections were split into three or four locations, roughly corresponding to all the corps CPs. A fourth, farther to the rear, was at the Port of Debarkation (POD) at Dhahran where at least one of the corps maintained a chaplain/chaplain assistant. Based on the corps scheme of maneuver and commander guidance, the VII Corps staff chaplain remained at the Tactical (TAC) CP from late in February until mid-April 1991. (See also Appendix G, Tab A, Q. 30.)

(3) The corps staff MT is the only MT with continual access to locations of all units on the battlefield. To constantly monitor locations and the course of the battle is a vital function for GRS. Units may be monitored at either the corps main or corps rear CPs.

b. As currently configured, the corps staff chaplain section consists of five enlisted requirements (SGM, SGT, CPL, SPC, PFC). Most of the time, the SGM is on the road with the staff chaplain providing supervisory functions throughout the corps. This leaves an SGT in charge of a section which must interface with senior enlisted and officers, in addition to supervising other section 71Ms. This function requires a greater level of experience and should be elevated one or two ranks.

c. Higher Supports Lower. During Operation Desert Storm, corps staff MTs relied almost exclusively on the brigade/group staff MTs to provide supervision for MTs after the units moved to the Tactical Assembly Areas (TAAs). They provided guidance to the brigade MTs and served as "pastor to pastors." The XVIII Airborne Corps staff MT was constantly on the move visiting MTs in their TAA positions. The VII Corps staff MT located at the Corps TAC for most of the deployment and traveled daily to unit locations. Whereas gatherings of MTs were possible in rear staging areas, they were almost impossible in TAA. Some battalion MTs rarely saw their supervisory MTs due to dispersion. Because MTs may be on their own much of the time, they must train, know how to survive, and minister where they are.

Chapter 5

Corps Religious Support Issues and Missions

1. The Battlefield in Corps Rear.

a. The battlefield in corps rear is a dynamic environment. The following are its peculiar characteristics:

(1) GRS is more complicated and expansive than at divisional level (See Appendix A).

(2) Supervisory MTs must manage Catholic, Jewish, and Orthodox assets to provide comprehensive support. MTs need to use the technical chain in requesting support.

(3) Wide dispersion of units makes dedicated transportation for MTs a necessity.

(4) Navigational devices and navigational knowledge, including map reading skills, are absolutely essential, particularly for corps MTs.

(5) Initial briefing for MTs entering the theater is critical for their swift integration into their assigned units.

(6) MTs must use the Army Supply System for religious support supplies.

(7) Corps soldiers (and MTs) may occupy areas closest to the enemy to the farthest reaches of the corps rear boundary.

(8) Units are constantly on the move through areas supported by CSS units. Religious coverage responsibilities for CSS units may change frequently, particularly in the corps rear.

(9) MTs may find their ability to move extensively to visit units interrupted or halted due to security measures or too wide dispersion.

(10) Based on an analysis of Operation Desert Storm deployed personnel, approximately 75 percent of corps MTs are Army National Guard (ARNG)/U.S. Army Reserve (USAR). This preponderance of Reserve Component soldiers in corps rear creates challenges for unit integration and religious support coordination.

b. CSS units are often multifunctional, but mission specific, at the small unit level. This allows for quick attachment and detachment.

(1) In staging areas, supervisory MTs may find it easy to provide guidance, organize for support, conduct MT meetings and training, organize transportation, and provide communication. When units leave for TAAs, however, what was easy before, becomes extremely difficult or impossible, because of rapid dispersion of units over great distances.

(2) The complexity is heightened even more during offensive operations when MTs move with their units and may not see another MT for long periods of time.

2. Integration of Reserve Component MTs.

a. A large majority of ARNG/USAR MTs performed well in Operation Desert Storm. Limited interaction with active component forces in training events prior to the war created some problems in the Gulf. Chaplain (LTC) John A. Rasmussen, the Reserve Affairs Advisor of the U.S. Army Chaplain Center and School, provided the following observations following Operation Desert Storm:

(1) The fact that some ARNG/USAR chaplains and chaplain assistants did not train together prior to deployment, created some difficulty in integrating with Active Component. In some Operation Desert Storm units, only 16 percent of the Reserve Component MTs had ever trained with the Active Component MTs.

(2) Some ARNG/USAR MTs were untrained and unprepared for the fast-paced, around-the-clock duty that combat required.

(3) Personnel issues included the following:

(a) Some young chaplains who had not completed Phase 3 of the Chaplain Officer Basic Course were not well prepared to be effective chaplains.

(b) Assigning chaplains with ranks over or under the requirement of the slot caused considerable difficulty. For instance, one chaplain (captain) assigned to a LTC's position, required supervision of chaplains senior to himself.

(c) Accounting procedures for the number and location of MTs were not adequate and some MTs entered theater without the knowledge of the ARCENT chaplain.

(d) Most hospitals are in the Reserve Component and contain two chaplain requirements each, neither of which is coded for denominational preference. Many hospital units deployed with two Protestant chaplains (and some without chaplain assistants). At M-Day, a Roman Catholic chaplain should be cross-leveled into one of these slots at the MOB station, if possible, since such changes are very difficult in-theater.

(e) Some hospital MTs had very little experience in ministry to traumatized and dying patients like the battlefield produces.

(4) Cross-leveling ARNG/USAR MTs created difficulties, since many had trained with the same units for many years. Likewise it was difficult for their soldiers, who though attached to other units, still looked to "their Reserve chaplain" for religious support.

b. Many of these problems can be resolved by leadership and training. More extensive integration with the active component in peacetime will help alleviate the disparities. A clearer reporting procedure at the MOB station would help provide the accountability needed in theater.

c. It should be noted that this is a unique phenomenon among corps units. All reserve chaplains activated in Operation Desert Storm were assigned to units at corps and above. Divisional units and MTs which work together daily do not experience this integration of disparate units, commanders, and MTs in theater.

3. Technical Control and Coordination.

a. Answers to the study questionnaires indicate that supervisory chaplains felt less control would be necessary in combat than in peacetime (see Appendix G, Tab A, Q 9, 13). Operation Desert Storm experience taught that increased supervision was impossible, particularly after MTs moved to TAAs. MTs participating in Operation Just Cause experienced this isolation, though the theater was considerably smaller than in Saudi Arabia.

b. MTs need a clear understanding of appropriate MT relationships, especially across command lines. This is especially true for MTs assigned at corps level.

c. Though not a command relationship, technical control and coordination describes the controlling and coordinating relationship between chaplain supervisors and chaplains assigned to subordinate units within the same command (see Appendix B).

d. Generally, chaplain relationships follow command relationships. Chaplains may provide supervision across command lines when MTs are attached or Operational Control (OPCON) with their units in a Task Force (see FM 101-5).

4. Task Organizing.

a. When CSS units leave the staging area, rapid task organizing, almost daily, creates considerable turbulence. In Operation Desert Storm, it was difficult for CSS MTs to keep up with their own units, much less others which might be in their AO.

b. MTs need to understand the significance of task organizing for command relationships and consequent chaplain relationships. MTs attached or OPCON to a brigade, for instance, fall under the brigade staff MT supervision.

c. Often the MT's unit splits into several parts which are attached to other units. This disrupts established relationships. MTs must be flexible and open to serve all soldiers regardless of past experience.

5. General Religious Support (GRS). GRS has been done in most cases by an, "If I happen to be around and you're there, I'll cover your unit," basis. In combat, a plan or system for providing GRS is vital. If MTs do not train for area coverage (GRS) as they would in war, commanders will not understand and this will cause units to be without support, while others may have an overage of available MTs. Supervisory chaplains agree that GRS is more extensive for CSS/CS units in corps rear during combat than in divisional areas (see Appendix G, Tab, Q 11). The deputy corps chaplain plans for GRS in rear areas and may delegate much of the mission to the COSCOM staff chaplain (see Appendix A, Q. 26; also Tab B, Q. 30). MTs must be intentional in their area coverage plans and train accordingly.

6. Denominational Coverage. Scarce assets, particularly Catholic and Jewish chaplains, should be managed carefully at senior levels. However, if such personnel, especially Jewish chaplains, are assigned to the corps or COSCOM chaplain section, they will likely be traveling throughout the corps and be unavailable for the many corps or COSCOM duties required daily.

7. Religious Support Plans (RSP). The RSP is the game plan of the MT with pertinent information being included in OPLAN/OPORD annexes for religious support. The RSP presupposes coordination--the mutual sharing of information between chaplains and the inclusion of support initiatives from both lower and higher echelons into the RSP of each MT. The RSP is a living document, subject to constant revision as the situation warrants. When approved by the commander, it becomes the blueprint for

providing the religious support for the unit. (See Appendix G, Tab A, Q. 36-38; Tab B, Q. 31).

8. Religious Support Supplies.

a. In the Operation Desert Storm experience, religious support supplies were of lesser priority than war materiel and some religious material never left the U.S. Because much of the religious materiel which arrived was not intercepted at the port by MT personnel, it was placed in a lot containing other lost material. Procedures were hammered out "on the ground" in Saudi Arabia for reception and distribution of religious support supplies.

b. Some progress is being achieved to get National Stock Numbers (NSN) on all religious support supplies so they can be handled through the unit like any other supply item. This would eliminate much of the confusion caused when materials are bought and handled "off line" from the standard supply system.

c. Until standard supply system includes religious support supplies, the COSCOM MT will normally be responsible to plan for and disperse religious support supplies (see Appendix G; Tab A, Q 66; Tab D, Q 13).

9. Communication.

a. On the study survey, senior chaplains listed the problems associated with communicating with MTs as the most difficult area of their mission in combat (see Appendix G, Tab A, Q. 68; Tab B, Q. 62; Tab C, Q. 48). Providing denominational and area coverage was high on the list and related directly to the need for communication capability.

b. Most supervisory chaplains surveyed (76.3 percent) agree or strongly agree that dedicated radio equipment would greatly enhance their mission. MTs in Operation Just Cause mostly used telephone or face-to-face meetings to convey information, and MTs in Operation Desert Storm used all means including telephone, courier, and radio. But even radio communication was difficult over such great distances in Saudi Arabia. The surest method used by the XVIII Airborne was through daily courier service used by the units. The Corps Staff MT often used the liaison officers of various units stationed at the corps main CP to send messages to their units. MTs who had voice communication capability, and were accustomed to its use, felt that it greatly enhanced their ability to provide religious support.

c. One method of establishing a flow of communication is through regular reports. The study surveys showed that daily reports were not regarded as essential by over half the supervi-

sory MTs (Tab A, Q. 8). However, supervisory MTs in Operation Just Cause and Operation Desert Storm revealed that daily situation reports were important as reporting, accounting, and management tools to provide comprehensive religious support. The situation reports most effective were standardized, requiring data by line. More complete religious support reports were filed weekly or less, depending on the phase of the war.

d. Automation on the battlefield is a facet of the communication matrix, especially at corps level and higher. Modern fax, electronic mail and computer networks greatly facilitate the gathering and dissemination of data. During Operation Desert Storm, computers were used extensively at the corps rear CP. After the war, there was greater utility for the equipment at divisional level. The principle seems to be that computers are more practical, even essential, at higher supervisory levels.

10. Civil Affairs (CA) and Religious Support.

a. Though some CA chaplains are presently assigned to battalions, the new "L series" TOE, which takes effect in 1992, has a total of 16 chaplains (MAJ) who are assigned at brigade or theater command level. The chaplains will be assigned as "Assistant Cultural Affairs Officers" and are not charged with providing religious support for their units (see Appendix L).

b. One CA Brigade (132 Rstr) may be assigned to the corps HQ to assist in Civil-Military Operations (CMO) which are conducted by the G5/S5 of the corps, COSCOM, division, or brigade. The chaplain assigned to this brigade will likely be the only CA chaplain in the corps and his/her function will be to support CMO as a liaison between ethnic, religious and social groups, to identify buildings or shrines for restrictions, and to recommend to command the methods and techniques of support most acceptable to the local population.

c. Unit chaplains normally work through CA officers and the G5/S5 when providing input to the command on civil-military matters (see FM 41-10). In the study surveys, 71.1 percent of supervisory chaplains see no conflict between their mission and the CA officer's. However, only about 50 percent felt a need to coordinate through the CA Officer when giving commanders advice on indigenous religions.

d. In contingency or Low-Intensity operations, chaplains may be the first staff officers on the ground with the expertise to advise the commander on indigenous religions or assist indigenous populations in civil-humanitarian projects. Unit chaplains, though not necessarily experts in regional religions, should learn about religions found in the regions for which their unit has responsibility. In Operation Desert Storm many chaplains assisted their units with briefings on Islam.

e. Though, doctrinally, CA chaplains are to provide CA support as Assistant Cultural Affairs Officers, Operation Desert Storm experience revealed a wide latitude of commanders' expectations. Most served as unit chaplains as well, providing religious support to their units. However, in one case the chaplain served as the primary staff officer for a CA brigade at ARCENT. There appears to be considerable inconsistency in what is expected of the CA chaplain doctrinally and what commanders expect practically.

11. Forward Thrust.

a. The essence of the Forward Thrust organizational principle is two fold: MT assignment to battalion level and MT accompaniment of their soldiers wherever they are (see Appendix J). However, the directional emphasis ("Forward") may apply less to CSS MTs in corps rear than to divisional MTs. Many MTs assigned to corps units serve units which may be located in any direction, including rearward, of their headquarters.

b. One supervisory chaplain who served in Operation Desert Storm suggests that the emphasis in doctrine on "being forward" can create such a "need" to be forward that it is potentially fatal. Another recommended that Forward Thrust apply to corps units since his CSG had a base located forward of the division. It should be noted that Forward Thrust doctrine defined in FM 16-1 applies to all religious support. In the study surveys, corps supervisory chaplains were uncertain of whether Forward Thrust adequately describes the religious support mission to corps units (see Appendix G, Tab A, Q. 17).

c. The word "forward" appears to be the primary element in explanations of the Forward Thrust principle. Nonlinear operations belie the notion of "forward." CSS units serve their soldiers regardless of direction.

12. Ministry to Enemy Prisoners of War (EPW)/Civilian Internees (CI).

a. All military police (MP) units whose mission is to escort and guard EPWs are in the ARNG/USAR and are assigned to Theater. However, "holding cages" may be located in corps and even division rear areas, for temporary guard of prisoners pending immediate evacuation to larger "camps" in the theater. It would be unusual if EPWs remained in the holding areas for even 24 hours (see FM 19-1).

b. Generally, two chaplains and two chaplain assistants are assigned to MP units responsible for the large camps. The primary mission is ministry to U.S. soldiers; however, depending on the population and time available, chaplains may serve in a liaison function with local clergy, etc. to provide religious support. The chaplain assists in identifying clergy EPWs and insuring their treatment IAW Geneva Convention rules.

c. It is unlikely that corps MTs will be extensively involved with EPWs in a scenario involving a mature theater as in Operation Desert Storm. However, in actions involving less than a mature corps, as in Operation Just Cause, MTs (even divisional) may have greater contact with EPW/CI. In Panama, agitated and distressed EPW/CI detainees were calmed and relaxed as chaplains prayed, ministered, and distributed crosses (see Operation Just Cause After-Action Report). MT involvement will depend to a large extent on the religious base of the EPW population and country where camps are located. In Operation Desert Storm, EPWs stayed in the EPW camps less than a week and were moved westward to be placed in camps administered by the host nation. MT involvement will depend largely on the religious base of the EPW population and country where the camps are located.

d. The religious and/or political background of EPWs affects how MTs are received by them on the battlefield, but generally MTs have ministered to EPWs with significant and lasting results.

e. The Geneva Convention governs the treatment of EPW chaplains, clergy, or lay leaders. U.S. chaplains make every effort to comply with the applicable articles.

13. Ministry in Reconstitution.

a. Reconstitution (both reorganization and regeneration) includes actions planned and implemented by commanders to restore ineffective units to a desired level of effectiveness. Units which have experienced severe loss, trauma, and fatigue need to be rebuilt physically, militarily, and spiritually.

b. Reorganization of units includes realignment and consolidation of depleted units to increase the level of combat effectiveness. This normally takes place within forward units.

c. Regeneration involves large scale replacements/rebuilding of units, e.g., a divisional brigade regenerated by the corps. This mission is usually assigned to the COSCOM. Corps MTs will likely assist in religious support to the units (see Appendix I).

d. Depending on the state of the MTs of the unit being regenerated, one or more corps MTs may be temporarily assigned to the Reconstitution Task Force (RTF) to minister to soldiers until the unit's MTs have recuperated or been replaced. Assistance from corps MTs must be coordinated with commanders as a temporary and emergency mission.

e. Reconstitution in future warfighting concepts is a rapid pull back from the engagement area, a short period of resupply and respite, and preparation for the next battle. If it is determined that the unit is depleted below combat effectiveness, the commander may order a thorough reconstitution.

f. Ministry emphases during reconstitution must include memorial services, group and individual debriefing/counseling, worship services, and prayer. The RTF MTs will greatly assist in the rebuilding of morale and cohesion in the unit.

14. Chaplain Support Teams (CST).

a. In FY 1993, 13 TOE 16-500 chaplain teams will move from component (COMPO) 4 (unmanned and unresourced) to COMPO 3 (USAR). This accomplishment provides a partial solution to the GRS problem which has been a constant struggle since WW II. Using augmentation teams to address coverage inadequacies in the corps rear area has been proposed in every major chaplaincy study dealing with this subject since 1962 (see Appendix E).

b. The chaplaincy MARC study, which was approved by DA in January 1990, resolved most of the GRS problems caused by so many units without MT requirements (see Appendix E). This greatly reduced the need for augmentation chaplain teams. It should be noted that the MARC deals only with go-to-war requirements.

c. Commanders have recently begun to use the TOE 16-500 chaplain support teams in ways in which they were never intended. Their use of them to fill TDA slots is one of these ways.

15. Ministry to Mortuary Affairs Units.

a. MT support for Mortuary Affairs personnel is twofold:

(1) Providing ministry to personnel handling the dead and,

(2) Rendering appropriate honors for the dead.

b. One of the most difficult missions on the battlefield is the recovery, preparation, and transport of the dead. It is demoralizing work. During Operation Just Cause, a scout platoon was tasked to recover bodies from the jungle due to a helicopter crash. It was a traumatizing task and several of the soldiers had serious psychological reactions. The collection of the dead is a unit responsibility since there are too few Mortuary Affairs personnel to do the work. Consequently, MTs must be particularly aware of all soldiers performing this mission, not merely Mortuary Affairs personnel.

c. In Operation Desert Storm, many Mortuary Affairs collection points were collocated with the Ammunition Supply Points (ASP). According to the study survey, the COSCOM chaplains felt that ministry to Mortuary Affairs units was their mission (see Appendix G, Tab B, Q 29; Tab A, Q 27). The COSCOM chaplains will probably delegate this mission to the CSG or Ordnance unit.

d. Chaplains are advocates for paying respect to the dead, both enemy and friendly. Some chaplains provided prayers when Mortuary Affairs teams buried Iraqi and Kuwaiti soldiers and civilians in Saudi Arabia. Whenever temporary burial of U.S. soldiers becomes necessary, it is likely that the COSCOM MT will be responsible to render appropriate honors.

16. Corps Replacement Policy.

a. The corps staff MT is the MT personnel manager for the corps and plans a MT replacement policy which reflects guidance from higher headquarters and the mission needs of the corps.

b. The Operation Desert Storm corps staff chaplains maintained that assignment priority of MT personnel should be to combat units first, CS and CSS units last (see also Appendix G, Tab A, Q. 28).

c. Personnel actions are handled at corps rear CP where automated equipment is essential.

d. The corps staff chaplain coordinates moves of MTs temporarily or permanently, with commander approval. Temporary attachment might be for reconstitution, mass casualty, or stationing MTs where the heaviest battles are expected.

Chapter 6

Conclusions

1. The Nature of Religious Support in Corps Units.

a. Significant mission differences exist between maneuver units and CS/CSS units in corps rear. Corps support unit MTs meet religious needs over great distances, in all areas of the battlefield, with small groups of soldiers who are constantly on the move, and often fatigued and unappreciated for their hard work. Numerous religious support factors are more accentuated at corps than at division level, including the following:

- (1) Rapid unit expansion and increase of MTs,
- (2) Integration of many previously unassigned units (including ARNG/USAR) demanding far greater attention of corps supervisory MT personnel,
- (3) Multifunctional units conducting a multiplicity of missions on an around-the-clock basis,
- (4) Greater dispersion of units over wide areas, and
- (5) More frequent changes in task organizing of units, often daily.

b. Corps MTs must incorporate these factors into a realistic RSP at their levels. Managing the much expanded religious support mission for corps units is a challenge for supervisory MTs.

2. Functions of Technical Control and Coordination (TECHCON) at corps level.

a. The corps MT supervisory functions are complex because of the wide diversity of units, wide dispersion of units, and the enlarged territory to be covered. Aspects of supervision include the following:

- (1) MTs assigned to corps units are faced with many diverse commands and unit missions. A clear concept of TECHCON is essential for all MTs. How to relate to MTs across command lines is important to management of the religious support mission. As a general principle, chaplain technical relationships should follow command lines as defined in FM 101-5.

(2) MTs must understand the concept of changing task forces which is a daily phenomenon in corps rear. Clearly understanding command relationships will be helpful, but MTs must constantly monitor unit configurations to provide support for all soldiers.

(3) Corps supervisory MTs use a number of documents to assist in management of religious support in the corps rear including: daily situational reports (best standardized by line), RSP, Field Standard Operating Procedures (FSOP), and annexes to operations plans and orders.

(4) The corps staff chaplain may elect to station his own section for various responsibilities at any or all of the corps command posts. This allows for more responsive supervision and effective division of labor.

(5) The corps staff MT monitors the battlefield and determines religious support needs. The corps staff chaplain may delegate GRS or area coverage of rear areas to the COSCOM staff MT. The Army's Rear Security doctrine, to include a concept of base clustering and RAOs, provides MTs an efficient means to monitor unit movements, religious support needs, and MT assets in their areas. Increasing the CSG MT to two chaplains and two chaplain assistants would allow for this GRS mission and provide an opportunity to balance the team denominationally to provide GRS for the entire group.

(6) The degree of supervision of corps assets should be considered in terms of the stages of the operation or campaign. Supervisory contact and spiritual preparation for units should be maximized in the staging areas where MTs are in close proximity. At other times, for instance, at the FAA or during offensive operations, there may be minimal contact with advancing MTs. There must be maximum flexibility of MTs on the battlefield with capability to function alone over protracted periods.

b. The corps staff chaplain must have a clear personnel plan based upon priorities which may include:

(1) Seeking to retain Jewish and Orthodox chaplain assets in assignments which will provide the greatest flexibility to provide area coverage,

(2) Setting principles for management of Catholic coverage, and

(3) Prioritizing reconstitution, mass casualty, or stationing MTs where the heaviest battles are expected.

c. The application of the approved chaplaincy MARC to the FY 91 force helped resolve many personnel worries by requiring MT assignments to nearly all battalions in the corps. As a result, the TOE 16-500LA/B Chaplain Support Teams (CST) have minimal utility since there are few religious support personnel requirement shortfalls.

3. Emerging Doctrines.

a. Future warfighting concepts position some corps units forward of divisions (ADA, SC, MI, EN, ACR, FA), while many are positioned behind the divisions in dispersal areas. Corps unit MTs are scattered over the battlefield with their units.

(1) Though initial positions in the dispersal area are beyond the enemy's long range fires, the rear areas are subject to missile and air attacks and airborne insertions to disrupt friendly lines of communication, C2, and supply systems.

(2) MTs must know how to communicate, travel, and survive on a battlefield that is twice the size formerly considered.

(3) The wide dispersion of units over this battlefield makes scheduling visitations and services extremely difficult and MTs may experience considerable frustration in covering all their soldiers, especially when they leave the TAA in the dispersal areas.

b. Future warfighting concepts describe a nonlinear battlefield. The Army doctrine of Forward Thrust presumes a linear battlefield with a directional emphasis ("Forward"). Religious support at corps level minimizes the directional emphasis, particularly in nonlinear operations. However, assignment of MTs to battalions, with an emphasis on being where the soldiers are, is a critical organizational principle for religious support.

c. Doctrine should reflect that the MT will neither be placed, nor place itself, beyond the survivability range of its assigned equipment. Forward Thrust terminology may be discontinued or a more adequate description developed, such as, Battalion-Based Religious Support.

4. Reserve Integration.

a. At least 75 percent of corps CS/CSS units are in the ARNG/USAR. Of the 200 chaplains from the USAR who participated in Operation Desert Storm, only one was assigned to a divisional unit, with most assigned at corps level. The diverse locations and training of Reserve Component units in peacetime create some difficulties when integrated with the Active Component in a theater of operations.

b. Rank disparities exist in some positions which may place MTs of less rank and experience supervising those higher in rank. Unit loyalties are deeply held and task organizing with other units presents some problems for MTs when they are required to serve units other than their own.

c. Maximum training with the Active Component with more varied assignments during a military career will help alleviate these problems.

d. Cross-leveling MTs in key positions and providing denominational balance for the theater are important missions which may be coordinated at the MOB station before deployment.

5. Special Missions.

a. The corps staff MT plans and coordinates for battlefield emergencies; i.e., mass casualties, reconstitution, and significant loss of MTs. All special missions are coordinated with the commanders involved.

b. The corps staff chaplain should focus his attention on the divisional MSCs and delegate the management of corps rear area missions to the deputy corps or COSCOM chaplain. These include organizing the reconstitution mission, execution of the GRS plan, ministry to Mortuary Affairs personnel, and EPW/CI battlefield operations.

c. Chaplains should use and coordinate with civil affairs personnel when issues fall within CA responsibility. There will likely be only one CA chaplain in a corps, who often deploys late, since all CA units are in the Reserve Component, except one. In lieu of the presence of an expert in indigenous religions, the unit chaplain must be ready to provide minimum essential information to the unit on religions in his targeted area of operations. This information must be prepared in advance of deployment, be authoritative, and ready for dissemination to the unit by the assigned MT.

Chapter 7

Recommendations

1. Doctrine.

a. Clarify doctrine to delineate differences between the missions and battlefield environments of maneuver units and CS/CSS corps units and their impacts on religious support.

b. Task DCD, USACHCS to complete a study on MT leadership to include a complete definition and description of technical control and coordination.

c. Clarify doctrine to delineate a system of GRS (area coverage) for corps rear areas which will give maximum responsibility for its coordination to the deputy corps chaplain (or delegated to the COSCOM chaplain) and use established Army systems; i.e., unit clustering and RAOs.

d. Clarify doctrine to allow some personnel of the corps staff chaplain section to be located at any or all of the corps CPs.

e. Describe special corps MT missions fully in doctrine including; reconstitution, GRS coordination, and Mortuary Affairs ministries.

f. Task USACHCS to complete a study to determine the impact of the nonlinear battlefield concept on religious support.

g. Develop a standardized, by-line situation report format and include in doctrine for use by MTs on the battlefield.

h. Discontinue Forward Thrust terminology or use other terminology to more accurately reflect the organizational principle; e.g., Battalion-Based Religious Support.

i. Clarify doctrine to delineate the missions of the CA chaplain and the unit chaplain to advise the commander on indigenous religions.

j. Clarify doctrine to more adequately address the extent of Reserve Component units and MTs in corps rear areas and identify positions and issues involving cross-leveling of MTs at the MOB station.

2. Organization.

a. In the next cyclical review of the chaplaincy MARC, change the COSCOM MT positions from the standard rank positions of one chaplain/one chaplain assistant (COL/SFC) to three chaplains (COL, LTC, MAJ) and three chaplain assistants (SFC, SPC, PFC).

b. At the chaplaincy Personnel Proponent office, begin the change in the SGA of the second 71M position in the corps staff MT section from SGT to SSG.

c. In the next cyclical review of medical TOEs, ensure that DCD, USACHCS places MTs (MAJ, SSG) in the medical group positions IAW with the current Chaplaincy Medical MARC.

d. Explore the possibility at DCD, USACHCS to increase every CSG staff MT section to two chaplains (MAJ, CPT) and two chaplain assistants (SSG, SPC).

e. Moving the TOE 16-500LA/B chaplain support teams, which are to be activated to COMPO 3 in FY 1993, back into COMPO 4 (unfinanced and unresourced).

f. Task DCD, USACHCS, to explore the possibility of recommending an increase in grade of the rear CSG MT from MAJ/SGT to LTC/SFC.

3. Training.

a. Train the MOB installation staff chaplain to maximize cross-leveling for denominational mix for hospitals and to assign/attach Jewish or Orthodox personnel to positions which will allow them the greatest flexibility to provide GRS.

b. Train MTs to develop RSPs which incorporate higher and lower MT input and how to use them, as well as unit documents, to manage religious support.

c. Train maneuver brigade chaplains to understand where corps MTs and units may be located in their area of responsibility and what task organizing means for TECHCON.

d. Train Reserve MTs with active duty units on a regular basis and initiate programs of assignment or service to different type units periodically.

4. Materiel.

a. Include religious support supplies and materiel in the standard supply system.

b. Upgrade the shipping priority on major materiel and ecclesiastical items which are essential to MTs upon their arrival in theater.

5. Leader Development.

a. Task USACHCS to develop exportable training support packages on managing religious support and staff integration at corps level.

b. Task USACHCS to develop and teach a system of assignment and management of limited chaplain assets (Jewish, Catholic, and Orthodox).

c. Task USACHCS to develop a teaching model which helps chaplaincy leaders see the corps rear battlefield in stages and plan religious support accordingly:

- (1) Deployment
- (2) Staging Areas
- (3) Tactical Assembly Areas
- (4) Forward Assembly Areas
- (5) Offensive/Defensive Operations
- (6) After engagement/reconstitution

APPENDIX AA

Study Plan and TRADOC Analysis Command Memorandum

STUDY PLAN

FOR

**RELIGIOUS SUPPORT TO
ECHELONS ABOVE DIVISION**

2 January 1990


CERTIFICATION


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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

HEADQUARTERS TRADOC ANALYSIS COMMAND
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS 66027-0000

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

ATRC-RPR (5-5d)

7 Nov 88

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT: Unit Ministry Team (UMT) Support to Echelons Above Division (EAD) Study

1. HQ TRAC, RPD will not prepare a formal HQ TRADOC, DCSCD tasker for the Unit Ministry Team (UMT) Support to Echelons Above Division (EAD) Study. This study is programmed as priority 182 in the TRADOC FY 89 AR 5-5 Study Program (ACN: 72558).

2. General. This study will determine religious support concepts and requirements for delivery to soldiers in EAD. It will determine doctrine for UMT and operations with limited equipment and mobility in a tactical environment.

3. Responsibilities.

a. U.S. Army Chaplain School (USACHS), as the Study Agency, will: appoint a study director, prepare a study plan, conduct the analysis, write the report, and forward the certified final report to Soldier Support Center (SSC) for approval. Study Agency POC is CH (MAJ) Walker (ATSC-DCD), AV 992-5147.

b. TRAC-FBHN, as the TRAC oversight element, will: approve the study plan, maintain quality and production oversight during the execution, and certify the final report. Since the analysis will not include cost, a cost certification is not required. TRAC-FBHN POC is Dr. Klopp (ATRC-B), AV 699-6899.

c. SSC, as the Study Sponsor, will approve the final report. Study Sponsor POC is Ms. Brandenburg (ATSG-DDN), AV 699-3815.

4. Administrative.

a. The Study Agency will submit requests for data in accordance with the following guidelines:

(1) For TRADOC provided data, submit requests directly to the data provider with an information copy of the request forwarded to HQ TRAC, RPD.

ATRC-RPR (5-5d)
SUBJECT: Unit Ministry Team (UMT) Support to Echelons Above
Division (EAD) Study

(2) For data provided by non-TRADOC organizations, submit data requests directly to HQ TRAC, RPD.

(3) HQ TRAC, RPD, data POC is Mr. Dempsey, ATRC-RPP, AV 680-3004.

b. The Study Agency will submit all information required to initialize and update the TRADOC Study Summary Report (maintained by HQ TRAC, RPD) and the DD 1498 forms required to initialize and update the data base maintained by the Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC). TRADOC Study Summary Report POC is Ms. Conrad, ATRC-RPP, AV 680-2200. Direct questions on DTIC procedures to the USAIS AR 5-5 Study Program coordinator.

c. This memorandum has been coordinated with:


(1) HQ TRADOC, DCSCD (MAJ Rodriguez, ATCD-SE, AV 680-3477).

(2) SSC (Ms. Brandenburg, ATSG-DDN, AV 699-3815).

(3) Chaplain (CH (MAJ) Walker, ATSC-DCD, AV 992-5147).

(4) TRAC-FBHN (Dr. Klopp, ATRC-B, AV 699-6899).

5. The HQ TRAC, RPD mailing address is: Director, HQ TRAC, Requirements and Programs Directorate, ATTN: ATRC-RP, Fort Monroe, VA 23651-5143. HQ TRAC, RPD, POC for this action is Mr. Wise, ATRC-RPR, AV 680-3117/2207.


