


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
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Role of Air Force Special Operations
in Foreign Internal Defense

JOHN R. MOULTON II, Maj, USAF

THE FUTURE OF THE AIR FORCE


REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

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Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503.

1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)		2. REPORT DATE		3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE ROLE OF AIR FORCE SPECIAL OPERATIONS IN FOREIGN INTERNAL DEFENSE				5. FUNDING NUMBERS N/A	
6. AUTHOR(S) Maj JOHN R MOULTON II, USAF					
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) CADRE/PT MAXWELL AFB AL 36112-5532				8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER AU-ARI-CPSS-91-3	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) SAME as #7				10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER N/A	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES					
12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT PUBLIC RELEASE				12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE A	
13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words)					
14. SUBJECT TERMS				15. NUMBER OF PAGES	
				a. PRICE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT UNCLAS	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE UNCLAS	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT UNCLAS	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT NONE		

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Report No. AU-ARI-CPSS-91-3

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by

JOHN R. MOULTON II, Maj, USAF

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Air University Press
Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama 36112-5532

September 1991

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This publication has been reviewed by security and policy review authorities and is cleared for public release.

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Foreword

The stunning changes in the complexion of international politics that began late in the decade of the 1980s and continue today will profoundly affect the American military establishment as a whole, and the US Air Force in particular. Decisions about the future course of the military will be made in the early part of the 1990s which will essentially determine the course of the US Air Force well into the next century. Decisions of such importance require thoughtful consideration of all points of view.

This report is one in a special series of CADRE Papers which address many of the issues that decision makers must consider when undertaking such momentous decisions. The list of subjects addressed in this special series is by no means exhaustive, and the treatment of each subject is certainly not definitive. However, the Papers do treat topics of considerable importance to the future of the US Air Force, treat them with care and originality, and provide valuable insights.

We believe this special series of CADRE Papers can be of considerable value to policymakers at all levels as they plan for the US Air Force and its role in the so-called postcontainment environment.



DENNIS M. DREW, Col, USAF
Director
Airpower Research Institute

About the Author



Maj John R. Moulton II

Maj John R. ("Randy") Moulton II completed this study while assigned to the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service as a USAF Research Associate. Major Moulton is a 1978 graduate of the United States Air Force Academy. Upon graduation from undergraduate navigator training, Major Moulton served as a WC-130 navigator with the 54th Weather Reconnaissance Squadron, Andersen Air Force Base (AFB), Guam. During this tour of duty he logged 51 typhoon penetrations and 135 tropical cyclone missions while serving as unit mobility officer and assistant chief of standardization and evaluation. From September 1982 to July 1985, Major Moulton served as standardization and evaluation, tactics, and plans officer for the 55th Ammunition Asset Reporting System, Eglin AFB, Florida, flying special operations HC-130s. From July 1985 to July 1987 he served as deputy director Wing Standardization and Evaluation and as the special operations focal point officer for the 39th Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Wing, Eglin AFB. In 1987 Major Moulton was assigned to the staff of 23rd Air Force as chief of United States Southern Command Plans where he contributed to the special operations planning for Operation Just Cause. From June 1989 to July 1990 he was assigned to the Special Operations Section; Airlift, Special Operations and Rescue Forces Division, HQ USAF. In this capacity, Major Moulton was responsible for the development of special operations long-range plans and force structure. He is currently assigned to the faculty of the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service. In addition to writing several articles on defense related matters, Major Moulton also teaches an undergraduate seminar on American Defense Policy.

Major Moulton received a bachelor of science degree in history from the US Air Force Academy in 1978 and a master of science degree in international relations from Troy State University in 1985. He is currently pursuing postgraduate work at the University of Maryland.

Executive Summary

Current trends in the international political arena, combined with fiscal constraints at home, are pointing toward a significant change in US defense policy. With the drawdown of conventional forces and forward deployed units, US defense interests abroad will increasingly rely on the armed forces of other nations. As witnessed in the recent Persian Gulf crisis, maintenance of vital US strategic interests hinges upon the development of social, economic, political, and military institutions favorable to our foreign policy objectives. The overall military role in this effort is termed *foreign internal defense* (FID). As a primary mission of the US Special Operations Command, FID is also an integral part of future USAF special operations endeavors. The USAF plays a significant role in FID by providing analysis and training in operations, maintenance, and logistical support to host-nation forces. This paper focuses on emerging operational requirements and whether or not these requirements necessitate the development and institutionalization of a structure within the Air Force Special Operations Command to develop, execute, and monitor Air Force efforts in foreign internal defense. Because the nature of confrontations most often associated with internal defense fall under the rubric of "low-intensity conflict," the question of maintaining an organic capability to train in counterinsurgency and guerrilla warfare is also addressed.

