


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
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Some Alternative Futures and Their Military Implications

DAVID E. ALBRIGHT

THE FUTURE OF THE AIR FORCE

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


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Some Alternative Futures and Their Military Implications

by

DAVID E. ALBRIGHT



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
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Foreword

The stunning changes in the complexion of international politics that began late in the decade of the 1980s and continue today will profoundly affect the American military establishment as a whole, and the US Air Force in particular. Decisions about the future course of the military will be made in the early part of the 1990s which will essentially determine the course of the US Air Force well into the next century. Decisions of such importance require thoughtful consideration of all points of view.

This report is one in a special series of CADRE Papers which address many of the issues that decision makers must consider when undertaking such momentous decisions. The list of subjects addressed in this special series is by no means exhaustive, and the treatment of each subject is certainly not definitive. However, the Papers do treat topics of considerable importance to the future of the US Air Force, treat them with care and originality, and provide valuable insights.

We believe this special series of CADRE Papers can be of considerable value to policymakers at all levels as they plan for the US Air Force and its role in the so-called postcontainment environment.



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Executive Summary

A number of assumptions about continuities relevant to US military strategy and force structure underlie much of the analysis in the contributions to the Airpower Research Institute's (ARI) study of "The Future of the Air Force." Three of the propositions have to do with the international environment, and two concern the internal US situation. The specific premises are:

1. Eastern Europe will stay on the path of liberalization.
2. US-Soviet relations will continue to improve.
3. The importance of the Warsaw Pact and NATO as military alliances will decrease, for both will significantly reduce their forces.
4. US budget deficits will remain a problem.
5. Pressure to cut military spending will grow. When carefully examined, however, some of these assumptions seem open to challenge. Indeed, the chances are good in several instances that conditions different than those forecast may develop. All of the assumptions involving the external world fall into this category.

If circumstances other than the ones foreseen do emerge, these circumstances could have implications for both US military strategy and US force structure that vary from the prescriptions of contributors to ARI's study. Some of the deviations might even be quite significant.

Therefore, the conclusions about military strategy and force structure advanced by participants in this study should be approached with a degree of caution. These judgments represent the best estimates of the participants, but the judgments are still probabilities, not certainties. Moreover, the greater the number of underlying assumptions that turn out to be wrong, the greater the chances are that the recommendations set forth in the study will prove questionable.

Chapter 1

Introduction

NO MATTER how many changes in conditions affecting US military strategy and force structure the future may bring, there will always be some continuities. The real challenge lies in foreseeing their exact nature.

Underlying much of the analysis in the CADRE Papers that make up the Airpower Research Institute's study of "The Future of the Air Force" are several assumptions about such continuities. These premises reflect the common wisdom in the US since the momentous shifts that began in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in 1989. The assumptions are:

1. Eastern Europe will remain on the path of liberalization.
2. US-Soviet relations will keep improving.
3. The Warsaw Pact and NATO will decline in importance as military alliances, with both sides significantly drawing down their forces.
4. US budget problems will persist.
5. There will be increased pressure to cut military spending.

But it appears vital to subject such propositions to careful scrutiny before accepting them as likely continuities over the next decade or so. Equally important,

any alternative judgments that might emerge should be assessed for their military implications, and these implications need to be examined for deviations from those that flow from the continuities foreseen. Such are the purposes of the present paper.

This paper contends that a number of the forecasts rest on rather shaky ground. Some even appear to stand as little as a 50-50 chance of being right. Furthermore, the paper goes on, the most probable alternative outcomes suggest that the US will need a military strategy and a force structure somewhat different than it would if the outcomes anticipated became reality.

Chapter 2 looks at each of the five assumptions in turn. In all cases, the goal of the effort is not to validate or reject the specific premise, but rather to weigh the likelihood that it will prove accurate. No one, after all, can predict the future with certainty. The most that one can hope to do is to minimize the possibilities and to mitigate the consequences of error.

Chapter 3 explores the implications for US military strategy and force structure of the conclusions in chapter 2. It focuses particularly on judgments that vary to a consequential degree from the basic propositions.

Chapter 2

Assessment of Prevailing Forecasts

OF THE FIVE assumptions about the future under consideration here, three have to do with international circumstances, and two relate to the US domestic situation. It is useful, therefore, to group them in this fashion in examining them.

International Conditions

AS FOR THE premises concerning the international environment, the odds are almost as good that they will prove wrong as that they will turn out to be accurate. The probability does differ from one case to another, but it does not do so radically.

Eastern Europe's Course

Strong possibilities exist that the states of Eastern Europe will not manage to traverse the path of liberalization to the end. Building democratic political systems and market economies in these countries will require at least a generation, and there will be plenty of opportunities for the states to falter along the way or to backslide. Some could even revert to a form of authoritarian rule and/or descend into economic chaos.

Of course, the prospects for individual portions of Eastern Europe do vary. The areas formerly under Austro-Hungarian rule appear to stand a better chance of making the transition to political democracies and market economies than do those previously under Ottoman control. The former include Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and the republics of Slovenia and Croatia in Yugoslavia; the

latter consist of Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, and the remainder of Yugoslavia.

This judgment that the East European countries could well fail to transform themselves into political democracies with market economies reflects several factors. First, all of the states of Eastern Europe, to diverse degrees, lack the cultural traditions vital to the proper functioning of democratic political systems and market economies. In political democracies, citizens must display civility toward one another—that is, respect for views that clash with their own—and be willing to engage in compromise to achieve common goals. Market economies depend heavily on entrepreneurs to serve as the source of innovations, and they entail a substantial amount of risk taking in the hope of future gain. Before the communist takeovers throughout Eastern Europe in the 1940s, only Czechoslovakia evidenced any of these things to a significant extent, and even it had notable deficiencies in the political sphere. More than 40 years of communist rule did little to modify these circumstances. Opposition to communist regimes in power did bring together some individuals and groups of different political perspectives for a time—especially in places like Poland—but the collapse of these regimes has led to a revival of bickering and intransigence even within such coalitions. Centrally planned economies left almost no room within the bounds of legal

activity for the development of entrepreneurs' skills or a willingness to take economic risks.¹

Creating new cultural traditions of these sorts is not impossible. Yet they will not emerge overnight. Producing them entails altering attitudes of, at minimum, large segments of the populace of the East European states, and such a task represents a long-term undertaking. Moreover, the difficulty of revising traditions should not be underestimated. Old outlooks and ways are comfortable and provide a sense of security, so people tend to cling to them with great tenacity.

Second, the collapse of communist authority in Eastern Europe has allowed long-standing social cleavages to resurface as major issues, and these have generated substantial domestic strife. In Poland, the key divide has proved to be between workers and peasants, on the one hand, and intellectuals, on the other.

This split became manifest during the country's 1990 presidential election.² Throughout most of the 1980s, intellectuals had cooperated with workers and peasants in shaping the independent trade union Solidarity into a political alternative to the communist regime. Even after the communist regime began to fall apart in 1989, there was no basic discord initially between the two groups on how to approach the new realities. With the approval of Lech Walesa, the head of Solidarity and a former worker, the first noncommunist premier, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, and the other noncommunists in his cabinet were drawn essentially from the ranks of the intelligentsia. Walesa himself opted to stay on the sidelines and serve as a generator of popular support for the revamped government.

By late 1989, however, Walesa had grown perturbed at the hardships that the government's economic policies were imposing on those at the lower end of the social scale and at the slow pace at which

communist bureaucrats were being replaced. He sought to increase his leverage by running for president to succeed the Communist Gen Wojciech Jaruzelski. Most intellectuals opposed his candidacy. Many of them privately and sometimes publicly dismissed him as insufficiently sophisticated to cope with the myriad problems facing the country in the transition period clearly under way. The dispute eventually split Solidarity, with the intellectuals putting up Prime Minister Mazowiecki as their candidate. Mazowiecki's poor showing in the election merely enhanced the rancor between the two groups, and a reconciliation between them will be hard to achieve, although Walesa still numbers some intellectuals among his key advisers and backers.