RONALD J. RADDAM
Chief, Requirements Division
HQ TRAC, RPD

DISTRIBUTION:

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**DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, US ARMY CHAPLAIN CENTER AND SCHOOL
FORT MONMOUTH, NEW JERSEY 07703-5000**

ATSC-DCD-CS

**SUBJECT: Study Plan: Religious Support to Echelons Above Division
(EAD) (ACN 073979)**

**1. PURPOSE. To determine religious support capabilities to units
at EAD.**

2. REFERENCES.

**FM 16-1 Religious Support Doctrine: The Chaplain and
Chaplain Assistant**

FM 63-3 Combat Service Support Operations Corps

FM 100-5 Operations

FM 100-10 Combat Service Support

FM 100-15 Corps Operations

FM 100-16 Echelons Above Corps

FM 101-5 Staff Organization and Operations

FM 570-2 Manpower Requirements Criteria

TOE 16500LA00/16500LB00 Chaplain Support Team

3. TERMS OF REFERENCE.

**a. PROBLEM STATEMENT. Religious support capabilities to
units at EAD are unclear. No studies have addressed these
capabilities.**

**b. IMPACT ON THE PROBLEM. Failure to identify and clarify
these capabilities may result in inadequate religious support to
EAD.**

c. OBJECTIVES.

**(1) To identify the impact of the threat, unit missions
and dispersion factors which affect religious support to soldiers
assigned to EAD.**

**(2) To determine the implications of the Manpower
Requirements Criteria (MARC) on religious support to EAD.**

(3) To identify operational employment principles of TOE 16500LA00 and 16500LB00 Chaplain Support Teams (CST).

(4) To identify Technical Control and Supervision principles for units at EAD.

(5) To identify and recommend changes in doctrine, organization, operational concepts, training and leader development to overcome religious support deficiencies.

d. SCOPE. This study will be battle focused and will concentrate only on religious support to soldiers assigned to EAD. The study will also consider religious support provided by divisional Unit Ministry Teams (UMTs) to nondivisional soldiers located in their Area of Responsibility.

e. LIMITATIONS.

(1) The study will be limited to the first 120 days of deployment.

(2) Historical data is limited because the U.S. has not deployed a full corps since the Korean conflict.

(3) The only EAC units to be considered in this study will be TOE 16500LA00 and 16500LB00 CSTs.

(4) The study will not address materiel issues for religious support to EAD.

(5) The study will not address religious support to family members of soldiers assigned to EAD.

f. ASSUMPTIONS.

(1) The ALB doctrine will remain the Army's war fighting doctrine for the future.

(2) Host nation clergy will not be used for religious support to soldiers assigned to EAD.

(3) The Logistics Center (LOGCEN) Notional Corps Laydown provides an accurate doctrinal portrayal of the distribution of units on the battlefield.

(4) The number of Roman Catholic chaplains will continue to be critically short.

g. ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF ANALYSIS.

(1) How does the threat affect religious support to EAD?

(2) What units meeting current MARC criteria have no authorized UMT?

(3) What does the analysis of the LOGCEN Notional Corps Laydown reveal about religious support in EAD?

(4) What are the implications of the current MARC on religious support to EAD?

(5) How was religious support provided to EAD since 1940?

(6) What is the impact of combat duration on religious support to EAD?

(7) How do coverage shortfalls affect the adequacy of religious support?

(8) What are the unit attachment and technical control and supervision issues for TOE 16500LA00 and 16500LB00 CSTs?

(9) Does Forward Thrust doctrine apply to EAD?

(10) How do the outcomes of this study relate to the Battlefield Operating System (BOS)?

(11) How will emerging doctrines affect the religious support mission of EAD?

(12) What are the implications of the outcome of this study for changes in doctrine, organization, training, operational concepts and leader development?

h. CONSTRAINTS.

(1) Manpower for this effort should not exceed current levels delineated under paragraph 5.

(2) TDY funds for Study Advisory Group (SAG) members will be constrained to local funding.

i. **ALTERNATIVES.** This study will determine and analyze religious support issues at EAD. Since the problem is investigative in nature, alternatives are not applicable.

j. **MEASURES OF EFFECTIVENESS.** Measures of effectiveness are not applicable since alternatives are not the focus of this paper.

k. METHODOLOGY.

(1) A thorough literature review will be conducted to determine relevant historical data.

(2) An assessment of the impact of the threat on religious support to EAD will be completed.

(3) Identify and evaluate current religious support to EAD by utilizing surveys, interviews and lessons learned. This information will be acquired from current, former and reserve Corps, Corps Support Command (COSCOM) and Theater Area Command (TAACOM) UNTs.

(4) Determine the religious support capabilities at EAD through analyses of the religious support MARC, the LOGCEN Notional Corps Laydown, and AirLand Operations and Emerging Doctrines.

(5) The study will recommend changes, if required, in doctrine, organization, training, operational concepts and leader development.

1. MODELS. Not applicable.

m. RELATED STUDIES.

(1) ACN 06346 "Unit Ministry Team Religious Support to Casualties on the AirLand Battlefield"

(2) ACN 044666 "Chaplain Support to the Maneuver Battalion"

(3) ACN 072559 "Unit Ministry Team Communication/Transportation on the AirLand Battlefield"

(4) ACN 057970 "MOS 71M Support to the Maneuver Battalion"

4. THREAT AND OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT.

The AirLand Battlefield (ALB) doctrine is predicated upon a multi-dimensional battlefield consisting of massed attacks at multiple points in every echelon to maximize stress, shock and confusion. Soviet operations are planned with the overall intent of seizing critical strategic/operational objectives before the NATO alliance can decide on nuclear weapons employment or before the arrival of conventional reinforcements. As a result, Soviet military doctrine emphasizes the disruption of rear area operations, including command and control centers, communication networks, nuclear storage facilities, airfields and reserve unit formations. The capability of Soviet forces to project conventional, chemical and nuclear munitions into rear areas presents a formidable destructive and disruptive potential. The employment of elite airborne and Spetznaz forces for rear area missions is a foundational principle of Soviet tactics.

Soldiers assigned to units at EAD may also be located forward in support of divisional units at the Forward Line of Troops (FLOT). These soldiers will be exposed to intense artillery fires, bombardment from the air, area chemical saturation and massing of forces for a potential breakthrough of allied defenses.

Since UNTs are embedded in units in all echelons of the battlefield, they will be affected by the threat in the same degree as the units/locations where they are providing religious support. Although most soldiers assigned to units at EAD will be located in rear areas, many will be located forward with covering forces and in divisional areas. None will be immune from the ravages of the modern battlefield. Therefore, all units, including EAD, will need religious support.

5. SUPPORT REQUIREMENTS.

(1) Manpower requirements in Professional Staff Years (PSY)

(a) U.S. Army Chaplain Center and School - .9

(b) TRADOC Analysis Command - FBH - .1

(2) Temporary Duty (TDY) to conduct interviews and research - \$5000.

6. MILESTONE SCHEDULE.

1 Feb 90	Submit study plan
1 May 90	SAG meeting at USACHCS
1 Aug 90	Completion date for data collection
1 Oct 90	Completion of first draft, staff to SAG
1 Nov 90	SAG meeting at USACHCS
1 Dec 90	Staff with USACHCS and DACH
30 Jan 91	Completion date for study report

7. Study Advisory Group

Ch (LTC) John R. Hannah, Director, Combat Developments, U.S. Army Chaplain Center and School (USACHCS), Fort Monmouth, NJ, SAG Chairman

Ch (LTC) Gilbert Pingel, Office of the Chief of Chaplains, Member

Ch (LTC) John Rasmussen, Chief, Reserve Advisor, USACHCS, Member

Ch (MAJ) Greg W. Hill, Soldier Support Center

Ch (MAJ) Donald C. Crippen, Training and Doctrine Directorate, USACHCS, Member

CSM Aaron Gibson, USACHCS, Member

MSG John R. Leonforte, Combat Developments, USACHCS, Member

Ch (MAJ) Richard Cooper, USA Logistics Management College, Member

Ch (COL) Ocie Courtney, 13th COSCOM Command, Chaplain, Member

Mr. Martin Walker, TRADOC Analysis Command, Member

8. Correlation.

a. Study ACN: 73979

b. AR 5-5 category: 8

c. Coordination. The study plan was developed and coordinated with members of the study advisory group and TRAC-FBHN.

APPENDIX AB

Essential Elements of Analysis (EEA)

1. How does the threat affect religious support to corps units?

Few corps units deploy in conflicts such as Operation Just Cause because the theater is confined and the military action is expected to be short. However, analysis of the Laydown showed that when a conflict enlarges to a war, as in Operation Desert Storm, corps MTs comprise approximately 57 percent of the total force. In future operations, MTs will serve units scattered over the entire battlefield, to include those nearest the enemy and those located near the rear boundaries of the corps. Whatever the capability of the threat, corps MTs will be exposed to the same enemy hostility as the units to which they are assigned.

2. What units meeting current MARC criteria have no authorized MT?

When this EEA was developed, the new chaplaincy MARC had not been approved (see EEA 4 below). However, using the former MARC standard of 1:700 (MT-to-troop ratio), 37 units (a total of 20,125 soldiers) were without assigned MTS.

3. What does the analysis of the LOGCEN Notional Corps Laydown reveal about religious support at corps level?

The Laydown depicts a linear battlefield with divisions forward, corps support groups (CSG) set immediately behind the divisions for their support, and the rear CSG extending to the corps rear boundary. The analysis revealed numerous particulars, some of which follow:

- Over 3,100 corps soldiers are located in the division rear which must be covered mostly by division chaplain assets.

- Maneuver brigade staff MT, will have a corps FA and EN battalion MT in their area.

- Only one corps MT, the corps FA brigade staff MT, is stationed in the division rear area.

- MTs from the forward CSGs travel many miles to cover their units in the divisional areas and other CSGs. Whenever they leave the primary base or HQ of their units, it is necessary to coordinate coverage for their units.

- There are three combat support hospitals with requirements for 2 chaplains and 2 chaplain assistants in each CSG.

- The only chaplain that is available to provide coverage for medical units other than hospitals is the medical brigade MT located in the rear CSG.

- The corps rear CSG supports the largest area in the corps many CSS units which support the forward CSGs, units in reserve, and separate brigades, are located there. Normally, the COSCOM and corps staff chaplain sections will be located in this area.

4. What are the implications of the new MARC on the religious support at corps level?

The chaplaincy MARC, which was approved for application to the FY 91 force, significantly alters the number of MT requirements. When the MARC is applied uniformly to the Laydown units, the number of MTs increases by 71 and the number of soldiers without organic religious support drops from 20,125 to 801 soldiers (See the Laydown analysis in Appendix A).

5. How was religious support provided for corps units since 1940?

WW II and Desert Storm are the only two wars in which a full corps was deployed. In WW II, CSS units and their chaplains were well to the rear and relatively safe. In Desert Storm, CSS units and MTs were scattered throughout the battlefield over great distances with little protection from the threat. In WW II, there were considerable chaplain shortages and the theater chaplain developed "pools" of chaplain augmentees to be sent where the need was the greatest. In the Gulf, there was a 100 percent fill of chaplain positions and few units did not have religious support. In smaller conflicts such as Vietnam, corps MTs moved with their units but were generally set up in bases or base camps. In Operation Just Cause, the corps rear area was in Ft. Bragg, NC and few corps CSS units deployed as part of the joint task force.

6. What is the impact of combat duration on religious support to corps units?

Over 71 percent of the supervisory chaplains responding to the study surveys felt that combat duration increases religious support difficulty (See in Appendix G, Tab A, Q10). Fatigue, boredom, loneliness, use of drugs, intoxicants, and soldier discontent increase. Protracted struggles usually include significant political maneuvering which dissatisfies the soldier who is trained to fight and win. Carnage and devastation often lead to demoralization.

7. How do coverage shortfalls affect the adequacy of religious support?

Prior to January 1990 when the chaplaincy MARC was approved, coverage shortfalls put severe strains on MTs that could not do an adequate job. The new MARC significantly reduces this inadequacy, though some GRS problems still remain.

8. What are the unit attachment and technical control and supervision issues for TOE 16500LA00 and 16500LB00 chaplain support teams (CST)?

When the new MARC method for corps units is applied, the need for the CSTs to be activated to COMPO 3 diminishes. The CSTs were designed to be assigned to theater with possible attachment to corps HQ for support assignments to units without assigned MTs.

9. Does Forward Thrust doctrine apply to corps units?

Forward Thrust is an organizational principle of two parts: assignment of MTs to battalion level, and provision of religious support to soldiers wherever they are on the battlefield. The concept of "Forward" does not adequately describe an operational principle for MTs of corps units. A more accurate description of the doctrine might be, Battalion-Based Religious Support.

10. How do the outcomes of this study relate to the Battlefield Operating System (BOS)?

The BOS describes systems operative on the battlefield. This study investigates religious support in the corps, an important aspect of the Combat Service Support BOS.

11. How will emerging doctrines affect religious support missions at corps level?

The evolution of the AirLand Battle doctrine is expanding to take into account modern weaponry and munitions. The religious support mission will remain the same. However, some branches are responding with a redesign of their structure and procedures to meet future warfare expectations. It is clear that more corps units will be positioned nearer the enemy than before and MTs will need to know how to survive and minister in a very lethal environment. Corps MTs will be involved as their units move to support the maneuver units during offensive operations with possible follow-on reconstitution missions.

12. What are the implications of the outcome of this study for changes in doctrine, organization, training, operational concepts, and leader development?

The answer to this question is contained in Chapter 7 of the main report of this study.

APPENDIX AC
Questionnaires



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS US ARMY CHAPLAIN CENTER AND SCHOOL
FORT MONMOUTH, NEW JERSEY 07703-5000

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

ATSC-DCD-CS

1 NOV 1990


MEMORANDUM FOR Survey Participants

SUBJECT: Religious Support at Echelons Above Division (EAD)

1. The purpose of this survey is to provide you an opportunity to submit input for the future doctrine, training, and leadership of the U.S. Army Chaplaincy. The Directorate of Combat Developments (DCD) of the U.S. Army Chaplain Center and School will include your input in a new study of Religious Support at Echelons Above Division (EAD).
2. As you know, most of our doctrine and training are for divisional units. But when we examine a mature corps of five divisions with support units, 75 percent of all UMTs are assigned to nondivisional units! To help us determine how religious support can most effectively be accomplished at EAD, the enclosed questionnaire will provide invaluable assistance to DCD from the field.
3. Request your input on the enclosed General Purpose Data sheet in the self-addressed envelope not later than 15 December 1990.
4. We appreciate your assistance in this study. The primary point of contact is Chaplain (MAJ) Larry Walker, DSN/(AV) 992-5147 or (908) 532-5147.

3 Encls

1. Questionnaire
2. Data Sheet
3. Return Envelope


BERNARD L. WINDMILLER
Chaplain (COL) USA
Commandant

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

HEADQUARTERS US ARMY CHAPLAIN CENTER AND SCHOOL
FORT MONMOUTH, NEW JERSEY 07703-5000

S: 15 Dec 90

ATSC-DCD-CS

1 Nov 90

SUBJECT: QUESTIONNAIRE FOR RELIGIOUS SUPPORT AT ECHELONS ABOVE
DIVISION

PURPOSE:

This questionnaire will provide data which will be used for future doctrine, training and leadership development for delivery of Religious Support to nondivisional units assigned at Echelons Above Division (EAD). Your input will be included in a new study being prepared by the Directorate of Combat Developments (DCD) of the U.S. Army Chaplain Center and School.

Request your answer sheet be returned in the enclosed addressed envelope to DCD not later than 15 Dec 90.

////////////////////////////////////
/
/ 1. All questions are COMBAT FOCUSED and do not address garrison /
/ or peacetime missions. /
/
/ 2. Answer how you would expect to carry out your mission in /
/ combat. BASE YOUR ANSWERS ON YOUR EXPERIENCE and TRAINING. /
/
/ 3. Questions cover ONLY Corps Nondivisional Supervisory UNT /
/ positions. /
/
////////////////////////////////////

INSTRUCTIONS:

Using the General Purpose Data sheet 1, Form No. 19543. (Marks Sense Form):

1. Use ONLY a #2 pencil. Mark your answers completely within the allotted space. If you erase, erase completely.
2. Leave NAME, ID number and special code blocks blank.
3. Fill out the General Purpose Data sheet according to the directions given for each section of questions.
4. Additional comments may be made on separate sheets.
5. PLEASE DO NOT FOLD ANSWER SHEET.

CORPS STAFF CHAPLAIN SURVEY

THIS QUESTIONNAIRE IS FOR CURRENT OR FORMER CORPS STAFF CHAPLAINS ONLY.

1. How long did you serve (or have you served) as the corps staff chaplain?
 - A. Less than 6 months
 - B. 6 - 12 months
 - C. 13 - 18 months
 - D. 19 - 24 months
 - E. More than 24 months
2. Are you currently serving as a corps staff chaplain?
 - A. Yes (If yes, go to question 4)
 - B. No (If no, continue with question 3)
3. How long has it been since you LAST served as a corps staff chaplain?
 - A. Less than 1 year
 - B. 1 - 2 years
 - C. 3 - 4 years
 - D. More than 4 years
4. Have you ever served at the following major subordinate command levels? (SELECT LAST POSITION HELD)
 - A. Corps Field Artillery Staff Chaplain
 - B. Corps Engineer Staff Chaplain
 - C. Corps Signal Staff Chaplain
 - D. COSCOM Staff Chaplain
 - E. Corps Air Defense Artillery Staff Chaplain
5. How long did you serve in the position checked in Question 4?
 - A. Less than 6 months
 - B. 6 - 12 months
 - C. 13 - 18 months
 - D. 19 - 24 months
 - E. More than 24 months
6. What is your current duty status?
 - A. Active Duty
 - B. National Guard
 - C. Reserve
 - D. Retired

CORPS STAFF CHAPLAIN SURVEY (continued)

7. In which of the following conflicts did you serve?
(MARK ALL THAT APPLY)
- A. Vietnam
 - B. Panama
 - C. Grenada
 - D. None of the above

Directions: Based on your **EXPERIENCE** and **TRAINING**, mark your responses on the answer sheet for questions 8 through 42 using the scale below.

A	B	C	D	E
:	:	:	:	:
Strongly	Disagree	Neither	Agree	Strongly
Disagree		Disagree nor Agree		Agree

**ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS AS YOU WOULD EXPECT TO FUNCTION IN
COMBAT AS THE CORPS STAFF CHAPLAIN.**

During combat . . .

- 8. daily supervisory Unit Ministry Team (UNT) reports will be essential for me to plan religious support for the corps.
- 9. I will provide minimal control and supervision for UNTs since they will function on their own most of the time.
- 10. sustained combat operations will increase the difficulty for me to provide comprehensive religious support to corps soldiers.
- 11. I expect a more extensive general religious support mission (area coverage) for corps nondivisional units and detachments than for divisional units.
- 12. the staff chaplain's mission to advise the commander on indigenous religions will conflict with the Civil Affairs officer's mission to advise the commander on religious and cultural matters of indigenous populations.
- 13. I will need greater control in managing the corps religious support mission than in peacetime.
- 14. it will be important to assign a Catholic chaplain to the corps staff chaplain section to provide general religious support (denominational coverage) throughout the corps.
- 15. it will be important to assign an Orthodox chaplain to the corps staff chaplain section to provide general religious support (denominational coverage) throughout the corps.
- 16. it will be important to assign a Jewish chaplain to the corps staff chaplain section to provide general religious support (denominational coverage) throughout the corps.

CORPS STAFF CHAPLAIN SURVEY (continued)

A	B	C	D	E
:	:	:	:	:
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither Disagree nor Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree

During combat . . .

17. Forward Thrust Doctrine adequately describes how UNTs will provide religious support to corps nondivisional units throughout the corps.
18. I anticipate that frequent attachments/detachments of units/elements in the Corps Rear will reduce the habitual support relationship of UNTs to their units, thereby reducing the effectiveness of the religious support mission.
19. I will expect corps nondivisional UNTs traveling into divisional areas to coordinate coverage plans with the senior chaplain in whatever area they plan to visit units.
20. a primary reason I will plan the control and coordination of general religious support (area coverage) is to prevent two or more UNTs providing coverage simultaneously for a unit or area (duplication of effort).
21. I will coordinate my mission to advise the corps commander on indigenous religions through the Civil Affairs officer attached to the corps HQ.
22. establishing liaison with host nation religious leaders will be of great importance to my mission.
23. my primary focus will be to monitor battlefield changes and supervise division staff UNTs.
24. I expect to use Chaplaincy Support Teams (TOE 16500LA/B) extensively in the Corps Rear area, if they are available.
25. I anticipate that frequent attachments/detachments of units/elements in the Corps Rear will require close monitoring to provide comprehensive religious support.
26. normally I will delegate the mission to monitor and plan general religious support (area coverage) in the Corps Rear areas to the COSCOM staff chaplain.
27. I expect the COSCOM staff chaplain to coordinate with Graves Registration personnel for religious support and provide coverage for mass burials in the Corps Rear.
28. my assignment priority for UNT replacement personnel will always be maneuver units first, combat service units second, and combat service support units third.

CORPS STAFF CHAPLAIN SURVEY (continued)

A : Strongly Disagree	B : Disagree	C : Neither Disagree nor Agree	D : Agree	E : Strongly Agree
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During combat . . .

29. I will have the capability to position or "weight" UNTs according to the anticipated main battle effort.
30. it will be important for me to locate an assistant corps staff chaplain with chaplain assistant at the corps main command post (CP).
31. I will have only minimal control over religious support throughout the Corps.
32. I expect the corps SGH always to visit units and UNTs with me to model the UNT concept.
33. my corps SGH will handle all corps 71M personnel issues to include assignment recommendations to the corps staff chaplain.
34. establishing liaison with senior chaplains of other services in a joint operation will be one of my major functions.
35. supervising the corps major subordinate command supervisory UNTs will be one of my major missions.
36. I anticipate that the corps commander will provide significant input into the development of the corps religious support plan.
37. the corps coordinating staff officers will support the implementation of the corps religious support plan.
38. I will include input from all appropriate divisional, major subordinate command, and COSCOM staff UNTs into the corps religious support plan.
39. it will be essential for me to coordinate and negotiate frequently with commanders of subordinate units concerning religious support issues.
40. I will frequently coordinate religious support requirements with the Theater Area Command (TAACOM) staff chaplain.
41. it will be vital for me to have thoroughly reviewed contingency plans of my unit in preparation for war.
42. dedicated radio communication equipment would greatly enhance the the accomplishment of my mission.

CORPS STAFF CHAPLAIN SURVEY (continued)

Directions: Based on your **EXPERIENCE** and **TRAINING**, mark your responses on the answer sheet for questions 43 through 57 using the scale below.

A	B	C	D	E
:	:	:	:	:
Not	Slightly	Moderately	Very	Extremely
Important	Important	Important	Important	Important

ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS AS YOU WOULD EXPECT TO FUNCTION IN COMBAT AS THE CORPS STAFF CHAPLAIN.

During combat, how important will it be for you to . . .

43. advise the commander on religious support issues?
44. coordinate with the corps staff officers?
45. provide guidance for Corps UMTs?
46. develop and ensure implementation of the corps religious support plan?
47. manage UMT personnel?
48. monitor the course of the battle?
49. monitor UMT locations and coordinate general religious support (area coverage)?
50. plan emergency corps missions (reconstitution, etc.)?
51. train UMT personnel entering the corps for the first time?
52. support civil humanitarian efforts?
53. develop religious support policy for the corps?
54. coordinate with the Host Nation religious leaders?
55. manage Chaplain Support Teams (TOE 16500LA/B)?
56. provide religious support to the Corps HQ?
57. provide retreats in Corps Rear for soldiers and UMTs?

CORPS STAFF CHAPLAIN SURVEY (continued)

Select the BEST answer and mark the response on the answer sheet for questions 58 through 65.

ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS AS YOU WOULD EXPECT TO FUNCTION IN COMBAT AS THE CORPS STAFF CHAPLAIN.

58. I will usually monitor unit and UNT locations in the Corps Rear through the . . .
- A. Rear Operations Center (RAOC).
 - B. Supervisory Chaplain Reports.
 - C. COSCOM UNT.
 - D. Unit G-3.
 - E. Do not monitor locations.
59. For planning and implementation of general religious support (area coverage) in the Corps Rear for nondivisional units without assigned UNTs, I will . . .
- A. delegate to an assistant corps chaplain.
 - B. delegate to the COSCOM chaplain.
 - C. leave general religious support to each brigade level chaplain.
 - D. develop the plan myself.
60. I estimate the percentage of time I will spend in supervision or coordination of religious support with divisional supervisory UNTs during a 30-day period will be . . .
- A. less than 10%.
 - B. 10 - 20%.
 - C. 21 - 30%.
 - D. 31 - 40%.
 - E. more than 40%.
61. I estimate the percentage of time I will spend in supervision or coordination of religious support with supervisory UNTs assigned to support units in Corps Rear during a 30-day period will be . . .
- A. less than 10%.
 - B. 10 - 20%.
 - C. 21 - 30%.
 - D. 31 - 40%.
 - E. more than 40%.
62. If I had Chaplain Support Teams (TOE 16500LA/B) available, I would . . .
- A. use them for special missions or emergencies.
 - B. use them for a pool for replacements forward.
 - C. attach them to units with no UNTs assigned.
 - D. attach them to the Corps Support Group to provide general religious support (area coverage) for units in the group area.
 - E. All of the above.

CORPS STAFF CHAPLAIN SURVEY (continued)

63. Based on your previous experiences (either in training or conflict), how often do you believe the COSCOM HQ will be located near the Corp Rear command post during combat (thus allowing the COSCOM staff chaplain to visit the command post daily, if necessary)?
- A. Almost all of the time
 - B. Most of the time
 - C. About half of the time
 - D. Some of the time
 - E. Never
64. During combat, UNTs assigned to medical units or hospitals attached to COSCOM in the Corps Rear . . .
- A. should not be used for general religious support (area coverage).
 - B. should be used as any other UNT for general religious support (area coverage).
 - C. should be used for emergency coverage (e.g., reconstitution, mass casualties, etc.).
 - D. should be used for denominational coverage.
 - E. All the above except a
65. My primary means of communication with subordinate UNTs will be through . . .
- A. telephone (military only).
 - B. radio.
 - C. courier (distribution).
 - D. electronic message.
 - E. other.
66. The primary UNT responsible to plan for and dispense ecclesiastical and religious supplies will be the . . .
- A. COSCOM staff UNT.
 - B. TAACOM staff UNT.
 - C. Corps staff UNT.

CORPS STAFF CHAPLAIN SURVEY (continued)

Directions: Based on your **EXPERIENCE** and **TRAINING**, answer questions 67 to 69 in write-in areas on the Marks Sense Form as indicated. Use additional sheets, if necessary.

ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS AS YOU WOULD EXPECT TO FUNCTION IN COMBAT AS THE CORPS STAFF CHAPLAIN.

67. Your greatest leadership challenge as corps staff chaplain during combat will be: (write answer in Write-In Area 1 on answer sheet)
68. The most difficult areas of the corps staff chaplain mission during combat will be: (write answer in Write-In Area 2 on answer sheet)
69. What should be included in FM 16-1, Religious Support Doctrine, concerning the mission, functions and operations of the corps staff chaplain during combat? (write answer in Write-In Area 3 on answer sheet)

CORPS SUPPORT COMMAND (COSCOM)
STAFF CHAPLAIN SURVEY

THIS QUESTIONNAIRE IS FOR CURRENT OR FORMER COSCOM STAFF CHAPLAINS ONLY.

1. How long did you serve (or have you served) as the COSCOM staff chaplain?
 - A. Less than 6 months
 - B. 6 - 12 months
 - C. 13 - 18 months
 - D. 19 - 24 months
 - E. More than 24 months
2. Are you currently serving as a COSCOM staff chaplain?
 - A. Yes (If yes, go to question 4)
 - B. No (If no, continue with question 3)
3. How long has it been since you LAST served as a COSCOM staff chaplain?
 - A. Less than 1 year
 - B. 1 - 2 years
 - C. 3 - 4 years
 - D. More than 4 years
4. Have you ever served at the following major subordinate command levels? (SELECT LAST POSITION HELD)
 - A. Corps Field Artillery Staff Chaplain
 - B. Corps Engineer Staff Chaplain
 - C. Corps Signal Staff Chaplain
 - D. Corps Aviation Staff Chaplain
 - E. Corps Air Defense Artillery Staff Chaplain
5. How long did you serve in the position checked in Question 4?
 - A. Less than 6 months
 - B. 6 - 12 months
 - C. 13 - 18 months
 - D. 19 - 24 months
 - E. More than 24 months
6. What is your current duty status?
 - A. Active Duty
 - B. National Guard
 - C. Reserve
 - D. Retired

COSCOM STAFF CHAPLAIN SURVEY (continued)

7. In which of the following conflicts did you serve?
(MARK ALL THAT APPLY)
- A. Vietnam
 - B. Panama
 - C. Grenada
 - D. None of the above

Directions: Based on your EXPERIENCE and TRAINING, mark your responses on the answer sheet for questions 8 through 37 using the scale below.

A	B	C	D	E
Strongly Disagree	Disagree	Neither Disagree nor Agree	Agree	Strongly Agree

ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS AS YOU WOULD EXPECT TO FUNCTION IN COMBAT AS THE COSCOM STAFF CHAPLAIN.

During combat . . .

- 8. daily supervisory Unit Ministry Team (UNT) reports will be essential for me to plan religious support for the COSCOM.
- 9. I will provide minimal control and supervision for UNTs since they will function on their own most of the time.
- 10. sustained combat operations will increase the difficulty for me to provide comprehensive religious support to COSCOM soldiers.
- 11. I expect a more extensive general religious support mission (area coverage) for corps nondivisional units and detachments than for divisional units.
- 12. the staff chaplain's mission to advise the commander on indigenous religions will conflict with the Civil Affairs officer's mission to advise the commander on religious and cultural matters of indigenous populations.
- 13. I will need greater control in managing the COSCOM religious support mission than in peacetime.
- 14. it will be important to assign a Catholic chaplain to the COSCOM staff chaplain section to provide general religious support (denominational coverage) throughout the Corps Rear.
- 15. it will be important to assign an Orthodox chaplain to the COSCOM staff chaplain section to provide general religious support (denominational coverage) throughout the Corps Rear.
- 16. it will be important to assign a Jewish chaplain to the COSCOM staff chaplain section to provide general religious support (denominational coverage) throughout the Corps Rear.

COSCOM STAFF CHAPLAIN SURVEY (continued)

A : Strongly Disagree	B : Disagree	C : Neither Disagree nor Agree	D : Agree	E : Strong Agree
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During combat . . .

17. Forward Thrust Doctrine adequately describes how UNTs will provide religious support to corps nondivisional units throughout the corps.
18. I anticipate that frequent attachments/detachments of units/elements in the Corps Rear will reduce the habitual support relationship of UNTs to their units, thereby reducing the effectiveness of the religious support mission.
19. I will expect COSCOM UNTs traveling into divisional areas to coordinate coverage plans with the senior chaplain in whatever area they plan to visit units.
20. a primary reason I will plan the control and coordination of general religious support (area coverage) is to prevent two or more UNTs providing coverage simultaneously for a unit or area (duplication of effort).
21. I will coordinate my mission to advise the COSCOM commander on indigenous religions through the Civil Affairs officer.
22. establishing liaison with host nation religious leaders will be of great importance to my mission.
23. my primary focus will be to monitor battlefield changes and supervise division staff UNTs.
24. I expect to use Chaplaincy Support Teams (TOE 16500LA/B) extensively in the Corps Rear area, if they are available.
25. I anticipate that frequent attachments/detachments of units/elements in the Corps Rear will require close monitoring to provide comprehensive religious support.
26. I expect to receive the mission to monitor and plan general religious support in Corps Rear areas from the corps staff chaplain.
27. a dedicated tactical vehicle will be essential for me to supervise subordinate supervisory UNTs and provide religious support for assigned nondivisional units during combat.
28. more effective religious support would be provided for the Corps Support Group in combat if all Group UNTs were assigned to group HQ and provided general religious support to all group units.

COSCOM STAFF CHAPLAIN SURVEY (continued)

A : Strongly Disagree	B : Disagree	C : Neither Disagree nor Agree	D : Agree	E : Strongly Agree
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During combat . . .

29. I expect to coordinate religious support for Graves Registration personnel and provide coverage for mass burials in the Corps Rear.
30. the Corps Support Group staff UNT may be a primary point of contact for coordination of general religious support (area coverage) for all corps nondivisional units in the Group area during combat.
31. I will integrate the religious support plans of the Corps Support Groups, medical brigade and other COSCOM units into an overall COSCOM religious support plan.
32. I will expect TAACOM UNTs traveling into Corps Rear areas to cover their units and coordinate their coverage plans with the senior chaplain in whatever area they plan to visit.
33. I anticipate that the COSCOM commander will provide significant input into the development of the COSCOM religious support plan.
34. I anticipate that the COSCOM coordinating staff officers will support the implementation of the COSCOM religious support plan.
35. it will be essential for me to coordinate and negotiate frequently with subordinate unit commanders on chaplain coverage responsibilities.
36. it will be vital for me to have thoroughly reviewed contingency plans of my unit in preparation for war.
37. dedicated radio communication equipment would greatly enhance the accomplishment of my mission.