Chapter 1

Statement of the Problem

US NATIONAL security strategy is currently undergoing the most significant reevaluation since the post-World War II era. The events of the 1980s—*glasnost* and *perestroika* in the Soviet Union, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, and the economic gains of Western Europe, Japan, and the newly industrialized countries of Asia—have prompted a reexamination of the assumptions that have provided the foundation of American defense policy. The evolution of a multipolar international system, combined with increased economic interdependence, will significantly increase the importance of regional security strategies. The current reformulation of strategic objectives and policies, combined with domestic fiscal constraints, will have important consequences for the future of US force structure.*

The drawdown of conventional forces and forward deployed units will mean that US defense interests abroad will become more closely tied to the capabilities of the armed forces of other countries. This trend is reinforced by a general reluctance on the part of the American public to support a "global policeman" role. These political constraints imply that US forces will increasingly need to develop regional orientation and the capability to operate with minimal support and visibility. This is particularly true of military involvement with lesser-developed countries (LDC).

*Special thanks to Andrew J. Harris for his insights into current international geopolitics and the concomitant effect on US strategic policy.

Military involvement in LDCs also has important implications for doctrine and strategy. These implications have been discussed in detail during the ongoing low-intensity conflict (LIC) debate. A common theme is the need to support host-nation forces in maintaining internal stability to promote an environment conducive to democracy and economic development. Throughout much of the world, and especially in LDCs, instability is caused by internal threats more often than by external pressures. These threats usually appear as manifestations of conflict falling under the LIC rubric. Special operations forces (SOF) have played a leading role in assisting host-nation forces in combating threats to internal stability. Specifically, SOF have supported stability efforts by providing training, advice, and support for nation-building efforts such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. These efforts are generally referred to as foreign internal defense (FID) operations.

The US Air Force plays a significant role by providing training in operations, maintenance, and logistical support to host-nation air forces. This paper focuses on the questions, Do the current and emerging operational requirements necessitate the development and institutionalization of a structure within the Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) to develop, execute, and monitor Air Force efforts in foreign internal defense? If so, should Air Force SOC maintain an organic capability in order to train effectively?

United States

DIRECTION and guidance for implementing programs providing FID support is evident in several key national security guidance documents, albeit in a general manner. The *National Security Strategy of the United States* outlines the interests and objectives around which US foreign policy is formed. US support for promoting stability in LDCs is clearly articulated in the following passage from *National Security Strategy of the United States*:

promote the growth of free, democratic political institutions, as the surest guarantee of both human rights and economic and social progress; and aid in combatting threats to democratic institutions from aggression, coercion, insurgencies, subversion, terrorism, and illicit drug trafficking.¹

In his 1989 *Annual Report to Congress*, the secretary of defense indicated the importance of supporting host-nation forces as opposed to a unilateral US role.

Our role is not to shoulder the burden ourselves, but to assist others in defending themselves. . . . We must train host nation forces in the technical skills needed to accomplish their mission.²

The advice and assistance approach to fostering and maintaining stability in LDCs meets several policy concerns by reducing US direct involvement and stressing the requirement for host-nation governments to maintain internal stability as a primary responsibility. Historically, SOF have been at the forward edge of US advice and assistance efforts. According to the 1986 DOD Authorization Act:

SOF are the military mainstay of the U.S. for the purpose of nation building and training friendly foreign forces, in order to preclude deployment or combat involving conventional or strategic forces of the U.S.³

The national goals of supporting host-nation internal stability efforts, as well as the primary role of SOF in implementing

those goals, are clear. One question remains: How do we get from national strategy to implementation of a sound, coordinated, and productive foreign internal defense program that supports US strategic interests? To adequately address this question, we must consider the characteristics of the environment in which FID operations are conducted.

Sources of Instability

CONDITIONS conducive to instability are common in almost all LDCs. These conditions include explosive population growth, inefficient economic systems dependent on the export of agricultural products and raw materials, insufficient or nonexistent educational opportunities and medical care, repression of ethnic and religious minorities, and inefficient civil and judicial administrations. Given these conditions, a single policy or event can often provide the spark necessary to initiate widespread instability. Skillful exploitation of existing conditions, combined with rising expectations of just deserts, often provide the impetus behind revolutionary, religious, and separatist movements. Once a movement has gained momentum, it is almost impossible to derail without significant political and economic concessions and reforms.

Instability in LDCs manifests itself in a variety of forms. These include four basic categories of instability—insurgency, lawlessness, terrorism, and narcotics trafficking. While these categories are interrelated, the methods used in prevention and response to a particular source of instability may vary.

DOD defines *insurgency* as "an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict."⁴ Insurgencies are normally

protracted conflicts involving much more than basic military confrontation. Military efforts to defeat the armed forces of insurgency groups—counterinsurgency (COIN)—are rarely effective unless accompanied by an extremely coercive and totalitarian political structure. Even in these exceptional circumstances, purely military solutions will not provide a long-term solution to a mature insurgency. Governments must therefore incorporate military efforts against insurgencies into greater social, economic, and political campaigns.

Lawlessness is a manifestation of civil disorder and may include examples from social, economic, or political confrontations. Whether real or perceived, deprivation may inspire collective action leading to food riots, tax revolts, or cross-cultural confrontations. As in the case of insurgency, military actions must be taken concurrently with political and economic actions that will ensure or retain the legitimacy of the government's armed forces.

