STANDING NAVAL FORCES AND GLOBAL SECURITY

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

DAVID L. KELLY, LCDR, USN
B.S., B.A., University of California, Irvine, 1976

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
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The United States faces a security dilemma with the end of the cold war and the advent of ill defined, regional based threats. The United States must meet increased global security needs with a concurrent drawdown in naval strength. As a partial solution to this dilemma this thesis examines using regional standing naval forces to meet global security needs. A standing naval force offers a variety of diplomatic and military responses to crises and can react on very short notice. The cost of a standing naval force is shared among the members of the multinational alliance. In this thesis NATO's standing naval forces provide a model that is developed into an exportable concept. This concept is tested for the Pacific geopolitical region.

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
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ABSTRACT

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

European security concerns have radically changed
from the previous four decades. The Soviet threat has
always been a significant planning factor for the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) since its inception in
1949. This threat has diminished considerably with the
collapse of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of the
Warsaw Pact. NATO, which was originally formed to counter
the growing threat of Soviet expansion, has now redefined
it's strategy and has adopted a new role. Where NATO was
once an almost purely deterrent force, it is now taking on
tasking as a reactive force. NATO's standing naval forces
have quickly transitioned to this new role in crisis
response. As an example, in July 1992, the Standing Naval
Forces Mediterranean (STANAVFORMED) began monitoring
shipping along the Dalmation coast to support economic
sanctions imposed on Serbia by the United Nations.[1] In
August 1992, STANAVFORMED conducted a seamless turnover of
monitoring responsibilities to Standing Naval Forces
Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT), demonstrating the high degree of
interoperability and flexibility attained in NATO's
standing naval forces. Subsequently, in November 1992, the

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United Nations (UN) increased the responsibilities of
STANAVFORLANT and STANAVFORMED to include stopping and
searching commercial vessels in the Adriatic Sea.[2]

Concurrently, the United States is growing
increasingly reluctant to promote the notion that America
is the world's policeman. This reluctance stems from at
least two unhealthy situations: a consistent loss of
American global economic stature while, at the same time,
American dollars are absorbing a lion's share of global
security costs (Somalia, Desert Storm, Foreign Military
Sales on credit). Adding even more of a difficult twist to
the world policeman dilemma is the large drawdown in
military forces being demanded internally by practically
all of the NATO nations, particularly the United States.
The absence of a quantifiable threat in the east has
induced a mass demilitarization in the NATO nations. NATO
is still expected to cope with the myriad regional threats
that have the potential to erupt and fester out of control.
Iraq, Somalia, and Bosnia-Hercegovina are examples of
regional threats that have received large scale media
interest.

This new look at regional threats has been
identified and incorporated into the strategy of the U.S.
Navy in the form of the recent white paper, "From the
Sea."[3] NATO has also updated the Concept for Maritime
Operations with a strategy focusing on this somewhat
elusive threat definition.[4] Both strategies agree that

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the threat of multiple low intensity conflicts is real,
difficult to manage, and becoming harder to encompass as
weapons technology proliferates throughout Third World
nati... In spite of these new, untested strategies, the
reduction in military forces is rampant with an almost
surreal impression that it is the panacea for economic
woes.

It is, then, a paradoxical position that the United
States has come to realize: the recognition of an
increased need for multiple global security commitments
concurrent with an accelerating draw down in the
conventional military forces required to meet those
commitments.

In this thesis I will investigate one possible
solution to the paradox facing the United States: the use
of global standing naval forces as a means to assist in
global security. A standing naval force serves as a front
line show of force and solidarity that is highly mobile,
carries a variety of alternative diplomatic and military
responses, and can endure on station for an almost
unlimited time span. The standing naval force is a
multinational team which requires the collective
expenditure of many nations. This allows national draw
down of military forces without sacrificing security
commitments.

In order to establish the credibility of the
standing naval force, I will use NATO's current operational

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standing naval forces as a model. As a test of its flexibility and adaptability, I will then project this model into a parallel employment in the Pacific region. Finally, I will conclude by showing how the standing naval force concept can be used world wide as an economic and efficient crisis reaction force.

Chapter Two looks at NATO's standing naval forces, both historically and critically. In this chapter, I will show that the standing naval forces of NATO serve as a successful model because they have not only endured, but they have accomplished their objectives. The concept of standing naval forces is shown to be flexible in adapting quickly to NATO's new strategy. Finally, three factors are illustrated that have been the backbone for success: NATO's command structure, infrastructure, and logistics.

Chapter Three reviews the out-of-area issue that has plagued NATO since 1949. I will first present the background of this issue and then some interesting findings from research performed on the out-of-area issue. Finally, I will expand the findings of that research to the present day. The goal of this chapter is to answer the question if it is possible to expand the geographic sphere of influence of the present NATO standing naval forces, or whether new standing naval forces must be established to deal with extra-regional crises.

Chapter Four reviews what the experts have to say about the future employment of NATO's standing naval

forces. In presenting a wide variety of statements, I will show that some of the consistent ideas can be used to construct an ideal model. I will develop the ideal model of a standing naval force in this chapter.

Chapter Five presents the scenario for the employment of the standing naval forces outside of NATO. The Pacific region provides a realistic example of an area that will benefit now from the coalition of a multinational naval force to protect economic interests and provide security. In examining this possibility, I will show that the standing naval force is a sound means of enforcing security in a region of common economic interests. To this end, I will show that the re-emergence of the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) as a NATO-like organization is not an option. Finally, I will present one possible methodology to apply the standing naval force concept to this region.

Chapter Six concludes the thesis. The goal of this final chapter is to review the conclusions established in the previous chapters. After reviewing those conclusions I will propose using regional standing naval forces as an alternative to purely American maritime security measures (that are now a result of the US status as the singular global naval power). I will show that the standing naval forces are a modern interpretation of the Mahan sea power doctrine. In other words, single nations with geopolitical advantages used to be able to gain economic prowess and

domination from the proper use of sea power. Today, geo-political regions with common economic and security interests will reap the same advantages through the collective use of sea power. Ultimately, I hope to bring to light that the United States will find the answer to one dimension of the global security dilemma through the expansion of the standing naval force concept on a regional basis.

CHAPTER 2

NATO, A HISTORY OF SUCCESS

The most successful, and longest standing coalition of
multinational military forces, is the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO). NATO was formed on April 4, 1949,
when 12 European and North American nations cosigned the
North Atlantic Treaty in Washington DC. Subsequently, 4
other nations signed the treaty and NATO membership has
remained the following 16 nations since 1982:

1. Belgium   5. Germany   9. Luxembourg   13. Spain

2. Canada   6. Greece   10. Netherlands 14. Turkey

3. Denmark   7. Iceland   11. Norway   15. United Kingdom

4. France   8. Italy   12. Portugal   16. United States

The North Atlantic Treaty was formulated as a result
of the extensive and formidable growth of the Soviet
Union's military forces after World War II. An
expansionist doctrine, coupled with a newly industrialized
military might, gained the Soviet Union an increasing
number of satellite countries in Eastern Europe. These
satellites became politically and economically tied to the
Soviet Union. Apprehensive of the westward expansion of
Soviet influence, NATO provided a degree of security to the
free European nations. The collective force of NATO proved

successful in stopping the westward expansion of the Soviet Union for 40 years.

In 1989, the Soviet Union suddenly collapsed. All of the former satellite nations of the Soviet Union gained independence. The military, political, and economic power of the Soviet Union was unequally dispersed among the former satellite nations.

Today, NATO still exists even though the threat of an aggressive superpower looming in the east has evaporated. Predictably, NATO has redefined its mission and NATO's proponents are scrambling to justify continuing NATO. To date, there have been several conferences which have laid the groundwork for NATO's new strategy for collective security. In London, during July 1990, NATO agreed to formulate the new concept of strategy. In Rome, during November 1991, NATO devised their "new strategic concept." NATO's new strategy involves a focus on rapid response forces which can quickly deter aggression by the immediate projection of a unified and flexible military power. These forces are designed to react to the newly recognized threat consisting of unpredictable, regional low intensity conflicts being posed by quasi-military organizations of a much smaller scale than the former Soviet threat. To illustrate this "new strategic concept," the following passages from the communique that was developed in Rome in 1991 are provided:

> The security challenges and risks which NATO faces
> are different in nature from what they were in the

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past. The threat of a simultaneous, full scale attack on all of NATO's European fronts has effectively been removed and thus no longer provides the focus for Allied strategy.... In contrast with the predominant threat of the past, the risks to allied security that remain are multi-faceted in nature and multi-directional, which makes them hard to predict and assess.[2]

The standing naval forces are an integral part of NATO's new strategy. The standing naval forces become increasingly important because of their inherent mobility and because of their capability to project a flexible array of military and diplomatic positions. NATO's Rome 1991 communique' concisely describes the enduring role of NATO's maritime conventional forces:

Maritime forces, which because of their inherent mobility, flexibility and endurance, make an important contribution to the Alliance's crisis response options. Their essential missions are to ensure sea control in order to safeguard the Allies' sea lines of communication, to support land and amphibious operations, and to protect the deployment of the Alliance's sea-based nuclear deterrent.[3]

In November 1992, NATO put its new strategy to work when the Standing Naval Forces Mediterranean carried out a blockade on the former Yugoslavian coast in support of a United Nations (UN) embargo.[4] Presently, NATO is refining its maritime strategy in the document, The Concept of Maritime Operations.

A Brief History of NATO's Standing Naval Forces

Under the direction of Admiral Gorshikov, the Soviet Union built a large and versatile fleet of modern combatant naval vessels after World War II. Adding strategic importance to the Soviet fleet was the increasing number of

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state-of-the-art nuclear powered ballistic missile submarines capable of sustained global deep water operations. Soviet nuclear powered attack submarines also increased in number and capability throughout the sixties and the seventies.[5] Culminating with the launching of their first aircraft carrier in 1985, this blue water fleet was a power projection tool rivaling the United States in size and technology.[6]

To counter the Soviet underwater threat and to ensure the continued unrestricted use of sea lines of communication (SLOC), NATO devised a multinational squadron of Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) ships. In 1965, Canada, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom (UD) and the United States (U.S.) each provided a single frigate for an ASW exercise of five months duration in the Atlantic called Matchmaker I.[7] This exercise was considered highly successful in that it provided strong combined training in a real world scenario while demonstrating NATO's commitment abroad. Matchmaker I paved the way for two additional matchmaker exercises, Matchmaker II in 1966, and Matchmaker III in 1967.[8] As a result of the success of the matchmaker exercises, a permanent NATO ASW squadron was approved by the Defense Planning Committee of the North Atlantic Council in mid-December 1967.[9] This multinational squadron was named the Standing Naval Forces, Atlantic or STANAVFORLANT and was made subordinate to the Supreme Allied Command, Atlantic (SACLANT). The first

STANAVFORLANT was composed of four ships: USS Holder (U.S.), HMS Brighton (U.K.), HNLMS Holland (Netherlands), and HNOMS Narvik (Norway). In March 1968, HMCS Gatineau (Canada) and FGS Koln (Germany) joined STANAVFORLANT.[10]

NATO next addressed the lines of communication and supply into Europe from North America. The major trans-Atlantic shipping routes to northern European ports run through the shallow channel waters off of the coast of England and in the North Sea. Mine emplacement, as well as submarine operations, in these waters would pose a significant threat to European resupply from America in the event of a land war in Europe. In 1973, a multinational squadron of minesweeping vessels was formed by NATO to counter this threat.[11] This permanent naval force was called the Standing Naval Force, Channel (STANAVFORCHAN) and was made subordinate to the Commander in Chief, Channel (CINCHAN). Minesweepers and minehunters from the following four nations originally comprised the core of STANAVFORCHAN: U.K., Belgium, Netherlands, and West Germany.[12]

NATO's southern flank is the Mediterranean Sea. The Soviet fleet, growing in size and capability in the sixties and seventies, began operating its Black Sea fleet in the Mediterranean Sea. The expansionist doctrine of the Soviets bolstered the threat of their increasingly powerful naval force roaming freely in the Mediterranean Sea. STANAVFORLANT, busy in the Atlantic Ocean, could not "bear

a hand" in deterring the Soviet threat in the
Mediterranean. Consequently, NATO formed another squadron
of multinational naval combatants to perform combined
exercises and, again, demonstrate NATO's commitment, this
time exclusively in the Mediterranean Sea.[13] The
squadron was formed in 1969, and named the Naval On-Call
Forces in the Mediterranean (NAVOCFORMED).[14] NAVOCFORMED
was made subordinate to the Supreme Allied Commander,
Europe (SACEUR). NAVOCFORMED was organized to assemble and
provide rapid response when called on by NATO. In April
1992, NAVOCFORMED was succeeded by the Standing Naval
Forces, Mediterranean (STANAVFORMED), a permanent squadron
composed of ships from the following eight nations:
Germany, Greece, Italy, The Netherlands, Spain, Turkey,
United Kingdom, and the United States.[15] STANAVFORMED is
dedicated to intense interoperability training, as planned
and directed by Commander, Allied Naval Forces Southern
Europe. Command of the STANAVFORMED rotates among the
participating nations.

To date, two of the three existing NATO standing
naval forces have endured as a part of the NATO team and
are permanently integrated into the military command
structure of NATO. On December 15, 1991, NATO merged
Allied Command Channel (ACCHAN) with Allied Command
Atlantic (ACLANT). STANAVFORCHAN is now under command of
SACLANT and has been integrated into STANAVFORLANT.

<u>A Model for Multinational Navy Operations</u>

STANAVFORLANT operates year round with each member
(NATO nation with an Atlantic coastline) participating to
some greater or lesser degree.[16] An annual deployment of
six months is routinely conducted. Operational command is
held by SACLANT, with operational command passed to the
Commander-in-Chief, Eastern Atlantic (CINCEASTLANT) while
the ships are operating in European waters.[17] The force
composition is dynamic in that it will vary throughout an
annual deployment. Typically, the U.S., the U.K.,
Netherlands, West Germany, and Canada have provided a
consistent baseline force with Belgium, Denmark, Norway,
Portugal, and Spain committing ships when required.[18]
The STANAVFORLANT commanders are chosen annually by
rotation among the nations assigning ships to the force.
The commander will embark in his nation's ship, which
serves as the flagship.[19] COMSTANAVFORLANT has a
five-member officer staff, one officer from each of the
baseline navies. These staff members are also rotated on
an annual basis.[20]

STANAVFORLANT has as it's mission the following four
objectives:

(1) The squadron must be capable of rapid
deployment to a threatened area in time of crisis or
tension. It represents an immediately available
deterrent naval force, NATO's Immediate Reaction Force
at Sea.

