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Report to the Commander-in-Chief,
U.S. Army, Europe

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ARMY FORCE STRUCTURE

Planning for the Drawdown of Forces and Equipment in Europe



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European Office

c/o American Consulate General
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February 22, 1991

General Crosbie E. Saint
Commander-in-Chief
U.S. Army, Europe

Dear General Saint:

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In response to a request from the Chairman and the Ranking Minority Member of the Subcommittee on Readiness, Sustainability and Support, Senate Committee on Armed Services, we examined the U.S. Army, Europe's (USAREUR) plans to draw down its forces and close various military facilities and installations in Europe. Because we worked with your staff in ensuring that drawdown plans contained adequate policies, procedures, and guidelines for deactivating activities, the Subcommittee suggested that the results of our review be reported to you directly.

This report discusses (1) the status of Army planning for the reduction of U.S. forces in Europe and (2) the Army's plans to maintain accountability and control over the movement and disposition of equipment, the transfer of Army personnel and their dependents and possessions to other locations, and the disposition of facilities planned to be transferred to the host nation government. The report also describes several issues that could have an impact on the Army's drawdown plans.

Our review was completed prior to (1) the commencement of hostilities in the Middle East under Operation Desert Storm and (2) the Soviet Union's recent intervention in the Baltic region. These events further complicate drawdown planning.

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Results in Brief

By November 1990, USAREUR had developed a comprehensive drawdown implementation plan with the assistance of its headquarters staff offices and major commands to ensure that issues dealing with logistics, public affairs, security, and the transfer of facilities were considered and planned for before the drawdown began. Specifically, USAREUR had established special procedures and created teams of logistics experts to improve the oversight and control of equipment. It also had established procedures and additional support to assist units in transferring facilities to the German government.

Implementation of the drawdown plan has been largely overtaken by the deployment of USAREUR troops and equipment to the Middle East.

USAREUR forces scheduled to draw down have deployed to Saudi Arabia, and the departure of other units has been delayed. We have not reviewed the impact of Operation Desert Storm on the drawdown or considered the impact of other recent events that could affect USAREUR's force structure, such as the Soviet Union's recent military intervention in the Baltic region. However, some of the established goals, assumptions, assigned roles, and resources covered in the plan will need to be adjusted.

Moreover, although USAREUR developed a comprehensive drawdown plan, our review indicated several areas of concern:

- Is the established 180-day time frame for completing a drawdown of a unit realistic?
- To what extent do equipment and facilities need to be upgraded prior to transfer and how much time and resources will it take?
- What rate of drawdown can USAREUR most efficiently handle?

USAREUR officials told us that they planned to monitor such issues during the initial stages of the drawdown's implementation and adjust the plan as needed.

Background

In March 1989, the 23 nations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact began negotiations to reduce the level of conventional armed forces in Europe. In recognition of the dramatic political reforms in Eastern Europe and in response to increased force reductions, the United States proposed that its ground and air forces be reduced to 225,000—195,000 troops in Central Europe and an additional 30,000 elsewhere in Europe. Army forces in the central region would be reduced by 60,000.

Recognizing that these changes were soon to occur, USAREUR began as early as July 1988 to plan for the drawdown of Army forces. USAREUR formed a planning group to plan for, monitor, and evaluate the reduction of Army conventional forces in Europe, whether driven by a treaty, budget constraints, or other factors. In November 1990, the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty was signed.

USAREUR Had Completed Planning for the Drawdown of Forces and Equipment

By March 1990, USAREUR had developed a theater-oriented drawdown plan that identified the major actions that needed to be taken to successfully carry out the force reductions. By June 1990, USAREUR had distributed the draft plan to its major commands, which in turn submitted supporting plans to USAREUR by October 1990.

As a result of this process, USAREUR developed a detailed drawdown plan that provided procedures to ensure, among other things, that units would properly account for and control the extensive logistics assets that would be destroyed or transferred to the United States or other countries. USAREUR's plan also provided that soldiers and families in communities and facilities being closed would be notified of drawdown activities in a timely manner, that the security of sensitive munitions would be maintained, and that facilities transferred to the host nation government would be upgraded as necessary.