DOD defines *terrorism* as "the unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence against individuals or property to coerce or intimidate governments or societies, often to achieve political, religious, or ideological objectives."⁵ Terrorism presents a significant problem in that while it is an internal defense problem, the acts may be committed or controlled by state-sponsored or nonstate-sponsored terrorists from other countries. Terrorism can be used to extort political favors, to sway public opinion, or to give the appearance of instability and lack of civil control within the host government. Efforts against terrorism usually take two general forms: measures designed to deter or prevent terrorist actions (combating terrorism), or measures taken directly against terrorists (counterterrorism). US military personnel can provide support to host-nation forces in both areas.

Narcotics trafficking as a threat to US national security and the internal stability of foreign nations is a relatively new phenomenon in official DOD policy. The end result of narcotics trafficking, consumer use, and the associated drawbacks is a domestic concern for the United States. In narcotics-producing countries, the problem is extremely complex. In addition to consumer availability, narcotics have become cash crops in many countries, replacing traditional commodities as primary exports. Windfall profits from narcotics sales have created international drug cartels which have undermined the social and political institutions of some nations. In many countries, the military institutions that historically have been among the least corrupt (e.g., Colombia) have been thoroughly penetrated by trafficking organizations. This increased level of corruption poses a host of problems for US military personnel assisting in interdiction and training efforts. Another ominous event is the now established link or partnership that exists between drug cartels and various terrorist and insurgent groups.⁶

Given this broad range of threats to internal stability, countries must design FID strategies to address a range of social, economic, and political factors. The following discussion highlights the need for integrated programs designed to support the host-nation's goals and capabilities as well as US regional and country-specific objectives.

Foreign Internal Defense: Definition and Scope

Foreign internal defense—(DOD) Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.⁷

THIS definition illustrates the diverse nature of threats which can undermine internal stability in developing countries. Effective FID programs must respond to a broad range of factors, and consequently they require the employment of a diverse set of economic, political, informational, and military tools.

The application of military capability in particular should be part of a comprehensive program aimed at addressing the inherently political nature of instability in LDCs. As noted by Dr Lawrence Grinter:

Low-intensity conflicts are growing in frequency and in importance. Each one is at heart a political struggle. To stop them or control them requires carefully adapted responses and extraordinary cooperation between the involved elements of the US government and the host government which has the ultimate responsibility. The military will be only one instrument—sometimes predominant, sometimes not—in responding to low-intensity conflicts.⁶

This cooperation between the US and host-nation governments is very important but must be nurtured along with strategic vision and long-range goals. US diplomatic and political efforts often focus on instituting reforms that undermine the popular basis for insurgents. US forces can play an important role in this effort by strengthening professionalism in host-nation forces (e.g., by limiting civilian casualties and eliminating human rights abuses), thereby increasing civilian support for the host-nation regime. In short, US forces must play a much broader role in FID efforts than simply supplying military technology and technical expertise to host-nation forces engaged in stability efforts.

Excessive reliance on military equipment as a solution to internal stability problems can have other long-term disadvantages. As evidenced in the cases of Iran (pre-1979) and Iraq (pre-1990),

strengthening host-nation and indigenous capabilities through the supply and transfer of sophisticated military technology can be a two-edged sword. While these examples more closely relate to foreign "external" defense efforts, the lesson should not be lost: only through the prudent application of foreign policy tools can we expect positive strategic gains. This is why it is imperative to assess the type of assistance required to defeat the specific threat. As Maj Gen Harry C. ("Heinie") Aderholt, USAF, Retired, notes, "A misplaced 250 pounder may create more revolutionaries than it kills insurgents."⁹ This observation is particularly useful in describing how conventional applications of air power against a third-world internal threat may actually exacerbate the problem in a protracted politico-military confrontation. In contrast to mid- and high-intensity conflict, selection of appropriate military technology does not necessarily mean selection of the most sophisticated military systems available.

Because countries can apply FID as both prevention and cure for internal instability, they should consider the spectrum of warfare, from peace through conflict to postconflict, in defining FID requirements. The broad nature of the operational environment in which FID operations are conducted necessitates organizational flexibility to conduct a wide range of missions. These include joint efforts with other branches of the US armed forces, combined operations with host-nation forces, operations with other government agencies, conventional and/or special operations applications, and nonconflict related activities such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. Certain aspects of FID may require area-oriented capabilities (language, culture), while others may require functional capabilities with global applications

(aircraft maintenance, administrative support). Because of the multifaceted nature of these operational requirements, the US needs the capability to bridge the traditional functional boundaries associated with military efforts.

The following discussion focuses on the role of air power in supporting FID objectives. The current Air Force definition of FID indicates the broad role air assets can play in implementing FID programs.

Air Force FID operations can be employed to improve host air force contributions to peacetime stability and development or can be conducted during the incipient phase of an internal confrontation to assist in preventing an outbreak of violence within the host nation. USAF assistance

can also be applied in situations where the host government is actively threatened by an armed opponent.¹⁰

For air power to be applied effectively in support of host-nation stability efforts, the US must integrate the precepts outlined above into the overall US support strategy. These efforts include supporting host-nation civic-action efforts before open conflict can manifest itself in the form of terrorism and insurgency; using technologies appropriate to the operational conditions and capabilities of the host nation; and, where conflict does occur, applying air power judiciously for support, mobility, and firepower.

Notes

1. *National Security Strategy of the United States* (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 1990), 3.