(2) STANAVFORLANT is charged with contributing to
NATO's maritime effectiveness. This is achieved through
participation in both large and smaller scale NATO
exercises. In the course of providing continuous

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squadron experience and training. STANAVFORLANT serves
as a development vehicle for new NATO tactics.

(3) STANAVFORLANT demonstrates the solidarity of
the Alliance by showing the flags of the various members
nations in a single multinational force. Normally,
during the course of a year, the squadron will visit
some 25 to 30 ports, including a deployment to the east
coast of the U.S. and Canada.

(4) The squadron forms a nucleus around which a more
powerful and versatile naval force could be built.[21]

The Standing Naval Forces At Work

The shifting role of NATO to a reactive force can be
illustrated by the historical use of the standing naval
forces. During their first 20 years, the standing naval
forces were employed as a deterrent force, whereas the
recent 5 years reveal an increasing use of the standing
naval force as a crisis response force.

As an example, NATO's maritime coalition forces have
been involved in three noteworthy operations. In 1988,
vessels from STANAVFORLANT rescued workers from the burning
wreckage of the Piper Alpha oil rig off the coast of
Scotland. An explosion and fire caused many deaths;
however, NATO's quick response was vital in preventing
further loss of life.[22] During the Desert Storm
operation, STANAVFORCHAN deployed to the Mediterranean when
the NATO Defense Planning Committee approved SACEUR's
request for deployment. STANAVFORCHAN provided training
and surveillance to other mine-counter-measure forces. The
mission of STANAVFORCHAN was to improve operational
standards and monitor the freedom of navigation while

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ensuring safe navigation in the Mediterranean.[23]   The
deployment was conducted from February to June 1991.   Most
recently, in November 1992, STANAVFORMED enforced a U.N.-
sanctioned embargo on the former Yugoslavia by conducting a
blockade.[24]

Clearly, in the past 25 years, NATO's maritime
forces have played a more significant role in maintaining
peace through deterrence than through any direct action.
Both attributes of the standing naval forces, their
maritime readiness and their projection of a committed and
cohesive team, have been instrumental in preventing the
Soviet Navy from acquiring total dominance of the seas in
and around Europe during those 25 years. It is interesting
to note that the only operational deployment of the nding
naval forces as a reactive force has occured after the
collapse of the Warsaw Pact. While possibly showing the
guiding light behind NATO's "new strategic concept," this
employment definitely demonstrates that the standing naval
forces are inherently flexible enough to serve in the
capacity as both a deterrent force and a reactive force.

Factors for Success

NATO's standing naval forces serve as a model for a
successful multinational maritime coalition. Perhaps the
most obvious reason to consider the standing naval forces
as successful is that they have endured for twenty five
years. Another obvious reason to consider success is that

the standing naval forces fulfilled their mission of preventing Soviet maritime hegemony in the Atlantic and in the Mediterranean. These two outward signs of success stem from NATO's ability to meet the basic requirements to sustain the standing naval force concept. These requirements include the following: dependable and strategically located infrastructure, logistics support that strives for standardization, and a well defined chain of command that leaves controversial employment decisions at the diplomatic level and operational decisions at the major NATO command level. By meeting these basic requirements NATO has ensured that the standing naval forces can operate with the flexibility that is intrinsic to the standing naval force concept. This flexibility, in turn, allows NATO's standing naval forces to meet their four-fold objective: rapid reaction capability; interoperability training, development and experimentation; demonstration of the alliances commitment to solidarity; and establishing a nucleus for a stronger and more versatile force.

In order to gain a deeper understanding of the basic requirements that have sustained a successful standing naval force, I will present a brief review of each of those requirements.

NATO Infrastructure

To support the efforts of the standing naval forces
NATO must rely on its members to provide the
infrastructure. In the case of the surface maritime
forces, the infrastructure means the following facilities
located on accessable naval bases:

        1. piers and mooring facilities in sheltered
    harbors with adequate depth
        2. ship repair facilities with the capability to
    conduct intermediate and depot level work
        3. supply depots to store and acquire a large
    variety of parts
        4. ammunition and weapons depots for storage and
    rearmament
        5. petroleum storage and pumping stations (and
    tanker support for underway replenishment)
        NATO has devised a logical system to ensure the

proper infrastructure is available to support its maritime

efforts. The system is mutually beneficial in that the

host nation is largely responsible for developing and

implementing NATO's plans for support facilities within

that country. The procedure for infrastructure acquisition

can be simplified by referring to these major steps in the

overall process:

        1. Proposal. A proposal for a facility in a
    specific location is submitted to Major Nato Commanders
    (MNCs) by the subordinate command responsible for the
    specified area and host nation (HN).

        2. Feasibility. The MNCs prioritize and scrutinize
    the proposal and, with the assistance of the national
    experts, the MNCs include proposal in a Slice annual
    program of work required by all NATO.

        3. Review. The Military Committee reviews the
    proposal using military considerations as a guideline.
    The Infrastructure Committee and International Staff
    review the proposal using financial, technical,
    political, and economic considerations as their

guidelines. All recommendations are forwarded to the Council or the Defense Planning Committee.

    4. Approval. The North Atlantic Council or the Defense Planning Committee approve or disapprove the proposal.

    5. Planning. The facility site and details of construction are worked out by the host nation and NATO military authorities. An estimate of costs for MNC approved work is developed by the host and the user nations. It is submitted to the Infrastructure Payments and Progress Committee (IPPC) for financial approval.

    6. Bidding. All member countries participating in the project can submit bids to accomplish the work based on the IPPC approved estimate. IPPC awards the contract to the lowest compliant bidder.

    7. Inspection. A NATO team inspects the completed project for conformity with authorization, standards and good engineering practices. The team submits a report to IPPC recommending that the project be accepted by NATO.

    8. Audit. The International Board of Auditors for NATO objectively reviews HN financial records for the project to ensure the validity of charges to NATO common funds.[25]

Infrastructure work is not entirely financed by the Host Nation but rather is supported by the NATO common fund. A common fund is established based on several factors. Simply put, a nation will share the burden of cost according to its own financial situation (loosely based on the monetary figures given in Table 1) as well as the benefits it may incur from the project.[26] It should be noted that, for the sake of simplicity and practicality, not all infrastructure is acquired by this comprehensive procedure. Minor infrastructure work and urgent repair work are programmed and financed under a compendious

procedure.[17] The extent of NATO's naval facilities in support of the standing naval forces is listed in Table 1.

NATO Logistics

Logistics for a blue water naval force is entirely different than logistics for ground forces. A naval force must be sustained, for the most part, while at sea. The supply-laden vessels of the logistics force must be as mobile as the combatants. They must deliver ammunition, fuel, and foodstuffs to these roving maritime groups. If a carrier is included in the group, vital and urgently needed items can be delivered to the group over great distances by the C-2 Greyhound (Carrier Onboard Delivery). Helicopters normally assigned ASW roles can also be allocated to fly in items, albeit with the need to be at a closer distance to a landfall than the C-2. Although port visits are routinely required for maintenance, crew rest, and diplomacy, the mobility and self sufficiency of naval logistics is the key to the endurance on station, the readiness, and the rapid responsiveness desired of a standing naval force.

NATO is not wholly responsible for logistics support of the standing naval forces. A basic tenet of the Alliance is that each nation is responsible for the continuous support of its own forces.[18] The individual countries must ensure that their ships are properly sustained with unique parts support or unique ammunition requirements. The major commands of NATO are each

responsible for the planning and coordination of support in their area to ensure that forces can meet operational commitments.[29] The weakness in this arrangement is that the NATO major command, although he may require a consultation between the agencies involved, does not have any power to compel argreements.[30] So, without a harmonious, agreeable group, NATO logistics is doomed to be bogged down under the weight of its own intricacy.

Another difficult aspect of NATO maritime logistics is that the standing naval force usually do not use auxilliary ships to conduct at-sea sustainment, but must make a port call for resupply. The supply ships are not used because of the coordination required by the separate countries which are, for the most part, responsible for their own ship's resupply. The only hope, then, for a simple sustainment equation lies in NATO's ongoing drive towards interoperability and standardization, which may eventually allow consistent use of auxiliaries for sustainment.

Standardization and interoperability will make or break the standing naval forces. The following are NATO's definitions:

Standardization: the process of formulating, agreeing, implementing, and updating standards for regular use throughout NATO. It involves the process of developing concepts, doctrines, procedures, and designs which will help to acheive and maintain the most effective levels of compatibility, interoperability, interchangeability, and commonality in the fields of operations, administration and material.
Interoperability: the minimum requirement for military effectiveness since it enables systems, units

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or forces to provide services to, and accept services from, other systems, units or forces and to use the services exchanged in a manner which enables them to operate effectively together.[5]

Two examples of interoperability in NATO concern underway replenishment and the tactical data link. All NATO ships are rigged to accept both NATO common UNREP (Underway replenishment, fuel) and CONREP (Conventional replenishment, drystuffs) gear. This is one truly basic requirement to operate as a team: the ability to sustain together at sea from a common source. All NATO ships, while operating together, co-operate using a common tactical data exchange system called link 11, along with common communications circuits. This linking of ships combines the tactical picture afforded by single ships into a collective and concise overall picture by which the commanders can best conduct operations. These two examples identify the prime need for interoperability and bring to light the importance of a simple and workable communications network.

By eliminating unique weapons and equipment types the force stands a greater chance to remain a responsive and cohesive team through the elimination of duplicate efforts. A good example is the 76 millimeter (mm) rapid firing gun produced by Otto Melara. This gun is perfectly suited for a corvette or frigate-sized ship. At one time, the U.S. Navy had frigates with either the Otto Malera or an older 3-inch gun. The supply ship for the battle group had to carry both types of ammunition. When all the 3 inch

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guns were phased out the logistics were invariably simplified. Also, with a single type of gun this size and caliber, the parts support requirement was simplified. This problem of duplicity would be intensified in a standing naval force with as many different gun types as ships represented by member countries. Obviously, the closer to a perfect interchangeability of weapons systems, the easier the sustainment equation will become. This will hold true for weapons systems, shipboard aircraft, propulsion plants, and habitability items.

NATO's endeavors toward standardization are serious. Two committees are actively involved with the standardization problem: the Military Agency for Standardization (MAS) and NATO Standardization Group (NSG).[32] In addition, complete shipbuilding programs have been developed in the past with the goal of producing a "generic" NATO ship which would have a consistent design, but which would be built in several countries' shipyards. This NATO frigate program was a positive step towards ideal interchangeability. Unfortunately, the idea was eventually quashed by NATO because of disagreements.[33] In the United States in the late 1970's the guided missile hydrofoil patrol boat (PHM) was developed in conjunction with the navies of Italy and West Germany" in an effort to produce a small combatant that would be universally acceptable to NATO navies with minor modifications."

Unfortunately, that project was also limited in scope with the U.S. Navy being the sole employers of the PHM.[34]

Table 3 is designed to roughly illustrate the degree of standardization facing the standing naval forces in 1993. Listed are the variety of guns and associated fire control systems, missile systems, and antisubmarine warfare systems that are found aboard frigate and destroyer-sized ships in NATO's navies.

NATO's Command Structure

Another reason for the success of the standing naval forces is the command structure which allows tactical decisions to be made at the standing naval forces level, while operational and strategic decisions are made at NATO's higher levels. The standing naval force's chain-of-command has been designed to fully support the operational readiness that is required in this immediate reaction force. In order to illustrate that chain-of-command, and how it works, it will be necessary to first look at a macro view of NATO's overarching command structure. Given that vantage point it will then make sense to work down to the command of a single ship.

Referring to Appendix 1, it is evident that NATO's ultimate authority and highest level of decision making comes from the North Atlantic Council (NAC). The NAC is equally represented by a member with ambassador-ranking status from each of the NATO countries.[35] This permanent

representative expresses the views of his parent country,
and is collocated in Brussels with the delegates from th
15 other countries. This collocation allows the capability
for regular and informal consultation with other
delegates. Important decisions and policy making are
conducted in formal meetings and final decisions are based
on consensus and mutual support.[36] The NAC has many
subcommittees working on their behalf. The subcommittes of
interest to the standing naval forces are the Senior NATO
Logistics Conference, NATO Conventional Armaments Review
Committee, Defense Review Committee, NATO Standardization
Group, Infrastructure Committee, and the Civil and Military
Budgets Committee.[37]

The Defense Planning Committee (DPC) deals with the
majority of NATO's defense issues. With ambassador-ranking
representatives from each of the member countries, the
Defense Planning Committee operates much like the NAC, and
is, for all practical purposes, equal in authority to the
NAC. The Secretary General of NATO is the chairman for
both the NAC and the DPC.[38]

The military strong arm for enforcing the decisions
of the NAC and the DPC is the NATO Military Committee (MC).
At the apex of an integrated command structure, the MC is
equally represented by the chiefs of staffs of each of the
member nations, with the exception of France and Iceland
(France withdrew all military connections with NATO in 1966
and Iceland has such a minute military force they are

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expected only to share in providing infrastructure. For practicality, each of the chiefs of staffs is permanently represented in the MC by a representative. The chief of staff will attend sessions a minimum of three times annually and as emergencies may dictate. At other times his representative, as a member of the permanent session, will convey the views of the country he represents. The MC is presided by a chief of staff who is rotated among the nations annually. The MC is chaired by an elected chief of staff for a triannual term. The chairman is the one who conducts the daily business and who serves as a spokesman and military advisor to the NAC and the DPC.[39]

The executive branch of the Military Committee is the International Military Staff. They are tasked to ensure that the policies and the directives of the MC are properly implemented and provide the plans, policy recommendations, and studies required to assist and support NATO, specifically the MC. This staff consists of civilians and NATO military personnel representing all the nations. The staff is broken down into divisions as follows:

1) Intelligence Division
2) Plans and Policy Division
3) Operations Division
4) Logistics and Resources Division
5) Communications and Information Systems Division
6) Armaments and Standardization Division

At the heart of NATO's military command structure are the two Major NATO Commands (MNC). These MNCs

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represent the military forces in two separate geographic regions of the area defined by Article 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty: Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic (SACLANT) and Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR). Each of the MNCs develop the defense plans for their areas. The MNCs are responsible for the combat readiness of their respective forces through the training, logistics, infrastructure, and deployment of the total military forces under their command. Each of the MNCs report directly to the MC, and also has direct access to the chiefs of staff, the defense ministers, as well as the Heads of Government of each of NATO's member nations.[41]

Each of the two MNC's has its own standing naval force. The commander of the respective standing naval force is directly responsible to the MNC. To ensure equality in the command structure, command of the standing naval forces is rotated among the participating nations on an annual basis.[42]

The success of this chain of command can be attributed to the concept of decision making at the appropriate level. Strategic decisions are made at the level of the NAC and the DPC with the recommendations of the MC. At this level the intraNATO disputes are brought out for resolution and a consensus decision is made. Operational decisions are then made by the MC with close, consistent liaison with the MNC's. Tactical decisions are left to the commanders of the standing naval forces who are

best capable of discerning the employment of their
conventional weapons to complete a tasking. This structure
allows the naval force to act as a cohesive and disciplined
team since there is no provision for the individual ships
to react as independent political entities.