The drawdown planning document was comprehensive, consisting of 18 annexes and 73 appendixes. It also included several extensive checklists that provided guidance to deactivating units and assigned responsibilities to the individuals involved in carrying out drawdown tasks. Each annex of the plan was validated by the responsible USAREUR staff directorate. The plan was also reviewed by USAREUR's legal staff, approved by USAREUR's Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, and coordinated with Department of Army headquarters.

Areas of Concern in Reducing Forces and Equipment

USAREUR's overall planning effort was thorough, but there were several aspects of the drawdown that could hinder the Army's force and equipment reductions:

- The time frame for moving out units and their equipment may be unrealistic. One of USAREUR's goals was to remove all military personnel, equipment, and dependents from the theater within 180 days of the date a unit was notified it would be withdrawn. During this period, a unit must begin planning its drawdown activities and, at a minimum, inventory its equipment, verify personnel records, upgrade equipment, and prepare facilities for transfer to the host nation government. Because of all the tasks that must be accomplished prior to troops' leaving the European theater and because USAREUR had not tested the plan's feasibility, this 180-day period may be overly optimistic.
- The plan may not be flexible enough to handle the potentially larger reductions that Congress might request. By its own calculations,

USAREUR believed that it could effectively withdraw up to 30,000 troops annually. If Congress requires USAREUR to withdraw more than 30,000 in a fiscal year, the required transportation assets may not be available, backlogs in shipping household goods and automobiles could develop, and other elements of the drawdown could be adversely affected. Consequently, USAREUR planned to closely supervise the number of soldiers leaving Europe each year.

- Despite USAREUR's efforts to enhance accountability and control over the movement and disposition of equipment in Europe, the drawdown plan may fall short in this area. The Army planned to ensure, among other things, that (1) instructions for equipment disposition would be received in time to prevent massive equipment storage problems, (2) only equipment planned to be transferred to host nation countries or to other Army units would be upgraded, and (3) uncertainties about the resources needed to upgrade the equipment would be minimized.
- The deployment of USAREUR forces to the Middle East as part of Operation Desert Storm has dramatically affected drawdown plans. Many of the logistics assets and forces needed to support the drawdown in Europe are supporting the Persian Gulf forces. Coordinating and integrating the support for both missions had already put a strain on USAREUR's logistics operations, particularly in view of the Secretary of Defense's November 8, 1990, announcement that 65,000 additional troops, as well as extensive equipment assets, would deploy to Saudi Arabia from Europe. USAREUR planners are rethinking and adjusting drawdown goals, assumptions, roles, and resources.

The issues related to planning for the reduction of forces and equipment in Europe are more fully discussed in appendix I.

Scope and Methodology

We performed our review primarily at Headquarters, U.S. European Command, Stuttgart, Germany, and Headquarters, U.S. Army, Europe, Heidelberg, Germany. We also visited the 21st Theater Army Area Command and the 200th Theater Army Materiel Management Center. We interviewed Army headquarters and Joint Chiefs of Staff officials responsible for drawdown planning and implementation. We examined and analyzed relevant planning documents to assess the Army's implementation policies and procedures. At the suggestion of the Subcommittee, we worked closely with Army planners to share the information we learned and to identify potential areas of concern.

We conducted our review from June 1990 through January 1991 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

We discussed our observations with Department of the Army, European Command, USAREUR, and 21st Theater Army Area Command officials during the course of our assignment and included their comments where appropriate.

We are sending copies of this report to the Chairmen of the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations and on Armed Services, the Secretaries of Defense and the Army, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and other interested parties. Copies will also be made available to others upon request.

If you have any questions, please call me on (069) 7535-3696 or ETS 320-7511. This report was prepared under the direction of Richard Davis, Director, Army Issues. Other major contributors to this report are listed in appendix II.

Sincerely yours,

W. J. Anderson

W. J. Anderson
Assistant Comptroller General
Director, European Office

Contents

Letter		1
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Appendix I		8
Planning for the	Force Structure and Base Realignment Planning	8
Drawdown of Forces	Drawdown Goals and Assumptions	9
and Equipment in	Accountability of and Control Over Property and	10
Europe	Equipment	
	Planning for Military Personnel and Civilian Employees	12
	Planning for the Transfer of Facilities to Host Nation	14
	Control	
	Drawdown Issues That the Army Plans to Assess	14

Appendix II		17
Major Contributors to		
This Report		

Abbreviations

TM	Technical Manual
CFE	Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
PCS	Permanent Change of Station
USAREUR	U.S. Army, Europe