2. Secretary of Defense, *Annual Report to Congress* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1989), 6.

3. Department of Defense Authorization Act, 99 Stat. sec. 1453, 760 (1986), Public Law 99-145 sec. 1453, "Readiness of Special Operations Forces."

4. Joint Pub 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, 1 December 1989, 183-84.

5. *Ibid.*, 370.

6. Col Richard T. Jeffreys, "Missions for Air Force Special Operations Forces in Support of the

War on Illegal Drugs," student research report (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air War College, 1989), 4-5.

7. Joint Pub 1-02, 150.

8. Lawrence E. Grinter, "Policy Overview," in *Low-Intensity Conflict and Modern Technology*, ed. Lt Col David J. Dean, USAF (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1986), 4.

9. Maj Gen Harry C. ("Heinie") Aderholt, USAF, Retired, interview with author, 25 October 1990, at Fort Walton Beach, Fla.

10. AFM 2-X, "Aerospace Operational Doctrine Foreign Internal Defense," final draft, 15 August 1990.

Chapter 2

Role of Air Power

A HOST nation's national campaign plan to counter internal turmoil is usually found within its overall strategy for internal defense and development (IDAD). In theory, a national IDAD strategy

incorporates four basic functions to prevent or counter internal threats—balanced development of social, economic, and political institutions; mobilization of manpower and material resources; security of the population and national resources; and neutralization of hostile elements.¹

The necessity to maintain the fragile balance in an IDAD strategy cannot be overemphasized. Military defeat of an insurgent-type organization does not equate to total victory without adequately addressing the other facets underlying the hostility—population control; social, economic, and political reform; improvement of government services; civic action; civil defense; or psychological operations.² The flexibility required in this type of strategy is a strong point for the application of air power. In a counterinsurgent role, air power can provide leverage through speed and mobility. In developmental roles, air power can serve in administrative-support missions for humanitarian assistance or civic actions.

Mobilization of resources is also important to the IDAD strategy. Insurgent interdiction of lines of communication can hamper a nation's ability to carry on daily activities. Communication nets, supply lines, and basic service functions within the civilian sector must be reestablished and maintained to provide a positive civilian-military-government relationship. The Air Force role is to sustain the

administrative-support infrastructure and assist in nation-building or civic action/humanitarian aid efforts. This ability to extend the protection of the government rapidly and effectively is an effective weapon in the state arsenal.

A predominant variable in winning the hearts and minds of the population is providing physical security, often through civil defense programs. Lack of effective civil defense can detract from the legitimacy of the state. The Salvadoran Organizacion Democratica Nacionalista, the state version of civil defense in El Salvador in the early 1960s, provided little protection to the populace and was seen more as a source of extortion, repression, and intimidation than anything else.³ On the other hand, an effective civil defense force can effectively supplement the regular forces while providing the people with a reason to support the government. The most constructive application of air power in civil defense scenarios is not in providing a substitute for small-unit maneuver actions or other counterinsurgent fire-support missions, but in "emphasizing surveillance and logistical mobility over firepower."⁴

Neutralization of the threat in this type of warfare requires tactics that counter the guerrilla's advantage of mobility, surprise, and deception. For the ground forces commander this is accomplished by using small-unit patrols, ambushes, night operations, and flexibility. The most productive and complementary application of air power is to keep the ground commanders informed on enemy

positions, while employing, sustaining, and resupplying their troops.

Prioritization of air operations in support of IDAD strategy is important to the overall success of the program. In El Salvador, the virtual autonomy of the air force—Fuerza Aerea Salvadoreña (FAS)—from the other services has exacerbated the tactical coordination problems. Because of failures to prioritize missions in support of a long-range IDAD strategy, the effectiveness of the FAS has not increased appreciably despite a substantial growth in the force structure.⁵

Use of air power against insurgent-type forces can be traced as far back as 1916 when the 1st Aero Squadron under Gen John Joseph Pershing flew attacks against guerrillas led by Pancho Villa.⁶ Over the years, from US experiences in the Second World War to the Vietnam conflict, certain missions have become identified with successful counterinsurgency and internal development operations: reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S), airlift, close air support (CAS), interdiction, and psychological operations. These missions, however basic or simple in nature, are the foundation of air power application in foreign internal defense and development.

Reconnaissance and surveillance is important in that it provides an intelligence and information collection capability for the effective employment of forces. In the tactical environment R&S can relay information as to location, strength, and composition of enemy forces. Collection methods can include visual, photographic, electronic, and infrared. The first of these, visual reconnaissance, is especially important when dealing in the LIC environment.

The mission of continuous, armed, low-altitude visual reconnaissance and surveillance of the guerrilla operating area is probably the most important application of air power in limited-intensity warfare, and it is the one for which the US Air Force is least prepared. It is a mission that high-speed fighters are incapable of per-

forming, especially when it is combined with other mission options inherent in light armed surveillance aircraft.⁷

Mobility is a strong suit for the insurgent, and the practice of "leopard skin" tactics—multiple dispersed contacts of encirclement—rather than an established forward line of troops makes visual contact essential.