Elsewhere, ethnic and religious differences have assumed the greatest importance. All of the remaining countries have ethnic and/or religious minorities of major consequence; moreover, such groups often have brethren with whom they identify in neighboring states. As the political situations in the East European countries have opened up, the ethnic and/or religious groups there have taken advantage of the new circumstances to assert themselves politically. The consequence has been increased tensions among ethnic and/or religious groups within states and heightened disputes between states. Yugoslavia provides the most extreme example. By the latter part of 1991, the country had reached the point of civil war as a result of the feuding between its ethnic groups, especially the Serbs and Croats, and Serbia's attempts to curtail the powers of the autonomous provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina, inhabited by ethnic Albanians and Hungarians respectively, had angered Albania and Hungary.³

Third, the nature of the new governments in Eastern Europe raises considerable doubt about their ability and in some instances even their desire to preside over

further liberalization of their countries. In Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and the republics of Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia in Yugoslavia, noncommunists have taken over control of the governments. But the noncommunist elements that have assumed power in these places have little, if any, experience in administration, and they came to office with no expertise whatsoever in major areas of central government responsibility, such as defense and foreign policy. Thus, for the time being they have had to keep many old-line communist bureaucrats around and rely on these bureaucrats to implement changes in government policy.⁴

This situation is fraught with possibilities for trouble. The current ruling forces could turn out to be so inept that the reins of authority could fall into the hands of conservative, authoritarian elements of either the left or right. Both types of elements now form a part of the political spectrums in most of these areas. Or the predominantly communist bureaucracy could so subvert government policies in the execution phase that these fail miserably, thereby undermining popular support for the government. Replacement of obstructionists in the bureaucracy with more neutral cadres will decrease the chances of such an outcome, but training and preparing such cadres adequately will require a substantial amount of time and effort.

In Romania, Bulgaria, and Albania, reform communists of differing kinds have at least temporarily gained ascendancy. Technically speaking, the Bulgarian and Albanian governments are coalitions, but reform communists constitute the dominant force in them. Although the leaderships in all three states have endorsed multiparty political systems and market economies, it is far from certain exactly how far along the path of liberalization they are prepared to move.

Many signs suggest that their postures reflect expedience more than genuine convictions. Moreover, orthodox communists still retain some influence in all three countries and can constrain what the present leaderships can do.⁵

Yugoslavia's key republic, Serbia, and the small republic of Montenegro remain under hard-line communist control. Although the Serbian leadership has accepted multiparty elections and effects a populist and Serbian nationalist stance, it firmly upholds one-party rule. For a long while, it also rejected any political or economic measures that would weaken the Yugoslav federal state. Since Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence in June 1991, however, it has reluctantly agreed to countenance their withdrawal from the federation—but only if they hand over to Serbia all lands inhabited predominantly by Serbs.⁶

Finally, all of the East European countries confront imposing economic obstacles to the establishment of market economies. No state has ever carried out a transition from a centrally planned to a market economy before, so there are no sure blueprints to follow. Consequently, the likelihood of major mistakes and setbacks is high.

Even more serious, the pain that economic transformations will entail has increased dramatically because of factors that East European leaders did not originally foresee. No leader has ever believed that such changes could take place without a certain amount of pain; however, they all tended to think that this could be kept fairly moderate as well as short in duration. Events in the 1990s have negated these calculations. Technical tasks such as privatizing state-owned enterprises and controlling inflation while raising prices have proved far thornier than expected. In addition, there have been some unanticipated developments in the international arena.

Not only has Moscow ceased to sell oil to Eastern Europe at prices below the world market level, but East European trade with the Soviet Union has fallen drastically as a result of Moscow's lack of foreign exchange to pay for purchases from Eastern Europe. At the same time, world oil prices have risen in response to the conflict in the Persian Gulf, and economic difficulties have restricted the capabilities of many Western states to engage in trade with and furnish credits to East European countries.⁷

The negative impact of these factors on East European economies does vary somewhat. In 1990, for instance, industrial output appears to have declined by about 28 percent in Romania; 26 percent in Poland; 10 percent in Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Hungary; and 3 percent in Czechoslovakia. The figure for Poland, however, covers only the "socialist" sector. If some estimate of private production is included, total industrial output for the country may have been down only roughly 15 percent.⁸

Nevertheless, every East European state must now anticipate adversities of substantial proportions for a lengthy period before it can create a market economy. These, in turn, will mean hardships and no real hope of improvement in standards of living for the local population in the short term. Such a situation risks rapid alienation of rank and file citizens—especially in the more open political circumstances now prevailing. Under these conditions, maintaining a steady course toward economic liberalization will require a high degree of discipline, which is not in evidence anywhere at the moment.

US-Soviet Cooperation

During the coming years, US-Soviet cooperation could stagnate or even decrease. The attitudes of both the Soviet Union and the US will figure in here.

From the Soviet standpoint, the objective arguments for expanding economic collaboration with the US will remain compelling and probably will increase in urgency. These have to do essentially with the need for aid from the US and other Western states to restructure the Soviet economy.

By the early 1990s, the Soviet Union had still failed to reshape its economy to any significant degree, and Soviet and Western analysts agreed that the country's economic situation was deteriorating. According to the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), for example, the Soviet Union's gross national product (GNP) dropped between 4 and 5 percent in 1990. Productivity declined as well, largely as the result of the loss of 10 million worker days from strikes. Although the Soviet Union continued to be the world's largest producer of oil, its output fell by 6 percent, and this drop resulted in a reduction of its vital foreign exchange earnings. As for 1991, the CIA estimated that the Soviet Union faced a "radically worse" year. Its GNP would probably fall by 10 percent, and its inflation rate would in all likelihood rise above 100 percent.⁹

Over the longer term, the CIA foresaw the possibility, though not necessarily the probability, of an economic catastrophe for the Soviet Union that would rival the experience of the US during the Great Depression of 1930-33. At that time, US GNP plummeted by 30 percent, and unemployment in the country reached 25 percent.¹⁰

Even under the most optimistic assumptions, it will require a substantial period of time to revamp the Soviet economy and to improve its performance appreciably, and the economic conditions in the Soviet Union appear destined to worsen before they get better. Under such circumstances, expanded economic cooperation with the US and other Western countries will clearly retain great

potential attractiveness for Moscow. Indeed, such cooperation might prove imperative to prevent the Soviet Union from suffering an economic disaster.

Yet conservatives in the Soviet Union continue to resist the notion of a decentralized market economy, and they blame foreign enemies for the state's economic problems. Vladimir Kryuchkov, the former head of the Soviet security police (KGB), set forth their perspective in succinct fashion in December 1990. He warned that "a substantial increase in the activity of several Western special services" represented a "threat to our development." Then he went on to suggest that economic contacts with the West often served not merely as a pretext for the West to compile strategic information about the Soviet Union's industry and resources but also as a means to impose "dubious ideas and plans for extricating the country from its difficult situation."¹¹

Right-wing Soviet elements have suffered a great reduction in influence on all aspects of Soviet foreign policy since their abortive attempt to seize power in August 1991. However, despite the fact that the ringleaders of the failed coup have lost their positions, right-wing forces remain entrenched in many of the country's institutions—even in the Russian republic, which has undergone the greatest shake-up in personnel. As long as conservatives retain their institutional bases and those institutions have an important role in Soviet life, conservatives will continue to be a factor in Soviet politics. Indeed, even Soviet reformers concede that if there are severe shortages of food in the near future, large portions of the Soviet population might accept the argument of the right wing that reestablishing order and discipline in the country is imperative. Under such circumstances, conservatives might manage to stage a major political comeback.¹² If they did so, the Soviet Union's readiness to engage in economic cooperation with the US and

other Western powers could conceivably decline—whatever the consequences for the Soviet Union internally.