Planning for the Drawdown of Forces and Equipment in Europe

In response to unprecedented and ongoing political and military changes in Europe, the U.S. Army, Europe (USAREUR) has begun drawing down its forces to meet the expected limits of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty and presidentially imposed troop levels. The remaining force will reflect the Commander-in-Chief, USAREUR's vision of his command's role and mission following the signing of the treaty. To draw down their forces, USAREUR officials designed a new force structure for the forces that will remain in Europe, identified units and equipment to be returned to the United States, identified facilities to consolidate or close, and devised a corresponding drawdown plan. While the plan provided guidance, procedures, and special assistance to deactivating units, USAREUR officials said that they planned to carefully monitor it as it was implemented.

Force Structure and Base Realignment Planning

At a meeting of foreign ministers in Ottawa, Canada, in February 1990, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to limit their non-naval military forces located between the Atlantic Ocean and the Ural Mountains to a maximum of 225,000 troops each. In response, the U.S. European Command determined that the Army's share of European-based forces would be reduced from 217,000 to 158,500. The European Command provided the following principles to guide USAREUR's force structure planning:

- Reductions should be balanced among geographic regions and among missions.
- Modernization of the remaining Army forces should continue.
- Sufficient numbers of personnel must be assigned to units to ensure that they can successfully draw down their units and, once reestablished in their new locations, quickly become operational.

Considering that 158,500 troops was the Army's staffing baseline and that CFE equipment limitations were being negotiated at the time, the Commander-in-Chief of USAREUR reconfigured the remaining Army forces in Europe to (1) maintain a credible U.S. presence and commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and (2) help ensure stability in the region.

With the remaining force reconfigured, USAREUR identified military bases and communities to close. Some of USAREUR's considerations in deciding which installations to close included

- maintaining operational military requirements;

- increasing the efficiency of base operations;
- reducing currently adverse environmental effects on surrounding areas; and
- taking into account such factors as the proximity of training areas to road/rail networks, the quality of facilities, the local political-military environment, and the concerns of the host nation.

Once bases and communities were identified for closing, USAREUR began to develop a plan that would relocate 27 percent of the existing Army forces in Europe to locations in the United States and elsewhere.

In September 1990, the Secretary of Defense announced the start of the Army's drawdown of forces in Germany. He stated that the United States would end military operations in Germany at 94 sites and reduce personnel and operations at another 14 sites during fiscal year 1991 and beyond. Specifically, the first 13 Army battalions and 10 companies or batteries were scheduled to depart Germany by March 1991, and another 8 battalions by May 1991. This would be the first of several phases that could extend into the mid-1990s. Specific units involved in the second phase were to have been announced in January 1991.

Drawdown Goals and Assumptions

By March 1990 USAREUR had developed a theater-oriented drawdown contingency plan that identified actions necessary to reduce Army forces in Europe. The plan described how to deactivate units, close installations, close military communities and facilities, and transfer designated equipment. USAREUR officials outlined the following goals:

- Units will draw down in 180 days. Upon being notified, units will stop all major training activities, begin a 60-day planning period, and conduct complete and thorough inventories of equipment. After the planning period, units will have 120 days to prepare unit personnel, families, facilities, and equipment for relocation or transfer.
- Battalion and other unit commanders will remain with their units to ensure a smooth transition during the drawdown period.
- Quality of life for soldiers and their families will be maintained. For example, soldiers will work reasonable schedules; families will have access to necessary services, such as legal assistance; and soldiers and families will leave Europe together.
- Transportation costs will be minimized, and resources used efficiently. For example, USAREUR planned to move equipment and personnel only once to minimize transportation costs.

- Accountability over unit equipment will be strictly maintained. Units will not move until their inventory records are reconciled and closed out.

According to USAREUR officials, achieving most of these goals is contingent on drawing down the forces in Europe at a manageable rate. USAREUR staff determined that to achieve the mandated reduction of approximately 60,000 soldiers, the most efficient rate of return was about 20,000 personnel per year. However, the Secretary of Defense announced that for fiscal year 1991 a total of 30,000 troops would be withdrawn from western Europe. A model USAREUR developed demonstrated that certain risks would increase as the rate of return approached 30,000 a year. USAREUR officials stated that a higher annual rate of return than 30,000 could result in (1) a backlog of household goods and privately owned vehicles to be shipped to the United States, (2) too few personnel to upgrade and turn in unit equipment before departing the theater, (3) higher transportation costs and the inefficient use of resources, and (4) the erosion of the quality of life for soldiers and their families.