While R&S provides the visual contact necessary to engage an insurgent-type force, airlift provides the capability to actually conduct and sustain operations. Airlift was first successfully employed in unconventional conflicts during World War II. Inspired by Gen Henry H. ("Hap") Arnold, Col Philip C. Cochrane and his 1st Air Commando Group flew infiltration, exfiltration, and resupply missions in support of British Gen Orde C. Wingate's guerrilla operations deep behind Japanese lines.⁸

Airlift capability can provide much more than sustainment of military efforts, particularly in countries with rudimentary infrastructure. In these cases, airlift may provide the only means of contact between the state and outlying regions. In countries like El Salvador, where state social structures are not yet firmly established, the military is often the only institution capable of providing and administering civic programs. Airlift assists these programs by providing a mechanism to deliver supplies during drought, famine, and disaster relief. Typical of these operations is Bold Venture 1962 during which Detachment 3, 1st Special Operations Wing, Panama, was involved in many civic-action and humanitarian assistance missions throughout Latin America. The missions included delivering educational supplies to rural areas, medical evacuations, support of Army civil engineers studying irrigation and farming techniques, and deliveries of clothing and foodstuffs.⁹

Close air support and interdiction are undeniably important in security and

neutralization. Because of the nature of third-world conflicts, discretion in the use of air-to-ground armament is paramount. The primary purpose of CAS is to support ground forces in accomplishing their mission, not to replace them. Overuse and indiscriminate application of force can have devastating results, as in General Aderholt's example of the misplaced 250-pound bomb. One prudent application of CAS would be in support of law officials in counternarcotics operations. Forces would employ tactics and munitions to enhance suppression, shock, and intimidation. Recourse to lethal force would only be used to support troops in contact. Interdiction also plays an important role by denying the enemy sanctuaries and limiting external logistical support. Defeating the insurgents' abilities to organize and resupply is one method to beat them at their own games. However, as with close air support, interdiction in the LIC environment leaves no room for indiscriminate actions. Collateral damage at the low end of the conflict spectrum carries a lot more political and psychological baggage than mistakes at the upper levels.

Significant political and psychological advantages are possible through the proper employment and coordination of air power psychological operations (PSYOPS) assets. Psychological operations focus on both the insurgent and the

populace. Against hostile forces, psychological operations aim to disrupt unity and motivation by increasing defeatism and distrust. Against friendly or neutral groups, psychological operations goals are legitimacy and support for state policies and programs. Air power employment can range from direct application such as radio and television broadcasting, leaflet and loudspeaker missions, shows of force, and harassment to indirect applications such as medical evacuation, disaster relief, or airlift of civic action teams. As with the other missions supporting internal defense and development goals, psychological operations must be part of a carefully orchestrated plan.

Psyops must be an integral part of a coordinated plan to defeat the insurgent and to bring about recognition, acceptance and support of the government's policies and programs.¹⁰

The success of many Communist insurgencies places primacy on mass mobilization. By uniting various factions suffering from different forms of relative deprivation under some system of ideology, they are able to gain support for their cause. Properly employed, psychological operations play a key role for the government by tying together all aspects of the conflict—political, military, economic, and information—in offering a cohesive and comprehensive program to rally around.

Notes

1. AFM 2-X, "Acrospace Operational Doctrine Foreign Internal Defense," final draft, 15 August 1990, 14.

2. A. J. Bacevich et al., *American Military Policy in Small Wars: The Case of El Salvador* (Cambridge, Mass.: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 1988), 38.

3. *Ibid.*, 75.

4. AFM 2-X, 16.

5. Bacevich, 56-60.

6. Gary N. Schneider, *Air Power in Low-Intensity Conflict* (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air War College, 1987), 31.

7. Jerome W. Klingaman, "Light Aircraft Technology for Small Wars," in *Low-Intensity Conflict and Modern Technology*, 130.

8. Lt Col David J. Dean, *The Air Force Role in Low-Intensity Conflict* (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1986), 86.

9. This information was gathered from a chronological list of military training team, civic-action, and humanitarian missions performed by the Special Air Warfare Center at Eglin AFB, Florida. Documents are from archives kept by the 1st Special Operations Wing historian.

10. AFM 2-5, *Tactical Air Operations Special Air Warfare*, 1967, 21.

Chapter 3

Current United States Capabilities and Foreign Internal Defense

OF ALL options available to support FID efforts, security assistance is by far the most important. The major programs that collectively fall under security assistance have evolved over the years through US cooperation with sovereign nations sharing similar values. Authorized by the US Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the Arms Export Control Act of 1975, these programs are fundamental in providing defense articles and services in support of national security objectives.¹ Foreign military sales (FMS) and international military education and training (IMET) are the two key programs. IMET is conducted solely on a grant basis, while FMS uses cash, credit, or grants. The current FMS credits program and the military assistance program (MAP) are being merged into FMS financing. Peacekeeping operation programs are designed to underwrite US forces engaged in peacekeeping activities and do not play a significant role in FID. The other non-FMS/IMET program is economic support funds (ESF), which does play a potentially significant role in FID. ESF is economic support to militarily threatened developing countries and is used to supplement other programs in trying to maintain economic and political stability and cannot be used for military or paramilitary purposes.