Conclusions on NATO's Standing Naval Forces

In this chapter I have endeavored to examine NATO's
standing naval forces so that they can be used as a model
for the standing naval force concept. First, I reviewed
the operational history of the standing naval forces and
found that they have been used primarily as a deterrent
force for the past 25 years. Only recently has their role
been expanded into a crisis intervention force. Next, I
reviewed the aspects of the standing naval forces that I
considered essential for the continuing success enjoyed by
STANAVFORLANT. These aspects include a sound method for
infrastructure procurement and maintenance, a logistics
system that incessently aims at interoperability and
standardization, and a command structure that allows
strategic, operational and tactical decision making to be
made at the appropriate levels.

In the next chapter I will review the particularly
troublesome problem of the out-of-area response in NATO.
This issue is important for this thesis because it
determines the degree of geographic influence afforded by
the standing naval force concept and dictates whether

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NATO's standing naval forces can be expanded into an
extraregional force.

NATO's standing naval forces can be expanded into an
extraregional force.

CHAPTER 3

NATO: OUT-OF-AREA RESPONSE

The North Atlantic Treaty delineated specific
boundaries to the operating area of NATO's forces. Article
6 of the Treaty defines those boundaries as follows:

> -on the territory of any of the parties in Europe or
> North America, on the territory of Turkey or on the
> islands under the jurisdiction of any of the Parties in
> the North Atlantic area north of the tropic of Cancer.

> -on the forces, vessels, or aircraft of any of the
> Parties when in or over these territories or any other
> area in Europe in which occupation forces of any of the
> Parties were stationed on the date when the Treaty
> entered into force or the Mediterranean Sea or the North
> Atlantic Area north of the Tropic of Cancer[1]

Although NATO's operating area is well defined by
Article 6, NATO planners argue that they must also deal
with events outside those boundaries. Clearly, any event
that may have an impact on the interests of any of the NATO
nations will come under the scrutiny of the Alliance,
regardless of geography.[2]

Out-of-Area Issue From a Historical Perspective

Historically, NATO has been very reluctant to
project its collective forces outside the realm of the
Treaty. Typically, individual NATO nations have become

actively involved in maritime interdiction, deterrence, and protection outside of NATO's Article 6 boundaries, but they do so without a NATO flag flying at their masts. Several good examples include the British in the Falkland Islands, the French in IndoChina, and the United States in Grenada, Panama, and Vietnam. NATO has used Article 6 as the basic argument to stand firm on its original purpose of deterrence in a specific area of operation.

Douglas Stuart and William Tow propose that NATO has succeeded as a coalition force for 40 years because of its commitment to maintaining a clearly defined area of operations.[3] This stand has prevented divisive and destructive internal debates over controversial out-of-area issues to loosen the cohesion of the Alliance.[4] The United States, on the other hand, has favored expanding NATO's area of operations since the 1960's. Further, the United States has sought NATO assistance in Vietnam (as the French had done when they occupied Vietnam and later in Algeria), during the Arab "oil boycott," when Iran turned to Islamic fundamentalism (ousting the Shah), when the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan began, and since the reign of terrorism worldwide has become a daily affair. NATO has used Article 6 in all these cases as a reason for nonintervention, offering only sympathetic statements to the United States. In each of these crises, NATO refused to provide military support.[5]

Recent crises have provided exceptional
circumstances for NATO to accept extraregional tasking. In
1990, NATO took a stand and formally condemned the Iraqi
invasion of Kuwait. During Desert Storm, however, NATO did
not send forces to assist the United States-led coalition.
Member nations individually assisted the coalition in the
way of forces and equipment, but this was not NATO
sanctioned. The Western European Union sanctioned this
active involvement. In this manner, NATO nations also
cooperated to neutralize the mine threat in the Persian
Gulf starting in 1987. These nations provided minesweeping
vessels which reported the results of their efforts
directly to a politically distant NATO. This kept NATO
updated on any impact to its defense policy or to the
interests of any of the Western nations.[6] This also
kept NATO disentangled from disputes of out-of-area
intervention. During this international conflict NATO
still prioritzed the Treaty area to ensure that sufficient
forces remained to provide an adequate regional defense
posture.[7] It is interesting to speculate on what effect
a concurrent regional crisis inside the Treaty area would
have had on NATO member deployed forces.

In addition to mine countermeasures, practically all
of the NATO navies contributed surface ships to interdict
commercial shipping during Desert Storm in support of a
U.N.-sanctioned embargo on Iraq. Once again (as stressed
in Chapter 2) the rapid employment of NATO's maritime

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assets in a crisis brought to light the advantages gained
through interoperability training. The mine warfare forces
were quickly and efficiently conducting routine coordinated
sweeps because they had already worked as a team for
CINCCHAN. The surface force interdiction efforts were
equally successful even though the Western European Union,
not NATO, was the organization in charge.

NATO's "new strategic concept" devised in Rome in
November 1991, clearly points the way for broadening NATO's
area of responsibility. The following are two key passages
from the communique':

> The stability and peace of the countries on the
> southern periphery of Europe are important for the
> security of the alliance, as the 1991 Gulf war has
> shown. This is all the more so because of the build up
> of military power and the proliferation of weapons
> technologies in the area, including weapons of mass
> destruction and ballistic missiles capable of reaching
> the territory of some member states of the Alliance.

> Any armed attack on the territory of the Allies,
> from whatever direction, would be covered by Articles 5
> and 6 of the Washington Treaty (North Atlantic Treaty).
> However, Alliance security must also take account of the
> global context. Alliance security interests can be
> affected by other risks of a wider nature, including
> proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, disruption
> of the flow of vital resources, and actions of terrorism
> and sabotage.[3]

An Analysis of the Out-of-Area Issue

With the adoption of NATO's "new strategic concept"
a closer look at the out-of-area issue is warranted. The
question comes up, "is it desirable or even feasible for
the standing naval forces to react to a crisis outside of
the North Atlantic or outside of the Mediterranean?" The

answer, of course, is inextricably tied to the interests of the NATO nations as a collective political/economic entity. Douglas Stuart and William Tow have conducted exhaustive research on this out-of-area issue. Based on historical controversies, they have categorized out-of-area events into five different types of disputes.

1. Guilt-by-Association. This is the situation where one member nation protests the intervention of another member nation in an out-of-area conflict. In this case, the dispute stems from the possible inference that the out-of-area conflict is being supported by all of the NATO nations.

2. Domain Reserve Disputes. This occurs when one of the members feels that the other NATO nations are meddling in the affairs of their sovereignty (e.g., their colonies). Grenada was a good example where the U.K. disputed the U.S. intervention in one of their Commonwealth states.

3. Disputes Over Solicitation of Support. In this case one of the members is actively involved in an out-of-area conflict and they are actively requesting assistance from other members. The dispute arises because the solicitation for assistance is for a conflict not sanctioned by NATO.

4. Burden Sharing Disputes. This case involves one member being tagged by other members as not bearing their share of the costs of NATO support due to that country's

preponderance of involvement in an out-of-area conflict not supported by NATO.

   5. Disputes Regarding the Nature and Identity of the Threat. This final dispute is the result of different interpretations by members of provocative out-of-area issues and whether or not they pose a threat and warrant a response from NATO.[9]

   Although these five types of disputes neatly categorize historical observations, Stuart and Tow warn that some out-of-area issues may actually involve one or more of these types of disputes. However, the really interesting finding comes from a matrix that Stuart and Tow devised that lists, in chronological sequence, all of the events that have caused an out-of-area dispute within NATO. Each of these events is then categorized by the type of dispute as it relates to the five type categories shown above. This arrangement clearly shows a shift in the types of disputes over time. The early sources of disputes were mainly domain reserve (type 2), whereas later sources of disputes became mainly burden sharing (type 4) and definition of threat (type 5).[10]

   Stuart and Tow further explain the reason for this shift. Early in NATO's history, many of the member nations had colonies in out-of-area locales. When they experienced troubles in those colonies they expected assistance from the Allies, but, at the same time, did not want any of the other members to get involved with the politics of the

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colony. Other nations, especially the United States, disputed the fact that the colonies were out-of-area and, being extraregional, were out of the jurisdiction of NATO (solicitation for support). The United States further considered the colonial practices reprehensible (domain reserve). As time passed, European colonies eventually became independent countries and the domain reserve issue, for the most part, faded.[11] (See Appendix 2.)

In the 1960's, defense budgets were being cut from all NATO members. As members withdrew force strength the burden sharing became the predominate source of dispute. The United States is a good example. In the 1960's there was a drawdown of popular support for the military within the United States. Concurrently, the US military was hopelessly mired in Vietnam, an out-of-area conflict not supported by NATO. The United States wished to see greater burden sharing in NATO by other members so the United States could continue funneling dollars into their quagmire in Vietnam. The other members were not only drawing down their military forces, but they were also not sympathetic to the United States involvement in a non-NATO-sponsored out-of-area conflict. They felt the United States should continue its share of the financial burden.

In addition to burden sharing, defining the threat to NATO has caused recent divisive disputes. A good example was the Soviet invasion into Afghanistan. This was clearly a blatant example of the kind of Soviet

expansionism that originally triggered NATO's existence.
Surprisingly, NATO members held heated debates hotly over
the need for NATO to intervene since Afghanistan was not in
the treaty area.

A Present Day Need to Go Out-of-Area?

This trend in out-of-area disputes can be useful in
a discussion of the present day need for NATO's standing
naval forces to conduct out-of-area operations. First, I
will review the five types of disputes to see how they
would apply to NATO's "new strategic concept."

1. Guilt-by-association. This will continue to be a
source of dispute. Simply put, NATO is one of many
alliances and the NATO members have each acquired many and
varied bed-fellows. A conflict in an out-of-area region,
say South Africa as an example, could cause immediate and
devisive intraNATO disputes. Those disputes would include
the fear by some members that, because other members choose
to participate in the conflict, it will be inferred that
they, too, equally support that issue. This would
jeopardize their diplomatic position with South Africa, or
other nations sympathetic to South Africa.

2. Domain Reserve. As described earlier, this
source for dispute is fading. European colonies no longer
exist in the fashion they did in the 1940's and 1950's.
Adding further to this turn in colonial practice is the
increased uniting of all of Europe's economies into a

collective entity, now called the European Community (EC).

The EC offers fundamental collective economic security to

its members. The domain reserve issue becomes less caustic

as the members of the EC, many of whom are also NATO

members, have developed understandings at the economic

level.[12]

　　　3. Solicitation of Support. Because of the

historical failure to illicit a satisfactory response from

other members, regardless of the ingenuity and resolve of

the solicitor, this source of dispute should fade.

However, recent NATO crisis response has stemmed from

requests outside of the NAC (e.g. a U.N. request to enforce

the Yugoslavian embargo). The issue of a unilateral

benefit by a single member from NATO involvement no longer

appears to be a consideration. As long as requests come

from outside of the NAC, as with the unprecedented ties of

NATO military force to the United Nations and to the

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE),

the solicitation dispute will not fade away. Consider

these passages from the Communique' of the Ministerial

Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Oslo, 4 June 1992:

> The strengthening of the means available to the
> CSCE for conflict prevention and crisis management
> will be essential if peace and prosperity are to be
> upheld in Europe.

> The Alliance has the capacity to contribute to
> effective actions by the CSCE in line with its new and
> increased responsibilities for crisis management and
> peaceful settlement of disputes. In this regard, we are
> prepared to support, on a case by case basis in
> accordance with our own procedures, peacekeeping
> activities under the responsibility of the CSCE,

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including the making available Alliance resources and expertise.

We support the valuable contribution of the United Nations to conflict settlement and peacekeeping in the EuroAtlantic Region. We reiterate our commitment to strengthening that organizations ability to carry out its large endeavors for world peace.[13]

NATO members can still refuse to participate if they do not understand, or agree with, the need for a collective response. The problem of solicitation of support, then, has been removed from the NATO forum only to some degree. However, it is evident that the issue still may cause divisive arguments if not all member nations agree with the need to respond to the requests of the CSCE or the United Nations. The Standing Naval Forces take their orders from the Major NATO Commands, not the United Nations or the CSCE. The major NATO commands take their orders from the NAC via the Military Committees, not from the United Nations or the CSCE.

4. Burden Sharing. NATO is still not the sole source of a member's military obligation. Each of the nations faces a variety of separate out-of-area interests stemming from their individual national security objectives. Without NATO sanctioning, military action in support of individual national interests becomes a cost above that of the cost of sharing the NATO burden. Concurrently, military drawdown continues omnilaterally in NATO. These two situations point to continued disputes relating to burden sharing. One hope in these disputes is

the reluctance of NATO's members to alienate themselves from an organization that offers a well-defined collective security mechanism and an elitism by membership alone.

5. Definition of Threat. This particular source for dispute will follow the same future as the solicitation for support issue. NATO will be tasked to a greater extent from outside authority and the threat will be defined by that outside authority. However, the definition of the threat will still require full agreement and support of the NATO members. The definition of threat cannot be completely removed from NATO's forum. Again, the Standing Naval Forces will respond to what is tasked them by their MNC, not by the United Nations or CSCE.

The out-of-area issue has been subjected to two factors that were not considered by Stuart and Tow simply because those factors had not yet occurred. Those factors are NATO's adoption of a "new strategic concept" and NATO's offer to act as the strong arm for the CSCE and the United Nations. In the case of the "new strategic concept," the role of NATO as a rapid reaction force used to quell uprisings of a regional nature lends itself to a greater probability of acquiring out-of-area tasking. Previously, as a deterrent to Soviet expansionism, the standing naval forces could rightfully limit the scope of their operations. Interests that were dear to NATO could be defined and confined to those areas. If the Soviets threatened any area outside of the NATO area it was still

no problem. The vying super power, the United States, could be counted on to "butt heads" with the Soviets. This provided a clear desirability for NATO to stay in the North Atlantic and in the Mediterranean. Now, however, the United States is reluctant to serve in the capacity as a global police force. It is more probable that NATO will have to react, in earnest, out-of-area if their collective interest is truly threatened, especially by an ill-defined threat.