COSCOM STAFF CHAPLAIN SURVEY (continued)

Directions: Based on your **EXPERIENCE** and **TRAINING**, mark your responses on the answer sheet for questions 38 through 53 using the scale below.

A : Not Important	B : Slightly Important	C : Moderately Important	D : Very Important	E : Extremely Important
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ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS AS YOU WOULD EXPECT TO FUNCTION IN COMBAT AS THE COSCOM STAFF CHAPLAIN.

During combat, how important will it be for you to . . .

38. advise the commander on religious support issues?
39. coordinate with the COSCOM staff officers?
40. provide guidance for COSCOM UNTs?
41. develop and ensure implementation of the COSCOM religious support plan?
42. manage UNT personnel?
43. monitor the course of the battle?
44. monitor UNT locations and coordinate general religious support (area coverage)?
45. plan emergency corps missions (reconstitution, etc.)?
46. train UNT personnel entering the corps for the first time?
47. support civil humanitarian efforts?
48. develop religious support policy for the corps?
49. coordinate with the Host Nation religious leaders?
50. manage Chaplain Support Teams (TOE 16500LA/B)?
51. provide religious support to the COSCOM HQ?
52. provide retreats in Corps Rear for soldiers and UNTs?
53. provide materiel resources for UNTs?

COSCOM STAFF CHAPLAIN SURVEY (continued)

Select the BEST answer and mark the response on the answer sheet for questions 54 through 61.

ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS AS YOU WOULD EXPECT TO FUNCTION IN COMBAT AS THE COSCOM STAFF CHAPLAIN.

54. I will usually monitor unit and UMT locations in the Corps Rear through the . . .
- A. Rear Operations Center (RAOC).
 - B. Supervisory Chaplain Reports.
 - C. COSCOM UMT.
 - D. Unit G-3/S-3.
 - E. Do not monitor locations.
55. During combat how often will you need to communicate with the other major subordinate command staff chaplains?
- A. Several times a day
 - B. At least once a day
 - C. About every other day
 - D. About once a week
 - E. Only in an emergency
56. How important are the COSCOM Field SOP, FM 100-15 (Corps Operations) and FM 53-3 (Corps Support Operations) in developing the COSCOM religious support plan?
- A. Extremely important
 - B. Very important
 - C. Moderately important
 - D. Slightly important
 - E. Not important
57. I estimate the percentage of time I will spend in supervision or coordination of religious support with supervisory UMTs assigned to support units in Corps Rear during a 30-day period will be . .
- A. less than 10%.
 - B. 10 - 20%.
 - C. 21 - 30%.
 - D. 31 - 40%.
 - E. more than 40%.

COSCOM STAFF CHAPLAIN SURVEY (continued)

58. Based on your previous experiences (either in training or conflict), how often do you believe the COSCOM HQ will be located near the Corp Rear command post during combat (thus allowing the COSCOM staff chaplain to visit the command post daily, if necessary)?
- A. Almost all of the time
 - B. Most of the time
 - C. About half of the time
 - D. Some of the time
 - E. Never
59. During combat, UNTs assigned to medical units or hospitals attached to COSCOM in the Corps Rear . . .
- A. should not be used for general religious support (area coverage).
 - B. should be used as any other UNT for general religious support (area coverage).
 - C. should be used for emergency coverage (e.g., reconstitution, mass casualties, etc.).
 - D. should be used for denominational coverage.
 - E. All the above except a
60. My primary means of communication with subordinate UNTs will be through . . .
- A. telephone (military only).
 - B. radio.
 - C. courier (distribution).
 - D. electronic message.
 - E. other.
61. The primary UNT responsible to plan for and dispense ecclesiastical and religious supplies will be the . . .
- A. COSCOM staff UNT.
 - B. TAACOM staff UNT.
 - C. Corps staff UNT.

COSCOM STAFF CHAPLAIN SURVEY (continued)

Directions: Based on your **EXPERIENCE** and **TRAINING**, answer questions 62 to 64 in write-in areas on the Marks Sense Form as indicated. Use additional sheets, if necessary.

**ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS AS YOU WOULD EXPECT TO FUNCTION IN
COMBAT AS THE COSCOM STAFF CHAPLAIN**

- 62. Your greatest leadership challenge as COSCOM staff chaplain during combat will be: (write answer in Write-In Area 1 on answer sheet)**
- 63. The most difficult areas of the COSCOM staff chaplain mission during combat will be: (write answer in Write-In Area 2 on answer sheet)**
- 64. What should be included in FM 16-1, Religious Support Doctrine, concerning the mission, functions and operations of the COSCOM staff chaplain during combat? (write answer in Write-In Area 3 on answer sheet)**

MAJOR SUBORDINATE COMMAND (MSC)
STAFF CHAPLAIN SURVEY

THIS QUESTIONNAIRE IS FOR CURRENT OR FORMER MSC STAFF CHAPLAINS ONLY.

1. Which of the following MSC positions do you have experience in?
 - A. Corps Field Artillery Staff Chaplain
 - B. Corps Engineer Staff Chaplain
 - C. Corps Signal Staff Chaplain
 - D. Corps Aviation Staff Chaplain
 - E. Corps Air Defense Artillery Staff Chaplain
2. How long did you serve (or have you served) as the MSC staff chaplain?
 - A. Less than 6 months
 - B. 6 - 12 months
 - C. 13 - 18 months
 - D. 19 - 24 months
 - E. More than 24 months
3. Are you currently serving as a MSC staff chaplain?
 - A. Yes (If yes, go to question 5)
 - B. No (If no, continue with question 4)
4. How long as it been since you LAST served as a MSC staff chaplain?
 - A. Less than 1 year
 - B. 1 - 2 years
 - C. 3 - 4 years
 - D. More than 4 years
5. What is your current duty status?
 - A. Active Duty
 - B. National Guard
 - C. Reserve
 - D. Retired
6. In which of the following conflicts did you serve?
(MARK ALL THAT APPLY)
 - A. Vietnam
 - B. Panama
 - C. Grenada
 - D. None of the above

MSC STAFF CHAPLAIN SURVEY (continued)

Directions: Based on your EXPERIENCE and TRAINING, mark your responses on the answer sheet for questions 7 through 31 using the scale below.

A	B	C	D	E
:	:	:	:	:
Strongly	Disagree	Neither	Agree	Strongly
Disagree		Disagree nor Agree		Agree

ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS AS YOU WOULD EXPECT TO FUNCTION
IN COMBAT AS THE MSC STAFF CHAPLAIN.

During combat . . .

7. my attendance at corps staff chaplain meetings will be important for receiving guidance, as well as providing me a sense of cohesion with other Unit Ministry Teams (UMT).
8. daily supervisory UMT reports will be essential for me to plan religious support for the MSC.
9. I will provide minimal control and supervision for UMTs since they will function on their own most of the time.
10. sustained combat operations will increase the difficulty for me to provide comprehensive religious support to MSC soldiers.
11. I expect a more extensive general religious support mission (area coverage) for corps nondivisional units and detachments than for divisional units.
12. the staff chaplain's mission to advise the commander on indigenous religions will conflict with the Civil Affairs officer's mission to advise the commander on religious and cultural matters of indigenous populations.
13. I will need greater control in managing the MSC religious support mission than in peacetime.
14. it will be important to assign a Catholic chaplain as one of the subordinate chaplains in my unit to provide general religious support (denominational coverage).
15. it will be important to assign an Orthodox chaplain as one of the subordinate chaplains in my unit to provide general religious support (denominational coverage).

MSC STAFF CHAPLAIN SURVEY (continued)

A : Strongly Disagree	B : Disagree	C : Neither Disagree nor Agree	D : Agree	Strongly Agree
---	----------------------------------	--	-------------------------------	---------------------------------

During combat . . .

16. it will be important to assign a Jewish chaplain as one of the subordinate chaplains in my unit to provide general religious support (denominational coverage).
17. Forward Thrust Doctrine adequately describes how UMTs will provide religious support to MSC units throughout the corps.
18. I anticipate that frequent attachments/detachments of units/elements in the Corps Rear will reduce the habitual support relationship of UMTs to their units, thereby reducing the effectiveness of the religious support mission.
19. I will expect MSC UMTs traveling into divisional areas to coordinate coverage plans with the senior chaplain in whatever area they plan to visit units.
20. a primary reason I will plan the control and coordination of general religious support (area coverage) is to prevent two or more UMTs providing coverage simultaneously for a unit or area (duplication of effort).
21. I will coordinate my mission to advise the corps commander on indigenous religions through the Civil Affairs officer.
22. I will expect other UMTs to cover my units without prior coordination when they are located in their unit areas.
23. if the corps staff chaplain would identify UMTs to serve as points of contact to coordinate general religious support (area coverage) in Corps Rear, it would greatly assist me in providing coverage for all my units.
24. the senior battalion chaplain in the MSC could adequately cover brigade staff religious support responsibilities in addition to his/her own battalion.
25. the corps staff chaplain will provide technical control and coordination for all the MSC staff UMTs.
26. providing denominational coverage for all my units will be a severe difficulty.
27. I anticipate that my commander will provide significant input into the development of the MSC religious support plan.

MSC STAFF CHAPLAIN SURVEY (continued)

A : Strongly Disagree	B : Disagree	C : Neither Disagree nor Agree	D : Agree	E : Strongly Agree
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During combat . . .

28. I anticipate that the MSC coordinating staff officers will support the implementation of the MSC religious support plan.
29. it will be essential for me to coordinate and negotiate frequently with subordinate unit commanders on chaplain coverage responsibilities.
30. it will be vital for me to have thoroughly reviewed contingency plans of my unit in preparation for war.
31. dedicated radio communication equipment would greatly enhance the accomplishment of my mission.

Directions: Based on your **EXPERIENCE** and **TRAINING**, mark your responses on the answer sheet for questions 32 through 42 using the scale below.

A : Not Important	B : Slightly Important	C : Moderately Important	D : Very Impotant	E : Extremely Important
---	--	--	---	---

**ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS AS YOU WOULD EXPECT TO FUNCTION IN
COMBAT AS THE MSC STAFF CHAPLAIN.**

During combat, how important will it be for you to . . .

32. advise the commander on religious support issues?
33. coordinate with the MSC staff officers?
34. provide guidance to UMTs in my unit?
35. develop and ensure implementation of the MSC religious support plan?
36. manage UMT personnel?
37. monitor the course of the battle and UMT locations?
38. train the UMT personnel?

MSC STAFF CHAPLAIN SURVEY (continued)

A	B	C	D	
:	:	:	:	
Not	Slightly	Moderately	Very	Extremely
Important	Important	Important	Important	Important

During combat, how important will it be for you to . . .

- 39. support civil humanitarian efforts?
- 40. coordinate with the Host Nation religious leaders?
- 41. provide direct religious support to the MSC HQ?
- 42. provide retreats for soldiers or UMTs?

Select the BEST answer and mark the response on the answer sheet for questions 43 through 46.

ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS AS YOU WOULD EXPECT TO FUNCTION
IN COMBAT AS THE MSC STAFF CHAPLAIN.

- 43. I will usually monitor unit and UMT locations in the Corps Rear through the . . .
 - A. Rear Area Operations Center (RAOC).
 - B. Supervisory Chaplain Reports.
 - C. Unit S-3.
 - D. Do not monitor locations.
- 44. During combat I will communicate with other corps MSC staff chaplains:
 - A. Several times a day.
 - B. At least one a day.
 - C. About every other day.
 - D. About once a week.
 - E. Only in an emergency.
- 45. I estimate the percentage of time I will spend in supervision or coordination of religious support with supervisory UMTs assigned to MSC units during a 30-day period will be . . .
 - A. less than 10%.
 - B. 10 - 20%.
 - C. 21 - 30%.
 - D. 31 - 40%.
 - E. more than 40%.

MSC STAFF CHAPLAIN SURVEY (continued)

**ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS AS YOU WOULD EXPECT TO FUNCTION
IN COMBAT AS THE MSC STAFF CHAPLAIN.**

**46. My primary means of communication with subordinate UMTs will be
through . . .**

- A. telephone (military only).**
- B. radio.**
- C. courier (distribution).**
- D. electronic message.**
- E. other.**

**Directions: Based on your EXPERIENCE and TRAINING, answer questions
47 to 49 in write-in areas on the Marks Sense Form as indicated. Use
additional sheets, if necessary.**

**ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS AS YOU WOULD EXPECT TO FUNCTION
IN COMBAT AS THE MSC STAFF CHAPLAIN.**

- 47. Your greatest leadership challenge as MSC staff chaplain during
combat will be: (write answer in Write-In Area 1 on answer
sheet)**
- 48. The most difficult areas of the MSC staff chaplain mission
during combat will be: (write answer in Write-In Area 2 on
answer sheet)**
- 49. What should be included in FM 16-1, Religious Support Doctrine,
concerning the mission, functions and operations of the MSC
staff chaplain during combat? (write answer in Write-In Area 3
on answer sheet)**

CORPS SERGEANT MAJOR AND CORPS
SUPPORT COMMAND (COSCOM) NCOIC SURVEY

THIS QUESTIONNAIRE IS FOR CURRENT OR FORMER CORPS SGMS OR COSCOM
NCOICs ONLY.

1. I served (or serve) as the . . .
 - A. Corps SGM
 - B. COSCOM NCOIC
2. How long did you serve (or have you served) in the position checked in question 1?
 - A. Less than 6 months
 - B. 6 - 12 months
 - C. 13 - 18 months
 - D. 19 - 24 months
 - E. More than 24 months
3. Are you currently serving in the position selected in question 1?
 - A. Yes (If yes, go to question 5)
 - B. No (If no, continue with question 4)
4. How long as it been since you LAST served in the position selected in question 1?
 - A. Less than 1 year
 - B. 1 - 2 years
 - C. 3 - 4 years
 - D. More than 4 years
5. What is your current duty status?
 - A. Active Duty
 - B. National Guard
 - C. Reserve
 - D. Retired
6. In which of the following conflicts did you serve?
(MARK ALL THAT APPLY)
 - A. Vietnam
 - B. Panama
 - C. Grenada
 - D. None of the above

CORPS SGM AND COSCOM NCOIC SURVEY (Continued)

Directions: Based on your **EXPERIENCE** and **TRAINING**, mark your responses of the answer sheet for questions 7 through 21 using the scale below.

A	B	C	D	E
: Strongly Disagree	: Disagree	: Neither Disagree nor Agree	: Agree	: Strongly Agree

**ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS AS YOU WOULD EXPECT TO FUNCTION
IN COMBAT AS THE CORPS SGM OR COSCOM NCOIC.**

During combat . . .

7. I anticipate that the corps or COSCOM staff chaplain will support me in doing my job.
8. the corps SGM or COSCOM NCOIC should visit units and UMTs with the corps or COSCOM staff chaplain to model the UMT concept.
9. enlisted personnel management, including assignment recommendations to the staff chaplain, will be a major portion of my job.
10. supervising senior 71M NCOs in the corps or COSCOM area will be my most demanding function.
11. supervising the 71M personnel of the corps or COSCOM staff chaplain section will be my responsibility.
12. training the Unit Ministry Team (UMT) will be a minor concern for me.
13. providing resources for UMTs will be a critical part of my mission.
14. I expect to coordinate and consolidate the chaplain annex to OPLANS.
15. I will monitor unit and UMT locations in the Corps Rear area.
16. my input will be included in the development of the religious support plan for my unit.
17. dedicated radio communication equipment would greatly enhance my ability to fulfill my duties throughout the corps or COSCOM areas.
18. dedicated tactical vehicle will be essential in fulfilling my duties throughout the corps or COSCOM areas.

CORPS SGM AND COSCOM NCOIC SURVEY (Continued)

A	B	C	D	E
:	:	:	:	:
Strongly	Disagree	Neither	Agree	Strongly
Disagree		Disagree nor Agree		Agree

During combat . . .

19. UMTs need minimal control and supervision since they will function on their own most of the time.
20. Forward Thrust Doctrine adequately describes how UMTs will provide religious support to Corps non-divisional units throughout the Corps.
21. it will be vital for me to have thoroughly reviewed contingency plans of my unit in preparation for war.

Directions: Based on your **EXPERIENCE** and **TRAINING**, answer questions 22 through 31 using the scale below.

A	B	C	D	E
:	:	:	:	:
Not	Slightly	Moderately	Very	Extremely
Important	Important	Important	Important	Important

**ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS AS YOU WOULD EXPECT TO FUNCTION
IN COMBAT AS THE CORPS SGM OR COSCOM NCOIC.**

During combat, how important will it be for you to . . .

22. work on computers for the religious support mission.
23. supervise the corps or COSCOM staff chaplain section assistants.
24. be present and manage the corps or COSCOM staff chaplain's office.
25. prepare for special events, escorting dignitaries, etc.
26. revising the Corps or COSCOM religious support plan.
27. monitoring unit and UMT locations and battlefield changes.
28. evaluate chaplain assistant effectiveness in fulfilling the religious support mission.

CORPS SGM AND COSCOM NCOIC SURVEY (Continued)

A	B	C	D	E
:	:	:	:	:
Not	Slightly	Moderately	Very	Extremely
Important	Important	Important	Important	Important

During combat, how important will it be for you to . . .

- 29. visit the units or UMTs without your supervisory chaplain.
- 30. handle and account for Chaplain Nonappropriated Funds (NAF) on the battlefield.
- 31. coordinate with the corps staff NCOs.

Directions: Based on your **EXPERIENCE** and **TRAINING**, answer questions 32 through 34 in write-in areas on the Marks Sense Form as indicated. Use additional sheets, if necessary.

**ANSWER THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS AS YOU WOULD EXPECT TO FUNCTION
IN COMBAT AS THE CORPS SGM OR COSCOM NCOIC.**

- 32. Your greatest leadership challenge as corps SGM or COSCOM NCOIC during combat will be: (write answer in Write-In Area 1 on answer sheet)
- 33. The most difficult areas of the corps SGM or COSCOM NCOIC mission during combat will be: (write answer in Write-In Area 2 on answer sheet)
- 34. What should be included in FM 16-1, Religious Support Doctrine, concerning the mission, functions and operations of the corps SGM or COSCOM NCOIC during combat? (write answer in Write-In Area 3 on answer sheet)

APPENDIX AD

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Appendix A

The LOGCEN Notional Corps Laydown and Religious Support

1. Introduction.

a. The Logistics Center (LOGCEN) Notional Corps Laydown (hereafter referred to as "the Laydown") is a doctrinally correct display of units deployed in a five-division corps. The Laydown is the only approved portrayal of deployed units particularly adaptable for study and analyses. The reader should note that this analysis was completed before the advent of the nonlinear battlefield of the AirLand Operations concept.

b. The LOGCEN developed the Laydown, staffed it through the Combined Arms Center (CAC), and obtained approval for illustrative purposes in 1988. The Laydown is used widely by service schools to study particular tactical and support problems. The Laydown is based on an Army of Excellence (AOE) force design reflected in the Total Army Analysis (TAA) 93 process and does not include Component (COMPO) 4 units (unresourced). Host Nation Support (HNS) is included.

c. The Laydown is notional and reflects current Army doctrine. It is not prescriptive, however. Since MTs are included in units throughout the battlefield, a thorough analysis of the Laydown yields important data for the religious support mission. It provides the "base case" or beginning reference for much of the analyses in this study.

d. The corps is divided into brigade, division, corps forward and corps rear areas. The Laydown presents a four-division front: Infantry Light (IN (L)), Infantry (National Guard), Infantry Mechanized (IN (M)), and Armor (AR) (see Figure 1). An IN (M) division is also in reserve. Four additional separate brigade-sized units support the divisions: IN(M), Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR), AR and IN.

e. On 30 January 1990, DA approved the chaplaincy Manpower Requirements Criteria (MARC). The MARC conforms to the standards in AR 570-2 and uses the prescribed formula for arriving at MT requirements in any Army unit. A summary of its impact on force structure may be seen in Appendix E.

f. The Laydown depicts an area of operations roughly 140 X 190 kilometers or 26,600 square kilometers. The Laydown, tactically arrayed, shows combat units without the support structure (see Figure 1). The Division Area is approximately 25-35 kilometers wide and 50-60 kilometers deep. The Corps Forward and Rear encompass an area 130 X 140 kilometers. The Laydown contains 92 companies and is realistically aligned with the TAA 93/AOE force.

It may be compared to the V and VII Corps which have 101 companies each.

g. For ease of analysis, the Laydown divides the corps into 21 numeric regions or unit locations (see Figure 2). Computer printouts give the units by Standard Requirements Code (SRC) and required strength (Rstr), both by region and command. By using unit Table of Organization and Equipment (TOE), the analyst may conceptualize the full depth of battlefield deployment and identify religious support challenges in the regions where Combat, Combat Support (CS) or Combat Service Support (CSS) units predominate.

h. The Armor division and its supporting Corp Support Group (CSG) (Regions 7, 11, 16) were selected to consider religious support to nondivisional units/elements in divisional areas. Later in this appendix, the Light Infantry Division (LID) and its supporting CSG (Regions 5, 9, 14) will be considered to highlight variations in religious support from that of heavy forces. The Corps Regions 1, 2, 3 (Forward Support Areas) and 4 (Corps Rear) will be examined for religious support implications where CS/CSS units are most numerous (See Figure 2).

2. The Covering Force.

a. Corps CS/CSS units/elements (hereafter, corps units means nondivisional units) may be found first on the battlefield in the covering force located beyond the Forward Edge of the Battle Area (FEBA). Though the Laydown does not depict a covering force, for the purpose of this study, the corps Armor Cavalry Regiment (ACR) employed as a covering force will be evaluated for religious support implications.

b. The missions of the covering force include: penetration of the enemy's security zone, identification and location of enemy forces and their most likely main axis of attack, and destruction of the lead elements of the first echelon divisions. The corps Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR) is particularly suited for this mission (see FM 100-15). The ACR is capable of rapid movement and independent action over a large area and can provide a robust antiarmor counterattack force.

c. The Laydown shows an ACR (Region 19) of 4,832 soldiers with five MTs, a MT-to-soldier ratio of 1:966 (Ratios will be described in this manner hereafter). In addition to the regimental MT (O4, E6), three ACR squadrons, and the aviation squadron have MTs assigned (O3, E5). This leaves the coordination of religious support for four additional organic company-sized units (EN, ADA, CEWI, CHEM) and the support squadron (total soldiers - 1,706) with the regimental chaplain.

d. In addition to organic assets, the ACR will normally have

Corps Rear Area	CORPS FORWARD AREA	DIVISION AREA	BRIGADE AREA
13 4 20	1	5	9 14
		6	10 15 18
	2 21	7	11 16
	3 19	8	12 17

Prepared by USALOGCEN, Ft. Lee, Va., 27 Dec 88

CORPS REGIONS

- | | |
|--|--------------------------|
| 1. Corps Forward Supporting Regions 14 and 15 | 13. IN (M) Div (Reserve) |
| 2. Corps Forward Supporting Region 16 | 14. LID |
| 3. Corps Forward Supporting Region 17 | 15. IN Div (NG) |
| 4. Corps Rear | 16. AR Div |
| 5. Corps Support Units, LID Rear | 17. IN (M) Div |
| 6. Corps Support Units, In Div (NG) | 18. SIB (M) |
| 7. Corps Support Units, AR Div | 19. ACR |
| 8. Corps Support Units, In Div (M) | 20. SIB |
| 9 - 12. Regions of CS/CSS Corps Units, Brigade Areas | 21. SAB |

Figure 2

NOTIONAL CORPS LAYDOWN - LOGICAL REGIONS

additional corps combat, CS and CSS units. Typical support includes additional FA, aviation, engineers, ADA, NBC reconnaissance and smoke, the majority of the available Close Air Support (CAS) and possible infantry augmentation (See FM 100-15). These Corps units could add as many as three or more organic MTs to the covering force, increasing the total number of MTs identified with the ACR to as many as eight or more.

e. The Corps Support Command (COSCOM) sustains the ACR and its supporting corps nondivisional units. These units may collocate with the organic logistic units of the ACR and their MTs will come under the technical control and coordination of the covering force MT (see appendix B for discussion of religious support supervision). The parent MTs will be located in the Corps Support Group (CSG) in the Corps Forward area approximately 75-100 kilometers to their rear. Corps nondivisional soldiers/elements must be provided General Religious Support (GRS) by the ACR and other corps nondivisional MTs when there is no organic MT.

f. Providing religious support to the covering force is complex and difficult. Covering force battles may last for days. However, in a mid-to high-intensity conflict they will likely last for only a few hours. Rapid mobility, high lethality, and significant casualties may be expected. Toward the end of the covering force battle, medical evacuation of casualties to corps facilities and recovery of reparable systems will dominate ACR efforts as the unit prepares to hand over the battle to Main Battle Area (MBA) forces.

g. The ACR staff chaplain must be aware of all units/elements in the covering force area and coordinate religious support using all MT assets available, while providing GRS for attached units in his Area of Responsibility. He must establish this technical control of religious support assets and coordinate the general religious support mission in a short period of time. Maximum effort should be made for ministry in designated, assembly areas before the engagement. MTs must be prepared for the mass destruction on the AirLand Battlefield. Threat doctrine includes use of chemical munitions at the onset of hostilities and ACR MTs must be prepared for extensive operations in Mission Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP).

h. MTs must know the battle plan and subsequent unit locations to provide the most comprehensive support possible. As the support elements withdraw prior to the passage of lines to the MBA forces, MTs must move with them to designated areas in the divisional or corps area. In these areas pastoral care for casualties, battle fatigue ministry, ministry to command and staff, and services to honor the dead are predominant religious support missions. Since it would not be uncommon for a covering force to suffer 40-60 percent casualties in a mid-to high-inten-

sity conflict, the commander may order a reconstitution (see Appendix I).

i. Note that three additional separate brigades are depicted the Laydown - IN (M), Armor, and IN. Each separate brigade is a corps asset and contains either four or five MTs, though each has between 300-650 fewer soldiers than the ACR. COSCOM units provide additional CSS support to these brigades' logistical elements.

3. The Corps Religious Support Mission in the Armor Division.

Nondivisional units/elements operating forward in the division area are often overlooked. Corps artillery and engineer battalions locate in each brigade and their field trains must be close enough to provide the necessary support.

a. The Maneuver Brigade Areas.

(1) The Laydown depicts the Armor division (Regions 11 and 16) with six Tank (M1A1) and four Mechanized (MX) Heavy battalions, each of which contains one O3 chaplain (CH) and one Sergeant E-5 chaplain assistant (CA). The brigade MT has one O4 chaplain and one E-6 Staff Sergeant CA assigned. Divisional MTs for the brigade areas total 13 (10 battalion and three brigade MTs).

(2) In addition to divisional units, the following nondivisional units will likely be located in the brigades: three self-propelled field artillery battalions (1,893 Rstr), one chemical company (119 Rstr), one Tow Light Anti-Tank (TLAT) Co. (96 Rstr), two engineer battalions (1,626 Rstr), and one engineer battalion minus (474 Rstr). These units are under the Operational Control (OPCON) or in direct support of the brigade. Total corps population in the brigade areas is 4,208 with 6 organic MTs.

(3) By applying the 1990 MARC to the two engineer battalions with 813 soldiers each, one additional MT would be required for each unit, bringing the total to eight nondivisional MTs in the brigade areas (1:526). (See discussion of MARC in Appendix E).

(4) It should be noted that this is an average for the brigade areas and does not address dispersion factors. The TLAT company, chemical company and two engineer companies may be deployed by platoon in each brigade. The brigade chaplain as the brigade commander's staff officer for religious support assumes responsibility for the nondivisional units/elements in his AOR.

(5) A disparity exists between the required grades of the divisional battalion CAs (Sergeant, E-5), and those of the

corps Engineer and FA units (Specialist, E-4). The justification for Skill Level (SL) 20 Sergeant (E-5) for CAs in the maneuver battalions was approved and included in AR 611-201, 5 Dec 86. Division 86 recognized that the requirements for CAs were affected by intensity of combat, number of casualties, and lethality of the battlefield. The maturity and qualifications for the CA in such an environment are minimally SL 20. Corps CAs at SL 10 (Grades Private E-2 to Specialist E-4) have limited training and experience required for the battle fatigue mission on the AirLand battlefield.

b. Faith Mix of Soldiers.

(1) Faith mix guidance from the Chief of Chaplains recommends one Jewish chaplain and four Catholic chaplains per division, with Protestant chaplains assigned to the remaining spaces (see FM 16-1, Ch 6). The brigade MT seeks to fulfill denominational religious support needs within these parameters. Difficulties associated with this goal may be seen clearly in his attempt to provide support to Catholic soldiers. If the Catholic chaplain is assigned to one of the brigade maneuver battalions, he must be mobile and provide sacramental Catholic support to the entire brigade. The brigade MT must also monitor the number of Jewish and Orthodox populations in their area of operations and ensure coverage with divisional MT assets as the combat situation allows. The brigade MT serves a particularly critical supervisory role to ensure that unit commanders understand the complexity of the religious support mission.

(2) Providing denominational balance further complicates the supervising chaplain's religious support mission. Historically the military service population has been divided into four major faith groups. The number of chaplains representing these groups in May 1989 was distributed as follows: Protestant (1,363), Catholic (201), Jewish (19), and Orthodox (10). Some Protestant faith groups, as well as Catholic groups, have unique requirements which cannot be met by chaplains of other faith groups (e.g., eucharistic requirements, adult and infant baptism, other liturgical rituals, etc.). Furthermore, the chaplain is not required to perform services or ministrations which violate his/her conscience or theological position (see AR 165-1).

(3) The complexity of providing comprehensive religious support begins with the corps staff MT. In order to adequately "cross-level" chaplain assets, the corps staff chaplain must be able to grasp the depth and complexities of battlefield deployment and assignment. The division staff MT informs the corps staff MT of denominational balance concerns so that adequate personnel planning may be conducted at corps level.

(4) The denominational affiliation of corps nondivisional chaplains in the brigade area is a "given" from the perspec-

tive of the division and brigade MTs. For instance, if all chaplains in the brigade area are Protestant--which is likely, given the shortage of priests on active duty--Catholic coverage deficiencies increase dramatically (4,695 additional soldiers). Assuming the Laydown's total of 17,292 divisional soldiers in an Armor division, and 8,058 nondivisional soldiers with no organizational Catholic chaplain, there would be an average of one priest to cover 6,338 soldiers! Providing Jewish and Orthodox support depends on availability of such assets in the division. It is therefore incumbent upon the brigade MT to obtain accurate information on denominational requirements and MT assets to meet the soldier's religious support needs.

c. The Division Rear.

(1) Corps logistic units locate in the brigade and division support areas to be close enough to provide the necessary support for the corps Artillery and Engineer battalions in the brigade. Other corps units located there provide CS/CSS to divisional and nondivisional units. Approximately 3,812 corps soldiers may be found in the division rear area of the Armored Division (see Figure 3).

(2) The MT's priority mission is to provide DRS to the unit to which it is assigned. GRS is provided for units without organic MTs. Dispersion factors increase the difficulty of a MT providing DRS for all its units. In such cases the MT coordinates with MTs in the area to provide religious support for these units. This is a temporary measure only.

(3) The Laydown shows only one corps MT in the division rear area. It is assigned to a Field Artillery HQ Brigade whose battalions are located in the brigade areas, each of which has a MT assigned (see Figure 3). Two corps battalions are in the rear--an Attack Helicopter battalion (AH-64) of 269 soldiers and a Chaparral battalion of 439 soldiers, neither of which has an organic MT. Added to these are 16 company-sized units totaling 2,272 soldiers ranging in size from a PSYOP Co. of 80 soldiers to an Engineer Support Co. of 211 soldiers. Some of these companies have religious support from their parent units in the corps forward and rear areas. Most are without religious support, relying on divisional GRS. In addition to these units, specialized detachments and teams totaling 245 soldiers are spread throughout the Division Rear (see Figure 3).