In 1988 Gen Paul Gorman, USA, Retired, chaired a working group supporting the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy. Their report, *Commitment to Freedom: Security Assistance*

as a U.S. Policy Instrument in the Third World, presented some sobering insights on the Security Assistance Program and some rather strong conclusions. The following statement summarizes a recurring concern for US policy about strategic interests in the third world.

The United States is likely to suffer grievous setbacks unless future Presidents are provided with improved means for protecting U.S. interests in the Third World. Current security assistance programs, variously legislated as Economic Support, Military Assistance, Foreign Military Sales Credits, or International Military Education and Training, are seriously underfunded for pursuing an integrated, long-term strategy and too micromanaged by Congress to enable any Administration to deal with crises.²

Between 1985 and 1988 security assistance (SA) authorizations were substantial, ranging from \$7.2 billion in 1984 to \$4.8 billion in 1988. However, these statistics can be misleading. In fiscal year 1988, 96 percent of FMS credits, 50 percent of MAP, and 90 percent of ESF were earmarked or "fenced" by Congress. This trend was further exacerbated by Gramm-Rudman-Hollings sequestrations that added to the 25 percent decline in funds from 1984 to 1987.³ Gen Fred Woerner, commander in chief, Southern Command, argued for more allocations of funds based on regional problems with insurgency, narcotics trafficking, and politico-economic instability. For example, in 1987 Latin America received only 4 percent of security assistance. Of that amount, 84 percent went to El Salvador and Honduras, leaving the rest of

the countries with 0.6 percent of the total SA budget.⁴

A primary problem with security assistance is related to the players and administration of programs. The congressional foreign relations committees, as opposed to the armed services committees, have legislative jurisdiction over authorizations. This creates friction when trying to develop a cohesive national security agenda because the tools of policy are not wielded in a coordinated fashion. Within the executive branch, the Foreign Assistance Act charges the secretary of state with administering the Security Assistance Program. Agencies within the Department of State (DOS) work with the Defense Security Assistance Agency (DSAA), which is responsible for planning, administering, and accounting for the DOD security assistance program. As noted by General Gorman's working group, this arrangement creates a host of bureaucratic problems:

Security assistance funds are "appropriated to the President," and treated legislatively quite separately from appropriations for national defense. Foreign aid is administered by the State Department. Yet, DoD (particularly the military services) actually provides almost all the equipment or services delivered as security assistance. This arrangement has broad consequences—The DoD must be compensated from the State Department's security assistance accounts for any equipment or services it provides. A major issue, then, is how much DoD should charge for equipment and services.⁵

In spite of these problems, security assistance remains the primary tool in FID. The commission did have several recommendations for overhauling the program, which will be addressed later.

An excellent tool for enhancing internal defense capabilities is military exchange programs. Official visits to promote understanding and improve relations can include conferences, seminars, and orientation tours. International military education and training funding, ad-

ministered under security assistance, is a productive tool for training foreign military personnel. IMET provides professional military education in addition to training skills for operations and maintenance, base management, and development of efficient and professional defense establishments. Especially important for the military establishments of developing nations is the interaction among US and foreign military personnel and the exposure to American democratic institutions and values.

Joint-combined exercises provide a cross flow of information, strategy, and tactics. The effectiveness of coordinated efforts can be tested and evaluated with emphasis on particular capabilities of the host country. These operations can be manifested in several ways, including multinational exercises, show of force, and intelligence sharing. Intelligence cooperation has an added advantage in that it supports the host-nation IDAD strategic planning objectives by identifying potential areas of conflict.

Intelligence sharing is also a form of direct support not involving combat which is important when a country has not yet achieved self-sufficiency. As in the case of El Salvador in 1979, the US may be tasked to provide support that does not expose US personnel to combat. In addition to intelligence support, direct support not involving combat may include nation-building programs, humanitarian assistance, logistic and supply system support, and advice in air operations and tactical employment of forces.

Special operations personnel are directly involved in many of the activities outlined above. US Army Special Forces have been employed extensively for over three decades in mobile training teams (MTT) and deployment for training activities that have enhanced US relations

with over 100 countries worldwide. US Navy SEALs and special boat units are currently enhancing their capabilities to conduct advice and assistance operations, particularly in the areas of maritime special operations and riverine activities. Air Force SOF employment in advice and assistance activities has been more sporadic. There is currently no coordinated approach to providing MTTs or other direct training to host-nation forces that emphasizes adequate employment of air power assets.

The focus of this article, and that of several ongoing studies, is on the lack of

any comprehensive US capabilities to support the air power aspects of FID. This is in large part due to the lack of a centralized focal point for FID expertise. Air Force SOF FID activities have largely been confined to support for civic-action activities such as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief—one-time, crisis-driven events. Limited training has been provided in fire-support operations; personnel used to provide this training were drawn from reserve forces due to the lack of current operational expertise in the active duty Air Force.⁶

Notes

1. *United States Security Assistance* (Washington, D.C.: Defense Security Assistance Agency, 1989), 1.

2. *Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy, Commitment to Freedom: Security Assistance as a U.S. Policy Instrument in the Third World* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1988), 2.

3. *Ibid.*, 14–15.