The US, for its part, has reservations about how much it should collaborate with the Soviet Union economically. Not only does Washington face severe constraints on its economic resources because of the US budget deficits and the myriad of other states seeking economic assistance, but both US government officials and private investors doubt the wisdom of much economic involvement with the Soviet Union until it has taken some fundamental steps to reshape its economy. In September 1991, Secretary of State James A. Baker III did soften the US government's stance on the issue a bit. Previously, the US had insisted on real progress toward the implementation of a free-market economic reform before it would contemplate aid; now Baker indicated that the US would consider economic assistance through the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as soon as the Soviet Union came up with "credible" and "concrete" plans for such a reform.¹³ But Baker left unanswered the fundamental question of whether the US would provide the kind of assistance that the Soviet Union will need. US reluctance to do so obviously could hold back economic cooperation.

In addition, the current Soviet rationale for increasing political cooperation with the US in the global arena might not stay valid forever in Moscow's eyes without at least some progress toward realization of the basic assumption underlying it. To date, the Soviet Union has held that it must foster an international political climate that is nonthreatening to the US and other Western powers to convince them to cooperate extensively with it in the economic sphere. For this reason, the Soviet Union has actively pursued political collaboration with the US in the global context.

This policy has earned Moscow considerable plaudits from the US, for it has facilitated a number of major international achievements in recent years. A treaty was concluded between NATO and the Warsaw Pact in November 1990 that provided for mutual reduction of conventional forces in Europe. In July 1991, a treaty reducing the strategic nuclear forces of the US and the Soviet Union was signed. Several regional conflicts have been resolved, or frameworks for their resolution have been laid out. In accordance with the agreements reached under US and Soviet sponsorship in December 1988, Namibia gained its independence from South Africa in March 1990, and the last Cuban troops departed from Angola in late May 1991. Prodded by the Soviet Union and the US, the Sandinista government held free elections open to all groups in Nicaragua in February 1990; then, after losing those elections, it handed over power to a non-Marxist coalition under Violeta Barrios de Chamorro the next month. Under pressure from Moscow, Vietnam withdrew its troops from Cambodia in 1989, and during 1990 the UN Security Council, with Soviet and US concurrence, drew up a plan for ending the civil war in Cambodia. The plan entails the holding of elections under UN supervision and the turning over of substantial administrative authority to UN civilian and military personnel to prepare for these elections. In September 1990, all parties involved in the civil war accepted this plan, although it has yet to be implemented.¹⁴ US-Soviet collaboration in the UN Security Council permitted that body to condemn Saddam Hussein's seizure of Kuwait, to institute an embargo against Iraq, and eventually to authorize the use of force to liberate Kuwait. Last but by no means least, the US-Soviet agreement in September 1991 to stop all arms sales to combatants in Afghanistan by 1 January 1992 has opened the door to free elections in Af-

ghanistan and a possible final settlement of the civil war there.¹⁵

Since the failed right-wing coup of August 1991, Soviet efforts to cooperate politically with the US in the international arena have become even more conciliatory than they were previously. In September 1991, for example, President Mikhail Gorbachev announced that the Soviet Union would begin discussions with Fidel Castro about withdrawing the 11,000 Soviet military personnel on the island, and Gorbachev declared that in the future the Soviet Union would base its economic relations with Cuba on free-trade principles. The latter shift in policy means the elimination of the annual subsidy of \$2 billion that Moscow has been providing Havana by bartering Soviet oil for Cuban sugar on terms that greatly overvalue the sugar.¹⁶

But thus far the Soviet Union has reaped relatively few economic benefits from the US for its conduct. There has been a virtual explosion of technical economic contacts between the two states. Washington has also approved federal loan guarantees to permit Soviet purchases of \$2.5 billion worth of US food, and it has indicated receptivity to Soviet pleas for additional food aid to get through the 1991-92 winter after a poor harvest. Of more long-range import, the US has endorsed associate membership in the IMF for the Soviet Union. In September 1991, the Bush administration even cleared the way to granting most-favored-nation trading status to the Soviet Union by seeking congressional approval of the Soviet-American trade agreement signed in June 1990. (The administration had delayed submission of the accord to Congress until after Moscow enacted a free emigration law—a step that the Soviet Union finally took in May 1991.)¹⁷ Nevertheless, the US government to date has declined to provide direct economic assistance to the Soviet Union. Of perhaps far greater sig-

nificance, US businesses have displayed great wariness about investing private capital there after a brief flurry of interest in the late 1980s.

With major progress toward economic reforms in the Soviet Union, these circumstances could change somewhat, yet it is highly unlikely that anything approaching the economic help now being solicited from the US by the Soviet Union will be forthcoming. Prominent Soviet economists have talked about the need for total Western grants of \$20 to \$30 billion a year for five years, and a large percentage of this amount would obviously have to come from the US.¹⁸

Rebuffed in the economic sphere, the Soviet Union might opt to cut back on political cooperation with the US. Such a possibility is enhanced by the failure of the policy to evoke universal acclaim in the Soviet Union.¹⁹ Two groups have opposed it from quite different perspectives.

One of these groups criticizes the policy on the grounds that it has resulted in a loss of Soviet influence in various countries and regions of the world where the Soviet Union once loomed important. Eastern Europe stands at the top of the list, but some developing states and areas are on it as well.²⁰ This viewpoint is espoused by conservatives, particularly those in the central bureaucracy. Although their weight in state affairs has decreased greatly since the unsuccessful right-wing coup in August 1991, they continue to cling to many positions in institutions like the KGB and the military, and they could regain at least some of their lost power in the future—especially if the situation in the Soviet Union persists in sliding toward disorder and chaos.

A second group objects to the policy because, from the group's standpoint, it unwisely fosters Soviet "globalism." These individuals contend that the Soviet Union can no longer pretend to be a "superpower" like the US, for it is in the

process of disintegrating into sovereign states as a consequence of the forces set in motion by *glasnost* and *perestroika*. Thus, they advocate a foreign policy of isolationism to ensure "a smooth, conflict-free transfer of foreign policy powers from Moscow to the republics."²¹ This group consists of "radicals" who operate outside the central bureaucracy but often have key roles in the governments of the republics. Their weight has increased substantially as a result of the weakening of the union that has taken place in the wake of the August 1991 attempted coup, and if the centrifugal forces now at work in the Soviet Union should intensify, the outlook of this group might become dominant.

Although Soviet attitudes will probably be the key determinant of what happens to US-Soviet political cooperation in the world arena, the US perspective could have an impact too. Most of the regional problems in whose resolution the Soviet Union might conceivably play a role have now been settled or at minimum moderated. The major exception is the Arab-Israeli conflict. Under such conditions, Washington might decide that close political collaboration with the Soviet Union in international affairs no longer has as much utility as it once did and therefore devote reduced effort to it.

NATO's Future

On 1 July 1991, the members of the Warsaw Pact agreed to disband the organization, and their parliaments are expected to complete formal ratification of this decision by the end of 1991. Furthermore, an accord providing for a substantial drawdown of conventional military forces in Eastern and Western Europe was signed in November 1990, although it must still be carried out. But NATO could wind up retaining a lot of vitality as a military entity.