(4) The corps FA brigade MT located in the division rear provides the logistical and administrative sustainment and training functions for its MTs in the brigades. Other GRS duties will be determined by the location of the FA Brigade HQ and in coordination with the division staff MT and the FA Brigade commander. This MT may be a valuable asset to the division chaplain to help address the religious support shortfalls in the division

HMB FA Bde 134 (1 UMT) Atk Hel Bn (AH-64) 269 CHAP Bn 439 Decon Co 133 Cbt Spt EN EQ Co 211 MDM GRDR BRG Co 107 RIBBON BRG Co 183 MLRS Btry 126 Ammo Co DS (HND) 01 Area SPT Co (MSE) 156 MP Co, CBT SPT 176 PSYOP Co 80 EW Co (COL) TEB 85 CA Co 126 FLD SVC Co 110 TK Co Lt/Md 179 NON-DIV DS Maint Co 201 NON-DIV DS Maint Co 201 NON-DIV DS Maint Co 201	TURB ENG Maint Tm 2 TURB ENG Maint Tm 2 ENGR EQ RPR Tm 9 TRACK VEH Maint Tm 11 TRACK VEH Maint Tm 11 TRACK VEH Maint Tm 11 ARTY FC Maint Tm 9 RADAR RPR Tm 1 TANK TURR RPR Tm 9 NICAD BTY CHG Tm 2 NICAD BTY CHG Tm 2 OP RD FLOAT 16 TACFIRE RPR Tm 2 TACFIRE RPR Tm 2 TACFIRE RPR Tm 2 TERRAIN ANALYSIS Tm 8 TERRAIN DS Elem 2 Inf LRS dET 63 MSL Tm, Hvy Div 11 CID Tm, Hvy Div 11 MIL HISTORY Det Div 3 GREGG Tm (Hvy Div) 36 ATC Pit 38	Arty Bn 8* (M) 643 (1 MT) Engr Bn (M) 813 (1 MT) TLAT Co 96 Tot. Non-Div Pop. 1552
Chem Co (smoke) 119 Arty Bn (165M) 607 (1 MT) 2 Engr Co 314 (Bn HQ in sector above) Arty Bn 8* (M) 643 (1 MT)	Tot. Non-Div Pop. 1687	Arty Bn 8* (M) 643 (1 MT) Engr Bn (M) 813 (1 MT) Tot. Non-Div Pop. 1456
Tot. Non-Div Pop. 3363	Tot. Non-Div Pop. 3363	Tot. Non-Div Pop. 1456

Figure 3

CORPS UNITS/ELEMENTS IN DIVISIONAL AREA

ARMOR DIVISION




Figure 4

DRS FOR CORPS UNITS IN ARMOR DIVISION REAR

rear (see discussion of Technical Control and Coordination in Appendix B).

(5) The division staff MT experiences similar problems in providing religious support to corps units in the division rear as those experienced by the brigade MTs in the brigade areas. The divisional brigades have 6 additional corps MTs to provide DRS to their soldiers, whereas the division MT has only the one corps MT to address the religious support needs of the 3,812 nondivisional CS/CSS soldiers in its area of operations.

(6) Corps MTs in the corps forward area move forward to the division rear to provide religious support to their companies/elements located there (see Figure 4). These MTs travel as little as five to as many as 95 kilometers to provide this coverage and often have companies in other divisional areas thereby extending distances involved. For example, the chemical battalion MT covers chemical companies in Regions 1, 6, and 7, though the battalion HQ is in Region 2, located to the rear of the Armor division (see Figure 5).




Figure 6
CHEMICAL SUPPPORT - CORPS FORWARD

Similarly, the MP battalion MT located in Region 3 covers MP companies in Regions 2, 7, 3, and 8 (see Figure 6).

The three engineer companies in the division rear (Region 7) belong to the battalion located in Region 2 which has no MT. Other companies of the battalion are in Regions 2 and 6. The Engineer group MT located in Region 2 must perform or provide coverage to these units (see Figure 7). The Engineer soldiers in division rear who are provided DRS by the group MT in corps forward (Region 2) total 1,660.




Figure 6

MP SUPPORT - CORPS FORWARD





Figure 7

ENGINEER UNITS - CORPS FORWARD

(7) MTs in the corps rear face greater distances and difficulties in providing DRS to their units/elements in the division rear area (see Figure 8). For example, the corps ADA brigade MT in the corps rear must travel as few as 95 km and as many as 130 km (straight line distances) to provide DRS to its soldiers. Road conditions, routes and normal battlefield clutter, to include significant refugee populations moving to the rear, present increased obstacles to the religious support mission. The required strength of corps soldiers in the division rear whose DS MT is assigned to HQ in corps rear is 1,318.



• Teams/Detachments

HHC, CORPS CID Tm - 11
 LRS Det - 53
 MII Hist - 3
 Terrain Analysis - 10
 HHC, ENG Bde

Total RStr - 1242
 (FA Bde not included)

Figure 8

**DRS FOR CORPS UNITS
 IN ARMOR DIVISION REAR
 (MTs in Corps Rear)**

(8) In summary, the number of corps soldiers in the Armor division rear total 3,812 with only one corps MT located there. For a total Armor division population (17,292), 23 divisional MTs provide a support ratio of 1:752 (see Figure 9 for regional populations and support ratios). Parent corps MTs located in the corps rear provide DRS to their units dispersed forward in the division rear and coordinate GRS with the divisional staff MT.

4. The Light Infantry Division.

a. As the name implies, the LID is a force light enough to be deployed rapidly anywhere in the world and is capable of at least 48 hours of operation without resupply. It is ideally suited for Low Intensity Conflict (LIC) situations but can be highly effective in mid-to high-intensity conflicts when augmented with additional corps units to strengthen combat power, mobility, and sustainment.

b. The Armor division totals 17,292 soldiers whereas the LID totals 11,049, a difference of 6,243. The number of MTs also reflects this difference (23 versus 20). The difference in numbers is accounted for primarily in the brigade population (3,971 versus 6,118). Though the battalions are smaller in the LID, each meets the MARC criteria for an assigned MT.

c. The LID requires significant logistic sustainment support from corps units. COSCOM units/elements are designed or identified to perform required functions or work loads which are beyond the capabilities of the LID Division Support Command (DISCOM) (see FM 63-3). Corps units/elements in the LID rear number 3,198 soldiers compared to 3,363 in the Armor division rear (-165). The Armor Division rear has only three larger corps units not found in the LID: Chaparral Bn. (439), Ammunition Co. DS (232) and a Field Service Co. (110). A proportionately greater number of corps support troops are located in the LID than in the Armor division.

d. Though the operational missions and designs of the Armor and LID divisions are quite different, the "corps slice" is similar, indicating basic soldier and logistical support needs remain constant regardless of unit configurations. The greater demand upon corps units comes largely because of a lack of mobility and fire power.

e. Religious support to the LID presents unique difficulties. Battalion level MTs are without dedicated transportation and communication which reduces the responsiveness of MTs to battlefield conditions. Greater likelihood exists of MTs becoming isolated with one company or element. MTs will likely station themselves in the combat trains or aid station during combat to see as many soldiers as possible. It also may be more

difficult to remain apprised of the battlefield situation, since the S2/S3 elements will likely be located elsewhere. The Administrative/Logistics Operation Center (A/LOC) may become the only source for current battlefield information.

f. The number of divisional MTs in the LID brigade area is fewer than in the heavy division (4 versus 6) because no Forward Support Battalion (FSB) or FA battalion MTs are assigned. However, corps units in the LID brigade are very similar in number and increase the brigade MT assets by two. As in the Armor Division rear, one corps MT (FA brigade) locates there. Its battalions are in each of the brigades.

g. The lack of mobility of battalion MTs in the LID hinders the religious support mission. This places greater demands upon the brigade-level MTs since they normally have assigned vehicles. Battalion MTs must follow Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) closely, utilizing available communication to coordinate with other MTs.

h. The same number of MTs from corps rear and corps forward have DRS responsibilities in the LID rear as in the Armor Division rear. Since fewer divisional MTs have transportation assets than in other divisions, GRS by divisional MTs will be very difficult to provide. Hence, it would appear that greater emphasis may need to be given to providing DRS and GRS to corps units in the LID by corps MTs traveling forward.

5. The Corps Support Command (COSCOM).

a. As the Logistical Support Command assigned to the corps, the COSCOM provides sustainment functions including manning, arming, fueling, fixing, protecting, and transporting the corps force and weapon systems. As a part of manning, the COSCOM provides the soldier with support missions of the necessary health, supply, and field services.

b. The COSCOM consists of an HHC, functional management centers, a variable number of CSGs, a medical brigade, and may contain Civil Affairs or chemical units (See FM 100-15). Other units may be attached to the COSCOM by the corps commander or the theater Army commander. A possible COSCOM organization may be seen in Figure 10 taken from the FM 100-15 (see functional descriptions in FM 100-15 and FM 63-3).

c. The Laydown shows a COSCOM HQ with 934 soldiers which includes the materiel management (386 soldiers) and movement control (164 soldiers) centers. The COSCOM staff MT is composed of three chaplains (O6, O5, O3) and four CAs (E7, E5, E4, E3). It provides DRS to the COSCOM HQ and GRS to units in the areas which have no organic MT support.




Figure 10

COSCOM ORGANIZATION

d. Since the COSCOM task organizes support battalions to respond to battle conditions and maneuver unit requirements, the COSCOM staff MT continually monitors battlefield changes and religious support needs. MTs of subordinate units transmit reports, supply, and budgetary requests on a regular basis. Since corps-level reconstitution efforts are normally led by COSCOM, the corps staff chaplain usually delegates the religious support mission during reconstitution to the COSCOM MT (see Appendix I). The COSCOM chaplain monitors and synchronizes all COSCOM religious support assets to provide a denominationally balanced, comprehensive religious coverage plan. Religious support responsibilities to the Host Nation (HNS) Petrol/Transportation battalions and other allied or joint forces may become a coordinating requirement for the COSCOM staff MT. The COSCOM staff MT also coordinates with the COSCOM Mortuary Affairs personnel to ensure appropriate procedures for honoring the dead at temporary burial sites.

6. Corps Support Group (CSG).

a. The COSCOM executes a major portion of its mission through CSGs located in the corps forward and rear areas. The CSGs provide supply, services, and DS maintenance to units within their geographic area of responsibility, in addition to maneuver units forward. One CSG is normally allocated per committed division sector and one for the corps rear (see FM 100-15).

b. The Laydown depicts the corps forward area broken into three Regions (1, 2, 3) each of which contains a CSG responsible to the COSCOM. Each is composed of a group HQ, maintenance battalion, and Supply and Service (S&S) battalion. The fourth CSG located in the corps rear area (Region 4), provides DS to

corps rear units and assists the CSG in Region 1 to provide logistical support to both the LID and IN divisions (Regions 5, 6). It also contains additional maintenance and petroleum supply battalions, as well as a projected HNS Petroleum Supply battalion.

c. The CSG MTs are critical to the religious support mission of the COSCOM. The Laydown printout for each CSG HQ shows three chaplains and three chaplain assistants according to "H" series TOE. However, when the TOE is updated to the "L" series, only one MT (O4, E6) will be assigned to each CSG HQ. The two remaining MTs are assigned to the Maintenance and S&S battalions IAW the Army doctrine of Forward Thrust (see FM 16-1 and discussion in Appendix J).

d. The CSG in Region 2 supporting the Armor division follows the "L" series TOE. Companies of the CSG battalions located in the Division Rear total 713 soldiers (see Figure 11). However, two large S&S air drop support companies (528 soldiers total) are in corps rear (Region 4). The soldier total for the CSG is 2,542 with 3 MTs (1:847). All the problems highlighted previously about distances, dispersion, and coverage ratios are graphically illustrated in the CSG.




Figure 11

CSG - CORPS FORWARD (REGION 2)

7. Religious Support to Medical Units.

a. The battlefield medical support system provides medical, dental, and veterinary services. The modular design support system under Medical Force 2000 (MF2K) allows medical resource managers to tailor the corps medical support organization to the unique requirements of the corps to which it is assigned (see FM 8-10, FM 8-21, and Appendix H).

b. The Laydown pictures a medical brigade in the corps with

four medical groups to meet the medical support requirements. Though a MT is assigned at brigade (05, E6), none is assigned at group level. Each support region (1, 2, 3, 4) contains approximately the same medical units: three Combat Support Hospitals (CSH) of 576 soldiers each with two MTs assigned (04, E-6, 03, E-4); an area support battalion and an evacuation battalion, neither of which has an assigned MT; and a dental company whose parent unit is in corps rear and has no MT (see Figure 12).




Figure 12
MEDICAL UNITS
CORPS FORWARD (REGION 2)

c. Two Mobile Army Surgical Hospitals (MASH) are allocated to this sized corps to provide resuscitative lifesaving surgery and medical treatment for critically injured. The Laydown places one MASH in Region 2 near the Armor Division Rear boundary and has one MT assigned (03, E4).

d. The Combat Stress Control (CSC) company (96 soldiers) is a specialized company which treats battlefield stress casualties. The chaplain assigned (no chaplain assistant) employs skills developed in special counseling training. Region 2 also contains a CSC company and a MASH, bringing the total medical MTs to eight. Because of their specialized assignments, none of these MTs would normally be available to cover other corps medical units without MTs in the region. However, the COSCOM staff chaplain may use these assets for support in mass casualties, burials, or other emergency missions, if possible.

e. The medical units in the region without organic MTs include an area support battalion minus (216 soldiers), EVAC Battalion minus (301 soldiers), group HQ (65 soldiers), and a dental company (58 soldiers). Religious support for these 640 soldiers must be coordinated by the medical brigade MT located in Region

4. The CSG staff MT may be the most logical MT to cover these units which have no organic MTs. However, such a request would require commander approval. The total number of medical personnel in Region 2 is 2,564. Five MTs are assigned to the hospital units and are normally unavailable to provide support to the medical units without assigned MTs.

8. Religious Support to Personnel Service Support (PSS) Units.

a. Region 2 also contains four Finance Support Companies (FSU) and four Personnel Support Companies (PSC), and a postal company for a total of 571 soldiers. In addition, there are 62 soldiers of Judge Advocate General (JAG) and Public Affairs (PA) elements. All PSS units fall under the corps staff MT for DRS. Since there are no organic MTs for PSS units, the corps staff chaplain must provide DRS when possible, and coordinate GRS with MTs in the regions as needed. The CSG MTs offer the most likely points of contact for GRS of PSS units.

b. Region 2 also contains seven HQ units with organic MTs (see Table 1). Five of these have all, or all except one, of their subordinate units in other regions. These MTs will be out of Region 2 for significant periods, often leaving their 1,045 soldiers uncovered. All battalions of the corps attack helicopter group (Rstr 895) are without MT assigned. In addition, the corps Engineer group MT must provide DRS for the Engineer battalion located in Region 2 or coordinate GRS. The Engineer group MT is responsible for two additional battalions in other sectors.

c. Eight company-sized units (Rstr 1,353) are located in Region 2 whose parent MTs are located outside the region. Added to all these are four units/HQ having no parent or organic MTs: Signal Bn. (415 Rstr), Engineer Bn. HQs (36 Rstr), Engineer Co. (107) Rstr), and a Chaparral Co. (118 Rstr).

d. It is possible that the CSG chaplain may have GRS responsibility for many of these 3,074 soldiers at any given time. He/she is the logical point of contact (POC) for religious support in Region 2. However, the CSG is not designated in the chain of command to provide religious support for these occupying units. These responsibilities could be coordinated by the corps staff chaplain and delineated in the Corps Religious Support Plan (RSP).

9. The Corps Rear.

a. The corps rear (Region 4) contains support units, an ID(M) Reserve (Region 13), and a Separate Infantry Brigade (SIB) (Region 20) (See Figure 2). The corps CS/CSS units found in Region 4 will be discussed in this section (see Table 2).

b. Corps rear is the largest single area depicted in the Laydown and contains a nondivisional population of 22,648 with 41

TABLE 1

UNITS/HQ IN CORPS FORWARD (REGION 2)*

<u>UNITS WITH MTs</u>		<u>UNITS W/O MTs</u>		<u>UNITS WITH MTs</u> <u>IN OTHER SECTORS</u>	
TRANS BN	(50)	SIGNAL BN	(415)	AMMO CO	(238)
CHEMICAL BN	(84)	CHAPPAREL CO	(118)	TRANS CO	(189)
AVIATION HELO GROUP	(76)	ENGINEER BN	(36)	MP CO	(189)
ENGINEER GROUP HQ	(117)	ENGINEER CO	(107)	MP CO	(176)
ENGINEER BN HQ	(315)			CHEM CO	(176)
FIELD ARTILL BDE HQ	(139)			CHEM CO	(119)
MP BN	(68)			CHEM CO	(133)
LANCE BN	(466)				
CSC CO	(96)				
CSH (3) (2 MTs EACH)	(1728)				
TOTAL	3149	TOTAL	676	TOTAL	1353
TOTAL POPULATION	9,523;				
	CH 20, CA 19				

*CSG UNITS NOT INCLUDED

TABLE 2

UNITS/HQ IN CORPS FORWARD (REGION 4)*

UNITS WITH MTs

ATC BN	(76)
MEDICAL BDE	(95)
CSC (1CH, OCA)	(96)
CSH (3 MTs)	(1728)
COMBAT AVIATION GP	(69)
AVIATION BDE	(101)
MDM HEL BN	(70)
TRANS BN (2)	(100)
SIGNAL BDE	(214)
AMMO BN	(67)
ADA BDE	(124)
ADA BN (HAWK)	(554)
FA BDE HQ	(139)
ENG BDE HQ	(159)
ENG GROUP HQ	(117)
ENG BN (3)	(1704)
CORPS HQS (3CH, 4CA)	(334)
CHEMICAL BDE HQ	(94)
MI BDE	(46)
CA BDE (2 MTs)	(173)
COSCOM HHC (3CH, 4CA)	(344)
PETRL SUP BN	(54)

TOTAL 6309

TOTAL POPULATION 22,648;
CH 41, CA 42

*CSG UNITS NOT INCLUDED

UNITS W/O MTs

AVIM BN	(50)
MEDICAL GROUP HQS	(95)
DENTAL BN (2)	(20)
AVIATION ASSAULT (UH-1) BN	(450)
AVIATION BN	(363)
AVIATION ASSAULT BN	(346)
TRANS GROUP HQ	(61)
MSE SPT BN	(522)
ADA BN (HAWK)	(554)
FINANCE GP HQS	(56)
AG GROUP HQS	(58)
MP BDE HQS	(94)
MED LOG BN	(230)
PSYOP	(46)
MI BN	(236)

TOTAL 2597

CHs and 42 CAs. A significant number of transportation, supply, and aviation units provide GS for units forward as well as units located in their own region.

c. The Corps staff MT, composed of three CHs and four CAs (06, 05, 04, E9, E5, E4, E3), locates in the corps rear. The Corps HQ staff officers, including the chaplain, develop broad, long range plans and policies in their respective areas in consonance with the corps commander's intent.

d. The corps staff MT must constantly monitor battlefield changes and anticipate potential problems in the religious support area. The corps chaplain may station one of his chaplains and chaplain assistants at or near the corps main HQ which will likely be located in one of the corps forward regions, while he remains at the corps rear Command Post (CP). This would allow close and immediate reporting of potential religious support problems due to battlefield changes while providing DRS to the soldiers of the corps main CP.

e. The corps staff MT must identify units with shortfalls in religious support. These units/elements may be too small to meet current MARC requirements for a chaplain, or for other reasons, eliminate the assignment of MTs. The Laydown shows 34 battalion-sized (or greater) units with no assigned MT totaling 20,125 soldiers (see Appendix E).

f. Location at the corps rear CP allows the corps staff MT to access the listings and locations of all units on the battlefield. By monitoring the shortfalls and movements of units, the corps staff MT may be able to facilitate coordination of GRS for these units. It also receives input on personnel requests to the Theater Personnel Command.

g. The corps staff chaplain assigns chaplain personnel considering denominational needs, Direct Combat Probability Codes (DCPC), the weight of the battle, and emergency requirements (e.g. reconstitution). Close contact must be kept with the division staff MTs for personnel feeder information. The corps SGM coordinates with G1 for the priority of chaplain assistant assignments.

h. The corps staff chaplain is responsible for handling Chaplain Nonappropriated Funds on the battlefield. Soldiers will make offerings in worship services or donations at different times for the religious support mission. Peacetime NAF procedures and regulations are not applicable in war and fund accounting procedures must be established with the Office of the Chief of Chaplains.

APPENDIX B

Technical Control and Coordination

1. Purpose. This appendix clarifies the basic principles of chaplaincy supervision. The focus is combat, with an emphasis on chaplaincy technical control and coordination in corps units.

2. General.

a. Assignment of Chaplains to battalions IAW the Forward Thrust organizational principle enhances the effectiveness of the religious support mission. Through habitual support relationships and more immediate responsiveness to the commander, MTs are more effective. The chaplain is under the operational control of the commander and he, or his designated representative, normally rates the chaplain (see Appendix J).

b. Two fundamental questions concerning the relationships of chaplains need answers: What is the supervisory relationship of chaplains/MTs within a command? and How is chaplain/MT supervision exercised across unit/command lines?

c. FM 16-1 provides some clarification by discussing the concept of "technical control and coordination" (see pp. 3-15, 5-17). However, a concise definition of this expression was not included.

(1) Other terms included in the FM are: "operational supervision and control" and "supervisory control" (see pp. 1-2, 1-3). These may be understood as synonymous with "technical control and coordination."

(2) Four functions are included in the FM to describe supervision: consultation, technical guidance, training, and coordination. To describe the actions of supervision, the following words are used: supervise, direct, and control.

(3) Command policy determines control and supervision in wartime (AR 600-200, para 2-2). The larger picture of battle, high mobility, and the likelihood of mass destruction on the battlefield demand clear technical guidance and control.

3. Definitions.

a. Command and Control (C2). This is the authority and directions a commander in the military service lawfully exercises over assigned forces (see JCS Pub 1-02, AR 600-20, FM 101-5). Chaplains are officers without command authority.

b. Staff Supervision.

(1) Chaplaincy personnel in supervisory positions (bde, div, corps, etc.) exercise staff supervision in the area of their expertise, the religious support mission. The commander delegates the necessary authority for the chaplain to accomplish his religious support mission (FM 101-5, pp. 1-2).

(2) The supervisory function implies the exercise of planning, organizing, coordinating and controlling activities in order to effectively accomplish the religious support mission.

c. Technical Channels. The Army recognizes a "Technical Channel" (see FM 101-5, p. 1-7; AR 310-25, AR 600-20). This language and concept may help in explaining chaplain relationships.

(1) The Technical Channel is a technical link between two commands used for transmission of technical instructions. It is used by staff officers who have been given authority to do so due to the technical nature of activities within their assigned areas of responsibility.

(2) Whereas chaplains operate within the chain of command, professional and technical aspects of their mission often require the use of technical channels; i.e., that channel of communication which conveys guidance, direction, and coordination from supervisory staff chaplains (see FM 16-1, pp. 3-4; AR 600-20, para 2-2).

d. Coordination.

(1) AR 310-25, "Dictionary of United States Army Terms," defines coordination as: to coordinate with, in consultation with. The expression means that coordinating agencies will participate actively. If their concurrence is not obtained, the disputed matter shall be referred to the higher authority in which all participants have a voice.

(2) Coordination of religious support within a command implies the mutual sharing of information between chaplains and the inclusion of support initiatives from both lower and higher echelons into the Religious Support Plans (RSP) of each MT. Supervisory chaplains ensure guidance and directives from higher chaplain supervisors are included in RSPs.

e. Technical Control and Coordination (TECHCON).

(1) Though not an official acronym, TECHCON will be used in this paper to describe ideas of supervision.

(2) TECHCON is authority delegated by the commander to the supervisory staff chaplain to plan, organize, coordinate and control his religious support mission.

(a) TECHCON describes the controlling and coordinating relationship between supervisory and subordinate chaplains within the same command. However, it is not a command relationship.

(b) TECHCON is also applicable to chaplains across command lines when a unit is in a command relationship with a supported unit. In such cases the TF staff chaplain, with the commander's approval, exercises TECHCON for all TF religious support assets to accomplish the religious support mission in his area of responsibility.

(3) Because of their denominational ordination and endorsement for the U.S. Army chaplaincy, chaplains are certified as competent representatives of their denominations. However, competencies in other areas of military knowledge, leadership skill, and conceptions of religious support must be developed.

(a) Improvement in these areas of professional development requires supervision and training in the performance of ministry skills in the military environment.

(b) For these reasons, TECHCON includes the responsibility and authority of the supervisory chaplain to establish standards of performance and cooperation, ensure compliance, and certify individuals competent to perform specific duties within the military.

4. Unit and MT Relationships.

a. The nature of modern warfare requires task organization of forces. FM 101-5 describes the various command relationships of units in TF arrangements. As a general principle, chaplains follow the command and control (C2) configurations of the unit to which they are assigned for TECHCON. The following are primary relationships of chaplains due to unit relationships:

(1) Assigned. MTs assigned to a unit normally follow the command lines of that unit for TECHCON. For example, a FA Bn chaplain will not look to the ADA command chaplain for guidance in religious support for his units; rather, he looks to his FA supervisory channel including the FA brigade staff chaplain.

(2) Attached. When the MT is assigned to a unit that is attached to another, the lines for TECHCON change IAW the command relationship changes of the unit. In such a unit relationship, the gaining commander exercises the same C2 and logistical and training responsibility for the supporting (attached)

unit as he does for assigned units. The only exceptions are certain administrative functions; i.e., UCMJ jurisdiction, promotions, etc. which are listed in the attachment orders.

(a) The attached MT responds to the gaining unit's staff MT for TECHCON of religious support. This is only a temporary arrangement until the supporting mission is completed. Rating authority remains with the parent unit commander.

(b) The parent MT maintains administrative support and contact with the attached MT, but relinquishes the MT for employment in the TF according to the TF staff MT's guidance. This relationship may be seen in Figure 13.




Figure 13

TECHNICAL CONTROL AND COORDINATION ATTACHED UNITS

----- Administrative Support
 ————— Technical Control & Coordination

(3) OPCON. Units are placed OPCON to another to accomplish specific missions limited by function, time or location. The gaining commander does not exercise administrative or logistical responsibility to include discipline, internal organization, and unit training. The distinctions between OPCON and attachment may be imperceptible during combat as it pertains to religious support.

5. Support Relationships.

a. Support relationships define specific relationships and responsibilities between supporting and supported units. A supporting unit has no command relationship with the supported unit or force and the supporting unit commander provides all command, logistical, and administrative support for this unit. Generally, support relationships have been established as: Direct Support (DS), General Support (GS), General Support Reinforcing (GSR) and Reinforcing. Corps FA, EN, and signal units are examples of such units. They may assume command relationships to the supported unit, if so stated in orders.

b. MTs of units in such supporting roles fall under the TECHCON of their parent unit's MT. Coverage responsibility may include GRS for units other than their own which is coordinated by the supervisory chaplain in the supported unit. This may be properly called technical coordination of GRS without technical control. This relationship may be seen in Figure 14.




FIGURE 14
TECHNICAL CONTROL AND COORDINATION
SUPPORTING UNIT MT

—— Technical Control & Coordination
—●— Technical Coordination of GRS

c. Just as commanders of units in supporting relationships are responsive to the directions and requirements of the supported unit, the MT of the supporting unit is responsive to the requests of the staff MT of the supported unit. The supporting MT's responsibility is to coordinate with the TF staff MT for GRS of units in the AO.

6. TECHCON at Corps Level--The Corps Staff Chaplain.

a. TECHCON for corps units begins with the corps staff chaplain. Access to all the battlefield positions of units and full briefings on the course of the war enables the corps staff chaplain to exercise TECHCON through several functions:

(1) Monitoring - the process of discerning what is happening and what it means. The corps staff MT monitors the implementation of the corps RSP.

(a) Constant religious support and battlefield situation assessment is conducted through maps, status boards, MT reports, and formal and informal briefings.

(b) The Corps staff MT resolves uncertainty by assimilating large amounts of data to develop detailed planning or make quick decisions for religious support.

(2) Planning - the process of developing base line expectations of how the MT will operate in the corps.

(a) The corps staff chaplain integrates policy and procedures of higher headquarters, his own experience, and the corps commander's desires, as well as input from MTs of subordinate units.

(b) The corps RSP is a base line document which articulates priorities, coordinating instructions, and religious support procedures. It is a "living" document which may be quickly modified to respond to unforeseen events (see FM 16-1, p. 5-9).

(c) The RSP is a proactive product which includes contingency plans; i.e. mass casualty, EPW policies, and reconstitution. Such planning may be included in published checklists, SOPs, and handbooks.

(3) Directing - the process of giving guidance.

(a) The corps staff chaplain synchronizes religious support for supporting and main battlefield efforts, as well as contingency operations. He must identify all critical battlefield activities (critical events), estimate time and distance factors, and understand the mutually supporting relationships among them.

(b) Clear directions to corps MTs with follow-up reporting procedures ensure that guidance was understood and that the recipient can and does carry it out.

(c) Policy, guidance, and initiatives at corps level are implemented by decentralized execution through supervisory ministry teams.

b. Three command posts (CP) provide C2 facilities for corps on the AirLand Battlefield: tactical CP (TAC CP), main CP, and the rear CP for rear operations.

(1) Normally, the corps staff MT is located at the rear CP. This facilitates the monitoring of religious support in rear areas where there is a preponderance of CS and CSS units. However, command guidance or coverage plans may dictate stationing at either of the other CPs.

(2) However, the corps chaplain may want one of his deputies located with the main CP. In addition to providing DRS to the main CP (approximately 300-500 soldiers), the MT will be able to monitor the battlefield and religious support needs and communicate this information directly to the corps staff chaplain.

c. Reporting procedures for MT Status Reports should be SOP for MTs. Reports support MT relationships and establish religious support expectations.

(1) Periodic reports are essential for the corps staff chaplain section to plan and monitor religious support for the corps. Reports are consolidated at brigade, division, or COSCOM level and submitted to the corps staff MT IAW SOP.

(2) Lessons learned from exercises and combat operations demonstrate that report forms are best used when they are:

(a) Standardized by line. When all MTs understand the standardized format, there is ease of communication.

(b) Periodic. Lessons learned from recent combat experiences demonstrate daily reports are essential, except during offensive operations.

(c) Short. Only essential information should be required and only information which differs from the previous report. The number of services, counseling sessions, etc., may not be considered essential in combat. A more complete MT activities report giving such data may be required less frequently.

(3) MTs communicate their reports through whatever means are available - courier or secure means, radio communication or data transmission. Use of the secure nets will be limited, so the Admin/Log net may be the most accessible for unsecure transmissions. Some coded responses may be necessary if security requirements dictate.

(4) Reports using a format corresponding to staff functions (S-1, personnel, etc.) facilitate responses and preserve Communications Security (COMSEC). An example of a report by line may be seen in Figure 15. Each line may be broken into components.

c. Corps Staff MT Section Functions. Though each corps staff chaplain establishes his own priorities, the following is a brief description of likely duties and assignment of the corp staff MT section. The assignment of chaplain/chaplain assistant functions is arbitrary and for illustrative purposes only (see Figure 16 for summary).

- Line 1 - Name/Unit of MT**
- Line 2 - Team Personnel Status**
- Line 3 - Mission to What Units, Where**
- Line 4 - Supply Needs**
- Line 5 - Other Problems**

Figure 15

UMT Status Report

(1) The corps chaplain integrates with equivalent staff sections, incorporates guidance from the corps commander, provides leadership and supervision of all MTs in the corps, and ensures the religious support mission is carried out IAW the Corps TAC SOP.

(2) The two additional staff chaplains (05, 04) fulfill functions which correspond to the staff positions of command; i.e., personnel, intelligence, operations, and supply.

(a) One chaplain and one assistant obtain current battlefield information and operations while performing DRS/GRS for soldiers at the main CP. They may also plan GRS for the corps rear based on their access to unit and MT locations and needs.

(b) The second chaplain provides/plans personnel, administrative, briefing, logistics, and other duties at the rear CP as the staff chaplain directs. Two chaplain assistants remain to assist in those duties.

(3) The sergeant major is the senior chaplain assistant supervisor in the corps and attends to all 71M enlisted soldier matters in coordination with the staff chaplain. Enlisted personnel, training, and support issues fall within this responsibility.

O6, E9

- Policy
- Guidance
- Advise commander
- Supervision
- Coordination with Commanders/
Senior MTs/HSN Rel leaders

O5, E5, E3

- RSP Planning
- Personnel
- Unit MT locations
- Planning
- Resources
- Briefing
- Administrative
- Training

O4, E4

- Location of main CP
- DRS to main CP
- Monitors Battlefield
- Monitors Religious Spt.
- Inform Corps Staff Ch

Figure 16

CORPS STAFF MT SECTION FUNCTIONS

d. DRS Requirements.

(1) The following detachments in the corps have no MTs and fall under the corps HQ and the corps staff chaplain for DRS: Band, JAG, Public Affairs, Rear CP. These total approximately 802 soldiers, based on analysis of the Laydown. In addition, there are the adjutant general (AG) (2,371) and finance (891) groups which total 3,262 soldiers (see Appendix A).

(2) The dispersion of these elements throughout the corps rear area and the small corps chaplain staff to cover them present an impossible DRS mission. GRS for these detachments and units must be coordinated with units which have assigned MTs.

e. Technical Coordination of Religious Support of Personnel Entering the Corps.

(1) Personnel entering the corps rear area from the Theater Area (TA) may number into the thousands on any given day. These personnel may include several categories: units providing maintenance support and logistical support, special operations troops, Engineer troops, and MPs. Normally, these forces will be in the corps rear area only on a temporary basis, but their presence increases the religious support mission which falls under the corps staff chaplain's monitoring and planning functions.

(2) Replacement and filler personnel or units may enter the corps to be processed into units through the AG personnel replacement companies or detachments. The high anxiety levels produced by the anticipation of combat creates the need for the stabilizing presence of the MTs; however, none is assigned to personnel units.