Since NATO has agreed to support the CSCE and the United Nations, the probability that the standing naval forces will be tasked out-of-area is increased even more. The nations of the CSCE and the United Nations will, no doubt, hash out the disputes of a course of action at their level, but NATO will still require unanimous agreement for sanctioning a response from an outside organization.

In spite of the increased likelihood of out-of-area tasking the intraNATO disputes over guilt-by-association and burden sharing, and, to a lesser extent, disputes from solicitation of support and definition of threat, still remain vital concerns. These sources of disputes still appear to have enough vitality to create rifts in the NATO team.

Recent work by Douglas Stuart demonstrates the precarious position that NATO faced during Desert Storm. Although unanimous NATO support was given in condemning the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, a rift still formed within the

Alliance concerning the appropriate response.[14] The

United States and the United Kingdom agreed on a rapid

military response, whereas the other nations desired more

diplomatic rapport with Iraq. Douglas Stuart makes a

convincing argument that NATO risked collapse if pressed

too hard into an extraregional intervention that was

"marginal to the alliance's established purpose."[15] He

explains that the WEU, being flexible in its geographic

area of operations saved NATO from being pressed into

intervention and subsequent divisive intra-alliance

disputes.[16]

Conclusions to the Out-of-Area Issue

In this chapter the out-of-area issue has been

investigated historically and brought to light using the

research of Douglas Stuart and William Tow. Their research

has yielded interesting trends that reveal the shift of the

source of out-of-area disputes mirroring a declining

colonialism and a rising demilitarization of the NATO

nations. Two factors have developed since their research

was conducted: NATO has acquired a new mission and NATO

will accept tasking from the United Nations as well as the

CSCE. It was then considered that these two factors will

play an important role in the future probability that NATO

will be tasked outside of the Article 6 area of operations.

However, the out-of-area issue is in no way resolved

because of the recent geo-political change. The issue

remains as grey as the ships in the standing naval forces.
What does appear evident is that, in spite of extraregional
tasking coming from the United Nations or the CSCE, the
probability of NATO intra-alliance disputes is still a
considerable factor. The out-of-area response still has
the potential for divisive intraNATO disputes stemming from
burden sharing differences, definition of threat,
solicitation of support, and guilt-by-association. If this
effect were diluted by United Nations or CSCE authority
then NATO would become a mere middleman for the standing
naval forces instead of its clear chain of command.

The conclusions on the out-of-area issue reached in
this chapter have a profound effect on the concept of a
standing naval force. This chapter concludes that the
standing naval forces must remain within their original
treaty area to completely avoid both the intra-alliance
political ramifications and the loss of popular support
that would mire NATO's intervention in an extraregional
crisis. In addition to intraNATO disputes, world opinion
would be against NATO, in many instances making NATO appear
to be imperialist. The best use of the standing naval
force concept is to create regional standing naval forces
that are restricted, for the most part, to a defined treaty
area of operations.

In the next chapter I will develop an ideal model
for the standing naval forces concept using the views
expressed by various experts. This will, in turn, lead to

the application of the concept in developing regional

standing naval forces.

CHAPTER 4

DEVELOPING A STANDING NAVAL FORCE MODEL

In the previous chapters, NATO's standing naval forces
were analyzed to illustrate those factors that have
contributed to their success. The standing naval forces
have consistently met NATO objectives for the 25 years of
their existence because NATO has guaranteed their success.
NATO has accomplished this through a well-defined chain-of-
command that places decision making at the appropriate
level, through a logistics system ever evolving towards
standardization and interchangeability, and through a
mutually beneficial system for meeting and maintaining
infrastructure requirements. Chapter 3 revealed that,
although the nations of NATO may now be tasked
extraregionally by the United Nations or the CSCE, the
controversy associated with out-of-area is still a
pertinent factor in NATO's employment of the standing naval
forces. Chapter 3 concluded that the best application for
a standing naval force is to formulate exclusive
regionally-based forces.

Knowing, then, the factors for success, and having
reviewed the out-of-area issue, this chapter will further
investigate the concept of the standing naval force and how

that concept could be employed for the benefit of global security. This chapter will begin by examining what the experts are thinking these days about NATO's standing naval forces.

Admiral Leon Edney, USN (retired), former SACLANT, is confident that NATO's maritime forces will continue to be a vital element in NATO's changing strategy.[1] In his essay on NATO's new concept for maritime operations, Admiral Edney emphasizes that NATO nations are dependent on the seas for a large part of their trade (he quotes 64 percent of global trade involves NATO nations as importers or exporters). The maritime forces of NATO are indispensable in protecting the sea lines of communications and commerce through the capability of projecting a rapid and flexible response with a large variety of conventional weapons. The maritime forces can also serve as political tools because of their deterrent image. Admiral Edney claims that a great contribution of NATO is the training exercises that solve the problems caused by interoperability. This consistent training enabled ships of many nations to operate together with very few problems during Desert Storm. As NATO restructures to meet the challenges of regional conflicts, Admiral Edney foresees an expanded role for the multinational naval force. The two standing naval forces would provide rapid response capability to support security requirements exceeding those of the smaller immediate reaction force. They must be

flexible in both size and capability to respond
appropriately anywhere in NATO's operating area. Admiral
Edney points out that main defensive maritime forces would
be deployed to back up the reaction forces as the severity
of the crisis dictates.

In a magazine article, Admiral James R. Hogg, U.S.
Navy (retired), former US military representative to NATO,
lists the benefits that the United States derives from
NATO. The first benefit he states is support for
multinational military operations. Giving Desert Storm as
an example, Admiral Hogg stresses that NATO infrastructure
and NATO-earmarked forces provided invaluable support
during Desert Storm. Another benefit of NATO is base
access during crises, which Admiral Hogg describes as
"priceless" because of NATO's extensive political and
diplomatic relationships that have developed a deep trust
among the members. Admiral Hogg states that the biggest
benefit from NATO membership is the means provided to the
United States to influence European politics and diplomacy,
which, in turn, provides an informal avenue for the United
States to influence European economics.[2]

Admiral Hogg guages NATO's success to date as
stemming from the common interests and ideals, as well as
the strong democratic values, that are the fabric of the
member's societies, cultures, and institutions. Admiral
Hogg also feels that NATO could expand over time to
encompass additional members. He foresees NATO cooperation

with the Western European Union and an expansion of NATO membership to include former Warsaw Pact nations. He mentions the North Atlantic Cooperation Council as a possible intermediate to this expanded relationship.[3]

Sir Patrick Wall, a retired member of the British Parliament, and former president of the North Atlantic Assembly, described the new NATO four-tier force structure.

> The new NATO structure envisioned by a number of Allied planners would embody four different force categories: immediate reaction, main defense, rapid reaction, and augmentation (reinforcement) forces. Of these, some units would be maintained in full strength, others would rely on a large number of reserves. Readiness levels would range from 'rapid' to several weeks.[4]

Patrick Wall emphasizes the continuing importance of NATO as a political and diplomatic counterbalance to the uncertainties of European security and stability. He also sees NATO as the premier forum for trans-Atlantic cooperation and common defense. Sir Patrick Wall discusses NATO's relation to the United Nations in light of the current tasking put forth from the United Nations. He feels that the United Nations "will grow primarily through the efforts of NATO and the CSCE."[5] He does not think that the United Nations will ever replace NATO as a military alliance. Sir Patrick Wall also envisions an expanded role for NATO's naval forces due to the continuing threat of global unrest. He feels that it is time for an organization to perform operations outside of the present NATO Article 6 area of operations. Patrick

Wall indicates that the Article 6 definition was arbitrarily drawn after World War II and no longer holds any significance.[6]

Diametrically opposed to this view of expanding the role of the present NATO is Admiral Sir Peter Stanford, Royal Navy retired. Sir Peter Stanford states,

> NATO is a defensive military alliance, not some sort of political club. To attempt to fit new patterns of geo-politics into the NATO mold, or to massage NATO into a wider spectrum of activities of a wholly different order, are retrograde distortions.[7]

Sir Stanford claims that a new structure is needed: a "flexible geometry," that takes into account the maritime enterprises of the nations and may, in some aspects, look like the NATO structure. Sir Stanford also believes that action should be taken now to implement a new "NATO" maritime force structure so that it will be operational by the year 2000.[8]

Dr. James George, an internationally-known author on naval affairs and a former U.S. naval officer, sees a clear pattern to the drawdown of NATO land forces. He postulates that an inverse relationship likely exists between the ground and maritime forces of NATO. As the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty I (CFE I) takes affect and allied troop strength in Europe declines, the European Allies will rely more heavily on their maritime forces for fast reaction as well as the sea lift capability to support trans-Atlantic mobility.[9] With the predominance of NATO's maritime forces, Dr. George foresees a shift in

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seniority of the NATO command structure. He believes that SACLANT will take predominance over SACEUR.[10] Dr. George points out the historical reluctance of NATO's European nations to take on problems outside of the Article 6 area of operation will have to change. He proposes that the creation of more standing naval forces with different allied commanders will incite participation by more of NATO's nations.

However, in spite of these optimistic forecasts, Dr. George is actually concerned that the concurrent drawdown of NATO's maritime forces would create a void that will not be easily filled. This drawdown, he feels, would be a grave error because the leaders are not taking into account the time and money required to build back naval strength compared to the requirements of rebuilding ground troop strength. He advises that "more attention must be given to the decline of NATO navies."[11] Dr. George's book is most notable in that it addresses specifics about the standing naval forces. In particular, he shows how NATO's navy is becoming a frigate navy, devoid of cruisers and battleships. He explains that if frigates are going to be the forte of NATO then the Anti-Air Warfare (AAW) capability of the frigates must be improved. He recommends revisiting the NATO Frigate Replacement of the 1990's Program which was aimed at standardizing the building and parts support of the new construction frigates for NATO nations.

Gary L. Geipel, a research fellow at the Hudson Institute's Center for Soviet and Central European Studies, gives three important reasons for the continuation of NATO as is.[12] First, he states, Europe is still a dangerous place and needs to be policed by a military force. Second, the U.S. presence in Europe is almost a sure deterrence to any future war. Third, burden sharing is an economically sound way to maintain a strong military while gaining a "peace dividend." Mr. Geipel focuses on the successful structure that NATO has developed. He gives proof of NATO's interoperability when he cites the successful completion of a complicated naval exercise involving 11 submarines and numerous maritime air patrol assets from 5 NATO nations. The officers and crews of the NATO vessels considered an exercise like this to be routine. Mr. Geipel also claims that NATO should expand the area of operation outside of the Article 6 definition. He envisions NATO serving as an agent to the United Nations to enforce resolutions of the Security Council.[13]

Perhaps the most widely researched view on the future employment of standing naval forces comes from a project for the Center for Strategic and International Studies co-chaired by Douglas Johnston, Harlan Ullman and R.J. Woolsey. Entitled "NATO Realignment and the Maritime Component," this project joined many naval and geopolitical experts into a steering committee and a working group. (Admiral Hogg was on the steering committee.) This project

developed and forwarded six recommendations for the gainful
employment of the standing naval forces in the near future:

1. Continue to realign NATO command structure by...

   a. upgrading CINCSOUTH to a major NATO command
and by,

   b. extending the SACLANT tour of duty

2. Develop multinational task groups to compliment
the standing naval forces in performing taskings out-of-
area

3. Prepare the way for out-of-area operations by...

   a. political acclamation through initial goodwill
cruises

   b. conduct non-provacative humanitarian
assistance tasking out-of-area

   c. conduct noncombatant evacuation missions

   d. focus on choke point control as it has direct
correlation to the economy

4. In-rease the capability for strategic sea lift
and maritime prepositioning

5. Revisit the NATO generic frigate
(standardization) effort for use in Third World scenarios.

6. Develop a shipboard antitheater ballistic
missile (ATBM) capability[14]

This project also discusses the many benefits that
come from the standing naval forces. First, sea power is
described as:

   A mobile, flexible, and easily manageable means of
   projecting alliance resolve in either a deterrence or

conflict-resolving mode... In short, they (the standing naval forces) are a diplomatic rheostat, well suited to overseeing alliance interests on a worldwide basis.[15]

The project also recognizes that the standing naval forces are multifarious, capable of performing humanitarian assistance missions, providing non-combat evacuation and disaster relief, and promoting diplomatic good will while strengthening cultural ties through port visits. The project foresees a growing reliance on the standing naval forces as NATO draws down its ground forces and must attend to collective interests in more remote areas of the world. The most notable conclusion reached by this coalition of experts is that, regardless of the future that faces NATO, the standing naval forces will become increasingly important to NATO.[16]

A Consensus Opinion on the Standing Naval Forces

By examining the options discussed by the experts presented above, it may be possible to discover a consensus of their visions of the ideal standing naval force. First, the similarities in the experts' opinions will be presented, and then this chapter will conclude by tying all of these attributes together into a model force.

There are many common threads running through the extracts that were presented above. All of the authors agree, for example, that NATO still has a relevant mission and that the standing naval forces are an indispensable asset. It is pointed out by more than one author that the

maritime forces become increasingly important as the drawdown of ground forces in Europe continues to the scale on which it is proceeding. This increasing dependence on the maritime forces as the initial NATO response to crises as set forth in the "new strategic concept" underwrites a need to realign the major NATO commands. Several authors agree that SACLANT will replace SACEUR as the primary major NATO command and that CINCSOUTH is a candidate for a new major NATO command.

Several authors agree that the frigate is the best ship to be used in the standing naval force. These authors felt that the NATO standard frigate program of the 1990's was prematurely dropped. The standard frigate is depicted by these authors to be flexible and multifarious in response options, as well as quick. These authors see the reduction in naval strength by many NATO nations to be shortsighted and a foreboding weakness in the future NATO maritime forces capability to deal substantially with all levels of threats.

The authors all agree that NATO should be expanded because of its new role as manager of ill defined threats and crisis response, yet the authors' visions of expansion are clearly divergent. In one case, NATO is expanded eastward to include members of the former Warsaw Pact. In another case the present standing naval forces are given a step-by-step method to gradually increase their presence out-of-area. Still another author believes that NATO should

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not respond extraregionally in their present configuration, rather he proposes new force structuring along a NATO-like base. One other author foresees multiple regional standing naval forces being the logical expansion of the present NATO standing naval force.