A variety of considerations underpin this judgment. Although the Soviet threat to Western Europe has diminished greatly, it has not wholly disappeared. The Soviet leadership betrays no inclination in the early 1990s to engage in military adventurism in Europe; moreover, with the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the probable implementation of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty, the Soviet Union will lose the capability to launch a massive multi-pronged attack against Western Europe by the mid-1990s. Indeed, by that juncture it may lack the capacity to undertake even a limited action on the central front without a fairly lengthy period of military buildup. Yet national intentions can alter as the attitudes of leaders or the leaders themselves change; and even the revamped and truncated Soviet Union that now appears to be taking shape has, and will continue to have, substantial capabilities to conduct military operations on the northern and the southern fronts. These are particularly imposing on the southern front.²²

Such a situation causes concern in Norway and Turkey, because of their proximity to the Soviet Union. The Turks are especially apprehensive. They stress that the Soviet Union, in complying with CFE restrictions on weapons and equipment west of the Urals, has merely moved a lot of these east of the Urals instead of destroying them. To make matters worse, many of these newly arrived weapons and equipment are replacing older and less sophisticated items in the Soviet inventory. Thus, Turkey confronts an increased, rather than a decreased, Soviet capability to wage war against it. Turkey does hope to do some modernizing of its forces by obtaining a fair amount of the weapons and equipment that must be withdrawn from Central Europe to meet the CFE limitations for this area. Turkey also feels a need for a strong continuing commitment by its NATO partners to

come to its aid in the event of a Soviet assault on it.²³

In light of Turkey's major contributions to the anti-Iraq coalition in the 1990-91 conflict in the Persian Gulf, other NATO members, which benefited enormously from the conflict's ultimate outcome, will have difficulty ignoring Ankara's desires. This is true despite the "peace euphoria" that seems to be sweeping the populaces of many Central European countries at present and despite the big cultural gulf between the Central European states and Turkey.

More important than the persisting threat of direct Soviet military activities will be the challenges to NATO countries that could arise from the instability that now marks Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. As indicated previously, the new governments in Eastern Europe confront major political and economic problems that could lead to severe strife in at least parts of the region, especially the Balkans. In fact, Yugoslavia is already in substantial civil turmoil. Such conflict could easily spill over into NATO states—particularly Turkey, Greece, and Italy. All three countries have minorities with ethnic brethren in East European states, and vice versa. In addition, there are no firmly fixed boundaries between these NATO countries and their East European neighbors.²⁴ Even NATO members not likely to be subject to direct spillover will doubtless view the prospects of such a development with alarm because of its potentially unsettling effect on the general European situation.

The Soviet Union is facing three kinds of crises simultaneously—economic, political, and ethnic. As already pointed out, the Soviet leadership's attempt to restructure the Soviet economy has barely gotten off the ground, and the performance of the economy has steadily worsened. An economic catastrophe on the order of the 1930-33 Great Depression in the US can no longer be ruled out.

In the political realm, a process of democratization has begun. Even before the failed coup of August 1991, the Soviet Communist party had lost its monopoly of power. Free elections for posts such as the mayors of Moscow and Leningrad and the presidents of the Russian republic and the Baltic republics had brought to office avowed noncommunist reformers. Since the collapse of the coup, the party has virtually ceased to exist as a coherent institution. President Gorbachev has resigned as general secretary and disbanded the Politburo. Moreover, the party's activities have been suspended, and much of its property has been seized.

Yet the political situation remains quite fragile.²⁵ Although democratic forces now hold sway in what is left of the central government apparatus and in the organs of some of the republics—notably the Russian republic—they have by no means vanquished the hard-line, authoritarian elements. The latter still occupy many major posts in the central bureaucracy, and they retain dominance of the structures of a number of republics. No less significant, there is a "silent majority" in the country that has yet to commit itself politically. According to a deputy of the Leningrad (now St. Petersburg) city council, polls taken after the unsuccessful coup showed that 30 percent of Leningrad's population had actively opposed the coup, 20 percent had supported it, and 50 percent had stayed neutral or been indifferent.²⁶ If many of this last group had opted to side with forces calling for restoration of order and discipline in the event of another confrontation, the outcome might have been quite different than it was in August 1991.

On the ethnic front, the loosening of political controls has unleashed a flood of nationalist and even secessionist sentiments in the republics which threatens the survival of any unified Soviet state.²⁷ In April 1991, a compromise that would

avoid a bloody confrontation between the center and many union republics appeared to be emerging. Gorbachev and the heads of nine republics hammered out a joint statement which seemed to go a long way toward guaranteeing a new union pact with substantial features of the confederal arrangement that these republics wanted. It left open as well the possibility for the six republics not represented at the gathering—Armenia, Georgia, Moldavia, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia—to adhere to whatever new accord was worked out.²⁸

The abortive coup of August 1991, however, rendered the accord eventually produced a dead issue. Opposition to implementation of the agreement had clearly sparked the right-wing effort to oust Gorbachev,²⁹ so the republics sought to protect themselves against any future crackdown by the center on their freedom of action. Because of the center's weakened condition after the coup, they managed to pursue this goal effectively in the individual ways that they deemed desirable. The three Baltic republics at last regained the independence that they had lost in 1940. Both the Moldavian and Georgian republics asserted their independence, although neither has yet obtained international recognition as a separate state. The leaders of the other 10 republics and President Gorbachev presented a plan to an emergency session of the Congress of People's Deputies in early September 1991 that would preserve a union, but their blueprint greatly strengthened the powers of the republics. The central government was to retain responsibility only for defense, foreign affairs, and certain economic functions.³⁰

Whether even this truncated and watered-down union will endure is still an open question. Economic realities suggest that it should, but nationalist passions have risen so high that such an outcome is not a foregone conclusion.

This is especially true because many of the precise details of the arrangement still have to be worked out, and there is already much haggling among the republics over them.³¹

All of these circumstances are fraught with possibilities for major strife. From the standpoint of NATO states, these possibilities raise anxieties for several reasons. First, turmoil in a country where a raft of nuclear weapons exists enhances the chances that an accidental firing might take place or that some weapons might fall into the hands of irresponsible elements. Second, conflict in the Soviet Union could spill over into neighboring East European or NATO countries because of ethnic bonds between groups in these states and dominant groups in various republics of the Soviet Union. Such a development could bring about the involvement of still other countries and ultimately engulf Europe as a whole in war. Third, the new Baltic states and any other republics that achieve independent status in the eyes of the international community could turn out to be highly unstable and a source of potential trouble for NATO members. Each of the original 14 non-Russian republics has at least one significant ethnic minority within its borders that fears oppression by the particular national group that dominates there; these tensions have already resulted in internal strife in many republics. Here again, the conflict could draw in NATO countries because of ethnic ties of one kind or another. Furthermore, hostilities between the Christian inhabitants of Georgia and Armenia and the Muslim Turks have existed for centuries, and Armenians have long-standing grievances against the Turks that stem from alleged mistreatment during and after World War I.

Most NATO members do tend to look to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) as a political

mechanism for dealing with crises growing out of instability in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, but the CSCE's capabilities to handle such matters are currently quite modest. Certainly, it has no military forces at its disposal to deploy even for peacekeeping purposes. The West European Union (WEU) suffers from similar limitations. This organization does have the advantage of close links to NATO because it was created originally as a device for integrating West Germany into NATO, and the WEU's membership (nine countries, as opposed to 16 for NATO) excludes those states that over the years have most strenuously objected to joint military actions outside Western Europe (Norway, Denmark, Iceland, and Greece). Yet the WEU lacks any standing institutions to plan for contingencies in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union that might require a military response; moreover, it controls no military forces and can only serve as a coordinating framework for military operations. For the foreseeable future, then, the NATO military structure will provide the only feasible venue for working out plans to cope militarily with crises in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and it will be the source of the most readily available military forces for commitment to crisis management undertakings there.

The growing possibilities of out-of-area threats to European security are equally relevant to NATO's future. Saddam Hussein's attempt in 1990 to gain dominance over the Persian Gulf's oil by seizing Kuwait and bullying the other Gulf states into doing his bidding affords a good illustration of the trend. Many West European states rely heavily on the Persian Gulf for supplies of petroleum to sustain their highly energy-dependent economies, and Iraqi control of the flow of oil from the Gulf would have left them open to blackmail by Hussein. Thus, a number of them joined the anti-Iraq military coalition, although not under of-

ficial NATO auspices. They coordinated their activities loosely through the WEU.

