The Evacuation Phase of the Gallipoli Campaign of 1915
Abstract
This study examines the Allied evacuation of 130,000 men, nearly 10, 000 animals, and huge quantities of weapons and equipment from the Gallipoli Peninsula in 1915. A synopsis of the eight months preceding the evacuation illustrates the myriad problems facing the Allies during the ill-fated campaign to secure the Dardanelles straits. The study analyzes the decision to evacuate and the subsequent planning, preparation, and execution of the amphibious withdrawal. The Allies were able to conduct the withdrawal with no lives lost from enemy action and no man left behind. The study concludes that the successful evacuation of the Anzac, Suvla, and Helles beachheads was the result of close coordination, tactical ingenuity, disciplined troops, bold leadership, and good fortune: qualities essential to any amphibious operation. Though there is much to be learned from the Allied failures on the Gallipoli peninsula, so is there equally much to be learned from the brilliant success of its evacuation. Amphibious withdrawal, command and control, leadership.
Document Details
- Document Type
- Technical Report
- Publication Date
- Jun 04, 1993
- Accession Number
- ADA272730
Entities
People
- Keith A. Lawless
Organizations
- United States Army Command and General Staff College