(3) MT personnel replacements enter the corps as required. A program or system of identification, briefing, and acclimation of MT personnel entering the corps is a critical ministry and will greatly assist the corps staff chaplain in making adequate and balanced assignments.

f. Chaplain Nonappropriated Fund (NAF) Activities.

(1) In a mature theater, the corps staff chaplain will implement procedures for handling, safeguarding, and disbursing of monies which may be received by MTs on the battlefield.

(2) The Army Component Commander determines if and what type of currency will be allowed on the battlefield. Such operations must be supported by finance units.

(3) Current regulations (AR 165-1, Ch 16) do not address accounting or disbursement procedures for monies received during deployments. Until such guidance is provided, the corps staff chaplain will set policy and SOP with command approval. Given wartime pressures, such policies should have the following characteristics:

- adequate accountability at lowest levels possible
- minimum bureaucratic layers
- minimum, but adequate, record keeping
- simple procedures
- use of finance unit's services to maximum extent possible

6. The COSCOM MT.

a. The farther from the engagement area, the more important the GRS mission becomes. Out of a total population of 179,231 soldiers, 101,707 are nondivisional (57 percent). Of these, only about 14,000 are located in the divisional areas. The remaining 87,707 soldiers are dispersed over a geographical area of 15,400 square kms (see appendix A).

(1) CSS units manage support to diverse units through habitual support relationships and, for others, through an area support coverage system.

(2) The corps staff chaplain must rely upon the supervisory MTs in the corps rear area to avoid duplication of effort, provide adequate coverage for all units, and overcome the difficulties of distance and dispersion. The lead MT for providing this management of the religious support mission is the deputy corps chaplain. The COSCOM chaplain has the organization and management systems inherent in his/her unit of assignment to facilitate this mission.

b. TECHCON for all CSS unit MTs in the corps rear area falls under the COSCOM staff MT (06, 05, 03, E7, E5, E4, E3). A discussion of the COSCOM and organizational chart may be seen in Appendix A, pp. 10-13).

c. The COSCOM staff chaplain is responsible for the religious support mission of the medical, CSG, and COSCOM HQ units. Under the LOG C2 concept, corps CSS units are multifunctional and may include transportation and ammunition units (see Appendix H).

d. The COSCOM staff MT may also monitor GRS requirements for the following:

- units without MTs
- units without MTs in the area
- units/individuals entering the corps
- separate brigade units in Tactical Assembly areas

e. The COSCOM staff MT functions may be described similarly to that for the corps staff MT. They are depicted in Figure 17 for illustrative purposes only.

(1) The COSCOM staff chaplain integrates with equivalent staff sections, ensures the flow of information to and from COSCOM MTs, ensures RSP guidance is integrated, coordinates religious support mission(s) with commander(s), ensures integration of CAPSTONE unit MTs on the battlefield, monitors the battlefield, and plans the GRS mission for the COSCOM and other units, as appropriate.

(2) The two additional staff chaplains (05, 03) fulfill functions which correspond to the staff positions in the command; i.e. personnel, intelligence, operations and supply. Contingency missions may become critical functions for the COSCOM MT section.

O6, E-7

- Advise Commander
- Supervision
- Guidance
- Coordination with Commanders/
Senior MTs
- Integration of Corps Rear Area RSP

O5, E-6, E3

- Monitor Unit/ MT Locations
- Communicate the GRS Responsibilities
to CSG MTs
- Personnel
- Briefings
- Training

O3, E4

- Resources
- Planning
- Administrative
- Contingency Missions

Figure 17

COSCOM STAFF MT SECTION FUNCTIONS

APPENDIX C

Religious Support and Rear Operations

1. Introduction.

a. The purpose of this appendix is to outline how the corps staff chaplain may plan and provide for GRS for units in the corps rear using a recognized Army system.

b. In response to the threat in rear areas, U.S. military planners detailed an integrated plan for rear area security. The heart of the rear area security doctrine is to enable the corps sustainment mission to proceed unimpeded by responding to threat incursions quickly and decisively.

c. At corps level, rear area command and control (C2) are provided by a rear command post (CP) and normally, four rear operations centers (RAOC). The Deputy Corps Commander commands the rear CP which is composed of three cells: HQ, Operations, and Combat Service Support (CSS). The RAOCs primarily manage the terrain in their area of responsibility while assisting with security, movements and sustainment. They usually collocate with either a corps support group or MP battalion for life support, security and ease of coordination.

d. Divisional Rear Operations follow similar, though simplified, rear operations procedures. The rear CP is usually collocated with the DISCOM and manages the terrain of the division rear (see FM 71-100, pp. 1-14, 3-4). Rear operations in echelons above corps are likewise similar (see FM 100-16, Ch 5).

2. Terrain Management.

a. The RAOC function of terrain management offers the quickest opportunity for the corps staff chaplain to acquire information for providing GRS in the corps rear area. Using this management system mechanism, the corps staff chaplain may determine assets available and religious support needs in the rear area. The corps staff chaplain may delegate responsibility for this function to the COSCOM staff MT, providing the COSCOM HQ is collocated with the Rear CP.

b. When developing the echelon terrain management plan, the G3 allocates terrain to support the scheme of maneuver, reserves, and sustainment. The operations cell of the rear CP contains the corps situation and terrain management maps which are kept current at all times. Specific unit positioning is accomplished by the RAOCs in coordination with the Rear CP, major subordinate commands and separate units.

3. Base.

a. The Base: RAOs position units into bases for security. A base is composed of a unit or units which are located in a geographically small, defensible area with a contiguous perimeter and established access controls. The base commander establishes a Base Defense Operation Center (BDOC) to operate 24 hours a day to plan, coordinate and supervise base defense operations. The BDOC is responsible to establish and maintain communication with their BCOCs (see below).

b. Base Clusters: Bases may be geographically grouped to assist in the span of control and to provide mutual support, thereby forming a cluster.

(1) Normally the senior commander in each cluster is the cluster commander. The commander establishes a Base Cluster Operations Center (BCOC) to operate 24 hours a day in support of the tactical chain of command.

(2) The RAO provides the following significant information sources for the MT located in the base cluster: a current situation map, continuous communications with the rear CP and assigned bases and base clusters, threat condition, and Base Defense Status reports. A supervisory MT needs such information to provide GRS for units in a constantly changing area of operations.

c. Independent bases: Bases which are not within a reasonable distance of other bases to allow clustering are called independent bases. They report directly to one of the RAOs and are integrated into rear security plans.

d. Units not in bases: Some units operate within the corps rear area that are not positioned or designated as bases. Air Defense Artillery, FA units, and signal sites are examples.

4. Management of General Religious Support in the Corps Rear.

a. An effective means for the supervisory MT to comprehend and monitor religious support in the corps rear may be through rear operations security arrangements. Using this system the MT of the base cluster commander could serve as the base cluster MT (see Figure 18). The MT could have immediate access to information on cluster units which may not have a MT. If the unit of the base cluster commander has no organic MT, the most senior MT within the cluster would be the cluster MT.

b. Base cluster MTs could provide support with the approval of their commanders and in coordination with their supervisory technical channel. Upon being designated as the base cluster MT,

the chaplain contacts his supervisory chaplain who in turn coordinates with the POC for coordination of GRS in the area (see para d below).




Figure 18

Base Clusters With One MT

c. Base clusters without MTs must rely on the coordinating effort of the corps MT to coordinate GRS with MTs in other base clusters nearby.

d. The CSG MT may be key for GRS coordination in the CSG sector. The entire corps rear area is divided into geographical areas and all units fall within the purview of a CSG. As the most stationary MT in the sector, the CSG MT may have direct access to the RAOC and may easily receive information from and coordination with base and base cluster MTs. As the CSG MT coordinates GRS with base cluster MTs, information may be shared of base clusters nearby which have no organic MTs. By having direct access to the RAOC, the CSG MT may monitor the movements of MTs in and out of the sector.

e. Under this arrangement, the CSG MT is the coordinating POC, a conduit of information, and does not control the GRS mission. The supervisory MT of the base cluster MT coordinates with the CSG MT to advise of his MT's location and arrange parameters of support. By all MTs sharing information, cooperation for mutual support and GRS will result in the most comprehensive religious support of units in the CSG (see Figure 19 below).

f. Constant communication availability within the CSG sector offers superb opportunities for MT coordination. Figure 20 reflects the information flow from the BCOCs to the RAOC which in turn coordinates with the rear operations cell in the corps CP. BCOC MTs keep the CSG MT informed of activities, coverage, and

needs in the base cluster. Normally the CSG MT has access to the RAOC which provides unit locations for monitoring religious support needs.




Figure 19

Religious Support Coordination in CSG

- Sr. Cdr. with MT
- ... Support Responsibility
- ↔ Coordination of GRS




Figure 20

MT COMMUNICATION FLOW USING RAOC

g. For comprehensive religious support in the corps rear area, MTs must make contact with the BDOC or BCOC as soon as they enter a CSG sector. This will enable them to know what MTs, if any, are in their cluster and the list of units and their locations. Base cluster MTs advise their supervisory MTs of the GRS needs in their cluster and receive guidance as required. MTs must know to coordinate with the CSG MT which has the "larger picture" of units and MTs in sector because of direct access to

the RAOC. Communication assets should be readily available in the control centers and call signs kept current, thereby facilitating the GRS mission in the CSG. The coordination may be diagrammed as in Figure 21.

h. The following must be considered if this system for GRS is to function effectively:

- (1) Currently the CSG MT does not have this mission.
- (2) The CSG is limited in personnel (1 Ch, 1 CA).
- (3) The CSG Commander's concurrence is vital.

i. These limitations may be remedied by the following:

- (1) Including this system for GRS in doctrine and training and/or corps staff chaplains including coordinating instructions in all corps RSPs and field SOPs outlining the plan, and
- (2) Providing an additional chaplain and chaplain assistant to the CSG HHC TOE; or minimally adding a CA in the grade of E-5 or higher.




Figure 21
COORDINATION OF RELIGIOUS
SUPPORT IN THE CSG

• Base Cluster MT
... Support Responsibility
←→ Coordination of GRS

APPENDIX D

The Threat

1. The purpose of this appendix is to highlight the threat posed to MTs along the operational continuum.

2. The Operational Continuum.

a. Military operations and activities are conducted against threats which may be described as three general states of an operational continuum; peacetime competition, conflict and war.

b. These states are described as follows:

(1) Peacetime Competition - normal activities between or within nations which are nonhostile.

(2) Conflict - an armed struggle or clash between organized parties within a nation or between nations in order to achieve limited political or military objectives.

(3) War - a sustained armed conflict between nations or organized groups within a nation involving regular and irregular forces in a series of connected battles and campaigns to achieve vital national objectives.

3. Peacetime Competition.

a. Peacetime competition includes the normal pressures and exchanges between nations, short of combat operations or active support to a warring nation.

b. The Army may assume a number of such related missions in the future - combating terrorism, drug interdiction, disaster relief, civil works, nation building and security assistance.

c. MTs will be involved in peacetime competition as their units are involved and be subject to the same type of threat.

4. Conflicts.

a. In the long-range period, the Army must intensify its efforts to deal with low-intensity conflicts. Old and new regional animosities may erupt into an armed struggle or clash between organized parties with a nation or between nations in order to achieve limited political or military objectives. Such conflicts may easily spread outside the confines of the warring parties and threaten to become expanded war.

b. Conflicts are often protracted, confined to a restricted geographic area, and constrained in weaponry and level of violence. However, with the proliferation of modern weaponry and munition sophistication; i.e.; chemical weapons, a third world country may become a menacing threat to its neighbors or the entire region.

c. Whereas MTs will likely be involved in any significant projection of their units into a geographic area, few corps MTs will leave CONUS. Only in a protracted involvement in the conflict would corps support units be involved.

5. War.

a. The Soviet threat of the past 45 years in Europe changed drastically with the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and recent Soviet internal dissention. The Soviets are no longer considered the same antagonistic foe to our national interest. Whereas forces will be withdrawn from the European theater, a sizable forward deployed force will remain.

b. The Desert Storm war demonstrated modified soviet war-fighting doctrine with older, mostly Soviet equipment. During the campaign, SCUD missile attacks demonstrated the constant threat of even older weapons systems. Only one missile penetrated the Patriot defenses into the allied rear area with devastating results. One can imagine what might have happened if our foe possessed the latest generation of soviet "smart" weapons with similar capability to our own.

c. Though the Iraqi army deployed defensively and proved to be a weak foe, a more tenacious army with more modern weapons would employ the same strategy: strike hard, with surprise, deep into allied rear to disrupt the lines of communications, logistical support, command and control, reinforcement of front-line/enveloped units, and to negate the nuclear delivery systems and capabilities.

d. The ability of the Soviets to attack corps rear areas by artillery bombardment, missile and air strikes means that no area on the battlefield is safe. Satellite and other air and ground surveillance systems reduce the ability of forces to camouflage themselves. Chemicals, both persistent and nonpersistent, can be expected at any time after initiation of hostilities. Forces possessing tactical nuclear weapons can be anticipated once a threat force is halted and can no longer realize the accomplishment of its objectives.

e. Corps soldiers in such a war would be subject to the fatigue of continuous operations, often in Mission Oriented Protective Posture (MOPP) equipment. Providing support to forward

units would expose MTs to the same lethality and destructive horror combat units experience.

f. MTs are embedded in army units throughout the battlefield. Future battlefield operations will produce many casualties with intense destructive force projected from long range fires. The MT will seek to minister in this environment and will itself be subject to all the stresses of combat around them.

APPENDIX E

The Manpower Requirements Criteria (MARC) Impact on Religious Support for Corps Units

1. This appendix outlines the MARC process and significant changes in MT requirements because of the recently approved chaplaincy MARC.

2. The most recent MARC study for TOE MT was completed in July 1988 (ACN 036709) and approved by DA in January 1990 for application to the FY 91 force. It is the first time that the chaplaincy has employed the formula prescribed in AR 570-2 for calculating battalion/squadron chaplain positions.

a. The formula is as follows:

$$\frac{A \times B}{C} = R$$

WHERE:

R = REQUIREMENT FOR 56A

A = ACTUAL BN/SQN POPULATION

B = ANNUAL RELIGIOUS SUPPORT "PER SOLDIER" IN MANHOURS

(6.84)

C = AVAILABILITY FACTOR AS DETERMINED BY THE FOLLOWING:

For Divisional units: 4376 (hours) minus Unit Movement Code from AR 570-2, Table 3-1b

For corps nondivisional units/EAC units: 4654 (hours) minus, Unit Movement Code from AR 570-2, Table 3-1b

b. Using Subject Matter Expert (SME) panels to determine religious support tasks, task times, and task frequencies, the study determined that the chaplain spends 6.84 hours annually per soldier. Battalion, division, and corps SMEs validated this number.

(1) The calculation was as follows: The Annual Manhour (AMH) factor (6.84 AMH) was then divided by the Availability Factors (the annual number of hours available for work) for divisional and nondivisional units, minus the Unit Movement Code from Table 3-1b, AR 570-2. The result was the 56A (chaplain) requirement. Requirements of .5 to .9 were rounded up, thereby increasing requirements by one.

(2) As an example, consider the Assault Helicopter battalion UH-60 (TOE 01206L00) which has a required strength of

346. The MARC computation may be seen in Table 1.

Table 3

MARC COMPUTATION FOR ASSAULT HELICOPTER BATTALION
(Divisional Unit)

Step 1

$$\frac{A \times B}{C} = R$$

$$\frac{346 \times 6.84}{4654 - 96} = R$$

(Mov't Code)

Step 2

$$\frac{2366.64}{4558} = .52$$

Step 3

Chaplain Requirement = 1 Chaplain
(rounded up from .52)

3. Supervisory positions at brigade and above were regarded as standard positions based on mission and the commander's grade, rather than population served (see AR 611-101). The MARC study does not consider unit dispersion.

4. The SME panel also reviewed the workload factors for the chaplain assistant and demonstrated that the AMH factor for the assistant was less than that of the chaplain by only seven percent. The doctrinal requirement for an assistant for every chaplain was thus confirmed.

5. When approved by DA, the MARC provides an official guideline for proponents to use in TOE development and TOE cyclical reviews (every three years).

6. A proponent considers resource constraints as TOEs are developed or changed. If a proponent determines that it is unable to "afford" the MT requirement, a MARC deviation may be requested (IAW TRADOC Pam 71-6). If approved, the requirement is relieved until the next cyclical update when the request must be resubmitted, providing the branch continues to accept the "risk" to its religious support mission.

7. The impact of the current MARC may be clearly seen in an analysis of the LOGCEN Notional Corps Laydown (see Appendix A).

a. The former MARC based chaplain requirements on a simple ratio of 1:700 or major fraction thereof. Applying this MARC to the Notional Corps revealed 34 battalion-sized and three brigade-

sized units without assigned MTs. These units total 20,125 soldiers.

b. When applying the new MARC, only three of these units are without MTs, a total of 807 soldiers.

8. The following observations apply to the implementation of the MARC:

a. The MARC applies ONLY to go-to-war requirements.

b. Commanders may modify the TOE in peacetime to accommodate resource constraints, but changes in TOEs must be approved through prescribed MARC deviation procedure.

c. Proponents may seek to ignore the MARC deviation requirement, thereby placing an important mission on USACHCS, DCD to monitor all TOEs to ensure the inclusion of MTs in TOE updates, where applicable. When DA places constraints on proponents, it is easy for them to attempt to use MTs as "bill payers."

9. The MARC formula shows that beyond a certain number of soldiers covered, the MT's effectiveness diminishes. Accordingly, 25 large battalions throughout the corps showed a requirement of two MTs (see Table 4).

Table 4

UNITS WITH TWO MT REQUIREMENTS

AOE SRC	UNIT DESIGNATION	REQ. STRENGTH	*MARC REQ
63066J330	CAV SPT SQDN	1025	1.51
07246J410	BN MX HVY DIV	832 (15 EA)	1.62
63136J400	MSB HVY DIV	1066 (5 EA)	2.08
01946L000	AVIM BN	1296	2.00
55016H400	MTR TRANS BN	1091 (2 EA)	1.63
09066J300	AMMO BN	1259	1.99

*Reqs at .5 or greater are rounded off to the next higher number.

10. As a result of the MARC study, many battalions now have MT requirements for the first time. Twenty-seven nondivisional units in the Laydown fit this category and are shown in Table 5 with their MARC requirements.

Table 5

UNITS WITH FIRST TIME MT REQUIREMENTS

AOE SRC	ULC	DESIGNATION	RSTR	*MARC REQ
33500H0AB	BN	PSYOP	525	.77
07416L000	BN	TLAT	529	.96
06446J200	BN	155MM SP (3x8)	607	1.10
01206L000	BN	ASLT HEL BN UH-60	346	.55
01406L100	BN	ASLT HEL BN UH-1	450	.70
34206L000	BN	CEWI BN OPNS	588	1.16
34226L000	BN	TEB BN (-)	305	.60
34236J510	BN	MI AE BN (-)	398	.59
34236L200	BN	BN TE (RC) CORPS	527	1.04
44426L000	BN	HNB/GUN/STGFR BTY	485	.96
44446L100	BN	HNB CHAP (CORPS)	439 (3 EA.)	.79
01946L100	BN	HHD AVIM BN	1296	2.00
08446L000	BN	HHD, MED BN DENTAL	548	.85
08446L000	BN	EVAC BN	686 (3 EA.)	1.06
08456L000	BN	AREA SPT MED BN	454 (2 EA.)	.75
08486L000	BN	MED LOG BN (FWD)	355	.53
01416L000	BN	GSAB (CMD AV CPS)	363	.56
01386L100	BN	ATK HEL BN AH-1	277 (2 EA.)	.50
05500LA00	BN	ENG	614 (3 EA.)	.95
11436L000	BN	SIG BN AREA (MSE)	415 (3 EA.)	.82
11446L000	BN	SIG SPT BN (MSE)	522	1.03

*Reqs at .5 or greater are rounded off to the next higher number.

11. The current MARC requires MTs at brigade/group and higher as standard requirements. Consequently, eight of these units have MT requirements for the first time (see Table 6).

Table 6

FIRST TIME MT REQUIREMENTS
STANDARD POSITIONS

AOE SRC	UNIT DESIGNATION
12402L000	PERS GP
14412L000	FIN GP
19262J400	MP BDE
08432L000	MED GP (4 EA)
55012H600	TRANS BDE

12. The MARC study recommended standard numbers of chaplains and chaplain assistants for some positions. These were based on mission requirements rather than normal MARC formula (see Table

7).

Table 7

SPECIAL MT REQUIREMENTS
STANDARD POSITIONS

UNIT DESIGNATION	REQUIREMENTS	
	56A	71M
COMMAND HQ CORPS	3	4
DIVISION HQ	2	2
EPW/CI BN	1	1
CHAPLAIN SPT TEAM A	2	3
CHAPLAIN SPT TEAM B	1	1

13. Under the former MARC, HQ COSCOM required three chaplains and four chaplain assistants, the same as HQ Corps; however, under the new MARC, only two requirements are recognized for HQ COSCOM, one of which is the standard brigade chaplain position. This was an apparent oversight in the MARC study.

14. A numerical summary final tally of the MARC impact on the Notional Corps may be seen in Table 8. The totals show an overall gain of 71 chaplains and 67 chaplain assistants.

Table 8

COMPARISON OF MARC REQUIREMENTS

FORMER MARC REQUIREMENTS		CURRENT MARC REQUIREMENTS	
56A	71M	56A	71M
240	240	311	307

15. Conclusions.

a. The MARC recognizes the fact that the MT is unable to provide comprehensive religious support when the battalion exceeds a certain number of soldiers. As the battalion size increases, the effectiveness of religious support coverage decreases exponentially.

b. Application of the MARC to all units would practically eliminate a religious support shortfall at corps nondivisional units (based on population and workload). However, unique movement requirements of the MT on the battlefield are not considered in these calculations.

c. When the MARC is reviewed in January 1993, a standard

grading should be submitted for the HQ COSCOM to equal the current requirements of three chaplains and four chaplain assistants.

APPENDIX F

Chaplain Support Teams (CST) (TOE 16-500LA/B)

1. Purpose: The purpose of this appendix is to acquaint the reader with the background, mission and employment of CSTs in corps rear.

2. Background:

a. Past studies of corps and communication zone (COMMZ) areas identified significant religious support shortfalls; i.e., mission requirements beyond present TOE capabilities.

(1) The low density of authorized chaplains for combat service support units was identified in 1945 in The Army Chaplain in the European Theater (Central Board, US Forces, European Theater, File 2322. 01/4, Study No. 68). To partially address the problem of many units without chaplains, the Chief of Chaplains approved a "chaplains-at-large" concept to be employed in the theater.

(2) These teams or "chaplain pools" provided supervisory chaplains the flexibility to address coverage shortfalls, area coverage, unnecessary duplication of effort, and inadequate sources of replacements for casualties (pp. 4-5).

(3) When sent into an area, the teams reported to the commander of a camp and if chaplains were in the area, teams would report to them and render every assistance possible. The report summarizes, "These teams were powers of coordination and not, in any sense, dictatorial in program or policy." (p. 50).

b. The Chaplain Agency of the Combat Developments Command conducted studies of coverage problems beginning in 1962 (see end of this appendix for listings and study synopses). They revealed that chaplain TOE requirements for corps units did not, and could not, provide effective religious support without an additional general support capability.

c. These studies validated and established earlier chaplain support organizations. The current TOE 16-500L superseded TOE 16-500H (15 December 1975), which superseded TOE 16-4H (13 September 1972) and TOE 29-500G (31 August 1967).

(1) In the only AR 5-5 study devoted specifically to religious support to corps personnel (January 1976) seven alternatives were considered in how best to accomplish the mission to provide all soldiers with religious support without adequate TOE resources. The study concluded that unit assignment (pure TOE

assignment) with back-up team support for units without chaplains (using TOE 16-500) provided the best approach.

(2) A study conducted by the Combat Developments Directorate of the US Army Chaplain Center and School in 1978 revealed a low density of authorized chaplains for corps, combat service support soldiers. Based on the Manpower Authorization Criteria (MACRIT) of 1:700, the study showed only 45.8 percent of recognized requirements were filled. This shortfall and TOE proposal were briefed to the TOE Review Board, HQ TRADOC and the TOE was approved on 1 May 1987.

(a) In order to project the number of spaces needed to address the shortfall, the study writers used the Illustrative Planning Scenario (IPS) to calculate spaces in various theaters.

(b) Table 9 reflects the outcome--a total of 4 A teams and 43 B teams for a total of 106 spaces.

(c) It should be noted that all these calculations were completed prior to the approval of the new chaplaincy Manpower Requirements Criteria (MARC) (see appendix E).

Table 9

CHAPLAIN SUPPORT TEAMS IN VARIOUS THEATERS

	NATO	SWA	NEA	OTR	TOTAL
A TEAMS	2	1	1	0	4
B TEAMS	36	5	1	1	43

(d) The utility of the teams was questioned since the teams were component (COMPO) 4 and activation is not authorized for COMPO 4 units until D + 180. In July 1986, the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army directed that these TOEs be revised in line with new TOEs developed in the Force Structure System (L-edition) and partially moved from COMPO 4 (unmanned and unresourced) to COMPO 3 (US Army Reserve) status. Consequently, 13 teams were slated for COMPO 3 in FY 1993 (and may be deployed at D +1) with 93 teams remaining at COMPO 4.

(e) To implement the constraints of the 1990s, military leaders were faced with severely reducing Table of Distribution and Allowances (TDA) structure while preserving as much of the warfighting strength in TOE organizations as possible. Military planners sought to incorporate essential military missions performed under TDA organizations into TOE designs. One such proposed design in USAREUR resulted in base support TOEs for European Military communities to assume many TDA functions while

supplying a primary TOE mission. Force designers wanted to incorporate TOE 16-500 teams in the chaplain slots, a clear violation of the mission and design of the TOE.

3. Mission.

a. Complete descriptions of CSTs may be seen in FM 16-1, pp. 5-15 through 5-17. For the purposes of this study, only brief descriptions are outlined.

(1) CSTs were designed to augment TOE MTs to provide for corps units having no organic MT support.

(2) Analysis of the LOGCEN Notional Corps Laydown (see Appendix A) revealed that 37 battalion-sized and group-sized corps units had no MT assigned. All CSTs are assigned to the Theater Area Command (TAACOM) and may be OPCON or attached to these units in the corps area of operations.

b. CSTs consist of chaplains (56A) and Chaplain Assistants (71M) in two organizational designs:

(1) TOE 16500LA00--This team is composed of two chaplains (05, 04, and three CAs, E7, E4, E3) and is primarily responsible for General Religious Support (GRS) and emergency missions while providing technical control and coordination for up to 12 B teams.

(2) TOE 16500LB00--This team is composed of one chaplain (03) and CA (E4) and is primarily responsible for Direct Religious Support (DRS) to units to which it is attached or OPCON by the TAACOM or corps commander.

4. Employment.

a. The teams are assigned to the TAACOM with the possibility of attachment or OPCON to corps units upon the request of the corps commander.

b. The corps staff chaplain prepares an accurate assessment of the battlefield and religious support needs and bases his request for CSTs on reliable information.

5. Conclusions.

a. When the new MARC is applied to the Laydown (see Appendix E), the total of 37 units without MT requirements is reduced to only three. This is a reduction of the total number of soldiers uncovered from 20,125 to 801. As the new MARC is applied, there will be a similar decrease in Theater as in the Corps.

b. Under ALO (see Appendix H) divisional religious support assets may be located in closer proximity to CSS units until brigades move to join in the maneuver phase of battle. Therefore, there may be a greater density of MTs. However, the significantly greater corps area (400 X 300 km) means units will be dispersed over greater corps distances than previously leaving some "holes."

c. It is unlikely that proponents will apply the new MARC evenly to all units. It will be a number of years before normal TOE cyclical updates will consider the MARC requirements. In Desert Storm some supervisory chaplains felt that the CSTs would have been invaluable had they been available.

6. Study Listings and Synopses.

a. The Army Chaplain in the European Theater, Report by General Board US Forces, European Theater, File 2322, Study Number 68, 1945.

(1) This final WW II chaplain report is a monolithic collection of extensive analyses, documents, letters, etc. summarizing lessons learned from the conflict.

(2) The bearing of this document on the subject is contained in 2a above.

b. Chaplain Support of the Communications Zone, Project CHAPCD 62-1, US Army Chaplain Board, Ft. Meade, Maryland, 30 Jun 62.

(1) Present (1962) TOE authorizations result in a shortage of 84 chaplains (48.5%) based on the MARC; the need for a system of supplemental chaplain support has been recognized for years. (annex F).

(2) Based on LOGEX 61 exercises, proposals extending back to 1958 for various types of chaplaincy teams were dismissed in favor of a single chaplain support team (TOE 16-500D), 1 chaplain and 1 chaplain assistant, which would provide professional chaplain support to: augment TOE chaplains; serve as replacements; area coverage; emergency coverage; specialized functions (supply, retreat, etc.) (pp. 52ff).

(3) Philosophy: The "unity of command" concept; i.e., one command cannot direct chaplains from another without violating the concept, was a basis for the rationale for team requirements. The use of chaplain teams provides the command chaplain needed flexibility to address needs while not violating the "unity of command." (pp. 49ff).

(4) Excerpts from a briefing for deputy chiefs of staff, DA, in February 1962, approved by the Chief of Chaplains, provide an excellent rationale for chaplain support teams.

c. Chaplain Support, TASTA, 1965 - 1970, USACDCCHA 65-9, Fort Lee, Virginia, September 1966.

(1) Chaplain shortfalls due to a proliferation of small, often dispersed units without assigned chaplains, create a need for at least one authorized chaplain general support TOE activity per theater to provide theater-wide chaplain activities (pp. 21-33).

(2) Proposal: A Chaplain General Support Detachment (TOE 16-4G) assigned to the Personnel Command of TASCOC to serve a 12 or 8 division force. This 18 person TOE would provide and operate religious retreat centers, chaplain training conferences, lay leaders training conferences, provide religious information to Armed Forces networks, and professional and educational religious library (pp. E-I-1,2).

(3) This detachment may be augmented, if necessary, by chaplain professional support Teams TOE 29-500, Team MA); however, these teams are designed to provide additional support for enlarged units or task forces because of the attachments or detachments of a large number of units, making it impossible for assigned TOE chaplains to provide adequate coverage.

d. Chaplain Support-75, USADC Number 6503, US Army Combat Developments Command, Chaplain Agency, Fort Lee, Virginia, June 1968.

(1) Vietnam experience indicated a requirement for more chaplains per committed division. (Three additional chaplains per division was recommended by the US Army Vietnam [USARV] staff chaplain.) Some divisions emphasized area coverage which proved inadequate.

(2) Use of TOE 29-500, Team HA, Chaplain Professional Team, is proposed to supplement divisional TOE unit chaplains (3 teams of one chaplain and one chaplain assistant each). The Team HA was only one of many types of teams authorized under this TOE.

(3) Additionally, lay leadership involvement with forces was recommended to alleviate the situation.

e. Chaplain Direct Support to Nondivisional Combat Support Organizations, USA TRADOC, USA Chaplain Center and School, ACN 18199, January 1976.

(1) This study considers chaplain missions and opera-

tions as they relate to corps units located at various echelons. An Army Command and General Staff College scenario (SCIMITAR) was used to analyze troop lists and coverage requirements.

(2) The study considers seven alternatives to providing support to corps combat support organizations without assigned chaplains. The current method, Unit Assignment, with Area Coverage, degrades chaplain support to the unit of assignment. The preferred alternative, Unit Assignment with Back-up Team Support, provides flexibility and coverage to units without chaplains (pp. 14-22).

f. Chaplain Support to the Army Division, US Army Chaplain Center and School, 20 June 1980.

(1) This study analyses assignments and operations of chaplains and chaplain assistants in the Army Division 86.

(2) The study considers the impact of Forward Thrust doctrine on the division, which includes assignment of chaplains and assistants to battalions. In order to address area and denominational coverage problems, two chaplains and two chapel activities specialists were recommended at maneuver brigade level. The study suggests the "ministry of presence" mission is best encapsulated in Forward Thrust Doctrine (see A-24; Appendices C & D).

APPENDIX G

Analysis of Questionnaires

1. Purpose. The purpose of this appendix is to analyze data gained from questionnaires sent to chaplains and chaplain assistants (CA) who serve/served in key positions in nondivisional units.

2. Background.

a. Four surveys were developed which contained questions derived from analyses of the Notional Corps Laydown, literary search, and preliminary research. They were: the Corps Staff Chaplain, the Corps Support Command (COSCOM) Staff Chaplain, Major Subordinate Command (MSC) staff Chaplain (these are nondivisional brigades other than separate brigades), and the Corps SGM/COSCOM NCOIC positions.

b. These survey populations were chosen because they represent primary leadership positions among corps units.

c. The surveys were approved by the U.S. Army Personnel Integration Command (USAPIC) on 25 October 1990. The survey administration dates were 1 November - 15 December 1990.

d. All survey populations were small since the target positions were generally the highest ranking or most responsible in the corps. Surveys were sent to Active Duty (AD), Reserve (USAR), National Guard (ARNG), and Retirees (Ret.) who serve/served in the positions.