Hussein's defeat by no means guarantees that oil supplies will move freely from the Gulf to Western Europe in the years ahead. Iran's internal politics could take another lurch to the left and spark a new militant Islamic drive against the Western countries. One or more of the Arab states in the Gulf could experience domestic upheavals that would bring to power virulently anti-Western forces. Or fighting could break out again between Israel and the Arab countries, and the Arabs could decide to employ an oil boycott against Western powers to persuade these states to exert pressure on Israel to act in a particular way. None of these developments can be dismissed as far-fetched in light of existing conditions.

Challenges of a different nature could stem from closer home—namely, from North Africa. Many of the states of this region have the potential of becoming serious adversaries of European countries, particularly those along the northern littoral of the Mediterranean.

All of the North African states except Libya suffer from major social and economic problems—high rates of population growth, increases in GNP that fail to keep pace with the rise in population, high unemployment, rapid urbanization, maldistribution of income, and so forth. Even Libya has not escaped these difficulties entirely. In the past, the ability of people to emigrate, either legally or illegally, to greener pastures in Europe has served as a safety valve for the region, and most of the Mediterranean European countries now have large minorities of immigrant North Africans. An estimated two million Moroccans, Algerians, and Tunisians live in France alone. The economic unity of Europe impending at the end of 1992, however, will encourage new and severe measures by European governments to cut off this flow of North African immigrants. It will also eliminate

the preferences that many North African products now enjoy in the European market. Consequently, the North African states are becoming highly vulnerable to efforts by anti-Western elements to mobilize the masses politically against both the existing order and against the West. Islamic militants of various stripes have already emerged as forces to be reckoned with in Algeria, Tunisia, and Egypt, and they have made some inroads elsewhere. In the case of Libya, of course, they have to contend with Muammar Qadhafi, who has his own anti-Western agenda.³² What is especially troubling in this context is that at least three North African countries—Egypt, Libya, and Algeria—possess or are in the process of trying to acquire weapons of mass destruction of one sort or another as well as the means to deliver them.³³

Traditionally, the European members of NATO have opposed the involvement of NATO military forces beyond the European area, but their views on this issue now appear to be shifting. Under a plan approved in outline at a NATO defense ministers meeting in late May 1991, a multinational rapid reaction corps of 50,000 to 70,000 troops is to be formed within NATO under British command and partly based in Germany. Officials say that this unit could be used in crises outside Europe if NATO countries agree to modify the treaty to permit its employment in this fashion.³⁴

Even if some members ultimately object to altering the NATO treaty, the military organization will still probably have a key, if informal, function in preparations to handle out-of-area crises. That is, it will provide a framework in which forces from various states can learn to work together effectively as a coalition to cope with such situations. This sort of experience will tend to render inconsequential the question of whether the forces are deployed as representatives of NATO itself or on the basis of individual

national commitments or a WEU commitment.

A final factor that could help keep NATO active militarily lies in the desire of virtually all of the European states for continued US military involvement on the continent—something which can most logically take place through NATO. Clearly, the Soviet Union in 1990 agreed to the participation of a unified Germany in NATO because Moscow believed that this would permit the US to serve as an effective military counterweight to Germany in Europe. Some new East European governments in places like Hungary have gone so far as to express a wish to join NATO, and all except perhaps Albania have shown little enthusiasm about the idea of dissolving NATO's military structure. They seem to regard a US military role in Europe as essential to deter the Soviet Union from military ventures against them.³⁵ With the unification of Germany, at least most West European countries have come to see continuing US military engagement in Europe as worthwhile, for none of them can counterbalance their German partner either economically or militarily. The new plan for the alliance military structure discussed at the May 1991 NATO defense ministers conference, for instance, calls for substantial, if reduced, numbers of US troops to remain in Europe indefinitely; furthermore, it provides for an American to retain the top command of the alliance's military organization.³⁶

Domestic Conditions

IN CONTRAST with the assumptions about the world situation, those concerning domestic circumstances look pretty solid. The assumption related to the budget, however, seems slightly more solid than the one about pressure to cut military spending.

Budget Problems

Constraints on the US budget will unquestionably continue to be severe through the mid-1990s. After that, they could ease, but there is no certainty that they will do so.

The agreement hammered out by President George Bush and the Congress in October 1990 calls for a cut of \$492 billion in federal deficits across a five-year period. This is to be financed about equally by reductions in federal spending and increases in federal revenues. New rules on spending also impose yearly ceilings through fiscal year (FY) 1993 in three broad budget categories—domestic, military, and foreign aid. If Congress appropriates total amounts that exceed the ceiling in any category, the administration must make across-the-board cuts within that category. Moreover, any expansion of benefits in the domestic category must be offset by revenue increases or spending reductions.³⁷

This accord, however, applies to projected federal outlays rather than to current budget levels; thus, its impact will depend on the accuracy of the economic forecasts upon which its goals are based. Although the Bush administration in 1990 foresaw budget surpluses emerging by 1994, few experts accepted this prediction at the time. Many argued that even a mild recession would raise the deficit beyond the current projections, and they also noted that the calculations excluded the massive costs of the federal bailout of the savings and loan industry.³⁸ Over ensuing months, the US has experienced one moderate to serious recession; furthermore, its military operations in the Persian Gulf in 1990-91 have required supplemental appropriations to the FY 1991 defense budget that will probably run about \$15 billion.³⁹ Consequently, even a balanced budget by 1994 seems highly improbable.

This judgment is reinforced by the calls since August 1991 to revise the October 1990 budget agreement so as to allow any unforeseen military budget cuts to be used to supplement domestic spending as well as to reduce the budget deficits. Such proposals began soon after the democratic forces in the Soviet Union succeeded in thwarting the right-wing coup there in late August. They have intensified since President Bush announced at the end of September 1991 that he was unilaterally ordering elimination of ground-launched US tactical nuclear weapons and withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons from all surface ships, attack submarines, and land-based naval aircraft bases; removal of US strategic bombers from day-to-day alert status and placement of their nuclear weapons in storage; and cancellation of US development of both nuclear short-range attack missiles and mobile versions of the Peacekeeper and the Midgetman intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM).⁴⁰

Just how long large deficits might persist is hard to say. One key factor will be the general health of the US economy. If the economy suffers other recessions between now and the mid-1990s or even if its growth rate proves more sluggish than the Bush administration expects, big shortfalls could last for some time.

The domestic political scene over the next several years will constitute another major influence. Theoretically, the executive and legislative branches could decide—either before or after the present budget pact expires—to raise taxes again to reduce the deficits. Although Congress might be so inclined, President Bush does not appear disposed to do so while he holds office. That could be through 1996. Whether his successor in either 1992 or 1996 will be any more amenable to the idea is at best debatable. As for the American public, it shows increased concern about the deficits, but it is decidedly

less than enthusiastic about additional taxes or major cuts in domestic outlays to bring the deficits down. In the absence of a major presidential effort to alter this perspective, it seems unlikely to change.

In a worst-case scenario, the US could face significant budget difficulties for quite an extended period. Indeed, major problems of this sort could still be confronting it by the beginning of the next century.

Pressure to Decrease Military Spending

Washington gives every evidence of a firm commitment to a reduction of US military outlays through the mid-1990s, but until August–September 1991 the cuts promised to be relatively gradual rather than precipitous in nature. Since then, however, there have been mounting calls from many quarters for deeper cuts in military expenditures than those anticipated in the budget agreement of October 1990. These developments now leave the size of the military budget in the next few years somewhat open to question. Moreover, they raise the possibility that the rate of military cutbacks may stay high well into the late 1990s.