4. *Ibid.*, 17.

5. *Ibid.*, 23.

6. Conversations with Air Force Deputy Director for Resources, Programs Division personnel, November 1990; Col Hugh Hunter, USAF, Retired, former 1st SOW commander, interview with author, December 1990.

Chapter 4

Recommendations

POLICY guidance on FID is clear. From the *National Security Strategy* to statements by the secretary of defense, training host-nation forces to defend themselves is paramount. The scope and objectives of FID are clear. Applications of air power have been articulated and well documented. Congress answered the question of who should administer the program by assigning FID as one of United States Special Operations Command's (USSOCOM) five special operations missions in *US Code*, Title 10, sec. 167.

Proposed Role for Air Force Special Operations Command

RECOGNIZING that the scope of FID reaches beyond the normal capabilities of special operations, USSOCOM clarified this point in their statement of need for an Air Force SOC foreign internal defense program.

We realize FID is larger than just SOF, and that all USAF organizations have roles to play, both in FID and the broader issue of security assistance. But, arguably, the focal point for organization, doctrine development, training, and operational proficiency for the USAF FID effort should be the organization for which FID is a principal mission, USSOCOM and AFSOC.¹

Having clarified the role of Air Force SOC in FID, responsibilities and capabilities fall into place. Responsibilities should cover those objectives

outlined earlier—support for IDAD programs and nation-building activities, including those efforts directed at combating insurgency, lawlessness, terrorism, and narcotics trafficking. Capabilities should begin with a structure to institutionalize and support the program and should include professional education, doctrine, research and applications, and training.

Several organizational structures have recently been presented including the establishment of a unit along the lines of the Special Air Warfare Center (SAWC) of the early 1960s. In "A US Air Force Role in Counterinsurgency Support," Maj Richard Newton suggests creating a fifth special operations wing within Air Force SOC along the lines of the SAWC.² His proposal includes three squadrons, a technical training squadron (TTS), a flying training squadron (FTS), and a combat development squadron (CDS). The TTS would act much like current replacement training units but would focus on COIN applications. The FTS would provide instructors specializing in rotary-wing, light-airlift/surveillance, or attack weapon systems. The CDS would focus on integrating weapon systems and mission requirements. While not weapon system specific, the squadron would be divided into attack/fire-support, airlift, and reconnaissance flights.

A current Air Force SOC proposal focuses on a FID-dedicated flying unit manned by area-oriented, language-trained personnel. The unit would be divided along the mission lines identified earlier to support IDAD initiatives—R&S,

airlift, CAS/interdiction, and PSYOPS. Along with the flying unit, the Air Force SOC proposal includes establishing an FID office within the headquarters to train the staff and future cadre.

My recommendation deviates from these "flying wing" approaches by focusing on the organizational and training aspects rather than on force structure. The lack of institutional support has forced Air Force FID capability into a state of innocuous desuetude. In an organization relying more and more on sophisticated, high-tech weapon systems and support structures, missions like FID get lost in the "noise" level. Although a multitude of policy directives exist which direct the Air Force to support and maintain FID capabilities, the programs have yet to be implemented. Much of this is due to a general misunderstanding of both special operations and low-intensity conflict on the part of the mainstream Air Force. The Air Force white paper, *The Air Force and U.S. National Security: Global Reach—Global Power*, designed to "provide an overview of evolving Air Force thinking and planning," highlights some misperceptions.³ The paper discusses "capitalizing on the potential capability of the A/OA-10 to support SO/LIC operations"⁴ despite continued strong support against such a move by the special operations community. The magnitude of firepower, intense support requirements, and a long logistics tail limit the A-10 primarily to a conventional applications role. In fact the two paragraphs dedicated to special operations primarily focus on conventional forces and their support of special operations. To ensure proper implementation, it is imperative to establish the organization and institutional structures that will ensure a strong and enduring Air Force commitment to foreign internal defense.

The proposed FID organization would be responsible for three main areas: strategic concepts, formal education, and

training. While not manpower intensive, the strategic concepts branch would be the lifeblood of the organization. Responsible for maintaining the currency and applicability of FID doctrine, this branch would monitor developments in national security strategy, congressional legislation, and actions by other governmental agencies, and ensure new initiatives get translated into appropriate FID documents and programs. The strategic concepts branch would also analyze completed and ongoing programs and maintain an enduring historical journal of the relative successes and failures of FID programs. Strategists would work closely with DSAA, DOS, and congressional staffs in order to articulate command and theater campaign goals and ensure that military objectives are properly integrated in accordance with country team guidance and public policy.

The formal education branch would monitor language and area orientation training for Air Force SOC personnel, work closely with the Special Operations School on course material relevant to internal defense matters, and monitor such aspects of security assistance as the IMET program. A basic program for FID cadre would include instruction on the fundamentals of unconventional warfare, revolutionary theory, counterinsurgency, counternarcotics, and internal defense and development. In addition to the fundamentals of FID, cadre would receive further instruction in language proficiency as well as an in-depth area orientation focusing on religious, cultural, social, and economic concerns.