(1) Surveys were mailed to AD personnel in Europe, Continental U.S. (CONUS), Korea, and Saudi Arabia.

(2) Seventy-five questionnaires were mailed, 51 were received (68%) (see Table 10 for distribution/results).

3. Analysis of the Questionnaires.

a. Method of Analysis.

- 1) Evaluation of each questionnaire.
- 2) Comparison of key questions.
- 3) Conclusions on major themes or operational principles.

Table 10
Percentages of Returned Surveys

Positions	Sent	Received	Percentage
Corps	14	13	92.9
COSCOM	8	7	87.5
MSC	34	18	52.9
SGM/NCOIC	22	13	59.1

b. Keys to the Analysis:

1) The first six or seven questions on all surveys provide administrative data.

2) Questions 8-21 are identical on the corps, COSCOM and MSC staff chaplain questionnaires. These questions are considered together in the data summary of the Corps Staff Chaplain survey. In addition, several other similar questions are considered in the remainder of the summary (Tab A).

3) Questions 22-36 address the same issues on the Corps and COSCOM staff chaplain surveys. These questions are considered together in the data summary of the Corps Staff Chaplain survey (Tab A).

4) Each survey contains a final section of write-in answers which are summarized in the last section of each survey.

5) Data is summarized as follows: Tab A - Corps; Tab B - COSCOM; Tab C - MSC; Tab D - SGM/NCOIC.

6) All questions are shortened in the data summaries. Complete questionnaires as they were mailed to the respondents may be seen at Appendix C of the administrative appendices.

TAB A

**Corps Staff Chaplain Survey
Data Summary**

Section I - Background of Corps Staff Chaplain Respondents (Q. 1-7)

- Total Respondents: 13/14 = 92.9%
- By Category: AD: 11/12 = 91.7%; NG: 0; R: 0; Ret: 2/2 = 100%

*Hereafter, analysis of data will be recorded as a ratio of surveys sent to surveys returned and the percentage.

- Four of the AD Corps staff chaplains currently in the position responded.
- 61.5% were in the job for more than 24 months
- It had been 1-4 years since most (66.6%) had served as the corps staff chaplain.
- Only 4 of the 13 respondents had prior experience as a MSC staff chaplain, but only one had such experience extending beyond 12 months.
- All respondents (100%) served in the Vietnam conflict.
- All corps staff chaplain positions are in the Active Component, hence the absence of NG and R respondents.

Section II - Identical questions the Corps, COSCOM, and MSC staff chaplain surveys (Q. 8-21) are compared below.

Q.8: Daily supervisory MT reports will be essential.

a. Responses:	Corps	COSCOM	MSC
Strongly Disagree	0	1	1
Disagree	7	4	7
Neither Response	0	0	5
Agree	5	1	3
Strongly Agree	1	1	2

b. Analysis: The corps and MSC chaplains show divided viewpoints, whereas the COSCOM respondents are generally negative. By a small margin, respondents feel that daily reports will not be essential.

Q.9: Minimal control and supervision of MTs will be necessary in combat.

a. Responses:	Corps	COSCOM	MSC
Strongly Disagree	0	0	1
Disagree	2	2	3
Neither Response	0	1	4
Agree	10	2	6
Strongly Agree	1	2	4

b. Analysis: General agreement that minimal control and supervision will be necessary. Only 8/38 = 21.1% disagreed.

Q.10: Sustained Combat Operations will increase religious support difficulty.

a. Responses:	Corps	COSCOM	MSC
Strongly Disagree	0	0	1
Disagree	2	0	5
Neither Response	0	1	2
Agree	9	4	9
Strongly Agree	2	2	1

b. Analysis: Agreement/Strong agreement with the question (27/38 = 71.1% agree). Only 8 disagree.

Q. 11: There will be a more extensive GRS mission for nondivisional than divisional units in combat.

a. Responses:	Corps	COSCOM	MSC
Strongly Disagree	0	0	1
Disagree	1	0	1
Neither Response	1	0	1
Agree	8	2	11
Strongly Agree	3	5	4

b. Analysis: Overwhelming agreement that in combat, area coverage of nondivisional units will be more extensive (33/38 = 86.8%).

Q. 12: Staff Chaplain's mission will conflict with the Civil Affairs mission on indigenous religions.

a. Responses:	Corps	COSCOM	MSC
Strongly Disagree	0	2	4
Disagree	10	4	7
Neither Response	0	0	5
Agree	3	1	1
Strongly Agree	0	0	1

b. Analysis: Strong evidence (27/38 = 71.1%) that chaplains do no see their mission in conflict with the Civil Affairs mission.

Q. 13: Greater control over religious support mission will be needed during combat than in peacetime.

a. Responses:	Corps	COSCOM	MSE
Strongly Disagree	0	0	0
Disagree	5	3	10
Neither Response	0	1	2
Agree	5	2	6
Strongly Agree	3	1	0

b. All groups are divided on this question. No respondents strongly disagree, but four strongly agree (three of whom are at Corps level). There is stronger disagreement among MSC chaplains than others. Overall the chaplains agree that greater control will be needed. See also Q. 9 above.

Q. 14: It will be important to assign a Catholic chaplain to my unit.

a. Responses:	Corps	COSCOM	MSE
Strongly Disagree	0	0	4
Disagree	8	1	6
Neither Response	3	4	5
Agree	1	1	2
Strongly Agree	1	1	1

b. Analysis: Most chaplains are in agreement/strong agreement that a Catholic chaplain should be assigned to their units (29/38 = 76.3%).

Q. 15: It will be important to assign an Orthodox chaplain to my unit.

a. Responses:	Corps	COSCOM	MSE
Strongly Disagree	0	0	4
Disagree	8	1	6
Neither Response	3	4	5
Agree	1	1	2
Strongly Agree	1	1	1

b. Analysis: Most chaplains were neutral ($12/38 = 31.6\%$) or disagreed ($15/38 = 39.5\%$) with this proposal. 18.4% were positive.

Q. 16: It will be important to assign a Jewish Chaplain to my unit.

a. Responses:	Corps	COSCOM	MSE
Strongly Disagree	0	0	3
Disagree	4	1	4
Neither Response	3	1	8
Agree	5	4	2
Strongly Agree	1	1	1

b. Analysis: Much stronger agreement at COSCOM and corps levels; MSC chaplains disagreed more than others. Indicates a belief that Jewish chaplains should be assigned at higher HQs.

Q. 17: Forward Thrust adequately describes the religious support mission to nondivisional units.

a. Responses:	Corps	COSCOM	MSE
Strongly Disagree	0	2	1
Disagree	6	4	4
Neither Response	1	0	3
Agree	6	1	8
Strongly Agree	0	0	2

b. Analysis: 17 disagree/strongly disagree (44.7%), 15 agree, 4 neutral (10.5%). Reflects ambivalence concerning the application of Forward Thrust to nondivisional units.

Q. 18: Frequent changes of unit configurations in corps rear reduces the habitual support relationship which reduces religious support effectiveness.

a. Responses:	Corps	COSCOM	MSE
Strongly Disagree	0	1	1
Disagree	2	3	7
Neither Response	1	0	3
Agree	10	3	6
Strongly Agree	0	0	1

b. Analysis: 19 agree (50%); 12 disagree (32.6%); 4 neutral (10.5%). Shows general agreement on the positive significance of "habitual support," though not as strong as might have been expected since habitual support is an important aspect of Forward Thrust doctrine.

Q. 19: My MTs traveling into divisional areas will coordinate with senior chaplains.

a. Responses:	Corps	COSCOM	MSE
Strongly Disagree	0	0	0
Disagree	1	0	2
Neither Response	0	0	0
Agree	7	3	9
Strongly Agree	5	4	7

b. Analysis: Overwhelming, strong support for this view (92.1%). Only three disagree.

Q.20: A primary reason I will control GRS will be to prevent duplication of effort.

a. Responses:	Corps	COSCOM	MSE
Strongly Disagree	1	1	0
Disagree	2	0	2
Neither Response	1	0	1
Agree	7	3	8
Strongly Agree	2	3	7

b. Analysis: 28 agree/strongly agree, 5 disagree, 2 neutral. Shows overwhelming support for the control of GRS. 31.6% checked strongly agree. See also Qs. 9 and 11.

Q. 21: I will coordinate advice to the commander on indigenous religions through the Civil Affairs Officer (CAO).

a. Responses:	Corps	COSCOM	MSE
Strongly Disagree	0	2	2
Disagree	4	2	2
Neither Response	3	1	3
Agree	5	1	10
Strongly Agree	1	1	1

b. Analysis: 19 agree/strongly agree (50%), 12 disagree/strongly disagree (31.6%), 7 neutral (18.4%). Generally respondents believe they should coordinate this mission through the CAO. However, when the neutral and disagree responses are added, the response shows some ambivalence.

Section II - Questions about the same issues on both the Corps and COSCOM staff chaplain surveys. (Qs. 22 - 26)

Q. 22: Establishing liaison with host nation religious leaders will be of great importance.

a. Responses:	Corps	COSCOM
Strongly Disagree	0	0
Disagree	0	0
Neither Response	5	3
Agree	5	4
Strongly Agree	3	0

b. Analysis: Strong agreement at Corps level; less at COSCOM level. Though there was no disagreement, 40% responded neutrally. This mission will likely be felt more at the higher levels of supervision.

Q. 23: My primary focus will be to monitor the battlefield and supervise divisional staff MTs. *An inadvertent repetition of "division staff MTs" in the COSCOM survey disqualifies this question for that survey. Supervising divisional MTs is clearly not their responsibility.

a. Responses:	Corps
Strongly Disagree	0
Disagree	3
Neither Response	2
Agree	6
Strongly Agree	2

b. Analysis: 8 agree, 3 disagree, 2 neutral. The strong focus of the corps chaplains was on divisional MT supervision and the course of the battle. See also Q. 25.

Q. 24: I expect to use Chaplaincy Support Teams extensively in corps rear.

a. Responses:	Corps	COSCOM
Strongly Disagree	1	0
Disagree	1	1
Neither Response	1	0
Agree	7	4
Strongly Agree	3	2

b. Analysis: 16 agree, 3 disagree, 1 neutral. Strong agreement. 25% strongly agree. Results confirm the utility of CSTs in corps rear.

Q. 25: Frequent attachments/detachments of units in Corps Rear will require close monitoring for religious support.

a. Responses:	Corps	COSCOM
Strongly Disagree	0	0
Disagree	0	1
Neither Response	0	0
Agree	8	4
Strongly Agree	5	2

b. Analysis: Only one dissenting voice. Supports the conclusion that rapidly changing task forces require exceptionally close monitoring to provide adequate religious support.

Q. 26: The Corps Chaplain will delegate planning of Corps Rear area coverage to the COSCOM staff chaplain.

a. Responses:	Corps	COSCOM
Strongly Disagree	0	0
Disagree	0	0
Neither Response	0	2
Agree	10	2
Strongly Agree	3	3

b. Analysis: No dissenting voice. Both the corps and COSCOM chaplains consider area coverage planning in Corps Rear a COSCOM chaplain responsibility. 6/20 = 30% strongly agree. See also Q. 27.

Section IV - Some of these questions are unique to the Corps staff chaplain survey and others are common to all (Q. 27-42). The response scale below was used for these questions.

A	B	C	D	E
Strongly	Disagree	Neither	Agree	Strongly
Disagree		Disagree nor Agree		Agree

Q. 27: The COSCOM staff chaplain will coordinate with Graves Registration personnel.

a. Responses: A = 0; B = 1; C = 1; D = 8; E = 3.

b. Analysis: Strong confirmation that corps rear responsibilities are delegated to the COSCOM chaplain.

Q. 28: Assignment priority of MT personnel will always be combat first, CS second and CSS third.

a. Responses: A = 0; B = 2; C = 2; D = 6; E = 3.

b. Analysis: Strong support for this assignment policy (69.2%).

Q. 29: I will have capability to "weight" MTs for religious support on the battlefield.

a. Responses: A = 2; B = 3; C = 0; D = 8; E = 0.

b. This question measures how free the corps staff chaplain feels to effect changes in religious support in combat. 5/13 = 38.5% disagree. 8/13 = 61.5% agree. The majority feel they will be able to respond to battlefield emergencies or anticipated needs. See also Q. 9 in this regard.

Q. 30: It will be important to have an assistant corps MT located at corps main command post.

a. Responses. A = 0, B = 4; C = 0; D = 4; E = 5.

b. Strong support to have an assistant corps chaplain located at the corps main command post. (9/13 = 69.2%). 4/13 = 30.8% disagree.

Q. 31: I will have only minimal control over religious support throughout the corps.

a. Responses: A = 0; B = 5; C = 1; D = 7; E = 0.

b. Analysis: There appears to be considerable response both negative and positive on the extent to which control over religious support should or could be exercised in the Corps by the corps staff chaplain. These responses perhaps reflect the systemic difficulties. See also Q. 9.

Q. 32: I expect the corps SGM to visit units with me to model the MT concept.

a. Responses: A = 0; B = 1; C = 4; D = 6; E = 2.

b. Analysis: 8 agree; 1 disagree; 4 neutral. Strong support for this expectation (61.5%).

Q. 33: The corps chaplain assistant SGM handles all 71M issues including assignment recommendations.

a. Responses: A = 0; B = 0; C = 1; D = 9; E = 3.

b. Analysis: Extremely strong support for allowing the corps chaplain assistant SGM to handle all chaplain assistant issues. Only one undecided.

Q. 34: Liaison with senior chaplains of other services will be one of my major functions.

a. Responses: A = 0; B = 0; C = 0; D = 8; E = 5.

b. Analysis: 100% agreement that liaison with senior chaplains of other military services will be of major importance.

Q. 35: Supervising MSC supervisory MTs will be one of my major missions.

a. Responses: A = 0; B = 1; C = 0; D = 9; E = 3.

b. Analysis: Extremely strong agreement (12/13 = 92.3%) that supervision of MSC chaplains is a major corps staff chaplain function.

Q. 36: The commander will provide significant input for the RSP.
(COSCOM = Q. 33; MSC = Q. 27).

a. Responses	Corps	COSCOM	MSC
Strongly Disagree	0	0	1
Disagree	8	3	8
Neither Response	1	2	1
Agree	4	0	6
Strongly Agree	0	2	2

b. Analysis: 52.6% of respondents disagree/strongly disagree; 36.8% agree/strongly agree; 10.5% neutral. The majority of chaplains feel that their commanders will not provide significant input into the development of the RSP. However, there is significant agreement to its importance and 4 respondents considered it extremely important. Response indicates that generally commanders leave the development of the RSP to their chaplains. MSC responses are also almost equally divided.

Q. 37: The coordinating staff will support the implementation of the RSP. (COSCOM = Q. 34; MSC = Q. 28).

a. Responses	Corps	COSCOM	MSC
Strongly Disagree	0	0	1
Disagree	1	0	1
Neither Response	5	2	3
Agree	7	20	9
Strongly Agree	0	3	4

b. Analysis: Only 3 of 38 respondents (7.9%) felt the coordinating staff would not support the implementation of the RSP. Eighteen (50%) agree and 7 (18.4%) strongly agree with the proposition. A strong neutral response (26.3%) indicates considerable uncertainty, however.

Q. 38: I will include input from all subordinate supervisory MTs into the corps RSP.

a. Responses: A = 0; B = 0; C = 0; D = 10; E = 3.

b. Analysis: 100% agreement. This response shows the felt need to have a vertical flow of information for RSP development at corps level.

Q. 39: It will be essential for me to coordinate and negotiate frequently with commanders of subordinate units over religious support issues. (COSCOM = Q. 35; MSC = Q. 29)

a. Responses	Corps	COSCOM	MSC
Strongly Disagree	0	0	0
Disagree	2	0	3
Neither Response	2	0	2
Agree	6	4	9
Strongly Agree	0	3	4

b. Analysis: Only 5 respondents (13.2%) felt that frequent negotiation would be unnecessary; 4 felt neutral; 29 (76.3%) agree/strongly agree that this will be an important element of their mission. It is important to note that 10 (26.3%) of these strongly agreed. Response shows the necessity of strong inter-face of supervisory staff chaplains with subordinate commanders.

Q. 40: I will frequently coordinate requirements with the TAACOM staff chaplain.

a. Responses: A = 0; B = 1; C = 0; D = 9; E = 3.

b. Analysis: Extremely strong evidence that the Corps staff chaplain will need to coordinate closely with the TAACOM staff chaplain (12/13 = 92.3%)

Q. 41: It is vital for me to have thoroughly reviewed my unit's contingency plans in preparation for war (COSCOM = Q. 36; MSC = Q. 30).

a. Responses	Corps	COSCOM	MSC
Strongly Disagree	0	0	0
Disagree	0	0	0
Neither Response	0	1	0
Agree	7	3	9
Strongly Agree	6	3	9

b. Analysis: Extremely strong support indicating that this is a critical preparation and involvement in unit mission.

Q. 42: Dedicated radio equipment would greatly enhance the accomplishment of my mission. (COSCOM = Q. 37; MSC = Q. 31)

a. Responses	Corps	COSCOM	MSC
Strongly Disagree	0	1	1
Disagree	0	0	1
Neither Response	1	4	1
Agree	6	1	8
Strongly Agree	6	1	7

b. Analysis: The corps (92.3%) and MSC (83.3%) chaplains are overwhelmingly in strong agreement that such capability would greatly enhance the accomplishment of mission. However, the COSCOM respondents differ, with only 2 (28.6%) agreeing, 4 (57.1%) neutral and 1 (14.2%) strongly disagreeing. Overall the chaplains agree/strongly agree to the benefit of this equipment (29/38 = 76.3%).

Section IV - Questions about corps staff chaplain functions during combat (Q. 43-57). The response scale below was used for these questions. See Table 11 for results and analysis following.

A	B	C	D	E
Not	Slightly	Moderately	Very	Extremely
Important	Important	Important	Important	Important

Table 11

Summary of Corps Staff Chaplain Functions

Question	Not	Slight	Moderate	Very	Extremely
		I m p o r t a n t			
43-Advise the commander:	0	0	2	7	4
44-Coordinate with staff:	0	1	0	7	5
45-Provide guidance for MTs:	0	1	1	6	5
46-Develop corps RSP:	0	0	2	6	5
47-Manage MT personnel:	0	2	3	3	5
48-Monitor battlefield:	0	0	1	5	7
49-Monitor MTs for GRS:	1	1	0	5	6
50-Plan emergency missions:	0	0	1	8	4
51-Train new MT personnel:	1	0	1	5	6
52-Support humanitarian efforts:	0	2	5	3	3
53-Develop religious support policy:	0	1	0	6	6
54-Coordinate with religious leaders:	0	0	4	7	2
55-Manage CSTs:	1	0	4	5	3
56-Religious support to corps HQ:	0	0	0	5	8
57-Retreats in Corps Rear:	2	3	4	4	0

c. Summary analysis of functions in combat.

(1) All functions listed were important to the corps chaplains. Eight were viewed as especially important: coordinate with staff officers; provide guidance for MTs; develop corps RSP; monitor battlefield; monitor MTs for GRS; plan emergency corps mission; develop religious support policy and religious support to corps HQ.

(2) Three functions had less support though they were

still regarded as important: support humanitarian efforts; manage CSTs; retreats in corps rear.

Section V - Operational questions with best answer selected. (Q. 58-66).

Q. 58: I will usually monitor unit and MT locations through the...(COSCOM = Q. 54; MSC = Q. 43).

a. Responses	Corps	COSCOM	MSC
A (RAOC)	5	6	7
B (CH Reports)	1	0	3
C (COSCOM MT)	4	0	0
D (Unit G-3)	2	0	7
E (Do not monitor)	0	0	1

b. Analysis: These chaplains (18/36 = 50%) use the RAOC most often. All COSCOM chaplains use the RAOC and 4/12 (33.3%) corps chaplains derive the information from the COSCOM MT. This indirectly is reliance on the RAOC since the COSCOM MT uses the RAOC. A larger number of MSC respondents (7/18 = 38.9%) rely upon the Unit S-3.

Q. 59: For area coverage in Corps Rear for nondivisional units I will...

a. Responses: A (delegate to assistant) = 0; B (delegate to COSCOM CH) = 11; C (leave to Bde CH) = 1; D (develop plan myself) = 0. One missing.

b. Analysis: Extremely strong support for delegation to the COSCOM chaplain (11/12 = 91.7%). See analysis to Q. 58.

Q. 60: The percentage of time I will spend in supervision/coordination with divisional supervisory MTs...

a. Responses: A (less than 10%) = 2; B (10-20%) = 5; C (21 - 30%) = 3; D (31 - 40%) = 2; E (more than 40%) = 1.

b. Analysis: The weight of answers (8/13 = 61.5%) reflect from 10-30% of time expected to supervise divisional supervisory MTs.

Q. 61: The percentage of time I will spend in supervision/coordination with support MTs in Corps Rear...

a. Responses: A (less than 10%) = 3; B (10-20%) = 4; C (21-30%) = 4; D (31-40%) = 1; E (more than 40%) = 1.

b. Analysis: Results are similar to those of Q. 60. Indicates strong interest in supervision of Corps Rear MTs.

Q. 62: With CSTs available, I would use them...

a. Responses: A (special missions) = 1; B (replacement pool) = 1; C (attach to units without MTs) = 0; D (attach to CSG) = 1; E (all the above) = 9; one missing.

b. Analysis: 75% of corps chaplains see using CSTs in all the above missions.

Q. 63: The frequency of the COSCOM HQ being located near the Corps HQ which facilitates COSCOM CH visits to the rear command post?

a. Responses: A (almost all the time) = 3; B (most of time) = 6; C (half the time) = 1; D (sometimes) = 2; E (never) = 0; one missing.

b. Analysis: 9/12 = 75% responded that this happens with high frequency; others (3) indicate less frequency. Evidence may indicate that at times the COSCOM MT may have some difficulty in getting to the Corp Rear Command Post to receive accurate daily locations of MSC units. But overall the COSCOM chaplain would have access to the command post.

Q. 64: How should MTs assigned to medical units attached to the COSCOM be used?

a. Responses: A (not for area coverage) = 6; B (for area coverage too) = 1; C (for emergency coverage) = 1; D (denominational coverage) = 1; E (all the above except A) = 3; one missing.

b. Analysis: 50% of the corps chaplains felt medical MTs should not be used for area coverage; the remaining number felt that they may be used in other capacities, as indicated.

Q. 65: My primary means of commo with MTs will be... (COSCOM = Q. 60; MSC = Q. 46)

a. Responses	Corps	COSCOM	MSC
A (telephone)	4	4	6
B (radio)	0	2	5
C (courier)	1	0	0
D (electronic message)	3	0	5
E (other)	0	0	0

b. Analysis: Most chaplains use the telephone (14/30 = 46.7%); 7 (23.3%) use the radio; and 8 (26.7%) use electronic message as the primary means of communication. These results are predictable since radio equipment is not assigned to the MT section and MTs generally have little experience in its use. It is interesting that 5 corps chaplains (38.5%) did not respond on this question. It may be that the greater number of radio and electronic messages used by MSC chaplains may be due to greater movement over the battlefield by these chaplains.

Q. 66: The primary MT responsible to plan for and dispense religious support supplies will be ...

a. Responses: A (COSCOM) = 9; B (TAACOM) = 3; C (corps) = 0.

b. Analysis: The chaplains favored the COSCOM MT handling this mission by 3 to 1.

Section VI - Corps write-in questions (Q. 67-69). Answers are summarized and the number of times they were repeated is indicated in the tables below.

Q. 67: What will be the greatest leadership challenge of the corps staff chaplain?

Table 12

Greatest Leadership Challenge - Corps

Challenge	Number of times mentioned
Area Coverage Plan	4
Training MTs	2
Networking Personnel	2
Motivate, encourage, comfort MTs on battlefield	2
Religious Support Coverage when MT casualties occur	1
Implementation of RSP	1
Cdr resistance to sharing chaplain assets	1

Q. 68: What will be the most difficult areas of your mission?

Table 13

Most Difficult Areas of Mission - Corps

Area	Number of times mentioned
Communication with MTs	7
Denominational Coverage	4
Monitoring the battlefield	3
Taking care of MTs	3
Personnel assignments/replacements	2
Area Coverage	2
Support in mass casualties	1

Q. 69: What should be included in FM 16-1 for the corps staff chaplain mission?

Table 14

FM 16-1 Inclusions

Inclusion	Number of times mentioned
Information Flow	2
FM satisfactory	2
A conceptual model tying doctrinal principles together	1
Responsibilities delegated to chaplain staff	1
Monitoring the battle	1
Delineation of chaplain roles	1
Supervisory and major command relationships	1
Location of staff chaplain in combat	1
NAF procedures	1
Comprehensive corps RSP	1
Combat responsibilities	1
FM unavailable	1

TAB B

COSCOM Staff Chaplain Survey
Data Summary

Section I. Background of COSCOM Staff Chaplain Respondents (Q. 1-7)

- Total Respondents: $7/8 = 87.5\%$
- By category: AD: $5/7 = 71.4\%$; NG: 0; R: $1/7 = 14.3\%$;
Ret.: $1/7 = 14.3\%$.
- 57% had experience in the job for over 2 years.
- Four chaplains of five AD COSCOM positions responded to the questionnaire; two of the remaining respondents had served in the position within the past two years.
- 5 of the 7 chaplains had Vietnam experience.
- None of the respondents had experience in brigades listed on the questionnaire other than the COSCOM.

Section II. Questions unique to the COSCOM Staff Chaplain Survey (Q. 27 - 37);

a. Questions 8-26 are common with the corps staff questionnaire and are considered in its analysis (see TAB A). Seven other such questions in this section are analyzed in the same TAB A as noted.

b. The response scale below was used for these questions.

A	B	C	D	E
Strongly	Disagree	Neither	Agree	Strongly
Disagree		Disagree nor Agree		Agree

Q. 27: Dedicated transportation will be essential for me to supervise subordinate supervisory UMTs.

a. Responses: A = 0; B = 0; C = 1; D = 1; E = 5.

b. Analyses: Very strong support for this position ($6/7 = 85.7\%$); five of seven (71.4%) strongly agree.

Q. 28: Assigning Corps Support Group UMTs to the Group HQ to provide GRS would provide more effective religious support for the Group.

a. Responses: A = 1; B = 4; C = 1; D = 1; E = 0.

b. Analysis: This question tests for the validity of assigning UMTs to battalion level in nondivisional units. Five (71.4%) believe UMTs would provide more effective support assigned to battalion. Only one (14.3%) disagreed.

Q. 29: I expect to coordinate with Graves Registration personnel and provide coverage for mass burials.

a. Responses: A = 0; B = 0; C = 0; D = 4; E = 3.

b. Analysis: Decided agreement that this is a COSCOM staff chaplain mission (100% positive).

Q. 30: The CSG staff UMT may be a primary POC for coordinating GRS for all nondivisional units in the group area.

a. Responses: A = 0; B = 0; C = 0; D = 3; E = 4.

b. Analysis: This question is important for the perceptions of these chaplains that the CSG staff UMT is a logical UMT to coordinate GRS in the Rear. Decided agreement (100%).

Q. 31: I will integrate the RSPs of subordinate units into an overall COSCOM RSP.

a. Responses: A = 0; B = 0; C = 0; D = 4; E = 3.

b. Analysis: This question is important for the understanding of RSP development - upward as well as downward flow of information. Strong agreement (100%).

Q. 32: TAACOM UMTs traveling into Corps Rear areas will cover their units and coordinate coverage plans with the senior chaplain in the area.

a. Responses: A = 1; B = 0; C = 1; D = 3; E = 2.

b. Analysis: This question relates to Q. 19 in the Corps chaplain survey (see TAB A); Q. 19 relates to divisional areas, whereas Q. 32 relates to the rear boundary of the corps. The principle applies to both. All 3 of the chaplain surveys show extremely strong support for this view (33/35 = 94.3%).

Q. 33-37: See TAB A under Q. 36-42.

Section III - Questions about COSCOM staff chaplain functions during combat (Q. 38-53). Respondents were asked to rate how important various functions would be for them in combat. See

Table 15 for results and analysis following.

Table 15

Function	Summary of COSCOM Staff Chaplain Functions				
	Not	Slight	Moderate	Very	Extremely
	I m p o r t a n t				
Q 38 Advise the commander:	0	0	2	2	3
Q 39 Coordinate with staff officers:	0	0	0	3	4
Q 40 Provide guidance for UMTs:	0	0	1	2	4
Q 41 Develop COSCOM RSP:	0	1	0	2	4
Q 42 Manage UMT personnel:	0	0	4	2	1
Q 43 Monitor battlefield:	0	0	1	4	2
Q 44 Monitor UMTs for GRS:	0	0	0	5	2
Q 45 Plan emergency missions:	0	1	0	4	2
Q 46 Train new UMT personnel:	1	2	0	3	1
Q 47 Support humanitarian efforts:	0	3	1	2	1
Q 48 Develop religious support policy:	0	2	1	2	2
Q 49 Coordinate with religious leaders:	0	1	4	1	1
Q 50 Manage CSTs:	0	0	3	2	2
Q 51 Religious support to COSCOM HQ:	0	0	0	4	3
Q 52 Retreats in Corps Rear:	3	1	2	1	0
Q 53 Materiel resources for UMTs:	0	0	1	3	3

c. Summary Analysis of Functions in Combat.

(1) All functions except one, conducting retreats in Corps Rear (Q. 52), were considered important to the religious support mission. Several showed some ambiguity: supporting civil-humanitarian efforts (Q. 47); developing religious support policy (Q. 48); training new personnel entering the theater (Q. 46).

(2) Six functions were rated extremely important by 3 or 4 respondents: advise the commander (Q. 38); coordinate with staff officers (Q. 39); provide guidance for UMTs (Q. 40); develop COSCOM RSP (Q. 41); religious support to COSCOM HQ (Q. 51); materiel resources for UMTs (Q. 53). In each case 2-4 chaplains checked the second selection (very important) indicating these are paramount among the others.

Q. 54: See TAB A under Q. 58.

Section IV - Operational questions with the best answer selected (Q. 54-61).

Q. 55: How often will you communicate with other MSC staff chaplains?

a. Responses: A (several times a day) = 0; B (once a day) = 2; C (every other day) = 4; D (weekly) = 1; E (only in emergency) = 0.

b. Analysis: Responses indicate a ready and frequent communication between MSC staff chaplains (85.7% state communication at least every other day).

Q. 56: How important are COSCOM FMs in developing the COSCOM RSP?

a. Responses: A (extremely important) = 1; B (very important) = 3; C (moderately important) = 1; D (slightly important) = 1; E (not important) = 1.

b. Analysis: Generally respondents perceive acquaintance with unit field manuals/SOPs as important. Two respondents (28.6%) saw minimal importance.

Q. 57: The percentage of time I will spend in supervision of supervisory UMTs.

a. Responses: A (less than 10%) = 0; B (10-20%) = 0; C (21-30%) = 2; D (31-40%) = 2; E (more than 40%) = 3.

b. Analysis: These chaplains see supervisory UMTs as a major portion of their efforts. Five (71.4%) consider over 30% of their time will be devoted to this purpose.

Q. 58: Frequency of the COSCOM HQ located near the Corps HQ which facilitates COSCOM chaplain visits to the Rear Command Post?

a. Responses: A (almost all the time) = 1; B (most of time) = 4; C (half the time) = 0; D (sometimes) = 1; E (never) = 0; one missing.

b. Analysis: The purpose of this question was to determine the accessibility of the COSCOM UMT to unit location information. Four of six chaplains (66.7%) checked B; one checked A. If the mission to plan and coordinate GRS for the Corps Rear were delegated to the COSCOM UMT, the accessibility to the Corps Rear Command Post would be essential.

Q. 59: How should UMTs assigned to medical units attached to the COSCOM be used:

a. Responses: A (not for area coverage) = 1; B (for area coverage too) = 0; C (for emergency coverage) = 2; D (denominational coverage) = 4; E (all the above except a) = 0.

b. Analysis: Other than serving their own hospital/unit, most respondents felt these UMTs may be used for denominational coverage ($4/7 = 57.1\%$). No responses were checked for area coverage which is a larger responsibility than emergency or denominational coverage.

Q. 60: See TAB A under Q. 65.

Q. 61: The primary UMT responsible for planning religious supplies?

a. Responses: A (COSCOM) = 5; B (TAACOM) = 1; C (Corps) = 0; one missing.

b. Analysis: Most of the COSCOM chaplains ($5/6 = 83.3\%$) see planning for corps UMT resources as their responsibility.

Section IV - COSCOM write-in questions (Q. 62-64). Answers are summarized and the number of times they are repeated is indicated in the tables below.