As a driving factor for the size and composition of the standing naval forces, the assigned mission or role would best support the forces if it were a constant. How easy it would be to structure the standing naval force if the only job was to provide gunfire support or to hunt submarines. However, the threat defined by the "new strategic concept" is multifaceted in the extreme and demands the maximum flexibility and mobility possible from the standing naval forces. All of the authors agree that the standing naval forces are inherently mobile, flexible, and are capable of multifarious responses. It follows then that the missions given to them can be equally diverse. The standing naval forces have already proven their capability to deter aggression and expansion by the highly technical and skillful Soviet blue water navy. They have also shown a great success in enforcing embargoes by blockading commercial maritime traffic into and out of an aggressor nation. The STANAVFORCHAN has time and again proven singularly instrumental in mine countermeasure operations in the Persian Gulf. Finally, although acting apart from the formal STANAVFORLANT organization, various NATO ships have escorted oil tanker merchant ships through

the Persian Gulf during the Iran-Iraq War. Additional
missions that the NATO Realignment Project foresees as
becoming important to the standing naval forces are
humanitarian assistance, noncombatant evacuation, and
chokepoint control.[17] These missions are in line with
the "new strategic concept" in that they are representative
of the possible crisis that could spring up almost
anywhere. NATO will depend on the immediate reaction
capability of the standing naval force to provide the
initial contact as these conflicts arise.

The Ideal Standing Naval Force Concept

In the previous two chapters the characteristics of
a successful standing naval force were defined by using
NATO as an example. By analyzing the factors that have
both helped and hindered the employment of NATO's standing
naval forces, some insight was gained into the framework
supporting the concept for the standing naval force. In
this chapter the concept of the standing naval forces was
analyzed a step further by reviewing what the experts are
expounding on this subject. Although the experts are not
entirely in consensus on all aspects of the future
employment of the standing naval forces, common visions
were brought to light that will serve as the ground work
for building an ideal concept. Finally, the ultimate goal
in illustrating an ideal concept of the standing naval
force is to provide a model for a collective security force

capable of reacting effectively to the challenges of a multiple threat environment on a regional basis.

The standing naval forces evolved from the need for collective maritime security in the waters that provide sea lines of communication to and from geo-political regions engaged in commerce. The mobility, diverse array of weapons, and capability to provide military and diplomatic responses to crisis increases the potential employment of the standing naval force. The standing naval force is a team, united in their common goals, and directed from a single, indisputable chain of command. The team demonstrates singlemindedness of purpose with the resolve to ensure the security of the alliance as well as the protection of the interests of the individual nations.

In order to be a truly representative team of the alliance the standing naval force must have equal representation from all of the member nations that have navies in the oceans or seas of the geo-political region. Representation should be in the form of ships tasked for devoted participation in the standing naval force. However, if a member nation was devoid of military resources then representation should be in the contribution of sea ports and associated infrastructure, as well as logistics support, for use by the standing naval force. The possibility of being tasked in diplomatic responses to crisis dictates total alliance representation in the standing naval forces. Anything less than total

representation will reduce the overall effectiveness and credibility of the standing naval force.

Since a particular response provided by the standing naval force is inextricably tied to a variety of possible mission taskings, the size and composition of the force must be structured to adequately encompass every possibility. Technological advances have armed frigate and destroyer-sized ships with the weapons system mix to perform all three warfare areas (AntiSubmarine Warfare or ASW, AntiSurface Warfare or ASUW, and AntiAir Warfare or AAW). Therefore the standing naval force will most economically and effectively be composed of a single frigate or destroyer sized ship from each representative member nation. Four to ten frigates and destroyers are capable of responding quickly and capably to the full range of representative low intensity conflicts and still remain, in a relative sense, an unprovacative military force. The newer Aegis destroyers are particularly well adapted for a lead ship role in the standing naval force.

As previously mentioned, the standing naval force is a mobile and flexible immediate reaction force with a multifarious response capability. There is really no limit to the variety of missions that could be assigned to the standing naval force. A distinction must be drawn, however, between the mission capability of the standing naval force and that of the striking force. The striking force concept is designed for larger, protracted conflicts

involving sizeable enemy forces and an environment of
simultaneous multithreat scenarios. The standing naval
force concept was never designed to complete a mission of
that magnitude. As discussed in Chapter 2, the capability
to deter the aggression and expansionism of a rival blue
water navy was not possible without the muscle of the
striking force. Although compatable with supporting the
striking force (now termed rapid response or main body
force in the "new strategic concept" parlance), the
standing naval force is most economically used to intervene
in a crisis with any of the following methods:

> -blockade of commercial shipping in support of
> economic sanctions
>
> -convoy or tanker escort
>
> -support of nation assistance
>
> -evacuation of non-combat personnel
>
> -chokepoint control
>
> -projection of power and collective resolve by mere
> presence
>
> -goodwill port visits to demonstrate solidarity
>
> -support of mine countermeasure operations
>
> -support amphibious landings and special operation
> forces

In addition to these taskings the standing naval forces
must conduct training cruises to "shake down"
interoperability and experiment with new and better ways to
standardize procedures and logistic support. Training

should stress the development of teamwork in conducting the three basic warfare areas of ASW, AAW, and ASUW.

The standing naval force needs the support of shore-based infrastructure in the form of supply, petroleum, and ammunition storage facilities, intermediate and depot level repair facilities, moorings, piers and associated handling equipment and habitability hook-ups. To oversee this infrastructure an organization for procurement, construction and maintenance must be established. A system of common funds and trailing audits must be in effect to pay for the infrastructure. NATO infrastructure appears to be a good example to follow. Seaports and bases to hold this infrastructure must be available in strategic locales and within the member nations of the alliance.

To support the standing naval forces while underway there must be available auxiliary ships to deliver ammunition, fuel, food, mail, and repair parts. To lessen the complexity of the sustainment equation all ships in the standing naval force must be equipped with standard rigging for UNREP and CONREP. There must be an ongoing effort to standardize weapons systems, propulsion systems, and deck equipment. The goal here is to reduce multiplicity as much as politically possible. Sustainment and the capability to perform a mission are bound one to the other. The easier the sustainment effort becomes through interchangeability and standardization, the more efficiently the standing naval force can concentrate on their operational tasking.

In addition, communications and data linking must be exercised until the interoperability is seamless. As an example, COMSTANAVFORLANT prioritizes communications and at-sea sustainment as the areas which require further effort to perfect.[18]

The standing naval forces are best deployed within the prescribed boundries of a treaty-defined operating area. The alliance should refrain, if at all possible, from deploying the standing naval forces out-of-area. This will prevent divisive arguments from tearing apart the alliance. For example, as discussed in Chapter 3, there is still a possibility of NATO intra-alliance disputes over the out-of-area issue. This possibility still exists in spite of the decisions to respond out-of-area coming from the United Nations or the CSCE. The standing naval force is a regional military force.

As previously discussed, technological advances in weapons systems have enabled the frigate/destroyer-sized ship to perform the three basic warfare areas. Technology consistently enhances these capabilities and could benefit the alliance. However, from a political point of view, the technology is the property of the nation that made the discovery. The United States, for example, is currently at the apex of a virtual revolution in information technology. Admiral Jeremiah, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, describes the importance of maintaining this lead in technology, as well as developing tactics to fit the

technology, as vital aspects of future battlefield success.[19] It is, then, best to leave the decision to contribute the newfound technology to the owner. A good example is the Aegis weapon system. The United States decided to contribute this advanced technology to Japan in the construction of their Kongo class destroyers.[20] This decision was disputed within the United States because of the unique and advanced capability of the Aegis system. Sharing technology will become less of an issue when and if the alliance nations become comfortable with trusting each other.

The ideal model that was envisioned in this chapter will be used in the next chapter to assess its applicability. Knowing that the concept has been successfully employed by NATO it will be applied in a like manner to the Pacific region. There are definite and notable dissimilarities between the NATO region and the Pacific region, but it is the goal of this thesis to show that the standing naval force concept is versatile and flexible enough to adapt to the various geo-political regions.

CHAPTER 5

THE STANDING NAVAL FORCES CONCEPT PUT TO WORK

In the previous chapters an in-depth look at the
concept of the standing naval forces was presented. NATO's
standing naval forces provided an example of a successful
standing naval force since they have endured for 25 years
and have succeeded in meeting their original objective of
deterrence. NATO's standing naval forces have also
transitioned smoothly into the "new strategic concept."
The out-of-area issue was then reviewed only to conclude
that it is a persistent dispute that will probably never be
rooted out of NATO. Knowing this, it was concluded that
the best use of the standing naval forces in a global
context was as regionally based standing naval forces.
Finally, Chapter 4 presented the visions of several experts
on the future of NATO's standing naval forces. Using the
consistent ideas an ideal model of the standing naval
forces concept was synthesized.

This chapter will demonstrate how one might use the
standing naval force concept in a non-NATO area. For this
demonstration the Pacific geo-political region will serve
as an example. The intent in this chapter is to show that
the standing naval force concept can be applied to any

geopolitical region and provide an economical and highly diverse means of collective maritime security.

For this demonstration a description of the area of the Pacific geopolitical region will first be examined. Recent alliances and trade agreements in the Pacific region will be presented in an attempt to forecast which countries would most likely share interests and, therefore, would most likely ally for collective security. Using this alliance it will be shown that a standing naval force would provide the best initial use of sea power for collective maritime security. Ultimately, by showing the utility of the standing naval force model it is intended to bring the concept to light as a means for the United States to maintain global security while still drawing down military forces.

The Pacific Geopolitical Region

The Pacific geopolitical region can be defined as that area binding the Pacific Ocean to the west of Hawaii. This includes both the North and the South Pacific. The major democratic countries that are included in this region are the United States, Japan, Russia (?), South Korea, Taiwan, Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia. The major communist countries in this region include Peoples Republic of China, Vietnam, and North Korea. There are numerous smaller island nations, lightly populated, with undeveloped

military forces in the Pacific region. Table 4 lists the important factors to consider for each country's contributions to an alliance. For the purposes of this thesis it will be assumed that an alliance in this region would most likely form between the major democratic nations. To add validity to this alliance we can review the present treaties and associations in the Pacific region:

ANZAC: an Australia and New Zealand agreement signed in 1944 discussing common interests, establishing policy and defense for the South Pacific region in and around their nations.

ANZUS: a tripartite security system signed in 1951 by the US, Australia and New Zealand. This treaty basically stated that an armed attack on one of the three nations in the Pacific would be an attack on all three nations. Strained by New Zealand's ban on nuclear weapons, which denied the United States port visits in New Zealand, the United States withdrew its security obligations to New Zealand under this treaty until New Zealand would allow port visitation. Australia remains in good standing with both nations to date.

Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Area: An agreement signed in 1965 and extended in 1977, this established an area of limited free trade between the two countries.

Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty: Signed in 1954 by the United States, the United Kingdom, Thailand,

Australia, Philippines, New Zealand, France, and Pakistan, this treaty provided the groundwork for the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). SEATO was designed to provide collective security aimed to ward off communist aggression in the area of the West Pacific below 21 degrees 30 minutes north latitude. This treaty also established a protocol on Indo-China which included Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam. Although SEATO formally disbanded in 1977, the treaty remains in effect to this very day. SEATO will be discussed in detail in this chapter.

Bilateral treaties with the United States: The United States has signed various bilateral treaties with the nations of the Pacific. In most cases these treaties establish mutual defense and security, and includ agreements to settle international disputes peacefully. The following nations in the Pacific now have bilateral treaties with the United States.

    Republic of Korea
    Philippines
    Japan
    Vietnam Peace Agreement of 1973

ASEAN: Established in 1967, this organization includes the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, Indonesia, Singapore, and Thailand. The objectives of ASEAN are to promote and stimulate economic growth as well as social and cultural development in the members' countries. This organization is not a military pact and is not designed to compete with any economic or political ideology. In spite

of this attempt to remain apolitical, ASEAN formally castigated the overthrow of Cambodia by Vietnamese Communists in 1979, and intervened to stop border disputes between China and Vietnam. ASEAN sincerely aspires to promote a harmonious trade relationship with all nations in Southeast Asia. ASEAN signed a co-operation agreement with the United States for narcotics control and cultural development in 1979, trade agreements with Japan in 1985, held meetings with the European Community since 1985, and has remained in a dialogue status with Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Japan, the EC, and the Unbited States. ASEAN remains adament about Vietnam withdrawing its influence from Cambodia.

Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Council: The concept for this organization originated in 1989 with the goal of keeping multilateral trade open in the Pacific region in order to prevent "defensive trading blocs" from forming. The council originally met in 1989 and included 12 countries of the Pacific region: all ASEAN representative countries, the United States, Canada, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, and Australia. The United States originally requested attendence by Peoples Republic of China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong but was opposed in this request by many of the ASEAN nations.[1]

The existing treaties and agreements, as well as many organizations in the Pacific region reveal that there are a variety of mutual interests between the major

democratic nations. This adds credibility to the example
that will be used of an alliance established between the
democratic nations in the Pacific. In order to further
enhance a credible foundation for this alliance a former
military alliance established in 1954 in the Pacific
region, SEATO, will be examined. The goal in analyzing
SEATO is to understand what caused the demise of that
alliance so that lessons learned could benefit the forming
of a new alliance.

SEATO: A Study in Failure

SEATO was established in 1954, to check aggression
and expansion of communist idealogy into the treaty area of
Southeast Asia and in the South Pacific. Like NATO, SEATO
was developed along a separate political and military force
structure, and, like NATO, SEATO had a well defined
operating area. The members of SEATO were the United
States, the United Kingdom, Thailand, Indonesia,
Philippines, France, Australia, New Zealand, and Pakistan.
SEATO stood for a powerful guarantee, backed by U.S.
military strength, that the political order of the area
would be stable.[2] As a result of that guarantee, a
polarization became evident, where countries were notably
aligned with either a pro-Western or an anti-Western
government. Those countries which aligned in the
pro-Western manner were rewarded by economic assistance
from the United States, both through SEATO and from

outside SEATO management. SEATO, like NATO, became primarily a deterrent force bent on using military intervention only as a last resort.[3] In June 1977, SEATO disbanded after nearly a quarter century of development, international training, and deterrence of the onslaught of communism.