The training branch would be the largest branch and would cover two major areas: flight training and operations/support. Due to the nature of the mission and type aircraft employed, this branch could benefit greatly from US Army experience and training. The joint

nature of special operations and the operational command lines within US-SOCOM would make acquiring Army training a minor organizational obstacle to overcome.

Flight training would be concerned with flight instruction for both host-nation and US aviators. The structure of the flight training portion is purposely left vague. Actual size, composition, and associated force structure would depend on DOD, US Air Force, and USSOCOM commitment. This unit could vary substantially in design from instructors only, with no organic force structure, to a fully operational Air Force SOC flying unit with associated aircraft necessary to support the four IDAD missions.

Manpower support for flying training could come from three primary sources: civilian contract, reserve, and active duty forces, or any combination of the three. Similarly, the force structure to support flying training could be leased, borrowed, or purchased through a revamped FMS system, or could come from an "organic" USSOCOM unconventional warfare unit. Theoretically, the flying training unit would focus on the mission areas of psychological operations, airlift, reconnaissance and surveillance, and close air support/attack. The types of aircraft employed could be limited to fixed-wing lift, fixed-wing attack, and rotary-wing. Aircraft selected for use should optimally meet the broadest requirements of the third world. This does not necessarily equate to what is currently available or attractive through the FMS system.

The operations and support section of the training branch would perform the in-country functions of the FID program. This section would be divided into deployment training units (DTU), and much like mobile training teams, would be deployed as cohesive units to provide advice and training in operations, tactics, logistics,

supply, administration, communications, and intelligence. The nucleus of these teams would perform the initial assessment of host-nation capabilities and provide a recommended course of action to the country team. Following approval of an air power IDAD strategy, DTUs would be deployed in-country to begin training with host-nation forces.

These teams would perform many of the functions described in Major Newton's combat development squadron. One of their primary missions would be to instruct host-nation air forces in applying a combination of operations and tactics necessary to defeat a particular threat. While concerned with employment, the operational section would also integrate concepts such as command, control, and communications. The other primary mission covers the vitally important support functions. Proficiency in support skills will determine the overall effectiveness of FID efforts. This branch would be responsible for analyzing and developing host-nation capabilities in aircraft maintenance, logistical support, communications, intelligence, and basic administration functions. Emphasis in this area would stress the importance of total integration of the support network with operations.

The importance of this concept is that it focuses on the institutionalization of the FID process. By not concentrating on the force structure aspects of flying training, FID programs can emphasize the crucial factors of concept integration, formal education, and host-nation assessment. This provides a solid foundation on which to begin foreign internal defense training while leaving the option to build a future force structure open to the sobering realities of fiscal politics. In fact, a well-managed program in the initial stages could foster support for future expansion of the program. The guidance to establish a foreign internal defense program is clear. Air Force SOC and US-

SOCOM are currently studying several proposals to develop an effective FID capability. Regardless of what concept is approved, implementation of the program in the form of a new military organization will face some very high policy hurdles.

Policy Implications

ESTABLISHING and institutionalizing an organization within Air Force SOC to oversee FID is a proper beginning. Building on this foundation will not come easily. For the ground troop, a change in mission often requires little more than retraining in the use of new tactics and procedures. In the application of air power, a change in mission can equate to entirely new weapon systems and the accompanying support infrastructures. In low-intensity conflict, and foreign internal defense in particular, we face a double dilemma. We are being asked to provide assistance and training to counteract internal disorder, yet we maintain no organic capability ourselves with which to train or fight. The Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy noted the contradictions between our policy goals and capabilities:

Much of the materiel that the United States should provide to countries facing low intensity conflict is not in the inventories of the U.S. armed services. What is needed to combat terrorists

and insurgents is not the high-tech, expensive, difficult-to-maintain, and very lethal equipment that the U.S. military has bought to prepare against a Soviet attack on Europe or the United States. Nor is conventional U.S. training and doctrine relevant for their circumstance. The United States is not well prepared to provide the countries facing insurgencies with the kind of help they require. . . . The United States has found it very difficult to provide equipment that is not in the U.S. inventory to our allies and friends through security assistance. We must reexamine the restrictions, and seek their removal.⁵

This quote is not presented to discourage pursuit of an effective FID capability. Any progress at all will assist in achieving the goals of long-range national security strategy. Emphasis should be placed on institutionalizing FID within Air Force SOC. Once FID is established, then other obstacles to implementation can be addressed. More importantly, the utility of an organic FID capability, and US security assistance efforts in general, will be enhanced by addressing the current legislative and bureaucratic impediment discussed earlier. A well-balanced, coordinated effort will provide the most effective mechanism for realizing the goals and objectives of an evolving national security strategy that emphasized regional engagement. Air Force support of this effort can best be achieved by creating the structure that will promote an effective and productive foreign internal defense program.

Notes

1. Approval letter for Air Force SOC FID Statement of Need, 29 March 1990.

2. Maj Richard D. Newton, USAF, "A US Air Force Role in Counterinsurgency Support," *Airpower Journal* 3, no. 3 (Fall 1989).

3. *The Air Force and U.S. National Security: Global Reach—Global Power*, white paper

(Washington, D.C.: Headquarters USAF, June 1990), 1.

4. *Ibid.*, 11.

5. Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy, *Commitment to Freedom*, 48.