According to the FY 1992 budget request and the projected budget requests through FY 1996 that Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney presented to Congress in February 1991, the defense budget would fall at an average rate of 3 percent a year, in real terms, during the 1992–96 period. By FY 1996, Cheney reported, defense outlays were expected to constitute just 3.6 percent of the US GNP—the lowest share since before World War II. No less significant, the levels of spending upon which Cheney's analysis was based were consistent with the discretionary caps accepted by the president and Congress in October 1990.⁴¹ Thus, there appeared to be general accord be-

tween the executive and legislative branches on what size the defense budget should be over the next several years, although it remained to be seen whether Congress would actually exercise the discipline required to adhere to the projected levels of military expenditures.

But this state of affairs has altered considerably since the collapse of the coup attempt in the Soviet Union in August 1991 and especially since President Bush's unilateral arms initiatives in September 1991. Although the Bush administration continues to endorse the fairly moderate pace of military reductions embodied in the budget accord that it concluded with Congress in 1990, both liberals and conservatives in Congress are now voicing a conviction that the pace can be speeded up without damage to US security. Thus far, talk of decreased military outlays has focused on "big-ticket" items such as the B-2 bomber and the Strategic Defense Initiative, yet even totally eliminating funding for these items would not have that great an impact on overall spending. However, significant reductions in conventional forces beyond those cutbacks already contemplated in the administration's 25 percent draw-

down could bring about a steep fall in military expenditures.⁴²

Congressional inclinations appear to be in harmony with the mood of the public at large. For example, a major new private study published in September 1991 suggested that much deeper cuts than those already programmed could be made in the 1990s without adversely affecting US security, and public opinion polls have been indicating that more and more Americans believe that the time for big military budgets is nearing an end.⁴³

The latter evidence seems to negate earlier signs of the emergence of a somewhat different public judgment in the wake of the 1991 Persian Gulf conflict. This event appeared to be persuading Americans generally that the diminished Soviet threat did not necessarily ensure a tranquil world; thus, the public looked ready to support the maintenance of sizable US military forces in the future. Liberal as well as conservative analysts conceded that the rate of military cutbacks might decline by the middle of the decade or thereafter, and that there might even be an upward turn in military spending then.⁴⁴

Notes

1. For an excellent summary of the pre-1945 politico-economic traditions of Eastern Europe, see George Schopflin, "The Political Traditions of Eastern Europe," *Daedalus* 119, no. 1 (Winter 1990): 55-90. Valerie Bunce looks at the cultural impediments to democratization and marketization in Eastern Europe at the outset of the 1990s in "The Struggle for Liberal Democracy in Eastern Europe," *World Policy Journal* 7, no. 3 (Summer 1990): 395-430. Her conclusions about the ability of the East European countries to surmount these impediments, however, may wind up being overly sanguine.

2. A good discussion of the election and its background may be found in Voytek Zubek, "Walesa's Leadership and Poland's Transition," *Problems of Communism* 40, no. 1-2 (January-April 1991): 69-83.

3. On the growing strife in Eastern Europe resulting from ethnic and/or religious diversity, see the country and regional analyses since early 1990

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4. For an especially vivid account of these features of the new governments, see Serge Schmemmann, "For Eastern Europe Now, a New Disillusion," *New York Times*, 9 November 1990. Other relevant discussions may be found in Anna Sabbat-Swidlicka, "Poland: Mazowiecki's Year in Review," *Report on Eastern Europe* 2, no. 1 (4 January 1991): 25-31, and "Sejm Rejects President's Proposals for Early Elections," *Report on Eastern Europe* 2, no. 12 (22 March 1991): 16-21; Jan B. de Weydenthal, "The First Hundred Days of Walesa's Presidency," *Report on Eastern Europe* 2, no. 14 (5 April 1991): 9-12; Louisa Vinton, "Walesa, 'Special Powers,' and the Balcerwicz Plan," *Report on Eastern Europe* 2, no. 29 (19 July 1991): 15-23; David McQuaid, "Poland: The 'War' over the Election Law," *Report on Eastern Europe* 2, no. 31 (2 August 1991): 11-28; Alfred Reisch, "Hungary: Prime Minister Replaces Key Ministers," *Report on Eastern Europe* 2, no. 6 (8 February 1991): 11-15; George Schopflin, "Conservatism and Hungary's Transition," *Problems of Communism* 40, no. 1-2 (January-April 1991): 60-68; Judith Pataki, "Hungary: Popularity of Major Political Parties Decreases," *Report on Eastern Europe* 2, no. 31 (2 August 1991): 5-10; Jiri Pehe, "Czechoslovakia: The Instability of Transition," *Report on Eastern Europe* 2, no. 1 (4 January 1991): 11-16; Milan Andrejevich, "Bosnia-Herzegovina: Yugoslavia's Linchpin," and "Election Update," *Report on Eastern Europe* 1, no. 49 (7 December 1990): 20-27; Milan Andrejevich, "The Future of Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Sovereign Republic or Cantonization?" *Report on Eastern Europe* 2, no. 27 (5 July 1991): 28-34; Milan Andrejevich, "The Election Scoreboard for Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia," *Report on Eastern Europe* 1, no. 51 (21 December 1990): 37-39; Milan Andrejevich, "Yugoslavia: The End of an Era, New Beginnings," *Report on Eastern Europe* 2, no. 1 (4 January 1991): 38-44; Milan Andrejevich, "Slovenian Government Faces Challenges," *Report on Eastern Europe* 2, no. 11 (15 March 1991): 30-33; Milan Andrejevich, Patrick Moore, and Duncan M. Perry, "Croatia and Slovenia Declare Their Independence," *Report on*

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6. Andrejevich, "The Election Scoreboard for Serbia, Montenegro, and Macedonia," and "Yugoslavia: The End of an Era, New Beginnings"; Milan Andrejevich, "Unrest in Belgrade: A Symptom of Serbia's Crisis," *Report on Eastern Europe* 2, no. 13 (29 March 1991): 13-18; Robert D. Kaplan, "The Absurd in Serbia: Bloody Balkans," *The New Republic*, 8 April 1991, 14-15; David Binder, "How Tito's Heirs Made a Mess of Yugoslavia," *New York Times*, 30 June 1991; Sudetic, "Yugoslav Federal Army to Pull Out of Slovenia"; Stephen Engelberg, "Croatia Offers Peace Plan to Serb Rebels," *New York Times*, 1 August 1991; Chuck Sudetic, "Serbs Refuse to Negotiate in Croatia," *New York Times*, 5 August 1991.

7. See, for example, Marie Lavigne, "The CMEA's Transition from the Transferable Ruble," *Report on Eastern Europe* 1, no. 44 (2 November 1990): 34-47; Steven Greenhouse, "Long and Painful Road Ahead to Free Markets for East," *New York Times*, 10 November 1990; Clyde Haberman, "Bulgaria and

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8. Jackson, "The Economic Situation in Eastern Europe in 1990," 52.

9. David Binder, "More Economic Pain Seen for Soviets," *New York Times*, 17 May 1991. For a more detailed picture of the status of the Soviet economy in the early 1990s, see Anders Aslund, "Gorbachev, Perestroika, and Economic Crisis," *Problems of Communism* 40, no. 1-2 (January-April 1991): 18-41.

10. Binder.

11. Speech at the Fourth Congress of USSR People's Deputies on 22 December 1990, *Izvestiya*, 24 December 1990.

12. Based on conversations in the Soviet Union, 12 to 22 September 1991.

13. For a particularly good discussion of US perspectives on the issue of expanding economic links with the Soviet Union, see Keith Bradsher, "Shortage of Cash Keeps Soviets Out of World Markets," *New York Times*, 19 August 1991. On Baker's statement see Thomas L. Friedman, "Baker Eases Terms for Aid to Soviets," *New York Times*, 11 September 1991.