There are many reasons why SEATO did not succeed in the same manner as NATO has succeeded. Some of the reasons become quite obvious on review while other reasons remain subtle. The following are some of the reasons that SEATO did not succeed:

1. France and Pakistan withdrew support.

2. Smaller Asian nations questioned membership of the United Kingdom and France (colonialism).

3. Disputes between the United Kingdom, the United States, and France rendered SEATO powerless from time to time.

4. ASEAN offered other Southeast Asia nations economic security and probable military protection by the United States without being committed to a strictly bi-polar stance.

5. The Japan-United States alliance divorced Japan from involvement in SEATO.

6. A wide disparity existed between the military and technical strength of the three major powers and the smaller Asian nations.

7. No permanent SEATO commands were established in the fashion of the MNC's.

8. The Western powers expected the organization to be run in parallel with NATO, underestimating the impact of the geopolitical/economic differences between the nations of SEATO vis-a-vis the nations of NATO.

9. SEATO was an assistance alliance (with the United States doing most of the assisting) vice a burden sharing alliance like NATO.

10. The three major powers had homefronts that were thousands of miles away from the treaty area.

11. The effort to stop North Vietnamese expansion into South Vietnam catalyzed the dissolution of an alliance that was not quite strong enough in both theory and practice.

12. Relations between the United States and the perceived threat of the area (Peoples Republic of China) were improved in the mid-1970's.

13. An out-of-area dispute erupted over Chinese incursions into Burma in 1956.

14. All of the conflicts met by SEATO were representative regional conflicts which were difficult to handle with the forces available.[4]

In spite of these difficulties, SEATO (at one time) operated as a team. Many exercises were performed, including naval exercises coordinating ships from all SEATO nations. These exercises were aimed at interoperability

and standardization training, and familiarization with combined efforts for convoy protection, anti-submarine warfare, and minecountermeasures.[5] SEATO never integrated the standing naval force concept into their force structure. Most likely this is because in 1967, when the concept was brought into fruition in NATO, SEATO nations were agonizing in the quagmire of the Vietnam conflict. SEATO was, from that point on, unable to remain a cohesive team. In addition, the command structure in SEATO, lacking the MNC, was not conducive to establishing a standing naval force.

The Pacific Region Today

The Pacific region has changed considerably since the demise of SEATO. The South China Sea Basin remains one of the most provacative strategic areas in the region. Notably, the political/economic factors of the former SEATO and present ASEAN nations have taken on a considerably renovated appearance. Those nations that were previously described as having disparate military and technological strength compared to the major three nations in SEATO are now, for the most part, coming into their own, both militarily and economically. The nations of ASEAN, in particular, are beginning to enjoy economic, cultural and social growth. They are also beginning to modernize their military forces with high tech weapons.[6] ASEAN perceives no insurgent threat from within their governments as in the

days of SEATO, but are interested in collective security against threats from outside their area.[7] In addition to the Southeast Asian nations gaining increasing global economic status, the nations of Japan, Russia, China, Taiwan, and South Korea are all enmeshed in the political/economic base of that region. Meanwhile, the United States is pushing Japan into the regional defense arena while fending off the historical distrust of the Japanese throughout Southeast Asia.[8]

The threat scenario in the Pacific region has changed considerably since SEATO disbanded. There is no common perception of threat in this region. Each nation has uniquely prioritized threats. The following threats have been identified in the Southeast Asia region:

1. The People's Republic of China is perceived as a threat by Indonesia and Malaysia based on their past experiences with Chinese-backed communist insurgencies. Chinese political influence may become a threat to Singapore and Indonesia.

2. Vietnam and their large army is perceived by several of the ASEAN nations as a threat. Vietnam, in turn, looks upon China as a threat because of historical border confrontations. The other ASEAN nations would like to see increased trade and economic relations with Vietnam. This would make Vietnam a physical and political buffer between China and the ASEAN nations.

3.   Territorial disputes have the potential to erupt into armed confrontations in the South China Sea Basin. This includes the varied claims of sovereignty for the Spratly and the Natuna Islands.

4.   Cam Ranh Bay in Vietnam remains an open port to Russian military ships. Russian military assistance to Vietnam and Laos has not ceased.

5.   Thailand continues to have border confrontations with both Laos and Burma.

6.   Since American forces have departed the Philippines, there have been increasing confrontations between the democratic government and communist insurgent organizations. The Philippines is one nation that has been unable to recover economically and is without substantial modern military power.

7.   Peoples Republic of China perceives a reduction in threat from the former Soviet Union and is able to reduce the number of forces involved in border security.[9]

8.   A showdown is impending between North Korea and the United Nations as the North Koreans refuse to allow inspectors into purported nuclear weapon industry sites in North Korea.[10]

In the present condition of the Pacific region, and in support of the interests shared there by the democratic nations, it would be prudent to establish a means of collective security. It would be easy at this point to recommend that an organization like NATO or SEATO be

renovated for use in the Pacific region by trying to solve the problems that led to the demise of the military alliance in 1977. However, the nations in this region are far too diverse and differ culturally and politically from the NATO nations. A NATO clone can not be expected to succeed in the Pacific region.

ASEAN, for example, claims that they are not a military organization, yet those nations continue on a high tech weapon buying spree in hopes of adding some credible deterrence to the threats they see coming from outside.[11] This includes an increasing number of warships added to the fleets of these ASEAN nations. Although it is apparent that threats exist in the Pacific region (from the preceding eight examples), it is difficult now for the nations in this region to agree on what they perceive to be the common threat. This is one of many factors that will prohibit an immediate and concrete military alliance to be established now in the region.[12] The other factors include:

1. The regional nations place a great deal of pride in their independence and in their ever increasing ability to act without interference from a superpower.

2. The regional countries are vastly different in the economic and domestic constraints placed on their navies.

3. The maritime environment is viewed differently by the regional nations of the Pacific. They believe in

large areas of regional waters comprising the sovereignty of the nation.

4. The navies in the region are not recently practiced in interoperability and standardization.

5. The regional nations have navies which are mostly designed for littoral tasks of sea denial, not blue water power projection.[13]

A Step by Step Methodology

An expert in the Pacific region is Commodore Sam Bateman of the Royal Australian Navy, presently Director General of th Maritime Studies Program in Canberra. He recommends using gradual measures as a prerequisite to establishing a multinational maritime coalition.[14] These measures must establish a common sense of purpose and, at the same time, demonstrate a mutually beneficial end state. He calls these transitory measures maritime confidence and security building measures (MCSBM). They include the following activities:

1. maritime surveillance
2. monitor illegal activities (smuggling, piracy)
3. control and protection of regional shipping
4. Search And Rescue and maritime safety
5. monitor marine pollution
6. sharing maritime intelligence[15]

Commodore Bateman foresees coupling these activities or MCSBMs with dialogues between the navies of the region

to provide a base to further the growth of maritime cooperation between the countries. Since 1988 Peoples Republic of China, Japan, the United States, Australia, New Zealand, South Korea, Papua New Guinea, and the ASEAN members have joined in the Western Pacific Naval Symposium. This forum for maritime related topics has succeeded in defining the MCSBMs mentioned above and, in the future, may be the forum for implementing this foundation.[16] The MCSBMs have a potential to succeed as a groundwork in that they do not require the definition of a common threat.

Once this groundwork is established, it is the best opportunity to either expand current combined naval exercises in the region, or to initiate new exercises. As an example there is an annual naval exercise held in the north Pacific called "Team Spirit." Team Spirit provides training for Japan, the United States, and South Korea perform a combined amphibious assault. This exercise could be expanded to include additional Pacific region surface ships to be integrated into combined ASW and convoy escort operations. "RIMPAC" is another exercise that already provides interoperability training to the United States Canada, South Korea, Japan, and Australia.[17]

New exercises could also be initiated as the navies become more familiar with each other from the MCSBMs. These exercises would, for all practical purposes, simulate common military requirements for diplomatic missions: the

protection of shipping transiting the region, the search for and submission of pirates, humanitarian assistance, the evacuation of noncombatant civilians, or putting a stranglehold on drug smuggling.

Combined exercises will invariably demonstrate the versatility and economical basis of multinational maritime cooperation. These nations with similar economic interests will see the benefit in joining together to ensure a state-of-the-art force is available to act on their behalf. Since the prospect of having the United States "on your team" appeals to many of the Pacific countries, a multinational naval alliance with the United States as a member should be the guarantee of US backing. At the same time, since these nations are now better aligned economically than they were during SEATO, they can contribute naval assets with the knowledge of their independence and the pride in the capability to make a significant contribution to the alliance.

As discussed above, after the groundwork of the MCSBMs is established it would then be the best opportunity to encourage multinational participation and coordination in naval training exercises. Successful participation and the demonstration of the great economic and security benefits gained from the multinational naval exercises will be the catalyst for the creation of the standing naval force.

The Standing Naval Forces Pacific

Before a standing naval force can be formulated, certain prerequisites must be met to support the force. The factors that have guaranteed success in NATO's standing naval force, discussed in Chapter 2, must be addressed to see how they would apply to a new standing naval force in the Pacific.

Organization.

An organization needs to be identified to support a collective military force in the area. Members should be those that have immediate interests in the area and are geographically tied to the region (unlike France's and United Kingdom's colonial ties and Pakistan in SEATO). This organization must provide a forum that places all members on equal footing for determining policy. This forum should be divorced from the military structure for the simple reason that the military must concentrate on teamwork rather than political debate. The organization must provide a method of common funding for burden sharing, infrastructure maintenance and construction, as well as logistics. ### Command Structure.

A chain of command like NATO's is the best structure for supporting a standing naval force. In the case of the Pacific region, it seems logical to divide it into two major commands, North and South Pacific. This would mirror the two major NATO commands. In the early stages of the development of the standing naval force, the United States

should assume command of the major commands because the
United States is the only superpower with interests that
are global and not as strictly localized as the other
nations. The standing naval forces should have a rotating
command exactly like NATO standing naval forces. Table 4
shows contribution capabilities of possible alliance
members.)

Infrastructure.

First, bases must be established in ports that are
strategically located throughout the Pacific. Once these
bases have been identified, they must be upgraded to
provide adequate mooring facilities, supply depots, depot
and intermediate level repair facilities, refuel
capability, and, in some cases, training sites.
Fortunately, sufficient bases already exist in the region:
Pearl Harbor, Guam, Sasebo, Yokosuka, and Subic Bay are
some fine examples. (See Table 5.) The fact that the
United States has operated a blue water naval force in this
area for over a century greatly facilitates the
infrastructure equation.

Logistics.

The key to successful logistics, as discussed in
Chapter 2, is the endeavor to approach an ideal
interoperability and standardization. Currently,
interoperability is one of the weaknesses of the countries
in this region. There have been a few combined naval
exercises. The United States, Australia, South Korea, and

Japan have consistently worked together in exercises like Team Spirit and Rimpac. To some extent interoperability has been introduced to the nations of the region. However, interoperability must be tackled immediately after identifying the need for a standing naval force. The progress towards interoperability, interchangeability and standardization is slow while the naval force build-up by all countries in this region has increased over the past ten years.

Table 6 shows the degree of standardization of weapons systems currently existing in the navies of some countries that are possible future alliance members. The degree of interchangeability, as demonstrated in Table 6 is almost the same as NATO (Table 3). It is encouraging to see that the interchangeability problem is not unwieldy.

The standing naval force would require several support ships to deploy with the force. The following nations have support ships available: United States, Japan, Australia, South Korea, and Thailand.

Force size and composition. The initial standing naval force should be composed of one frigate or destroyer sized ship from each of the member nations. Nations that do not have sufficient resources to provide naval vessels of that size would be able to contribute infrastructure. Bases are of particular value since this region is relatively far reaching. Table 4 shows the possible naval vessels that each of the countries has available for

possible contribution. The capabilities of the present day
frigate or destroyer makes this cooperative force capable
of reacting to a multitude of threat possibilities. The
new Arleigh Burke class or the Japanese Kongo class
destroyers are particularly well suited as lead ships in
the standing naval force because of their Aegis technology.

Mission and Tasking

The first missions of the infant Standing
Naval Force Pacific (STANAVFORPAC) will be very close to
the MCSBMs. These missions will be similar to the missions
given to the US Coast Guard. These will include the
interdiction of vessels involved in smuggling contraband,
search for and arresting of piracy, humanitarian
assistance, evacuation of noncombatant personnel,
enforcement of maritime safety, and protection of
international shipping through the regions sea lines of
communication. In time, as the alliance nations become
more accustomed to working together, and as a mutual trust
builds, the missions of the STANAVFORPAC will require more
coordination and cooperation. These missions would include
choke point regulation and control, escorting commercial
vessels, mine countermeasures, deterrence of pan-Pacific
aggressive expansionism, and enforcing territorial claims
or rights. Ultimately, the STANAVFORPAC, as a crisis
interventionist, would exist as a measure of collective
security that would relieve the United States of its role
in the Pacific as the world's policeman. The United

States, by maintaining its present well trained and highly capable blue water navy with strike capability, will serve as a back up to the STANAVFORPAC in the case where a more capable naval force is warranted. Japan, with its ever growing naval power, could also serve in the capacity as a back up naval force. This back up force would be similar to NATO's immediate reaction force.

Out-of-Area.

The out-of-area dispute, as discussed in Chapter 3, is a problem that will never escape NATO. It was also shown that at least one out-of-area dispute entangled SEATO. It appears evident that treaty organizations best serve within the areas defined by their treaties. To journey out of the treaty area invites intra-member arguments of a divisive potential. The standing naval force concept does not require forces to be assigned missions out-of-area. The out-of-area use, if any, should come from an outside authority (like the United Nations), and, in all cases, should be mutually agreed on by all member nations. However, during the infant stages of the STANAVFORPAC, the out-of-area issue should not be brought up as a possible tasking. In the case of multiple regional standing naval forces, their separate existence precludes extraregional interference. This aligns perfectly with the desires of the nations in the Pacific region to remain autonomous and independent.

An Agreeable End State

This chapter has brought to light a possible methodology that could be used to initiate a standing naval force in the Pacific region. The successful application of the standing naval force concept into this region depends on a variety of factors, some of which were not considerations for NATO's standing naval forces. As discussed above, these factors constitute a need to approach the Pacific region with care and tact using a gradual introduction of multinational naval cooperation. By first involving nations attached to the Western Naval Symposium in Maritime Confidence and Structure Building Measures, the ice could be broken between the varied cultures of the different nations. Once these nations begin to find a common purpose in the completion of combined tasking it is logical to initiate combined naval exercises that would demonstrate several important points. First, that working together does not sacrifice one's independence, but actually is the chance to display a nation's pride by presenting vessels that are professionally maintained and operated. Second, that it is more economical and militarily advantageous to share the burden of collective security than going it alone. Third, that these nations will see they have a lot more in common than they ever thought possible and will discover teamwork. Finally, these nations will see that they need more training in interoperability if they wish to continue and

increase the complexity of their coordination. This will be
the time for introducing the standing naval force concept.
This will require the first real dedication of resources
from these nations and will be a delicate time when nations
will have to discern if they really want to make the
commitment. At this time it would be wise to present a
list of the advantages and disadvantages. The following
factors can be included in that list:

Advantages

1. For many nations it is more economical to share
in the cost of a collective security effort than it is to
provide the same degree of security, if possible, with no
assistance.