The USAREUR drawdown plan contained two important assumptions. First, the plan assumed that the United States would not destroy many CFE-treaty limited weapons. Instead, it would transfer that equipment to U.S. allies to replace their older equipment. Several NATO allies have verbally committed themselves to accept this excess treaty-limited equipment. On the basis of these commitments, USAREUR officials said that they assumed equipment destruction activities would be limited.

Second, the plan assumed that the operation and maintenance funds then programmed for USAREUR would be sufficient to continue training and base operations as well as to pay for unit drawdown costs. According to USAREUR officials, to be successful, each phase of the drawdown would have to begin as early as possible in the fiscal year to limit the amount of these funds spent on base operations or on the training activities of units that are scheduled to depart the European theater.

Accountability of and Control Over Property and Equipment

During the drawdown, existing Army regulations, supplemented with specially developed procedures, will be followed to account for and control the hundreds of thousands of pieces of equipment that will be transferred. In addition, USAREUR planned to help deactivating units with the drawdown by providing special teams and additional personnel.

To prepare property for transfer to the United States or to other locations in Europe, deactivating units will conduct a 100-percent inventory of all accountable property and compare the results to their property books. Discrepancies between the inventory count and property book balances will be investigated by the units. Accountability for missing items will be determined during the investigations, and the responsible parties will be held financially liable. Unit commanders will be ultimately accountable for all unit property under their control.

Deactivating units will also (1) inspect vehicles and equipment, (2) make necessary repairs, and (3) ensure that all equipment meets the Army's maintenance standards (known as "Technical Manual [TM] 10/20" requirements) unless disposition instructions specifically state otherwise. These requirements are imposed to ensure that the Army unit to which the equipment and vehicles are transferred receives them in good working order. Exceptions to the TM 10/20 requirement may be granted on a case-by-case basis for within-theater transfers provided the transferring and receiving units are in agreement.

To supplement existing procedures, USAREUR established a special team, known as the "USAREUR Reduction Cell," to monitor and coordinate the overall reduction effort. The Cell is made up of personnel experienced in logistics, planning, and engineering and will provide technical advice and assistance in all these areas to deactivating units.

The USAREUR logistics staff has also established the CFE Coordination Center to monitor and coordinate specific theater-wide logistics activities. The Center will work directly with deactivating units to solve logistics problems that could develop during the 180-day drawdown period. In addition, USAREUR will provide deactivating units with additional on-site liaison teams to enhance control and facilitate the turn-in and transfer of equipment.

Redistribution of In-Theater Equipment

The 200th Theater Army Materiel Management Center, a USAREUR component command, will oversee property redistribution activities within Europe. Through the Center, USAREUR officials will identify theater-wide shortages of equipment and materiel and will fill these shortages with assets from deactivating units. In filling shortages, USAREUR will give priority to remaining active units, storage sites for prepositioned equipment, and Theater War Reserve stocks. USAREUR officials believe that the automated property book (known as the "Continuing Balance System Expanded") now being used will ensure that only known shortages will

be filled and that unauthorized increases to inventory levels will not occur. USAREUR planned to return property not redistributed within the theater to the United States. However, some items that exceeded theater requirements, such as M-60 tanks, have been sent to Saudi Arabia, thereby reducing the amount that initially must be returned.

Planning for Military Personnel and Civilian Employees

Once the drawdown is completed and facilities are closed, the Army will not need the services of thousands of U.S. soldiers, U.S. civilian employees, and local national employees who work at those locations. USAREUR officials stated that, during drawdown planning, they carefully assessed the relevant personnel, legal, and other issues pertaining to reducing the number of soldiers, civilians, and local national employees in Europe. Army officials also stated, however, that certain personnel matters, especially the reassignment of soldiers, the rights of local national employees, and the strategy for communicating drawdown plans would have to be thought through as the drawdown process continues.