14. Regarding the plan, see Justus M. van der Kroef, "Cambodia in 1990: The Elusive Peace," *Asian Survey* 31, no. 1 (January 1991): 94-102; Steven Erlanger, "Ending Talks, All Cambodia Parties Commit Themselves to UN Peace Plan," *New York Times*, 11 September 1990.

15. On the accord, see Thomas L. Friedman, "US and Soviets to End Arms Sales to Afghan Rivals," *New York Times*, 14 September 1991.

16. Thomas L. Friedman, "Gorbachev Says He's Ready to Pull Troops Out of Cuba and End Castro's Subsidies," *New York Times*, 12 September 1991.

17. Secretary of State James Baker, "From Points to Pathways of Mutual Advantage: Next Steps in Soviet-American Relations," address before the American Committee on US-Soviet Relations, 19 October 1990, *US Department of State Dispatch*, 22 October 1990, 200; "Waiver of Jackson-Vanik Amendment and US Economic Assistance to the Soviet Union," *Foreign Policy Bulletin* 1, no. 4-5

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18. See, for example, Serge Schmemmann, "Moscow to Ask Help From West on Reform Plan," *New York Times*, 18 May 1991; "Have We Got a Deal for You," *Newsweek*, 3 June 1991, 39.

19. For a Soviet attempt to categorize the diverse Soviet opinions in the 1990s about Moscow's foreign policy, see A. Kortunov and A. Izumov, "What Is Meant by State Interests in Foreign Policy," *Literaturnaya gazeta*, 11 July 1990, 14. Some of the cleavages that these authors identify involve attitudes toward US-Soviet political cooperation, but not all do.

20. Typical illustrations of this outlook are the speeches of N. S. Petrushenko, V. I. Alksnis, and Ye. V. Kogan at the 15 October 1990 meeting of the USSR Supreme Soviet, as published in *Literaturnaya Rossiia*, 12 November 1990, 18-19.

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22. For more extended treatment of these points, see David E. Albright, *Threats to US Security in a Postcontainment World*, CADRE Paper, AU ARI CPSS-91 12 (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, forthcoming), chap. 4.

23. Conversations with Turkish officials in Washington on 27 February 1991.

24. See Larrabee, 58-91; Daniel E. Nelson, "Europe's Unstable East," *Foreign Policy*, Spring 1991, 137-58.

25. This judgment is based on personal observations and talks with a variety of Soviet citizens during a visit to the Soviet Union from 12 to 22 September 1991.

26. Conversation of 20 September 1991 in St. Petersburg.

27. For analysis of the situation, see, for example, Gail W. Lapidus, "Gorbachev's Nationality Problem," *Foreign Affairs* 68, no. 4 (Fall 1989): 92-108; Richard Pipes, "The Soviet Union Adrift," *Foreign Affairs* 70, no. 1 (America and the World, 1990/91): 70-87.

28. See Roman Solchanyk, "The Gorbachev-El'tsin Pact and the New Union Treaty," *Report on the USSR* 3, no. 19 (10 May 1991): 1-3.

29. Bill Keller, "Gorbachev and His Fateful Step," *New York Times*, 20 August 1991. This assessment is widely shared among Western analysts.

30. "Statement of the USSR President and the Highest Leaders of the Union Republics," *Izvestiya*, 3 September 1991.

31. For illustrative purposes, see the meetings on defense issues among republic representatives and the leadership of the Soviet Ministry of Defense.

as described by V. Litovkin, "Marshall Shaposhnikov Presents His Concept of Military Reform," *Izvestiya*, 11 September 1991; and "Military Council in Arbat Takes a Break. Consultations Will Be Continued," *Izvestiya*, 14 September 1991.

32. For more detailed discussion, see Joe Stork, "North Africa Faces the 1990s," *Middle East Report*, March-April 1990, 4-8, 44; Paul Balta, "Oranges, Olives, Oil—The Maghreb in Transition," *NATO's Sixteen Nations*, April 1990, 18-24; Ellen Lalpison, "Thinking about the Mediterranean," *Mediterranean Quarterly* 1, no. 1 (Winter 1990): 50-66; Richard B. Parker, *North Africa: Regional Tensions and Strategic Concerns* (New York: Praeger, 1987), chap. 6; Hermann Frederick Eilts, "Islamic Fundamentalism: A Quest for a New Order," *Mediterranean Quarterly* 1, no. 4 (Fall 1990): 27-45; Mark Tessler, "Tunisia's New Beginning," *Current History*, April 1990, 169-72, 182-84; Dirk Vandewalle, "Qadhafi's Unfinished Revolution," *Mediterranean Quarterly* 1, no. 1 (Winter 1990): 67-81; William Lewis, "Algeria and the Maghreb at the Turning Point," *Mediterranean Quarterly* 1, no. 3 (Summer 1990): 62-74; Alan Riding, "Immigrant Unrest Alarming French," *New York Times*, 23 June 1991.

33. See Albright, chap. 2, for a more extended treatment of this subject.

34. Paul L. Montgomery, "NATO Is Planning to Cut US Forces in Europe by 50%," *New York Times*, 29 May 1991. For a good discussion of the traditional views of West European states on the out-of-area issue, see Douglas L. Stewart, *Can NATO Transcend Its European Borders? NATO Out-of-Area Disputes* (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 21 February 1991).

35. For analysis of East European attitudes, see Nelson.

36. Alan Riding, "NATO: Still the Defender of Europe," *New York Times*, 30 May 1991.

37. "The Art of the Deal," *Newsweek*, 5 November 1990, 21-22; Sylvia Nasar, "Economic Outlook: The Budget Battle Isn't Over," *US News & World Report*, 12 November 1990, 75; "Cutting the Deficits: The Final Package," *New York Times*, 28 October 1990; Susan F. Rasky, "Substantial Power on Spending Is Shifted From Congress to Bush," *New York Times*, 30 October 1991.

38. "The Art of the Deal" and Nasar.

39. Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, "The Cost of Desert Storm," prepared statement to the Senate Appropriations Committee, Washington, D.C., 26 February 1991, *Defense Issues* 6, no. 7.

40. See, for example, Gwen Ifill, "Calls to Review Budget Pact Rise," *New York Times*, 2 October 1991. For details of President Bush's unilateral reductions, see Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, "Reducing the United States Nuclear Arsenal," memorandum for Secretaries of the Military Departments, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Under Secretaries of Defense, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence, 28 September 1991.

41. Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, "US Defense Strategy and the DoD Budget Request," prepared statement to the House Armed Services Committee, Washington, D.C., 7 February 1991, *Defense Issues* 6, no. 4, 4.

42. R. W. Apple, Jr., "Battle Cry in Congress," *New York Times*, 1 October 1991.

43. William W. Kaufmann and John D. Steinbruner, *The Post-Cold War Defense Program* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1991); Apple.

44. Noted in Leonard Silk, "Economic Scene: A Balancing Act in Military Policy," *New York Times*, 31 May 1991.

Chapter 3

Implications

IF CIRCUMSTANCES other than those commonly anticipated in this series of CADRE Papers prevail in the international arena in the years ahead, what ramifications would there be for US military strategy and force structure? These can be conveniently discussed under three broad headings: the European region, third world conflicts, and arms control.

The European Region

A WANING of US-Soviet cooperation could result in a reversal of the ongoing military drawdown of the Soviet Union—especially if accompanied by a conservative takeover of whatever central Soviet government still existed. Just how serious a military challenge to NATO's European members the Soviet Union could then mount would depend on the extent to which the drawdown had progressed before it was halted, the state of the Soviet economy, and the relationship between central and republic authorities. At maximum, the threat would probably not equal that of the mid-1980s, in light of the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the possibility of opposition from the new East European governments to military actions by the Soviet Union against Western Europe. Nevertheless, it could prove significant.