2. A collective effort enables all nations to be
under the protecting aegis of a large state-of-the-art
fleet.

3. The organization of treaty nations provides a
forum for intramember discussion and the peaceful
resolution of disputes.

4. Smaller nations, being on an increased footing
with larger nations, have an unprecedented opportunity to
contribute to regional policy making.

5. Larger nations can operate commercial shipping
in the region reduced fear of territorial disputes
disrupting their trade routes.

6. Piracy and smuggling would not be tolerated and the standing naval force would provide an organized counteroperation.

7. Nations in the region would be guaranteed the freedom to choose their fate. Aggression and expansionism would be more effectively discouraged.

8. All member nations would have an opportunity to improve relations with the other member nations. Port visits throughout the Pacific would provide a new cultural interchange.

Disadvantages

1. A commitment must be made that will not be easy to release.

2. Every member must add the cost of burden sharing to their defense budget. This may or may not be offset by the reduction in military requirements that are the result of being a member of the alliance.

3. The members will, in a way, be labled as part of the alliance. This may affect diplomatic relations with some countries for the better or for the worst.

4. Members will be restrained in their complete freedom of political decision making. They must think of how their decisions will affect the alliance.

5. Members will be under pressure in future military expenditures to choose in favor of interchangeability and standardization.

The United States would greatly benefit from a standing naval force in the Pacific for the following reasons:

1. The standing naval force would enable the United States to maintain security commitments in the Pacific with a reduced national maritime force.

2. Naval bases and infrastructure would be available to the United States in strategic positions in the Western Pacific.

3. United States popularity in the Pacific would be increased if the United States were perceived by the Pacific region nations as being a member of the STANAVFORPAC team, as an equal partner.

4. The United States would be assured of cooperation in economic matters in the Pacific, including guarantee of open SLOCs.

The next and final chapter will further expand on the concept of regional standing naval forces to demonstrate an end state of global security. In this end state, regional standing naval forces can be tasked by the United Nations as well as their parent alliance organizations. This provides a global security network that is both flexible and adaptive in nature.

CHAPTER 6

CONCLUSION, GLOBAL SECURITY ON A REGIONAL BASIS

This thesis has developed the concept of the
standing naval forces as an alternative means for the
United States to provide global security. The chapters in
this thesis were arranged methodically to develop an ideal
model of the standing naval forces based on the successful,
existing NATO standing naval forces. The ideal model was
then projected into a realistic scenario to examine its
applicability. In the previous chapter the Pacific region
was used to demonstrate the flexibility and adaptability of
the standing naval force in providing regional security.
In this concluding chapter the end state of global security
based on several regional standing naval forces, like
STANAVFORLANT and STANAVFORPAC, will be examined. As a
final note, this chapter will present several
recommendations for the United States to initiate the
standing naval forces into various geopolitical regions of
the world.

The United States as the World Policeman

The idea of the United States as a policeman for the
world may have appealed at one time to a few Americans,

with their idealistic, but sincere desire to promote global freedom and democracy. However, this ideal has recently lost its appeal. Realistically, the United States does not have the resources or the popular domestic support to interfere in every crisis worldwide. Americans today accept this fact and do not want to increase military strength to enhance the image and capability as a true global law enforcer. Instead Americans are content with the demise of their arch-rival, communism, and are willing, even demanding, now to concentrate time and money on domestic improvements. The election of a Democratic vs. Republican Commander-in-Chief is proof of America's shifting stance on the issues of the military and the economy. In a recent magazine article LTG Bernard Trainor argues against American complacency:

> As the United States adjusts to the dynamics of the new world, its goals remain essentially unchanged. Simply stated those goals are to protect and advance the well-being of U.S. citizens, and only those with the narrowest of vision would endorse isolationism as a national policy. In addition, the United States has a special burden: it must continue to foster the growth of democracy around the world - not only as a moral imperitive, but from enlightened self-interest... The United States simply cannot withdraw into isolationism with the excuse that domestic issues come first. The world is far too interdependent.[1]

NATO's current secretery general, Manfred Werner, mirrored these sentiments when he recently stated, "No other NATO country, in our traditional division of labor, equals the United States in its global responsibilities."[2] As the sole superpower in the world,

the United States is in a unique position. The historical reputation of the United States as the defender of justice and the fighter of aggression connotes a worldwide expectation that the United States will use its present situation for the benefit of freedom and justice on a global scale. Unfortunately, the idealist image must be pared down. As LTG Trainor states, "... the United States cannot police the world unilaterally. It neither can - nor should - use its military muscle to deal with every event that is inimical to its political, economic, or moral interests."[3]

The United States, then, has a moral obligation to promote democracy to the greatest extent possible. This is, in fact, consonant with the U.S. national security objectives. As the *sole superpower*, however, the United States is in an enviable position to choose from a number of alternatives to meet those objectives. Since the United States neither can be, nor desires to be, the world's policeman, it must settle for a suitable alternative.

Multinational Forces as a Viable Alternative

As the military force structure of the United States is significantly reduced in the wake of the Soviet Union's collapse, strategists at all levels are seeking answers to difficult security questions. Perhaps the two most important questions are: How can the United States maintain its forward presence with fewer forces and how can

the United States most efficiently manage a new strategic
scenario of multiple, regional low intensity conflicts?

Service documents like the US Navy's white paper,
"From the Sea" have presented answers to these questions:

> With a far greater emphasis on joint and combined
> operations our Navy and Marine Corps will provide unique
> capabilities of indispensable value in meeting our
> future security challenges. American Naval Forces
> provide powerful yet unobtrusive presence; strategic
> deterrence; control of the seas; extended and continuous
> on-scene crisis response; project precise power from the
> sea; and provide sealift if larger scale warfighting
> scenarios emerge. These maritime capabilities are
> particularly well tailored for the forward presence and
> crisis response missions articulated in the President's
> National Security Strategy.[4]

The answer to the security dilemma facing our nation
is to act as a member of a joint or combined effort. In
the case of providing for security and interests overseas,
the U.S. Navy, as an integral part of a multinational
coalition of maritime forces, is part of the answer. The
current Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admiral Kelso, has
stated that he anticipates the US Navy will be conducting
more scenarios involving coalition warfighting. LTG Trainor
states this point emphatically,

> Because coalition warfare is both politically and
> militarily desirable in dealing with future regional
> crises, US naval forces are well positioned to
> capitalize on existing joint-force techniques.
> Exercises with friendly warships have the advantage of
> enhancing international cooperation at sea without
> imposing any commitments.[6]

The coalition of multinational forces is a viable
option for meeting America's security requirements. This

type of combined warfighting is both expected and is planned for in the US Navy's strategic tasking documents.

The Standing Naval Forces as a Multinational Team

For the US Navy, the standing naval forces are the keystone in the overarching global security structure. The standing naval forces enable the United States to meet the goal of forward presence and crisis response while concurrently reducing military force sizing. This concept is consonant with the ultimate destiny of the U.S. Navy as pointed out by Vice Admiral Owens, Deputy CNO:

> The size and composition of task groupings will change as the overall size of the force decreases and as new platforms, systems, and capabilities enter the fleet, and older, less efficient and threat capable platforms retire. The end result will be a quality Navy, smaller in size, and tailored to maintain a balanced capability and postured to provide crisis response, power projection, strategic deterrence, and sealift force sustainment in support of national tasking.[7]

In this thesis the standing naval forces of NATO were examined and used to derive an ideal model for the standing naval force as an exportable concept. This idealist model contained the following salient points:

1. The standing naval forces are uniquely suited to the new strategic situation in that they are a quickly deployed force that provide a multifaceted response to any variety of crises.

2. The standing naval forces provide diplomatic as well as military solutions. They can provide a wide range

of perceptable intentions, from a peaceful cultural exchange to an ominous threat of destructive force.

3. The standing naval force requires a parent organization that must provide support in the form of infrastructure and logistics. This parent organization must also be the luminary of strategic and operational decisions, leaving tactical decisions to the commander to as great an extent possible. The parent organization must provide a clear pathway of command authority or chain of command.

4. The standing naval forces must operate within a prescribed area of operations that is defined by treaty.

5. The standing naval forces, because of their confined operating areas, will best comprise regional blocs.

6. The standing naval force is an exportable concept. It can be used for security measures in the different geopolitical regions of the world. The implementation of the concept, however, requires unique prerequisites and diplomatic considerations that depend on the geopolitical region.

7. The best ship suited for the standing naval force is the frigate or destroyer. State-of-the-art weaponry and command and control systems have enhanced the warfighting capabilities of these ships significantly. These ships can perform the three warfare areas singly or as a team.

8. One frigate or destroyer from each nation of the alliance is a suitable contribution that will provide the best mix of warfighting capabilities while demonstrating the total resolve and commitment of the alliance. The newer Aegis class ships are particularly well suited as lead ships in the force.

9. Instill standardization and interchangeability into the logistics of the standing naval force as early as possible. Ensure at-sea refueling and resupply are routine practices. Establish a standard communication plan and use the same plan as often as possible. Standardization of communications gear is a must.

This thesis has demonstrated that the salient points presented above are important basic requirements for a successful standing naval force. However, to examine the regional standing naval force concept in full detail there must be some mention of the inter-relationship between the various regional alliances as well as their relationship with the United Nations.

Regional Standing Naval Forces and Global Cooperation

Perhaps the first organization that comes to mind when one thinks of an overarching authority that will coordinate the cooperation and interface of the regional standing naval forces is the United Nations. This is not possible for several reasons. First, the United Nations cannot become a global military super-superpower. It is an

inappropriate occupation for the world's peace community that runs against the grain of the original United Nation's charter. Second, the United Nations, if viewed as the ultimate authority in the regional organization's chain of command, would be the cause of dissention among the nations that may not agree with the United Nations dictates. This dissention would eventually cause the dissolution of the coherence and teamwork which are the hallmark of the alliance. It is possible that many nations would be indignant of tasking from "outsiders."

Further, the United Nations is such a large and top heavy organization that even the secretary general, Boutros-Boutros Ghali, states, "under current procedures, three or four months can elapse between the Security Council's authorization of a mission and its becoming operational in the field."[3] Add that delay to the alliance's council meetings to gain approval for the United Nations mission, and one can see the unacceptable bureaucratic network that would mire the effectiveness of the standing naval force.

The United Nations does have a role in the employment of the standing naval forces. This employment would not be on a treaty basis, rather, the standing naval forces should volunteer to support United Nations peacekeeping or peacemaking resolutions on a case by case basis. In this manner, the standing naval force is not a military appendage of the United Nations and is in no way

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interdependent with United Nations bureaucracy. This would fulfill Boutros Boutros-Ghali's vision for the United Nation's increasingly active role in enforcing its own mandates, "The answer is not to create a United Nations standing force, which would be impractical and inappropriate, but to extend and make more systematic standby arrangements by which governments commit themselves to hold ready, at an agreed period of notice, specially trained units for peacekeeping service."[9] The standing naval forces could provide this margin of cooperation with the United Nations in their specific regions.

Cooperation with other regional alliances is likely to become neccessary in the global security network envisioned in this thesis. Nations may find themselves supporting more than one regional standing naval force with interests in both regions that may, at times, conflict. This situation exists in a similar circumstance today between NATO and the Western European Union (WEU). These two organizations each support standing naval forces and they have proven their interoperability and interalliance cooperation in Operation Maritime Monitor and in Desert Storm. In the case of different geopolitical regional standing naval forces, the parent organizations would have to meet on a periodic basis to discuss issues of interoperability and interalliance cooperation and assistance. There is no need for an outside organization to delegate cooperation and political agendas.

Recommendations for Implementing Regional
Standing Naval Forces

The United States is in a unique and enviable position as the sole global super power. The United States Navy is now the strongest and most versatile navy in the world's history. The United States Navy can chart out its future now with an efficacy never before realized. The new concept of strategy, the reduction of military ships and personnel, the interdependence of global trade for continuing economic growth, the United States technological edge, and the need to continue promoting democracy and freedom around the world all point to using multinational maritime coalitions for meeting global security needs. The standing naval force is the one multinational maritime force that has proven successful in various applications. The United States Navy can ensure its future success in meeting its security objectives by starting now to implement the building blocks for regional standing naval forces. The following are recommendations to support the implementation of regional standing naval forces with the ultimate goal of meeting the global security needs of the United States.

1. Identify geopolitical regions that comprise areas of common economic interests. LTG Trainor has broken the world into areas with common economic and security requirements.[16]

2. Review alliances, treaties, and understandings existing in the separate geopolitical region. Identify countries with common political/economic interests. Identify naval forces in the region including existing infrastructure.

3. Introduce confidence building measures into the region through conferences or symposiums. Initialize interregional cooperation slowly and methodically based on the unique and specific socio-cultural barriers, as well as the threat perception, of the nations of that region.

4. As confidence-building measures take hold, initiate inter-regional naval exercises that focus on enforcing the confidence-building measures. These exercises must prove to be a valid and indispensable use of military forces that will benefit the nations concerned. The nations must see merit in participating in the exercises.

5. If the exercises are supported by the regional nations then the concept of a standing naval force should be introduced. The successful completion of the exercises would be the best indicator that a standing naval force could be successfully introduced into the region. A list of the advantages of participating as a member of the standing naval forces (like the one in chapter 5) would be reviewed by the nations.

6. The United States Navy is in a position to nurture the fledgling standing naval force based on past

experience and based on regional interests. The standing
naval force would best be aligned along the principle
points presented above. One of the first requirements
would be to establish a mutually agreeable parent alliance
organization. In this way regional standing naval forces
could be introduced in the geopolitical regions of the
world. The United States would meet its global security
needs in a new world order of smaller, but more
professional, navies.