Procedures to Expedite Reassignments

Army officials recognized that obtaining reassignments and Permanent Change of Station (PCS) orders for soldiers as early and as efficiently as possible is critical to a smooth and orderly drawdown. USAREUR subsequently established procedures to ensure that reassignments are processed in an accurate and timely manner. As the drawdown begins, each unit validates the accuracy of its personnel data base and sends the data to the Department of the Army headquarters for reassignment instructions. The Army estimates that it can process 3,000 reassignments per week. These reassignments will be electronically transmitted back to USAREUR, where PCS orders will be processed. USAREUR intends to provide soldiers PCS orders within 28 days of data base validation.

Rights of Local National Employees

USAREUR has assessed the relevant sections of the German amendment to the NATO Status of Forces Agreement and applicable bilateral U.S. agreements with Germany to ensure that the United States meets its legal commitments to local national employees. For example, USAREUR plans to provide these employees severance pay when (1) the separation is involuntary, (2) the employee is at least 21 years of age, and (3) the employment period was at least 24 months. According to USAREUR officials, no severance pay is to be paid to employees who decline a reasonable offer of other employment or find new employment immediately after their services are terminated. USAREUR officials estimated that the average

severance payment could be approximately \$2,000 for each local national employee. However, they informed us that, at several locations being closed, actual payments have been higher.

USAREUR has established special reduction-in-force teams to (1) provide direction, advice, guidance, and training to the 31 USAREUR personnel offices; (2) coordinate activities across USAREUR; (3) act as clearing-houses for information; and (4) disseminate notification requirements.

In addition, USAREUR will monitor any concerns that are raised by local national employees through Germany's Works Council process. Works Councils are bodies of local nationals chosen as representatives of the local national work force. According to USAREUR officials, the Works Councils (1) propose actions that serve the activity and its employees; (2) ensure the observance of laws, tariff agreements, and regulations established for the benefit of employees; (3) promote the integration and vocational development of severely handicapped and other persons needing protection; and (4) receive and present grievances from employees. An important feature of civilian personnel management in USAREUR is the interaction among commanders, personnel staff, and the Works Councils. USAREUR officials said that the process will be closely monitored during the drawdown to ensure that U.S. commitments are met.

Communication of Personnel Reduction Procedures

According to USAREUR officials, procedures for reducing personnel in USAREUR have been thoroughly communicated to its military and civilian employees. Prior to the September 1990 announcement of the drawdown's first phase, USAREUR officials (1) briefed military community commanders on the personnel aspects of the drawdown, (2) conducted monthly personnel meetings with officials of USAREUR's major commands, and (3) closely coordinated drawdown plans with Department of Defense Dependent Schools and Army and Air Force Exchange Service representatives.

In addition, the USAREUR community and public affairs staff has disseminated information to the public and provided guidance to subordinate commands about drawdown activities. The public affairs office held a workshop in September 1990 for its officers and distributed drawdown fact sheets to soldiers and their families.

Planning for the Transfer of Facilities to Host Nation Control

USAREUR controls over 800 facilities in Germany. Many will be retained to support the Army's remaining forces, but numerous facilities will be turned over to the German government. USAREUR is responsible for negotiating the residual value of facilities with the German government and will do so before transferring a facility. The residual value of a facility is the value of U.S.-built buildings and other improvements for which the German government will reimburse the United States. USAREUR and the German government have yet to agree on the specifics involved in determining residual value.

United States Will Retain the Best Facilities

During the process of determining how to reconfigure the post-CFE force structure in Europe, USAREUR decided to retain the best and most cost-efficient facilities for its remaining forces. According to USAREUR officials, these facilities will include those in which the United States has invested the most money and those situated close to major roads, rail networks, and training areas. USAREUR also considered the host nation's preference for facilities located in urban areas. During the first phase of the drawdown, USAREUR intends to turn over approximately 10 of the 30 facilities the German government has requested.

United States Will Make Minimal Upgrades to Facilities

USAREUR will minimize upgrades to facilities selected for transfer, performing maintenance related to only "health and safety" concerns. USAREUR believes it would not be prudent to upgrade facilities that may be destroyed after they are transferred. USAREUR also will not undertake large-scale environmental clean-up projects, since the final uses for the facilities are not known at this time.

USAREUR has established procedures and additional support to help units in facility transfer tasks. Facilities engineers have developed an extensive 114-step checklist to be used by deactivating units in closing down a facility. The engineers also will provide specialized maintenance and engineering support during the deactivation. An engineering team will visit units and monitor the status of closures as they occur.