To cope with such a challenge, the US and its NATO partners would almost cer-

tainly have to return to a strategy of forward defense and flexible response.¹ In doing so, they would need to come up with a way of carrying out this type of strategy within the constraints imposed on military forces in the former German Democratic Republic (GDR) by the 1990 German unification treaty. This document forbids the stationing in the ex-GDR of German military units assigned to NATO until after the withdrawal of all Soviet troops in 1994, and it allows only German NATO forces to be deployed in the area thereafter.²

Responsibility for providing the forces to deter or counter an extensive Soviet military attack would fall first of all upon the European NATO countries, but the US would need to be prepared to reinforce these elements. In light of the increased response time likely to be available because of the demise of the military organization of the Warsaw Pact, there would probably be no requirement to station a large contingent of US troops in Europe. However, the US would have to be able to dispatch substantial forces from the continental US on fairly short notice, and this imperative suggests the desirability of maintaining a sizable ready reserve capable of conducting such a deployment.

Mounting turmoil in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union—a much more likely prospect than the revival of a severe Soviet military threat to NATO states—would probably necessitate a US military

strategy of conflict management in Europe. Such turmoil could easily involve other portions of the continent of direct interest to the US, for the neighbors of the East European countries and the Soviet Union have a variety of ethnic ties with these states and share numerous contested borders with them. Meeting challenges posed by conflict situations of this sort would doubtless require political as well as military actions, yet political efforts alone might not suffice. An evident capability and willingness to use military means to prevent or stop hostilities, to monitor peace accords, and the like might well turn out to be essential.

To implement this type of strategy, the US would need some kind of rapid deployment force. This force's structure would have to be quite flexible so that the elements deployed in any given instance could be tailored to the precise circumstances of that particular crisis. Although such a force could conceivably function from the continental US, it would clearly be more effective if it operated from European soil.

Survival of a vital NATO military organization would, of course, greatly facilitate attempts by the US to devise and carry out a military strategy for conflict management in the European region. Under such circumstances, the US could collaborate with its European allies in arriving at measures to cope with conflict situations of mutual concern. Such collaboration would require the US to be sensitive to its allies' interests and perspectives, but because joint undertakings would be more credible and less offensive to the peoples of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union than a unilateral approach, they would be well worth that price.

The proposed NATO rapid reaction force would also afford a worthwhile vehicle for implementing a strategy of conflict management. As a mixed force

with heavy European representation, it would lack the onus of a wholly US force.

Third World Conflicts

DECREASED US-Soviet cooperation could render it difficult if not impossible for Washington to work through the UN to build a coalition for dealing militarily with a third world conflict of major concern to the US. The Soviet Union might wind up neutral or take the opposite side from the US in specific third world conflicts. Thus, it might often decide to abstain from votes on, or even veto, US-backed initiatives in the Security Council. In addition, lack of Soviet concurrence on a proposed course of action could inhibit many other states from endorsing it either in the Security Council or in the General Assembly.

Should NATO opt to expand the scope of its military activities to non-European situations of relevance to European countries, it could serve as an alternative formal structure for US pursuit of joint military undertakings to deal with some third world conflicts important to Washington. Most conflicts in the Middle East and North Africa would in all likelihood fall into this group. Moreover, the contemplated rapid deployment force for NATO would constitute a valuable means of joint military actions because it would not have to be formed from scratch.

Even if NATO did become an institutional framework for assuring a standing military coalition to handle some third world conflicts, instances would undoubtedly arise in which a coalition and the forces to accomplish its goals would need to be put together on an ad hoc basis. Indeed, should NATO retain its past aversion to out-of-area commitments, the US would have to approach the building of essentially all military coalitions in such a manner. Under extreme conditions—where no coalition could be formed and Washington deemed

the stakes involved sufficiently high—the US would be compelled to act alone to uphold its interests.

To function effectively either as a member of an ad hoc coalition or in a unilateral undertaking, the US would unquestionably require some rapid deployment capabilities in being. These would be essential to handle the immediate dangers of a crisis and to give other forces needed time to mobilize. In view of likely budget constraints and the attendant limitations on forces available, these rapid reaction elements would have to be composite in nature and highly flexible in organization so that the deployed force could be shaped in accordance with the pertaining concrete conditions.

Arms Control

THE REDUCTION or cessation of US-Soviet cooperation could severely impair the ability of the US to employ arms control as a key element of its military strategy. This effect would probably be felt in two particular spheres.

First, such a development could well foreclose the possibility of concluding major new agreements with the Soviet Union on mutual arms reductions. It would probably not jeopardize implementation of the CFE and Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) treaties and, depending on the timing involved, perhaps even the measures that President Gorbachev has decided to take in response to President Bush's unilateral undertakings in the nuclear realm,³ but the chances of progress on further curtailment of Soviet capabilities to threaten the US and/or its NATO allies would in all likelihood be slim.

The outcome could be increased pressure in the US to modernize its weapons inventory to ensure at least technological parity with Soviet forces. This would no

doubt be strongest in the strategic nuclear realm.

Second and perhaps more important, a decline or end of US-Soviet collaboration could have quite a deleterious impact on US efforts to curb the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The 1990-91 Persian Gulf conflict pointed up the dangers of proliferation of not only nuclear but also chemical and biological weapons and the missile systems to deliver them; consequently, the US has now undertaken an intensified drive to stop their spread. Without Soviet help, however, such an effort will inevitably prove futile.

In the event of such an outcome, the US would probably then need to ensure that it possessed the means to deter the use of weapons of mass destruction by any state that possessed them. This requirement would almost certainly mean retention of some tactical nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons plus advanced systems for delivering them. Essential as well, however, might be the unquestionable capability not only to defend against the employment of weapons of these kinds but also to destroy those deployed and any facilities for producing them. Antiballistic missiles could be useful for defensive purposes, while sophisticated bombers and missiles would be essential to take out deployed weapons and production facilities.

Conclusion

THE FOREGOING analysis, it should be stressed, must be treated as cautionary and not corrective. By no means is it certain that the conditions out of which the discussed implications for US military strategy and force structure would flow will actually materialize. Indeed, most contributors to this special series of CADRE Papers believe that such cir-

cumstances are less likely to emerge than those upon which they have predicated their judgments and recommendations. Nothing said here is meant to negate that conclusion.

What the analysis does highlight, however, is the need to think through what the US should do if it encounters discontinuities rather than the continuities en-

visioned by contributors to the series, and how the US might best posture itself to follow these alternative courses if necessary. The fact that several, and not just one, of the assumed continuities are questionable heightens the imperative. Only with such advance planning can the US offset, or at least mitigate, the consequences of unexpected events.

Notes

1. In its London declaration of July 1990, the North Atlantic Council pledged to "move away" from such a strategy. See "London Declaration, North Atlantic Council, July 5-6, 1990," *US Department of State Dispatch*, 8 October 1990, 163.

2. The full text of the treaty may be found in "Treaty on the Final Settlement With Respect to Germany: Treaty and Agreed Minutes," *US Department of State Dispatch*, 8 October 1990, 165-67.

3. In early October 1991, President Gorbachev said that the Soviet Union intended to eliminate its nuclear artillery, nuclear mines, and nuclear warheads on tactical rockets; to withdraw all of its tactical nuclear weapons from ships and from multipurpose submarines; to remove its heavy bombers

from alert status and put their nuclear weapons in storage; to move its nuclear-tipped Zenith missiles to a central base and destroy some of them; to take off alert 503 of its ICBMs, including 134 missiles with multiple warheads; to stop development of both a "modified nuclear short-range missile" for heavy bombers and a "mobile small-dimension" ICBM; to keep its mobile missiles stationary; and over the next seven years to cut the number of its strategic warheads from the 6,000 authorized by the START treaty to 5,000. "Gorbachev's Remarks on Nuclear Arms Cuts," excerpts from Gorbachev's Soviet television statement of 5 October 1991, translated in part by Tass and in part by Cable News Network, *New York Times*, 6 October 1991.