Global Security Network

The end state envisioned in this thesis is a global
security network consisting of various regional standing
naval forces working both independently and in cooperation
with one another. Although there is no ultimate authority
envisioned that would unify these regional forces into a
single chain of command, their cooperation would be
predicated on the common goal to provide global stability.
A higher authority is not desired because each region has
different goals, cultures, and security requirements. In
this way each region is independent. However,
interregional cooperation is required for geographically
overlapping security concerns and because each region is,
in some way, economically connected with the other regions.

Ultimately, the regional standing naval forces will
provide a unity and international trust that would provide

a strong foundation for increased global peace and
stability.

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NATO'S CIVIL AND MILITARY STRUCTURE

APPENDIX B. TRENDS IN OUT-OF-AREA DISPUTES
From <u>Limits of the Alliance</u>

Event/Date	Type 1 Guilt by Association	Type 2 Domaine Réserve	Type 3 Solicitation of Support	Type 4 Burden Sharing	Type 5 Definition of Threat	Participants	Behavior
							to use SEATO to solicit support)
Six Day War (1967)	x Allied view		x By U S			U S , all allies	Controlled disputes over overflight rights and base use
Malaysia (1963-66)			x By U K	x U S concern		U S , U K	U K uses SEATO to solicit support. U S resists—some spillover to NATO
Yom Kippur War (1973)	x Allied concern		x By U S			U S , allies	Intense U S criticism of allied lack of support
Arab oil boycott (1973)			x By U S , Holland		x U S , allies disagree	U S , all allies	Intense dispute, carried on in various forums—NATO summits, etc
Zaire 2 (1978)		x Belgian concern	xx By France		x FR , Belgium disagree	FR , Belgium, U S	Essentially collaborative, but actions reflect different interests and concerns
Afghanistan (1979)			x By U S		xx U S , allies disagree	U S , allies	Strong U S pressure for allied actions, including support for RDF. Intense disagreements
Yamal Pipeline (1979-83)			x By U S		x U S , allies disagree	U S , allies	Strong U S pressure for allied rejection of Soviet offer. Allies resist U S demands
Terrorism (1981-present)			x By U S		x U S , allies disagree	U S , allies	Periodic U S /allied disagreements over means of response and significance of threat
Persian Gulf (1979-present)			xx By U S	x Allied concern	x U S , allies disagree	U S , allies	Initial disagreements, then essentially collaborative
Falklands (1982)	x Spanish view	x U K view				U K , Spain, allies	Moderate criticism by Spain and certain allies
Chad (1982-84)		x French view				U S , FR	U S , Belgium assist, controlled FR resentment—kept out of NATO forum
Grenada (1983)		x U K , U S disagree				U S , U K	Strong but controlled dispute—kept out of NATO forum
Achille Lauro (1983)		x Italian view	x By U S			U S , Italy	Intense but controlled dispute
Lebanon MLF (1982-84)		x U K , FR, Italy all claim special expertise	x By U S			U S , U K , FR, Italy	Essentially collaborative, but actions reflect some differing approaches to peacekeeping and different interests in Lebanon & Middle East
Libya (1985, 1986, 1989)	x Italian view		xx By U S		x U S , Italy disagree	U S , Italy, other allies	Moderate U S pressure, strong Italian resentment. U K provides support for U S action in 1986

Notes In cases where an out-of-area event exhibits characteristics of more than two types, two checks (xx) indicate our interpretation of the type(s) which most accurately describe the central issues under debate.
FR = France, F R G , Federal Republic of Germany

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Event/Date	Type 1 Guilt by Association	Type 2 Domaine Réserve	Type 3 Solicitation of Support	Type 4 Burden Sharing	Type 5 Definition of Threat	Participants	Behavior
Indonesia (1949)	x U.S. view	x Dutch view				U.S. Holland	Acrimonious but controlled
Middle East (MEDO) (1949-53)	xx U.S. view	xx U.K. view	x By U.K			U.K. U.S.	Moderate controlled dispute
Indochina (1949-54)	x U.S. view	xx FR view	x By France	xx U.S. view	x FR U.S. disagree	FR U.S. U.K	Initially collaborative then progressively recriminatory. Intense French recrimination after fall of Dien Bien Phu
Korean War (1950-53)			x By U.S		x U.S. U.K disagree	U.S. U.K. FR	Essentially collaborative, but actions reflected differing interests & concerns in region
ANZUS (1951-53)			x By U.K			U.S. U.K	Strong, but controlled U.K. resentment -- U.K. uses NATO to seek access
Suez (1956)	xx U.S. view	xx U.K. & FR view	x By U.K. & FR. by allies in context of Hungarian crisis	x Allied view of U.K./FR action		U.S. U.K. FR Germany Belgium	Intense confrontation between U.S. and U.K. FR. Strong F.R.G criticisms of U.K. & France
Lebanon/Jordan (1958)	x U.S. view	x U.K. view				U.S. U.K./ allies	Essentially collaborative, but actions reflected differing views of rights and interests in region. Some allies provide support (basing etc.)
Tunisia (1958-61)	x Allied view	x French view				U.S./U.K. FR Scandinavian allies	Strong FR resentment of allied policies
Laos (1959-62)			x by U.S			U.S. U.K. FR	U.S. uses SEATO forum to solicit support. U.K. & FR resist -- some spillover to NATO
Kuwait (1961)	x U.S. concern	x U.K. view				U.S./U.K.	Moderate controlled disagreement, with some allied aid to U.K. (use of F.R.G. bases, overflight of Turkey)
Brunei (1961)				x U.S. concern		U.S./U.K	Moderate U.S. concern for U.K. overextension -- kept out of NATO forum
... in Congo (1961)	x U.S. view	x Belgian view				U.S. Belgium other European allies	Strong but controlled disagreement
Portuguese Africa (1961-74)	x Initially U.S., later, view of Scandinavian allies	xx Portuguese view	x By Portugal	x By U.S., then Scandinavian allies		U.S. Portugal	Periodic intense conflict
Vietnam (1961-75)			x By U.S	xx Allied coverage	x U.S. allies disagree	U.S. various allies FR in particular	Controlled periodic U.S. requests for aid periodic allied complaints about U.S. Asian involvement, gradual drawdown of U.S. troops in NATO
Cuban Missile Crisis (1962)			x By U.S			U.S. all allies	Essentially collaborative, but strong residual resentment by Turkey
Irian Jaya (1962)		x Dutch view				U.S. Holland	Controlled dispute (Holland also attempted

TABLE 1. A Comparison of NATO Member Resources and Expenditures
Extracted from The Military Balance 1992-1993

COUNTRY	GDP	DEBT	DEFENSE	POPULATION	FF/DD	PCC	AUX
Belgium	202.2	91	4.77	9.856	4	0	1
Canada	592.8	266	10.35	27.016	18	12	
Denmark	130.1	141	2.67	5.075	3	33	
France	1121.2	146	42.39	56.897	38	23	26
Germany	1676.7	405	39.88	79.753	14	43	29
Greece	67.7	22	3.90	10.209	13	37	8
Iceland	6.5	4	0.00	.259	0	3	0
Italy	1134.0	203	23.59	57.345	27	15	34
Nethrlds	283.8	75	7.24	14.855	16		9
Norway	106.5	80	3.49	4.215	5	36	1
Portugal	66.1	35	1.48	10.618	11	29	5
Spain	527.1	113	7.41	40.307	20	100	
Turkey	115.3	49	5.01	58.103	20	47	26
UK	1017.9	325	43.61	56.696	41	27	21
US	5673.9	829	282.6	251.842	128	30	121

GDP = Gross Domestic Product in Billions of US Dollars
Debt = Nations Debt in Billions of US Dollars
Defense = Amount Spent on Defense in Billions of US
        Dollars
Population = Number of People in Millions
FF/DD = Number of Destroyers or Frigates in the Nation's
        Navy
PCC = Number of Coastal Patrol Craft in Nation's Navy
AUX = Number of Tanker or Supply Capable Ships in
        Nation's Navy

Table 2. NATO Members' Naval Facilities from The Military
Balance 1992- 1993.

COUNTRY	BASES
Belgium	Ostend, Zeebruge
Canada	Halifax
Denmark	Copenhagen, Korsor, Frederikshavn
France	Cherbourg, Brest, Lorient, Toulon, Fort de France
Germany	Glucksburg, Wilhelmshaven, Kiel, Olpenitz, Warnemunde
Greece	Salamis, Patras, Soudha Bay
Iceland	Reykjavik
Italy	La Spezia, Taranto, Ancona, Brindisi, Augusta, Messina, La Maddalena, Cagliari, Naples, Venice
Netherlands	Den Helder, Vlissingen, Willemsted, Oranjestad
Norway	Horten, Haakonsvern, Ramsund, Olavsvern
Portugal	Lisbon, Portimao, Ponta Delgada, Funchal
Spain	
Turkey	Ankara, Golcuk, Istanbul, Izmir, Eregli, Iskenderun, Aksaz Bay, Mersin
United Kngdm	Northwood, Devonport, Faslane, Portland, Portsmouth, Rosyth, Gibraltar
United States	Norfolk, Mayport

TABLE 3. A Comparison of the Degree of Interchangeability in NATO Navies Showing Occurance of Weapon Types. (Numbers derived from Jane's Fighting Ships 1992).

```
WEAPON              OCCURANCE (number of countries)
SYSTEM        1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10  11  12  13  14
-------------------------------------------------------------------
GUNS
35mm/90---------1
40mm/70--------------3
57mm/70---------1
76mm/50-----------------4
76mm/62----------------------------------8
100mm/55-------------------5
114mm/55--------1
120mm/50--------1
127mm/38-----------2
127mm/54 MK42-----------------6
127mm/54 MK45------2
```

FIRE CONTROL: There are over 30 different gun fire control systems in use in NATO' navies.

```
SAM
RIM-7-------------------------------------------------11
Masurca---------1
SM-1------------------------------7
Aspide----------1
Sea Dart--------1
Sea Cat---------1
Sea Wolf--------1
SM-2------------1
```

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CLOSE IN WEAPONS
MK-15----------------------5
Oerlikon-----------2
RAM-21-------------2
SGE-30----------1
BZAN-20---------1
Sea Zenith------1
Goal Keeper-----1
```

```
TORPEDOES
ECAN L3,L5-------------3
MK-46-------------------------------------------------12
Marconi Stingray----2
```

SONAR There are over 25 different sonar types in use in NATO navies.

TABLE 4. A Comparison of Pacific Region Resources and
Expenditures Extracted from The Military Balance 1992-1993

COUNTRY	GDP	DEBT	DEFENSE	POPULATION	FF/DD	PCC	AUX
Australia	293.1	125	7.27	17.067	11	19	12
Brunei	3.5	-	.23	.283	0	6	0
China	371.2	53	6.76	1148.593	54	860	150
Indonesia	116.6	58	1.65	185.647	17	48	18
Japan	3362.7	425	34.30	124.593	62	11	18
N. Korea	20.5	8	2.75	23.760	3	379	7
S. Korea	282.9	38	12.35	44.908	38	81	11
Malaysia	42.4	19	1.94	18.076	4	37	3
New Zlnd	42.3	30	.66	3.396	4	4	4
Papua NG	3.6	3	.05	4.127	0	5	0
Philippnes	45.1	30	1.03	64.250	1	42	11
Singpore	39.7	0	2.13	2.744	0	30	1
Taiwan	173.2	1	9.71	21.265	34	93	28
Thailand	93.4	27	2.69	58.438	8	65	4
Vietnam	14.9	15	2.32	73.778	7	55	17
US	5673.9	829	282.60	251.842	128	30	121

GDP = Gross Domestic Product in Billions of US Dollars
Debt = Nations Debt in Billions of US Dollars
Defense = Amount Spent on Defense in Billions of US
        Dollars
Population = Number of People in Millions
FF/DD = Number of Destroyers or Frigates in the Nation's
        Navy
PCC = Number of Coastal Patrol Craft in Nation's Navy
AUX = Number of Tanker or Supply Capable Ships in
        Nation's Navy

Table 5. Pacific Region Naval Facilities from The Military
Balance 1992- 1993.

COUNTRY   BASES
Australia   Sydney, Cockburn Sound, Cairns, Darwin
Brunei   Muara
China   Qingdao, Dalian, Huludao, Weihai, Chengshan
               Shanghai, Wusong, Dinghai, Hangzhou
Indonesia   Jakarta, Tanjungpinang, Sabang, Belawan
Japan   Yokosuka, Sasebo, Kure, Maizuru, Ominato
N. Korea   Munchon, Songjon, Mugye-po, Mayang-do,
               Chehollodongjagu, Puan-dong, Najiin, Nampo,
               Pipaqo, Sagwon-ri, Chodo-ri, Koampo, Tasali
S. Korea   Chinhae, Cheju, Inchon, Mokpo, Mukho, Pukpyong,
               Pohang, Pusan
Malaysia   Lumut, Tanjong Gelong, Kuantan, Labuan, Sungei
               Antu
New Zealand   Auckland
Papaua N.G.   Port Moresby, Lombrum
Phillipines   Subic Bay, Cavite, Zamboanga, Cebu
Singapore   Pulau Brani
Taiwan   Tsoying, Makung, Keelung
Thailand   Bangkok, Sattahip, Songkhla, Phang Nga, Trat
Vietnam   Cam Ronh Bay, Hanoi, Da Nang, Haiphong, Ha Tou
               Ho Chi Minh City, Can Tho
United States Pearl Harbor, Agana Guam

TABLE 6. A Comparison of the Degree of Interchangeability in
Pacific Regional Navies Showing Occurance of Weapon Types.*
(Numbers derived from Jane's Fighting Ships 1992).

WEAPON   OCCURANCE (number of countries)
SYSTEM   1   2   3   4   5   6   7   8   9   10   11

GUNS
37mm/63---------1
37mm/76---------1
40mm/56----------------3
40mm/60------------2
40mm/70-------------------------5
57mm/70---------1
76mm/50--------------------4
76mm/62------------------------------6
100mm/55--------1
100mm/56--------1
114mm/55----------------------5
120mm/46--------1
127mm/38------------2
127mm/54 MK42-------2
127mm/54 MK45---1

FIRE CONTROL: There are over 22 different gun fire control
systems in use in the navies of the Pacific region.

SAM
RIM-7-----------1
SM-1---------------------3
Sea Cat------------2
SM-2-----------1
Heisung Feng----1
Ying Ji---------1
Sea Chapparel---1

CLOSE IN WEAPONS
MK-15----------------------4

TORPEDOES
MK-46----------------------------------7
Whitehead-------1
Aeg Sut---------1

SONAR There are over 23 different sonar types in use in the
navies of the Pacific region.

*(Australia, Indonesia, Japan, S.Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand,
Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand)

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