Drawdown Issues That the Army Plans to Assess

Although USAREUR has developed a comprehensive drawdown plan, there are three issues that could hinder the Army's force and equipment reductions: the rate of troop reductions, the complexity of the drawdown, and U.S. deployment to the Persian Gulf area.

Higher-Than-Expected Rate of Return

USAREUR officials stated that they expect to have difficulty coping with a rate of return higher than 30,000 troops per year. For example, existing personnel and transportation resources may not be adequate to carry out required tasks, including equipment upgrades, equipment transfers, and the shipment of household goods and privately owned vehicles. Since the Army expected to draw down 30,000 soldiers for fiscal year 1991 (that is, before Operation Desert Storm), USAREUR planned to assess, during the first phases of the drawdown, whether it could effectively return soldiers, families, equipment, and household goods at that rate.

Drawdown Complexity and Magnitude Could Cause Problems

USAREUR officials believe adequate controls exist to provide strict accountability and control. Because of the complexity and magnitude of the drawdown, the Army plans to monitor and assess the following areas of concern during its early phases:

- USAREUR plans to assess whether the 180-day planning and implementation period for deactivating units will provide units with enough time to complete their assigned tasks. For example, USAREUR plans to determine whether units have enough time and resources to upgrade equipment to Army TM 10/20 maintenance standards before it is transferred. USAREUR does not know the exact condition of this equipment or the amount of resources needed to bring the equipment up to a particular TM 10/20 standard.
- USAREUR plans to determine whether funding for the drawdown is adequate. USAREUR officials have been unable to estimate precisely how much the drawdown will cost due to the numerous variables affecting it. For example, if NATO and other U.S. allies do not accept U.S. excess treaty-limited equipment, destruction costs will be higher than originally estimated.
- USAREUR plans to assess the impact on the drawdown of departing local national and U.S. civilian employees. USAREUR officials stated that they are concerned that some essential personnel, including engineers, personnel clerks, security guards, and maintenance workers, may leave before drawdown tasks are complete. The loss of critical personnel could severely hamper a unit's ability to draw down efficiently.

In our opinion, plans to closely monitor drawdown activities are particularly important. A USAREUR official told us that in a drawdown exercise (known as "Homeward Bound") in August 1990, the Department of the Army did not test the adequacy of resources needed to implement the drawdown.

Implication of Operation Desert Storm on Drawdown Plans

In addition to restructuring and drawing down its forces, USAREUR is actively supporting Operation Desert Storm, the largest U.S. military deployment since the Vietnam War. Extensive coordination is required to support the deployment to Saudi Arabia while, at the same time, drawing down 30,000 soldiers in fiscal year 1991. As of January 1991, a USAREUR official told us that, as a result of the deployment to the Middle East and other events, they were reviewing (1) the requirement to draw down 30,000 soldiers this year and (2) the size and configuration of the force structure that should remain in Europe.

USAREUR still plans for those units designated to leave Europe in March 1991 to return to the United States without first serving a rotation in Saudi Arabia. Some key personnel from those units, however, have been sent to support Operation Desert Storm. At least two of the eight battalions scheduled to return in May 1991 were ordered to Saudi Arabia. The return of the other six may be delayed, and they, along with all or some of the units involved in the second drawdown phase—which were tentatively to be announced in July 1991—may first be required to rotate to Saudi Arabia. The units sent to Saudi Arabia will either redeploy directly to the United States or return to Europe for deactivation.

Since Operation Desert Storm is a vast undertaking, extensive logistical support is required. Many of the personnel required to plan for and implement the drawdown are now preoccupied with Desert Storm. Therefore, USAREUR planners are rethinking and adjusting drawdown goals, assumptions, roles, and resources. Initially, USAREUR officials reacted to the changing situation in several ways:

- Because of Desert Storm's support requirements, the shipment of household goods and privately owned vehicles will have a low priority. Soldiers departing Europe in March 1991 may not receive their privately owned vehicles and household goods until several months after their arrival in the United States.
- Future dates for units scheduled to depart Europe for the United States may slip due to logistics support needed for Operation Desert Storm.
- Family members of soldiers serving rotations to Operation Desert Storm may not return to the United States as planned. As of November 1990, USAREUR's position was that European troops deployed to the Middle East should return to Europe to deactivate and that family members should remain in Europe until rotations were complete.

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