Q. 62: What will be the greatest leadership challenge for my position?

Table 16

Greatest Leadership Challenge - COSCOM

Challenge	Number of times mentioned
Coordinating area coverage	4
Staff integration	2
Rapid task forcing and commander's reluctance to share their UMTs	1
Communication with UMTs	1
Transportation	1
Supplies	1
Replacements	1
Contingency needs	1
Flexibility	1

Q. 63: What will be the most difficult areas of your mission?

Table 17

Most Difficult Areas of Mission - COSCOM

Area	Number of times mentioned
Assuring UMT replacements	3
Developing relationships in a constantly changing Task Force	1
Area coverage	1
Battlefield emergencies	1
Ministering to battle fatigued UMT	1
Training replacements	1
Staff ministry	1
Monitoring the battlefield	1
Communication	1

Q. 64: What should be included in FM 16-1 for your position?

Table 18

FM 16-1 Inclusions

Inclusion	Number of times mentioned
Fuller description of technical control and coordination	2
Area coverage	1
Integrate chaplain doctrine with rest of the Army	1
Leadership	1
Lack of supply system for religious supplies	1
Coordination with supervisory chaplains	1
Communication network	1
Larger vision of contingency plans	1
SOP for area coverage	1
How to deal with task forcing in support group areas	1

TAB C

MSC Staff Chaplain Survey
Data Summary

Section I - Background of MSC Staff Chaplain Respondents (Q. 1-6).

Most surveys were mailed to AD corps staff chaplains to distribute the surveys to their MSC chaplains. It is possible that some did not receive them or there was an unclear emphasis placed on returning them. Again some may have been occupied with Desert Shield deployments and considered it low priority. In any case, the MSC return percentage is weak compared to the other surveys.

- Total Respondents: $18/34 = 52.9\%$.

- Most respondents had served either as a signal (5) or an aviation (4) staff chaplain (50% of total respondents).

Five chaplains did not respond to Q. 1: (1) one wrote "MI Bde" on the survey which qualifies as an MSC respondent (2) other respondents indicated they had been in the position for up to 18 months with the exception of 2 who did not answer. One respondent did not answer the first 6 questions.

- All are serving presently (except two) and have served for either up to 18 months (5) or more than 24 months (4).

- Five served in Vietnam; 2 in Panama; 9 (56.3%) had no combat time. One did not respond.

Section II - Questions unique to the MSC staff chaplain survey (Q. 7; 22-31).

a. Questions 8-21 are in common with other questionnaires and results may be seen in TAB A.

b. The response scale below was used for these questions.

A	B	C	D	E
Slightly	Disagree	Neither	Agree	Strongly
Disagree		Disagree nor Agree		Agree

Q. 7: My attendance at corps staff chaplain meetings will be important for guidance and cohesion.

a. Responses: A = 1; B = 1; C = 1; D = 4; E = 11.

b. Analysis: A very strong response. This shows the responsiveness of MSC chaplains to the technical supervision of the corps chaplain.

Q. 22: I expect other MTs to cover my units without prior coordination when they are located in their unit areas.

a. Responses: A = 5; B = 2; C = 2; D = 8; E = 1.

b. Analysis: Answers to this question reflect differing views on the extent of the responsibility felt for units other than those to which a chaplain is assigned. 7 disagree; 9 agree; 2 neutral.

Q. 23: Identifying MTs in the corps rear to coordinate GRS would greatly assist me in providing for my units.

a. Responses: A = 1; B = 2; C = 1; D = 9; E = 5.

b. Analysis: Strong agreement ($14/18 = 77.8\%$) with this proposition. Seems to indicate a felt need for a more centralized coordination of GRS.

Q. 24: The senior battalion chaplain in the MSC could adequately cover brigade responsibilities too.

a. Responses: A = 5; B = 5; C = 3; D = 3; E = 2.

b. Analysis: $9/15 = 55.69\%$ disagree; 3 neutral; $5/18 = 27.8\%$ agree. This question measures the perceptions of the chaplains as to the importance of the brigade supervisory chaplain positions. There is strong disagreement that a battalion chaplain could cover brigade responsibilities in addition to his/her own. The fact that there were 44.4% who differed or were neutral indicates some confusion in their minds as to this idea.

Q. 25: The corps staff chaplain will provide technical control and coordination for all MSC staff MTs.

a. Responses: A = 0; B = 0, C = 0; D = 14; E = 4.

b. Analysis: strong agreement.

Q. 26: Providing denominational coverage for all my units will be a severe difficulty.

a. Response: A = 0; B = 2; C = 1; D = 3; E = 12.

b. Analysis: Extremely strong agreement that denominational coverage will be a major concern and difficulty in combat.

Q. 27-31: May be seen in TAB A under Q. 36-42.

SECTION III - Questions about MSC staff chaplain functions during combat (Q. 32-42).

a. Respondents were asked to rate how important various functions would be for them in combat. See Table 19 for results with analysis following.

Table 19

Summary of MSC Staff Chaplain Functions

Question/Function	Not	Slight	Moderate	Very	Extremely
	I m p o r t a n t	I m p o r t a n t	I m p o r t a n t	I m p o r t a n t	I m p o r t a n t
Q 32 advise commander:	0	0	3	7	8
Q 33 coordinate with staff:	0	1	6	7	4
Q 34 provide guidance for MTs:	0	0	4	6	8
Q 35 develop MSC RSP:	0	1	1	7	9
Q 36 manage MT personnel:	0	2	4	8	4
Q 37 monitor battlefield:	0	1	1	5	11
Q 38 train MTs:	1	2	6	4	5
Q 39 support humanitarian efforts:	1	5	4	6	2
Q 40 coordinate with religious leaders:	1	4	7	5	1
Q 41 religious support to MSC HQ:	0	0	2	8	8
Q 42 provide retreats:	1	9	6	2	0

c. Summary Analysis of Functions in Combat.

(1) Four functions were rated more than others as important or extremely important: Provide guidance for MTs (Q. 34 - 77.8%); Develop MSC RSP (Q. 35 - 88.9%); Monitor Battlefield (Q. 37 - 88.9%); Religious Support to MSC HQ (Q. 41 - 88.9%).

(2) Four functions showed some ambivalence by the respondents (larger number of those who checked "C"): Coordinate with staff, Q. 33; Train MTs, Q. 38; Coordinate with religious leaders, Q. 40.

(3) Only one issue was generally considered of minimal importance - providing retreats, Q. 42.

Section IV - Operational questions with best answer selected (Q. 43-46).

Q. 43 may be seen in TAB A under Q. 58.

Q. 44: I will communicate with other MSC staff chaplains:

a. Responses: A (several times a day) = 1; B (once a day) = 3; C (every other day) = 3; D (once a week) = 7; E (only in emergency) = 4.

b. Analysis: Most responded D, once a week (38.9%). These answers indicate that MSC staff chaplains do not function in a vacuum and maintain contact with their colleagues.

Q. 45: The percentage of time I will spend in supervision of MSC supervisory MTs:

a. Responses: A (less than 10%) = 2; B (10-20%) = 7; C (21-30%) = 3; D (31-40%) = 2; E (more than 40%) = 4.

b. Analysis: Nine respondents (50%) indicate they expect to supervise MTs less than 20% of their time. The second greatest number (4 = 22.2%) indicate over 40% of their time. MSC responses are more disparate than in the COSCOM responses to the same question (see TAB B, Q. 57).

Q. 46 may be seen in TAB A under Q. 65.

Section V - MSC Write-in Questions (Q. 47-49). Answers are summarized and the number of times they are repeated is indicated in the tables below.

Q. 47: What will be the greatest leadership challenge of the MSC staff chaplain?

Table 20

Greatest Leadership Challenges - MSC

Challenges	Number of times Mentioned
Communication with MTs and commanders	6
"Pastoring" the MTs	3
Monitoring and finding MTs on the battlefield	4
Moving on the battlefield safely	1
Training of MTs	1
Catholic coverage	1
Keeping MTs ministry focused	1

Q. 48: What will be the most difficult areas of your mission?

Table 21
Most Difficult Areas - MSC

Area	Number of times Mentioned
Coordination of GRS	4
Communication	3
Supplies	2
Support to units suffering MT casualties	2
Monitoring ministry needs and movements of subordinate MTs	1
MT shortfall in Bde	1
Providing a comprehensive RSP	1
Being present with MTs	1
Pastoral care to staff and casualties	1
Reconstitution planning	1

Q. 49: What should be included in FM 16-1 for the MSC staff chaplain mission?

Table 22

FM 16-1 Inclusions - MSC

Inclusions	Number of times Mentioned
Area Coverage System	4
FM 16-1 is O.K.	3
RSP using 5 paragraph operations order format with clearly defined mission	2
Define coordination and supervision responsibilities of brigade chaplain	1
Emphasize flexibility in ALB	1
Information system for religious ministrations	1
Personnel fill	1
Management of resupply	1
Manages by exception to doctrine only	1

TAB D

Corps SGM/COSCOM NCOIC Survey
Data Summary

Section I - Background of Respondents (Q. 1-6).

- Total respondents: 13/22 = 59.1%
- By category: AD: 11/13 = 84.6%; NG: = 0; R: = 1/13 = 8.3%
- Seven (53.8%) were responses by the corps SGMs and six (46.2%) were by COSCOM NCOICs.
- Seven had served in the position 12 months or less and six had served for 19 months or more.
- 66.7% were currently serving in other positions.
- Only 4 (30.8%) had combat experience (Vietnam).

Section II - SGM/NCOIC Operational Questions (Q. 7-21). The response scale below was used for these questions.

A	B	C	D	E
Strongly	Disagree	Neither	Agree	Strongly
Disagree		Disagree nor Agree		Agree

Q. 7: The supervisory chaplain will support me.

a. Responses: A = 1; B = 1; C = 0; D = 3; E = 8.

b. Analysis: The overwhelming majority (84.6%) believe their supervisory chaplain would support them.

Q. 8: SGM/NCOIC should visit soldiers with their supervisory chaplain to model the MT.

a. Responses: A = 0; B = 0; C = 0; D = 5; E = 8.

b. Analysis: Very strong support for this issue.

Q. 9: Enlisted personnel management will be a major portion of my job.

a. Responses: A = 0; B = 0; C = 1; D = 7; E = 5.

b. Analysis: Twelve of 13 felt this a very significant function of their position during combat.

Q. 10: Supervising senior chaplain assistants will be my most demanding function.

a. Responses: A = 0; B = 3; C = 3; D = 5; E = 2.

b. Analysis: Responses were almost evenly divided between those neutral or negative and those positive or very positive. This reflects ambivalence in their view on this issue.

Q. 11: Supervising the staff chaplain section assistants will be my responsibility.

a. Responses: A = 0; B = 3; C = 2; D = 4; E = 4.

b. Analysis: One might expect a greater sense of supervisory responsibility felt for the CSM/NCOIC's own section; however, the responses were almost the same as in Q. 10 above. This would appear to reflect some ambivalence as to what extent the senior CA is charged with supervision of these personnel.

Q. 12: Training the MT during combat will be a minor concern.

a. Responses: A = 7; B = 4, C = 0; D = 2; E = 0.

b. Analysis: The great majority (84.6%) saw training as a continuing necessity during combat.

Q. 13: Providing resources will be a critical part of my job.

a. Responses: A = 0; B = 0, C = 2; D = 9; E = 2.

b. Analysis: Strong support for this premise (84.6% checked agree or strongly agree).

Q. 14: I expect to coordinate the chaplain annex to OPLANs.

a. Responses: A = 0; B = 1; C = 1; D = 6; E = 5.

b. Analysis: Strong support (84.6%) for seeing this as a function of these positions.

Q. 15: I will monitor locations in Corps Rear.

a. Responses: A = 0; B = 0, C = 1; D = 8; E = 4.

b. Analysis: Strong agreement that the "monitoring" function will be a part of their job.

Q. 16: My input will be included in the religious support plan (RSP).

a. Responses: A = 0; B = 0, C = 2; D = 5; E = 6.

b. Analysis: Shows strong confidence in the respectability of their opinions or suggestions.

Q. 17: Dedicated radio communications would greatly enhance job accomplishment.

a. Responses: A = 0; B = 0, C = 2; D = 6; E = 7.

b. Analysis: Strong support for this proposition. This is true even in light of little use or experience with radio equipment by most CAs.

Q. 18: Dedicated tactical vehicle will be essential to my job accomplishment.

a. Responses: A = 0; B = 1, C = 0; D = 2; E = 10. One missing.

b. Analysis: Strong agreement was expected. To have even one negative response is puzzling.

Q. 19: MTs need minimal control and supervision since they will function on their own most of the time.

a. A = 0; B = 3, C = 6; D = 3; E = 0.

b. Analysis: Respondents appear confused or neutral on this issue. It is possible that the difficulty is with the "control" issue or it may be the qualifier, "on their own most of the time."

Q. 20: Forward Thrust adequately describes religious support to nondivisional units.

a. Responses: A = 0; B = 3, C = 6; D = 3; E = 0.

b. Analysis: The responses on this question are the same as in Q. 19 and reflect disparate views with over half neutral toward the issue. This may reflect they either do not understand Forward Thrust adequately or may be confused as to what is entailed in providing support to nondivisional units.

Q. 21: It will be vital to review my unit contingency plans.

a. Responses: A = 0; B = 0; C = 0; D = 6; E = 7.

b. Analysis: This reflects a strong sense of the need to know war plans in advance of hostilities (100% were in agreement).

Section III - SGM/NCOIC Functions in Combat (Q. 22-31)

a. Respondents were asked to rate how important various functions would be for them in combat. See Table 23 for results and analysis following.

Table 23
Summary of SGM/NCOIC Functions

Function	Not	Slightly	Moderately	Very	Extremely
	I m p o r t a n t				
Q 22 Work on computers:	2	4	4	3	0
Q 23 Supervise section CAs:	0	3	5	4	1
Q 24 Manage the Chaplain's Office:	3	2	3	3	2
Q 25 Prepare for Special Events:	3	3	4	3	0
Q 26 Revising the RSP:	0	0	3	10	0
Q 27 Monitoring MT Locations:	0	0	0	3	10
Q 28 Evaluate CA effectiveness:	0	1	1	2	9
Q 29 Visit MTs without Chaplain:	1	3	1	6	2
Q 30 NAF on Battlefield:	7	1	1	3	1
Q 31 Coordinate with Corps Staff:	0	0	0	2	10

c. Summary Analysis of Functions in Combat.

(1) Qs. 23-25 showed the largest range of answers which may reflect ambivalence. These are generally "home base"

activities centering in or around staff chaplain office responsibilities (supervising section CAs, managing the chaplain's office, special events).

(2) Qs. 27-29, 31 elicited the strongest positive responses. These responses indicate these NCOs see their mission most importantly centered in combat-related activities (monitoring MT locations, evaluating CA effectiveness, visiting MTs and coordinating with corps staff).

(3) Revising the RSP was viewed as very important by 76.9% of respondents. This again is related to closely following battlefield needs.

(4) Qs. 22, 30 reflect the view that computer work and NAF on the battlefield will be the least important of their functions.

Section IV - SGM/NCOIC Write-In Questions (Q. 32-34). Answers are summarized and the number of times they are repeated is indicated in the table below.

Q. 32: What will be the greatest leadership challenge of your position?

Table 24

Greatest SGM/NCOIC Leadership Challenges

Challenge	Number of times Mentioned
Monitoring morale and ministering to MTs	4
Replacements of MT personnel	4
Communicating with MTs	4
Supervision and coordination with MTs	4
Monitoring Unit Locations and Training	2
Applying commander intent in RSP	1
Area Coverage Plan	1
Keep chaplain alive	1

Q. 33: What will be the most difficult areas of your mission?

Table 25

Most Difficult Areas of Mission - SGM/NCOIC

Areas	Number of times Repeated
MT replacements	4
Communication with MTs	3
Supply of resources	2
Lack of understanding of the CA role by commanders	2
Getting the chaplain to allow me to do my job	1
Monitoring the battlefield	1
Support at battle fatigue centers	1
Implementations of RSP	1
Rear Area coverage	1
Continuous operations	1
Monitoring and ministering to MTs	1
Transportation	1

Q. 34: What should be included in FM 16-1 for your mission?

Table 26

FM 16-1 Inclusions - SGM/NCOIC

Areas	Number of times repeated
MT supervision	4
Functioning in chemical environment	2
Information from AR 600-20 on NCO support channel	1
Team building	1
Dramatic increase of MTs to supervise in combat	1
Leave garrison mentality	1
Survivability	1
Interaction with other staff sections	1
Chemical environment	1
Battle fatigue center ministry	1
Area coverage planning	1
Logistics for MTs	1
Know the FMs applicable to units served	1

APPENDIX H

Emerging Army Doctrines

1. Purpose. This appendix investigates current Army doctrinal initiatives and their impact upon religious support, especially in corps nondivisional units.

2. Background. AirLand Operations, A Concept for the Evolution of AirLand Battle for the Strategic Army of the 1990s and Beyond, (See TRADOC Pam 525-5, 1 August 1991).

a. The AirLand Battle doctrine published in FM 100-5, Operations, 1985 is evolving. The basic principles of initiative, agility, depth, and synchronization remain the basic operational principles, however.

b. Future warfighting concepts will reflect the following characteristics:

- (1) Reduction of the size of the armies around the world;
- (2) Significant resources constraints; reducing the current corps size of 175,000 to approximately 145,000 soldiers;
- (3) Accurate targeting technologies and new weaponry with "smart munitions" producing long range fires to engage the enemy at long distances;
- (4) Communications capability over longer distances; and
- (5) Greatly enhanced intelligence capacity.

3. Central features.

a. Nonlinear Battlefield. Doctrine will emphasize nonlinear maneuver warfare. The nonlinear battlefield will be divided into zones or areas and more than double the size of the linear battlefield previously conceived.

b. Near real-time threat data. Satellite, airborne, ground, robotic, and other sophisticated surveillance means will provide near or real-time accurate targeting data for military decision makers.

c. Weapons of new and emerging technologies use "smart munitions" to produce long range fires with deadly accuracy. These fires "condition" the enemy for maneuver forces engagements.

d. An enlarged battlefield which may be divided into three areas (see Fig. 22):

(1) Detection Zone. An area approximately 400 X 200 km which uses all surveillance means available to identify enemy formations, locations, and movements.

(2) Battle Zone. The area approximately 100 X 200 km in which decisive battles will be fought by maneuver forces.

(3) Dispersal Area. The are approximately 400 X 200 km in which divisional and nondivisional units are located. The corps logistics area is located in the Dispersal Area where most divisional units are dispersed.




Figure 22

NONLINEAR BATTLEFIELD

4. Operational Characteristics.

a. The Corps Commander plans and commands the corps battle. Division commanders fight the battle with brigade units tailored by the corps commander. The brigades quickly mass from the dispersion area to the battle area to finish the destruction of enemy forces.

b. Brigade Based Divisions. The division commander is the tactical commander. Though each brigade retains a FSB and DS FA battalion, the divisional CS and CSS functions have been eliminated or moved to corps or brigade, thus "unhinging" the divi-

sional commander from logistical concerns. This effectively eliminates a division rear support area.

c. Tailoring or Task Organizing the Maneuver Units. The corps commander determines the type and number of brigades needed to destroy the enemy force. Task organizing for flexibility will be a feature of future operations to provide Army forces the capabilities needed across the entire spectrum of conflict.

5. Corps CSS Operational Concepts.

a. To free the maneuver commander of logistics concern in pursuing the battle, Forward Support Battalions (FSBs) and Corps Support Command (COSCOM) units will project support forward as needed, based on mission, time, and distance.

(1) Units providing support to the ACR and corps units employed forward of maneuver units may pass through potentially uncontrolled or unoccupied terrain.

(2) Brigades will be supported directly by FSBs. This has been described as a DS+ relationship. Sustainment will be provided directly from the COSCOM but managed and coordinated through the DISCOM commander.

(3) During recovery operations, force endurance is a predominant concern with the bulk of sustainment support being pushed forward from the rear of the corps sector. Reconstitution capability will be a cornerstone of the corps' ability to sustain operations after the initial battle.

b. The COSCOM is the focal point for logistical sustainment.

(1) The COSCOM will support the corps on a horizontal support basis through assigned Corps Support Groups (CSGs), a medical brigade, and an aviation maintenance group. Each corps will have three-to-five CSGs assigned, based on the number of divisions in the corps and METT-T. One CSG may be designated to perform an operational interface function with the TAACOM and functional units for sustaining the corps as a whole.

(2) The CSGs will contain multifunctional Corps Support Battalions (CSBs). Each CSB will be task organized to meet operational requirements.

6. Overall Principles of Religious Support.

a. Forward Thrust doctrine of assignment of MTs to battalions remains viable for future operations (see Appendix J).

(1) The "habitual support" relationship of the MT with its supported units remains the central focus of Forward Thrust. Doing a good job in a unit has a residual effect in the way units respond to other MT. This close relationship provides favorable command and soldier responses to the MT.

(2) However, wide dispersion of units and continual task organizing mitigate against the significance of the habitual support bonus to ministry. This is particularly true for corps CSS units. However, assigned MTs must make every effort to ensure their soldiers receive religious support.

b. Key conceptual religious support principles must be emphasized: flexibility, resourcefulness, ingenuity, creativity, and responsiveness.

(1) Flexibility. MTs must be aware of and adjust to the constantly changing battlefield situation. Rigid molds and expectations will shatter in the mobile, fluid ministry environment of the nonlinear battlefield. Corps MTs must be prepared to extend ministry to soldiers/units far forward into battle zone.

(2) Resourcefulness. MTs must know how to requisition resupply kits and be prepared to innovate when necessary. MTs must seek various means of communication, transportation, and coordination for GRS.

(3) Ingenuity. MTs must look for new ways and means to accomplish their mission most effectively. They must act wisely and use the system to get what they need. Being proactive will eliminate many problems later.

(4) Creativity. MTs must construct ministry approaches IAW commander guidance which will most effectively address future operations.

(5) Responsiveness. Corps MTs must be responsive to the needs of all soldiers in their area of responsibility. Just as support units are responsive to their customers regardless of where they come from, the GRS mission serves others not assigned to the MT's unit.

c. Combat Knowledge Essential to the MT.

(1) MTs must be intimately familiar with their own unit's mission and war fighting doctrine.

(2) MTs must have a general understanding of battlefield systems including:

(a) Movement management system including route plotting and approval procedures;

(b) Terrain Management. How the Rear Area Operations Center (RAOC) Functions; How to find out where units are located using information provided by RAOC and S3/G3;

(c) What units/teams may be in general support locations because of doctrine or habitual support procedures; and

(d) Survivability methods - how to camouflage and hide; how to protect units by intelligent route planning and security measures.

d. Supervision.

(1) Broad parameters should guide MTs with fewer rules.

(2) Future operations may call for greater independence for battalion MTs and greater trust between supervisors and subordinates.

(a) Greater trust is built through training MTs in procedures and expectations before deployment.

(b) Future operations may call for less expectation of predictable results/responses from MTs of subordinate units.

(3) Supervisors will focus on staff integration, GRS, monitoring the battlefield, and planning for emergency missions.

e. Transportation.

(1) MTs may function independently for extended periods with communication lines disrupted over large expanse of territory.

(2) Security considerations will mandate MT travel in convoys or often by helicopter.

(3) Large areas of uncontrolled or unoccupied terrain increase independent transportation dangers.

7. Implications for Divisional Religious Support (Heavy Division).

a. The enlargement of the maneuver brigade MT's responsibilities.

(1) The strength of the FSB may increase to approximately 1125, requiring close coordination by the FSB chaplain to

cover these highly dispersed forces. (This battalion will qualify for two MTs under the MARC, but it is unlikely that two will be authorized). The FSB area will increase dramatically with the attachments and detachments of nondivisional teams and elements.

(2) The E-Force (Engineer) reduces the combat engineer battalion in half under proposed warfighting concepts. The battalion still qualifies for a MT but force structure planners may seek to delete the MT positions. Some corps engineer units will be located forward of the dispersal area preparing for the decisive stage of the battle.

(3) With the elimination of the division rear, the roles and positions of the DISCOM and DIVARTY MTs are included in discussions of the division base battalion missions.

b. The Division Base Battalion. Currently a division base battalion, which includes the command group, has been proposed. A chaplain 0-3 has been proposed to cover the division base battalion which will include two maintenance companies (GS), a medical company, chemical company, and attachments which total over 1000 soldiers. In addition to these companies, the MP, Signal, and ADA battalions are without assigned MTs.

c. Operationally, the maneuver brigade MTs will move with their units and maintain as comprehensive ministry for their soldiers as possible. Less movement restrictions will be placed on the MTs in the dispersal zone and travel will be both essential and potentially extensive. Isolation of MTs or missing a unit movement may be the consequence of this wide dispersion. Adequate communication capability will be essential.

8. Implications for religious support to corps soldiers in the battle zone or divisional area.

a. Many CS and CSS divisional units and functions, formerly found in Division Rear, have been moved to corps level:

- Aviation logistics
 - medical operations
 - maintenance through the battalion maintenance system
- (BMS)
- supply and services

b. Just as the corps commands and controls the tactical fight, the COSCOM provides logistics for sustainment of forces in nonlinear operations. Through the multifunctional Corps Support Battalions (CSB) the support group anticipates future logistical needs and projects support forward during all battle stages and reinforces FSBs during the maneuver stage.

(1) MTs assigned to the CSB will find elements and detachments constantly on the move. As an operational principle, MTs will provide DRS to their companies and detachments, as appropriate.

(2) The CSG staff MT will monitor and plan religious support and supervise subordinate unit MTs.

(3) The COSCOM staff MT's responsibilities will change little.

c. The surveillance mission of the ACR is central under nonlinear operations. The vast expanse of the battle zone may require additional ACR troops and the supplementation of one or more corps CSBs with their MTs. The ACR staff MT may be able to rely upon these corps unit MTs to assist in GRS for ACR units or elements in their areas.

d. The corps signal, engineer, air defense artillery, military intelligence, and other corps units will be deployed forward and dispersed throughout the corps sector.

(1) MARC requirements may require MTs for these corps battalions, but only brigade chaplains are authorized to furnish support, thereby creating a localized religious support shortfall in a most lethal portion of the battlefield.

(2) Some religious support may be provided by coordination with divisional MTs in the area. However, many of these units will be isolated and detached throughout the area, greatly complicating adequate coverage. Helicopter transportation may be critical for an adequate attempt to cover these important soldiers.

e. To accommodate the high mobility and offensive nature of nonlinear operations, corps support units will employ teams at points to best serve their customers.

(1) Many corps support teams will be projected forward in the battle zone before maneuver forces arrive in order to sustain the tempo of offensive battlefield operations. Many of these teams locate in close proximity since their missions are interrelated or related to the same supported units or elements.

(2) Some of the teams are shown below.

- MASH surgical teams for augmentation to the FSB
- Direct Support Maintenance Battalion (DSMB) team/unit augmentation
- Ammo Forward Support Team at the corps Ammunition Transportation points (CATP)

- Rearm and Refuel Points (RRP)
- Aviation Forward Area Refuel Points (FARP)
- Aviation Forward Support Team (FST)
- Highway Regulating Point Teams
- Ambulance Transfer Points (ATP)
- Supply Transfer Points
- Electronic Maintenance Company/Teams (ELMC)

(3) The COSCOM or CSG MT must monitor the location of these forward bases or points of support so that religious support can be adequately advanced forward at appropriate times.

9. Implications for Religious Support in the Dispersal and Battle Zone Areas.

a. Whereas the dispersal area may be fairly safe from enemy long range fires, movement in the battle zone will be over extended lines of communication (LOC) in potentially unoccupied terrain.

(1) Some freedom of movement may be possible in the dispersal area, but for security, most movement in the battle zone should be in unit convoy or IAW S3/MCC guidance only.

(2) Travel liberty for maneuver units' MTs may be extremely limited during offensive operations. The most likely places of ministry will be at the aid station in the FSB (Bde) or at the Ambulance Transfer points (ATP) in the battalion support area.

(3) MTs are caught in a double bind - the necessity of visiting units over an area double the size of previous battlefields, yet unable to move freely because of security factors.

b. The following are likely requirements for the MT in the dispersal area.

(1) Demands close relationships and coordination with the S-3 and movement control center (MCC) for route planning to unit locations;

(2) May result in periods of mission frustration when MTs must be resigned to periods of isolation or minimal movement;

(3) May result in increased use of helicopter support which may split the MT because of lack of space;

(4) Will require familiarity with mobile subscriber equipment (MSE)/single channel ground and airborne radio system

(SINCGARS) communication procedures and use of the equipment on the battlefield.

(5) Intimate knowledge of MT's own unit mission and how it will operate on the battlefield;

(6) General knowledge of battlefield support systems;

(a) Movement control center and movement management;

(b) Division/Corps Terrain Management System (RAOC, etc.);

(7) General familiarity with unit missions; and

(8) Security Procedures.

10. Medical Force 2000 (MF2K) provides the basis for medical support in future operations. To accommodate the elimination of the division rear, MF2K has been modified as follows:

a. Greater emphasis on combat life saver and buddy aid at the lowest levels at battalion.

b. More advanced health care provided at the medical company organic to the FSB. Tracked ambulances transport evacuation patients to ambulance exchange points where wheeled ambulances receive patients for evacuation to the FSB medical company. This unit may receive augmentation from the corps, especially surgical detachments from the MASH.

c. Under a group HQ, second echelon medical treatment and evacuation (nondivisional) will be performed by units which may have a DS relationship with the division. These units will have an enhanced evacuation capability and be located for the most efficient C2 of medical assets.

d. A corps support medical battalion will provide health care primarily to the corps rear area. This battalion will incorporate the modular support system with four medical companies.

e. The Combat Support Hospitals (CSH) remain the same with two or three per CSG. Two chaplains and two chaplain assistants are assigned to these units.

f. A dental battalion or a combat stress control company (CSC) may be fielded in the new medical system. These units may be detachments to the CSH.

g. The medical MARC should be applied to any new medical battalions thereby requiring MTs.

11. Aviation Logistics - Future (2004).

a. Current Aviation Unit Maintenance (AVUM) and Aviation Intermediate Maintenance (AVIM) functions will be consolidated into a single organization under the Aviation Maintenance Group (AMG). Aviation groups will have dedicated Operational Maintenance Battalions (OMB) to provide maintenance support. Battalions will be modular in design and possess flexibility to project the needed support forward to the divisions.

b. Current MARC requires a MT at group level and in each OMB. A company in the OMB exceeds 200 soldiers which may create large aviation maintenance battalions of over 650 soldiers. The dispersed nature of these units complicates the mission of the unit MT.

12. The Military Police (MP) Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW) Mission.

a. The study of nonlinear conflicts shows that the shock effect caused by the swift application of firepower results in the capitulation of large numbers of enemy soldiers. This was demonstrated in Operation Just Cause and particularly in Desert Shield/Storm. The MP school moved to adjust to this situation in two ways. (See the MP school's study, "Enemy Prisoner of War Capture Rate Study, October 1990).

(1) Changes in Force Structure. Previously, EPW "camp" TOEs accommodated up to 60K EPWs (12K each), creating inflexibility for lesser requirements.

(a) In the place of huge camps, 3 EPW/CI battalion TOEs have been developed to accommodate 1, 2, or 4 thousand EPWs.

(b) In Desert Shield/Storm, 4 "camp" TOEs were activated and 4 EPW/CI battalions for a total of 60K capacity.

(2) With a surge of prisoners and civilian internees it is expected that theater EPW forces would go as far as the division to relieve commanders of their EPWs.

b. MTs are expected to be included in each of these EPW/CI battalion TOEs as standard positions, relieving many unit chaplains from significant involvement with EPW collection areas.

(1) In Operation Just Cause MTs ministered and calmed the EPW/CI populations. There were instances when they intervened for more humane treatment. Generally, chaplains had in-

stant credibility when the religious symbols on the uniform were seen. Many prisoners asked for blessings and prayers.

(2) Experience in Desert Storm was considerably different because of the different religious base of the host country. Units other than MPs rarely dealt with EPWs which were retained in large camps for several days before transferring them to the Saudi government for processing into their camps farther to the west of the combat zone.

c. In the rear areas, corps MTs may expect to become minimally involved with ministry to EPW/CI. This may occur at temporary collection points as preparations are being made for transport farther to the rear. However, MTs must not ignore this opportunity to minister and show the pastoral concern their mission calls for, depending on the situation and the commander's guidance.

13. Contingency Operations: Combined and Joint Operations.

a. Power Projection. The U.S. military's readiness to deploy into a region of the world within hours' notice addresses the volatility of the world's political situation. Combat actions in Just Cause (1989-90) and Desert Shield/Storm (1990-91) are examples of rapid deployments which impact corps operations and religious support.

b. Joint Operations. The Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986 intended to clarify the command line to combatant commanders (the CINCs of Unified commands) and provide a reorganized system of unified and specified commands. Almost all forces under the jurisdiction of the military departments were assigned to unified and specified combatant commands in war time which have designated geographic area responsibilities.

(1) A series of Joint publications have become the basis for incorporating joint doctrine in all U.S. service field manuals. Few, if any, combat operations will be uni-service in the future.

(2) Operation Just Cause was a joint operation which took place in the theater of a Regional CINC (U.S. Southern Command). Normally, the CINC chaplain is responsible to the CINC for religious support planning for all U.S. forces in the theater. The CINC chaplain may be assigned from any of the U.S. services.

(3) The U.S. Army component commander's staff chaplain is responsible to his commander for the religious support for Army forces IAW CINCs guidance and policy. The Army component

chaplain plans and formulates religious support guidance IAW CINC chaplain policies.

c. Combined Operations.

(1) In addition to operating as part of a joint force, the Army must be prepared for combined operations with forces of allied governments. Such operations may be defined by standardization agreements between nations as in NATO, or they may have to be developed "on the ground" as in Desert Shield/Storm.

(a) In combined operations, operational command and control of forces proceed from the political and strategic leadership of the alliance. It is exercised by a supreme allied commander (as in WWII) or a commander-in-chief appointed by the leaders of the alliance (as in Desert Shield/Storm).

(b) National contingents usually retain command of their own forces and retain some administrative and logistical functions of command.

(2) Combined operations are particularly sensitive to personality and political considerations. Coalition leaders must take personal and national characteristics into account in all their actions. Exercising tact and appreciation of national differences, goals, and interests are particularly important.

(3) The religious interest of nations was particularly important in Desert Shield/Storm, resulting in policies formulated by the CINC's chaplain to regard regional sensibilities.

(4) In a less than mature theater or Low-Intensity operations, one chaplain may be dual-hatted; for example, the U.S. Army South (USARSO) chaplain is also the USCINCSOUTH command chaplain, as well as staff chaplain for all Army forces in Panama.

14. The Contingency Corps.

a. Fewer forward deployed forces will characterize the future army. Force designers are preparing designs of a self-contained, active duty contingency corps which could project power to regions throughout the world. The concept calls for a lean, tailorable force to be readily deployable. It is too early at this writing to describe this unit.

b. In low intensity contingency operations, few corps soldiers may be involved. For instance, most corps support units remained at Ft. Bragg, N.C. and formed a CONUS rear area during Operation Just Cause.

APPENDIX I

Religious Support in Reconstitution

1. Introduction. This appendix analyzes religious support requirements during reconstitution.

2. Overview.

a. Reconstitution is a major mission for a division/corps or higher. The high lethality of the nonlinear battlefield will result in severe taxing of resources and numerous casualties which will critically degrade some units' combat effectiveness. Mass casualties due to chemical or nuclear action may be the precipitating factor or there may be a slow degradation through combat over longer periods of time.

b. Reconstitution may be defined as those actions planned and implemented by commanders to restore ineffective units to a desired level of combat effectiveness, commensurate with mission requirements and availability of resources and time (see FM 100-9).

c. Through continuous assessment, the commander determines if and when a unit will be reconstituted. The course of the battle, METT-T, follow-on missions, and operational and tactical objectives weigh heavily in the decision.

d. The commander's decision to reconstitute a unit is based on more than a summary of the number of its personnel and equipment. It is influenced by leadership losses/conditions, recent battle actions, unit and individual training, unit organization, and human factors that build cohesion and esprit-de-corps.

3. The Reconstitution Process. Though reconstitution concepts may be executed separately, sequentially, or in some hybrid variation, they may be described individually. There are two types of reconstitution which may be further described in subtypes.

a. Reorganization: This is the shifting of internal resources within a degraded unit to increase the level of combat effectiveness. It does not involve massive infusion of materiel or personnel and is the most expedient means of maintaining combat power in the early stages of a conflict and in forward units throughout the conflict.

(1) Immediate Reorganization. Immediate actions taken by the unit commander to quickly shift assets available to restore degraded units to minimum levels of combat effectiveness.

(2) Deliberate Reorganization. When greater resources and time are available, more intensive reorganization may take place farther to the rear than immediate reorganization. The intent of this action is to restore degraded units to the specified degree of combat effectiveness.

b. Regeneration: Regeneration involves rebuilding a unit at a relatively secure location through large scale replacement of personnel, equipment, and supplies to restore the unit to a specified level of combat effectiveness. Regeneration is the most difficult option to execute since it requires the greatest amount of effort, coordination, training, and consumption of materiel. Therefore, regeneration will likely be primarily a corps mission.

4. Approval Authority. Regeneration is directed by the commander with control of the required resources. This commander is normally two echelons higher in organization than the unit being regenerated (e.g., a divisional brigade regenerated by the corps). Reorganization is normally approved by the commander of the unit.

5. Unit Assessment in Regeneration. Unit assessment is part of the continuous estimate process by the commander's staff. A corps assessment team consisting of representatives from staff sections and appropriate support units assists the commander in his evaluation. Areas of assessment include: command and control, personnel services, logistics, and training.

a. The assessment team may include a MT to assess those subjective factors which impact unit cohesion and morale. Upon notification of a regeneration mission, the corps staff chaplain may designate a MT as a member of the assessment team.

b. The assessment team chaplain will contact the unit MTs and be able to project the number of additional MTs needed at the reconstitution site to assist the units.

(1) Unit MTs may be expected to be suffering from the same degradation as the units they serve. Some may be injured, fatigued, or killed and will be unable to provide support to their units.

(2) The assessment team chaplain will fairly assess the condition of the MTs and call for assistance where appropriate. Whenever possible, organic MTs should be allowed to minister to their own soldiers.

(3) The assessment team MT may be from the staff of the commander directing the regeneration, or more likely from the command providing CSS for the regeneration process.

6. The Reconstitution Task Force (RTF).

a. The RTF is designated to perform the regeneration. The RTF staff MT coordinates with the corps staff chaplain to determine the number and make up of the religious support team and provides the technical control and coordination for the entire mission (see Figure 23). The MT assigned to the unit conducting the regeneration will likely provide religious support to the task force.




Figure 23

**TECHNICAL CONTROL AND COORDINATION
RTF RELIGIOUS SUPPORT**

b. The RTF commander operates the regeneration site IAW the corps commander's plans and priorities. The CSS elements of the RTF conduct the reconstitution. Training exercises indicate that as many as 700 soldiers may be in the RTF for a brigade-sized regeneration.

c. The corps staff chaplain will likely delegate the reconstitution mission to the COSCOM staff chaplain. The RTF staff MT should be of the grade and capability to interface with the COSCOM staff officers and supervise the RTF MTs.

d. The corps staff chaplain will identify as many MTs as needed, based on his priorities in accordance with the commander's intent. Fragmentary Orders will be cut to the units providing MTs stating mission, time involved, requirements, and reporting date, and location. These MTs may be part of a special response team designated by the corps chaplain to respond to battlefield emergencies. They converge on the designated location and the RTF staff MT assigns them to a particular TAA (see Figure 24). Their mission is temporary and must be planned and coordinated with the commanders of the MTs affected.




Figure 24

CONFIGURATION OF RECONSTITUTION SITE

e. This contingency mission relieves fatigued MTs of duties to their units only until they are able to resume. The bond of organic MTs to their units because of combat experience qualifies them in a unique way to minister to their soldiers. This is particularly true in the conduct of memorial services.

7. Planning For Reconstitution.

a. A reconstitution SOP or appropriate plan developed by the corps staff chaplain must address procedures for reconstitution, especially regeneration. Advanced planning of religious support for this vital ministry is critical for mission effectiveness. Key reconstitution issues to be addressed are:

(1) What MT will be part of the assessment team, if required?

(2) Who will be the RTF supervisory MT and what will its responsibilities be?

(3) How/who will be selected as RTF MTs? How will they be notified? What coordination with commanders of selected RTF MTs must be accomplished?

(4) What will be the requirements, procedures, time projections, and other expectations of RTF MTs?

(5) What training may be expected for RTF MTs?

(6) What will be the special supply needs for the MTs and where may they be obtained?

(7) What types of ministry needs are likely to be found at the RTF site?

(8) What procedures may be identified for transitioning back to organic units or for integrating new MT personnel into the unit?

(9) What will be the priority of MT personnel fill for units reconstituting which have lost MT personnel?

b. Reconstitution and training must be conducted in a very short period of time with a view to the unit's follow-on mission. The corps staff chaplain must quickly evaluate the requirements and time constraints for an adequate response. The reconstitution mission may require commanders release their RTF MT participants for days or weeks.

8. Personnel Replacements.

a. MT personnel replacements are made in accordance with the priorities established by the corps staff chaplain. Reconstitution efforts early in battle will probably be typified by reorganization, with little or no regeneration, until the corps matures with an increased flow of personnel replacements and CSS units.

b. Assurance to commanders of the timely return of participating RTF MTs will facilitate the accomplishment of the RTF religious support mission. Personnel replacements should come from other than the RTF MTs.

c. As the corps matures, the TOE 16500LA and B teams may enter the theater. One of the missions for these Compo 3 units is religious support in reconstitution (see Appendix F).

9. Ministry Phases.

a. Ministry in the RTF site must be flexible and time sensitive. If several days or weeks are involved, the ministry may be phased as follows:

(1) Assessment phase. The first 24 hours will be prime time for showers, hot mess, and sleep for fatigued soldiers. The most a MT may accomplish during this period is being visible and accessible while conducting a religious support needs assessment.

(2) Pastoral care phase. Worship services, memorial services, group and individual counseling, prayer, and pastoral support characterize the primary phase which lasts until the

organic MT is ready to assume duties for its unit or until replacement personnel arrive.

(3) Transition phase. The RTF MT advises the commander and RTF supervisory chaplain of the appropriate time for turning over the religious support duties to the assigned MT. The RTF MT advises of any problems or lingering difficulties and provides an assessment of the condition of the unit.

b. The RTF MTs remain under the supervisory control of the RTF staff MT until the mission is complete and final out briefing has been conducted.

10. Battle Fatigue Ministry.

a. The MT's battle fatigue ministry will be amplified in the reconstitution site. Immediate post traumatic stress reactions may be a dominant psychological dynamic as the press of leadership responsibilities begin to lessen and soldiers are located in relative security.

b. Major theological themes of human spiritual need may be everywhere apparent - guilt, loss of spiritual anchor, rejection of God, a deep need for a transcendent hope, reconciliation, and forgiveness.

c. RTF MTs advise commanders on matters of stress levels, cohesion, and spiritual support of their soldiers. MTs must be proficient in battle fatigue ministry and be prepared for a whole range of human emotions.

d. Chaplain assistants may be particularly helpful to soldiers. Their ministry includes active listening and being alert to soldiers who have deeper problems needing referral. Chaplain assistants may give valuable input into the assessment of soldiers' trust levels, stress, and unit dynamics.

11. Force Reconstitution in Future Warfighting Concepts.

a. Under the emerging concepts, reconstitution will be a critical mission for corps units. After battle, units will be pulled back from the engagement area, given some respite, resupplied with essential materiel, and prepared for the follow-on mission. This is somewhat different from the reconstitution process outlined above.

b. During this short respite, a unit assessment may reveal significant degradation and the commander may call for a more intensive reconstitution mission (see Appendix H).

APPENDIX J

Forward Thrust and Corps Units

1. Purpose. The purpose of this appendix is to explore the Army doctrine of Forward Thrust and its applicability to corps units.

2. Background.

a. The July 1976 advent of FM 100-5, Operations, provided the impetus to reevaluate the positioning of chaplains in divisions. Assigning four chaplains to the Brigade in the divisions proved inadequate for a fast-moving, lethal battlefield envisioned in ALB. Planners felt that by assigning chaplains to maneuver battalions ministry would be more efficient and responsive.

b. During the Division 86 Restructure Study and Test at Fort Hood in June 1977, the Forward Thrust model for religious support was implemented with positive results. It concluded: "The chaplain in T-Series units has a higher visibility; is perceived as being more available; and, in general, is more a part of the organization (p. 2-104, TCATA Test Report FM 382, HQ TRADOC Combined Arms Test Activity, Feb 1978).

3. Implementation of Forward Thrust:

a. In the study, Chaplain Support to the Army Division, 20 June 1980, pp. C-11 through C-14, Forward Thrust benefits were highlighted:

- 1) identification with and habitual support to the unit;
- 2) responsiveness to the unit needs and ready availability; and
- 3) ministry of presence--soldiers identify with their chaplain and their chaplain becomes a part of the organization, sharing unit experiences.

b. The study called for two chaplains and two chaplain assistants at brigade (each chaplain of different faith groups), and one chaplain and chaplain assistant assigned to each maneuver battalion. Though the plan to assign two chaplains at brigade level did not survive, assigning chaplains to battalion level was accepted. The Forward Thrust model was approved by TRADOC on 25 July 1979.

c. The policy of assigning chaplains to battalions is in keeping with historical recommendations.

1) The Army Chaplain in the European Theater (1945), states:

In general the assignment of chaplains to group headquarters was thoroughly unsatisfactory. The major source of dissatisfaction was the impossibility of maintaining any continuity of ministry in the face of increasing turnover of personnel and the continual attachment and detachment of battalions. (p. 6, para 8).

2) Again in the same document: "It is strongly recommended that chaplains be assigned to battalions and not in group headquarters." (p. 16, note 22).

3) In the United States Army Chaplaincy, Vol. IV, p. 151, some commanders in WW I expressed the opinion that chaplains should be with the most forward elements. The presence of the chaplains with troops was so essential that the Chief of Chaplains during WW II directed that a chaplain should spend at least 50 percent of his time out of the office and with his men. (see same vol., pp. 135-36).

4. Though Forward Thrust was tested at maneuver battalion level (combat units), it was extended to all types of units. A request for approval of Forward Thrust as doctrine was expressed in a letter from the Commandant, U.S. Army Chaplain Center and School, to the Commander, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command on 30 May 79. The following was recommended as a change to FM 16-5, The Chaplain:

The battalion is normally the smallest unit to which chaplains are assigned. Chaplains will be assigned to divisional and separate brigade maneuver battalions and to nondivisional combat, combat support, and combat service support battalions which operate independently and normally are assigned directly to the Corps.

5. FM 16-1, Religious Support, articulates the doctrinal principle of Forward Thrust in three aspects:

a. Assignment: The assignment of Chaplains to the battalion level.

b. Direction: The manual emphasizes the "forward" nature of religious support "to integral elements of the battalion; to company, platoon, team and squad" (p. 1-8). This concept fits well with a linear concept of the battlefield and particularly, in divisional units.

c. Ministry of Presence: At its simplest definition the concept embraces the spirit of "bringing God to the soldier and

the soldier to God" (p. 1-8). This broader concept may apply to any level and simply means wherever soldiers are, there the chaplain must go.

6. The viability of Forward Thrust as a central doctrinal principle of the chaplaincy may need further clarification or definition for nondivisional CSS units, particularly in light of nonlinear battlefield concepts.

a. CSS units may be directed forward, backward, or laterally on the battlefield, particularly in the corps rear. This belies the directional emphasis of the concept.

b. The emergence of the nonlinear battlefield concepts blurs the concepts of forward or rearward, positing rather, battlefield zones. What most resembles the corps rear of the linear battlefield is simply a dispersal area sufficiently distant to be protected from enemy long range artillery fire (see appendix H). Divisional units, as well as nondivisional units, are located in this large area.

7. Results of Questionnaires (see Appendix H, TAB A, Q. 17 and TAB D, Q. 20). To the question, "Forward Thrust adequately describes the religious support mission to nondivisional units," the following summarizes the responses by group:

a. Corps Staff Chaplain Survey - These respondents were equally divided in their responses: 6 disagree, 6 agree, 1 neither response.

b. COSCOM Staff Chaplain Survey - 2 strongly disagree, 4 disagree, 1 agree. These respondents (86%) do not feel that Forward Thrust adequately describes their mission.

c. MSC Staff Chaplain Survey - 5 disagree/strongly disagree, 10 agree/strongly agree, 3 neither response. 56% of these respondents feel the doctrine adequately describes their mission, while 28% do not.

d. Corps staff chaplain SGMs and COSCOM NCOICs were equally divided on this question: 3 agree, 3 disagree, and 6 neither response. 50% were undecided or neutral, which is different from other respondent groups.

e. The wide disparity of responses of these groups appears to follow the mission emphasis of their units. The corps staff chaplains focus their attention on both divisional and corps MTs (see also their responses to Q. 60 and Q. 61 of Appendix H, TAB A). COSCOM chaplains are concerned with providing support to their nondivisional units and do not feel that the doctrine

adequately describes their mission. MSC chaplains' attention is forward and the majority agree with the survey proposition.

f. Results - The chaplains concerned with supporting divisional units see the doctrine as adequate. Chaplains whose mission is for corps units in Corps Rear do not believe the doctrine is adequate, or they are uncertain.

8. Conclusions:

a. The principle of assignment of MTs to battalions is superior to the former system of assignment of chaplains to brigade or group. This central element remains the critical issue in Forward Thrust doctrine.

b. The concept of "Forward" in Forward Thrust does not apply uniformly to divisional and nondivisional units. Most staff chaplains of corps units did not agree that Forward Thrust doctrine adequately describes their mission.

c. The heart of the doctrine is the imperative of providing religious support to soldiers at the lowest level, whether forward or rearward. The doctrine superbly captures the spirit of the "ministry of presence," i.e., being with soldiers wherever they are.

d. The directional emphasis of Forward Thrust should be minimized, and the operational emphasis of providing support to the lowest level should be maximized. Accordingly, renaming the concept to more accurately and comprehensively reflect the doctrinal principle may be considered; e.g., Battalion-Based Religious Support.

APPENDIX K

Civil Affairs and Religious Support in the Corps

1. The purpose of this appendix is to determine the assignments, missions, and relationships of CA chaplains with unit chaplains at corps level.

2. Units and Assignments.

a. Presently 36 chaplains (without chaplain assistants) are assigned to CA battalions, groups, and commands under the titles of "religious and Cultural Affairs Team Leader" and/or "Cultural Affairs Officer."

b. In FY 1992 a new TOE was effected which will assign chaplains only at command and brigade levels (16 at the rank of major). Chaplains assigned to civil affairs units are titled "Assistant Cultural Affairs Officers."

c. At command level (TOE 41701L0), which is normally assigned to the theater army (TA), the chaplain performs his mission as a member of the Special Functions Team which is normally composed of 11 persons. When the CA command is not mobilized and deployed, a CA brigade (TOE 41702L0) may provide the augmentation and become the senior CA unit for the TA. CA brigades may be assigned at the Theater Army Area Command (TAA-COM) or a Corps HQ and HQ Company.

(1) In the corps, one CA Brigade (HQ and HHC, 132 str.) may be assigned to provide CA units in support of Civil-Military Operations (CMO) conducted by the corps G-5, Corps Support Command (COSCOM), Division G-5 and Brigade S-5. The Brigade provides support to other component services, joint theater staff, and coalition forces. Three types of battalions may be assigned to the Bde:

(a) CA battalion, General Purpose (GP) (142 str.). This unit's companies and teams provide the S-5 elements to the brigade-sized units in the division, the COSCOM or the Theater Area Support Group (ASG) installation and facilities.

(b) CA battalion, Direct Support (DS) (141 str.). This unit plans and conducts CA operations in support of a division, COSCOM, or ASG.

(c) The CA battalion Foreign Internal Defense/Unconventional Warfare (FID/UW). This unit provides technical advice and assistance to Special Forces units supporting nations friendly to the U.S. and to Noncombatant Evacuation Operations (NEO).

(2) In addition, there are four CA operational support teams (company-sized units). The CA Corps Support Company (86 str.) plans and coordinates CA and Host Nation (HSN) support operations to support the corps operational scheme of maneuver. It augments the G-5, S-5 and CMO staffs in the corps.

(3) Corps Assignments Summary. CA brigades may be used at the corps or Theater Army (TA) level. Assignment of a CA brigade or battalion (as well as command) is almost always in the form of augmentation teams--principally at the G5/J5 staffs. The CA brigade and command both have chaplains in Religious and Cultural Affairs Officer positions. The CA chaplain may become a member of an augmentation team to be employed as needed in support of the CA mission.

3. Missions:

a. The chaplain (as religious and cultural affairs officer) is a member of a CA functional team (Cultural Affairs) at the brigade.

b. The Cultural Affairs team's functions include: identification of religious buildings or shrines with recommendations on their use or restrictions; liaison activity between indigenous ethnic, cultural, religious or social groups when necessary; advising the commander and principal staff concerning appropriate conduct/behavior of U.S. personnel in relationship to indigenous cultures and religions; and, recommending courses of action within the military mission to minimize the impact of military activity upon indigenous religious and cultural activities and customs.

c. The chaplain in a CA unit contributes to the CA area study. The indigenous religions and cultures of the area are reviewed.

d. The chaplain assigned to a CA brigade attached to a CA command or brigade may assist the corps chaplain when feasible. However, the CA chaplain's primary focus is to support the civil affairs and civil military operations functions within the corps. The corps chaplain will coordinate with the appropriate J5/G5/S5 staff element on matters impacting upon civil affairs functions.

4. Relationships of chaplains to CA.

a. The CA TOE is designed to permit the employment of assets in support of brigade, division, corps, and theater echelons.

(1) The CA chaplain's mission is to provide technical advice and expertise concerning regional religions and cultures and to function, as required, as a CA staff action officer and

planner. CA chaplains are not usually tasked to provide religious support to their units.

(2) The locus for all civil military operations and civil affairs activities is in the G5/S5 section of respective commands. Unit chaplains at brigade level and above should readily coordinate civil-military involvement with the G-5/S-5 of their units. Insights learned or expertise developed by the chaplain may be shared with the commander and soldiers, but should be coordinated with the G-5/S-5 or the CA officer filling that function.

b. Regional Religions Policy.

(1) Before deployment, CA units are under the operational control of the US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM).

(2) When deployed, CA units are under the operational command and control of the theater CINC who normally assigns them to the TA.

(a) A 10-person CA CINC team may augment the G-5 of a unified command in order to plan, manage and conduct CA operations in support of the TO. The CA chaplain may be an additional augmentee of the CINC team upon mobilization and deployment.

(b) The CINC chaplain may coordinate with the G-5 and the CINC J5/CMO Branch to ensure the impact of regional religions and cultures upon the military mission are included in plans and policy.

c. Former Study Findings.

(1) In the only approved chaplain study on the extent of chaplain involvement in regional religions, chaplains at unified commands were not playing a role (advisory or in training) in the area of the impact of indigenous religions on either current operations or plans for the future (see: "The Impact of Indigenous Religions Upon U.S. Military Operations Under All Conditions of War," USA Combat Developments Command Chaplain Agency, Ft. Lee, VA, 1966, p. E-3).

(2) Though the study recommends that the chaplain become the command's expert in indigenous religions, it summarizes, "Whatever the chaplain does in the area of indigenous religions can and should be coordinated with psychological warfare, Civil Affairs and special forces elements present." (p. E-8).

d. Unit Chaplain Involvement in CA Missions.

(1) In contingency operations or LIC operations the staff chaplain may be the first staff officer on the ground with the expertise to advise the commander on indigenous religions or assist indigenous populations in civil-humanitarian projects.

(2) In Operation Just Cause one chaplain organized a collection point for food supplies and the distribution plan to indigenous families. He continued the effort for days until the S-5 could arrange a CA officer to assume the duties.

(3) Chaplains have often been deeply involved with the indigenous populations to include religious leaders and facilities, particularly at corps level. In the official Chaplaincy History of Ministry in the Vietnam Conflict (Office of Chief of Chaplains, 1989) it is stated, "While civic action projects involved all US Army units in Vietnam, nowhere was the direct assistance by the soldier to the many displaced, orphaned, ill, and needy Vietnamese men, women, and children more evident than in combat service units (p. 125). These civic action projects were often completed in cooperation with the J-5 or civil military officer (pp. 57-58).

7. In the analysis of the questionnaires (Appendix H), two questions were designed to explore chaplain expectations of interface with CA officers (see Qs. 12 and 21).

a. Q. 12 - There was strong evidence (71.1%) that chaplains do not see their mission in conflict with the CA mission.

b. Q. 21 - The chaplains were less certain about the need to coordinate through the civil affairs officer when advising the commander on indigenous religions. Fifty percent said they would coordinate through the CA officer, but 31.6% felt no need to do so. 18.4% were neutral. Generally respondents believe they should coordinate this mission through the CA officer.

8. Conclusions.

a. Chaplains are regarded as experts in religious matters and the commander most often looks to them for questions concerning indigenous religions. During contingencies, chaplains are often the first on the ground possessing the expertise and leadership required to advise the commander and interface with religious elements of the population.

(1) This does not mean that the chaplain is an expert in regional or world religions and may have experienced minimal training in religious faiths outside his/her own denomination.

(2) Whatever the chaplain does in regard to regional religions should be coordinated through the S-5/J-5 or the CA officer charged with that responsibility.

b. If the CA brigade is attached at the corps level, the CA chaplain may be assigned to the functional team for Cultural Affairs. The CA unit may be assigned to corps and contain as many as 132 soldiers. The CA chaplain's mission requires continuous input into the CA regional assessment. When feasible, the CA chaplain may be a valuable resource for the corps chaplain. However, the mission of the CA chaplain does not include such a requirement or tasking. Nor does the CA chaplain's function routinely include providing religious support activities for his/her own unit personnel.

c. The corps staff chaplain should provide corps-level MTs with sufficient information to brief commanders and soldiers on minimum essential cautions and, when possible, a program for awareness and appreciation of local religions.

d. The COSCOM may have a CA brigade, battalion, or augmentation team assigned. A CA chaplain may not be a part of the augmentation. CA teams will usually be attached to the CSG and other brigade-sized units in the corps rear for administrative support.

(1) The COSCOM staff chaplains will want to interface with the G-5/S-5 and the CA attachments.

(2) Functional brigades and separate brigades will likewise have CA teams assigned and unit chaplains will coordinate with them, as appropriate.

APPENDIX L

Desert Shield/Storm Initial Observations

1. The Corps Staff Chaplain Section.

a. Deployment Stages. Operations must be considered in terms of deployment stages. During Desert Shield, most of the first units of the XVIII Airborne Corps were located in rear staging areas in and near Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. When the VII Corps began to arrive, the XVIII Corps moved west 600 miles to take up tactical assembly area (TAA) positions and were followed quickly by VII Corps. Dispersion over hundreds of miles and rapid task organizing in the TAA complicated supervisory functions. Combat units moved into forward assembly areas before battle. After conduct of the war, units withdrew and prepared for redeployment.

b. Location of Staff Chaplain Sections. The XVIII Airborne Corps staff MT section was located at Dhahran (for S-4 functions), King Khalid Military City (KKMC) (for S-1 functions), and Rafha (for S-3 functions). After leaving the staging area, the XVIII Corps Staff MT's base was at KKMC but the corps staff chaplain visited MSC MTs weekly in their TAA positions. Upon the outbreak of hostilities, the Corps staff MT stabilized at the forward command post (corps main). However, the VII Corps staff MT was located forward with the commander at the Tactical Command Post (TAC), for most of the war. The remainder of the section was located at the corps rear CP. The XVIII Airborne Corps staff chaplain monitored battlefield locations at the corps main CP, whereas the VII Corps accomplished this function at the corps rear CP.

c. Monitoring Unit Locations. Though RAOs were in place in all three locations mentioned above, they were ineffective. With a MT stationed at corps main CP, unit location information was more readily accessible. Other important conduits of information were the divisional, civil affairs brigade, and MSC liaison officers located at the corps main. They were used to alert their units of corps staff MT visitation plans. It is unlikely that Operation Desert Storm provided an environment in which the RAO would best function, but the system remains the Army's Doctrine for both corps and division (FM 100-15-1; FM 7-100-1).

d. Personnel issues.

(1) From December 1990 to March 1991 chaplains increased from 250 to end an strength of 569, with 40% Reserve Component and 60% Active Component. Approximately 6,000 troops per day were flowing into the theater in the heaviest buildup.

(2) At first, corps staff chaplains were required to request fills by required and authorized slot. This made cross-leveling very difficult in the early days of the war. Release was given late in February 1991 to use assets where the corps staff chaplains determined the greatest need.

(3) The Chief of Chaplains mandated that there would be Protestant and Catholic chaplain coverage for each combat support or field hospital. Management of Roman Catholic coverage for units and hospitals was difficult due to a shortage of these chaplains in Theater.

(4) The corps were at 100% fill of war time requirements prior to the ground war. The need for additional chaplains and assistants was accomplished by "shelf packages" of personnel sent by DACH. Two AIT classes were sent in this way and eleven Clinical Pastoral Education (CPE) students were sent to serve as casualty replacements. Most went to hospitals or headquarters units, since there were no MT casualties. Their redeployment to school several weeks after their initial deployment generated significant turbulence.

(5) The corps staff MT insured that all new chaplaincy personnel entering the theater were met at the corps Reception Center and gave them a briefing of the situation. This gave incoming personnel a sense of care from their senior MT and alleviated fears.

e. The XVIII corps staff chaplain section consisted of five chaplain assistants (E9, E5, E4, E4, E3) which were grouped with four chaplains in the command posts. The deputy staff chaplain remained at the corps rear CP where interface with Corps staff, personnel actions, consolidating situation reports, etc. were accomplished. To facilitate these functions, there should be a skill level 3 71M (E6) assigned to the staff chaplain section since the SGM was traveling much of the time. Additionally, one chaplain/chaplain assistant remained at Dhahran, as well as one at Rafha.

2. COSCOM Staff MTs.

a. Rapid Influx of MTs. Both COSCOMs grew from approximately 10 to 60 MTs in a matter of weeks. To fashion a working team of diverse MTs from the Total Army was a primary challenge with significant implications:

(1) Only about 16 percent of corps unit MTs had worked together before, leaving a significant leadership task of melding a cohesive, cooperative team.

(2) Higher Supports Lower. Dispersion factors and the great number of MTs defied centralized control. Corps staff MTs relied on the brigade/group staff MTs to provide supervision. They considered themselves as providing guidance and being a "pastor to pastors." COSCOM staff MTs depended heavily on group and brigade MTs. Extensive task organizing and size of units require a deputy at corps support group HQ (only one chaplain and one chaplain assistant currently required). The rear support groups or log bases were particularly large (approximately 19,000 soldiers) and needed a chaplain in the rank of LTC for supervision. It is essential that the corps and COSCOM staff MTs deploy early.

(3) The medical brigades of the COSCOMs included approximately 14 hospitals which contained half the COSCOM MTs (30). The units were spread over many miles and supervision was difficult. The brigade MT should be a LTC/E-6 and each hospital denominationally balanced (1 Protestant and 1 Catholic minimally). Catholic assets for GRS missions should be managed at COSCOM level.

(4) Constantly changing TF. MTs being attached to different CSGs almost daily and the development of ad hoc battalions created shifting religious support needs. This presented a dilemma for supervisory MTs who were monitoring the changes and determining GRS needs.

b. Base Cluster Ministries. The base clustering of units in the corps rear, which is trained by units and is in accordance with Army doctrine, never functioned well. Chaplains were preoccupied with unit responsibilities and were never very enthusiastic about the mission to provide base cluster ministry.

c. Confusion existed in the religious support resupply system. The Chaplain Consumable Resupply Kit (CCRK) was a great asset, but many were set aside when the dock workers did not know where to send them.

d. General Religious Support - Catholic Coverage. Outside of the hospitals, few Catholic chaplains were located in the corps rear and mostly they were assigned at battalion level. Lack of prior training in this area meant that neither MTs nor commanders were prepared for the aggressive management of religious support needed to make denominational coverage happen. Catholic coverage was not managed. Most MTs arranged their own coverage the best way they could. Often commanders were not understanding nor supporting of the MT role to provide GRS.

e. Integration of Capstone units. Of 180 capstone companies assigned to the 2nd COSCOM, only one had trained with the COSCOM before. Only 11 Reserve Component MTs had prior associa-

tion with the COSCOM. Many Capstone MTs did not expect the intensity and diversity of task organizing units.

f. Nature of the COSCOM unit ministry. Around-the-clock mission of the COSCOM makes services and religious support difficult. MTs must be content with many small worship services and traveling over great distances to visit soldiers. COSCOM units are characterized by unending, unvarying, and often unappreciated hard work.

g. Some COSCOM units spent time forward of divisional units.

h. Monitoring unit activity was accomplished mostly through staff briefings. RAOCs were ineffective primarily because most of their personnel were not deployed until just before the ground war started. Communication and unit location systems were already in place before the RAOC personnel arrived.

i. The COSCOM staff MT set up at the initial log base and maintained its base of operations there during the course of the war. Though a forward log base was established, it was little used since the ground battle was so short.

j. Communication for XVIII Airborne Corps was primarily through the distribution system after units moved to the TAA. Daily reports were required and they were submitted daily through courier. Communication worked well within 24 hours through this means. At other times, telephones were used.

k. Early deployment of corps and COSCOM staff MTs. Early deployment is essential to establish basic systemic procedures to facilitate the technical control and coordination of MTs. Much difficulty could have been eliminated if senior chaplains had deployed with the first staff.

l. The centrality of a ministry of presence. Programmed ministry was most difficult with the constant work load and task organizing support units. MTs did primary ministry by visiting and encouraging soldiers at their work and living areas.

m. Under widely dispersed conditions as in Desert Shield/Storm, a dedicated, mission essential vehicle is absolutely essential for the accomplishment of the religious support mission.

APPENDIX M

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